OpenSSL CHANGES
_______________
- Changes between 1.0.1 and 1.0.2 [xx XXX xxxx]
+ This is a high-level summary of the most important changes.
+ For a full list of changes, see the git commit log; for example,
+ https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commits/ and pick the appropriate
+ release branch.
- *) RFC 5878 support.
- [Emilia Kasper, Adam Langley, Ben Laurie (Google)]
+ Changes between 1.0.2o and 1.0.2p [xx XXX xxxx]
+
+ *) When unlocking a pass phrase protected PEM file or PKCS#8 container, we
+ now allow empty (zero character) pass phrases.
+ [Richard Levitte]
+
+ *) Certificate time validation (X509_cmp_time) enforces stricter
+ compliance with RFC 5280. Fractional seconds and timezone offsets
+ are no longer allowed.
+ [Emilia Käsper]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.2n and 1.0.2o [27 Mar 2018]
+
+ *) Constructed ASN.1 types with a recursive definition could exceed the stack
+
+ Constructed ASN.1 types with a recursive definition (such as can be found
+ in PKCS7) could eventually exceed the stack given malicious input with
+ excessive recursion. This could result in a Denial Of Service attack. There
+ are no such structures used within SSL/TLS that come from untrusted sources
+ so this is considered safe.
+
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 4th January 2018 by the OSS-fuzz
+ project.
+ (CVE-2018-0739)
+ [Matt Caswell]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.2m and 1.0.2n [7 Dec 2017]
+
+ *) Read/write after SSL object in error state
+
+ OpenSSL 1.0.2 (starting from version 1.0.2b) introduced an "error state"
+ mechanism. The intent was that if a fatal error occurred during a handshake
+ then OpenSSL would move into the error state and would immediately fail if
+ you attempted to continue the handshake. This works as designed for the
+ explicit handshake functions (SSL_do_handshake(), SSL_accept() and
+ SSL_connect()), however due to a bug it does not work correctly if
+ SSL_read() or SSL_write() is called directly. In that scenario, if the
+ handshake fails then a fatal error will be returned in the initial function
+ call. If SSL_read()/SSL_write() is subsequently called by the application
+ for the same SSL object then it will succeed and the data is passed without
+ being decrypted/encrypted directly from the SSL/TLS record layer.
+
+ In order to exploit this issue an application bug would have to be present
+ that resulted in a call to SSL_read()/SSL_write() being issued after having
+ already received a fatal error.
+
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL by David Benjamin (Google).
+ (CVE-2017-3737)
+ [Matt Caswell]
+
+ *) rsaz_1024_mul_avx2 overflow bug on x86_64
+
+ There is an overflow bug in the AVX2 Montgomery multiplication procedure
+ used in exponentiation with 1024-bit moduli. No EC algorithms are affected.
+ Analysis suggests that attacks against RSA and DSA as a result of this
+ defect would be very difficult to perform and are not believed likely.
+ Attacks against DH1024 are considered just feasible, because most of the
+ work necessary to deduce information about a private key may be performed
+ offline. The amount of resources required for such an attack would be
+ significant. However, for an attack on TLS to be meaningful, the server
+ would have to share the DH1024 private key among multiple clients, which is
+ no longer an option since CVE-2016-0701.
+
+ This only affects processors that support the AVX2 but not ADX extensions
+ like Intel Haswell (4th generation).
+
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL by David Benjamin (Google). The issue
+ was originally found via the OSS-Fuzz project.
+ (CVE-2017-3738)
+ [Andy Polyakov]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.2l and 1.0.2m [2 Nov 2017]
+
+ *) bn_sqrx8x_internal carry bug on x86_64
+
+ There is a carry propagating bug in the x86_64 Montgomery squaring
+ procedure. No EC algorithms are affected. Analysis suggests that attacks
+ against RSA and DSA as a result of this defect would be very difficult to
+ perform and are not believed likely. Attacks against DH are considered just
+ feasible (although very difficult) because most of the work necessary to
+ deduce information about a private key may be performed offline. The amount
+ of resources required for such an attack would be very significant and
+ likely only accessible to a limited number of attackers. An attacker would
+ additionally need online access to an unpatched system using the target
+ private key in a scenario with persistent DH parameters and a private
+ key that is shared between multiple clients.
+
+ This only affects processors that support the BMI1, BMI2 and ADX extensions
+ like Intel Broadwell (5th generation) and later or AMD Ryzen.
+
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL by the OSS-Fuzz project.
+ (CVE-2017-3736)
+ [Andy Polyakov]
+
+ *) Malformed X.509 IPAddressFamily could cause OOB read
+
+ If an X.509 certificate has a malformed IPAddressFamily extension,
+ OpenSSL could do a one-byte buffer overread. The most likely result
+ would be an erroneous display of the certificate in text format.
+
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL by the OSS-Fuzz project.
+ (CVE-2017-3735)
+ [Rich Salz]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.2k and 1.0.2l [25 May 2017]
+
+ *) Have 'config' recognise 64-bit mingw and choose 'mingw64' as the target
+ platform rather than 'mingw'.
+ [Richard Levitte]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.2j and 1.0.2k [26 Jan 2017]
+
+ *) Truncated packet could crash via OOB read
+
+ If one side of an SSL/TLS path is running on a 32-bit host and a specific
+ cipher is being used, then a truncated packet can cause that host to
+ perform an out-of-bounds read, usually resulting in a crash.
+
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Robert Święcki of Google.
+ (CVE-2017-3731)
+ [Andy Polyakov]
+
+ *) BN_mod_exp may produce incorrect results on x86_64
+
+ There is a carry propagating bug in the x86_64 Montgomery squaring
+ procedure. No EC algorithms are affected. Analysis suggests that attacks
+ against RSA and DSA as a result of this defect would be very difficult to
+ perform and are not believed likely. Attacks against DH are considered just
+ feasible (although very difficult) because most of the work necessary to
+ deduce information about a private key may be performed offline. The amount
+ of resources required for such an attack would be very significant and
+ likely only accessible to a limited number of attackers. An attacker would
+ additionally need online access to an unpatched system using the target
+ private key in a scenario with persistent DH parameters and a private
+ key that is shared between multiple clients. For example this can occur by
+ default in OpenSSL DHE based SSL/TLS ciphersuites. Note: This issue is very
+ similar to CVE-2015-3193 but must be treated as a separate problem.
+
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL by the OSS-Fuzz project.
+ (CVE-2017-3732)
+ [Andy Polyakov]
+
+ *) Montgomery multiplication may produce incorrect results
+
+ There is a carry propagating bug in the Broadwell-specific Montgomery
+ multiplication procedure that handles input lengths divisible by, but
+ longer than 256 bits. Analysis suggests that attacks against RSA, DSA
+ and DH private keys are impossible. This is because the subroutine in
+ question is not used in operations with the private key itself and an input
+ of the attacker's direct choice. Otherwise the bug can manifest itself as
+ transient authentication and key negotiation failures or reproducible
+ erroneous outcome of public-key operations with specially crafted input.
+ Among EC algorithms only Brainpool P-512 curves are affected and one
+ presumably can attack ECDH key negotiation. Impact was not analyzed in
+ detail, because pre-requisites for attack are considered unlikely. Namely
+ multiple clients have to choose the curve in question and the server has to
+ share the private key among them, neither of which is default behaviour.
+ Even then only clients that chose the curve will be affected.
+
+ This issue was publicly reported as transient failures and was not
+ initially recognized as a security issue. Thanks to Richard Morgan for
+ providing reproducible case.
+ (CVE-2016-7055)
+ [Andy Polyakov]
+
+ *) OpenSSL now fails if it receives an unrecognised record type in TLS1.0
+ or TLS1.1. Previously this only happened in SSLv3 and TLS1.2. This is to
+ prevent issues where no progress is being made and the peer continually
+ sends unrecognised record types, using up resources processing them.
+ [Matt Caswell]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.2i and 1.0.2j [26 Sep 2016]
+
+ *) Missing CRL sanity check
+
+ A bug fix which included a CRL sanity check was added to OpenSSL 1.1.0
+ but was omitted from OpenSSL 1.0.2i. As a result any attempt to use
+ CRLs in OpenSSL 1.0.2i will crash with a null pointer exception.
+
+ This issue only affects the OpenSSL 1.0.2i
+ (CVE-2016-7052)
+ [Matt Caswell]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.2h and 1.0.2i [22 Sep 2016]
+
+ *) OCSP Status Request extension unbounded memory growth
+
+ A malicious client can send an excessively large OCSP Status Request
+ extension. If that client continually requests renegotiation, sending a
+ large OCSP Status Request extension each time, then there will be unbounded
+ memory growth on the server. This will eventually lead to a Denial Of
+ Service attack through memory exhaustion. Servers with a default
+ configuration are vulnerable even if they do not support OCSP. Builds using
+ the "no-ocsp" build time option are not affected.
+
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Shi Lei (Gear Team, Qihoo 360 Inc.)
+ (CVE-2016-6304)
+ [Matt Caswell]
+
+ *) In order to mitigate the SWEET32 attack, the DES ciphers were moved from
+ HIGH to MEDIUM.
+
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL Karthikeyan Bhargavan and Gaetan
+ Leurent (INRIA)
+ (CVE-2016-2183)
+ [Rich Salz]
+
+ *) OOB write in MDC2_Update()
+
+ An overflow can occur in MDC2_Update() either if called directly or
+ through the EVP_DigestUpdate() function using MDC2. If an attacker
+ is able to supply very large amounts of input data after a previous
+ call to EVP_EncryptUpdate() with a partial block then a length check
+ can overflow resulting in a heap corruption.
+
+ The amount of data needed is comparable to SIZE_MAX which is impractical
+ on most platforms.
+
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Shi Lei (Gear Team, Qihoo 360 Inc.)
+ (CVE-2016-6303)
+ [Stephen Henson]
+
+ *) Malformed SHA512 ticket DoS
+
+ If a server uses SHA512 for TLS session ticket HMAC it is vulnerable to a
+ DoS attack where a malformed ticket will result in an OOB read which will
+ ultimately crash.
+
+ The use of SHA512 in TLS session tickets is comparatively rare as it requires
+ a custom server callback and ticket lookup mechanism.
+
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Shi Lei (Gear Team, Qihoo 360 Inc.)
+ (CVE-2016-6302)
+ [Stephen Henson]
+
+ *) OOB write in BN_bn2dec()
+
+ The function BN_bn2dec() does not check the return value of BN_div_word().
+ This can cause an OOB write if an application uses this function with an
+ overly large BIGNUM. This could be a problem if an overly large certificate
+ or CRL is printed out from an untrusted source. TLS is not affected because
+ record limits will reject an oversized certificate before it is parsed.
+
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Shi Lei (Gear Team, Qihoo 360 Inc.)
+ (CVE-2016-2182)
+ [Stephen Henson]
+
+ *) OOB read in TS_OBJ_print_bio()
+
+ The function TS_OBJ_print_bio() misuses OBJ_obj2txt(): the return value is
+ the total length the OID text representation would use and not the amount
+ of data written. This will result in OOB reads when large OIDs are
+ presented.
+
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Shi Lei (Gear Team, Qihoo 360 Inc.)
+ (CVE-2016-2180)
+ [Stephen Henson]
+
+ *) Pointer arithmetic undefined behaviour
+
+ Avoid some undefined pointer arithmetic
+
+ A common idiom in the codebase is to check limits in the following manner:
+ "p + len > limit"
+
+ Where "p" points to some malloc'd data of SIZE bytes and
+ limit == p + SIZE
+
+ "len" here could be from some externally supplied data (e.g. from a TLS
+ message).
+
+ The rules of C pointer arithmetic are such that "p + len" is only well
+ defined where len <= SIZE. Therefore the above idiom is actually
+ undefined behaviour.
+
+ For example this could cause problems if some malloc implementation
+ provides an address for "p" such that "p + len" actually overflows for
+ values of len that are too big and therefore p + len < limit.
+
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Guido Vranken
+ (CVE-2016-2177)
+ [Matt Caswell]
+
+ *) Constant time flag not preserved in DSA signing
+
+ Operations in the DSA signing algorithm should run in constant time in
+ order to avoid side channel attacks. A flaw in the OpenSSL DSA
+ implementation means that a non-constant time codepath is followed for
+ certain operations. This has been demonstrated through a cache-timing
+ attack to be sufficient for an attacker to recover the private DSA key.
+
+ This issue was reported by César Pereida (Aalto University), Billy Brumley
+ (Tampere University of Technology), and Yuval Yarom (The University of
+ Adelaide and NICTA).
+ (CVE-2016-2178)
+ [César Pereida]
+
+ *) DTLS buffered message DoS
+
+ In a DTLS connection where handshake messages are delivered out-of-order
+ those messages that OpenSSL is not yet ready to process will be buffered
+ for later use. Under certain circumstances, a flaw in the logic means that
+ those messages do not get removed from the buffer even though the handshake
+ has been completed. An attacker could force up to approx. 15 messages to
+ remain in the buffer when they are no longer required. These messages will
+ be cleared when the DTLS connection is closed. The default maximum size for
+ a message is 100k. Therefore the attacker could force an additional 1500k
+ to be consumed per connection. By opening many simulataneous connections an
+ attacker could cause a DoS attack through memory exhaustion.
+
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Quan Luo.
+ (CVE-2016-2179)
+ [Matt Caswell]
+
+ *) DTLS replay protection DoS
+
+ A flaw in the DTLS replay attack protection mechanism means that records
+ that arrive for future epochs update the replay protection "window" before
+ the MAC for the record has been validated. This could be exploited by an
+ attacker by sending a record for the next epoch (which does not have to
+ decrypt or have a valid MAC), with a very large sequence number. This means
+ that all subsequent legitimate packets are dropped causing a denial of
+ service for a specific DTLS connection.
+
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL by the OCAP audit team.
+ (CVE-2016-2181)
+ [Matt Caswell]
+
+ *) Certificate message OOB reads
+
+ In OpenSSL 1.0.2 and earlier some missing message length checks can result
+ in OOB reads of up to 2 bytes beyond an allocated buffer. There is a
+ theoretical DoS risk but this has not been observed in practice on common
+ platforms.
+
+ The messages affected are client certificate, client certificate request
+ and server certificate. As a result the attack can only be performed
+ against a client or a server which enables client authentication.
+
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Shi Lei (Gear Team, Qihoo 360 Inc.)
+ (CVE-2016-6306)
+ [Stephen Henson]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.2g and 1.0.2h [3 May 2016]
+
+ *) Prevent padding oracle in AES-NI CBC MAC check
+
+ A MITM attacker can use a padding oracle attack to decrypt traffic
+ when the connection uses an AES CBC cipher and the server support
+ AES-NI.
+
+ This issue was introduced as part of the fix for Lucky 13 padding
+ attack (CVE-2013-0169). The padding check was rewritten to be in
+ constant time by making sure that always the same bytes are read and
+ compared against either the MAC or padding bytes. But it no longer
+ checked that there was enough data to have both the MAC and padding
+ bytes.
+
+ This issue was reported by Juraj Somorovsky using TLS-Attacker.
+ (CVE-2016-2107)
+ [Kurt Roeckx]
+
+ *) Fix EVP_EncodeUpdate overflow
+
+ An overflow can occur in the EVP_EncodeUpdate() function which is used for
+ Base64 encoding of binary data. If an attacker is able to supply very large
+ amounts of input data then a length check can overflow resulting in a heap
+ corruption.
+
+ Internally to OpenSSL the EVP_EncodeUpdate() function is primarly used by
+ the PEM_write_bio* family of functions. These are mainly used within the
+ OpenSSL command line applications, so any application which processes data
+ from an untrusted source and outputs it as a PEM file should be considered
+ vulnerable to this issue. User applications that call these APIs directly
+ with large amounts of untrusted data may also be vulnerable.
+
+ This issue was reported by Guido Vranken.
+ (CVE-2016-2105)
+ [Matt Caswell]
+
+ *) Fix EVP_EncryptUpdate overflow
+
+ An overflow can occur in the EVP_EncryptUpdate() function. If an attacker
+ is able to supply very large amounts of input data after a previous call to
+ EVP_EncryptUpdate() with a partial block then a length check can overflow
+ resulting in a heap corruption. Following an analysis of all OpenSSL
+ internal usage of the EVP_EncryptUpdate() function all usage is one of two
+ forms. The first form is where the EVP_EncryptUpdate() call is known to be
+ the first called function after an EVP_EncryptInit(), and therefore that
+ specific call must be safe. The second form is where the length passed to
+ EVP_EncryptUpdate() can be seen from the code to be some small value and
+ therefore there is no possibility of an overflow. Since all instances are
+ one of these two forms, it is believed that there can be no overflows in
+ internal code due to this problem. It should be noted that
+ EVP_DecryptUpdate() can call EVP_EncryptUpdate() in certain code paths.
+ Also EVP_CipherUpdate() is a synonym for EVP_EncryptUpdate(). All instances
+ of these calls have also been analysed too and it is believed there are no
+ instances in internal usage where an overflow could occur.
+
+ This issue was reported by Guido Vranken.
+ (CVE-2016-2106)
+ [Matt Caswell]
+
+ *) Prevent ASN.1 BIO excessive memory allocation
+
+ When ASN.1 data is read from a BIO using functions such as d2i_CMS_bio()
+ a short invalid encoding can casuse allocation of large amounts of memory
+ potentially consuming excessive resources or exhausting memory.
+
+ Any application parsing untrusted data through d2i BIO functions is
+ affected. The memory based functions such as d2i_X509() are *not* affected.
+ Since the memory based functions are used by the TLS library, TLS
+ applications are not affected.
+
+ This issue was reported by Brian Carpenter.
+ (CVE-2016-2109)
+ [Stephen Henson]
+
+ *) EBCDIC overread
+
+ ASN1 Strings that are over 1024 bytes can cause an overread in applications
+ using the X509_NAME_oneline() function on EBCDIC systems. This could result
+ in arbitrary stack data being returned in the buffer.
+
+ This issue was reported by Guido Vranken.
+ (CVE-2016-2176)
+ [Matt Caswell]
+
+ *) Modify behavior of ALPN to invoke callback after SNI/servername
+ callback, such that updates to the SSL_CTX affect ALPN.
+ [Todd Short]
+
+ *) Remove LOW from the DEFAULT cipher list. This removes singles DES from the
+ default.
+ [Kurt Roeckx]
+
+ *) Only remove the SSLv2 methods with the no-ssl2-method option. When the
+ methods are enabled and ssl2 is disabled the methods return NULL.
+ [Kurt Roeckx]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.2f and 1.0.2g [1 Mar 2016]
+
+ * Disable weak ciphers in SSLv3 and up in default builds of OpenSSL.
+ Builds that are not configured with "enable-weak-ssl-ciphers" will not
+ provide any "EXPORT" or "LOW" strength ciphers.
+ [Viktor Dukhovni]
+
+ * Disable SSLv2 default build, default negotiation and weak ciphers. SSLv2
+ is by default disabled at build-time. Builds that are not configured with
+ "enable-ssl2" will not support SSLv2. Even if "enable-ssl2" is used,
+ users who want to negotiate SSLv2 via the version-flexible SSLv23_method()
+ will need to explicitly call either of:
+
+ SSL_CTX_clear_options(ctx, SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2);
+ or
+ SSL_clear_options(ssl, SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2);
+
+ as appropriate. Even if either of those is used, or the application
+ explicitly uses the version-specific SSLv2_method() or its client and
+ server variants, SSLv2 ciphers vulnerable to exhaustive search key
+ recovery have been removed. Specifically, the SSLv2 40-bit EXPORT
+ ciphers, and SSLv2 56-bit DES are no longer available.
+ (CVE-2016-0800)
+ [Viktor Dukhovni]
+
+ *) Fix a double-free in DSA code
+
+ A double free bug was discovered when OpenSSL parses malformed DSA private
+ keys and could lead to a DoS attack or memory corruption for applications
+ that receive DSA private keys from untrusted sources. This scenario is
+ considered rare.
+
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Adam Langley(Google/BoringSSL) using
+ libFuzzer.
+ (CVE-2016-0705)
+ [Stephen Henson]
+
+ *) Disable SRP fake user seed to address a server memory leak.
+
+ Add a new method SRP_VBASE_get1_by_user that handles the seed properly.
+
+ SRP_VBASE_get_by_user had inconsistent memory management behaviour.
+ In order to fix an unavoidable memory leak, SRP_VBASE_get_by_user
+ was changed to ignore the "fake user" SRP seed, even if the seed
+ is configured.
+
+ Users should use SRP_VBASE_get1_by_user instead. Note that in
+ SRP_VBASE_get1_by_user, caller must free the returned value. Note
+ also that even though configuring the SRP seed attempts to hide
+ invalid usernames by continuing the handshake with fake
+ credentials, this behaviour is not constant time and no strong
+ guarantees are made that the handshake is indistinguishable from
+ that of a valid user.
+ (CVE-2016-0798)
+ [Emilia Käsper]
+
+ *) Fix BN_hex2bn/BN_dec2bn NULL pointer deref/heap corruption
+
+ In the BN_hex2bn function the number of hex digits is calculated using an
+ int value |i|. Later |bn_expand| is called with a value of |i * 4|. For
+ large values of |i| this can result in |bn_expand| not allocating any
+ memory because |i * 4| is negative. This can leave the internal BIGNUM data
+ field as NULL leading to a subsequent NULL ptr deref. For very large values
+ of |i|, the calculation |i * 4| could be a positive value smaller than |i|.
+ In this case memory is allocated to the internal BIGNUM data field, but it
+ is insufficiently sized leading to heap corruption. A similar issue exists
+ in BN_dec2bn. This could have security consequences if BN_hex2bn/BN_dec2bn
+ is ever called by user applications with very large untrusted hex/dec data.
+ This is anticipated to be a rare occurrence.
+
+ All OpenSSL internal usage of these functions use data that is not expected
+ to be untrusted, e.g. config file data or application command line
+ arguments. If user developed applications generate config file data based
+ on untrusted data then it is possible that this could also lead to security
+ consequences. This is also anticipated to be rare.
+
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Guido Vranken.
+ (CVE-2016-0797)
+ [Matt Caswell]
+
+ *) Fix memory issues in BIO_*printf functions
+
+ The internal |fmtstr| function used in processing a "%s" format string in
+ the BIO_*printf functions could overflow while calculating the length of a
+ string and cause an OOB read when printing very long strings.
+
+ Additionally the internal |doapr_outch| function can attempt to write to an
+ OOB memory location (at an offset from the NULL pointer) in the event of a
+ memory allocation failure. In 1.0.2 and below this could be caused where
+ the size of a buffer to be allocated is greater than INT_MAX. E.g. this
+ could be in processing a very long "%s" format string. Memory leaks can
+ also occur.
+
+ The first issue may mask the second issue dependent on compiler behaviour.
+ These problems could enable attacks where large amounts of untrusted data
+ is passed to the BIO_*printf functions. If applications use these functions
+ in this way then they could be vulnerable. OpenSSL itself uses these
+ functions when printing out human-readable dumps of ASN.1 data. Therefore
+ applications that print this data could be vulnerable if the data is from
+ untrusted sources. OpenSSL command line applications could also be
+ vulnerable where they print out ASN.1 data, or if untrusted data is passed
+ as command line arguments.
+
+ Libssl is not considered directly vulnerable. Additionally certificates etc
+ received via remote connections via libssl are also unlikely to be able to
+ trigger these issues because of message size limits enforced within libssl.
+
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL Guido Vranken.
+ (CVE-2016-0799)
+ [Matt Caswell]
+
+ *) Side channel attack on modular exponentiation
+
+ A side-channel attack was found which makes use of cache-bank conflicts on
+ the Intel Sandy-Bridge microarchitecture which could lead to the recovery
+ of RSA keys. The ability to exploit this issue is limited as it relies on
+ an attacker who has control of code in a thread running on the same
+ hyper-threaded core as the victim thread which is performing decryptions.
+
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Yuval Yarom, The University of
+ Adelaide and NICTA, Daniel Genkin, Technion and Tel Aviv University, and
+ Nadia Heninger, University of Pennsylvania with more information at
+ http://cachebleed.info.
+ (CVE-2016-0702)
+ [Andy Polyakov]
+
+ *) Change the req app to generate a 2048-bit RSA/DSA key by default,
+ if no keysize is specified with default_bits. This fixes an
+ omission in an earlier change that changed all RSA/DSA key generation
+ apps to use 2048 bits by default.
+ [Emilia Käsper]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.2e and 1.0.2f [28 Jan 2016]
+
+ *) DH small subgroups
+
+ Historically OpenSSL only ever generated DH parameters based on "safe"
+ primes. More recently (in version 1.0.2) support was provided for
+ generating X9.42 style parameter files such as those required for RFC 5114
+ support. The primes used in such files may not be "safe". Where an
+ application is using DH configured with parameters based on primes that are
+ not "safe" then an attacker could use this fact to find a peer's private
+ DH exponent. This attack requires that the attacker complete multiple
+ handshakes in which the peer uses the same private DH exponent. For example
+ this could be used to discover a TLS server's private DH exponent if it's
+ reusing the private DH exponent or it's using a static DH ciphersuite.
+
+ OpenSSL provides the option SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE for ephemeral DH (DHE) in
+ TLS. It is not on by default. If the option is not set then the server
+ reuses the same private DH exponent for the life of the server process and
+ would be vulnerable to this attack. It is believed that many popular
+ applications do set this option and would therefore not be at risk.
+
+ The fix for this issue adds an additional check where a "q" parameter is
+ available (as is the case in X9.42 based parameters). This detects the
+ only known attack, and is the only possible defense for static DH
+ ciphersuites. This could have some performance impact.
+
+ Additionally the SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE option has been switched on by
+ default and cannot be disabled. This could have some performance impact.
+
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Antonio Sanso (Adobe).
+ (CVE-2016-0701)
+ [Matt Caswell]
+
+ *) SSLv2 doesn't block disabled ciphers
+
+ A malicious client can negotiate SSLv2 ciphers that have been disabled on
+ the server and complete SSLv2 handshakes even if all SSLv2 ciphers have
+ been disabled, provided that the SSLv2 protocol was not also disabled via
+ SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2.
+
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 26th December 2015 by Nimrod Aviram
+ and Sebastian Schinzel.
+ (CVE-2015-3197)
+ [Viktor Dukhovni]
+
+ *) Reject DH handshakes with parameters shorter than 1024 bits.
+ [Kurt Roeckx]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.2d and 1.0.2e [3 Dec 2015]
+
+ *) BN_mod_exp may produce incorrect results on x86_64
+
+ There is a carry propagating bug in the x86_64 Montgomery squaring
+ procedure. No EC algorithms are affected. Analysis suggests that attacks
+ against RSA and DSA as a result of this defect would be very difficult to
+ perform and are not believed likely. Attacks against DH are considered just
+ feasible (although very difficult) because most of the work necessary to
+ deduce information about a private key may be performed offline. The amount
+ of resources required for such an attack would be very significant and
+ likely only accessible to a limited number of attackers. An attacker would
+ additionally need online access to an unpatched system using the target
+ private key in a scenario with persistent DH parameters and a private
+ key that is shared between multiple clients. For example this can occur by
+ default in OpenSSL DHE based SSL/TLS ciphersuites.
+
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Hanno Böck.
+ (CVE-2015-3193)
+ [Andy Polyakov]
+
+ *) Certificate verify crash with missing PSS parameter
+
+ The signature verification routines will crash with a NULL pointer
+ dereference if presented with an ASN.1 signature using the RSA PSS
+ algorithm and absent mask generation function parameter. Since these
+ routines are used to verify certificate signature algorithms this can be
+ used to crash any certificate verification operation and exploited in a
+ DoS attack. Any application which performs certificate verification is
+ vulnerable including OpenSSL clients and servers which enable client
+ authentication.
+
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Loïc Jonas Etienne (Qnective AG).
+ (CVE-2015-3194)
+ [Stephen Henson]
+
+ *) X509_ATTRIBUTE memory leak
+
+ When presented with a malformed X509_ATTRIBUTE structure OpenSSL will leak
+ memory. This structure is used by the PKCS#7 and CMS routines so any
+ application which reads PKCS#7 or CMS data from untrusted sources is
+ affected. SSL/TLS is not affected.
+
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Adam Langley (Google/BoringSSL) using
+ libFuzzer.
+ (CVE-2015-3195)
+ [Stephen Henson]
+
+ *) Rewrite EVP_DecodeUpdate (base64 decoding) to fix several bugs.
+ This changes the decoding behaviour for some invalid messages,
+ though the change is mostly in the more lenient direction, and
+ legacy behaviour is preserved as much as possible.
+ [Emilia Käsper]
+
+ *) In DSA_generate_parameters_ex, if the provided seed is too short,
+ use a random seed, as already documented.
+ [Rich Salz and Ismo Puustinen <ismo.puustinen@intel.com>]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.2c and 1.0.2d [9 Jul 2015]
+
+ *) Alternate chains certificate forgery
+
+ During certificate verfification, OpenSSL will attempt to find an
+ alternative certificate chain if the first attempt to build such a chain
+ fails. An error in the implementation of this logic can mean that an
+ attacker could cause certain checks on untrusted certificates to be
+ bypassed, such as the CA flag, enabling them to use a valid leaf
+ certificate to act as a CA and "issue" an invalid certificate.
+
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Adam Langley/David Benjamin
+ (Google/BoringSSL).
+ (CVE-2015-1793)
+ [Matt Caswell]
+
+ *) Race condition handling PSK identify hint
+
+ If PSK identity hints are received by a multi-threaded client then
+ the values are wrongly updated in the parent SSL_CTX structure. This can
+ result in a race condition potentially leading to a double free of the
+ identify hint data.
+ (CVE-2015-3196)
+ [Stephen Henson]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.2b and 1.0.2c [12 Jun 2015]
+
+ *) Fix HMAC ABI incompatibility. The previous version introduced an ABI
+ incompatibility in the handling of HMAC. The previous ABI has now been
+ restored.
+
+ Changes between 1.0.2a and 1.0.2b [11 Jun 2015]
+
+ *) Malformed ECParameters causes infinite loop
+
+ When processing an ECParameters structure OpenSSL enters an infinite loop
+ if the curve specified is over a specially malformed binary polynomial
+ field.
+
+ This can be used to perform denial of service against any
+ system which processes public keys, certificate requests or
+ certificates. This includes TLS clients and TLS servers with
+ client authentication enabled.
+
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Joseph Barr-Pixton.
+ (CVE-2015-1788)
+ [Andy Polyakov]
+
+ *) Exploitable out-of-bounds read in X509_cmp_time
+
+ X509_cmp_time does not properly check the length of the ASN1_TIME
+ string and can read a few bytes out of bounds. In addition,
+ X509_cmp_time accepts an arbitrary number of fractional seconds in the
+ time string.
+
+ An attacker can use this to craft malformed certificates and CRLs of
+ various sizes and potentially cause a segmentation fault, resulting in
+ a DoS on applications that verify certificates or CRLs. TLS clients
+ that verify CRLs are affected. TLS clients and servers with client
+ authentication enabled may be affected if they use custom verification
+ callbacks.
+
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Robert Swiecki (Google), and
+ independently by Hanno Böck.
+ (CVE-2015-1789)
+ [Emilia Käsper]
+
+ *) PKCS7 crash with missing EnvelopedContent
+
+ The PKCS#7 parsing code does not handle missing inner EncryptedContent
+ correctly. An attacker can craft malformed ASN.1-encoded PKCS#7 blobs
+ with missing content and trigger a NULL pointer dereference on parsing.
+
+ Applications that decrypt PKCS#7 data or otherwise parse PKCS#7
+ structures from untrusted sources are affected. OpenSSL clients and
+ servers are not affected.
+
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Michal Zalewski (Google).
+ (CVE-2015-1790)
+ [Emilia Käsper]
+
+ *) CMS verify infinite loop with unknown hash function
+
+ When verifying a signedData message the CMS code can enter an infinite loop
+ if presented with an unknown hash function OID. This can be used to perform
+ denial of service against any system which verifies signedData messages using
+ the CMS code.
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Johannes Bauer.
+ (CVE-2015-1792)
+ [Stephen Henson]
+
+ *) Race condition handling NewSessionTicket
+
+ If a NewSessionTicket is received by a multi-threaded client when attempting to
+ reuse a previous ticket then a race condition can occur potentially leading to
+ a double free of the ticket data.
+ (CVE-2015-1791)
+ [Matt Caswell]
+
+ *) Removed support for the two export grade static DH ciphersuites
+ EXP-DH-RSA-DES-CBC-SHA and EXP-DH-DSS-DES-CBC-SHA. These two ciphersuites
+ were newly added (along with a number of other static DH ciphersuites) to
+ 1.0.2. However the two export ones have *never* worked since they were
+ introduced. It seems strange in any case to be adding new export
+ ciphersuites, and given "logjam" it also does not seem correct to fix them.
+ [Matt Caswell]
+
+ *) Only support 256-bit or stronger elliptic curves with the
+ 'ecdh_auto' setting (server) or by default (client). Of supported
+ curves, prefer P-256 (both).
+ [Emilia Kasper]
+
+ *) Reject DH handshakes with parameters shorter than 768 bits.
+ [Kurt Roeckx and Emilia Kasper]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.2 and 1.0.2a [19 Mar 2015]
+
+ *) ClientHello sigalgs DoS fix
+
+ If a client connects to an OpenSSL 1.0.2 server and renegotiates with an
+ invalid signature algorithms extension a NULL pointer dereference will
+ occur. This can be exploited in a DoS attack against the server.
+
+ This issue was was reported to OpenSSL by David Ramos of Stanford
+ University.
+ (CVE-2015-0291)
+ [Stephen Henson and Matt Caswell]
+
+ *) Multiblock corrupted pointer fix
+
+ OpenSSL 1.0.2 introduced the "multiblock" performance improvement. This
+ feature only applies on 64 bit x86 architecture platforms that support AES
+ NI instructions. A defect in the implementation of "multiblock" can cause
+ OpenSSL's internal write buffer to become incorrectly set to NULL when
+ using non-blocking IO. Typically, when the user application is using a
+ socket BIO for writing, this will only result in a failed connection.
+ However if some other BIO is used then it is likely that a segmentation
+ fault will be triggered, thus enabling a potential DoS attack.
+
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Daniel Danner and Rainer Mueller.
+ (CVE-2015-0290)
+ [Matt Caswell]
+
+ *) Segmentation fault in DTLSv1_listen fix
+
+ The DTLSv1_listen function is intended to be stateless and processes the
+ initial ClientHello from many peers. It is common for user code to loop
+ over the call to DTLSv1_listen until a valid ClientHello is received with
+ an associated cookie. A defect in the implementation of DTLSv1_listen means
+ that state is preserved in the SSL object from one invocation to the next
+ that can lead to a segmentation fault. Errors processing the initial
+ ClientHello can trigger this scenario. An example of such an error could be
+ that a DTLS1.0 only client is attempting to connect to a DTLS1.2 only
+ server.
+
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Per Allansson.
+ (CVE-2015-0207)
+ [Matt Caswell]
+
+ *) Segmentation fault in ASN1_TYPE_cmp fix
+
+ The function ASN1_TYPE_cmp will crash with an invalid read if an attempt is
+ made to compare ASN.1 boolean types. Since ASN1_TYPE_cmp is used to check
+ certificate signature algorithm consistency this can be used to crash any
+ certificate verification operation and exploited in a DoS attack. Any
+ application which performs certificate verification is vulnerable including
+ OpenSSL clients and servers which enable client authentication.
+ (CVE-2015-0286)
+ [Stephen Henson]
+
+ *) Segmentation fault for invalid PSS parameters fix
+
+ The signature verification routines will crash with a NULL pointer
+ dereference if presented with an ASN.1 signature using the RSA PSS
+ algorithm and invalid parameters. Since these routines are used to verify
+ certificate signature algorithms this can be used to crash any
+ certificate verification operation and exploited in a DoS attack. Any
+ application which performs certificate verification is vulnerable including
+ OpenSSL clients and servers which enable client authentication.
+
+ This issue was was reported to OpenSSL by Brian Carpenter.
+ (CVE-2015-0208)
+ [Stephen Henson]
+
+ *) ASN.1 structure reuse memory corruption fix
+
+ Reusing a structure in ASN.1 parsing may allow an attacker to cause
+ memory corruption via an invalid write. Such reuse is and has been
+ strongly discouraged and is believed to be rare.
+
+ Applications that parse structures containing CHOICE or ANY DEFINED BY
+ components may be affected. Certificate parsing (d2i_X509 and related
+ functions) are however not affected. OpenSSL clients and servers are
+ not affected.
+ (CVE-2015-0287)
+ [Stephen Henson]
+
+ *) PKCS7 NULL pointer dereferences fix
+
+ The PKCS#7 parsing code does not handle missing outer ContentInfo
+ correctly. An attacker can craft malformed ASN.1-encoded PKCS#7 blobs with
+ missing content and trigger a NULL pointer dereference on parsing.
+
+ Applications that verify PKCS#7 signatures, decrypt PKCS#7 data or
+ otherwise parse PKCS#7 structures from untrusted sources are
+ affected. OpenSSL clients and servers are not affected.
+
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Michal Zalewski (Google).
+ (CVE-2015-0289)
+ [Emilia Käsper]
+
+ *) DoS via reachable assert in SSLv2 servers fix
+
+ A malicious client can trigger an OPENSSL_assert (i.e., an abort) in
+ servers that both support SSLv2 and enable export cipher suites by sending
+ a specially crafted SSLv2 CLIENT-MASTER-KEY message.
+
+ This issue was discovered by Sean Burford (Google) and Emilia Käsper
+ (OpenSSL development team).
+ (CVE-2015-0293)
+ [Emilia Käsper]
+
+ *) Empty CKE with client auth and DHE fix
+
+ If client auth is used then a server can seg fault in the event of a DHE
+ ciphersuite being selected and a zero length ClientKeyExchange message
+ being sent by the client. This could be exploited in a DoS attack.
+ (CVE-2015-1787)
+ [Matt Caswell]
+
+ *) Handshake with unseeded PRNG fix
+
+ Under certain conditions an OpenSSL 1.0.2 client can complete a handshake
+ with an unseeded PRNG. The conditions are:
+ - The client is on a platform where the PRNG has not been seeded
+ automatically, and the user has not seeded manually
+ - A protocol specific client method version has been used (i.e. not
+ SSL_client_methodv23)
+ - A ciphersuite is used that does not require additional random data from
+ the PRNG beyond the initial ClientHello client random (e.g. PSK-RC4-SHA).
+
+ If the handshake succeeds then the client random that has been used will
+ have been generated from a PRNG with insufficient entropy and therefore the
+ output may be predictable.
+
+ For example using the following command with an unseeded openssl will
+ succeed on an unpatched platform:
+
+ openssl s_client -psk 1a2b3c4d -tls1_2 -cipher PSK-RC4-SHA
+ (CVE-2015-0285)
+ [Matt Caswell]
+
+ *) Use After Free following d2i_ECPrivatekey error fix
+
+ A malformed EC private key file consumed via the d2i_ECPrivateKey function
+ could cause a use after free condition. This, in turn, could cause a double
+ free in several private key parsing functions (such as d2i_PrivateKey
+ or EVP_PKCS82PKEY) and could lead to a DoS attack or memory corruption
+ for applications that receive EC private keys from untrusted
+ sources. This scenario is considered rare.
+
+ This issue was discovered by the BoringSSL project and fixed in their
+ commit 517073cd4b.
+ (CVE-2015-0209)
+ [Matt Caswell]
+
+ *) X509_to_X509_REQ NULL pointer deref fix
+
+ The function X509_to_X509_REQ will crash with a NULL pointer dereference if
+ the certificate key is invalid. This function is rarely used in practice.
+
+ This issue was discovered by Brian Carpenter.
+ (CVE-2015-0288)
+ [Stephen Henson]
+
+ *) Removed the export ciphers from the DEFAULT ciphers
+ [Kurt Roeckx]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.1l and 1.0.2 [22 Jan 2015]
+
+ *) Change RSA and DH/DSA key generation apps to generate 2048-bit
+ keys by default.
+ [Kurt Roeckx]
+
+ *) Facilitate "universal" ARM builds targeting range of ARM ISAs, e.g.
+ ARMv5 through ARMv8, as opposite to "locking" it to single one.
+ So far those who have to target multiple plaforms would compromise
+ and argue that binary targeting say ARMv5 would still execute on
+ ARMv8. "Universal" build resolves this compromise by providing
+ near-optimal performance even on newer platforms.
+ [Andy Polyakov]
+
+ *) Accelerated NIST P-256 elliptic curve implementation for x86_64
+ (other platforms pending).
+ [Shay Gueron & Vlad Krasnov (Intel Corp), Andy Polyakov]
+
+ *) Add support for the SignedCertificateTimestampList certificate and
+ OCSP response extensions from RFC6962.
+ [Rob Stradling]
+
+ *) Fix ec_GFp_simple_points_make_affine (thus, EC_POINTs_mul etc.)
+ for corner cases. (Certain input points at infinity could lead to
+ bogus results, with non-infinity inputs mapped to infinity too.)
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Initial support for PowerISA 2.0.7, first implemented in POWER8.
+ This covers AES, SHA256/512 and GHASH. "Initial" means that most
+ common cases are optimized and there still is room for further
+ improvements. Vector Permutation AES for Altivec is also added.
+ [Andy Polyakov]
+
+ *) Add support for little-endian ppc64 Linux target.
+ [Marcelo Cerri (IBM)]
+
+ *) Initial support for AMRv8 ISA crypto extensions. This covers AES,
+ SHA1, SHA256 and GHASH. "Initial" means that most common cases
+ are optimized and there still is room for further improvements.
+ Both 32- and 64-bit modes are supported.
+ [Andy Polyakov, Ard Biesheuvel (Linaro)]
+
+ *) Improved ARMv7 NEON support.
+ [Andy Polyakov]
+
+ *) Support for SPARC Architecture 2011 crypto extensions, first
+ implemented in SPARC T4. This covers AES, DES, Camellia, SHA1,
+ SHA256/512, MD5, GHASH and modular exponentiation.
+ [Andy Polyakov, David Miller]
+
+ *) Accelerated modular exponentiation for Intel processors, a.k.a.
+ RSAZ.
+ [Shay Gueron & Vlad Krasnov (Intel Corp)]
+
+ *) Support for new and upcoming Intel processors, including AVX2,
+ BMI and SHA ISA extensions. This includes additional "stitched"
+ implementations, AESNI-SHA256 and GCM, and multi-buffer support
+ for TLS encrypt.
+
+ This work was sponsored by Intel Corp.
+ [Andy Polyakov]
+
+ *) Support for DTLS 1.2. This adds two sets of DTLS methods: DTLS_*_method()
+ supports both DTLS 1.2 and 1.0 and should use whatever version the peer
+ supports and DTLSv1_2_*_method() which supports DTLS 1.2 only.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Use algorithm specific chains in SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file():
+ this fixes a limiation in previous versions of OpenSSL.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Extended RSA OAEP support via EVP_PKEY API. Options to specify digest,
+ MGF1 digest and OAEP label.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add EVP support for key wrapping algorithms, to avoid problems with
+ existing code the flag EVP_CIPHER_CTX_WRAP_ALLOW has to be set in
+ the EVP_CIPHER_CTX or an error is returned. Add AES and DES3 wrap
+ algorithms and include tests cases.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add functions to allocate and set the fields of an ECDSA_METHOD
+ structure.
+ [Douglas E. Engert, Steve Henson]
+
+ *) New functions OPENSSL_gmtime_diff and ASN1_TIME_diff to find the
+ difference in days and seconds between two tm or ASN1_TIME structures.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add -rev test option to s_server to just reverse order of characters
+ received by client and send back to server. Also prints an abbreviated
+ summary of the connection parameters.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) New option -brief for s_client and s_server to print out a brief summary
+ of connection parameters.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add callbacks for arbitrary TLS extensions.
+ [Trevor Perrin <trevp@trevp.net> and Ben Laurie]
+
+ *) New option -crl_download in several openssl utilities to download CRLs
+ from CRLDP extension in certificates.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) New options -CRL and -CRLform for s_client and s_server for CRLs.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) New function X509_CRL_diff to generate a delta CRL from the difference
+ of two full CRLs. Add support to "crl" utility.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) New functions to set lookup_crls function and to retrieve
+ X509_STORE from X509_STORE_CTX.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Print out deprecated issuer and subject unique ID fields in
+ certificates.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Extend OCSP I/O functions so they can be used for simple general purpose
+ HTTP as well as OCSP. New wrapper function which can be used to download
+ CRLs using the OCSP API.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Delegate command line handling in s_client/s_server to SSL_CONF APIs.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) SSL_CONF* functions. These provide a common framework for application
+ configuration using configuration files or command lines.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) SSL/TLS tracing code. This parses out SSL/TLS records using the
+ message callback and prints the results. Needs compile time option
+ "enable-ssl-trace". New options to s_client and s_server to enable
+ tracing.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) New ctrl and macro to retrieve supported points extensions.
+ Print out extension in s_server and s_client.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) New functions to retrieve certificate signature and signature
+ OID NID.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add functions to retrieve and manipulate the raw cipherlist sent by a
+ client to OpenSSL.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) New Suite B modes for TLS code. These use and enforce the requirements
+ of RFC6460: restrict ciphersuites, only permit Suite B algorithms and
+ only use Suite B curves. The Suite B modes can be set by using the
+ strings "SUITEB128", "SUITEB192" or "SUITEB128ONLY" for the cipherstring.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) New chain verification flags for Suite B levels of security. Check
+ algorithms are acceptable when flags are set in X509_verify_cert.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Make tls1_check_chain return a set of flags indicating checks passed
+ by a certificate chain. Add additional tests to handle client
+ certificates: checks for matching certificate type and issuer name
+ comparison.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) If an attempt is made to use a signature algorithm not in the peer
+ preference list abort the handshake. If client has no suitable
+ signature algorithms in response to a certificate request do not
+ use the certificate.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) If server EC tmp key is not in client preference list abort handshake.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add support for certificate stores in CERT structure. This makes it
+ possible to have different stores per SSL structure or one store in
+ the parent SSL_CTX. Include distint stores for certificate chain
+ verification and chain building. New ctrl SSL_CTRL_BUILD_CERT_CHAIN
+ to build and store a certificate chain in CERT structure: returing
+ an error if the chain cannot be built: this will allow applications
+ to test if a chain is correctly configured.
+
+ Note: if the CERT based stores are not set then the parent SSL_CTX
+ store is used to retain compatibility with existing behaviour.
+
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) New function ssl_set_client_disabled to set a ciphersuite disabled
+ mask based on the current session, check mask when sending client
+ hello and checking the requested ciphersuite.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) New ctrls to retrieve and set certificate types in a certificate
+ request message. Print out received values in s_client. If certificate
+ types is not set with custom values set sensible values based on
+ supported signature algorithms.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Support for distinct client and server supported signature algorithms.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add certificate callback. If set this is called whenever a certificate
+ is required by client or server. An application can decide which
+ certificate chain to present based on arbitrary criteria: for example
+ supported signature algorithms. Add very simple example to s_server.
+ This fixes many of the problems and restrictions of the existing client
+ certificate callback: for example you can now clear an existing
+ certificate and specify the whole chain.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add new "valid_flags" field to CERT_PKEY structure which determines what
+ the certificate can be used for (if anything). Set valid_flags field
+ in new tls1_check_chain function. Simplify ssl_set_cert_masks which used
+ to have similar checks in it.
+
+ Add new "cert_flags" field to CERT structure and include a "strict mode".
+ This enforces some TLS certificate requirements (such as only permitting
+ certificate signature algorithms contained in the supported algorithms
+ extension) which some implementations ignore: this option should be used
+ with caution as it could cause interoperability issues.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Update and tidy signature algorithm extension processing. Work out
+ shared signature algorithms based on preferences and peer algorithms
+ and print them out in s_client and s_server. Abort handshake if no
+ shared signature algorithms.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add new functions to allow customised supported signature algorithms
+ for SSL and SSL_CTX structures. Add options to s_client and s_server
+ to support them.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) New function SSL_certs_clear() to delete all references to certificates
+ from an SSL structure. Before this once a certificate had been added
+ it couldn't be removed.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Integrate hostname, email address and IP address checking with certificate
+ verification. New verify options supporting checking in opensl utility.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Fixes and wildcard matching support to hostname and email checking
+ functions. Add manual page.
+ [Florian Weimer (Red Hat Product Security Team)]
+
+ *) New functions to check a hostname email or IP address against a
+ certificate. Add options x509 utility to print results of checks against
+ a certificate.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Fix OCSP checking.
+ [Rob Stradling <rob.stradling@comodo.com> and Ben Laurie]
+
+ *) Initial experimental support for explicitly trusted non-root CAs.
+ OpenSSL still tries to build a complete chain to a root but if an
+ intermediate CA has a trust setting included that is used. The first
+ setting is used: whether to trust (e.g., -addtrust option to the x509
+ utility) or reject.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add -trusted_first option which attempts to find certificates in the
+ trusted store even if an untrusted chain is also supplied.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) MIPS assembly pack updates: support for MIPS32r2 and SmartMIPS ASE,
+ platform support for Linux and Android.
+ [Andy Polyakov]
+
+ *) Support for linux-x32, ILP32 environment in x86_64 framework.
+ [Andy Polyakov]
*) Experimental multi-implementation support for FIPS capable OpenSSL.
When in FIPS mode the approved implementations are used as normal,
certificates.
[Steve Henson]
- Changes between 1.0.1c and 1.0.1d [xx XXX xxxx]
+ *) New function i2d_re_X509_tbs for re-encoding the TBS portion of
+ the certificate.
+ Note: Related 1.0.2-beta specific macros X509_get_cert_info,
+ X509_CINF_set_modified, X509_CINF_get_issuer, X509_CINF_get_extensions and
+ X509_CINF_get_signature were reverted post internal team review.
+
+ Changes between 1.0.1k and 1.0.1l [15 Jan 2015]
+
+ *) Build fixes for the Windows and OpenVMS platforms
+ [Matt Caswell and Richard Levitte]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.1j and 1.0.1k [8 Jan 2015]
+
+ *) Fix DTLS segmentation fault in dtls1_get_record. A carefully crafted DTLS
+ message can cause a segmentation fault in OpenSSL due to a NULL pointer
+ dereference. This could lead to a Denial Of Service attack. Thanks to
+ Markus Stenberg of Cisco Systems, Inc. for reporting this issue.
+ (CVE-2014-3571)
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Fix DTLS memory leak in dtls1_buffer_record. A memory leak can occur in the
+ dtls1_buffer_record function under certain conditions. In particular this
+ could occur if an attacker sent repeated DTLS records with the same
+ sequence number but for the next epoch. The memory leak could be exploited
+ by an attacker in a Denial of Service attack through memory exhaustion.
+ Thanks to Chris Mueller for reporting this issue.
+ (CVE-2015-0206)
+ [Matt Caswell]
+
+ *) Fix issue where no-ssl3 configuration sets method to NULL. When openssl is
+ built with the no-ssl3 option and a SSL v3 ClientHello is received the ssl
+ method would be set to NULL which could later result in a NULL pointer
+ dereference. Thanks to Frank Schmirler for reporting this issue.
+ (CVE-2014-3569)
+ [Kurt Roeckx]
+
+ *) Abort handshake if server key exchange message is omitted for ephemeral
+ ECDH ciphersuites.
+
+ Thanks to Karthikeyan Bhargavan of the PROSECCO team at INRIA for
+ reporting this issue.
+ (CVE-2014-3572)
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Remove non-export ephemeral RSA code on client and server. This code
+ violated the TLS standard by allowing the use of temporary RSA keys in
+ non-export ciphersuites and could be used by a server to effectively
+ downgrade the RSA key length used to a value smaller than the server
+ certificate. Thanks for Karthikeyan Bhargavan of the PROSECCO team at
+ INRIA or reporting this issue.
+ (CVE-2015-0204)
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Fixed issue where DH client certificates are accepted without verification.
+ An OpenSSL server will accept a DH certificate for client authentication
+ without the certificate verify message. This effectively allows a client to
+ authenticate without the use of a private key. This only affects servers
+ which trust a client certificate authority which issues certificates
+ containing DH keys: these are extremely rare and hardly ever encountered.
+ Thanks for Karthikeyan Bhargavan of the PROSECCO team at INRIA or reporting
+ this issue.
+ (CVE-2015-0205)
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Ensure that the session ID context of an SSL is updated when its
+ SSL_CTX is updated via SSL_set_SSL_CTX.
+
+ The session ID context is typically set from the parent SSL_CTX,
+ and can vary with the CTX.
+ [Adam Langley]
+
+ *) Fix various certificate fingerprint issues.
+
+ By using non-DER or invalid encodings outside the signed portion of a
+ certificate the fingerprint can be changed without breaking the signature.
+ Although no details of the signed portion of the certificate can be changed
+ this can cause problems with some applications: e.g. those using the
+ certificate fingerprint for blacklists.
+
+ 1. Reject signatures with non zero unused bits.
+
+ If the BIT STRING containing the signature has non zero unused bits reject
+ the signature. All current signature algorithms require zero unused bits.
+
+ 2. Check certificate algorithm consistency.
+
+ Check the AlgorithmIdentifier inside TBS matches the one in the
+ certificate signature. NB: this will result in signature failure
+ errors for some broken certificates.
+
+ Thanks to Konrad Kraszewski from Google for reporting this issue.
+
+ 3. Check DSA/ECDSA signatures use DER.
+
+ Reencode DSA/ECDSA signatures and compare with the original received
+ signature. Return an error if there is a mismatch.
+
+ This will reject various cases including garbage after signature
+ (thanks to Antti Karjalainen and Tuomo Untinen from the Codenomicon CROSS
+ program for discovering this case) and use of BER or invalid ASN.1 INTEGERs
+ (negative or with leading zeroes).
+
+ Further analysis was conducted and fixes were developed by Stephen Henson
+ of the OpenSSL core team.
+
+ (CVE-2014-8275)
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Correct Bignum squaring. Bignum squaring (BN_sqr) may produce incorrect
+ results on some platforms, including x86_64. This bug occurs at random
+ with a very low probability, and is not known to be exploitable in any
+ way, though its exact impact is difficult to determine. Thanks to Pieter
+ Wuille (Blockstream) who reported this issue and also suggested an initial
+ fix. Further analysis was conducted by the OpenSSL development team and
+ Adam Langley of Google. The final fix was developed by Andy Polyakov of
+ the OpenSSL core team.
+ (CVE-2014-3570)
+ [Andy Polyakov]
+
+ *) Do not resume sessions on the server if the negotiated protocol
+ version does not match the session's version. Resuming with a different
+ version, while not strictly forbidden by the RFC, is of questionable
+ sanity and breaks all known clients.
+ [David Benjamin, Emilia Käsper]
+
+ *) Tighten handling of the ChangeCipherSpec (CCS) message: reject
+ early CCS messages during renegotiation. (Note that because
+ renegotiation is encrypted, this early CCS was not exploitable.)
+ [Emilia Käsper]
+
+ *) Tighten client-side session ticket handling during renegotiation:
+ ensure that the client only accepts a session ticket if the server sends
+ the extension anew in the ServerHello. Previously, a TLS client would
+ reuse the old extension state and thus accept a session ticket if one was
+ announced in the initial ServerHello.
+
+ Similarly, ensure that the client requires a session ticket if one
+ was advertised in the ServerHello. Previously, a TLS client would
+ ignore a missing NewSessionTicket message.
+ [Emilia Käsper]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.1i and 1.0.1j [15 Oct 2014]
+
+ *) SRTP Memory Leak.
+
+ A flaw in the DTLS SRTP extension parsing code allows an attacker, who
+ sends a carefully crafted handshake message, to cause OpenSSL to fail
+ to free up to 64k of memory causing a memory leak. This could be
+ exploited in a Denial Of Service attack. This issue affects OpenSSL
+ 1.0.1 server implementations for both SSL/TLS and DTLS regardless of
+ whether SRTP is used or configured. Implementations of OpenSSL that
+ have been compiled with OPENSSL_NO_SRTP defined are not affected.
+
+ The fix was developed by the OpenSSL team.
+ (CVE-2014-3513)
+ [OpenSSL team]
+
+ *) Session Ticket Memory Leak.
+
+ When an OpenSSL SSL/TLS/DTLS server receives a session ticket the
+ integrity of that ticket is first verified. In the event of a session
+ ticket integrity check failing, OpenSSL will fail to free memory
+ causing a memory leak. By sending a large number of invalid session
+ tickets an attacker could exploit this issue in a Denial Of Service
+ attack.
+ (CVE-2014-3567)
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Build option no-ssl3 is incomplete.
+
+ When OpenSSL is configured with "no-ssl3" as a build option, servers
+ could accept and complete a SSL 3.0 handshake, and clients could be
+ configured to send them.
+ (CVE-2014-3568)
+ [Akamai and the OpenSSL team]
+
+ *) Add support for TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV.
+ Client applications doing fallback retries should call
+ SSL_set_mode(s, SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV).
+ (CVE-2014-3566)
+ [Adam Langley, Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Add additional DigestInfo checks.
+
+ Reencode DigestInto in DER and check against the original when
+ verifying RSA signature: this will reject any improperly encoded
+ DigestInfo structures.
+
+ Note: this is a precautionary measure and no attacks are currently known.
+
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.1h and 1.0.1i [6 Aug 2014]
+
+ *) Fix SRP buffer overrun vulnerability. Invalid parameters passed to the
+ SRP code can be overrun an internal buffer. Add sanity check that
+ g, A, B < N to SRP code.
+
+ Thanks to Sean Devlin and Watson Ladd of Cryptography Services, NCC
+ Group for discovering this issue.
+ (CVE-2014-3512)
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) A flaw in the OpenSSL SSL/TLS server code causes the server to negotiate
+ TLS 1.0 instead of higher protocol versions when the ClientHello message
+ is badly fragmented. This allows a man-in-the-middle attacker to force a
+ downgrade to TLS 1.0 even if both the server and the client support a
+ higher protocol version, by modifying the client's TLS records.
+
+ Thanks to David Benjamin and Adam Langley (Google) for discovering and
+ researching this issue.
+ (CVE-2014-3511)
+ [David Benjamin]
+
+ *) OpenSSL DTLS clients enabling anonymous (EC)DH ciphersuites are subject
+ to a denial of service attack. A malicious server can crash the client
+ with a null pointer dereference (read) by specifying an anonymous (EC)DH
+ ciphersuite and sending carefully crafted handshake messages.
+
+ Thanks to Felix Gröbert (Google) for discovering and researching this
+ issue.
+ (CVE-2014-3510)
+ [Emilia Käsper]
+
+ *) By sending carefully crafted DTLS packets an attacker could cause openssl
+ to leak memory. This can be exploited through a Denial of Service attack.
+ Thanks to Adam Langley for discovering and researching this issue.
+ (CVE-2014-3507)
+ [Adam Langley]
+
+ *) An attacker can force openssl to consume large amounts of memory whilst
+ processing DTLS handshake messages. This can be exploited through a
+ Denial of Service attack.
+ Thanks to Adam Langley for discovering and researching this issue.
+ (CVE-2014-3506)
+ [Adam Langley]
+
+ *) An attacker can force an error condition which causes openssl to crash
+ whilst processing DTLS packets due to memory being freed twice. This
+ can be exploited through a Denial of Service attack.
+ Thanks to Adam Langley and Wan-Teh Chang for discovering and researching
+ this issue.
+ (CVE-2014-3505)
+ [Adam Langley]
+
+ *) If a multithreaded client connects to a malicious server using a resumed
+ session and the server sends an ec point format extension it could write
+ up to 255 bytes to freed memory.
+
+ Thanks to Gabor Tyukasz (LogMeIn Inc) for discovering and researching this
+ issue.
+ (CVE-2014-3509)
+ [Gabor Tyukasz]
+
+ *) A malicious server can crash an OpenSSL client with a null pointer
+ dereference (read) by specifying an SRP ciphersuite even though it was not
+ properly negotiated with the client. This can be exploited through a
+ Denial of Service attack.
+
+ Thanks to Joonas Kuorilehto and Riku Hietamäki (Codenomicon) for
+ discovering and researching this issue.
+ (CVE-2014-5139)
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) A flaw in OBJ_obj2txt may cause pretty printing functions such as
+ X509_name_oneline, X509_name_print_ex et al. to leak some information
+ from the stack. Applications may be affected if they echo pretty printing
+ output to the attacker.
+
+ Thanks to Ivan Fratric (Google) for discovering this issue.
+ (CVE-2014-3508)
+ [Emilia Käsper, and Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Fix ec_GFp_simple_points_make_affine (thus, EC_POINTs_mul etc.)
+ for corner cases. (Certain input points at infinity could lead to
+ bogus results, with non-infinity inputs mapped to infinity too.)
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.1g and 1.0.1h [5 Jun 2014]
+
+ *) Fix for SSL/TLS MITM flaw. An attacker using a carefully crafted
+ handshake can force the use of weak keying material in OpenSSL
+ SSL/TLS clients and servers.
+
+ Thanks to KIKUCHI Masashi (Lepidum Co. Ltd.) for discovering and
+ researching this issue. (CVE-2014-0224)
+ [KIKUCHI Masashi, Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Fix DTLS recursion flaw. By sending an invalid DTLS handshake to an
+ OpenSSL DTLS client the code can be made to recurse eventually crashing
+ in a DoS attack.
+
+ Thanks to Imre Rad (Search-Lab Ltd.) for discovering this issue.
+ (CVE-2014-0221)
+ [Imre Rad, Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Fix DTLS invalid fragment vulnerability. A buffer overrun attack can
+ be triggered by sending invalid DTLS fragments to an OpenSSL DTLS
+ client or server. This is potentially exploitable to run arbitrary
+ code on a vulnerable client or server.
+
+ Thanks to Jüri Aedla for reporting this issue. (CVE-2014-0195)
+ [Jüri Aedla, Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Fix bug in TLS code where clients enable anonymous ECDH ciphersuites
+ are subject to a denial of service attack.
+
+ Thanks to Felix Gröbert and Ivan Fratric at Google for discovering
+ this issue. (CVE-2014-3470)
+ [Felix Gröbert, Ivan Fratric, Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Harmonize version and its documentation. -f flag is used to display
+ compilation flags.
+ [mancha <mancha1@zoho.com>]
+
+ *) Fix eckey_priv_encode so it immediately returns an error upon a failure
+ in i2d_ECPrivateKey. Thanks to Ted Unangst for feedback on this issue.
+ [mancha <mancha1@zoho.com>]
+
+ *) Fix some double frees. These are not thought to be exploitable.
+ [mancha <mancha1@zoho.com>]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.1f and 1.0.1g [7 Apr 2014]
+
+ *) A missing bounds check in the handling of the TLS heartbeat extension
+ can be used to reveal up to 64k of memory to a connected client or
+ server.
+
+ Thanks for Neel Mehta of Google Security for discovering this bug and to
+ Adam Langley <agl@chromium.org> and Bodo Moeller <bmoeller@acm.org> for
+ preparing the fix (CVE-2014-0160)
+ [Adam Langley, Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Fix for the attack described in the paper "Recovering OpenSSL
+ ECDSA Nonces Using the FLUSH+RELOAD Cache Side-channel Attack"
+ by Yuval Yarom and Naomi Benger. Details can be obtained from:
+ http://eprint.iacr.org/2014/140
+
+ Thanks to Yuval Yarom and Naomi Benger for discovering this
+ flaw and to Yuval Yarom for supplying a fix (CVE-2014-0076)
+ [Yuval Yarom and Naomi Benger]
+
+ *) TLS pad extension: draft-agl-tls-padding-03
+
+ Workaround for the "TLS hang bug" (see FAQ and PR#2771): if the
+ TLS client Hello record length value would otherwise be > 255 and
+ less that 512 pad with a dummy extension containing zeroes so it
+ is at least 512 bytes long.
+
+ [Adam Langley, Steve Henson]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.1e and 1.0.1f [6 Jan 2014]
+
+ *) Fix for TLS record tampering bug. A carefully crafted invalid
+ handshake could crash OpenSSL with a NULL pointer exception.
+ Thanks to Anton Johansson for reporting this issues.
+ (CVE-2013-4353)
+
+ *) Keep original DTLS digest and encryption contexts in retransmission
+ structures so we can use the previous session parameters if they need
+ to be resent. (CVE-2013-6450)
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add option SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG (part of SSL_OP_ALL) which
+ avoids preferring ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers when the client appears to be
+ Safari on OS X. Safari on OS X 10.8..10.8.3 advertises support for
+ several ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers, but fails to negotiate them. The bug
+ is fixed in OS X 10.8.4, but Apple have ruled out both hot fixing
+ 10.8..10.8.3 and forcing users to upgrade to 10.8.4 or newer.
+ [Rob Stradling, Adam Langley]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.1d and 1.0.1e [11 Feb 2013]
+
+ *) Correct fix for CVE-2013-0169. The original didn't work on AES-NI
+ supporting platforms or when small records were transferred.
+ [Andy Polyakov, Steve Henson]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.1c and 1.0.1d [5 Feb 2013]
+
+ *) Make the decoding of SSLv3, TLS and DTLS CBC records constant time.
+
+ This addresses the flaw in CBC record processing discovered by
+ Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson. Details of this attack can be found
+ at: http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/tls/
+
+ Thanks go to Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson of the Information
+ Security Group at Royal Holloway, University of London
+ (www.isg.rhul.ac.uk) for discovering this flaw and Adam Langley and
+ Emilia Käsper for the initial patch.
+ (CVE-2013-0169)
+ [Emilia Käsper, Adam Langley, Ben Laurie, Andy Polyakov, Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Fix flaw in AESNI handling of TLS 1.2 and 1.1 records for CBC mode
+ ciphersuites which can be exploited in a denial of service attack.
+ Thanks go to and to Adam Langley <agl@chromium.org> for discovering
+ and detecting this bug and to Wolfgang Ettlinger
+ <wolfgang.ettlinger@gmail.com> for independently discovering this issue.
+ (CVE-2012-2686)
+ [Adam Langley]
+
+ *) Return an error when checking OCSP signatures when key is NULL.
+ This fixes a DoS attack. (CVE-2013-0166)
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Make openssl verify return errors.
+ [Chris Palmer <palmer@google.com> and Ben Laurie]
+
+ *) Call OCSP Stapling callback after ciphersuite has been chosen, so
+ the right response is stapled. Also change SSL_get_certificate()
+ so it returns the certificate actually sent.
+ See http://rt.openssl.org/Ticket/Display.html?id=2836.
+ [Rob Stradling <rob.stradling@comodo.com>]
*) Fix possible deadlock when decoding public keys.
[Steve Henson]
Changes between 1.0.1b and 1.0.1c [10 May 2012]
*) Sanity check record length before skipping explicit IV in TLS
- 1.2, 1.1 and DTLS to avoid DoS attack.
+ 1.2, 1.1 and DTLS to fix DoS attack.
Thanks to Codenomicon for discovering this issue using Fuzz-o-Matic
fuzzing as a service testing platform.
[Adam Langley]
*) Workarounds for some broken servers that "hang" if a client hello
- record length exceeds 255 bytes:
-
+ record length exceeds 255 bytes.
+
1. Do not use record version number > TLS 1.0 in initial client
hello: some (but not all) hanging servers will now work.
2. If we set OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH this will truncate
- the number of ciphers sent in the client hello. This should be
+ the number of ciphers sent in the client hello. This should be
set to an even number, such as 50, for example by passing:
-DOPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH=50 to config or Configure.
Most broken servers should now work.
3. If all else fails setting OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2_CLIENT will disable
- TLS 1.2 client support entirely.
+ TLS 1.2 client support entirely.
[Steve Henson]
*) Fix SEGV in Vector Permutation AES module observed in OpenSSH.
EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name() will automatically use these (while
EC_GROUP_new_curve_GFp() currently prefers the more flexible
implementations).
- [Emilia Käsper, Adam Langley, Bodo Moeller (Google)]
+ [Emilia Käsper, Adam Langley, Bodo Moeller (Google)]
*) Use type ossl_ssize_t instad of ssize_t which isn't available on
all platforms. Move ssize_t definition from e_os.h to the public
to work with OPENSSL_NO_SSL_INTERN defined.
[Steve Henson]
- *) Add SRP support.
- [Tom Wu <tjw@cs.stanford.edu> and Ben Laurie]
+ *) A long standing patch to add support for SRP from EdelWeb (Peter
+ Sylvester and Christophe Renou) was integrated.
+ [Christophe Renou <christophe.renou@edelweb.fr>, Peter Sylvester
+ <peter.sylvester@edelweb.fr>, Tom Wu <tjw@cs.stanford.edu>, and
+ Ben Laurie]
*) Add functions to copy EVP_PKEY_METHOD and retrieve flags and id.
[Steve Henson]
[Adam Langley (Google)]
*) Fix spurious failures in ecdsatest.c.
- [Emilia Käsper (Google)]
+ [Emilia Käsper (Google)]
*) Fix the BIO_f_buffer() implementation (which was mixing different
interpretations of the '..._len' fields).
lock to call BN_BLINDING_invert_ex, and avoids one use of
BN_BLINDING_update for each BN_BLINDING structure (previously,
the last update always remained unused).
- [Emilia Käsper (Google)]
+ [Emilia Käsper (Google)]
*) In ssl3_clear, preserve s3->init_extra along with s3->rbuf.
[Bob Buckholz (Google)]
*) Add RFC 3161 compliant time stamp request creation, response generation
and response verification functionality.
- [Zoltán Glózik <zglozik@opentsa.org>, The OpenTSA Project]
+ [Zoltán Glózik <zglozik@opentsa.org>, The OpenTSA Project]
*) Add initial support for TLS extensions, specifically for the server_name
extension so far. The SSL_SESSION, SSL_CTX, and SSL data structures now
*) Change 'Configure' script to enable Camellia by default.
[NTT]
- Changes between 0.9.8s and 0.9.8t [18 Jan 2012]
-
- *) Fix for DTLS DoS issue introduced by fix for CVE-2011-4109.
- Thanks to Antonio Martin, Enterprise Secure Access Research and
- Development, Cisco Systems, Inc. for discovering this bug and
- preparing a fix. (CVE-2012-0050)
- [Antonio Martin]
-
- Changes between 0.9.8r and 0.9.8s [4 Jan 2012]
-
- *) Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson have discovered an extension
- of the Vaudenay padding oracle attack on CBC mode encryption
- which enables an efficient plaintext recovery attack against
- the OpenSSL implementation of DTLS. Their attack exploits timing
- differences arising during decryption processing. A research
- paper describing this attack can be found at:
- http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/~kp/dtls.pdf
- Thanks go to Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson of the Information
- Security Group at Royal Holloway, University of London
- (www.isg.rhul.ac.uk) for discovering this flaw and to Robin Seggelmann
- <seggelmann@fh-muenster.de> and Michael Tuexen <tuexen@fh-muenster.de>
- for preparing the fix. (CVE-2011-4108)
- [Robin Seggelmann, Michael Tuexen]
-
- *) Stop policy check failure freeing same buffer twice. (CVE-2011-4109)
- [Ben Laurie, Kasper <ekasper@google.com>]
-
- *) Clear bytes used for block padding of SSL 3.0 records.
- (CVE-2011-4576)
- [Adam Langley (Google)]
-
- *) Only allow one SGC handshake restart for SSL/TLS. Thanks to George
- Kadianakis <desnacked@gmail.com> for discovering this issue and
- Adam Langley for preparing the fix. (CVE-2011-4619)
- [Adam Langley (Google)]
-
- *) Prevent malformed RFC3779 data triggering an assertion failure.
- Thanks to Andrew Chi, BBN Technologies, for discovering the flaw
- and Rob Austein <sra@hactrn.net> for fixing it. (CVE-2011-4577)
- [Rob Austein <sra@hactrn.net>]
-
- *) Fix ssl_ciph.c set-up race.
- [Adam Langley (Google)]
-
- *) Fix spurious failures in ecdsatest.c.
- [Emilia Käsper (Google)]
-
- *) Fix the BIO_f_buffer() implementation (which was mixing different
- interpretations of the '..._len' fields).
- [Adam Langley (Google)]
-
- *) Fix handling of BN_BLINDING: now BN_BLINDING_invert_ex (rather than
- BN_BLINDING_invert_ex) calls BN_BLINDING_update, ensuring that concurrent
- threads won't reuse the same blinding coefficients.
-
- This also avoids the need to obtain the CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA_BLINDING
- lock to call BN_BLINDING_invert_ex, and avoids one use of
- BN_BLINDING_update for each BN_BLINDING structure (previously,
- the last update always remained unused).
- [Emilia Käsper (Google)]
-
- *) Fix SSL memory handling for (EC)DH ciphersuites, in particular
- for multi-threaded use of ECDH.
- [Adam Langley (Google)]
-
- *) Fix x509_name_ex_d2i memory leak on bad inputs.
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) Add protection against ECDSA timing attacks as mentioned in the paper
- by Billy Bob Brumley and Nicola Tuveri, see:
-
- http://eprint.iacr.org/2011/232.pdf
-
- [Billy Bob Brumley and Nicola Tuveri]
-
- Changes between 0.9.8q and 0.9.8r [8 Feb 2011]
-
- *) Fix parsing of OCSP stapling ClientHello extension. CVE-2011-0014
- [Neel Mehta, Adam Langley, Bodo Moeller (Google)]
-
- *) Fix bug in string printing code: if *any* escaping is enabled we must
- escape the escape character (backslash) or the resulting string is
- ambiguous.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- Changes between 0.9.8p and 0.9.8q [2 Dec 2010]
-
- *) Disable code workaround for ancient and obsolete Netscape browsers
- and servers: an attacker can use it in a ciphersuite downgrade attack.
- Thanks to Martin Rex for discovering this bug. CVE-2010-4180
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Fixed J-PAKE implementation error, originally discovered by
- Sebastien Martini, further info and confirmation from Stefan
- Arentz and Feng Hao. Note that this fix is a security fix. CVE-2010-4252
- [Ben Laurie]
-
- Changes between 0.9.8o and 0.9.8p [16 Nov 2010]
-
- *) Fix extension code to avoid race conditions which can result in a buffer
- overrun vulnerability: resumed sessions must not be modified as they can
- be shared by multiple threads. CVE-2010-3864
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Fix for double free bug in ssl/s3_clnt.c CVE-2010-2939
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Don't reencode certificate when calculating signature: cache and use
- the original encoding instead. This makes signature verification of
- some broken encodings work correctly.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) ec2_GF2m_simple_mul bugfix: compute correct result if the output EC_POINT
- is also one of the inputs.
- [Emilia Käsper <emilia.kasper@esat.kuleuven.be> (Google)]
-
- *) Don't repeatedly append PBE algorithms to table if they already exist.
- Sort table on each new add. This effectively makes the table read only
- after all algorithms are added and subsequent calls to PKCS12_pbe_add
- etc are non-op.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- Changes between 0.9.8n and 0.9.8o [01 Jun 2010]
-
- [NB: OpenSSL 0.9.8o and later 0.9.8 patch levels were released after
- OpenSSL 1.0.0.]
-
- *) Correct a typo in the CMS ASN1 module which can result in invalid memory
- access or freeing data twice (CVE-2010-0742)
- [Steve Henson, Ronald Moesbergen <intercommit@gmail.com>]
-
- *) Add SHA2 algorithms to SSL_library_init(). SHA2 is becoming far more
- common in certificates and some applications which only call
- SSL_library_init and not OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms() will fail.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) VMS fixes:
- Reduce copying into .apps and .test in makevms.com
- Don't try to use blank CA certificate in CA.com
- Allow use of C files from original directories in maketests.com
- [Steven M. Schweda" <sms@antinode.info>]
-
Changes between 0.9.8m and 0.9.8n [24 Mar 2010]
*) When rejecting SSL/TLS records due to an incorrect version number, never
*) BN_CTX_get() should return zero-valued bignums, providing the same
initialised value as BN_new().
- [Geoff Thorpe, suggested by Ulf Möller]
+ [Geoff Thorpe, suggested by Ulf Möller]
*) Support for inhibitAnyPolicy certificate extension.
[Steve Henson]
some point, these tighter rules will become openssl's default to improve
maintainability, though the assert()s and other overheads will remain only
in debugging configurations. See bn.h for more details.
- [Geoff Thorpe, Nils Larsch, Ulf Möller]
+ [Geoff Thorpe, Nils Larsch, Ulf Möller]
*) BN_CTX_init() has been deprecated, as BN_CTX is an opaque structure
that can only be obtained through BN_CTX_new() (which implicitly
[Douglas Stebila (Sun Microsystems Laboratories)]
*) Add the possibility to load symbols globally with DSO.
- [Götz Babin-Ebell <babin-ebell@trustcenter.de> via Richard Levitte]
+ [Götz Babin-Ebell <babin-ebell@trustcenter.de> via Richard Levitte]
*) Add the functions ERR_set_mark() and ERR_pop_to_mark() for better
control of the error stack.
[Steve Henson]
*) Undo Cygwin change.
- [Ulf Möller]
+ [Ulf Möller]
*) Added support for proxy certificates according to RFC 3820.
Because they may be a security thread to unaware applications,
[Stephen Henson, reported by UK NISCC]
*) Use Windows randomness collection on Cygwin.
- [Ulf Möller]
+ [Ulf Möller]
*) Fix hang in EGD/PRNGD query when communication socket is closed
prematurely by EGD/PRNGD.
- [Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au> via Lutz Jänicke, resolves #1014]
+ [Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au> via Lutz Jänicke, resolves #1014]
*) Prompt for pass phrases when appropriate for PKCS12 input format.
[Steve Henson]
pointers passed to them whenever necessary. Otherwise it is possible
the caller may have overwritten (or deallocated) the original string
data when a later ENGINE operation tries to use the stored values.
- [Götz Babin-Ebell <babinebell@trustcenter.de>]
+ [Götz Babin-Ebell <babinebell@trustcenter.de>]
*) Improve diagnostics in file reading and command-line digests.
[Ben Laurie aided and abetted by Solar Designer <solar@openwall.com>]
[Bodo Moeller]
*) BN_sqr() bug fix.
- [Ulf Möller, reported by Jim Ellis <jim.ellis@cavium.com>]
+ [Ulf Möller, reported by Jim Ellis <jim.ellis@cavium.com>]
*) Rabin-Miller test analyses assume uniformly distributed witnesses,
so use BN_pseudo_rand_range() instead of using BN_pseudo_rand()
[Bodo Moeller]
*) Fix OAEP check.
- [Ulf Möller, Bodo Möller]
+ [Ulf Möller, Bodo Möller]
*) The countermeasure against Bleichbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5
RSA encryption was accidentally removed in s3_srvr.c in OpenSSL 0.9.5
[Bodo Moeller]
*) Use better test patterns in bntest.
- [Ulf Möller]
+ [Ulf Möller]
*) rand_win.c fix for Borland C.
- [Ulf Möller]
+ [Ulf Möller]
*) BN_rshift bugfix for n == 0.
[Bodo Moeller]
*) New BIO_shutdown_wr macro, which invokes the BIO_C_SHUTDOWN_WR
BIO_ctrl (for BIO pairs).
- [Bodo Möller]
+ [Bodo Möller]
*) Add DSO method for VMS.
[Richard Levitte]
*) Bug fix: Montgomery multiplication could produce results with the
wrong sign.
- [Ulf Möller]
+ [Ulf Möller]
*) Add RPM specification openssl.spec and modify it to build three
packages. The default package contains applications, application
*) Don't set the two most significant bits to one when generating a
random number < q in the DSA library.
- [Ulf Möller]
+ [Ulf Möller]
*) New SSL API mode 'SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY'. This disables the default
behaviour that SSL_read may result in SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ (even if
*) Randomness polling function for Win9x, as described in:
Peter Gutmann, Software Generation of Practically Strong
Random Numbers.
- [Ulf Möller]
+ [Ulf Möller]
*) Fix so PRNG is seeded in req if using an already existing
DSA key.
[Steve Henson]
*) Eliminate non-ANSI declarations in crypto.h and stack.h.
- [Ulf Möller]
+ [Ulf Möller]
*) Fix for SSL server purpose checking. Server checking was
rejecting certificates which had extended key usage present
[Bodo Moeller]
*) Bugfix for linux-elf makefile.one.
- [Ulf Möller]
+ [Ulf Möller]
*) RSA_get_default_method() will now cause a default
RSA_METHOD to be chosen if one doesn't exist already.
[Steve Henson]
*) des_quad_cksum() byte order bug fix.
- [Ulf Möller, using the problem description in krb4-0.9.7, where
+ [Ulf Möller, using the problem description in krb4-0.9.7, where
the solution is attributed to Derrick J Brashear <shadow@DEMENTIA.ORG>]
*) Fix so V_ASN1_APP_CHOOSE works again: however its use is strongly
[Rolf Haberrecker <rolf@suse.de>]
*) Assembler module support for Mingw32.
- [Ulf Möller]
+ [Ulf Möller]
*) Shared library support for HPUX (in shlib/).
[Lutz Jaenicke <Lutz.Jaenicke@aet.TU-Cottbus.DE> and Anonymous]
*) BN_mul bugfix: In bn_mul_part_recursion() only the a>a[n] && b>b[n]
case was implemented. This caused BN_div_recp() to fail occasionally.
- [Ulf Möller]
+ [Ulf Möller]
*) Add an optional second argument to the set_label() in the perl
assembly language builder. If this argument exists and is set
[Steve Henson]
*) Fix potential buffer overrun problem in BIO_printf().
- [Ulf Möller, using public domain code by Patrick Powell; problem
+ [Ulf Möller, using public domain code by Patrick Powell; problem
pointed out by David Sacerdote <das33@cornell.edu>]
*) Support EGD <http://www.lothar.com/tech/crypto/>. New functions
RAND_egd() and RAND_status(). In the command line application,
the EGD socket can be specified like a seed file using RANDFILE
or -rand.
- [Ulf Möller]
+ [Ulf Möller]
*) Allow the string CERTIFICATE to be tolerated in PKCS#7 structures.
Some CAs (e.g. Verisign) distribute certificates in this form.
#define OPENSSL_ALGORITHM_DEFINES
#include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
defines all pertinent NO_<algo> symbols, such as NO_IDEA, NO_RSA, etc.
- [Richard Levitte, Ulf and Bodo Möller]
+ [Richard Levitte, Ulf and Bodo Möller]
*) Bugfix: Tolerate fragmentation and interleaving in the SSL 3/TLS
record layer.
*) Bug fix for BN_div_recp() for numerators with an even number of
bits.
- [Ulf Möller]
+ [Ulf Möller]
*) More tests in bntest.c, and changed test_bn output.
- [Ulf Möller]
+ [Ulf Möller]
*) ./config recognizes MacOS X now.
[Andy Polyakov]
*) Bug fix for BN_div() when the first words of num and divsor are
equal (it gave wrong results if (rem=(n1-q*d0)&BN_MASK2) < d0).
- [Ulf Möller]
+ [Ulf Möller]
*) Add support for various broken PKCS#8 formats, and command line
options to produce them.
*) New functions BN_CTX_start(), BN_CTX_get() and BT_CTX_end() to
get temporary BIGNUMs from a BN_CTX.
- [Ulf Möller]
+ [Ulf Möller]
*) Correct return values in BN_mod_exp_mont() and BN_mod_exp2_mont()
for p == 0.
- [Ulf Möller]
+ [Ulf Möller]
*) Change the SSLeay_add_all_*() functions to OpenSSL_add_all_*() and
include a #define from the old name to the new. The original intent
*) Source code cleanups: use const where appropriate, eliminate casts,
use void * instead of char * in lhash.
- [Ulf Möller]
+ [Ulf Möller]
*) Bugfix: ssl3_send_server_key_exchange was not restartable
(the state was not changed to SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B, and because of
[Steve Henson]
*) New function BN_pseudo_rand().
- [Ulf Möller]
+ [Ulf Möller]
*) Clean up BN_mod_mul_montgomery(): replace the broken (and unreadable)
bignum version of BN_from_montgomery() with the working code from
SSLeay 0.9.0 (the word based version is faster anyway), and clean up
the comments.
- [Ulf Möller]
+ [Ulf Möller]
*) Avoid a race condition in s2_clnt.c (function get_server_hello) that
made it impossible to use the same SSL_SESSION data structure in
*) The return value of RAND_load_file() no longer counts bytes obtained
by stat(). RAND_load_file(..., -1) is new and uses the complete file
to seed the PRNG (previously an explicit byte count was required).
- [Ulf Möller, Bodo Möller]
+ [Ulf Möller, Bodo Möller]
*) Clean up CRYPTO_EX_DATA functions, some of these didn't have prototypes
used (char *) instead of (void *) and had casts all over the place.
[Steve Henson]
*) Make BN_generate_prime() return NULL on error if ret!=NULL.
- [Ulf Möller]
+ [Ulf Möller]
*) Retain source code compatibility for BN_prime_checks macro:
BN_is_prime(..., BN_prime_checks, ...) now uses
BN_prime_checks_for_size to determine the appropriate number of
Rabin-Miller iterations.
- [Ulf Möller]
+ [Ulf Möller]
*) Diffie-Hellman uses "safe" primes: DH_check() return code renamed to
DH_CHECK_P_NOT_SAFE_PRIME.
(Check if this is true? OpenPGP calls them "strong".)
- [Ulf Möller]
+ [Ulf Möller]
*) Merge the functionality of "dh" and "gendh" programs into a new program
"dhparam". The old programs are retained for now but will handle DH keys
*) Add missing #ifndefs that caused missing symbols when building libssl
as a shared library without RSA. Use #ifndef NO_SSL2 instead of
NO_RSA in ssl/s2*.c.
- [Kris Kennaway <kris@hub.freebsd.org>, modified by Ulf Möller]
+ [Kris Kennaway <kris@hub.freebsd.org>, modified by Ulf Möller]
*) Precautions against using the PRNG uninitialized: RAND_bytes() now
has a return value which indicates the quality of the random data
guaranteed to be unique but not unpredictable. RAND_add is like
RAND_seed, but takes an extra argument for an entropy estimate
(RAND_seed always assumes full entropy).
- [Ulf Möller]
+ [Ulf Möller]
*) Do more iterations of Rabin-Miller probable prime test (specifically,
3 for 1024-bit primes, 6 for 512-bit primes, 12 for 256-bit primes
[Steve Henson]
*) Honor the no-xxx Configure options when creating .DEF files.
- [Ulf Möller]
+ [Ulf Möller]
*) Add PKCS#10 attributes to field table: challengePassword,
unstructuredName and unstructuredAddress. These are taken from
*) More DES library cleanups: remove references to srand/rand and
delete an unused file.
- [Ulf Möller]
+ [Ulf Möller]
*) Add support for the the free Netwide assembler (NASM) under Win32,
since not many people have MASM (ml) and it can be hard to obtain.
worked.
*) Fix problems with no-hmac etc.
- [Ulf Möller, pointed out by Brian Wellington <bwelling@tislabs.com>]
+ [Ulf Möller, pointed out by Brian Wellington <bwelling@tislabs.com>]
*) New functions RSA_get_default_method(), RSA_set_method() and
RSA_get_method(). These allows replacement of RSA_METHODs without having
[Ben Laurie]
*) DES library cleanups.
- [Ulf Möller]
+ [Ulf Möller]
*) Add support for PKCS#5 v2.0 PBE algorithms. This will permit PKCS#8 to be
used with any cipher unlike PKCS#5 v1.5 which can at most handle 64 bit
[Christian Forster <fo@hawo.stw.uni-erlangen.de>]
*) config now generates no-xxx options for missing ciphers.
- [Ulf Möller]
+ [Ulf Möller]
*) Support the EBCDIC character set (work in progress).
File ebcdic.c not yet included because it has a different license.
[Bodo Moeller]
*) Move openssl.cnf out of lib/.
- [Ulf Möller]
+ [Ulf Möller]
*) Fix various things to let OpenSSL even pass ``egcc -pipe -O2 -Wall
-Wshadow -Wpointer-arith -Wcast-align -Wmissing-prototypes
[Ben Laurie]
*) Support Borland C++ builder.
- [Janez Jere <jj@void.si>, modified by Ulf Möller]
+ [Janez Jere <jj@void.si>, modified by Ulf Möller]
*) Support Mingw32.
- [Ulf Möller]
+ [Ulf Möller]
*) SHA-1 cleanups and performance enhancements.
[Andy Polyakov <appro@fy.chalmers.se>]
[Andy Polyakov <appro@fy.chalmers.se>]
*) Accept any -xxx and +xxx compiler options in Configure.
- [Ulf Möller]
+ [Ulf Möller]
*) Update HPUX configuration.
[Anonymous]
[Bodo Moeller]
*) OAEP decoding bug fix.
- [Ulf Möller]
+ [Ulf Möller]
*) Support INSTALL_PREFIX for package builders, as proposed by
David Harris.
[Niels Poppe <niels@netbox.org>]
*) New Configure option no-<cipher> (rsa, idea, rc5, ...).
- [Ulf Möller]
+ [Ulf Möller]
*) Add the PKCS#12 API documentation to openssl.txt. Preliminary support for
extension adding in x509 utility.
[Steve Henson]
*) Remove NOPROTO sections and error code comments.
- [Ulf Möller]
+ [Ulf Möller]
*) Partial rewrite of the DEF file generator to now parse the ANSI
prototypes.
[Steve Henson]
*) New Configure options --prefix=DIR and --openssldir=DIR.
- [Ulf Möller]
+ [Ulf Möller]
*) Complete rewrite of the error code script(s). It is all now handled
by one script at the top level which handles error code gathering,
[Steve Henson]
*) Move the autogenerated header file parts to crypto/opensslconf.h.
- [Ulf Möller]
+ [Ulf Möller]
*) Fix new 56-bit DES export ciphersuites: they were using 7 bytes instead of
8 of keying material. Merlin has also confirmed interop with this fix
[Andy Polyakov <appro@fy.chalmers.se>]
*) Change functions to ANSI C.
- [Ulf Möller]
+ [Ulf Möller]
*) Fix typos in error codes.
- [Martin Kraemer <Martin.Kraemer@MchP.Siemens.De>, Ulf Möller]
+ [Martin Kraemer <Martin.Kraemer@MchP.Siemens.De>, Ulf Möller]
*) Remove defunct assembler files from Configure.
- [Ulf Möller]
+ [Ulf Möller]
*) SPARC v8 assembler BIGNUM implementation.
[Andy Polyakov <appro@fy.chalmers.se>]
[Steve Henson]
*) New Configure option "rsaref".
- [Ulf Möller]
+ [Ulf Möller]
*) Don't auto-generate pem.h.
[Bodo Moeller]
*) New functions DSA_do_sign and DSA_do_verify to provide access to
the raw DSA values prior to ASN.1 encoding.
- [Ulf Möller]
+ [Ulf Möller]
*) Tweaks to Configure
[Niels Poppe <niels@netbox.org>]
[Steve Henson]
*) New variables $(RANLIB) and $(PERL) in the Makefiles.
- [Ulf Möller]
+ [Ulf Möller]
*) New config option to avoid instructions that are illegal on the 80386.
The default code is faster, but requires at least a 486.
- [Ulf Möller]
+ [Ulf Möller]
*) Got rid of old SSL2_CLIENT_VERSION (inconsistently used) and
SSL2_SERVER_VERSION (not used at all) macros, which are now the
Hagino <itojun@kame.net>]
*) File was opened incorrectly in randfile.c.
- [Ulf M
öller <ulf@fitug.de>]
+ [Ulf M
öller <ulf@fitug.de>]
*) Beginning of support for GeneralizedTime. d2i, i2d, check and print
functions. Also ASN1_TIME suite which is a CHOICE of UTCTime or
[Steve Henson]
*) Correct Linux 1 recognition in config.
- [Ulf M
öller <ulf@fitug.de>]
+ [Ulf M
öller <ulf@fitug.de>]
*) Remove pointless MD5 hash when using DSA keys in ca.
[Anonymous <nobody@replay.com>]
*) Fix the RSA header declarations that hid a bug I fixed in 0.9.0b but
was already fixed by Eric for 0.9.1 it seems.
- [Ben Laurie - pointed out by Ulf M
öller <ulf@fitug.de>]
+ [Ben Laurie - pointed out by Ulf M
öller <ulf@fitug.de>]
*) Autodetect FreeBSD3.
[Ben Laurie]
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff