OpenSSL CHANGES
_______________
- Changes between 0.9.8 and 0.9.9 [xx XXX xxxx]
+ Changes between 0.9.8a and 0.9.9 [xx XXX xxxx]
- *)
+ *) Disable rogue ciphersuites:
- Changes between 0.9.7h and 0.9.8 [xx XXX xxxx]
+ - SSLv2 0x08 0x00 0x80 ("RC4-64-MD5")
+ - SSLv3/TLSv1 0x00 0x61 ("EXP1024-RC2-CBC-MD5")
+ - SSLv3/TLSv1 0x00 0x60 ("EXP1024-RC4-MD5")
+
+ The latter two were purportedly from
+ draft-ietf-tls-56-bit-ciphersuites-0[01].txt, but do not really
+ appear there.
+
+ Other ciphersuites from draft-ietf-tls-56-bit-ciphersuites-01.txt
+ remain enabled for now, but are just as unofficial, and the ID
+ has long expired; these will probably disappear soon.
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Move code previously exiled into file crypto/ec/ec2_smpt.c
+ to ec2_smpl.c, and no longer require the OPENSSL_EC_BIN_PT_COMP
+ macro.
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) New candidate for BIGNUM assembler implementation, bn_mul_mont,
+ dedicated Montgomery multiplication procedure, is introduced.
+ BN_MONT_CTX is modified to allow bn_mul_mont to reach for higher
+ "64-bit" performance on certain 32-bit targets.
+ [Andy Polyakov]
+
+ *) New option SSL_OP_NO_COMP to disable use of compression selectively
+ in SSL structures. New SSL ctrl to set maximum send fragment size.
+ Save memory by seeting the I/O buffer sizes dynamically instead of
+ using the maximum available value.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) New option -V for 'openssl ciphers'. This prints the ciphersuite code
+ in addition to the text details.
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Very, very preliminary EXPERIMENTAL support for printing of general
+ ASN1 structures. This currently produces rather ugly output and doesn't
+ handle several customised structures at all.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Integrated support for PVK file format and some related formats such
+ as MS PUBLICKEYBLOB and PRIVATEKEYBLOB. Command line switches to support
+ these in the 'rsa' and 'dsa' utilities.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Support for PKCS#1 RSAPublicKey format on rsa utility command line.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Remove the ancient ASN1_METHOD code. This was only ever used in one
+ place for the (very old) "NETSCAPE" format certificates which are now
+ handled using new ASN1 code equivalents.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Let the TLSv1_method() etc. functions return a 'const' SSL_METHOD
+ pointer and make the SSL_METHOD parameter in SSL_CTX_new,
+ SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version and SSL_set_ssl_method 'const'.
+ [Nils Larsch]
+
+ *) Modify CRL distribution points extension code to print out previously
+ unsupported fields. Enhance extension setting code to allow setting of
+ all fields.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add print and set support for Issuing Distribution Point CRL extension.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.8a and 0.9.8b [XX xxx XXXX]
+
+ *) Add support for building of engines under engine/ as shared libraries
+ under VC++ build system.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Corrected the numerous bugs in the Win32 path splitter in DSO.
+ Hopefully, we will not see any false combination of paths any more.
+ [Richard Levitte]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.8 and 0.9.8a [11 Oct 2005]
+
+ *) Remove the functionality of SSL_OP_MSIE_SSLV2_RSA_PADDING
+ (part of SSL_OP_ALL). This option used to disable the
+ countermeasure against man-in-the-middle protocol-version
+ rollback in the SSL 2.0 server implementation, which is a bad
+ idea. (CVE-2005-2969)
+
+ [Bodo Moeller; problem pointed out by Yutaka Oiwa (Research Center
+ for Information Security, National Institute of Advanced Industrial
+ Science and Technology [AIST], Japan)]
+
+ *) Add two function to clear and return the verify parameter flags.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Keep cipherlists sorted in the source instead of sorting them at
+ runtime, thus removing the need for a lock.
+ [Nils Larsch]
+
+ *) Avoid some small subgroup attacks in Diffie-Hellman.
+ [Nick Mathewson and Ben Laurie]
+
+ *) Add functions for well-known primes.
+ [Nick Mathewson]
+
+ *) Extended Windows CE support.
+ [Satoshi Nakamura and Andy Polyakov]
+
+ *) Initialize SSL_METHOD structures at compile time instead of during
+ runtime, thus removing the need for a lock.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Make PKCS7_decrypt() work even if no certificate is supplied by
+ attempting to decrypt each encrypted key in turn. Add support to
+ smime utility.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.7h and 0.9.8 [05 Jul 2005]
+
+ *) Add libcrypto.pc and libssl.pc for those who feel they need them.
+ [Richard Levitte]
+
+ *) Change CA.sh and CA.pl so they don't bundle the CSR and the private
+ key into the same file any more.
+ [Richard Levitte]
+
+ *) Add initial support for Win64, both IA64 and AMD64/x64 flavors.
+ [Andy Polyakov]
+
+ *) Add -utf8 command line and config file option to 'ca'.
+ [Stefan <stf@udoma.org]
+
+ *) Removed the macro des_crypt(), as it seems to conflict with some
+ libraries. Use DES_crypt().
+ [Richard Levitte]
+
+ *) Correct naming of the 'chil' and '4758cca' ENGINEs. This
+ involves renaming the source and generated shared-libs for
+ both. The engines will accept the corrected or legacy ids
+ ('ncipher' and '4758_cca' respectively) when binding. NB,
+ this only applies when building 'shared'.
+ [Corinna Vinschen <vinschen@redhat.com> and Geoff Thorpe]
*) Add attribute functions to EVP_PKEY structure. Modify
PKCS12_create() to recognize a CSP name attribute and
differing sizes.
[Richard Levitte]
- Changes between 0.9.7g and 0.9.7h [XX xxx XXXX]
+ Changes between 0.9.7h and 0.9.7i [14 Oct 2005]
+
+ *) Wrapped the definition of EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE in a #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS.
+ The value now differs depending on if you build for FIPS or not.
+ BEWARE! A program linked with a shared FIPSed libcrypto can't be
+ safely run with a non-FIPSed libcrypto, as it may crash because of
+ the difference induced by this change.
+ [Andy Polyakov]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.7g and 0.9.7h [11 Oct 2005]
+
+ *) Remove the functionality of SSL_OP_MSIE_SSLV2_RSA_PADDING
+ (part of SSL_OP_ALL). This option used to disable the
+ countermeasure against man-in-the-middle protocol-version
+ rollback in the SSL 2.0 server implementation, which is a bad
+ idea. (CVE-2005-2969)
+
+ [Bodo Moeller; problem pointed out by Yutaka Oiwa (Research Center
+ for Information Security, National Institute of Advanced Industrial
+ Science and Technology [AIST], Japan)]
+
+ *) Minimal support for X9.31 signatures and PSS padding modes. This is
+ mainly for FIPS compliance and not fully integrated at this stage.
+ [Steve Henson]
*) For DSA signing, unless DSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME is set, perform
the exponentiation using a fixed-length exponent. (Otherwise,
Changes between 0.9.7f and 0.9.7g [11 Apr 2005]
+ [NB: OpenSSL 0.9.7h and later 0.9.7 patch levels were released after
+ OpenSSL 0.9.8.]
+
*) Fixes for newer kerberos headers. NB: the casts are needed because
the 'length' field is signed on one version and unsigned on another
with no (?) obvious way to tell the difference, without these VC++
Changes between 0.9.7c and 0.9.7d [17 Mar 2004]
*) Fix null-pointer assignment in do_change_cipher_spec() revealed
- by using the Codenomicon TLS Test Tool (CAN-2004-0079)
+ by using the Codenomicon TLS Test Tool (CVE-2004-0079)
[Joe Orton, Steve Henson]
*) Fix flaw in SSL/TLS handshaking when using Kerberos ciphersuites
- (CAN-2004-0112)
+ (CVE-2004-0112)
[Joe Orton, Steve Henson]
*) Make it possible to have multiple active certificates with the same
*) Fix various bugs revealed by running the NISCC test suite:
Stop out of bounds reads in the ASN1 code when presented with
- invalid tags (CAN-2003-0543 and CAN-2003-0544).
+ invalid tags (CVE-2003-0543 and CVE-2003-0544).
- Free up ASN1_TYPE correctly if ANY type is invalid (CAN-2003-0545).
+ Free up ASN1_TYPE correctly if ANY type is invalid (CVE-2003-0545).
If verify callback ignores invalid public key errors don't try to check
certificate signature with the NULL public key.
via timing by performing a MAC computation even if incorrrect
block cipher padding has been found. This is a countermeasure
against active attacks where the attacker has to distinguish
- between bad padding and a MAC verification error. (CAN-2003-0078)
+ between bad padding and a MAC verification error. (CVE-2003-0078)
[Bodo Moeller; problem pointed out by Brice Canvel (EPFL),
Alain Hiltgen (UBS), Serge Vaudenay (EPFL), and
Remote buffer overflow in SSL3 protocol - an attacker could
supply an oversized master key in Kerberos-enabled versions.
- (CAN-2002-0657)
+ (CVE-2002-0657)
[Ben Laurie (CHATS)]
*) Change the SSL kerb5 codes to match RFC 2712.
Changes between 0.9.6l and 0.9.6m [17 Mar 2004]
*) Fix null-pointer assignment in do_change_cipher_spec() revealed
- by using the Codenomicon TLS Test Tool (CAN-2004-0079)
+ by using the Codenomicon TLS Test Tool (CVE-2004-0079)
[Joe Orton, Steve Henson]
Changes between 0.9.6k and 0.9.6l [04 Nov 2003]
*) Fix additional bug revealed by the NISCC test suite:
Stop bug triggering large recursion when presented with
- certain ASN.1 tags (CAN-2003-0851)
+ certain ASN.1 tags (CVE-2003-0851)
[Steve Henson]
Changes between 0.9.6j and 0.9.6k [30 Sep 2003]
*) Fix various bugs revealed by running the NISCC test suite:
Stop out of bounds reads in the ASN1 code when presented with
- invalid tags (CAN-2003-0543 and CAN-2003-0544).
+ invalid tags (CVE-2003-0543 and CVE-2003-0544).
If verify callback ignores invalid public key errors don't try to check
certificate signature with the NULL public key.
via timing by performing a MAC computation even if incorrrect
block cipher padding has been found. This is a countermeasure
against active attacks where the attacker has to distinguish
- between bad padding and a MAC verification error. (CAN-2003-0078)
+ between bad padding and a MAC verification error. (CVE-2003-0078)
[Bodo Moeller; problem pointed out by Brice Canvel (EPFL),
Alain Hiltgen (UBS), Serge Vaudenay (EPFL), and
*) Add various sanity checks to asn1_get_length() to reject
the ASN1 length bytes if they exceed sizeof(long), will appear
negative or the content length exceeds the length of the
- supplied buffer. (CAN-2002-0659)
+ supplied buffer. (CVE-2002-0659)
[Steve Henson, Adi Stav <stav@mercury.co.il>, James Yonan <jim@ntlp.com>]
*) Assertions for various potential buffer overflows, not known to
[Ben Laurie (CHATS)]
*) Various temporary buffers to hold ASCII versions of integers were
- too small for 64 bit platforms. (CAN-2002-0655)
+ too small for 64 bit platforms. (CVE-2002-0655)
[Matthew Byng-Maddick <mbm@aldigital.co.uk> and Ben Laurie (CHATS)>
*) Remote buffer overflow in SSL3 protocol - an attacker could
- supply an oversized session ID to a client. (CAN-2002-0656)
+ supply an oversized session ID to a client. (CVE-2002-0656)
[Ben Laurie (CHATS)]
*) Remote buffer overflow in SSL2 protocol - an attacker could
- supply an oversized client master key. (CAN-2002-0656)
+ supply an oversized client master key. (CVE-2002-0656)
[Ben Laurie (CHATS)]
Changes between 0.9.6c and 0.9.6d [9 May 2002]
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff