+ Changes between 1.0.0g and 1.0.0h [12 Mar 2012]
+
+ *) Fix MMA (Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding) weakness
+ in CMS and PKCS7 code. When RSA decryption fails use a random key for
+ content decryption and always return the same error. Note: this attack
+ needs on average 2^20 messages so it only affects automated senders. The
+ old behaviour can be reenabled in the CMS code by setting the
+ CMS_DEBUG_DECRYPT flag: this is useful for debugging and testing where
+ an MMA defence is not necessary.
+ Thanks to Ivan Nestlerode <inestlerode@us.ibm.com> for discovering
+ this issue. (CVE-2012-0884)
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Fix CVE-2011-4619: make sure we really are receiving a
+ client hello before rejecting multiple SGC restarts. Thanks to
+ Ivan Nestlerode <inestlerode@us.ibm.com> for discovering this bug.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.0f and 1.0.0g [18 Jan 2012]
+
+ *) Fix for DTLS DoS issue introduced by fix for CVE-2011-4109.
+ Thanks to Antonio Martin, Enterprise Secure Access Research and
+ Development, Cisco Systems, Inc. for discovering this bug and
+ preparing a fix. (CVE-2012-0050)
+ [Antonio Martin]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.0e and 1.0.0f [4 Jan 2012]
+
+ *) Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson have discovered an extension
+ of the Vaudenay padding oracle attack on CBC mode encryption
+ which enables an efficient plaintext recovery attack against
+ the OpenSSL implementation of DTLS. Their attack exploits timing
+ differences arising during decryption processing. A research
+ paper describing this attack can be found at:
+ http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/~kp/dtls.pdf
+ Thanks go to Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson of the Information
+ Security Group at Royal Holloway, University of London
+ (www.isg.rhul.ac.uk) for discovering this flaw and to Robin Seggelmann
+ <seggelmann@fh-muenster.de> and Michael Tuexen <tuexen@fh-muenster.de>
+ for preparing the fix. (CVE-2011-4108)
+ [Robin Seggelmann, Michael Tuexen]
+
+ *) Clear bytes used for block padding of SSL 3.0 records.
+ (CVE-2011-4576)
+ [Adam Langley (Google)]
+
+ *) Only allow one SGC handshake restart for SSL/TLS. Thanks to George
+ Kadianakis <desnacked@gmail.com> for discovering this issue and
+ Adam Langley for preparing the fix. (CVE-2011-4619)
+ [Adam Langley (Google)]
+
+ *) Check parameters are not NULL in GOST ENGINE. (CVE-2012-0027)
+ [Andrey Kulikov <amdeich@gmail.com>]
+
+ *) Prevent malformed RFC3779 data triggering an assertion failure.
+ Thanks to Andrew Chi, BBN Technologies, for discovering the flaw
+ and Rob Austein <sra@hactrn.net> for fixing it. (CVE-2011-4577)
+ [Rob Austein <sra@hactrn.net>]
+
+ *) Improved PRNG seeding for VOS.
+ [Paul Green <Paul.Green@stratus.com>]
+
+ *) Fix ssl_ciph.c set-up race.
+ [Adam Langley (Google)]