OpenSSL CHANGES
_______________
- Changes between 1.0.2f and 1.1.0 [xx XXX xxxx]
+ Changes between 1.0.2g and 1.1.0 [xx XXX xxxx]
+
+ *) With Windows Visual Studio builds, the .pdb files are installed
+ alongside the installed libraries and executables. For a static
+ library installation, ossl_static.pdb is the associate compiler
+ generated .pdb file to be used when linking programs.
+ [Richard Levitte]
+
+ *) Remove openssl.spec. Packaging files belong with the packagers.
+ [Richard Levitte]
+
+ *) Automatic Darwin/OSX configuration has had a refresh, it will now
+ recognise x86_64 architectures automatically. You can still decide
+ to build for a different bitness with the environment variable
+ KERNEL_BITS (can be 32 or 64), for example:
+
+ KERNEL_BITS=32 ./config
+
+ [Richard Levitte]
+
+ *) Change default algorithms in pkcs8 utility to use PKCS#5 v2.0,
+ 256 bit AES and HMAC with SHA256.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Remove support for MIPS o32 ABI on IRIX (and IRIX only).
+ [Andy Polyakov]
+
+ *) Triple-DES ciphers have been moved from HIGH to MEDIUM.
+ [Rich Salz]
+
+ *) To enable users to have their own config files and build file templates,
+ Configure looks in the directory indicated by the environment variable
+ OPENSSL_LOCAL_CONFIG_DIR as well as the in-source Configurations/
+ directory. On VMS, OPENSSL_LOCAL_CONFIG_DIR is expected to be a logical
+ name and is used as is.
+ [Richard Levitte]
+
+ *) The following datatypes were made opaque: X509_OBJECT, X509_STORE_CTX,
+ X509_STORE, X509_LOOKUP, and X509_LOOKUP_METHOD. The unused type
+ X509_CERT_FILE_CTX was removed.
+ [Rich Salz]
+
+ *) "shared" builds are now the default. To create only static libraries use
+ the "no-shared" Configure option.
+ [Matt Caswell]
+
+ *) Remove the no-aes, no-hmac, no-rsa, no-sha and no-md5 Configure options.
+ All of these option have not worked for some while and are fundamental
+ algorithms.
+ [Matt Caswell]
+
+ *) Make various cleanup routines no-ops and mark them as deprecated. Most
+ global cleanup functions are no longer required because they are handled
+ via auto-deinit (see OPENSSL_init_crypto and OPENSSL_init_ssl man pages).
+ Explicitly de-initing can cause problems (e.g. where a library that uses
+ OpenSSL de-inits, but an application is still using it). The affected
+ functions are CONF_modules_free(), ENGINE_cleanup(), OBJ_cleanup(),
+ EVP_cleanup(), BIO_sock_cleanup(), CRYPTO_cleanup_all_ex_data(),
+ RAND_cleanup(), SSL_COMP_free_compression_methods(), ERR_free_strings() and
+ COMP_zlib_cleanup().
+ [Matt Caswell]
+
+ *) --strict-warnings no longer enables runtime debugging options
+ such as REF_DEBUG. Instead, debug options are automatically
+ enabled with '--debug' builds.
+ [Andy Polyakov, Emilia Käsper]
+
+ *) Made DH and DH_METHOD opaque. The structures for managing DH objects
+ have been moved out of the public header files. New functions for managing
+ these have been added.
+ [Matt Caswell]
+
+ *) Made RSA and RSA_METHOD opaque. The structures for managing RSA
+ objects have been moved out of the public header files. New
+ functions for managing these have been added.
+ [Richard Levitte]
+
+ *) Made DSA and DSA_METHOD opaque. The structures for managing DSA objects
+ have been moved out of the public header files. New functions for managing
+ these have been added.
+ [Matt Caswell]
+
+ *) Made BIO and BIO_METHOD opaque. The structures for managing BIOs have been
+ moved out of the public header files. New functions for managing these
+ have been added.
+ [Matt Caswell]
+
+ *) Removed no-rijndael as a config option. Rijndael is an old name for AES.
+ [Matt Caswell]
+
+ *) Removed the mk1mf build scripts.
+ [Richard Levitte]
+
+ *) Headers are now wrapped, if necessary, with OPENSSL_NO_xxx, so
+ it is always safe to #include a header now.
+ [Rich Salz]
+
+ *) Removed the aged BC-32 config and all its supporting scripts
+ [Richard Levitte]
+
+ *) Removed support for Ultrix, Netware, and OS/2.
+ [Rich Salz]
+
+ *) Add support for HKDF.
+ [Alessandro Ghedini]
+
+ *) Add support for blake2b and blake2s
+ [Bill Cox]
+
+ *) Added support for "pipelining". Ciphers that have the
+ EVP_CIPH_FLAG_PIPELINE flag set have a capability to process multiple
+ encryptions/decryptions simultaneously. There are currently no built-in
+ ciphers with this property but the expectation is that engines will be able
+ to offer it to significantly improve throughput. Support has been extended
+ into libssl so that multiple records for a single connection can be
+ processed in one go (for >=TLS 1.1).
+ [Matt Caswell]
+
+ *) Added the AFALG engine. This is an async capable engine which is able to
+ offload work to the Linux kernel. In this initial version it only supports
+ AES128-CBC. The kernel must be version 4.1.0 or greater.
+ [Catriona Lucey]
+
+ *) OpenSSL now uses a new threading API. It is no longer necessary to
+ set locking callbacks to use OpenSSL in a multi-threaded environment. There
+ are two supported threading models: pthreads and windows threads. It is
+ also possible to configure OpenSSL at compile time for "no-threads". The
+ old threading API should no longer be used. The functions have been
+ replaced with "no-op" compatibility macros.
+ [Alessandro Ghedini, Matt Caswell]
+
+ *) Modify behavior of ALPN to invoke callback after SNI/servername
+ callback, such that updates to the SSL_CTX affect ALPN.
+ [Todd Short]
+
+ *) Add SSL_CIPHER queries for authentication and key-exchange.
+ [Todd Short]
+
+ *) Changes to the DEFAULT cipherlist:
+ - Prefer (EC)DHE handshakes over plain RSA.
+ - Prefer AEAD ciphers over legacy ciphers.
+ - Prefer ECDSA over RSA when both certificates are available.
+ - Prefer TLSv1.2 ciphers/PRF.
+ - Remove DSS, SEED, IDEA, CAMELLIA, and AES-CCM from the
+ default cipherlist.
+ [Emilia Käsper]
+
+ *) Change the ECC default curve list to be this, in order: x25519,
+ secp256r1, secp521r1, secp384r1.
+ [Rich Salz]
+
+ *) RC4 based libssl ciphersuites are now classed as "weak" ciphers and are
+ disabled by default. They can be re-enabled using the
+ enable-weak-ssl-ciphers option to Configure.
+ [Matt Caswell]
+
+ *) If the server has ALPN configured, but supports no protocols that the
+ client advertises, send a fatal "no_application_protocol" alert.
+ This behaviour is SHALL in RFC 7301, though it isn't universally
+ implemented by other servers.
+ [Emilia Käsper]
+
+ *) Add X25519 support.
+ Integrate support for X25519 into EC library. This includes support
+ for public and private key encoding using the format documented in
+ draft-josefsson-pkix-newcurves-01: specifically X25519 uses the
+ OID from that draft, encodes public keys using little endian
+ format in the ECPoint structure and private keys using
+ little endian form in the privateKey field of the ECPrivateKey
+ structure. TLS support complies with draft-ietf-tls-rfc4492bis-06
+ and uses X25519(29).
+
+ Note: the current version supports key generation, public and
+ private key encoding and ECDH key agreement using the EC API.
+ Low level point operations such as EC_POINT_add(), EC_POINT_mul()
+ are NOT supported.
+ [Steve Henson]
*) Deprecate SRP_VBASE_get_by_user.
SRP_VBASE_get_by_user had inconsistent memory management behaviour.
whose return value is often ignored.
[Steve Henson]
+ *) New -noct, -requestct, -requirect and -ctlogfile options for s_client.
+ These allow SCTs (signed certificate timestamps) to be requested and
+ validated when establishing a connection.
+ [Rob Percival <robpercival@google.com>]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.2g and 1.0.2h [3 May 2016]
+
+ *) Prevent padding oracle in AES-NI CBC MAC check
+
+ A MITM attacker can use a padding oracle attack to decrypt traffic
+ when the connection uses an AES CBC cipher and the server support
+ AES-NI.
+
+ This issue was introduced as part of the fix for Lucky 13 padding
+ attack (CVE-2013-0169). The padding check was rewritten to be in
+ constant time by making sure that always the same bytes are read and
+ compared against either the MAC or padding bytes. But it no longer
+ checked that there was enough data to have both the MAC and padding
+ bytes.
+
+ This issue was reported by Juraj Somorovsky using TLS-Attacker.
+ (CVE-2016-2107)
+ [Kurt Roeckx]
+
+ *) Fix EVP_EncodeUpdate overflow
+
+ An overflow can occur in the EVP_EncodeUpdate() function which is used for
+ Base64 encoding of binary data. If an attacker is able to supply very large
+ amounts of input data then a length check can overflow resulting in a heap
+ corruption.
+
+ Internally to OpenSSL the EVP_EncodeUpdate() function is primarily used by
+ the PEM_write_bio* family of functions. These are mainly used within the
+ OpenSSL command line applications, so any application which processes data
+ from an untrusted source and outputs it as a PEM file should be considered
+ vulnerable to this issue. User applications that call these APIs directly
+ with large amounts of untrusted data may also be vulnerable.
+
+ This issue was reported by Guido Vranken.
+ (CVE-2016-2105)
+ [Matt Caswell]
+
+ *) Fix EVP_EncryptUpdate overflow
+
+ An overflow can occur in the EVP_EncryptUpdate() function. If an attacker
+ is able to supply very large amounts of input data after a previous call to
+ EVP_EncryptUpdate() with a partial block then a length check can overflow
+ resulting in a heap corruption. Following an analysis of all OpenSSL
+ internal usage of the EVP_EncryptUpdate() function all usage is one of two
+ forms. The first form is where the EVP_EncryptUpdate() call is known to be
+ the first called function after an EVP_EncryptInit(), and therefore that
+ specific call must be safe. The second form is where the length passed to
+ EVP_EncryptUpdate() can be seen from the code to be some small value and
+ therefore there is no possibility of an overflow. Since all instances are
+ one of these two forms, it is believed that there can be no overflows in
+ internal code due to this problem. It should be noted that
+ EVP_DecryptUpdate() can call EVP_EncryptUpdate() in certain code paths.
+ Also EVP_CipherUpdate() is a synonym for EVP_EncryptUpdate(). All instances
+ of these calls have also been analysed too and it is believed there are no
+ instances in internal usage where an overflow could occur.
+
+ This issue was reported by Guido Vranken.
+ (CVE-2016-2106)
+ [Matt Caswell]
+
+ *) Prevent ASN.1 BIO excessive memory allocation
+
+ When ASN.1 data is read from a BIO using functions such as d2i_CMS_bio()
+ a short invalid encoding can cause allocation of large amounts of memory
+ potentially consuming excessive resources or exhausting memory.
+
+ Any application parsing untrusted data through d2i BIO functions is
+ affected. The memory based functions such as d2i_X509() are *not* affected.
+ Since the memory based functions are used by the TLS library, TLS
+ applications are not affected.
+
+ This issue was reported by Brian Carpenter.
+ (CVE-2016-2109)
+ [Stephen Henson]
+
+ *) EBCDIC overread
+
+ ASN1 Strings that are over 1024 bytes can cause an overread in applications
+ using the X509_NAME_oneline() function on EBCDIC systems. This could result
+ in arbitrary stack data being returned in the buffer.
+
+ This issue was reported by Guido Vranken.
+ (CVE-2016-2176)
+ [Matt Caswell]
+
+ *) Modify behavior of ALPN to invoke callback after SNI/servername
+ callback, such that updates to the SSL_CTX affect ALPN.
+ [Todd Short]
+
+ *) Remove LOW from the DEFAULT cipher list. This removes singles DES from the
+ default.
+ [Kurt Roeckx]
+
+ *) Only remove the SSLv2 methods with the no-ssl2-method option. When the
+ methods are enabled and ssl2 is disabled the methods return NULL.
+ [Kurt Roeckx]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.2f and 1.0.2g [1 Mar 2016]
+
+ * Disable weak ciphers in SSLv3 and up in default builds of OpenSSL.
+ Builds that are not configured with "enable-weak-ssl-ciphers" will not
+ provide any "EXPORT" or "LOW" strength ciphers.
+ [Viktor Dukhovni]
+
+ * Disable SSLv2 default build, default negotiation and weak ciphers. SSLv2
+ is by default disabled at build-time. Builds that are not configured with
+ "enable-ssl2" will not support SSLv2. Even if "enable-ssl2" is used,
+ users who want to negotiate SSLv2 via the version-flexible SSLv23_method()
+ will need to explicitly call either of:
+
+ SSL_CTX_clear_options(ctx, SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2);
+ or
+ SSL_clear_options(ssl, SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2);
+
+ as appropriate. Even if either of those is used, or the application
+ explicitly uses the version-specific SSLv2_method() or its client and
+ server variants, SSLv2 ciphers vulnerable to exhaustive search key
+ recovery have been removed. Specifically, the SSLv2 40-bit EXPORT
+ ciphers, and SSLv2 56-bit DES are no longer available.
+ (CVE-2016-0800)
+ [Viktor Dukhovni]
+
+ *) Fix a double-free in DSA code
+
+ A double free bug was discovered when OpenSSL parses malformed DSA private
+ keys and could lead to a DoS attack or memory corruption for applications
+ that receive DSA private keys from untrusted sources. This scenario is
+ considered rare.
+
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Adam Langley(Google/BoringSSL) using
+ libFuzzer.
+ (CVE-2016-0705)
+ [Stephen Henson]
+
+ *) Disable SRP fake user seed to address a server memory leak.
+
+ Add a new method SRP_VBASE_get1_by_user that handles the seed properly.
+
+ SRP_VBASE_get_by_user had inconsistent memory management behaviour.
+ In order to fix an unavoidable memory leak, SRP_VBASE_get_by_user
+ was changed to ignore the "fake user" SRP seed, even if the seed
+ is configured.
+
+ Users should use SRP_VBASE_get1_by_user instead. Note that in
+ SRP_VBASE_get1_by_user, caller must free the returned value. Note
+ also that even though configuring the SRP seed attempts to hide
+ invalid usernames by continuing the handshake with fake
+ credentials, this behaviour is not constant time and no strong
+ guarantees are made that the handshake is indistinguishable from
+ that of a valid user.
+ (CVE-2016-0798)
+ [Emilia Käsper]
+
+ *) Fix BN_hex2bn/BN_dec2bn NULL pointer deref/heap corruption
+
+ In the BN_hex2bn function the number of hex digits is calculated using an
+ int value |i|. Later |bn_expand| is called with a value of |i * 4|. For
+ large values of |i| this can result in |bn_expand| not allocating any
+ memory because |i * 4| is negative. This can leave the internal BIGNUM data
+ field as NULL leading to a subsequent NULL ptr deref. For very large values
+ of |i|, the calculation |i * 4| could be a positive value smaller than |i|.
+ In this case memory is allocated to the internal BIGNUM data field, but it
+ is insufficiently sized leading to heap corruption. A similar issue exists
+ in BN_dec2bn. This could have security consequences if BN_hex2bn/BN_dec2bn
+ is ever called by user applications with very large untrusted hex/dec data.
+ This is anticipated to be a rare occurrence.
+
+ All OpenSSL internal usage of these functions use data that is not expected
+ to be untrusted, e.g. config file data or application command line
+ arguments. If user developed applications generate config file data based
+ on untrusted data then it is possible that this could also lead to security
+ consequences. This is also anticipated to be rare.
+
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Guido Vranken.
+ (CVE-2016-0797)
+ [Matt Caswell]
+
+ *) Fix memory issues in BIO_*printf functions
+
+ The internal |fmtstr| function used in processing a "%s" format string in
+ the BIO_*printf functions could overflow while calculating the length of a
+ string and cause an OOB read when printing very long strings.
+
+ Additionally the internal |doapr_outch| function can attempt to write to an
+ OOB memory location (at an offset from the NULL pointer) in the event of a
+ memory allocation failure. In 1.0.2 and below this could be caused where
+ the size of a buffer to be allocated is greater than INT_MAX. E.g. this
+ could be in processing a very long "%s" format string. Memory leaks can
+ also occur.
+
+ The first issue may mask the second issue dependent on compiler behaviour.
+ These problems could enable attacks where large amounts of untrusted data
+ is passed to the BIO_*printf functions. If applications use these functions
+ in this way then they could be vulnerable. OpenSSL itself uses these
+ functions when printing out human-readable dumps of ASN.1 data. Therefore
+ applications that print this data could be vulnerable if the data is from
+ untrusted sources. OpenSSL command line applications could also be
+ vulnerable where they print out ASN.1 data, or if untrusted data is passed
+ as command line arguments.
+
+ Libssl is not considered directly vulnerable. Additionally certificates etc
+ received via remote connections via libssl are also unlikely to be able to
+ trigger these issues because of message size limits enforced within libssl.
+
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL Guido Vranken.
+ (CVE-2016-0799)
+ [Matt Caswell]
+
+ *) Side channel attack on modular exponentiation
+
+ A side-channel attack was found which makes use of cache-bank conflicts on
+ the Intel Sandy-Bridge microarchitecture which could lead to the recovery
+ of RSA keys. The ability to exploit this issue is limited as it relies on
+ an attacker who has control of code in a thread running on the same
+ hyper-threaded core as the victim thread which is performing decryptions.
+
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Yuval Yarom, The University of
+ Adelaide and NICTA, Daniel Genkin, Technion and Tel Aviv University, and
+ Nadia Heninger, University of Pennsylvania with more information at
+ http://cachebleed.info.
+ (CVE-2016-0702)
+ [Andy Polyakov]
+
+ *) Change the req app to generate a 2048-bit RSA/DSA key by default,
+ if no keysize is specified with default_bits. This fixes an
+ omission in an earlier change that changed all RSA/DSA key generation
+ apps to use 2048 bits by default.
+ [Emilia Käsper]
+
Changes between 1.0.2e and 1.0.2f [28 Jan 2016]
*) DH small subgroups
*) Alternate chains certificate forgery
- During certificate verfification, OpenSSL will attempt to find an
+ During certificate verification, OpenSSL will attempt to find an
alternative certificate chain if the first attempt to build such a chain
fails. An error in the implementation of this logic can mean that an
attacker could cause certain checks on untrusted certificates to be
*) Facilitate "universal" ARM builds targeting range of ARM ISAs, e.g.
ARMv5 through ARMv8, as opposite to "locking" it to single one.
- So far those who have to target multiple plaforms would compromise
+ So far those who have to target multiple platforms would compromise
and argue that binary targeting say ARMv5 would still execute on
ARMv8. "Universal" build resolves this compromise by providing
near-optimal performance even on newer platforms.
[Steve Henson]
*) Use algorithm specific chains in SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file():
- this fixes a limiation in previous versions of OpenSSL.
+ this fixes a limitation in previous versions of OpenSSL.
[Steve Henson]
*) Extended RSA OAEP support via EVP_PKEY API. Options to specify digest,
*) Add support for certificate stores in CERT structure. This makes it
possible to have different stores per SSL structure or one store in
- the parent SSL_CTX. Include distint stores for certificate chain
+ the parent SSL_CTX. Include distinct stores for certificate chain
verification and chain building. New ctrl SSL_CTRL_BUILD_CERT_CHAIN
to build and store a certificate chain in CERT structure: returing
an error if the chain cannot be built: this will allow applications
[Steve Henson]
*) Integrate hostname, email address and IP address checking with certificate
- verification. New verify options supporting checking in opensl utility.
+ verification. New verify options supporting checking in openssl utility.
[Steve Henson]
*) Fixes and wildcard matching support to hostname and email checking
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff