OpenSSL CHANGES
_______________
- Changes between 1.1.0a and 1.1.1 [xx XXX xxxx]
+ Changes between 1.1.0e and 1.1.1 [xx XXX xxxx]
- *) MDC2 is now disabled by default.
- [Rich Salz]
+ *) Add EC_KEY_get0_engine(), which does for EC_KEY what RSA_get0_engine()
+ does for RSA, etc.
+ [Richard Levitte]
+
+ *) Have 'config' recognise 64-bit mingw and choose 'mingw64' as the target
+ platform rather than 'mingw'.
+ [Richard Levitte]
+
+ *) x86_64 assembly pack: annotate code with DWARF CFI directives to
+ facilitate stack unwinding even from assembly subroutines.
+ [Andy Polyakov]
+
+ *) Remove VAX C specific definitions of OPENSSL_EXPORT, OPENSSL_EXTERN.
+ Also remove OPENSSL_GLOBAL entirely, as it became a no-op.
+ [Richard Levitte]
+
+ *) Remove the VMS-specific reimplementation of gmtime from crypto/o_times.c.
+ VMS C's RTL has a fully up to date gmtime() and gmtime_r() since V7.1,
+ which is the minimum version we support.
+ [Richard Levitte]
+
+ *) Certificate time validation (X509_cmp_time) enforces stricter
+ compliance with RFC 5280. Fractional seconds and timezone offsets
+ are no longer allowed.
+ [Emilia Käsper]
+
+ *) Add support for ARIA
+ [Paul Dale]
+
+ *) Add support for SipHash
+ [Todd Short]
+
+ *) OpenSSL now fails if it receives an unrecognised record type in TLS1.0
+ or TLS1.1. Previously this only happened in SSLv3 and TLS1.2. This is to
+ prevent issues where no progress is being made and the peer continually
+ sends unrecognised record types, using up resources processing them.
+ [Matt Caswell]
*) 'openssl passwd' can now produce SHA256 and SHA512 based output,
using the algorithm defined in
https://www.akkadia.org/drepper/SHA-crypt.txt
[Richard Levitte]
- Changes between 1.1.0b and 1.1.0c [xx XXX xxxx]
+ *) Heartbeat support has been removed; the ABI is changed for now.
+ [Richard Levitte, Rich Salz]
+
+ *) Support for SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC in SSL_CONF_cmd.
+ [Emilia Käsper]
+
+ Changes between 1.1.0d and 1.1.0e [16 Feb 2017]
+
+ *) Encrypt-Then-Mac renegotiation crash
+
+ During a renegotiation handshake if the Encrypt-Then-Mac extension is
+ negotiated where it was not in the original handshake (or vice-versa) then
+ this can cause OpenSSL to crash (dependant on ciphersuite). Both clients
+ and servers are affected.
+
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Joe Orton (Red Hat).
+ (CVE-2017-3733)
+ [Matt Caswell]
+
+ Changes between 1.1.0c and 1.1.0d [26 Jan 2017]
+
+ *) Truncated packet could crash via OOB read
+
+ If one side of an SSL/TLS path is running on a 32-bit host and a specific
+ cipher is being used, then a truncated packet can cause that host to
+ perform an out-of-bounds read, usually resulting in a crash.
+
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Robert Święcki of Google.
+ (CVE-2017-3731)
+ [Andy Polyakov]
+
+ *) Bad (EC)DHE parameters cause a client crash
+
+ If a malicious server supplies bad parameters for a DHE or ECDHE key
+ exchange then this can result in the client attempting to dereference a
+ NULL pointer leading to a client crash. This could be exploited in a Denial
+ of Service attack.
+
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Guido Vranken.
+ (CVE-2017-3730)
+ [Matt Caswell]
+
+ *) BN_mod_exp may produce incorrect results on x86_64
+
+ There is a carry propagating bug in the x86_64 Montgomery squaring
+ procedure. No EC algorithms are affected. Analysis suggests that attacks
+ against RSA and DSA as a result of this defect would be very difficult to
+ perform and are not believed likely. Attacks against DH are considered just
+ feasible (although very difficult) because most of the work necessary to
+ deduce information about a private key may be performed offline. The amount
+ of resources required for such an attack would be very significant and
+ likely only accessible to a limited number of attackers. An attacker would
+ additionally need online access to an unpatched system using the target
+ private key in a scenario with persistent DH parameters and a private
+ key that is shared between multiple clients. For example this can occur by
+ default in OpenSSL DHE based SSL/TLS ciphersuites. Note: This issue is very
+ similar to CVE-2015-3193 but must be treated as a separate problem.
+
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL by the OSS-Fuzz project.
+ (CVE-2017-3732)
+ [Andy Polyakov]
+
+ Changes between 1.1.0b and 1.1.0c [10 Nov 2016]
+
+ *) ChaCha20/Poly1305 heap-buffer-overflow
+
+ TLS connections using *-CHACHA20-POLY1305 ciphersuites are susceptible to
+ a DoS attack by corrupting larger payloads. This can result in an OpenSSL
+ crash. This issue is not considered to be exploitable beyond a DoS.
+
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Robert Święcki (Google Security Team)
+ (CVE-2016-7054)
+ [Richard Levitte]
+
+ *) CMS Null dereference
+
+ Applications parsing invalid CMS structures can crash with a NULL pointer
+ dereference. This is caused by a bug in the handling of the ASN.1 CHOICE
+ type in OpenSSL 1.1.0 which can result in a NULL value being passed to the
+ structure callback if an attempt is made to free certain invalid encodings.
+ Only CHOICE structures using a callback which do not handle NULL value are
+ affected.
+
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Tyler Nighswander of ForAllSecure.
+ (CVE-2016-7053)
+ [Stephen Henson]
+
+ *) Montgomery multiplication may produce incorrect results
+
+ There is a carry propagating bug in the Broadwell-specific Montgomery
+ multiplication procedure that handles input lengths divisible by, but
+ longer than 256 bits. Analysis suggests that attacks against RSA, DSA
+ and DH private keys are impossible. This is because the subroutine in
+ question is not used in operations with the private key itself and an input
+ of the attacker's direct choice. Otherwise the bug can manifest itself as
+ transient authentication and key negotiation failures or reproducible
+ erroneous outcome of public-key operations with specially crafted input.
+ Among EC algorithms only Brainpool P-512 curves are affected and one
+ presumably can attack ECDH key negotiation. Impact was not analyzed in
+ detail, because pre-requisites for attack are considered unlikely. Namely
+ multiple clients have to choose the curve in question and the server has to
+ share the private key among them, neither of which is default behaviour.
+ Even then only clients that chose the curve will be affected.
+
+ This issue was publicly reported as transient failures and was not
+ initially recognized as a security issue. Thanks to Richard Morgan for
+ providing reproducible case.
+ (CVE-2016-7055)
+ [Andy Polyakov]
*) Removed automatic addition of RPATH in shared libraries and executables,
as this was a remainder from OpenSSL 1.0.x and isn't needed any more.
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff