OpenSSL CHANGES
_______________
- Changes between 1.0.0 and 1.1.0 [xx XXX xxxx]
+ Changes between 1.0.1 and 1.1.0 [xx XXX xxxx]
- *) Initial TLSv1.1 support. Since TLSv1.1 is very similar to TLS v1.0 only
- a few changes are required:
+ *) New ctrls to retrieve and set certificate types in a certificate
+ request message. Print out received values in s_client. If certificate
+ types is not set with custom values set sensible values based on
+ supported signature algorithms.
+ [Steve Henson]
- Add SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1 flag.
- Add TLSv1_1 methods.
- Update version checking logic to handle version 1.1.
- Add explicit IV handling (ported from DTLS code).
- Add command line options to s_client/s_server.
+ *) Support for distinct client and server supported signature algorithms.
[Steve Henson]
- *) Experiemental password based recipient info support for CMS library:
- implementing RFC3211.
+ *) Add certificate callback. If set this is called whenever a certificate
+ is required by client or server. An application can decide which
+ certificate chain to present based on arbitrary criteria: for example
+ supported signature algorithms. Add very simple example to s_server.
+ This fixes many of the problems and restrictions of the existing client
+ certificate callback: for example you can now clear an existing
+ certificate and specify the whole chain.
[Steve Henson]
- *) Split password based encryption into PBES2 and PBKDF2 functions. This
- neatly separates the code into cipher and PBE sections and is required
- for some algorithms that split PBES2 into separate pieces (such as
- password based CMS).
+ *) Add new "valid_flags" field to CERT_PKEY structure which determines what
+ the certificate can be used for (if anything). Set valid_flags field
+ in new tls1_check_chain function. Simplify ssl_set_cert_masks which used
+ to have similar checks in it.
+
+ Add new "cert_flags" field to CERT structure and include a "strict mode".
+ This enforces some TLS certificate requirements (such as only permitting
+ certificate signature algorithms contained in the supported algorithms
+ extension) which some implementations ignore: this option should be used
+ with caution as it could cause interoperability issues.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Update and tidy signature algorithm extension processing. Work out
+ shared signature algorithms based on preferences and peer algorithms
+ and print them out in s_client and s_server. Abort handshake if no
+ shared signature algorithms.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add new functions to allow customised supported signature algorithms
+ for SSL and SSL_CTX structures. Add options to s_client and s_server
+ to support them.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) New function SSL_certs_clear() to delete all references to certificates
+ from an SSL structure. Before this once a certificate had been added
+ it couldn't be removed.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Initial SSL tracing code. This parses out SSL/TLS records using the
+ message callback and prints the results. Needs compile time option
+ "enable-ssl-trace". New options to s_client and s_server to enable
+ tracing.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) New functions to retrieve certificate signature and signature
+ OID NID.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Print out deprecated issuer and subject unique ID fields in
+ certificates.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) RFC 5878 support.
+ [Emilia Kasper, Adam Langley, Ben Laurie (Google)]
+
+ *) Support for automatic EC temporary key parameter selection. If enabled
+ the most preferred EC parameters are automatically used instead of
+ hardcoded fixed parameters. Now a server just has to call:
+ SSL_CTX_set_ecdh_auto(ctx, 1) and the server will automatically
+ support ECDH and use the most appropriate parameters.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Enhance and tidy EC curve and point format TLS extension code. Use
+ static structures instead of allocation if default values are used.
+ New ctrls to set curves we wish to support and to retrieve shared curves.
+ Print out shared curves in s_server. New options to s_server and s_client
+ to set list of supported curves.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) New ctrls to retrieve supported signature algorithms and
+ supported curve values as an array of NIDs. Extend openssl utility
+ to print out received values.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add new APIs EC_curve_nist2nid and EC_curve_nid2nist which convert
+ between NIDs and the more common NIST names such as "P-256". Enhance
+ ecparam utility and ECC method to recognise the NIST names for curves.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Enhance SSL/TLS certificate chain handling to support different
+ chains for each certificate instead of one chain in the parent SSL_CTX.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Support for fixed DH ciphersuite client authentication: where both
+ server and client use DH certificates with common parameters.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Support for fixed DH ciphersuites: those requiring DH server
+ certificates.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Transparently support X9.42 DH parameters when calling
+ PEM_read_bio_DHparameters. This means existing applications can handle
+ the new parameter format automatically.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Initial experimental support for X9.42 DH parameter format: mainly
+ to support use of 'q' parameter for RFC5114 parameters.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add DH parameters from RFC5114 including test data to dhtest.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Update fips_test_suite to support multiple command line options. New
+ test to induce all self test errors in sequence and check expected
+ failures.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add FIPS_{rsa,dsa,ecdsa}_{sign,verify} functions which digest and
+ sign or verify all in one operation.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add fips_algvs: a multicall fips utility incorporaing all the algorithm
+ test programs and fips_test_suite. Includes functionality to parse
+ the minimal script output of fipsalgest.pl directly.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add authorisation parameter to FIPS_module_mode_set().
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add FIPS selftest for ECDH algorithm using P-224 and B-233 curves.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Use separate DRBG fields for internal and external flags. New function
+ FIPS_drbg_health_check() to perform on demand health checking. Add
+ generation tests to fips_test_suite with reduced health check interval to
+ demonstrate periodic health checking. Add "nodh" option to
+ fips_test_suite to skip very slow DH test.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) New function FIPS_get_cipherbynid() to lookup FIPS supported ciphers
+ based on NID.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) More extensive health check for DRBG checking many more failure modes.
+ New function FIPS_selftest_drbg_all() to handle every possible DRBG
+ combination: call this in fips_test_suite.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add support for Dual EC DRBG from SP800-90. Update DRBG algorithm test
+ and POST to handle Dual EC cases.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add support for canonical generation of DSA parameter 'g'. See
+ FIPS 186-3 A.2.3.
+
+ *) Add support for HMAC DRBG from SP800-90. Update DRBG algorithm test and
+ POST to handle HMAC cases.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add functions FIPS_module_version() and FIPS_module_version_text()
+ to return numberical and string versions of the FIPS module number.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Rename FIPS_mode_set and FIPS_mode to FIPS_module_mode_set and
+ FIPS_module_mode. FIPS_mode and FIPS_mode_set will be implmeneted
+ outside the validated module in the FIPS capable OpenSSL.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Minor change to DRBG entropy callback semantics. In some cases
+ there is no mutiple of the block length between min_len and
+ max_len. Allow the callback to return more than max_len bytes
+ of entropy but discard any extra: it is the callback's responsibility
+ to ensure that the extra data discarded does not impact the
+ requested amount of entropy.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add PRNG security strength checks to RSA, DSA and ECDSA using
+ information in FIPS186-3, SP800-57 and SP800-131A.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) CCM support via EVP. Interface is very similar to GCM case except we
+ must supply all data in one chunk (i.e. no update, final) and the
+ message length must be supplied if AAD is used. Add algorithm test
+ support.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Initial version of POST overhaul. Add POST callback to allow the status
+ of POST to be monitored and/or failures induced. Modify fips_test_suite
+ to use callback. Always run all selftests even if one fails.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) XTS support including algorithm test driver in the fips_gcmtest program.
+ Note: this does increase the maximum key length from 32 to 64 bytes but
+ there should be no binary compatibility issues as existing applications
+ will never use XTS mode.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Extensive reorganisation of FIPS PRNG behaviour. Remove all dependencies
+ to OpenSSL RAND code and replace with a tiny FIPS RAND API which also
+ performs algorithm blocking for unapproved PRNG types. Also do not
+ set PRNG type in FIPS_mode_set(): leave this to the application.
+ Add default OpenSSL DRBG handling: sets up FIPS PRNG and seeds with
+ the standard OpenSSL PRNG: set additional data to a date time vector.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Rename old X9.31 PRNG functions of the form FIPS_rand* to FIPS_x931*.
+ This shouldn't present any incompatibility problems because applications
+ shouldn't be using these directly and any that are will need to rethink
+ anyway as the X9.31 PRNG is now deprecated by FIPS 140-2
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Extensive self tests and health checking required by SP800-90 DRBG.
+ Remove strength parameter from FIPS_drbg_instantiate and always
+ instantiate at maximum supported strength.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add ECDH code to fips module and fips_ecdhvs for primitives only testing.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) New algorithm test program fips_dhvs to handle DH primitives only testing.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) New function DH_compute_key_padded() to compute a DH key and pad with
+ leading zeroes if needed: this complies with SP800-56A et al.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Initial implementation of SP800-90 DRBGs for Hash and CTR. Not used by
+ anything, incomplete, subject to change and largely untested at present.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Modify fipscanisteronly build option to only build the necessary object
+ files by filtering FIPS_EX_OBJ through a perl script in crypto/Makefile.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add experimental option FIPSSYMS to give all symbols in
+ fipscanister.o and FIPS or fips prefix. This will avoid
+ conflicts with future versions of OpenSSL. Add perl script
+ util/fipsas.pl to preprocess assembly language source files
+ and rename any affected symbols.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add selftest checks and algorithm block of non-fips algorithms in
+ FIPS mode. Remove DES2 from selftests.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add ECDSA code to fips module. Add tiny fips_ecdsa_check to just
+ return internal method without any ENGINE dependencies. Add new
+ tiny fips sign and verify functions.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) New build option no-ec2m to disable characteristic 2 code.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) New build option "fipscanisteronly". This only builds fipscanister.o
+ and (currently) associated fips utilities. Uses the file Makefile.fips
+ instead of Makefile.org as the prototype.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add some FIPS mode restrictions to GCM. Add internal IV generator.
+ Update fips_gcmtest to use IV generator.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Initial, experimental EVP support for AES-GCM. AAD can be input by
+ setting output buffer to NULL. The *Final function must be
+ called although it will not retrieve any additional data. The tag
+ can be set or retrieved with a ctrl. The IV length is by default 12
+ bytes (96 bits) but can be set to an alternative value. If the IV
+ length exceeds the maximum IV length (currently 16 bytes) it cannot be
+ set before the key.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) New flag in ciphers: EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER. This means the
+ underlying do_cipher function handles all cipher semantics itself
+ including padding and finalisation. This is useful if (for example)
+ an ENGINE cipher handles block padding itself. The behaviour of
+ do_cipher is subtly changed if this flag is set: the return value
+ is the number of characters written to the output buffer (zero is
+ no longer an error code) or a negative error code. Also if the
+ input buffer is NULL and length 0 finalisation should be performed.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) If a candidate issuer certificate is already part of the constructed
+ path ignore it: new debug notification X509_V_ERR_PATH_LOOP for this case.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Improve forward-security support: add functions
+
+ void SSL_CTX_set_not_resumable_session_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, int is_forward_secure))
+ void SSL_set_not_resumable_session_callback(SSL *ssl, int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, int is_forward_secure))
+
+ for use by SSL/TLS servers; the callback function will be called whenever a
+ new session is created, and gets to decide whether the session may be
+ cached to make it resumable (return 0) or not (return 1). (As by the
+ SSL/TLS protocol specifications, the session_id sent by the server will be
+ empty to indicate that the session is not resumable; also, the server will
+ not generate RFC 4507 (RFC 5077) session tickets.)
+
+ A simple reasonable callback implementation is to return is_forward_secure.
+ This parameter will be set to 1 or 0 depending on the ciphersuite selected
+ by the SSL/TLS server library, indicating whether it can provide forward
+ security.
+ [Emilia Käsper <emilia.kasper@esat.kuleuven.be> (Google)]
+
+ *) New function OPENSSL_gmtime_diff to find the difference in days
+ and seconds between two tm structures. This will be used to provide
+ additional functionality for ASN1_TIME.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add -trusted_first option which attempts to find certificates in the
+ trusted store even if an untrusted chain is also supplied.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Initial experimental support for explicitly trusted non-root CAs.
+ OpenSSL still tries to build a complete chain to a root but if an
+ intermediate CA has a trust setting included that is used. The first
+ setting is used: whether to trust or reject.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) New -verify_name option in command line utilities to set verification
+ parameters by name.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Initial CMAC implementation. WARNING: EXPERIMENTAL, API MAY CHANGE.
+ Add CMAC pkey methods.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Experimental regnegotiation in s_server -www mode. If the client
+ browses /reneg connection is renegotiated. If /renegcert it is
+ renegotiated requesting a certificate.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add an "external" session cache for debugging purposes to s_server. This
+ should help trace issues which normally are only apparent in deployed
+ multi-process servers.
[Steve Henson]
*) Extensive audit of libcrypto with DEBUG_UNUSED. Fix many cases where
whose return value is often ignored.
[Steve Henson]
- Changes between 0.9.8m (?) and 1.0.0 [xx XXX xxxx]
+ Changes between 1.0.1c and 1.0.1d [xx XXX xxxx]
+
+ *) Fix possible deadlock when decoding public keys.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Don't use TLS 1.0 record version number in initial client hello
+ if renegotiating.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.1b and 1.0.1c [10 May 2012]
+
+ *) Sanity check record length before skipping explicit IV in TLS
+ 1.2, 1.1 and DTLS to avoid DoS attack.
+
+ Thanks to Codenomicon for discovering this issue using Fuzz-o-Matic
+ fuzzing as a service testing platform.
+ (CVE-2012-2333)
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Initialise tkeylen properly when encrypting CMS messages.
+ Thanks to Solar Designer of Openwall for reporting this issue.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) In FIPS mode don't try to use composite ciphers as they are not
+ approved.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.1a and 1.0.1b [26 Apr 2012]
+
+ *) OpenSSL 1.0.0 sets SSL_OP_ALL to 0x80000FFFL and OpenSSL 1.0.1 and
+ 1.0.1a set SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1 to 0x00000400L which would unfortunately
+ mean any application compiled against OpenSSL 1.0.0 headers setting
+ SSL_OP_ALL would also set SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1, unintentionally disablng
+ TLS 1.1 also. Fix this by changing the value of SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1 to
+ 0x10000000L Any application which was previously compiled against
+ OpenSSL 1.0.1 or 1.0.1a headers and which cares about SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1
+ will need to be recompiled as a result. Letting be results in
+ inability to disable specifically TLS 1.1 and in client context,
+ in unlike event, limit maximum offered version to TLS 1.0 [see below].
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) In order to ensure interoperabilty SSL_OP_NO_protocolX does not
+ disable just protocol X, but all protocols above X *if* there are
+ protocols *below* X still enabled. In more practical terms it means
+ that if application wants to disable TLS1.0 in favor of TLS1.1 and
+ above, it's not sufficient to pass SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1, one has to pass
+ SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1|SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3|SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2. This applies to
+ client side.
+ [Andy Polyakov]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.1 and 1.0.1a [19 Apr 2012]
+
+ *) Check for potentially exploitable overflows in asn1_d2i_read_bio
+ BUF_mem_grow and BUF_mem_grow_clean. Refuse attempts to shrink buffer
+ in CRYPTO_realloc_clean.
+
+ Thanks to Tavis Ormandy, Google Security Team, for discovering this
+ issue and to Adam Langley <agl@chromium.org> for fixing it.
+ (CVE-2012-2110)
+ [Adam Langley (Google), Tavis Ormandy, Google Security Team]
+
+ *) Don't allow TLS 1.2 SHA-256 ciphersuites in TLS 1.0, 1.1 connections.
+ [Adam Langley]
+
+ *) Workarounds for some broken servers that "hang" if a client hello
+ record length exceeds 255 bytes:
+
+ 1. Do not use record version number > TLS 1.0 in initial client
+ hello: some (but not all) hanging servers will now work.
+ 2. If we set OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH this will truncate
+ the number of ciphers sent in the client hello. This should be
+ set to an even number, such as 50, for example by passing:
+ -DOPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH=50 to config or Configure.
+ Most broken servers should now work.
+ 3. If all else fails setting OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2_CLIENT will disable
+ TLS 1.2 client support entirely.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Fix SEGV in Vector Permutation AES module observed in OpenSSH.
+ [Andy Polyakov]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.0h and 1.0.1 [14 Mar 2012]
+
+ *) Add compatibility with old MDC2 signatures which use an ASN1 OCTET
+ STRING form instead of a DigestInfo.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) The format used for MDC2 RSA signatures is inconsistent between EVP
+ and the RSA_sign/RSA_verify functions. This was made more apparent when
+ OpenSSL used RSA_sign/RSA_verify for some RSA signatures in particular
+ those which went through EVP_PKEY_METHOD in 1.0.0 and later. Detect
+ the correct format in RSA_verify so both forms transparently work.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add compatibility with old MDC2 signatures which use an ASN1 OCTET
+ STRING form instead of a DigestInfo.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Some servers which support TLS 1.0 can choke if we initially indicate
+ support for TLS 1.2 and later renegotiate using TLS 1.0 in the RSA
+ encrypted premaster secret. As a workaround use the maximum pemitted
+ client version in client hello, this should keep such servers happy
+ and still work with previous versions of OpenSSL.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add support for TLS/DTLS heartbeats.
+ [Robin Seggelmann <seggelmann@fh-muenster.de>]
+
+ *) Add support for SCTP.
+ [Robin Seggelmann <seggelmann@fh-muenster.de>]
+
+ *) Improved PRNG seeding for VOS.
+ [Paul Green <Paul.Green@stratus.com>]
+
+ *) Extensive assembler packs updates, most notably:
+
+ - x86[_64]: AES-NI, PCLMULQDQ, RDRAND support;
+ - x86[_64]: SSSE3 support (SHA1, vector-permutation AES);
+ - x86_64: bit-sliced AES implementation;
+ - ARM: NEON support, contemporary platforms optimizations;
+ - s390x: z196 support;
+ - *: GHASH and GF(2^m) multiplication implementations;
+
+ [Andy Polyakov]
+
+ *) Make TLS-SRP code conformant with RFC 5054 API cleanup
+ (removal of unnecessary code)
+ [Peter Sylvester <peter.sylvester@edelweb.fr>]
+
+ *) Add TLS key material exporter from RFC 5705.
+ [Eric Rescorla]
+
+ *) Add DTLS-SRTP negotiation from RFC 5764.
+ [Eric Rescorla]
+
+ *) Add Next Protocol Negotiation,
+ http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-nextprotoneg-00. Can be
+ disabled with a no-npn flag to config or Configure. Code donated
+ by Google.
+ [Adam Langley <agl@google.com> and Ben Laurie]
+
+ *) Add optional 64-bit optimized implementations of elliptic curves NIST-P224,
+ NIST-P256, NIST-P521, with constant-time single point multiplication on
+ typical inputs. Compiler support for the nonstandard type __uint128_t is
+ required to use this (present in gcc 4.4 and later, for 64-bit builds).
+ Code made available under Apache License version 2.0.
+
+ Specify "enable-ec_nistp_64_gcc_128" on the Configure (or config) command
+ line to include this in your build of OpenSSL, and run "make depend" (or
+ "make update"). This enables the following EC_METHODs:
+
+ EC_GFp_nistp224_method()
+ EC_GFp_nistp256_method()
+ EC_GFp_nistp521_method()
+
+ EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name() will automatically use these (while
+ EC_GROUP_new_curve_GFp() currently prefers the more flexible
+ implementations).
+ [Emilia Käsper, Adam Langley, Bodo Moeller (Google)]
+
+ *) Use type ossl_ssize_t instad of ssize_t which isn't available on
+ all platforms. Move ssize_t definition from e_os.h to the public
+ header file e_os2.h as it now appears in public header file cms.h
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) New -sigopt option to the ca, req and x509 utilities. Additional
+ signature parameters can be passed using this option and in
+ particular PSS.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add RSA PSS signing function. This will generate and set the
+ appropriate AlgorithmIdentifiers for PSS based on those in the
+ corresponding EVP_MD_CTX structure. No application support yet.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Support for companion algorithm specific ASN1 signing routines.
+ New function ASN1_item_sign_ctx() signs a pre-initialised
+ EVP_MD_CTX structure and sets AlgorithmIdentifiers based on
+ the appropriate parameters.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add new algorithm specific ASN1 verification initialisation function
+ to EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD: this is not in EVP_PKEY_METHOD since the ASN1
+ handling will be the same no matter what EVP_PKEY_METHOD is used.
+ Add a PSS handler to support verification of PSS signatures: checked
+ against a number of sample certificates.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add signature printing for PSS. Add PSS OIDs.
+ [Steve Henson, Martin Kaiser <lists@kaiser.cx>]
+
+ *) Add algorithm specific signature printing. An individual ASN1 method
+ can now print out signatures instead of the standard hex dump.
+
+ More complex signatures (e.g. PSS) can print out more meaningful
+ information. Include DSA version that prints out the signature
+ parameters r, s.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Password based recipient info support for CMS library: implementing
+ RFC3211.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Split password based encryption into PBES2 and PBKDF2 functions. This
+ neatly separates the code into cipher and PBE sections and is required
+ for some algorithms that split PBES2 into separate pieces (such as
+ password based CMS).
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Session-handling fixes:
+ - Fix handling of connections that are resuming with a session ID,
+ but also support Session Tickets.
+ - Fix a bug that suppressed issuing of a new ticket if the client
+ presented a ticket with an expired session.
+ - Try to set the ticket lifetime hint to something reasonable.
+ - Make tickets shorter by excluding irrelevant information.
+ - On the client side, don't ignore renewed tickets.
+ [Adam Langley, Bodo Moeller (Google)]
+
+ *) Fix PSK session representation.
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Add RC4-MD5 and AESNI-SHA1 "stitched" implementations.
+
+ This work was sponsored by Intel.
+ [Andy Polyakov]
+
+ *) Add GCM support to TLS library. Some custom code is needed to split
+ the IV between the fixed (from PRF) and explicit (from TLS record)
+ portions. This adds all GCM ciphersuites supported by RFC5288 and
+ RFC5289. Generalise some AES* cipherstrings to inlclude GCM and
+ add a special AESGCM string for GCM only.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Expand range of ctrls for AES GCM. Permit setting invocation
+ field on decrypt and retrieval of invocation field only on encrypt.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add HMAC ECC ciphersuites from RFC5289. Include SHA384 PRF support.
+ As required by RFC5289 these ciphersuites cannot be used if for
+ versions of TLS earlier than 1.2.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) For FIPS capable OpenSSL interpret a NULL default public key method
+ as unset and return the appopriate default but do *not* set the default.
+ This means we can return the appopriate method in applications that
+ swicth between FIPS and non-FIPS modes.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Redirect HMAC and CMAC operations to FIPS module in FIPS mode. If an
+ ENGINE is used then we cannot handle that in the FIPS module so we
+ keep original code iff non-FIPS operations are allowed.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add -attime option to openssl utilities.
+ [Peter Eckersley <pde@eff.org>, Ben Laurie and Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Redirect DSA and DH operations to FIPS module in FIPS mode.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Redirect ECDSA and ECDH operations to FIPS module in FIPS mode. Also use
+ FIPS EC methods unconditionally for now.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) New build option no-ec2m to disable characteristic 2 code.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Backport libcrypto audit of return value checking from 1.1.0-dev; not
+ all cases can be covered as some introduce binary incompatibilities.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Redirect RSA operations to FIPS module including keygen,
+ encrypt, decrypt, sign and verify. Block use of non FIPS RSA methods.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add similar low level API blocking to ciphers.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Low level digest APIs are not approved in FIPS mode: any attempt
+ to use these will cause a fatal error. Applications that *really* want
+ to use them can use the private_* version instead.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Redirect cipher operations to FIPS module for FIPS builds.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Redirect digest operations to FIPS module for FIPS builds.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Update build system to add "fips" flag which will link in fipscanister.o
+ for static and shared library builds embedding a signature if needed.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Output TLS supported curves in preference order instead of numerical
+ order. This is currently hardcoded for the highest order curves first.
+ This should be configurable so applications can judge speed vs strength.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add TLS v1.2 server support for client authentication.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add support for FIPS mode in ssl library: disable SSLv3, non-FIPS ciphers
+ and enable MD5.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Functions FIPS_mode_set() and FIPS_mode() which call the underlying
+ FIPS modules versions.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add TLS v1.2 client side support for client authentication. Keep cache
+ of handshake records longer as we don't know the hash algorithm to use
+ until after the certificate request message is received.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Initial TLS v1.2 client support. Add a default signature algorithms
+ extension including all the algorithms we support. Parse new signature
+ format in client key exchange. Relax some ECC signing restrictions for
+ TLS v1.2 as indicated in RFC5246.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add server support for TLS v1.2 signature algorithms extension. Switch
+ to new signature format when needed using client digest preference.
+ All server ciphersuites should now work correctly in TLS v1.2. No client
+ support yet and no support for client certificates.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Initial TLS v1.2 support. Add new SHA256 digest to ssl code, switch
+ to SHA256 for PRF when using TLS v1.2 and later. Add new SHA256 based
+ ciphersuites. At present only RSA key exchange ciphersuites work with
+ TLS v1.2. Add new option for TLS v1.2 replacing the old and obsolete
+ SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK flags with SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2. New TLSv1.2 methods
+ and version checking.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) New option OPENSSL_NO_SSL_INTERN. If an application can be compiled
+ with this defined it will not be affected by any changes to ssl internal
+ structures. Add several utility functions to allow openssl application
+ to work with OPENSSL_NO_SSL_INTERN defined.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add SRP support.
+ [Tom Wu <tjw@cs.stanford.edu> and Ben Laurie]
+
+ *) Add functions to copy EVP_PKEY_METHOD and retrieve flags and id.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Permit abbreviated handshakes when renegotiating using the function
+ SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated().
+ [Robin Seggelmann <seggelmann@fh-muenster.de>]
+
+ *) Add call to ENGINE_register_all_complete() to
+ ENGINE_load_builtin_engines(), so some implementations get used
+ automatically instead of needing explicit application support.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add support for TLS key exporter as described in RFC5705.
+ [Robin Seggelmann <seggelmann@fh-muenster.de>, Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Initial TLSv1.1 support. Since TLSv1.1 is very similar to TLS v1.0 only
+ a few changes are required:
+
+ Add SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1 flag.
+ Add TLSv1_1 methods.
+ Update version checking logic to handle version 1.1.
+ Add explicit IV handling (ported from DTLS code).
+ Add command line options to s_client/s_server.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.0g and 1.0.0h [12 Mar 2012]
+
+ *) Fix MMA (Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding) weakness
+ in CMS and PKCS7 code. When RSA decryption fails use a random key for
+ content decryption and always return the same error. Note: this attack
+ needs on average 2^20 messages so it only affects automated senders. The
+ old behaviour can be reenabled in the CMS code by setting the
+ CMS_DEBUG_DECRYPT flag: this is useful for debugging and testing where
+ an MMA defence is not necessary.
+ Thanks to Ivan Nestlerode <inestlerode@us.ibm.com> for discovering
+ this issue. (CVE-2012-0884)
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Fix CVE-2011-4619: make sure we really are receiving a
+ client hello before rejecting multiple SGC restarts. Thanks to
+ Ivan Nestlerode <inestlerode@us.ibm.com> for discovering this bug.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.0f and 1.0.0g [18 Jan 2012]
+
+ *) Fix for DTLS DoS issue introduced by fix for CVE-2011-4109.
+ Thanks to Antonio Martin, Enterprise Secure Access Research and
+ Development, Cisco Systems, Inc. for discovering this bug and
+ preparing a fix. (CVE-2012-0050)
+ [Antonio Martin]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.0e and 1.0.0f [4 Jan 2012]
+
+ *) Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson have discovered an extension
+ of the Vaudenay padding oracle attack on CBC mode encryption
+ which enables an efficient plaintext recovery attack against
+ the OpenSSL implementation of DTLS. Their attack exploits timing
+ differences arising during decryption processing. A research
+ paper describing this attack can be found at:
+ http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/~kp/dtls.pdf
+ Thanks go to Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson of the Information
+ Security Group at Royal Holloway, University of London
+ (www.isg.rhul.ac.uk) for discovering this flaw and to Robin Seggelmann
+ <seggelmann@fh-muenster.de> and Michael Tuexen <tuexen@fh-muenster.de>
+ for preparing the fix. (CVE-2011-4108)
+ [Robin Seggelmann, Michael Tuexen]
+
+ *) Clear bytes used for block padding of SSL 3.0 records.
+ (CVE-2011-4576)
+ [Adam Langley (Google)]
+
+ *) Only allow one SGC handshake restart for SSL/TLS. Thanks to George
+ Kadianakis <desnacked@gmail.com> for discovering this issue and
+ Adam Langley for preparing the fix. (CVE-2011-4619)
+ [Adam Langley (Google)]
+
+ *) Check parameters are not NULL in GOST ENGINE. (CVE-2012-0027)
+ [Andrey Kulikov <amdeich@gmail.com>]
+
+ *) Prevent malformed RFC3779 data triggering an assertion failure.
+ Thanks to Andrew Chi, BBN Technologies, for discovering the flaw
+ and Rob Austein <sra@hactrn.net> for fixing it. (CVE-2011-4577)
+ [Rob Austein <sra@hactrn.net>]
+
+ *) Improved PRNG seeding for VOS.
+ [Paul Green <Paul.Green@stratus.com>]
+
+ *) Fix ssl_ciph.c set-up race.
+ [Adam Langley (Google)]
+
+ *) Fix spurious failures in ecdsatest.c.
+ [Emilia Käsper (Google)]
+
+ *) Fix the BIO_f_buffer() implementation (which was mixing different
+ interpretations of the '..._len' fields).
+ [Adam Langley (Google)]
+
+ *) Fix handling of BN_BLINDING: now BN_BLINDING_invert_ex (rather than
+ BN_BLINDING_invert_ex) calls BN_BLINDING_update, ensuring that concurrent
+ threads won't reuse the same blinding coefficients.
+
+ This also avoids the need to obtain the CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA_BLINDING
+ lock to call BN_BLINDING_invert_ex, and avoids one use of
+ BN_BLINDING_update for each BN_BLINDING structure (previously,
+ the last update always remained unused).
+ [Emilia Käsper (Google)]
+
+ *) In ssl3_clear, preserve s3->init_extra along with s3->rbuf.
+ [Bob Buckholz (Google)]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.0d and 1.0.0e [6 Sep 2011]
+
+ *) Fix bug where CRLs with nextUpdate in the past are sometimes accepted
+ by initialising X509_STORE_CTX properly. (CVE-2011-3207)
+ [Kaspar Brand <ossl@velox.ch>]
+
+ *) Fix SSL memory handling for (EC)DH ciphersuites, in particular
+ for multi-threaded use of ECDH. (CVE-2011-3210)
+ [Adam Langley (Google)]
+
+ *) Fix x509_name_ex_d2i memory leak on bad inputs.
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Remove hard coded ecdsaWithSHA1 signature tests in ssl code and check
+ signature public key algorithm by using OID xref utilities instead.
+ Before this you could only use some ECC ciphersuites with SHA1 only.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add protection against ECDSA timing attacks as mentioned in the paper
+ by Billy Bob Brumley and Nicola Tuveri, see:
+
+ http://eprint.iacr.org/2011/232.pdf
+
+ [Billy Bob Brumley and Nicola Tuveri]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.0c and 1.0.0d [8 Feb 2011]
+
+ *) Fix parsing of OCSP stapling ClientHello extension. CVE-2011-0014
+ [Neel Mehta, Adam Langley, Bodo Moeller (Google)]
+
+ *) Fix bug in string printing code: if *any* escaping is enabled we must
+ escape the escape character (backslash) or the resulting string is
+ ambiguous.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.0b and 1.0.0c [2 Dec 2010]
+
+ *) Disable code workaround for ancient and obsolete Netscape browsers
+ and servers: an attacker can use it in a ciphersuite downgrade attack.
+ Thanks to Martin Rex for discovering this bug. CVE-2010-4180
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Fixed J-PAKE implementation error, originally discovered by
+ Sebastien Martini, further info and confirmation from Stefan
+ Arentz and Feng Hao. Note that this fix is a security fix. CVE-2010-4252
+ [Ben Laurie]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.0a and 1.0.0b [16 Nov 2010]
+
+ *) Fix extension code to avoid race conditions which can result in a buffer
+ overrun vulnerability: resumed sessions must not be modified as they can
+ be shared by multiple threads. CVE-2010-3864
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Fix WIN32 build system to correctly link an ENGINE directory into
+ a DLL.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.0 and 1.0.0a [01 Jun 2010]
+
+ *) Check return value of int_rsa_verify in pkey_rsa_verifyrecover
+ (CVE-2010-1633)
+ [Steve Henson, Peter-Michael Hager <hager@dortmund.net>]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.8n and 1.0.0 [29 Mar 2010]
+
+ *) Add "missing" function EVP_CIPHER_CTX_copy(). This copies a cipher
+ context. The operation can be customised via the ctrl mechanism in
+ case ENGINEs want to include additional functionality.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Tolerate yet another broken PKCS#8 key format: private key value negative.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add new -subject_hash_old and -issuer_hash_old options to x509 utility to
+ output hashes compatible with older versions of OpenSSL.
+ [Willy Weisz <weisz@vcpc.univie.ac.at>]
+
+ *) Fix compression algorithm handling: if resuming a session use the
+ compression algorithm of the resumed session instead of determining
+ it from client hello again. Don't allow server to change algorithm.
+ [Steve Henson]
*) Add load_crls() function to apps tidying load_certs() too. Add option
to verify utility to allow additional CRLs to be included.
*) Change 'Configure' script to enable Camellia by default.
[NTT]
- Changes between 0.9.8l (?) and 0.9.8m (?) [xx XXX xxxx]
+ Changes between 0.9.8s and 0.9.8t [18 Jan 2012]
+
+ *) Fix for DTLS DoS issue introduced by fix for CVE-2011-4109.
+ Thanks to Antonio Martin, Enterprise Secure Access Research and
+ Development, Cisco Systems, Inc. for discovering this bug and
+ preparing a fix. (CVE-2012-0050)
+ [Antonio Martin]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.8r and 0.9.8s [4 Jan 2012]
+
+ *) Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson have discovered an extension
+ of the Vaudenay padding oracle attack on CBC mode encryption
+ which enables an efficient plaintext recovery attack against
+ the OpenSSL implementation of DTLS. Their attack exploits timing
+ differences arising during decryption processing. A research
+ paper describing this attack can be found at:
+ http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/~kp/dtls.pdf
+ Thanks go to Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson of the Information
+ Security Group at Royal Holloway, University of London
+ (www.isg.rhul.ac.uk) for discovering this flaw and to Robin Seggelmann
+ <seggelmann@fh-muenster.de> and Michael Tuexen <tuexen@fh-muenster.de>
+ for preparing the fix. (CVE-2011-4108)
+ [Robin Seggelmann, Michael Tuexen]
+
+ *) Stop policy check failure freeing same buffer twice. (CVE-2011-4109)
+ [Ben Laurie, Kasper <ekasper@google.com>]
+
+ *) Clear bytes used for block padding of SSL 3.0 records.
+ (CVE-2011-4576)
+ [Adam Langley (Google)]
+
+ *) Only allow one SGC handshake restart for SSL/TLS. Thanks to George
+ Kadianakis <desnacked@gmail.com> for discovering this issue and
+ Adam Langley for preparing the fix. (CVE-2011-4619)
+ [Adam Langley (Google)]
+
+ *) Prevent malformed RFC3779 data triggering an assertion failure.
+ Thanks to Andrew Chi, BBN Technologies, for discovering the flaw
+ and Rob Austein <sra@hactrn.net> for fixing it. (CVE-2011-4577)
+ [Rob Austein <sra@hactrn.net>]
+
+ *) Fix ssl_ciph.c set-up race.
+ [Adam Langley (Google)]
+
+ *) Fix spurious failures in ecdsatest.c.
+ [Emilia Käsper (Google)]
+
+ *) Fix the BIO_f_buffer() implementation (which was mixing different
+ interpretations of the '..._len' fields).
+ [Adam Langley (Google)]
+
+ *) Fix handling of BN_BLINDING: now BN_BLINDING_invert_ex (rather than
+ BN_BLINDING_invert_ex) calls BN_BLINDING_update, ensuring that concurrent
+ threads won't reuse the same blinding coefficients.
+
+ This also avoids the need to obtain the CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA_BLINDING
+ lock to call BN_BLINDING_invert_ex, and avoids one use of
+ BN_BLINDING_update for each BN_BLINDING structure (previously,
+ the last update always remained unused).
+ [Emilia Käsper (Google)]
+
+ *) Fix SSL memory handling for (EC)DH ciphersuites, in particular
+ for multi-threaded use of ECDH.
+ [Adam Langley (Google)]
+
+ *) Fix x509_name_ex_d2i memory leak on bad inputs.
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Add protection against ECDSA timing attacks as mentioned in the paper
+ by Billy Bob Brumley and Nicola Tuveri, see:
+
+ http://eprint.iacr.org/2011/232.pdf
+
+ [Billy Bob Brumley and Nicola Tuveri]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.8q and 0.9.8r [8 Feb 2011]
+
+ *) Fix parsing of OCSP stapling ClientHello extension. CVE-2011-0014
+ [Neel Mehta, Adam Langley, Bodo Moeller (Google)]
+
+ *) Fix bug in string printing code: if *any* escaping is enabled we must
+ escape the escape character (backslash) or the resulting string is
+ ambiguous.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.8p and 0.9.8q [2 Dec 2010]
+
+ *) Disable code workaround for ancient and obsolete Netscape browsers
+ and servers: an attacker can use it in a ciphersuite downgrade attack.
+ Thanks to Martin Rex for discovering this bug. CVE-2010-4180
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Fixed J-PAKE implementation error, originally discovered by
+ Sebastien Martini, further info and confirmation from Stefan
+ Arentz and Feng Hao. Note that this fix is a security fix. CVE-2010-4252
+ [Ben Laurie]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.8o and 0.9.8p [16 Nov 2010]
+
+ *) Fix extension code to avoid race conditions which can result in a buffer
+ overrun vulnerability: resumed sessions must not be modified as they can
+ be shared by multiple threads. CVE-2010-3864
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Fix for double free bug in ssl/s3_clnt.c CVE-2010-2939
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Don't reencode certificate when calculating signature: cache and use
+ the original encoding instead. This makes signature verification of
+ some broken encodings work correctly.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) ec2_GF2m_simple_mul bugfix: compute correct result if the output EC_POINT
+ is also one of the inputs.
+ [Emilia Käsper <emilia.kasper@esat.kuleuven.be> (Google)]
+
+ *) Don't repeatedly append PBE algorithms to table if they already exist.
+ Sort table on each new add. This effectively makes the table read only
+ after all algorithms are added and subsequent calls to PKCS12_pbe_add
+ etc are non-op.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.8n and 0.9.8o [01 Jun 2010]
+
+ [NB: OpenSSL 0.9.8o and later 0.9.8 patch levels were released after
+ OpenSSL 1.0.0.]
+
+ *) Correct a typo in the CMS ASN1 module which can result in invalid memory
+ access or freeing data twice (CVE-2010-0742)
+ [Steve Henson, Ronald Moesbergen <intercommit@gmail.com>]
+
+ *) Add SHA2 algorithms to SSL_library_init(). SHA2 is becoming far more
+ common in certificates and some applications which only call
+ SSL_library_init and not OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms() will fail.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) VMS fixes:
+ Reduce copying into .apps and .test in makevms.com
+ Don't try to use blank CA certificate in CA.com
+ Allow use of C files from original directories in maketests.com
+ [Steven M. Schweda" <sms@antinode.info>]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.8m and 0.9.8n [24 Mar 2010]
+
+ *) When rejecting SSL/TLS records due to an incorrect version number, never
+ update s->server with a new major version number. As of
+ - OpenSSL 0.9.8m if 'short' is a 16-bit type,
+ - OpenSSL 0.9.8f if 'short' is longer than 16 bits,
+ the previous behavior could result in a read attempt at NULL when
+ receiving specific incorrect SSL/TLS records once record payload
+ protection is active. (CVE-2010-0740)
+ [Bodo Moeller, Adam Langley <agl@chromium.org>]
+
+ *) Fix for CVE-2010-0433 where some kerberos enabled versions of OpenSSL
+ could be crashed if the relevant tables were not present (e.g. chrooted).
+ [Tomas Hoger <thoger@redhat.com>]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.8l and 0.9.8m [25 Feb 2010]
+
+ *) Always check bn_wexpend() return values for failure. (CVE-2009-3245)
+ [Martin Olsson, Neel Mehta]
+
+ *) Fix X509_STORE locking: Every 'objs' access requires a lock (to
+ accommodate for stack sorting, always a write lock!).
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) On some versions of WIN32 Heap32Next is very slow. This can cause
+ excessive delays in the RAND_poll(): over a minute. As a workaround
+ include a time check in the inner Heap32Next loop too.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) The code that handled flushing of data in SSL/TLS originally used the
+ BIO_CTRL_INFO ctrl to see if any data was pending first. This caused
+ the problem outlined in PR#1949. The fix suggested there however can
+ trigger problems with buggy BIO_CTRL_WPENDING (e.g. some versions
+ of Apache). So instead simplify the code to flush unconditionally.
+ This should be fine since flushing with no data to flush is a no op.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Handle TLS versions 2.0 and later properly and correctly use the
+ highest version of TLS/SSL supported. Although TLS >= 2.0 is some way
+ off ancient servers have a habit of sticking around for a while...
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Modify compression code so it frees up structures without using the
+ ex_data callbacks. This works around a problem where some applications
+ call CRYPTO_cleanup_all_ex_data() before application exit (e.g. when
+ restarting) then use compression (e.g. SSL with compression) later.
+ This results in significant per-connection memory leaks and
+ has caused some security issues including CVE-2008-1678 and
+ CVE-2009-4355.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Constify crypto/cast (i.e., <openssl/cast.h>): a CAST_KEY doesn't
+ change when encrypting or decrypting.
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Add option SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT which will allow clients to
+ connect and renegotiate with servers which do not support RI.
+ Until RI is more widely deployed this option is enabled by default.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add "missing" ssl ctrls to clear options and mode.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) If client attempts to renegotiate and doesn't support RI respond with
+ a no_renegotiation alert as required by RFC5746. Some renegotiating
+ TLS clients will continue a connection gracefully when they receive
+ the alert. Unfortunately OpenSSL mishandled this alert and would hang
+ waiting for a server hello which it will never receive. Now we treat a
+ received no_renegotiation alert as a fatal error. This is because
+ applications requesting a renegotiation might well expect it to succeed
+ and would have no code in place to handle the server denying it so the
+ only safe thing to do is to terminate the connection.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add ctrl macro SSL_get_secure_renegotiation_support() which returns 1 if
+ peer supports secure renegotiation and 0 otherwise. Print out peer
+ renegotiation support in s_client/s_server.
+ [Steve Henson]
*) Replace the highly broken and deprecated SPKAC certification method with
the updated NID creation version. This should correctly handle UTF8.
[Steve Henson]
- *) Implement draft-ietf-tls-renegotiation. Re-enable
- renegotiation but require the extension as needed. Unfortunately,
- SSL3_FLAGS_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION turns out to be a
- bad idea. It has been replaced by
+ *) Implement RFC5746. Re-enable renegotiation but require the extension
+ as needed. Unfortunately, SSL3_FLAGS_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION
+ turns out to be a bad idea. It has been replaced by
SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION which can be set with
SSL_CTX_set_options(). This is really not recommended unless you
know what you are doing.
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff