Redirect HMAC and CMAC operations to module.

[openssl.git] / CHANGES

diff --git a/CHANGES b/CHANGES
index 656b6a2f8f5851edaa206f257be4ec4a2175db4f..933aae0fabd5c7c259863888d3a4c008a9fea418 100644 (file)
--- a/CHANGES
+++ b/CHANGES
@@ -4,6 +4,62 @@
 
  Changes between 1.0.0d and 1.0.1  [xx XXX xxxx]
 
+  *) Redirect HMAC and CMAC operations to FIPS module in FIPS mode. If an
+     ENGINE is used then we cannot handle that in the FIPS module so we
+     keep original code iff non-FIPS operations are allowed.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Add -attime option to openssl verify.
+     [Peter Eckersley <pde@eff.org> and Ben Laurie]
+
+  *) Redirect DSA and DH operations to FIPS module in FIPS mode.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Redirect ECDSA and ECDH operations to FIPS module in FIPS mode. Also use
+     FIPS EC methods unconditionally for now.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) New build option no-ec2m to disable characteristic 2 code.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Backport libcrypto audit of return value checking from HEAD, not
+     all cases can be covered as some introduce binary incompatibilities.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Redirect RSA operations to FIPS module including keygen,
+     encrypt, decrypt, sign and verify. Block use of non FIPS RSA methods.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Add similar low level API blocking to ciphers.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Low level digest APIs are not approved in FIPS mode: any attempt
+     to use these will cause a fatal error. Applications that *really* want
+     to use them can use the private_* version instead.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Redirect cipher operations to FIPS module for FIPS builds. 
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Redirect digest operations to FIPS module for FIPS builds. 
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Update build system to add "fips" flag which will link in fipscanister.o
+     for static and shared library builds embedding a signature if needed.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Output TLS supported curves in preference order instead of numerical
+     order. This is currently hardcoded for the highest order curves first.
+     This should be configurable so applications can judge speed vs strength.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Add protection against ECDSA timing attacks as mentioned in the paper
+     by Billy Bob Brumley and Nicola Tuveri, see:
+
+       http://eprint.iacr.org/2011/232.pdf
+
+     [Billy Bob Brumley and Nicola Tuveri]
+
   *) Add TLS v1.2 server support for client authentication. 
      [Steve Henson]