OpenSSL CHANGES
_______________
- Changes between 0.9.7e and 0.9.8 [xx XXX xxxx]
+ Changes between 0.9.8f and 0.9.9 [xx XXX xxxx]
+
+ *) Add option -stream to use PKCS#7 streaming in smime utility. New
+ function i2d_PKCS7_bio_stream() and PEM_write_PKCS7_bio_stream()
+ to output in BER and PEM format.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Experimental support for use of HMAC via EVP_PKEY interface. This
+ allows HMAC to be handled via the EVP_DigestSign*() interface. The
+ EVP_PKEY "key" in this case is the HMAC key, potentially allowing
+ ENGINE support for HMAC keys which are unextractable. New -mac and
+ -macopt options to dgst utility.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) New option -sigopt to dgst utility. Update dgst to use
+ EVP_Digest{Sign,Verify}*. These two changes make it possible to use
+ alternative signing paramaters such as X9.31 or PSS in the dgst
+ utility.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Change ssl_cipher_apply_rule(), the internal function that does
+ the work each time a ciphersuite string requests enabling
+ ("foo+bar"), moving ("+foo+bar"), disabling ("-foo+bar", or
+ removing ("!foo+bar") a class of ciphersuites: Now it maintains
+ the order of disabled ciphersuites such that those ciphersuites
+ that most recently went from enabled to disabled not only stay
+ in order with respect to each other, but also have higher priority
+ than other disabled ciphersuites the next time ciphersuites are
+ enabled again.
+
+ This means that you can now say, e.g., "PSK:-PSK:HIGH" to enable
+ the same ciphersuites as with "HIGH" alone, but in a specific
+ order where the PSK ciphersuites come first (since they are the
+ most recently disabled ciphersuites when "HIGH" is parsed).
+
+ Also, change ssl_create_cipher_list() (using this new
+ funcionality) such that between otherwise identical
+ cihpersuites, ephemeral ECDH is preferred over ephemeral DH in
+ the default order.
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Change ssl_create_cipher_list() so that it automatically
+ arranges the ciphersuites in reasonable order before starting
+ to process the rule string. Thus, the definition for "DEFAULT"
+ (SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST) now is just "ALL:!aNULL:!eNULL", but
+ remains equivalent to "AES:ALL:!aNULL:!eNULL:+aECDH:+kRSA:+RC4:@STRENGTH".
+ This makes it much easier to arrive at a reasonable default order
+ in applications for which anonymous ciphers are OK (meaning
+ that you can't actually use DEFAULT).
+ [Bodo Moeller; suggested by Victor Duchovni]
+
+ *) Split the SSL/TLS algorithm mask (as used for ciphersuite string
+ processing) into multiple integers instead of setting
+ "SSL_MKEY_MASK" bits, "SSL_AUTH_MASK" bits, "SSL_ENC_MASK",
+ "SSL_MAC_MASK", and "SSL_SSL_MASK" bits all in a single integer.
+ (These masks as well as the individual bit definitions are hidden
+ away into the non-exported interface ssl/ssl_locl.h, so this
+ change to the definition of the SSL_CIPHER structure shouldn't
+ affect applications.) This give us more bits for each of these
+ categories, so there is no longer a need to coagulate AES128 and
+ AES256 into a single algorithm bit, and to coagulate Camellia128
+ and Camellia256 into a single algorithm bit, which has led to all
+ kinds of kludges.
+
+ Thus, among other things, the kludge introduced in 0.9.7m and
+ 0.9.8e for masking out AES256 independently of AES128 or masking
+ out Camellia256 independently of AES256 is not needed here in 0.9.9.
+
+ With the change, we also introduce new ciphersuite aliases that
+ so far were missing: "AES128", "AES256", "CAMELLIA128", and
+ "CAMELLIA256".
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Add support for dsa-with-SHA224 and dsa-with-SHA256.
+ Use the leftmost N bytes of the signature input if the input is
+ larger than the prime q (with N being the size in bytes of q).
+ [Nils Larsch]
+
+ *) Very *very* experimental PKCS#7 streaming encoder support. Nothing uses
+ it yet and it is largely untested.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add support for the ecdsa-with-SHA224/256/384/512 signature types.
+ [Nils Larsch]
+
+ *) Initial incomplete changes to avoid need for function casts in OpenSSL
+ when OPENSSL_NO_FCAST is set: some compilers (gcc 4.2 and later) reject
+ their use. Safestack is reimplemented using inline functions: tests show
+ that these calls are typically optimized away by compilers so they have
+ no additional overhead. Update ASN1 to avoid use of legacy functions.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Win32/64 targets are linked with Winsock2.
+ [Andy Polyakov]
+
+ *) Add an X509_CRL_METHOD structure to allow CRL processing to be redirected
+ to external functions. This can be used to increase CRL handling
+ efficiency especially when CRLs are very large by (for example) storing
+ the CRL revoked certificates in a database.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Overhaul of by_dir code. Add support for dynamic loading of CRLs so
+ new CRLs added to a directory can be used. New command line option
+ -verify_return_error to s_client and s_server. This causes real errors
+ to be returned by the verify callback instead of carrying on no matter
+ what. This reflects the way a "real world" verify callback would behave.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) GOST engine, supporting several GOST algorithms and public key formats.
+ Kindly donated by Cryptocom.
+ [Cryptocom]
+
+ *) Partial support for Issuing Distribution Point CRL extension. CRLs
+ partitioned by DP are handled but no indirect CRL or reason partitioning
+ (yet). Complete overhaul of CRL handling: now the most suitable CRL is
+ selected via a scoring technique which handles IDP and AKID in CRLs.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) New X509_STORE_CTX callbacks lookup_crls() and lookup_certs() which
+ will ultimately be used for all verify operations: this will remove the
+ X509_STORE dependency on certificate verification and allow alternative
+ lookup methods. X509_STORE based implementations of these two callbacks.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Allow multiple CRLs to exist in an X509_STORE with matching issuer names.
+ Modify get_crl() to find a valid (unexpired) CRL if possible.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) New function X509_CRL_match() to check if two CRLs are identical. Normally
+ this would be called X509_CRL_cmp() but that name is already used by
+ a function that just compares CRL issuer names. Cache several CRL
+ extensions in X509_CRL structure and cache CRLDP in X509.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Store a "canonical" representation of X509_NAME structure (ASN1 Name)
+ this maps equivalent X509_NAME structures into a consistent structure.
+ Name comparison can then be performed rapidly using memcmp().
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Non-blocking OCSP request processing. Add -timeout option to ocsp
+ utility.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Allow digests to supply their own micalg string for S/MIME type using
+ the ctrl EVP_MD_CTRL_MICALG.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) During PKCS7 signing pass the PKCS7 SignerInfo structure to the
+ EVP_PKEY_METHOD before and after signing via the EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PKCS7_SIGN
+ ctrl. It can then customise the structure before and/or after signing
+ if necessary.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) New function OBJ_add_sigid() to allow application defined signature OIDs
+ to be added to OpenSSLs internal tables. New function OBJ_sigid_free()
+ to free up any added signature OIDs.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) New functions EVP_CIPHER_do_all(), EVP_CIPHER_do_all_sorted(),
+ EVP_MD_do_all() and EVP_MD_do_all_sorted() to enumerate internal
+ digest and cipher tables. New options added to openssl utility:
+ list-message-digest-algorithms and list-cipher-algorithms.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) In addition to the numerical (unsigned long) thread ID, provide
+ for a pointer (void *) thread ID. This helps accomodate systems
+ that do not provide an unsigned long thread ID. OpenSSL assumes
+ it is in the same thread iff both the numerical and the pointer
+ thread ID agree; so applications are just required to define one
+ of them appropriately (e.g., by using a pointer to a per-thread
+ memory object malloc()ed by the application for the pointer-type
+ thread ID). Exactly analoguous to the existing functions
+
+ void CRYPTO_set_id_callback(unsigned long (*func)(void));
+ unsigned long (*CRYPTO_get_id_callback(void))(void);
+ unsigned long CRYPTO_thread_id(void);
+
+ we now have additional functions
+
+ void CRYPTO_set_idptr_callback(void *(*func)(void));
+ void *(*CRYPTO_get_idptr_callback(void))(void);
+ void *CRYPTO_thread_idptr(void);
+
+ also in <openssl/crypto.h>. The default value for
+ CRYPTO_thread_idptr() if the application has not provided its own
+ callback is &errno.
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Change the array representation of binary polynomials: the list
+ of degrees of non-zero coefficients is now terminated with -1.
+ Previously it was terminated with 0, which was also part of the
+ value; thus, the array representation was not applicable to
+ polynomials where t^0 has coefficient zero. This change makes
+ the array representation useful in a more general context.
+ [Douglas Stebila]
+
+ *) Various modifications and fixes to SSL/TLS cipher string
+ handling. For ECC, the code now distinguishes between fixed ECDH
+ with RSA certificates on the one hand and with ECDSA certificates
+ on the other hand, since these are separate ciphersuites. The
+ unused code for Fortezza ciphersuites has been removed.
+
+ For consistency with EDH, ephemeral ECDH is now called "EECDH"
+ (not "ECDHE"). For consistency with the code for DH
+ certificates, use of ECDH certificates is now considered ECDH
+ authentication, not RSA or ECDSA authentication (the latter is
+ merely the CA's signing algorithm and not actively used in the
+ protocol).
+
+ The temporary ciphersuite alias "ECCdraft" is no longer
+ available, and ECC ciphersuites are no longer excluded from "ALL"
+ and "DEFAULT". The following aliases now exist for RFC 4492
+ ciphersuites, most of these by analogy with the DH case:
+
+ kECDHr - ECDH cert, signed with RSA
+ kECDHe - ECDH cert, signed with ECDSA
+ kECDH - ECDH cert (signed with either RSA or ECDSA)
+ kEECDH - ephemeral ECDH
+ ECDH - ECDH cert or ephemeral ECDH
+
+ aECDH - ECDH cert
+ aECDSA - ECDSA cert
+ ECDSA - ECDSA cert
+
+ AECDH - anonymous ECDH
+ EECDH - non-anonymous ephemeral ECDH (equivalent to "kEECDH:-AECDH")
+
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Add additional S/MIME capabilities for AES and GOST ciphers if supported.
+ Use correct micalg parameters depending on digest(s) in signed message.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add engine support for EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD. Add functions to process
+ an ENGINE asn1 method. Support ENGINE lookups in the ASN1 code.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Initial engine support for EVP_PKEY_METHOD. New functions to permit
+ an engine to register a method. Add ENGINE lookups for methods and
+ functional reference processing.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) New functions EVP_Digest{Sign,Verify)*. These are enchance versions of
+ EVP_{Sign,Verify}* which allow an application to customise the signature
+ process.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) New -resign option to smime utility. This adds one or more signers
+ to an existing PKCS#7 signedData structure. Also -md option to use an
+ alternative message digest algorithm for signing.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Tidy up PKCS#7 routines and add new functions to make it easier to
+ create PKCS7 structures containing multiple signers. Update smime
+ application to support multiple signers.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) New -macalg option to pkcs12 utility to allow setting of an alternative
+ digest MAC.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Initial support for PKCS#5 v2.0 PRFs other than default SHA1 HMAC.
+ Reorganize PBE internals to lookup from a static table using NIDs,
+ add support for HMAC PBE OID translation. Add a EVP_CIPHER ctrl:
+ EVP_CTRL_PBE_PRF_NID this allows a cipher to specify an alternative
+ PRF which will be automatically used with PBES2.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Replace the algorithm specific calls to generate keys in "req" with the
+ new API.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Update PKCS#7 enveloped data routines to use new API. This is now
+ supported by any public key method supporting the encrypt operation. A
+ ctrl is added to allow the public key algorithm to examine or modify
+ the PKCS#7 RecipientInfo structure if it needs to: for RSA this is
+ a no op.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add a ctrl to asn1 method to allow a public key algorithm to express
+ a default digest type to use. In most cases this will be SHA1 but some
+ algorithms (such as GOST) need to specify an alternative digest. The
+ return value indicates how strong the prefernce is 1 means optional and
+ 2 is mandatory (that is it is the only supported type). Modify
+ ASN1_item_sign() to accept a NULL digest argument to indicate it should
+ use the default md. Update openssl utilities to use the default digest
+ type for signing if it is not explicitly indicated.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Use OID cross reference table in ASN1_sign() and ASN1_verify(). New
+ EVP_MD flag EVP_MD_FLAG_PKEY_METHOD_SIGNATURE. This uses the relevant
+ signing method from the key type. This effectively removes the link
+ between digests and public key types.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add an OID cross reference table and utility functions. Its purpose is to
+ translate between signature OIDs such as SHA1WithrsaEncryption and SHA1,
+ rsaEncryption. This will allow some of the algorithm specific hackery
+ needed to use the correct OID to be removed.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Remove algorithm specific dependencies when setting PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO
+ structures for PKCS7_sign(). They are now set up by the relevant public
+ key ASN1 method.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add provisional EC pkey method with support for ECDSA and ECDH.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add support for key derivation (agreement) in the API, DH method and
+ pkeyutl.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add DSA pkey method and DH pkey methods, extend DH ASN1 method to support
+ public and private key formats. As a side effect these add additional
+ command line functionality not previously available: DSA signatures can be
+ generated and verified using pkeyutl and DH key support and generation in
+ pkey, genpkey.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) BeOS support.
+ [Oliver Tappe <zooey@hirschkaefer.de>]
+
+ *) New make target "install_html_docs" installs HTML renditions of the
+ manual pages.
+ [Oliver Tappe <zooey@hirschkaefer.de>]
+
+ *) New utility "genpkey" this is analagous to "genrsa" etc except it can
+ generate keys for any algorithm. Extend and update EVP_PKEY_METHOD to
+ support key and parameter generation and add initial key generation
+ functionality for RSA.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add functions for main EVP_PKEY_method operations. The undocumented
+ functions EVP_PKEY_{encrypt,decrypt} have been renamed to
+ EVP_PKEY_{encrypt,decrypt}_old.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Initial definitions for EVP_PKEY_METHOD. This will be a high level public
+ key API, doesn't do much yet.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) New function EVP_PKEY_asn1_get0_info() to retrieve information about
+ public key algorithms. New option to openssl utility:
+ "list-public-key-algorithms" to print out info.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Implement the Supported Elliptic Curves Extension for
+ ECC ciphersuites from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt.
+ [Douglas Stebila]
+
+ *) Don't free up OIDs in OBJ_cleanup() if they are in use by EVP_MD or
+ EVP_CIPHER structures to avoid later problems in EVP_cleanup().
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) New utilities pkey and pkeyparam. These are similar to algorithm specific
+ utilities such as rsa, dsa, dsaparam etc except they process any key
+ type.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Transfer public key printing routines to EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD. New
+ functions EVP_PKEY_print_public(), EVP_PKEY_print_private(),
+ EVP_PKEY_print_param() to print public key data from an EVP_PKEY
+ structure.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Initial support for pluggable public key ASN1.
+ De-spaghettify the public key ASN1 handling. Move public and private
+ key ASN1 handling to a new EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD structure. Relocate
+ algorithm specific handling to a single module within the relevant
+ algorithm directory. Add functions to allow (near) opaque processing
+ of public and private key structures.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Implement the Supported Point Formats Extension for
+ ECC ciphersuites from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt.
+ [Douglas Stebila]
+
+ *) Add initial support for RFC 4279 PSK TLS ciphersuites. Add members
+ for the psk identity [hint] and the psk callback functions to the
+ SSL_SESSION, SSL and SSL_CTX structure.
+
+ New ciphersuites:
+ PSK-RC4-SHA, PSK-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA, PSK-AES128-CBC-SHA,
+ PSK-AES256-CBC-SHA
+
+ New functions:
+ SSL_CTX_use_psk_identity_hint
+ SSL_get_psk_identity_hint
+ SSL_get_psk_identity
+ SSL_use_psk_identity_hint
+
+ [Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of Nokia Corporation]
+
+ *) Add RFC 3161 compliant time stamp request creation, response generation
+ and response verification functionality.
+ [Zoltán Glózik <zglozik@opentsa.org>, The OpenTSA Project]
+
+ *) Add initial support for TLS extensions, specifically for the server_name
+ extension so far. The SSL_SESSION, SSL_CTX, and SSL data structures now
+ have new members for a host name. The SSL data structure has an
+ additional member SSL_CTX *initial_ctx so that new sessions can be
+ stored in that context to allow for session resumption, even after the
+ SSL has been switched to a new SSL_CTX in reaction to a client's
+ server_name extension.
+
+ New functions (subject to change):
+
+ SSL_get_servername()
+ SSL_get_servername_type()
+ SSL_set_SSL_CTX()
+
+ New CTRL codes and macros (subject to change):
+
+ SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_SERVERNAME_CB
+ - SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_callback()
+ SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_SERVERNAME_ARG
+ - SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_arg()
+ SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_HOSTNAME - SSL_set_tlsext_host_name()
+
+ openssl s_client has a new '-servername ...' option.
+
+ openssl s_server has new options '-servername_host ...', '-cert2 ...',
+ '-key2 ...', '-servername_fatal' (subject to change). This allows
+ testing the HostName extension for a specific single host name ('-cert'
+ and '-key' remain fallbacks for handshakes without HostName
+ negotiation). If the unrecogninzed_name alert has to be sent, this by
+ default is a warning; it becomes fatal with the '-servername_fatal'
+ option.
+
+ [Peter Sylvester, Remy Allais, Christophe Renou]
+
+ *) Whirlpool hash implementation is added.
+ [Andy Polyakov]
+
+ *) BIGNUM code on 64-bit SPARCv9 targets is switched from bn(64,64) to
+ bn(64,32). Because of instruction set limitations it doesn't have
+ any negative impact on performance. This was done mostly in order
+ to make it possible to share assembler modules, such as bn_mul_mont
+ implementations, between 32- and 64-bit builds without hassle.
+ [Andy Polyakov]
+
+ *) Move code previously exiled into file crypto/ec/ec2_smpt.c
+ to ec2_smpl.c, and no longer require the OPENSSL_EC_BIN_PT_COMP
+ macro.
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) New candidate for BIGNUM assembler implementation, bn_mul_mont,
+ dedicated Montgomery multiplication procedure, is introduced.
+ BN_MONT_CTX is modified to allow bn_mul_mont to reach for higher
+ "64-bit" performance on certain 32-bit targets.
+ [Andy Polyakov]
+
+ *) New option SSL_OP_NO_COMP to disable use of compression selectively
+ in SSL structures. New SSL ctrl to set maximum send fragment size.
+ Save memory by seeting the I/O buffer sizes dynamically instead of
+ using the maximum available value.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) New option -V for 'openssl ciphers'. This prints the ciphersuite code
+ in addition to the text details.
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Very, very preliminary EXPERIMENTAL support for printing of general
+ ASN1 structures. This currently produces rather ugly output and doesn't
+ handle several customised structures at all.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Integrated support for PVK file format and some related formats such
+ as MS PUBLICKEYBLOB and PRIVATEKEYBLOB. Command line switches to support
+ these in the 'rsa' and 'dsa' utilities.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Support for PKCS#1 RSAPublicKey format on rsa utility command line.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Remove the ancient ASN1_METHOD code. This was only ever used in one
+ place for the (very old) "NETSCAPE" format certificates which are now
+ handled using new ASN1 code equivalents.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Let the TLSv1_method() etc. functions return a 'const' SSL_METHOD
+ pointer and make the SSL_METHOD parameter in SSL_CTX_new,
+ SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version and SSL_set_ssl_method 'const'.
+ [Nils Larsch]
+
+ *) Modify CRL distribution points extension code to print out previously
+ unsupported fields. Enhance extension setting code to allow setting of
+ all fields.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add print and set support for Issuing Distribution Point CRL extension.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Change 'Configure' script to enable Camellia by default.
+ [NTT]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.8e and 0.9.8f [xx XXX xxxx]
+
+ *) Squeeze another 10% out of IGE mode when in != out.
+ [Ben Laurie]
+
+ *) AES IGE mode speedup.
+ [Dean Gaudet (Google)]
+
+ *) Add the Korean symmetric 128-bit cipher SEED (see
+ http://www.kisa.or.kr/kisa/seed/jsp/seed_eng.jsp) and
+ add SEED ciphersuites from RFC 4162:
+
+ TLS_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA = "SEED-SHA"
+ TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA = "DHE-DSS-SEED-SHA"
+ TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA = "DHE-RSA-SEED-SHA"
+ TLS_DH_anon_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA = "ADH-SEED-SHA"
+
+ To minimize changes between patchlevels in the OpenSSL 0.9.8
+ series, SEED remains excluded from compilation unless OpenSSL
+ is configured with 'enable-seed'.
+ [KISA, Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Mitigate branch prediction attacks, which can be practical if a
+ single processor is shared, allowing a spy process to extract
+ information. For detailed background information, see
+ http://eprint.iacr.org/2007/039 (O. Aciicmez, S. Gueron,
+ J.-P. Seifert, "New Branch Prediction Vulnerabilities in OpenSSL
+ and Necessary Software Countermeasures"). The core of the change
+ are new versions BN_div_no_branch() and
+ BN_mod_inverse_no_branch() of BN_div() and BN_mod_inverse(),
+ respectively, which are slower, but avoid the security-relevant
+ conditional branches. These are automatically called by BN_div()
+ and BN_mod_inverse() if the flag BN_FLG_CONSTTIME is set for one
+ of the input BIGNUMs. Also, BN_is_bit_set() has been changed to
+ remove a conditional branch.
+
+ BN_FLG_CONSTTIME is the new name for the previous
+ BN_FLG_EXP_CONSTTIME flag, since it now affects more than just
+ modular exponentiation. (Since OpenSSL 0.9.7h, setting this flag
+ in the exponent causes BN_mod_exp_mont() to use the alternative
+ implementation in BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime().) The old name
+ remains as a deprecated alias.
+
+ Similary, RSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME is replaced by a more general
+ RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME flag since the RSA implementation now uses
+ constant-time implementations for more than just exponentiation.
+ Here too the old name is kept as a deprecated alias.
+
+ BN_BLINDING_new() will now use BN_dup() for the modulus so that
+ the BN_BLINDING structure gets an independent copy of the
+ modulus. This means that the previous "BIGNUM *m" argument to
+ BN_BLINDING_new() and to BN_BLINDING_create_param() now
+ essentially becomes "const BIGNUM *m", although we can't actually
+ change this in the header file before 0.9.9. It allows
+ RSA_setup_blinding() to use BN_with_flags() on the modulus to
+ enable BN_FLG_CONSTTIME.
+
+ [Matthew D Wood (Intel Corp)]
+
+ *) In the SSL/TLS server implementation, be strict about session ID
+ context matching (which matters if an application uses a single
+ external cache for different purposes). Previously,
+ out-of-context reuse was forbidden only if SSL_VERIFY_PEER was
+ set. This did ensure strict client verification, but meant that,
+ with applications using a single external cache for quite
+ different requirements, clients could circumvent ciphersuite
+ restrictions for a given session ID context by starting a session
+ in a different context.
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Include "!eNULL" in SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST to make sure that
+ a ciphersuite string such as "DEFAULT:RSA" cannot enable
+ authentication-only ciphersuites.
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.8d and 0.9.8e [23 Feb 2007]
+
+ *) Since AES128 and AES256 (and similarly Camellia128 and
+ Camellia256) share a single mask bit in the logic of
+ ssl/ssl_ciph.c, the code for masking out disabled ciphers needs a
+ kludge to work properly if AES128 is available and AES256 isn't
+ (or if Camellia128 is available and Camellia256 isn't).
+ [Victor Duchovni]
+
+ *) Fix the BIT STRING encoding generated by crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c
+ (within i2d_ECPrivateKey, i2d_ECPKParameters, i2d_ECParameters):
+ When a point or a seed is encoded in a BIT STRING, we need to
+ prevent the removal of trailing zero bits to get the proper DER
+ encoding. (By default, crypto/asn1/a_bitstr.c assumes the case
+ of a NamedBitList, for which trailing 0 bits need to be removed.)
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Have SSL/TLS server implementation tolerate "mismatched" record
+ protocol version while receiving ClientHello even if the
+ ClientHello is fragmented. (The server can't insist on the
+ particular protocol version it has chosen before the ServerHello
+ message has informed the client about his choice.)
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Add RFC 3779 support.
+ [Rob Austein for ARIN, Ben Laurie]
+
+ *) Load error codes if they are not already present instead of using a
+ static variable. This allows them to be cleanly unloaded and reloaded.
+ Improve header file function name parsing.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) extend SMTP and IMAP protocol emulation in s_client to use EHLO
+ or CAPABILITY handshake as required by RFCs.
+ [Goetz Babin-Ebell]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.8c and 0.9.8d [28 Sep 2006]
+
+ *) Introduce limits to prevent malicious keys being able to
+ cause a denial of service. (CVE-2006-2940)
+ [Steve Henson, Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Fix ASN.1 parsing of certain invalid structures that can result
+ in a denial of service. (CVE-2006-2937) [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Fix buffer overflow in SSL_get_shared_ciphers() function.
+ (CVE-2006-3738) [Tavis Ormandy and Will Drewry, Google Security Team]
+
+ *) Fix SSL client code which could crash if connecting to a
+ malicious SSLv2 server. (CVE-2006-4343)
+ [Tavis Ormandy and Will Drewry, Google Security Team]
+
+ *) Since 0.9.8b, ciphersuite strings naming explicit ciphersuites
+ match only those. Before that, "AES256-SHA" would be interpreted
+ as a pattern and match "AES128-SHA" too (since AES128-SHA got
+ the same strength classification in 0.9.7h) as we currently only
+ have a single AES bit in the ciphersuite description bitmap.
+ That change, however, also applied to ciphersuite strings such as
+ "RC4-MD5" that intentionally matched multiple ciphersuites --
+ namely, SSL 2.0 ciphersuites in addition to the more common ones
+ from SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0.
+
+ So we change the selection algorithm again: Naming an explicit
+ ciphersuite selects this one ciphersuite, and any other similar
+ ciphersuite (same bitmap) from *other* protocol versions.
+ Thus, "RC4-MD5" again will properly select both the SSL 2.0
+ ciphersuite and the SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0 ciphersuite.
+
+ Since SSL 2.0 does not have any ciphersuites for which the
+ 128/256 bit distinction would be relevant, this works for now.
+ The proper fix will be to use different bits for AES128 and
+ AES256, which would have avoided the problems from the beginning;
+ however, bits are scarce, so we can only do this in a new release
+ (not just a patchlevel) when we can change the SSL_CIPHER
+ definition to split the single 'unsigned long mask' bitmap into
+ multiple values to extend the available space.
+
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.8b and 0.9.8c [05 Sep 2006]
+
+ *) Avoid PKCS #1 v1.5 signature attack discovered by Daniel Bleichenbacher
+ (CVE-2006-4339) [Ben Laurie and Google Security Team]
+
+ *) Add AES IGE and biIGE modes.
+ [Ben Laurie]
+
+ *) Change the Unix randomness entropy gathering to use poll() when
+ possible instead of select(), since the latter has some
+ undesirable limitations.
+ [Darryl Miles via Richard Levitte and Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Disable "ECCdraft" ciphersuites more thoroughly. Now special
+ treatment in ssl/ssl_ciph.s makes sure that these ciphersuites
+ cannot be implicitly activated as part of, e.g., the "AES" alias.
+ However, please upgrade to OpenSSL 0.9.9[-dev] for
+ non-experimental use of the ECC ciphersuites to get TLS extension
+ support, which is required for curve and point format negotiation
+ to avoid potential handshake problems.
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Disable rogue ciphersuites:
+
+ - SSLv2 0x08 0x00 0x80 ("RC4-64-MD5")
+ - SSLv3/TLSv1 0x00 0x61 ("EXP1024-RC2-CBC-MD5")
+ - SSLv3/TLSv1 0x00 0x60 ("EXP1024-RC4-MD5")
+
+ The latter two were purportedly from
+ draft-ietf-tls-56-bit-ciphersuites-0[01].txt, but do not really
+ appear there.
+
+ Also deactivate the remaining ciphersuites from
+ draft-ietf-tls-56-bit-ciphersuites-01.txt. These are just as
+ unofficial, and the ID has long expired.
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Fix RSA blinding Heisenbug (problems sometimes occured on
+ dual-core machines) and other potential thread-safety issues.
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Add the symmetric cipher Camellia (128-bit, 192-bit, 256-bit key
+ versions), which is now available for royalty-free use
+ (see http://info.isl.ntt.co.jp/crypt/eng/info/chiteki.html).
+ Also, add Camellia TLS ciphersuites from RFC 4132.
+
+ To minimize changes between patchlevels in the OpenSSL 0.9.8
+ series, Camellia remains excluded from compilation unless OpenSSL
+ is configured with 'enable-camellia'.
+ [NTT]
+
+ *) Disable the padding bug check when compression is in use. The padding
+ bug check assumes the first packet is of even length, this is not
+ necessarily true if compresssion is enabled and can result in false
+ positives causing handshake failure. The actual bug test is ancient
+ code so it is hoped that implementations will either have fixed it by
+ now or any which still have the bug do not support compression.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.8a and 0.9.8b [04 May 2006]
+
+ *) When applying a cipher rule check to see if string match is an explicit
+ cipher suite and only match that one cipher suite if it is.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Link in manifests for VC++ if needed.
+ [Austin Ziegler <halostatue@gmail.com>]
+
+ *) Update support for ECC-based TLS ciphersuites according to
+ draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt with proposed changes (but without
+ TLS extensions, which are supported starting with the 0.9.9
+ branch, not in the OpenSSL 0.9.8 branch).
+ [Douglas Stebila]
+
+ *) New functions EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new() and EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free() to support
+ opaque EVP_CIPHER_CTX handling.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Fixes and enhancements to zlib compression code. We now only use
+ "zlib1.dll" and use the default __cdecl calling convention on Win32
+ to conform with the standards mentioned here:
+ http://www.zlib.net/DLL_FAQ.txt
+ Static zlib linking now works on Windows and the new --with-zlib-include
+ --with-zlib-lib options to Configure can be used to supply the location
+ of the headers and library. Gracefully handle case where zlib library
+ can't be loaded.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Several fixes and enhancements to the OID generation code. The old code
+ sometimes allowed invalid OIDs (1.X for X >= 40 for example), couldn't
+ handle numbers larger than ULONG_MAX, truncated printing and had a
+ non standard OBJ_obj2txt() behaviour.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add support for building of engines under engine/ as shared libraries
+ under VC++ build system.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Corrected the numerous bugs in the Win32 path splitter in DSO.
+ Hopefully, we will not see any false combination of paths any more.
+ [Richard Levitte]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.8 and 0.9.8a [11 Oct 2005]
+
+ *) Remove the functionality of SSL_OP_MSIE_SSLV2_RSA_PADDING
+ (part of SSL_OP_ALL). This option used to disable the
+ countermeasure against man-in-the-middle protocol-version
+ rollback in the SSL 2.0 server implementation, which is a bad
+ idea. (CVE-2005-2969)
+
+ [Bodo Moeller; problem pointed out by Yutaka Oiwa (Research Center
+ for Information Security, National Institute of Advanced Industrial
+ Science and Technology [AIST], Japan)]
+
+ *) Add two function to clear and return the verify parameter flags.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Keep cipherlists sorted in the source instead of sorting them at
+ runtime, thus removing the need for a lock.
+ [Nils Larsch]
+
+ *) Avoid some small subgroup attacks in Diffie-Hellman.
+ [Nick Mathewson and Ben Laurie]
+
+ *) Add functions for well-known primes.
+ [Nick Mathewson]
+
+ *) Extended Windows CE support.
+ [Satoshi Nakamura and Andy Polyakov]
+
+ *) Initialize SSL_METHOD structures at compile time instead of during
+ runtime, thus removing the need for a lock.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Make PKCS7_decrypt() work even if no certificate is supplied by
+ attempting to decrypt each encrypted key in turn. Add support to
+ smime utility.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.7h and 0.9.8 [05 Jul 2005]
+
+ [NB: OpenSSL 0.9.7i and later 0.9.7 patch levels were released after
+ OpenSSL 0.9.8.]
+
+ *) Add libcrypto.pc and libssl.pc for those who feel they need them.
+ [Richard Levitte]
+
+ *) Change CA.sh and CA.pl so they don't bundle the CSR and the private
+ key into the same file any more.
+ [Richard Levitte]
+
+ *) Add initial support for Win64, both IA64 and AMD64/x64 flavors.
+ [Andy Polyakov]
+
+ *) Add -utf8 command line and config file option to 'ca'.
+ [Stefan <stf@udoma.org]
+
+ *) Removed the macro des_crypt(), as it seems to conflict with some
+ libraries. Use DES_crypt().
+ [Richard Levitte]
+
+ *) Correct naming of the 'chil' and '4758cca' ENGINEs. This
+ involves renaming the source and generated shared-libs for
+ both. The engines will accept the corrected or legacy ids
+ ('ncipher' and '4758_cca' respectively) when binding. NB,
+ this only applies when building 'shared'.
+ [Corinna Vinschen <vinschen@redhat.com> and Geoff Thorpe]
+
+ *) Add attribute functions to EVP_PKEY structure. Modify
+ PKCS12_create() to recognize a CSP name attribute and
+ use it. Make -CSP option work again in pkcs12 utility.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add new functionality to the bn blinding code:
+ - automatic re-creation of the BN_BLINDING parameters after
+ a fixed number of uses (currently 32)
+ - add new function for parameter creation
+ - introduce flags to control the update behaviour of the
+ BN_BLINDING parameters
+ - hide BN_BLINDING structure
+ Add a second BN_BLINDING slot to the RSA structure to improve
+ performance when a single RSA object is shared among several
+ threads.
+ [Nils Larsch]
+
+ *) Add support for DTLS.
+ [Nagendra Modadugu <nagendra@cs.stanford.edu> and Ben Laurie]
+
+ *) Add support for DER encoded private keys (SSL_FILETYPE_ASN1)
+ to SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file() and SSL_use_PrivateKey_file()
+ [Walter Goulet]
+
+ *) Remove buggy and incompletet DH cert support from
+ ssl/ssl_rsa.c and ssl/s3_both.c
+ [Nils Larsch]
+
+ *) Use SHA-1 instead of MD5 as the default digest algorithm for
+ the apps/openssl applications.
+ [Nils Larsch]
+
+ *) Compile clean with "-Wall -Wmissing-prototypes
+ -Wstrict-prototypes -Wmissing-declarations -Werror". Currently
+ DEBUG_SAFESTACK must also be set.
+ [Ben Laurie]
*) Change ./Configure so that certain algorithms can be disabled by default.
The new counterpiece to "no-xxx" is "enable-xxx".
Makefile.shared, for Cygwin's sake.
[Richard Levitte]
- *) Extend the BIGNUM API by creating new macros that behave like
- functions
-
- void BN_set_sign(BIGNUM *a, int neg);
- int BN_get_sign(const BIGNUM *a);
+ *) Extend the BIGNUM API by creating a function
+ void BN_set_negative(BIGNUM *a, int neg);
+ and a macro that behave like
+ int BN_is_negative(const BIGNUM *a);
- and avoid the need to access 'a->neg' directly in applications.
- [Nils Larsch <nla@trustcenter.de>]
+ to avoid the need to access 'a->neg' directly in applications.
+ [Nils Larsch]
*) Implement fast modular reduction for pseudo-Mersenne primes
used in NIST curves (crypto/bn/bn_nist.c, crypto/ec/ecp_nist.c).
*) Include some named elliptic curves, and add OIDs from X9.62,
SECG, and WAP/WTLS. Each curve can be obtained from the new
function
- EC_GROUP_new_by_nid(),
+ EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(),
and the list of available named curves can be obtained with
EC_get_builtin_curves().
Also add a 'curve_name' member to EC_GROUP objects, which can be
accessed via
- EC_GROUP_set_nid()
- EC_GROUP_get_nid()
- [Nils Larsch <nla@trustcenter.de, Bodo Moeller]
+ EC_GROUP_set_curve_name()
+ EC_GROUP_get_curve_name()
+ [Nils Larsch <larsch@trustcenter.de, Bodo Moeller]
*) Remove a few calls to bn_wexpand() in BN_sqr() (the one in there
was actually never needed) and in BN_mul(). The removal in BN_mul()
differing sizes.
[Richard Levitte]
- Changes between 0.9.7f and 0.9.7g [XX xxx xxxx]
+ Changes between 0.9.7m and 0.9.7n [xx XXX xxxx]
+
+ *) In the SSL/TLS server implementation, be strict about session ID
+ context matching (which matters if an application uses a single
+ external cache for different purposes). Previously,
+ out-of-context reuse was forbidden only if SSL_VERIFY_PEER was
+ set. This did ensure strict client verification, but meant that,
+ with applications using a single external cache for quite
+ different requirements, clients could circumvent ciphersuite
+ restrictions for a given session ID context by starting a session
+ in a different context.
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.7l and 0.9.7m [23 Feb 2007]
+
+ *) Cleanse PEM buffers before freeing them since they may contain
+ sensitive data.
+ [Benjamin Bennett <ben@psc.edu>]
+
+ *) Include "!eNULL" in SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST to make sure that
+ a ciphersuite string such as "DEFAULT:RSA" cannot enable
+ authentication-only ciphersuites.
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Since AES128 and AES256 share a single mask bit in the logic of
+ ssl/ssl_ciph.c, the code for masking out disabled ciphers needs a
+ kludge to work properly if AES128 is available and AES256 isn't.
+ [Victor Duchovni]
+
+ *) Expand security boundary to match 1.1.1 module.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Remove redundant features: hash file source, editing of test vectors
+ modify fipsld to use external fips_premain.c signature.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) New perl script mkfipsscr.pl to create shell scripts or batch files to
+ run algorithm test programs.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Make algorithm test programs more tolerant of whitespace.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Have SSL/TLS server implementation tolerate "mismatched" record
+ protocol version while receiving ClientHello even if the
+ ClientHello is fragmented. (The server can't insist on the
+ particular protocol version it has chosen before the ServerHello
+ message has informed the client about his choice.)
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Load error codes if they are not already present instead of using a
+ static variable. This allows them to be cleanly unloaded and reloaded.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.7k and 0.9.7l [28 Sep 2006]
+
+ *) Introduce limits to prevent malicious keys being able to
+ cause a denial of service. (CVE-2006-2940)
+ [Steve Henson, Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Fix ASN.1 parsing of certain invalid structures that can result
+ in a denial of service. (CVE-2006-2937) [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Fix buffer overflow in SSL_get_shared_ciphers() function.
+ (CVE-2006-3738) [Tavis Ormandy and Will Drewry, Google Security Team]
+
+ *) Fix SSL client code which could crash if connecting to a
+ malicious SSLv2 server. (CVE-2006-4343)
+ [Tavis Ormandy and Will Drewry, Google Security Team]
+
+ *) Change ciphersuite string processing so that an explicit
+ ciphersuite selects this one ciphersuite (so that "AES256-SHA"
+ will no longer include "AES128-SHA"), and any other similar
+ ciphersuite (same bitmap) from *other* protocol versions (so that
+ "RC4-MD5" will still include both the SSL 2.0 ciphersuite and the
+ SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0 ciphersuite). This is a backport combining
+ changes from 0.9.8b and 0.9.8d.
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.7j and 0.9.7k [05 Sep 2006]
+
+ *) Avoid PKCS #1 v1.5 signature attack discovered by Daniel Bleichenbacher
+ (CVE-2006-4339) [Ben Laurie and Google Security Team]
+
+ *) Change the Unix randomness entropy gathering to use poll() when
+ possible instead of select(), since the latter has some
+ undesirable limitations.
+ [Darryl Miles via Richard Levitte and Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Disable rogue ciphersuites:
+
+ - SSLv2 0x08 0x00 0x80 ("RC4-64-MD5")
+ - SSLv3/TLSv1 0x00 0x61 ("EXP1024-RC2-CBC-MD5")
+ - SSLv3/TLSv1 0x00 0x60 ("EXP1024-RC4-MD5")
+
+ The latter two were purportedly from
+ draft-ietf-tls-56-bit-ciphersuites-0[01].txt, but do not really
+ appear there.
+
+ Also deactive the remaining ciphersuites from
+ draft-ietf-tls-56-bit-ciphersuites-01.txt. These are just as
+ unofficial, and the ID has long expired.
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Fix RSA blinding Heisenbug (problems sometimes occured on
+ dual-core machines) and other potential thread-safety issues.
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.7i and 0.9.7j [04 May 2006]
+
+ *) Adapt fipsld and the build system to link against the validated FIPS
+ module in FIPS mode.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Fixes for VC++ 2005 build under Windows.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add new Windows build target VC-32-GMAKE for VC++. This uses GNU make
+ from a Windows bash shell such as MSYS. It is autodetected from the
+ "config" script when run from a VC++ environment. Modify standard VC++
+ build to use fipscanister.o from the GNU make build.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.7h and 0.9.7i [14 Oct 2005]
+
+ *) Wrapped the definition of EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE in a #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS.
+ The value now differs depending on if you build for FIPS or not.
+ BEWARE! A program linked with a shared FIPSed libcrypto can't be
+ safely run with a non-FIPSed libcrypto, as it may crash because of
+ the difference induced by this change.
+ [Andy Polyakov]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.7g and 0.9.7h [11 Oct 2005]
+
+ *) Remove the functionality of SSL_OP_MSIE_SSLV2_RSA_PADDING
+ (part of SSL_OP_ALL). This option used to disable the
+ countermeasure against man-in-the-middle protocol-version
+ rollback in the SSL 2.0 server implementation, which is a bad
+ idea. (CVE-2005-2969)
+
+ [Bodo Moeller; problem pointed out by Yutaka Oiwa (Research Center
+ for Information Security, National Institute of Advanced Industrial
+ Science and Technology [AIST], Japan)]
+
+ *) Minimal support for X9.31 signatures and PSS padding modes. This is
+ mainly for FIPS compliance and not fully integrated at this stage.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) For DSA signing, unless DSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME is set, perform
+ the exponentiation using a fixed-length exponent. (Otherwise,
+ the information leaked through timing could expose the secret key
+ after many signatures; cf. Bleichenbacher's attack on DSA with
+ biased k.)
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Make a new fixed-window mod_exp implementation the default for
+ RSA, DSA, and DH private-key operations so that the sequence of
+ squares and multiplies and the memory access pattern are
+ independent of the particular secret key. This will mitigate
+ cache-timing and potential related attacks.
+
+ BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime() is the new exponentiation implementation,
+ and this is automatically used by BN_mod_exp_mont() if the new flag
+ BN_FLG_EXP_CONSTTIME is set for the exponent. RSA, DSA, and DH
+ will use this BN flag for private exponents unless the flag
+ RSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME, DSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME, or
+ DH_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME, respectively, is set.
+
+ [Matthew D Wood (Intel Corp), with some changes by Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Change the client implementation for SSLv23_method() and
+ SSLv23_client_method() so that is uses the SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0
+ Client Hello message format if the SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2 option is set.
+ (Previously, the SSL 2.0 backwards compatible Client Hello
+ message format would be used even with SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2.)
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Add support for smime-type MIME parameter in S/MIME messages which some
+ clients need.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) New function BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked() to set montgomery parameters in
+ a threadsafe manner. Modify rsa code to use new function and add calls
+ to dsa and dh code (which had race conditions before).
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Include the fixed error library code in the C error file definitions
+ instead of fixing them up at runtime. This keeps the error code
+ structures constant.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.7f and 0.9.7g [11 Apr 2005]
+
+ [NB: OpenSSL 0.9.7h and later 0.9.7 patch levels were released after
+ OpenSSL 0.9.8.]
+
+ *) Fixes for newer kerberos headers. NB: the casts are needed because
+ the 'length' field is signed on one version and unsigned on another
+ with no (?) obvious way to tell the difference, without these VC++
+ complains. Also the "definition" of FAR (blank) is no longer included
+ nor is the error ENOMEM. KRB5_PRIVATE has to be set to 1 to pick up
+ some needed definitions.
+ [Steve Henson]
*) Undo Cygwin change.
[Ulf Möller]
- Changes between 0.9.7e and 0.9.7f [23 Mar 2005]
+ *) Added support for proxy certificates according to RFC 3820.
+ Because they may be a security thread to unaware applications,
+ they must be explicitely allowed in run-time. See
+ docs/HOWTO/proxy_certificates.txt for further information.
+ [Richard Levitte]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.7e and 0.9.7f [22 Mar 2005]
*) Use (SSL_RANDOM_VALUE - 4) bytes of pseudo random data when generating
server and client random values. Previously
*) Prompt for pass phrases when appropriate for PKCS12 input format.
[Steve Henson]
+ *) Back-port of selected performance improvements from development
+ branch, as well as improved support for PowerPC platforms.
+ [Andy Polyakov]
+
*) Add lots of checks for memory allocation failure, error codes to indicate
failure and freeing up memory if a failure occurs.
[Nauticus Networks SSL Team <openssl@nauticusnet.com>, Steve Henson]
Changes between 0.9.7c and 0.9.7d [17 Mar 2004]
*) Fix null-pointer assignment in do_change_cipher_spec() revealed
- by using the Codenomicon TLS Test Tool (CAN-2004-0079)
+ by using the Codenomicon TLS Test Tool (CVE-2004-0079)
[Joe Orton, Steve Henson]
*) Fix flaw in SSL/TLS handshaking when using Kerberos ciphersuites
- (CAN-2004-0112)
+ (CVE-2004-0112)
[Joe Orton, Steve Henson]
*) Make it possible to have multiple active certificates with the same
*) Fix various bugs revealed by running the NISCC test suite:
Stop out of bounds reads in the ASN1 code when presented with
- invalid tags (CAN-2003-0543 and CAN-2003-0544).
+ invalid tags (CVE-2003-0543 and CVE-2003-0544).
- Free up ASN1_TYPE correctly if ANY type is invalid (CAN-2003-0545).
+ Free up ASN1_TYPE correctly if ANY type is invalid (CVE-2003-0545).
If verify callback ignores invalid public key errors don't try to check
certificate signature with the NULL public key.
via timing by performing a MAC computation even if incorrrect
block cipher padding has been found. This is a countermeasure
against active attacks where the attacker has to distinguish
- between bad padding and a MAC verification error. (CAN-2003-0078)
+ between bad padding and a MAC verification error. (CVE-2003-0078)
[Bodo Moeller; problem pointed out by Brice Canvel (EPFL),
Alain Hiltgen (UBS), Serge Vaudenay (EPFL), and
Remote buffer overflow in SSL3 protocol - an attacker could
supply an oversized master key in Kerberos-enabled versions.
- (CAN-2002-0657)
+ (CVE-2002-0657)
[Ben Laurie (CHATS)]
*) Change the SSL kerb5 codes to match RFC 2712.
Changes between 0.9.6l and 0.9.6m [17 Mar 2004]
*) Fix null-pointer assignment in do_change_cipher_spec() revealed
- by using the Codenomicon TLS Test Tool (CAN-2004-0079)
+ by using the Codenomicon TLS Test Tool (CVE-2004-0079)
[Joe Orton, Steve Henson]
Changes between 0.9.6k and 0.9.6l [04 Nov 2003]
*) Fix additional bug revealed by the NISCC test suite:
Stop bug triggering large recursion when presented with
- certain ASN.1 tags (CAN-2003-0851)
+ certain ASN.1 tags (CVE-2003-0851)
[Steve Henson]
Changes between 0.9.6j and 0.9.6k [30 Sep 2003]
*) Fix various bugs revealed by running the NISCC test suite:
Stop out of bounds reads in the ASN1 code when presented with
- invalid tags (CAN-2003-0543 and CAN-2003-0544).
+ invalid tags (CVE-2003-0543 and CVE-2003-0544).
If verify callback ignores invalid public key errors don't try to check
certificate signature with the NULL public key.
via timing by performing a MAC computation even if incorrrect
block cipher padding has been found. This is a countermeasure
against active attacks where the attacker has to distinguish
- between bad padding and a MAC verification error. (CAN-2003-0078)
+ between bad padding and a MAC verification error. (CVE-2003-0078)
[Bodo Moeller; problem pointed out by Brice Canvel (EPFL),
Alain Hiltgen (UBS), Serge Vaudenay (EPFL), and
*) Add various sanity checks to asn1_get_length() to reject
the ASN1 length bytes if they exceed sizeof(long), will appear
negative or the content length exceeds the length of the
- supplied buffer. (CAN-2002-0659)
+ supplied buffer. (CVE-2002-0659)
[Steve Henson, Adi Stav <stav@mercury.co.il>, James Yonan <jim@ntlp.com>]
*) Assertions for various potential buffer overflows, not known to
[Ben Laurie (CHATS)]
*) Various temporary buffers to hold ASCII versions of integers were
- too small for 64 bit platforms. (CAN-2002-0655)
+ too small for 64 bit platforms. (CVE-2002-0655)
[Matthew Byng-Maddick <mbm@aldigital.co.uk> and Ben Laurie (CHATS)>
*) Remote buffer overflow in SSL3 protocol - an attacker could
- supply an oversized session ID to a client. (CAN-2002-0656)
+ supply an oversized session ID to a client. (CVE-2002-0656)
[Ben Laurie (CHATS)]
*) Remote buffer overflow in SSL2 protocol - an attacker could
- supply an oversized client master key. (CAN-2002-0656)
+ supply an oversized client master key. (CVE-2002-0656)
[Ben Laurie (CHATS)]
Changes between 0.9.6c and 0.9.6d [9 May 2002]
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff