Don't try and verify signatures if key is NULL (CVE-2013-0166)

[openssl.git] / CHANGES

diff --git a/CHANGES b/CHANGES
index a2275713fb3d1c6b074432a9994edd9e6b70ff1c..8adac3b6d415b380497c39c7ccdbfbbda06d183f 100644 (file)
--- a/CHANGES
+++ b/CHANGES
@@ -2,7 +2,45 @@
  OpenSSL CHANGES
  _______________
 
- Changes between 0.9.8u and 0.9.8v [xx XXX xxxx]
+ Changes between 0.9.8x and 0.9.8y [xx XXX xxxx]
+
+  *) Return an error when checking OCSP signatures when key is NULL.
+     This fixes a DoS attack. (CVE-2013-0166)
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Call OCSP Stapling callback after ciphersuite has been chosen, so
+     the right response is stapled. Also change SSL_get_certificate()
+     so it returns the certificate actually sent.
+     See http://rt.openssl.org/Ticket/Display.html?id=2836.
+     (This is a backport)
+     [Rob Stradling <rob.stradling@comodo.com>]
+
+  *) Fix possible deadlock when decoding public keys.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.8w and 0.9.8x [10 May 2012]
+
+  *) Sanity check record length before skipping explicit IV in DTLS
+     to fix DoS attack.
+
+     Thanks to Codenomicon for discovering this issue using Fuzz-o-Matic
+     fuzzing as a service testing platform.
+     (CVE-2012-2333)
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Initialise tkeylen properly when encrypting CMS messages.
+     Thanks to Solar Designer of Openwall for reporting this issue.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.8v and 0.9.8w [23 Apr 2012]
+
+  *) The fix for CVE-2012-2110 did not take into account that the 
+     'len' argument to BUF_MEM_grow and BUF_MEM_grow_clean is an
+     int in OpenSSL 0.9.8, making it still vulnerable. Fix by 
+     rejecting negative len parameter. (CVE-2012-2131)
+     [Tomas Hoger <thoger@redhat.com>]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.8u and 0.9.8v [19 Apr 2012]
 
   *) Check for potentially exploitable overflows in asn1_d2i_read_bio
      BUF_mem_grow and BUF_mem_grow_clean. Refuse attempts to shrink buffer