Changes between 1.0.1 and 1.0.2 [xx XXX xxxx]
+ *) New functions to retrieve certificate signature and signature
+ OID NID.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) If an attempt is made to use a signature algorithm not in the peer
+ preference list abort the handshake. If client has no suitable
+ signature algorithms in response to a certificate request do not
+ use the certificate.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) If server EC tmp key is not in client preference list abort handshake.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add support for certificate stores in CERT structure. This makes it
+ possible to have different stores per SSL structure or one store in
+ the parent SSL_CTX. Include distint stores for certificate chain
+ verification and chain building. New ctrl SSL_CTRL_BUILD_CERT_CHAIN
+ to build and store a certificate chain in CERT structure: returing
+ an error if the chain cannot be built: this will allow applications
+ to test if a chain is correctly configured.
+
+ Note: if the CERT based stores are not set then the parent SSL_CTX
+ store is used to retain compatibility with existing behaviour.
+
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) New function ssl_set_client_disabled to set a ciphersuite disabled
+ mask based on the current session, check mask when sending client
+ hello and checking the requested ciphersuite.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) New ctrls to retrieve and set certificate types in a certificate
+ request message. Print out received values in s_client. If certificate
+ types is not set with custom values set sensible values based on
+ supported signature algorithms.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Support for distinct client and server supported signature algorithms.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add certificate callback. If set this is called whenever a certificate
+ is required by client or server. An application can decide which
+ certificate chain to present based on arbitrary criteria: for example
+ supported signature algorithms. Add very simple example to s_server.
+ This fixes many of the problems and restrictions of the existing client
+ certificate callback: for example you can now clear an existing
+ certificate and specify the whole chain.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add new "valid_flags" field to CERT_PKEY structure which determines what
+ the certificate can be used for (if anything). Set valid_flags field
+ in new tls1_check_chain function. Simplify ssl_set_cert_masks which used
+ to have similar checks in it.
+
+ Add new "cert_flags" field to CERT structure and include a "strict mode".
+ This enforces some TLS certificate requirements (such as only permitting
+ certificate signature algorithms contained in the supported algorithms
+ extension) which some implementations ignore: this option should be used
+ with caution as it could cause interoperability issues.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Update and tidy signature algorithm extension processing. Work out
+ shared signature algorithms based on preferences and peer algorithms
+ and print them out in s_client and s_server. Abort handshake if no
+ shared signature algorithms.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add new functions to allow customised supported signature algorithms
+ for SSL and SSL_CTX structures. Add options to s_client and s_server
+ to support them.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) New function SSL_certs_clear() to delete all references to certificates
+ from an SSL structure. Before this once a certificate had been added
+ it couldn't be removed.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Integrate hostname, email address and IP address checking with certificate
+ verification. New verify options supporting checking in opensl utility.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Fixes and wildcard matching support to hostname and email checking
+ functions. Add manual page.
+ [Florian Weimer (Red Hat Product Security Team)]
+
+ *) New functions to check a hostname email or IP address against a
+ certificate. Add options x509 utility to print results of checks against
+ a certificate.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Fix OCSP checking.
+ [Rob Stradling <rob.stradling@comodo.com> and Ben Laurie]
+
+ *) Backport support for partial chain verification: if an intermediate
+ certificate is explicitly trusted (using -addtrust option to x509
+ utility for example) the verification is sucessful even if the chain
+ is not complete.
+ The OCSP checking fix depends on this backport.
+ [Steve Henson and Rob Stradling <rob.stradling@comodo.com>]
+
+ *) Add -trusted_first option which attempts to find certificates in the
+ trusted store even if an untrusted chain is also supplied.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) MIPS assembly pack updates: support for MIPS32r2 and SmartMIPS ASE,
+ platform support for Linux and Android.
+ [Andy Polyakov]
+
+ *) Call OCSP Stapling callback after ciphersuite has been chosen, so
+ the right response is stapled. Also change current certificate to
+ the certificate actually sent.
+ See http://rt.openssl.org/Ticket/Display.html?id=2836.
+ [Rob Stradling <rob.stradling@comodo.com>]
+
+ *) Support for linux-x32, ILP32 environment in x86_64 framework.
+ [Andy Polyakov]
+
+ *) RFC 5878 support.
+ [Emilia Kasper, Adam Langley, Ben Laurie (Google)]
+
+ *) Experimental multi-implementation support for FIPS capable OpenSSL.
+ When in FIPS mode the approved implementations are used as normal,
+ when not in FIPS mode the internal unapproved versions are used instead.
+ This means that the FIPS capable OpenSSL isn't forced to use the
+ (often lower perfomance) FIPS implementations outside FIPS mode.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
*) Transparently support X9.42 DH parameters when calling
PEM_read_bio_DHparameters. This means existing applications can handle
the new parameter format automatically.
certificates.
[Steve Henson]
- Changes between 1.0.1b and 1.0.1c [xx XXX xxxx]
+ Changes between 1.0.1c and 1.0.1d [xx XXX xxxx]
+
+ *) Make openssl verify return errors.
+ [Chris Palmer <palmer@google.com> and Ben Laurie]
+
+ *) Fix possible deadlock when decoding public keys.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Don't use TLS 1.0 record version number in initial client hello
+ if renegotiating.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.1b and 1.0.1c [10 May 2012]
+
+ *) Sanity check record length before skipping explicit IV in TLS
+ 1.2, 1.1 and DTLS to avoid DoS attack.
+
+ Thanks to Codenomicon for discovering this issue using Fuzz-o-Matic
+ fuzzing as a service testing platform.
+ (CVE-2012-2333)
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Initialise tkeylen properly when encrypting CMS messages.
+ Thanks to Solar Designer of Openwall for reporting this issue.
+ [Steve Henson]
*) In FIPS mode don't try to use composite ciphers as they are not
approved.