Changes between 1.0.1 and 1.1.0 [xx XXX xxxx]
+ *) Add support for certificate stores in CERT structure. This makes it
+ possible to have different stores per SSL structure or one store in
+ the parent SSL_CTX. Include distint stores for certificate chain
+ verification and chain building. New ctrl SSL_CTRL_BUILD_CERT_CHAIN
+ to build and store a certificate chain in CERT structure: returing
+ an error if the chain cannot be built: this will allow applications
+ to test if a chain is correctly configured.
+
+ Note: if the CERT based stores are not set then the parent SSL_CTX
+ store is used to retain compatibility with existing behaviour.
+
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) New function ssl_set_client_disabled to set a ciphersuite disabled
+ mask based on the current session, check mask when sending client
+ hello and checking the requested ciphersuite.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) New ctrls to retrieve and set certificate types in a certificate
+ request message. Print out received values in s_client. If certificate
+ types is not set with custom values set sensible values based on
+ supported signature algorithms.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Support for distinct client and server supported signature algorithms.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add certificate callback. If set this is called whenever a certificate
+ is required by client or server. An application can decide which
+ certificate chain to present based on arbitrary criteria: for example
+ supported signature algorithms. Add very simple example to s_server.
+ This fixes many of the problems and restrictions of the existing client
+ certificate callback: for example you can now clear an existing
+ certificate and specify the whole chain.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add new "valid_flags" field to CERT_PKEY structure which determines what
+ the certificate can be used for (if anything). Set valid_flags field
+ in new tls1_check_chain function. Simplify ssl_set_cert_masks which used
+ to have similar checks in it.
+
+ Add new "cert_flags" field to CERT structure and include a "strict mode".
+ This enforces some TLS certificate requirements (such as only permitting
+ certificate signature algorithms contained in the supported algorithms
+ extension) which some implementations ignore: this option should be used
+ with caution as it could cause interoperability issues.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Update and tidy signature algorithm extension processing. Work out
+ shared signature algorithms based on preferences and peer algorithms
+ and print them out in s_client and s_server. Abort handshake if no
+ shared signature algorithms.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add new functions to allow customised supported signature algorithms
+ for SSL and SSL_CTX structures. Add options to s_client and s_server
+ to support them.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) New function SSL_certs_clear() to delete all references to certificates
+ from an SSL structure. Before this once a certificate had been added
+ it couldn't be removed.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Initial SSL tracing code. This parses out SSL/TLS records using the
+ message callback and prints the results. Needs compile time option
+ "enable-ssl-trace". New options to s_client and s_server to enable
+ tracing.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) New functions to retrieve certificate signature and signature
+ OID NID.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Print out deprecated issuer and subject unique ID fields in
+ certificates.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) RFC 5878 support.
+ [Emilia Kasper, Adam Langley, Ben Laurie (Google)]
+
*) Support for automatic EC temporary key parameter selection. If enabled
the most preferred EC parameters are automatically used instead of
hardcoded fixed parameters. Now a server just has to call:
is enable if DEBUG_UNUSED is set. Add to several functions in evp.h
whose return value is often ignored.
[Steve Henson]
-
- Changes between 1.0.1 and 1.0.1a [xx XXX xxxx]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.1c and 1.0.1d [xx XXX xxxx]
+
+ *) Fix possible deadlock when decoding public keys.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Don't use TLS 1.0 record version number in initial client hello
+ if renegotiating.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.1b and 1.0.1c [10 May 2012]
+
+ *) Sanity check record length before skipping explicit IV in TLS
+ 1.2, 1.1 and DTLS to avoid DoS attack.
+
+ Thanks to Codenomicon for discovering this issue using Fuzz-o-Matic
+ fuzzing as a service testing platform.
+ (CVE-2012-2333)
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Initialise tkeylen properly when encrypting CMS messages.
+ Thanks to Solar Designer of Openwall for reporting this issue.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) In FIPS mode don't try to use composite ciphers as they are not
+ approved.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.1a and 1.0.1b [26 Apr 2012]
+
+ *) OpenSSL 1.0.0 sets SSL_OP_ALL to 0x80000FFFL and OpenSSL 1.0.1 and
+ 1.0.1a set SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1 to 0x00000400L which would unfortunately
+ mean any application compiled against OpenSSL 1.0.0 headers setting
+ SSL_OP_ALL would also set SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1, unintentionally disablng
+ TLS 1.1 also. Fix this by changing the value of SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1 to
+ 0x10000000L Any application which was previously compiled against
+ OpenSSL 1.0.1 or 1.0.1a headers and which cares about SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1
+ will need to be recompiled as a result. Letting be results in
+ inability to disable specifically TLS 1.1 and in client context,
+ in unlike event, limit maximum offered version to TLS 1.0 [see below].
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) In order to ensure interoperabilty SSL_OP_NO_protocolX does not
+ disable just protocol X, but all protocols above X *if* there are
+ protocols *below* X still enabled. In more practical terms it means
+ that if application wants to disable TLS1.0 in favor of TLS1.1 and
+ above, it's not sufficient to pass SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1, one has to pass
+ SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1|SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3|SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2. This applies to
+ client side.
+ [Andy Polyakov]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.1 and 1.0.1a [19 Apr 2012]
+
+ *) Check for potentially exploitable overflows in asn1_d2i_read_bio
+ BUF_mem_grow and BUF_mem_grow_clean. Refuse attempts to shrink buffer
+ in CRYPTO_realloc_clean.
+
+ Thanks to Tavis Ormandy, Google Security Team, for discovering this
+ issue and to Adam Langley <agl@chromium.org> for fixing it.
+ (CVE-2012-2110)
+ [Adam Langley (Google), Tavis Ormandy, Google Security Team]
+
+ *) Don't allow TLS 1.2 SHA-256 ciphersuites in TLS 1.0, 1.1 connections.
+ [Adam Langley]
+
+ *) Workarounds for some broken servers that "hang" if a client hello
+ record length exceeds 255 bytes:
+
+ 1. Do not use record version number > TLS 1.0 in initial client
+ hello: some (but not all) hanging servers will now work.
+ 2. If we set OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH this will truncate
+ the number of ciphers sent in the client hello. This should be
+ set to an even number, such as 50, for example by passing:
+ -DOPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH=50 to config or Configure.
+ Most broken servers should now work.
+ 3. If all else fails setting OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2_CLIENT will disable
+ TLS 1.2 client support entirely.
+ [Steve Henson]
*) Fix SEGV in Vector Permutation AES module observed in OpenSSH.
[Andy Polyakov]
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff