Changes between 0.9.8l (?) and 0.9.8m (?) [xx XXX xxxx]
+ *) On some versions of WIN32 Heap32Next is very slow. This can cause
+ excessive delays in the RAND_poll(): over a minute. As a workaround
+ include a time check in the inner Heap32Next loop too.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
*) The code that handled flushing of data in SSL/TLS originally used the
BIO_CTRL_INFO ctrl to see if any data was pending first. This caused
the problem outlined in PR#1949. The fix suggested there however can
[Steve Henson]
*) Add option SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT which will allow clients to
- connect (but not renegotiate) with servers which do not support RI.
+ connect and renegotiate with servers which do not support RI.
Until RI is more widely deployed this option is enabled by default.
[Steve Henson]
[Steve Henson]
*) If client attempts to renegotiate and doesn't support RI respond with
- a no_renegotiation alert as required by draft-ietf-tls-renegotiation.
- Some renegotiating TLS clients will continue a connection gracefully
- when they receive the alert. Unfortunately OpenSSL mishandled
- this alert and would hang waiting for a server hello which it will never
- receive. Now we treat a received no_renegotiation alert as a fatal
- error. This is because applications requesting a renegotiation might well
- expect it to succeed and would have no code in place to handle the server
- denying it so the only safe thing to do is to terminate the connection.
+ a no_renegotiation alert as required by RFC5746. Some renegotiating
+ TLS clients will continue a connection gracefully when they receive
+ the alert. Unfortunately OpenSSL mishandled this alert and would hang
+ waiting for a server hello which it will never receive. Now we treat a
+ received no_renegotiation alert as a fatal error. This is because
+ applications requesting a renegotiation might well expect it to succeed
+ and would have no code in place to handle the server denying it so the
+ only safe thing to do is to terminate the connection.
[Steve Henson]
*) Add ctrl macro SSL_get_secure_renegotiation_support() which returns 1 if
the updated NID creation version. This should correctly handle UTF8.
[Steve Henson]
- *) Implement draft-ietf-tls-renegotiation-03. Re-enable
- renegotiation but require the extension as needed. Unfortunately,
- SSL3_FLAGS_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION turns out to be a
- bad idea. It has been replaced by
+ *) Implement RFC5746. Re-enable renegotiation but require the extension
+ as needed. Unfortunately, SSL3_FLAGS_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION
+ turns out to be a bad idea. It has been replaced by
SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION which can be set with
SSL_CTX_set_options(). This is really not recommended unless you
know what you are doing.