https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commits/ and pick the appropriate
release branch.
- Changes between 1.1.1c and 1.1.1d [xx XXX xxxx]
+ Changes between 1.1.1d and 1.1.1e [xx XXX xxxx]
+
+ *) Fixed an an overflow bug in the x64_64 Montgomery squaring procedure
+ used in exponentiation with 512-bit moduli. No EC algorithms are
+ affected. Analysis suggests that attacks against 2-prime RSA1024,
+ 3-prime RSA1536, and DSA1024 as a result of this defect would be very
+ difficult to perform and are not believed likely. Attacks against DH512
+ are considered just feasible. However, for an attack the target would
+ have to re-use the DH512 private key, which is not recommended anyway.
+ Also applications directly using the low level API BN_mod_exp may be
+ affected if they use BN_FLG_CONSTTIME.
+ (CVE-2019-1551)
+ [Andy Polyakov]
+
+ *) Added a new method to gather entropy on VMS, based on SYS$GET_ENTROPY.
+ The presence of this system service is determined at run-time.
+ [Richard Levitte]
+
+ *) Added newline escaping functionality to a filename when using openssl dgst.
+ This output format is to replicate the output format found in the '*sum'
+ checksum programs. This aims to preserve backward compatibility.
+ [Matt Eaton, Richard Levitte, and Paul Dale]
+
+ *) Print all values for a PKCS#12 attribute with 'openssl pkcs12', not just
+ the first value.
+ [Jon Spillett]
+
+ Changes between 1.1.1c and 1.1.1d [10 Sep 2019]
+
+ *) Fixed a fork protection issue. OpenSSL 1.1.1 introduced a rewritten random
+ number generator (RNG). This was intended to include protection in the
+ event of a fork() system call in order to ensure that the parent and child
+ processes did not share the same RNG state. However this protection was not
+ being used in the default case.
+
+ A partial mitigation for this issue is that the output from a high
+ precision timer is mixed into the RNG state so the likelihood of a parent
+ and child process sharing state is significantly reduced.
+
+ If an application already calls OPENSSL_init_crypto() explicitly using
+ OPENSSL_INIT_ATFORK then this problem does not occur at all.
+ (CVE-2019-1549)
+ [Matthias St. Pierre]
+
+ *) For built-in EC curves, ensure an EC_GROUP built from the curve name is
+ used even when parsing explicit parameters, when loading a serialized key
+ or calling `EC_GROUP_new_from_ecpkparameters()`/
+ `EC_GROUP_new_from_ecparameters()`.
+ This prevents bypass of security hardening and performance gains,
+ especially for curves with specialized EC_METHODs.
+ By default, if a key encoded with explicit parameters is loaded and later
+ serialized, the output is still encoded with explicit parameters, even if
+ internally a "named" EC_GROUP is used for computation.
+ [Nicola Tuveri]
+
+ *) Compute ECC cofactors if not provided during EC_GROUP construction. Before
+ this change, EC_GROUP_set_generator would accept order and/or cofactor as
+ NULL. After this change, only the cofactor parameter can be NULL. It also
+ does some minimal sanity checks on the passed order.
+ (CVE-2019-1547)
+ [Billy Bob Brumley]
+
+ *) Fixed a padding oracle in PKCS7_dataDecode and CMS_decrypt_set1_pkey.
+ An attack is simple, if the first CMS_recipientInfo is valid but the
+ second CMS_recipientInfo is chosen ciphertext. If the second
+ recipientInfo decodes to PKCS #1 v1.5 form plaintext, the correct
+ encryption key will be replaced by garbage, and the message cannot be
+ decoded, but if the RSA decryption fails, the correct encryption key is
+ used and the recipient will not notice the attack.
+ As a work around for this potential attack the length of the decrypted
+ key must be equal to the cipher default key length, in case the
+ certifiate is not given and all recipientInfo are tried out.
+ The old behaviour can be re-enabled in the CMS code by setting the
+ CMS_DEBUG_DECRYPT flag.
+ (CVE-2019-1563)
+ [Bernd Edlinger]
+
+ *) Early start up entropy quality from the DEVRANDOM seed source has been
+ improved for older Linux systems. The RAND subsystem will wait for
+ /dev/random to be producing output before seeding from /dev/urandom.
+ The seeded state is stored for future library initialisations using
+ a system global shared memory segment. The shared memory identifier
+ can be configured by defining OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_DEVRANDOM_SHM_ID to
+ the desired value. The default identifier is 114.
+ [Paul Dale]
+
+ *) Correct the extended master secret constant on EBCDIC systems. Without this
+ fix TLS connections between an EBCDIC system and a non-EBCDIC system that
+ negotiate EMS will fail. Unfortunately this also means that TLS connections
+ between EBCDIC systems with this fix, and EBCDIC systems without this
+ fix will fail if they negotiate EMS.
+ [Matt Caswell]
*) Use Windows installation paths in the mingw builds
(CVE-2019-1552)
[Richard Levitte]
- *) Changed DH parameters to generate the order q subgroup instead of 2q.
- Previously generated DH parameters are still accepted by DH_check
+ *) Changed DH_check to accept parameters with order q and 2q subgroups.
+ With order 2q subgroups the bit 0 of the private key is not secret
but DH_generate_key works around that by clearing bit 0 of the
private key for those. This avoids leaking bit 0 of the private key.
[Bernd Edlinger]
was decided to revert this feature and leave it up to the OS
resp. the platform maintainer to ensure a proper initialization
during early boot time.
+ [Matthias St. Pierre]
Changes between 1.1.1b and 1.1.1c [28 May 2019]
SSL_set_ciphersuites()
[Matt Caswell]
- *) Memory allocation failures consistenly add an error to the error
+ *) Memory allocation failures consistently add an error to the error
stack.
[Rich Salz]
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff