OpenSSL CHANGES
_______________
- Changes between 1.0.1 and 1.1.0 [xx XXX xxxx]
+ Changes between 1.0.2 and 1.1.0 [xx XXX xxxx]
- *) Transparently support X9.42 DH parameters when calling
- PEM_read_bio_DHparameters. This means existing applications can handle
- the new parameter format automatically.
+ *) Fix for the attack described in the paper "Recovering OpenSSL
+ ECDSA Nonces Using the FLUSH+RELOAD Cache Side-channel Attack"
+ by Yuval Yarom and Naomi Benger. Details can be obtained from:
+ http://eprint.iacr.org/2014/140
+
+ Thanks to Yuval Yarom and Naomi Benger for discovering this
+ flaw and to Yuval Yarom for supplying a fix (CVE-2014-0076)
+ [Yuval Yarom and Naomi Benger]
+
+ *) Use algorithm specific chains in SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file():
+ this fixes a limiation in previous versions of OpenSSL.
[Steve Henson]
- *) Initial experimental support for X9.42 DH parameter format: mainly
- to support use of 'q' parameter for RFC5114 parameters.
+ *) Experimental encrypt-then-mac support.
+
+ Experimental support for encrypt then mac from
+ draft-gutmann-tls-encrypt-then-mac-02.txt
+
+ To enable it set the appropriate extension number (0x42 for the test
+ server) using e.g. -DTLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac=0x42
+
+ For non-compliant peers (i.e. just about everything) this should have no
+ effect.
+
+ WARNING: EXPERIMENTAL, SUBJECT TO CHANGE.
+
[Steve Henson]
- *) Add DH parameters from RFC5114 including test data to dhtest.
+ *) Add callbacks supporting generation and retrieval of supplemental
+ data entries.
+ [Scott Deboy <sdeboy@apache.org>, Trevor Perrin and Ben Laurie]
+
+ *) Add EVP support for key wrapping algorithms, to avoid problems with
+ existing code the flag EVP_CIPHER_CTX_WRAP_ALLOW has to be set in
+ the EVP_CIPHER_CTX or an error is returned. Add AES and DES3 wrap
+ algorithms and include tests cases.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Extend CMS code to support RSA-PSS signatures and RSA-OAEP for
+ enveloped data.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Extended RSA OAEP support via EVP_PKEY API. Options to specify digest,
+ MGF1 digest and OAEP label.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Support for DTLS 1.2. This adds two sets of DTLS methods: DTLS_*_method()
+ supports both DTLS 1.2 and 1.0 and should use whatever version the peer
+ supports and DTLSv1_2_*_method() which supports DTLS 1.2 only.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Make openssl verify return errors.
+ [Chris Palmer <palmer@google.com> and Ben Laurie]
+
+ *) New function ASN1_TIME_diff to calculate the difference between two
+ ASN1_TIME structures or one structure and the current time.
[Steve Henson]
*) Update fips_test_suite to support multiple command line options. New
[Steve Henson]
*) Add functions FIPS_module_version() and FIPS_module_version_text()
- to return numberical and string versions of the FIPS module number.
+ to return numerical and string versions of the FIPS module number.
[Steve Henson]
*) Rename FIPS_mode_set and FIPS_mode to FIPS_module_mode_set and
- FIPS_module_mode. FIPS_mode and FIPS_mode_set will be implmeneted
+ FIPS_module_mode. FIPS_mode and FIPS_mode_set will be implemented
outside the validated module in the FIPS capable OpenSSL.
[Steve Henson]
*) Minor change to DRBG entropy callback semantics. In some cases
- there is no mutiple of the block length between min_len and
+ there is no multiple of the block length between min_len and
max_len. Allow the callback to return more than max_len bytes
of entropy but discard any extra: it is the callback's responsibility
to ensure that the extra data discarded does not impact the
security.
[Emilia Käsper <emilia.kasper@esat.kuleuven.be> (Google)]
- *) New function OPENSSL_gmtime_diff to find the difference in days
- and seconds between two tm structures. This will be used to provide
- additional functionality for ASN1_TIME.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Add -trusted_first option which attempts to find certificates in the
- trusted store even if an untrusted chain is also supplied.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Initial experimental support for explicitly trusted non-root CAs.
- OpenSSL still tries to build a complete chain to a root but if an
- intermediate CA has a trust setting included that is used. The first
- setting is used: whether to trust or reject.
- [Steve Henson]
-
*) New -verify_name option in command line utilities to set verification
parameters by name.
[Steve Henson]
is enable if DEBUG_UNUSED is set. Add to several functions in evp.h
whose return value is often ignored.
[Steve Henson]
-
- Changes between 1.0.0f and 1.0.1 [xx XXX xxxx]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.1e and 1.0.2 [xx XXX xxxx]
+
+ *) Keep original DTLS digest and encryption contexts in retransmission
+ structures so we can use the previous session parameters if they need
+ to be resent. (CVE-2013-6450)
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) TLS pad extension: draft-agl-tls-padding-02
+
+ Workaround for the "TLS hang bug" (see FAQ and PR#2771): if the
+ TLS client Hello record length value would otherwise be > 255 and
+ less that 512 pad with a dummy extension containing zeroes so it
+ is at least 512 bytes long.
+
+ To enable it use an unused extension number (for example chrome uses
+ 35655) using:
+
+ e.g. -DTLSEXT_TYPE_padding=35655
+
+ Since the extension is ignored the actual number doesn't matter as long
+ as it doesn't clash with any existing extension.
+
+ This will be updated when the extension gets an official number.
+
+ [Adam Langley, Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add functions to allocate and set the fields of an ECDSA_METHOD
+ structure.
+ [Douglas E. Engert, Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add option SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG (part of SSL_OP_ALL) which
+ avoids preferring ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers when the client appears to be
+ Safari on OS X. Safari on OS X 10.8..10.8.3 advertises support for
+ several ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers, but fails to negotiate them. The bug
+ is fixed in OS X 10.8.4, but Apple have ruled out both hot fixing
+ 10.8..10.8.3 and forcing users to upgrade to 10.8.4 or newer.
+ [Rob Stradling, Adam Langley]
+
+ *) New functions OPENSSL_gmtime_diff and ASN1_TIME_diff to find the
+ difference in days and seconds between two tm or ASN1_TIME structures.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add -rev test option to s_server to just reverse order of characters
+ received by client and send back to server. Also prints an abbreviated
+ summary of the connection parameters.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) New option -brief for s_client and s_server to print out a brief summary
+ of connection parameters.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add callbacks for arbitrary TLS extensions.
+ [Trevor Perrin <trevp@trevp.net> and Ben Laurie]
+
+ *) New option -crl_download in several openssl utilities to download CRLs
+ from CRLDP extension in certificates.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) New options -CRL and -CRLform for s_client and s_server for CRLs.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) New function X509_CRL_diff to generate a delta CRL from the difference
+ of two full CRLs. Add support to "crl" utility.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) New functions to set lookup_crls function and to retrieve
+ X509_STORE from X509_STORE_CTX.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Print out deprecated issuer and subject unique ID fields in
+ certificates.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Extend OCSP I/O functions so they can be used for simple general purpose
+ HTTP as well as OCSP. New wrapper function which can be used to download
+ CRLs using the OCSP API.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Delegate command line handling in s_client/s_server to SSL_CONF APIs.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) SSL_CONF* functions. These provide a common framework for application
+ configuration using configuration files or command lines.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) SSL/TLS tracing code. This parses out SSL/TLS records using the
+ message callback and prints the results. Needs compile time option
+ "enable-ssl-trace". New options to s_client and s_server to enable
+ tracing.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) New ctrl and macro to retrieve supported points extensions.
+ Print out extension in s_server and s_client.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) New functions to retrieve certificate signature and signature
+ OID NID.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add functions to retrieve and manipulate the raw cipherlist sent by a
+ client to OpenSSL.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) New Suite B modes for TLS code. These use and enforce the requirements
+ of RFC6460: restrict ciphersuites, only permit Suite B algorithms and
+ only use Suite B curves. The Suite B modes can be set by using the
+ strings "SUITEB128", "SUITEB192" or "SUITEB128ONLY" for the cipherstring.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) New chain verification flags for Suite B levels of security. Check
+ algorithms are acceptable when flags are set in X509_verify_cert.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Make tls1_check_chain return a set of flags indicating checks passed
+ by a certificate chain. Add additional tests to handle client
+ certificates: checks for matching certificate type and issuer name
+ comparison.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) If an attempt is made to use a signature algorithm not in the peer
+ preference list abort the handshake. If client has no suitable
+ signature algorithms in response to a certificate request do not
+ use the certificate.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) If server EC tmp key is not in client preference list abort handshake.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add support for certificate stores in CERT structure. This makes it
+ possible to have different stores per SSL structure or one store in
+ the parent SSL_CTX. Include distint stores for certificate chain
+ verification and chain building. New ctrl SSL_CTRL_BUILD_CERT_CHAIN
+ to build and store a certificate chain in CERT structure: returing
+ an error if the chain cannot be built: this will allow applications
+ to test if a chain is correctly configured.
+
+ Note: if the CERT based stores are not set then the parent SSL_CTX
+ store is used to retain compatibility with existing behaviour.
+
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) New function ssl_set_client_disabled to set a ciphersuite disabled
+ mask based on the current session, check mask when sending client
+ hello and checking the requested ciphersuite.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) New ctrls to retrieve and set certificate types in a certificate
+ request message. Print out received values in s_client. If certificate
+ types is not set with custom values set sensible values based on
+ supported signature algorithms.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Support for distinct client and server supported signature algorithms.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add certificate callback. If set this is called whenever a certificate
+ is required by client or server. An application can decide which
+ certificate chain to present based on arbitrary criteria: for example
+ supported signature algorithms. Add very simple example to s_server.
+ This fixes many of the problems and restrictions of the existing client
+ certificate callback: for example you can now clear an existing
+ certificate and specify the whole chain.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add new "valid_flags" field to CERT_PKEY structure which determines what
+ the certificate can be used for (if anything). Set valid_flags field
+ in new tls1_check_chain function. Simplify ssl_set_cert_masks which used
+ to have similar checks in it.
+
+ Add new "cert_flags" field to CERT structure and include a "strict mode".
+ This enforces some TLS certificate requirements (such as only permitting
+ certificate signature algorithms contained in the supported algorithms
+ extension) which some implementations ignore: this option should be used
+ with caution as it could cause interoperability issues.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Update and tidy signature algorithm extension processing. Work out
+ shared signature algorithms based on preferences and peer algorithms
+ and print them out in s_client and s_server. Abort handshake if no
+ shared signature algorithms.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add new functions to allow customised supported signature algorithms
+ for SSL and SSL_CTX structures. Add options to s_client and s_server
+ to support them.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) New function SSL_certs_clear() to delete all references to certificates
+ from an SSL structure. Before this once a certificate had been added
+ it couldn't be removed.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Integrate hostname, email address and IP address checking with certificate
+ verification. New verify options supporting checking in opensl utility.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Fixes and wildcard matching support to hostname and email checking
+ functions. Add manual page.
+ [Florian Weimer (Red Hat Product Security Team)]
+
+ *) New functions to check a hostname email or IP address against a
+ certificate. Add options x509 utility to print results of checks against
+ a certificate.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Fix OCSP checking.
+ [Rob Stradling <rob.stradling@comodo.com> and Ben Laurie]
+
+ *) Initial experimental support for explicitly trusted non-root CAs.
+ OpenSSL still tries to build a complete chain to a root but if an
+ intermediate CA has a trust setting included that is used. The first
+ setting is used: whether to trust (e.g., -addtrust option to the x509
+ utility) or reject.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add -trusted_first option which attempts to find certificates in the
+ trusted store even if an untrusted chain is also supplied.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) MIPS assembly pack updates: support for MIPS32r2 and SmartMIPS ASE,
+ platform support for Linux and Android.
+ [Andy Polyakov]
+
+ *) Support for linux-x32, ILP32 environment in x86_64 framework.
+ [Andy Polyakov]
+
+ *) RFC 5878 (TLS Authorization Extensions) support.
+ [Emilia Kasper, Adam Langley, Ben Laurie (Google)]
+
+ *) Experimental multi-implementation support for FIPS capable OpenSSL.
+ When in FIPS mode the approved implementations are used as normal,
+ when not in FIPS mode the internal unapproved versions are used instead.
+ This means that the FIPS capable OpenSSL isn't forced to use the
+ (often lower perfomance) FIPS implementations outside FIPS mode.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Transparently support X9.42 DH parameters when calling
+ PEM_read_bio_DHparameters. This means existing applications can handle
+ the new parameter format automatically.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Initial experimental support for X9.42 DH parameter format: mainly
+ to support use of 'q' parameter for RFC5114 parameters.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add DH parameters from RFC5114 including test data to dhtest.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Support for automatic EC temporary key parameter selection. If enabled
+ the most preferred EC parameters are automatically used instead of
+ hardcoded fixed parameters. Now a server just has to call:
+ SSL_CTX_set_ecdh_auto(ctx, 1) and the server will automatically
+ support ECDH and use the most appropriate parameters.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Enhance and tidy EC curve and point format TLS extension code. Use
+ static structures instead of allocation if default values are used.
+ New ctrls to set curves we wish to support and to retrieve shared curves.
+ Print out shared curves in s_server. New options to s_server and s_client
+ to set list of supported curves.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) New ctrls to retrieve supported signature algorithms and
+ supported curve values as an array of NIDs. Extend openssl utility
+ to print out received values.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add new APIs EC_curve_nist2nid and EC_curve_nid2nist which convert
+ between NIDs and the more common NIST names such as "P-256". Enhance
+ ecparam utility and ECC method to recognise the NIST names for curves.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Enhance SSL/TLS certificate chain handling to support different
+ chains for each certificate instead of one chain in the parent SSL_CTX.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Support for fixed DH ciphersuite client authentication: where both
+ server and client use DH certificates with common parameters.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Support for fixed DH ciphersuites: those requiring DH server
+ certificates.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.1d and 1.0.1e [11 Feb 2013]
+
+ *) Correct fix for CVE-2013-0169. The original didn't work on AES-NI
+ supporting platforms or when small records were transferred.
+ [Andy Polyakov, Steve Henson]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.1c and 1.0.1d [5 Feb 2013]
+
+ *) Make the decoding of SSLv3, TLS and DTLS CBC records constant time.
+
+ This addresses the flaw in CBC record processing discovered by
+ Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson. Details of this attack can be found
+ at: http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/tls/
+
+ Thanks go to Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson of the Information
+ Security Group at Royal Holloway, University of London
+ (www.isg.rhul.ac.uk) for discovering this flaw and Adam Langley and
+ Emilia Käsper for the initial patch.
+ (CVE-2013-0169)
+ [Emilia Käsper, Adam Langley, Ben Laurie, Andy Polyakov, Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Fix flaw in AESNI handling of TLS 1.2 and 1.1 records for CBC mode
+ ciphersuites which can be exploited in a denial of service attack.
+ Thanks go to and to Adam Langley <agl@chromium.org> for discovering
+ and detecting this bug and to Wolfgang Ettlinger
+ <wolfgang.ettlinger@gmail.com> for independently discovering this issue.
+ (CVE-2012-2686)
+ [Adam Langley]
+
+ *) Return an error when checking OCSP signatures when key is NULL.
+ This fixes a DoS attack. (CVE-2013-0166)
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Make openssl verify return errors.
+ [Chris Palmer <palmer@google.com> and Ben Laurie]
+
+ *) Call OCSP Stapling callback after ciphersuite has been chosen, so
+ the right response is stapled. Also change SSL_get_certificate()
+ so it returns the certificate actually sent.
+ See http://rt.openssl.org/Ticket/Display.html?id=2836.
+ [Rob Stradling <rob.stradling@comodo.com>]
+
+ *) Fix possible deadlock when decoding public keys.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Don't use TLS 1.0 record version number in initial client hello
+ if renegotiating.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.1b and 1.0.1c [10 May 2012]
+
+ *) Sanity check record length before skipping explicit IV in TLS
+ 1.2, 1.1 and DTLS to fix DoS attack.
+
+ Thanks to Codenomicon for discovering this issue using Fuzz-o-Matic
+ fuzzing as a service testing platform.
+ (CVE-2012-2333)
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Initialise tkeylen properly when encrypting CMS messages.
+ Thanks to Solar Designer of Openwall for reporting this issue.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) In FIPS mode don't try to use composite ciphers as they are not
+ approved.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.1a and 1.0.1b [26 Apr 2012]
+
+ *) OpenSSL 1.0.0 sets SSL_OP_ALL to 0x80000FFFL and OpenSSL 1.0.1 and
+ 1.0.1a set SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1 to 0x00000400L which would unfortunately
+ mean any application compiled against OpenSSL 1.0.0 headers setting
+ SSL_OP_ALL would also set SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1, unintentionally disablng
+ TLS 1.1 also. Fix this by changing the value of SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1 to
+ 0x10000000L Any application which was previously compiled against
+ OpenSSL 1.0.1 or 1.0.1a headers and which cares about SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1
+ will need to be recompiled as a result. Letting be results in
+ inability to disable specifically TLS 1.1 and in client context,
+ in unlike event, limit maximum offered version to TLS 1.0 [see below].
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) In order to ensure interoperabilty SSL_OP_NO_protocolX does not
+ disable just protocol X, but all protocols above X *if* there are
+ protocols *below* X still enabled. In more practical terms it means
+ that if application wants to disable TLS1.0 in favor of TLS1.1 and
+ above, it's not sufficient to pass SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1, one has to pass
+ SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1|SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3|SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2. This applies to
+ client side.
+ [Andy Polyakov]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.1 and 1.0.1a [19 Apr 2012]
+
+ *) Check for potentially exploitable overflows in asn1_d2i_read_bio
+ BUF_mem_grow and BUF_mem_grow_clean. Refuse attempts to shrink buffer
+ in CRYPTO_realloc_clean.
+
+ Thanks to Tavis Ormandy, Google Security Team, for discovering this
+ issue and to Adam Langley <agl@chromium.org> for fixing it.
+ (CVE-2012-2110)
+ [Adam Langley (Google), Tavis Ormandy, Google Security Team]
+
+ *) Don't allow TLS 1.2 SHA-256 ciphersuites in TLS 1.0, 1.1 connections.
+ [Adam Langley]
+
+ *) Workarounds for some broken servers that "hang" if a client hello
+ record length exceeds 255 bytes.
+
+ 1. Do not use record version number > TLS 1.0 in initial client
+ hello: some (but not all) hanging servers will now work.
+ 2. If we set OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH this will truncate
+ the number of ciphers sent in the client hello. This should be
+ set to an even number, such as 50, for example by passing:
+ -DOPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH=50 to config or Configure.
+ Most broken servers should now work.
+ 3. If all else fails setting OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2_CLIENT will disable
+ TLS 1.2 client support entirely.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Fix SEGV in Vector Permutation AES module observed in OpenSSH.
+ [Andy Polyakov]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.0h and 1.0.1 [14 Mar 2012]
+
+ *) Add compatibility with old MDC2 signatures which use an ASN1 OCTET
+ STRING form instead of a DigestInfo.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) The format used for MDC2 RSA signatures is inconsistent between EVP
+ and the RSA_sign/RSA_verify functions. This was made more apparent when
+ OpenSSL used RSA_sign/RSA_verify for some RSA signatures in particular
+ those which went through EVP_PKEY_METHOD in 1.0.0 and later. Detect
+ the correct format in RSA_verify so both forms transparently work.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Some servers which support TLS 1.0 can choke if we initially indicate
+ support for TLS 1.2 and later renegotiate using TLS 1.0 in the RSA
+ encrypted premaster secret. As a workaround use the maximum pemitted
+ client version in client hello, this should keep such servers happy
+ and still work with previous versions of OpenSSL.
+ [Steve Henson]
*) Add support for TLS/DTLS heartbeats.
[Robin Seggelmann <seggelmann@fh-muenster.de>]
(removal of unnecessary code)
[Peter Sylvester <peter.sylvester@edelweb.fr>]
- *) Add -attime option to openssl utilities.
- [Peter Eckersley <pde@eff.org>, Ben Laurie and Steve Henson]
-
*) Add TLS key material exporter from RFC 5705.
[Eric Rescorla]
keep original code iff non-FIPS operations are allowed.
[Steve Henson]
- *) Add -attime option to openssl verify.
- [Peter Eckersley <pde@eff.org> and Ben Laurie]
+ *) Add -attime option to openssl utilities.
+ [Peter Eckersley <pde@eff.org>, Ben Laurie and Steve Henson]
*) Redirect DSA and DH operations to FIPS module in FIPS mode.
[Steve Henson]
Add command line options to s_client/s_server.
[Steve Henson]
- Changes between 1.0.0e and 1.0.0f [xx XXX xxxx]
+ Changes between 1.0.0j and 1.0.0k [5 Feb 2013]
+
+ *) Make the decoding of SSLv3, TLS and DTLS CBC records constant time.
+
+ This addresses the flaw in CBC record processing discovered by
+ Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson. Details of this attack can be found
+ at: http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/tls/
+
+ Thanks go to Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson of the Information
+ Security Group at Royal Holloway, University of London
+ (www.isg.rhul.ac.uk) for discovering this flaw and Adam Langley and
+ Emilia Käsper for the initial patch.
+ (CVE-2013-0169)
+ [Emilia Käsper, Adam Langley, Ben Laurie, Andy Polyakov, Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Return an error when checking OCSP signatures when key is NULL.
+ This fixes a DoS attack. (CVE-2013-0166)
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Call OCSP Stapling callback after ciphersuite has been chosen, so
+ the right response is stapled. Also change SSL_get_certificate()
+ so it returns the certificate actually sent.
+ See http://rt.openssl.org/Ticket/Display.html?id=2836.
+ (This is a backport)
+ [Rob Stradling <rob.stradling@comodo.com>]
+
+ *) Fix possible deadlock when decoding public keys.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.0i and 1.0.0j [10 May 2012]
+
+ [NB: OpenSSL 1.0.0i and later 1.0.0 patch levels were released after
+ OpenSSL 1.0.1.]
+
+ *) Sanity check record length before skipping explicit IV in DTLS
+ to fix DoS attack.
+
+ Thanks to Codenomicon for discovering this issue using Fuzz-o-Matic
+ fuzzing as a service testing platform.
+ (CVE-2012-2333)
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Initialise tkeylen properly when encrypting CMS messages.
+ Thanks to Solar Designer of Openwall for reporting this issue.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.0h and 1.0.0i [19 Apr 2012]
+
+ *) Check for potentially exploitable overflows in asn1_d2i_read_bio
+ BUF_mem_grow and BUF_mem_grow_clean. Refuse attempts to shrink buffer
+ in CRYPTO_realloc_clean.
+
+ Thanks to Tavis Ormandy, Google Security Team, for discovering this
+ issue and to Adam Langley <agl@chromium.org> for fixing it.
+ (CVE-2012-2110)
+ [Adam Langley (Google), Tavis Ormandy, Google Security Team]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.0g and 1.0.0h [12 Mar 2012]
+
+ *) Fix MMA (Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding) weakness
+ in CMS and PKCS7 code. When RSA decryption fails use a random key for
+ content decryption and always return the same error. Note: this attack
+ needs on average 2^20 messages so it only affects automated senders. The
+ old behaviour can be reenabled in the CMS code by setting the
+ CMS_DEBUG_DECRYPT flag: this is useful for debugging and testing where
+ an MMA defence is not necessary.
+ Thanks to Ivan Nestlerode <inestlerode@us.ibm.com> for discovering
+ this issue. (CVE-2012-0884)
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Fix CVE-2011-4619: make sure we really are receiving a
+ client hello before rejecting multiple SGC restarts. Thanks to
+ Ivan Nestlerode <inestlerode@us.ibm.com> for discovering this bug.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.0f and 1.0.0g [18 Jan 2012]
+
+ *) Fix for DTLS DoS issue introduced by fix for CVE-2011-4109.
+ Thanks to Antonio Martin, Enterprise Secure Access Research and
+ Development, Cisco Systems, Inc. for discovering this bug and
+ preparing a fix. (CVE-2012-0050)
+ [Antonio Martin]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.0e and 1.0.0f [4 Jan 2012]
+
+ *) Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson have discovered an extension
+ of the Vaudenay padding oracle attack on CBC mode encryption
+ which enables an efficient plaintext recovery attack against
+ the OpenSSL implementation of DTLS. Their attack exploits timing
+ differences arising during decryption processing. A research
+ paper describing this attack can be found at:
+ http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/~kp/dtls.pdf
+ Thanks go to Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson of the Information
+ Security Group at Royal Holloway, University of London
+ (www.isg.rhul.ac.uk) for discovering this flaw and to Robin Seggelmann
+ <seggelmann@fh-muenster.de> and Michael Tuexen <tuexen@fh-muenster.de>
+ for preparing the fix. (CVE-2011-4108)
+ [Robin Seggelmann, Michael Tuexen]
+
+ *) Clear bytes used for block padding of SSL 3.0 records.
+ (CVE-2011-4576)
+ [Adam Langley (Google)]
+
+ *) Only allow one SGC handshake restart for SSL/TLS. Thanks to George
+ Kadianakis <desnacked@gmail.com> for discovering this issue and
+ Adam Langley for preparing the fix. (CVE-2011-4619)
+ [Adam Langley (Google)]
+
+ *) Check parameters are not NULL in GOST ENGINE. (CVE-2012-0027)
+ [Andrey Kulikov <amdeich@gmail.com>]
+
+ *) Prevent malformed RFC3779 data triggering an assertion failure.
+ Thanks to Andrew Chi, BBN Technologies, for discovering the flaw
+ and Rob Austein <sra@hactrn.net> for fixing it. (CVE-2011-4577)
+ [Rob Austein <sra@hactrn.net>]
+
+ *) Improved PRNG seeding for VOS.
+ [Paul Green <Paul.Green@stratus.com>]
*) Fix ssl_ciph.c set-up race.
[Adam Langley (Google)]
*) Change 'Configure' script to enable Camellia by default.
[NTT]
-
- Changes between 0.9.8r and 0.9.8s [xx XXX xxxx]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.8x and 0.9.8y [5 Feb 2013]
+
+ *) Make the decoding of SSLv3, TLS and DTLS CBC records constant time.
+
+ This addresses the flaw in CBC record processing discovered by
+ Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson. Details of this attack can be found
+ at: http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/tls/
+
+ Thanks go to Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson of the Information
+ Security Group at Royal Holloway, University of London
+ (www.isg.rhul.ac.uk) for discovering this flaw and Adam Langley and
+ Emilia Käsper for the initial patch.
+ (CVE-2013-0169)
+ [Emilia Käsper, Adam Langley, Ben Laurie, Andy Polyakov, Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Return an error when checking OCSP signatures when key is NULL.
+ This fixes a DoS attack. (CVE-2013-0166)
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Call OCSP Stapling callback after ciphersuite has been chosen, so
+ the right response is stapled. Also change SSL_get_certificate()
+ so it returns the certificate actually sent.
+ See http://rt.openssl.org/Ticket/Display.html?id=2836.
+ (This is a backport)
+ [Rob Stradling <rob.stradling@comodo.com>]
+
+ *) Fix possible deadlock when decoding public keys.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.8w and 0.9.8x [10 May 2012]
+
+ *) Sanity check record length before skipping explicit IV in DTLS
+ to fix DoS attack.
+
+ Thanks to Codenomicon for discovering this issue using Fuzz-o-Matic
+ fuzzing as a service testing platform.
+ (CVE-2012-2333)
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Initialise tkeylen properly when encrypting CMS messages.
+ Thanks to Solar Designer of Openwall for reporting this issue.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.8v and 0.9.8w [23 Apr 2012]
+
+ *) The fix for CVE-2012-2110 did not take into account that the
+ 'len' argument to BUF_MEM_grow and BUF_MEM_grow_clean is an
+ int in OpenSSL 0.9.8, making it still vulnerable. Fix by
+ rejecting negative len parameter. (CVE-2012-2131)
+ [Tomas Hoger <thoger@redhat.com>]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.8u and 0.9.8v [19 Apr 2012]
+
+ *) Check for potentially exploitable overflows in asn1_d2i_read_bio
+ BUF_mem_grow and BUF_mem_grow_clean. Refuse attempts to shrink buffer
+ in CRYPTO_realloc_clean.
+
+ Thanks to Tavis Ormandy, Google Security Team, for discovering this
+ issue and to Adam Langley <agl@chromium.org> for fixing it.
+ (CVE-2012-2110)
+ [Adam Langley (Google), Tavis Ormandy, Google Security Team]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.8t and 0.9.8u [12 Mar 2012]
+
+ *) Fix MMA (Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding) weakness
+ in CMS and PKCS7 code. When RSA decryption fails use a random key for
+ content decryption and always return the same error. Note: this attack
+ needs on average 2^20 messages so it only affects automated senders. The
+ old behaviour can be reenabled in the CMS code by setting the
+ CMS_DEBUG_DECRYPT flag: this is useful for debugging and testing where
+ an MMA defence is not necessary.
+ Thanks to Ivan Nestlerode <inestlerode@us.ibm.com> for discovering
+ this issue. (CVE-2012-0884)
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Fix CVE-2011-4619: make sure we really are receiving a
+ client hello before rejecting multiple SGC restarts. Thanks to
+ Ivan Nestlerode <inestlerode@us.ibm.com> for discovering this bug.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.8s and 0.9.8t [18 Jan 2012]
+
+ *) Fix for DTLS DoS issue introduced by fix for CVE-2011-4109.
+ Thanks to Antonio Martin, Enterprise Secure Access Research and
+ Development, Cisco Systems, Inc. for discovering this bug and
+ preparing a fix. (CVE-2012-0050)
+ [Antonio Martin]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.8r and 0.9.8s [4 Jan 2012]
+
+ *) Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson have discovered an extension
+ of the Vaudenay padding oracle attack on CBC mode encryption
+ which enables an efficient plaintext recovery attack against
+ the OpenSSL implementation of DTLS. Their attack exploits timing
+ differences arising during decryption processing. A research
+ paper describing this attack can be found at:
+ http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/~kp/dtls.pdf
+ Thanks go to Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson of the Information
+ Security Group at Royal Holloway, University of London
+ (www.isg.rhul.ac.uk) for discovering this flaw and to Robin Seggelmann
+ <seggelmann@fh-muenster.de> and Michael Tuexen <tuexen@fh-muenster.de>
+ for preparing the fix. (CVE-2011-4108)
+ [Robin Seggelmann, Michael Tuexen]
+
+ *) Stop policy check failure freeing same buffer twice. (CVE-2011-4109)
+ [Ben Laurie, Kasper <ekasper@google.com>]
+
+ *) Clear bytes used for block padding of SSL 3.0 records.
+ (CVE-2011-4576)
+ [Adam Langley (Google)]
+
+ *) Only allow one SGC handshake restart for SSL/TLS. Thanks to George
+ Kadianakis <desnacked@gmail.com> for discovering this issue and
+ Adam Langley for preparing the fix. (CVE-2011-4619)
+ [Adam Langley (Google)]
+
+ *) Prevent malformed RFC3779 data triggering an assertion failure.
+ Thanks to Andrew Chi, BBN Technologies, for discovering the flaw
+ and Rob Austein <sra@hactrn.net> for fixing it. (CVE-2011-4577)
+ [Rob Austein <sra@hactrn.net>]
*) Fix ssl_ciph.c set-up race.
[Adam Langley (Google)]
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff