2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
113 #include <openssl/objects.h>
114 #include <openssl/evp.h>
115 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
116 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
117 #include <openssl/ec.h>
119 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
120 #include <openssl/rand.h>
121 #include "ssl_locl.h"
123 const char tls1_version_str[]="TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
125 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
126 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
127 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
128 SSL_SESSION **psess);
129 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
130 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
133 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data={
136 tls1_setup_key_block,
137 tls1_generate_master_secret,
138 tls1_change_cipher_state,
139 tls1_final_finish_mac,
140 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
141 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
142 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
143 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
145 tls1_export_keying_material,
147 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
148 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
152 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_1_enc_data={
155 tls1_setup_key_block,
156 tls1_generate_master_secret,
157 tls1_change_cipher_state,
158 tls1_final_finish_mac,
159 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
160 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
161 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
162 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
164 tls1_export_keying_material,
165 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
166 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
167 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
171 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_2_enc_data={
174 tls1_setup_key_block,
175 tls1_generate_master_secret,
176 tls1_change_cipher_state,
177 tls1_final_finish_mac,
178 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
179 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
180 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
181 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
183 tls1_export_keying_material,
184 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV|SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS|SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
185 |SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
186 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
187 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
191 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
193 /* 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec
194 * is way too long for http, the cache would over fill */
200 if (!ssl3_new(s)) return(0);
201 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
205 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
207 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
208 if (s->tlsext_session_ticket)
210 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
212 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
216 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
219 s->version = s->method->version;
222 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
224 static int nid_list[] =
226 NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
227 NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */
228 NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */
229 NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */
230 NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */
231 NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */
232 NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */
233 NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */
234 NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */
235 NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */
236 NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */
237 NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */
238 NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */
239 NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */
240 NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */
241 NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */
242 NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */
243 NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */
244 NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */
245 NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */
246 NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */
247 NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */
248 NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */
249 NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */
250 NID_secp521r1, /* secp521r1 (25) */
251 NID_brainpoolP256r1, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
252 NID_brainpoolP384r1, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
253 NID_brainpoolP512r1 /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
257 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] =
259 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
260 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
261 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
264 static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] =
266 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
267 0,14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
268 0,13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
270 0,25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
271 0,28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
272 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
273 0,11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
274 0,12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
276 0,27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
277 0,24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
278 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
279 0,9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
280 0,10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
282 0,26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
283 0,22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
284 0,23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
285 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
286 0,8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
287 0,6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
288 0,7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
290 0,20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
291 0,21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
292 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
293 0,4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
294 0,5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
296 0,18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
297 0,19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
298 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
299 0,1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
300 0,2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
301 0,3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
303 0,15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
304 0,16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
305 0,17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
308 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] =
310 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
311 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
315 /* Brainpool not allowed in FIPS mode */
316 static const unsigned char fips_curves_default[] =
318 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
319 0,14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
320 0,13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
322 0,25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
323 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
324 0,11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
325 0,12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
327 0,24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
328 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
329 0,9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
330 0,10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
332 0,22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
333 0,23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
334 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
335 0,8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
336 0,6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
337 0,7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
339 0,20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
340 0,21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
341 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
342 0,4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
343 0,5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
345 0,18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
346 0,19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
347 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
348 0,1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
349 0,2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
350 0,3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
352 0,15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
353 0,16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
354 0,17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
358 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
360 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
361 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id >
362 sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0])))
364 return nid_list[curve_id-1];
367 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
369 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
372 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
374 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
376 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
378 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
380 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
382 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
384 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
386 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
388 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
390 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
392 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
394 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
396 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
398 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
400 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
402 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
404 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
406 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
408 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
410 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
412 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
414 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
416 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
418 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
420 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
422 case NID_brainpoolP256r1: /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
424 case NID_brainpoolP384r1: /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
426 case NID_brainpoolP512r1: /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
432 /* Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
435 static void tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
436 const unsigned char **pcurves,
441 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
442 *pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
445 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
446 switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
448 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
449 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
450 *pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
453 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
454 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
458 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
459 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
463 *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
464 *pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
471 *pcurves = fips_curves_default;
472 *pcurveslen = sizeof(fips_curves_default);
476 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
477 *pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
480 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
481 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
483 const unsigned char *curves;
485 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
486 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
488 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
491 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
494 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
496 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
499 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
501 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
504 else /* Should never happen */
507 tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &curveslen);
508 for (i = 0; i < curveslen; i += 2, curves += 2)
510 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
516 /* Return nth shared curve. If nmatch == -1 return number of
517 * matches. For nmatch == -2 return the NID of the curve to use for
521 int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
523 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
524 size_t preflen, supplen, i, j;
526 /* Can't do anything on client side */
533 /* For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we
534 * already know these are acceptable due to previous
537 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
538 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
539 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
540 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
541 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
542 /* Should never happen */
545 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
548 tls1_get_curvelist(s, !!(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
550 tls1_get_curvelist(s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
555 for (i = 0; i < preflen; i++, pref+=2)
557 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
558 for (j = 0; j < supplen; j++, tsupp+=2)
560 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1])
564 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
565 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id);
576 int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
577 int *curves, size_t ncurves)
579 unsigned char *clist, *p;
581 /* Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works
582 * while curve ids < 32
584 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
585 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
589 clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
592 for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++)
594 unsigned long idmask;
596 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
598 /* NB: 25 is last curve ID supported by FIPS module */
599 if (FIPS_mode() && id > 25)
605 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
606 curve = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(curves[i]);
608 EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(curve))
609 == NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field)
611 if(curve) EC_GROUP_free(curve);
616 EC_GROUP_free(curve);
619 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask))
630 *pextlen = ncurves * 2;
634 #define MAX_CURVELIST 28
639 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
642 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
644 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
648 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
650 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
652 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
654 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
655 if (nid == NID_undef)
656 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
657 if (nid == NID_undef)
658 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
659 if (nid == NID_undef)
661 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
662 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
664 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
667 /* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
668 int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
673 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
677 return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
679 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
680 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
685 const EC_METHOD *meth;
688 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
689 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
692 meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(grp);
695 if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
699 /* Determine curve ID */
700 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
701 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
702 /* If we have an ID set it, otherwise set arbitrary explicit curve */
706 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
718 if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
720 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED)
723 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
725 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
728 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
732 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
733 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
734 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
736 const unsigned char *p;
739 /* If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything
740 * is supported (see RFC4492).
742 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
744 p = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
745 plen = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
746 for (i = 0; i < plen; i++, p++)
756 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
757 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++)
759 tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &p, &plen);
760 for (i = 0; i < plen; i+=2, p+=2)
762 if (p[0] == curve_id[0] && p[1] == curve_id[1])
767 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
774 static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
777 /* If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise
779 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
781 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
782 *pformatslen = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
786 *pformats = ecformats_default;
787 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
789 *pformatslen = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
791 *pformatslen = sizeof(ecformats_default);
795 /* Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks
796 * EC certificates have compatible curves and compression.
798 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
800 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
803 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
806 /* If not EC nothing to do */
807 if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)
812 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec);
816 /* Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a
817 * supported curves extension.
819 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
822 /* Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
823 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
825 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s))
832 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
833 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
834 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
835 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
836 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
838 return 0; /* Should never happen */
839 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
840 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
842 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
846 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
847 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha256();
849 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha384();
854 /* Check EC temporary key is compatible with client extensions */
855 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
857 unsigned char curve_id[2];
858 EC_KEY *ec = s->cert->ecdh_tmp;
859 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
860 /* Allow any curve: not just those peer supports */
861 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
864 /* If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384,
865 * no other curves permitted.
869 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
870 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
871 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
872 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
873 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
877 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
878 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
880 /* If auto or setting curve from callback assume OK */
881 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto || s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
883 /* Otherwise check curve is acceptable */
886 unsigned char curve_tmp[2];
889 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_tmp, NULL, ec))
891 if (!curve_tmp[0] || curve_tmp[1] == curve_id[1])
897 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
899 /* Need a shared curve */
900 if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
906 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
911 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, NULL, ec))
913 /* Set this to allow use of invalid curves for testing */
917 return tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL);
923 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
928 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
930 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
932 /* List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
933 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
936 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
937 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
939 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
942 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
943 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
945 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
948 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
949 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */
951 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
954 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
955 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
956 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
957 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
959 static unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
960 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
961 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
962 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
964 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
965 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
966 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
968 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
969 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
972 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
973 static unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
974 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
975 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
978 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
980 /* If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
983 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
984 switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
986 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
987 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
988 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
990 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
991 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
994 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
995 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
999 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
1000 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs)
1002 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
1003 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
1005 else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs)
1007 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
1008 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
1012 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
1013 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
1016 /* Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
1017 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
1019 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
1020 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
1022 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
1023 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
1024 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
1025 /* Should never happen */
1028 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
1029 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1])
1031 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1034 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1035 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
1037 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
1038 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
1039 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec))
1041 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id))
1043 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
1046 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
1051 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
1053 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
1055 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1056 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
1060 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
1062 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
1064 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1065 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
1073 else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
1077 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
1078 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
1079 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i+=2, sent_sigs+=2)
1081 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
1084 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
1085 if (i == sent_sigslen && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
1087 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1090 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
1093 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
1096 /* Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they
1099 if (s->session && s->session->sess_cert)
1100 s->session->sess_cert->peer_key->digest = *pmd;
1103 /* Get a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled
1104 * if it isn't supported or doesn't appear in supported signature
1105 * algorithms. Unlike ssl_cipher_get_disabled this applies to a specific
1106 * session and not global settings.
1109 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
1112 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
1113 size_t i, sigalgslen;
1114 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
1117 /* Don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers if we don't suppport them */
1118 if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s))
1119 c->mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
1122 /* Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support
1123 * any for RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just
1126 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
1127 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2)
1131 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1132 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
1136 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
1137 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
1141 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
1142 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
1148 /* Disable auth and static DH if we don't include any appropriate
1149 * signature algorithms.
1153 c->mask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
1154 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHr|SSL_kECDHr;
1158 c->mask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
1159 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHd;
1163 c->mask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
1164 c->mask_k |= SSL_kECDHe;
1166 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1167 if (!kssl_tgt_is_available(s->kssl_ctx))
1169 c->mask_a |= SSL_aKRB5;
1170 c->mask_k |= SSL_kKRB5;
1173 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1174 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1175 if (!s->psk_client_callback)
1177 c->mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
1178 c->mask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
1180 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1181 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1182 if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP))
1184 c->mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
1185 c->mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
1191 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1194 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1195 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1196 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1197 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1199 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
1202 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1203 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1205 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++)
1207 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1209 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1210 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1211 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)
1212 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
1221 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */
1222 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION
1223 && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1228 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1230 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
1232 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1233 unsigned long size_str;
1236 /* check for enough space.
1237 4 for the servername type and entension length
1238 2 for servernamelist length
1239 1 for the hostname type
1240 2 for hostname length
1244 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
1245 || (size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
1248 /* extension type and length */
1249 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1250 s2n(size_str+5,ret);
1252 /* length of servername list */
1253 s2n(size_str+3,ret);
1255 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
1256 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
1258 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
1262 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1267 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1269 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1273 if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1275 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1278 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1280 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1287 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1288 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
1289 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
1290 { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the Client Hello message */
1292 int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
1293 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0)
1295 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1299 /* check for enough space.
1300 4 for the srp type type and entension length
1301 1 for the srp user identity
1302 + srp user identity length
1304 if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0) return NULL;
1306 /* fill in the extension */
1307 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp,ret);
1308 s2n(login_len+1,ret);
1309 (*ret++) = (unsigned char) login_len;
1310 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
1315 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1318 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */
1320 const unsigned char *plist;
1323 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1325 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
1326 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1329 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1333 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
1334 s2n(plistlen + 1,ret);
1335 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)plistlen ;
1336 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1339 /* Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message */
1340 plist = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1341 tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &plist, &plistlen);
1343 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) return NULL;
1344 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1345 if (plistlen > 65532)
1347 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1351 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves,ret);
1352 s2n(plistlen + 2, ret);
1354 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1357 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1359 if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
1362 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
1363 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
1364 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1365 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data)
1367 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1368 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1369 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
1371 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1372 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data,
1374 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1378 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1379 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1381 /* Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len
1384 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0) return NULL;
1385 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1389 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
1395 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
1398 const unsigned char *salg;
1399 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
1400 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < salglen + 6)
1402 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms,ret);
1403 s2n(salglen + 2, ret);
1405 memcpy(ret, salg, salglen);
1409 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1410 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1412 size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len;
1414 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col < 0))
1416 if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1419 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1422 memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col);
1427 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
1430 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
1434 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
1436 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1437 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1443 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
1445 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1452 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0) return NULL;
1453 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1454 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
1456 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
1457 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
1459 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
1461 /* save position of id len */
1462 unsigned char *q = ret;
1463 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1464 /* skip over id len */
1466 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
1472 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
1475 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1476 /* Add Heartbeat extension */
1477 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1479 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1482 * 1: peer may send requests
1483 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1485 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1486 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1488 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1491 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1492 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
1494 /* The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its
1495 * support for Next Protocol Negotiation */
1496 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
1498 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1503 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
1505 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 6 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len)
1507 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation,ret);
1508 s2n(2 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len,ret);
1509 s2n(s->alpn_client_proto_list_len,ret);
1510 memcpy(ret, s->alpn_client_proto_list,
1511 s->alpn_client_proto_list_len);
1512 ret += s->alpn_client_proto_list_len;
1515 if(SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s))
1519 ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1521 if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1523 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1526 if(ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1528 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1533 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->cli_ext);
1534 /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
1535 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 0, &ret, limit, al))
1538 /* Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators.
1539 * See https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03
1541 * NB: because this code works out the length of all existing
1542 * extensions it MUST always appear last.
1544 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING)
1546 int hlen = ret - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1547 /* The code in s23_clnt.c to build ClientHello messages
1548 * includes the 5-byte record header in the buffer, while
1549 * the code in s3_clnt.c does not.
1551 if (s->state == SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A)
1553 if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200)
1555 hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
1561 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret);
1563 memset(ret, 0, hlen);
1568 if ((extdatalen = ret-orig-2)== 0)
1571 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1575 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1578 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1579 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1580 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1581 int next_proto_neg_seen;
1583 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1584 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1585 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1586 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1587 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1589 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */
1590 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1594 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1596 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
1598 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1600 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1604 if(s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1608 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1610 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1614 if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1616 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1619 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1621 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1628 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1631 const unsigned char *plist;
1633 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message */
1636 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1638 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
1639 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1642 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1646 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
1647 s2n(plistlen + 1,ret);
1648 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) plistlen;
1649 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1653 /* Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves extension */
1654 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1656 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected
1657 && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
1659 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1660 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1664 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
1666 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1667 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request,ret);
1671 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1672 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1674 size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len;
1676 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - sol) < 0)
1678 if (sol > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1681 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1684 memcpy(ret, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input, sol);
1689 if(SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->srtp_profile)
1693 ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1695 if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1697 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1700 if(ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1702 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1708 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x80 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x81)
1709 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG))
1710 { const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1711 0xfd, 0xe8, /*65000*/
1712 0x00, 0x20, /*32 bytes length*/
1713 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1714 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1715 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1716 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17};
1717 if (limit-ret<36) return NULL;
1718 memcpy(ret,cryptopro_ext,36);
1723 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1724 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
1725 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED)
1727 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1729 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1732 * 1: peer may send requests
1733 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1735 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1736 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1738 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1743 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1744 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1745 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1746 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb)
1748 const unsigned char *npa;
1749 unsigned int npalen;
1752 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1753 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
1755 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0) return NULL;
1756 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1758 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
1760 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1764 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 1, &ret, limit, al))
1767 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1769 const unsigned char *selected = s->s3->alpn_selected;
1770 unsigned len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
1772 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - 2 - 1 - len) < 0)
1774 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation,ret);
1778 memcpy(ret, selected, len);
1782 if ((extdatalen = ret-orig-2)== 0)
1785 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1789 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1790 /* ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1791 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |d|, of length |n|.
1792 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1797 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1798 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1799 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1800 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1802 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, const unsigned char *d, int n) {
1803 unsigned short type, size;
1804 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1805 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1806 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1807 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1808 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1809 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1810 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1812 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1813 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1814 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1815 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1818 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1819 static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock[] = {
1820 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1821 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1822 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1823 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1824 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1825 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1826 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1827 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1830 if (data >= (d+n-2))
1839 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1842 if (data+size > d+n)
1846 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
1848 const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1849 const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock);
1851 if (data + len1 + len2 != d+n)
1853 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0)
1855 if (memcmp(data + len1, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock, len2) != 0)
1860 const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1862 if (data + len != d+n)
1864 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0)
1868 s->s3->is_probably_safari = 1;
1870 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1872 /* tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello is called to process the ALPN extension in a
1874 * data: the contents of the extension, not including the type and length.
1875 * data_len: the number of bytes in |data|
1876 * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a non-zero
1879 * returns: 0 on success. */
1880 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
1881 unsigned data_len, int *al)
1885 const unsigned char *selected;
1886 unsigned char selected_len;
1889 if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb == NULL)
1895 /* data should contain a uint16 length followed by a series of 8-bit,
1896 * length-prefixed strings. */
1897 i = ((unsigned) data[0]) << 8 |
1898 ((unsigned) data[1]);
1907 for (i = 0; i < data_len;)
1909 proto_len = data[i];
1915 if (i + proto_len < i || i + proto_len > data_len)
1921 r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, data_len,
1922 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
1923 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1924 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1925 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1926 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
1927 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected)
1929 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1932 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, selected, selected_len);
1933 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
1938 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1942 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
1944 unsigned short type;
1945 unsigned short size;
1947 unsigned char *data = *p;
1948 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1950 s->servername_done = 0;
1951 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1952 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1953 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1956 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1958 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1959 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
1962 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1963 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1964 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1967 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1968 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1969 ssl_check_for_safari(s, data, d, n);
1970 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1972 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
1973 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
1975 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->peer_sigalgs);
1976 s->cert->peer_sigalgs = NULL;
1979 if (data >= (d+n-2))
1983 if (data > (d+n-len))
1986 while (data <= (d+n-4))
1991 if (data+size > (d+n))
1994 fprintf(stderr,"Received extension type %d size %d\n",type,size);
1996 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1997 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size,
1998 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1999 /* The servername extension is treated as follows:
2001 - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
2002 - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
2003 in which case an fatal alert is generated.
2004 - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
2005 - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
2006 to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
2007 - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
2008 it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
2009 Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
2010 set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
2011 case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
2012 a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
2013 presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
2014 the value of the Host: field.
2015 - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
2016 if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the session,
2017 i.e. when the session has been established with a servername extension.
2018 - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
2022 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
2024 unsigned char *sdata;
2030 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2037 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2044 servname_type = *(sdata++);
2050 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2053 if (s->servername_done == 0)
2054 switch (servname_type)
2056 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
2059 if(s->session->tlsext_hostname)
2061 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2064 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name)
2066 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2069 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
2071 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2074 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
2075 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len]='\0';
2076 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
2077 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
2078 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
2079 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2082 s->servername_done = 1;
2086 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
2087 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
2088 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
2100 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2105 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2106 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp)
2108 if (size <= 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size -1))
2110 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2113 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
2115 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2118 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
2120 memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len);
2121 s->srp_ctx.login[len]='\0';
2123 if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len)
2125 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2131 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2132 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
2134 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2135 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2137 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1 ||
2138 ecpointformatlist_length < 1)
2140 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2145 if(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
2147 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2148 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
2150 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2151 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
2153 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2156 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
2157 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
2160 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
2161 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2162 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2163 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2164 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2167 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves)
2169 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2170 int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
2171 ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
2173 if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 ||
2174 ellipticcurvelist_length < 1)
2176 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2181 if(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
2183 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2186 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
2187 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL)
2189 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2192 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = ellipticcurvelist_length;
2193 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata, ellipticcurvelist_length);
2196 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
2197 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
2198 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++)
2199 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2200 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2203 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2204 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2205 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input)
2207 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2211 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2214 n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
2215 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
2217 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2221 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2222 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2223 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2224 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2226 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
2227 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2229 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2234 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2236 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2237 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2239 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2243 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
2245 if(!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2247 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2249 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms)
2252 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs || size < 2)
2254 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2259 if (dsize != size || dsize & 1 || !dsize)
2261 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2264 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, data, dsize))
2266 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2270 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
2275 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2279 s->tlsext_status_type = *data++;
2281 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
2283 const unsigned char *sdata;
2285 /* Read in responder_id_list */
2290 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2299 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2303 dsize -= 2 + idsize;
2307 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2312 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL,
2316 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2321 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2322 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2325 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
2326 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
2327 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null()))
2329 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2330 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2333 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(
2334 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id))
2336 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2337 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2342 /* Read in request_extensions */
2345 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2352 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2358 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
2360 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2361 X509_EXTENSION_free);
2364 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
2365 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL,
2367 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts
2368 || (data + dsize != sdata))
2370 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2375 /* We don't know what to do with any other type
2379 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2381 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2382 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
2386 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
2387 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2389 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
2390 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2391 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2393 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2398 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2399 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2400 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0 &&
2401 s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL)
2403 /* We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2406 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2407 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2408 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
2409 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2410 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2411 * anything like that, but this might change).
2413 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2414 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2415 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2416 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2417 * Finished message could have been computed.) */
2418 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2422 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation &&
2423 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb &&
2424 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
2426 if (tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, data, size, al) != 0)
2428 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2429 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
2430 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2434 /* session ticket processed earlier */
2435 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)
2436 && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
2438 if(ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
2450 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2452 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
2453 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
2455 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2456 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2457 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2465 * Parse any custom extensions found. "data" is the start of the extension data
2466 * and "limit" is the end of the record. TODO: add strict syntax checking.
2469 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_custom_tlsext(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, const unsigned char *limit, int *al)
2471 unsigned short type, size, len;
2472 /* If resumed session or no custom extensions nothing to do */
2473 if (s->hit || s->cert->srv_ext.meths_count == 0)
2476 if (data >= limit - 2)
2480 if (data > limit - len)
2483 while (data <= limit - 4)
2488 if (data+size > limit)
2490 if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1 /* server */, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2499 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
2502 unsigned char *ptmp = *p;
2504 * Internally supported extensions are parsed first so SNI can be handled
2505 * before custom extensions. An application processing SNI will typically
2506 * switch the parent context using SSL_set_SSL_CTX and custom extensions
2507 * need to be handled by the new SSL_CTX structure.
2509 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
2511 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2515 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0)
2517 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2521 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->srv_ext);
2522 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_custom_tlsext(s, ptmp, d + n, &al) <= 0)
2524 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2531 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2532 /* ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2533 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly fill
2534 * the length of the block. */
2535 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
2537 unsigned int off = 0;
2551 static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
2553 unsigned short length;
2554 unsigned short type;
2555 unsigned short size;
2556 unsigned char *data = *p;
2557 int tlsext_servername = 0;
2558 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2560 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2561 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2564 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
2566 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2567 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
2570 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2571 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2572 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2575 if (data >= (d+n-2))
2579 if (data+length != d+n)
2581 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2585 while(data <= (d+n-4))
2590 if (data+size > (d+n))
2593 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2594 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size,
2595 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2597 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
2599 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0)
2601 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2604 tlsext_servername = 1;
2607 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2608 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
2610 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2611 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2613 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1)
2615 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2620 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2621 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2622 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
2624 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2627 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
2628 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
2631 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist ");
2632 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2633 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2634 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2635 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2638 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2640 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2642 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2643 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2645 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2648 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
2651 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2654 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2656 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2657 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input)
2659 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2663 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2666 n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2667 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
2669 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2673 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2674 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
2675 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2676 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2678 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2680 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2682 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2687 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
2689 /* MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested
2690 * a status request message.
2692 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0))
2694 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2697 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2698 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2700 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2701 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2702 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
2704 unsigned char *selected;
2705 unsigned char selected_len;
2707 /* We must have requested it. */
2708 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL)
2710 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2713 /* The data must be valid */
2714 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size))
2716 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2719 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, size, s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
2721 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2724 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2725 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
2727 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2730 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2731 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2732 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2736 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation)
2740 /* We must have requested it. */
2741 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list == NULL)
2743 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2748 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2751 /* The extension data consists of:
2752 * uint16 list_length
2753 * uint8 proto_length;
2754 * uint8 proto[proto_length]; */
2758 if (len != (unsigned) size - 2)
2760 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2764 if (len != (unsigned) size - 3)
2766 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2769 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
2770 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2771 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
2772 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected)
2774 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2777 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, data + 3, len);
2778 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
2781 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
2783 if(!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2785 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2787 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2788 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
2792 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
2793 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2795 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
2796 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2797 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2799 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2804 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
2806 if(ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
2810 /* If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but
2811 * matches a custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c
2813 else if (custom_ext_parse(s, 0, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2821 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2825 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1)
2827 if (s->tlsext_hostname)
2829 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL)
2831 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
2832 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname)
2834 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2840 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2850 /* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to
2851 * avoid an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server
2852 * hello because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an
2853 * attack. However this would mean we could not connect to any server
2854 * which doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI
2855 * absence on initial connect only.
2857 if (!renegotiate_seen
2858 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
2859 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
2861 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2862 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2863 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2871 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2874 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2878 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
2880 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2885 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
2887 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2888 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2890 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2891 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2893 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
2894 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2896 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2899 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2903 /* at callback's request, insist on receiving an appropriate server opaque PRF input */
2904 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2911 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2916 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
2918 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2919 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2921 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2922 /* The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely in
2923 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2925 /* The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely in
2926 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2930 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2931 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2932 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2933 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2935 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2937 /* This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(),
2938 * but we might be sending an alert in response to the client hello,
2939 * so this has to happen here in
2940 * ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(). */
2944 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
2946 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2949 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2950 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2955 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2956 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
2957 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL;
2959 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
2961 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
2962 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len)
2964 /* can only use this extension if we have a server opaque PRF input
2965 * of the same length as the client opaque PRF input! */
2967 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2968 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2970 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
2971 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2973 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2974 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2977 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2981 if (r == 2 && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2983 /* The callback wants to enforce use of the extension,
2984 * but we can't do that with the client opaque PRF input;
2985 * abort the handshake.
2987 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2988 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2996 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2997 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3000 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3001 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
3004 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3005 s->servername_done=0;
3011 int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3015 /* Clear any shared sigtnature algorithms */
3016 if (s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
3018 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
3019 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
3021 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
3022 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
3024 s->cert->pkeys[i].digest = NULL;
3025 s->cert->pkeys[i].valid_flags = 0;
3028 /* If sigalgs received process it. */
3029 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
3031 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s))
3033 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS,
3034 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3035 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3038 /* Fatal error is no shared signature algorithms */
3039 if (!s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
3041 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS,
3042 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS);
3043 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3048 ssl_cert_set_default_md(s->cert);
3051 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3055 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
3057 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
3060 /* If status request then ask callback what to do.
3061 * Note: this must be called after servername callbacks in case
3062 * the certificate has changed, and must be called after the cipher
3063 * has been chosen because this may influence which certificate is sent
3065 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
3068 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
3069 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
3070 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
3071 if (certpkey == NULL)
3073 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3076 /* Set current certificate to one we will use so
3077 * SSL_get_certificate et al can pick it up.
3079 s->cert->key = certpkey;
3080 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
3083 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
3084 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3085 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3087 /* status request response should be sent */
3088 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
3089 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
3090 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
3092 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3094 /* something bad happened */
3095 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3096 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3097 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3102 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3107 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3108 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3111 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3112 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
3120 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
3122 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
3123 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
3125 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3126 /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
3127 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension
3128 * it must contain uncompressed.
3130 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3131 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3132 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
3133 (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
3134 ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
3136 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
3138 unsigned char *list;
3139 int found_uncompressed = 0;
3140 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
3141 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
3143 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed)
3145 found_uncompressed = 1;
3149 if (!found_uncompressed)
3151 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
3155 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
3156 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
3158 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3159 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3160 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3161 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3163 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
3164 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0)
3166 /* This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on using opaque PRF inputs.
3167 * So first verify that we really have a value from the server too. */
3169 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
3171 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3172 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3175 /* Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to check
3176 * that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size. */
3177 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL ||
3178 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len)
3180 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3181 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3186 /* If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one
3189 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
3190 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
3193 /* Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows
3194 * there is no response.
3196 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
3198 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
3199 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
3201 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
3202 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
3205 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
3206 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3210 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3211 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3217 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3218 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3221 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3222 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
3225 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3226 s->servername_done=0;
3232 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
3235 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
3237 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
3239 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3243 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
3245 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
3251 /* Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
3252 * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle
3253 * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time.
3255 * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will
3256 * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket
3257 * extension, if any.
3258 * len: the length of the session ID.
3259 * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello.
3260 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3261 * point to the resulting session.
3263 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
3264 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
3265 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
3268 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3269 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
3270 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
3271 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
3272 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
3273 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
3274 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
3277 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
3278 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
3279 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
3280 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
3281 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
3282 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
3284 int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
3285 const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
3287 /* Point after session ID in client hello */
3288 const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
3292 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
3294 /* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present
3295 * to permit stateful resumption.
3297 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
3299 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
3303 /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
3311 /* Skip past cipher list */
3316 /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
3321 /* Now at start of extensions */
3322 if ((p + 2) >= limit)
3325 while ((p + 4) <= limit)
3327 unsigned short type, size;
3330 if (p + size > limit)
3332 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
3337 /* The client will accept a ticket but doesn't
3338 * currently have one. */
3339 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3342 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb)
3344 /* Indicate that the ticket couldn't be
3345 * decrypted rather than generating the session
3346 * from ticket now, trigger abbreviated
3347 * handshake based on external mechanism to
3348 * calculate the master secret later. */
3351 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret);
3354 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
3355 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3357 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
3359 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
3360 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3362 default: /* fatal error */
3371 /* tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
3373 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
3374 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
3375 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
3376 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
3377 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3378 * point to the resulting session.
3381 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3382 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
3383 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
3384 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
3386 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
3387 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
3388 SSL_SESSION **psess)
3391 unsigned char *sdec;
3392 const unsigned char *p;
3393 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
3394 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
3397 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3398 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
3401 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
3402 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3403 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3404 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
3406 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
3407 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
3418 /* Check key name matches */
3419 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
3421 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3422 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
3423 EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3424 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
3426 /* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and
3427 * integrity checks on ticket.
3429 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
3432 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3436 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
3437 HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
3438 HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
3439 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3440 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen))
3442 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3445 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
3446 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
3447 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3448 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3449 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
3452 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3455 EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
3456 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0)
3458 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3463 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3466 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3470 /* The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to
3471 * detect that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to
3472 * the session structure. If it is empty set length to zero
3473 * as required by standard.
3476 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3477 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3485 /* For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new
3490 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3498 static tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
3499 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3500 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3501 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3502 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3503 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3504 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}
3507 static tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
3508 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
3509 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
3510 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}
3513 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3516 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
3518 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3524 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3527 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
3529 if ((table[i].id) == id)
3530 return table[i].nid;
3535 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md)
3540 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md,
3541 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3544 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3547 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
3548 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
3552 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
3554 return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig,
3555 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3558 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
3562 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
3563 case TLSEXT_hash_md5:
3570 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
3571 case TLSEXT_hash_sha1:
3574 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
3575 case TLSEXT_hash_sha224:
3576 return EVP_sha224();
3578 case TLSEXT_hash_sha256:
3579 return EVP_sha256();
3581 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
3582 case TLSEXT_hash_sha384:
3583 return EVP_sha384();
3585 case TLSEXT_hash_sha512:
3586 return EVP_sha512();
3594 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
3598 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3599 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3600 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3602 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3603 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3604 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3606 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3607 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3608 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3614 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3615 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
3616 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3618 int sign_nid = 0, hash_nid = 0;
3619 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3621 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid)
3623 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md,
3624 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3626 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3628 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid)
3630 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig,
3631 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3633 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3637 if (sign_nid && hash_nid)
3638 OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid,
3639 hash_nid, sign_nid);
3641 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3644 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
3645 static int tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
3646 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3647 const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
3649 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3650 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3651 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i+=2, ptmp+=2)
3653 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3654 if (tls12_get_hash(ptmp[0]) == NULL)
3656 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3658 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j+=2, atmp+=2)
3660 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1])
3665 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3666 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3667 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3669 &shsig->signandhash_nid,
3680 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3681 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3683 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3684 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3686 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3688 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
3689 if (c->shared_sigalgs)
3691 OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
3692 c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
3694 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3695 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
3697 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3698 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3700 else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
3702 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
3703 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3706 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
3707 if(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb)
3711 allow = c->peer_sigalgs;
3712 allowlen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3718 pref = c->peer_sigalgs;
3719 preflen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3721 nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3724 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3727 nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3728 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3729 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3734 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3736 int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
3739 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
3740 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3742 /* Should never happen */
3746 if (c->peer_sigalgs)
3747 OPENSSL_free(c->peer_sigalgs);
3748 c->peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
3749 if (!c->peer_sigalgs)
3751 c->peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3752 memcpy(c->peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
3756 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3762 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3763 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s))
3766 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3767 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
3769 /* Use first set signature preference to force message
3770 * digest, ignoring any peer preferences.
3772 const unsigned char *sigs = NULL;
3774 sigs = c->conf_sigalgs;
3776 sigs = c->client_sigalgs;
3779 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigs[1]);
3780 md = tls12_get_hash(sigs[0]);
3781 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3782 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3783 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
3785 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3786 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3792 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3793 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++)
3795 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3796 if (idx > 0 && c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL)
3798 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
3799 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3800 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3801 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
3803 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3804 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3809 /* In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't
3810 * use the certificate for signing.
3812 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
3814 /* Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is
3815 * not supported it stays as NULL.
3817 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3818 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest)
3819 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3821 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3822 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest)
3824 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3825 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3828 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3829 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest)
3830 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3837 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3838 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3839 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3841 const unsigned char *psig = s->cert->peer_sigalgs;
3847 if (idx >= (int)s->cert->peer_sigalgslen)
3854 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
3856 return s->cert->peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3859 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3860 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3861 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3863 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
3864 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
3868 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3870 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3872 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3874 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
3876 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
3877 return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
3881 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
3883 tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3885 unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl;
3886 unsigned short hbtype;
3887 unsigned int payload;
3888 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3890 if (s->msg_callback)
3891 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3892 &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
3893 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3895 /* Read type and payload length first */
3896 if (1 + 2 + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
3897 return 0; /* silently discard */
3900 if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
3901 return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */
3904 if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST)
3906 unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
3909 /* Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes
3910 * message type, plus 2 bytes payload length, plus
3911 * payload, plus padding
3913 buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3916 /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
3917 *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
3919 memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
3921 /* Random padding */
3922 RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding);
3924 r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, 3 + payload + padding);
3926 if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
3927 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3928 buffer, 3 + payload + padding,
3929 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3931 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
3936 else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE)
3940 /* We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int),
3941 * and 16 random bytes, so we just try to read the
3942 * sequence number */
3945 if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq)
3948 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
3956 tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3958 unsigned char *buf, *p;
3960 unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
3961 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3963 /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
3964 if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
3965 s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS)
3967 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
3971 /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
3972 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
3974 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
3978 /* ...and no handshake in progress. */
3979 if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake)
3981 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
3985 /* Check if padding is too long, payload and padding
3986 * must not exceed 2^14 - 3 = 16381 bytes in total.
3988 OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381);
3990 /* Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
3991 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
3992 * some random stuff.
3993 * - Message Type, 1 byte
3994 * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
3995 * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
3996 * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
3999 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
4002 *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
4003 /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
4005 /* Sequence number */
4006 s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
4007 /* 16 random bytes */
4008 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16);
4010 /* Random padding */
4011 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding);
4013 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
4016 if (s->msg_callback)
4017 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
4018 buf, 3 + payload + padding,
4019 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
4021 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;
4030 #define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
4035 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
4038 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
4040 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
4043 int sig_alg, hash_alg;
4044 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
4046 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
4048 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
4050 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
4058 if (!strcmp(etmp, "RSA"))
4059 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
4060 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "DSA"))
4061 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
4062 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "ECDSA"))
4063 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_EC;
4066 hash_alg = OBJ_sn2nid(p);
4067 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
4068 hash_alg = OBJ_ln2nid(p);
4069 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
4072 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i+=2)
4074 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg
4075 && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
4078 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
4079 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
4083 /* Set suppored signature algorithms based on a colon separated list
4084 * of the form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512 */
4085 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
4089 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
4093 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
4096 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
4098 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
4103 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
4104 if (sigalgs == NULL)
4106 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i+=2)
4108 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md,
4109 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
4110 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig,
4111 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
4113 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
4121 if (c->client_sigalgs)
4122 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
4123 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
4124 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
4128 if (c->conf_sigalgs)
4129 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
4130 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
4131 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
4137 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
4141 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
4145 if (default_nid == -1)
4147 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
4149 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
4150 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
4151 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
4155 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
4156 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
4160 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
4161 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++)
4163 if(!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
4169 /* Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is
4170 * usable by server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to
4171 * check chains before passing them to the server and it allows the
4172 * server to check chains before attempting to use them.
4175 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
4177 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
4178 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
4179 /* Strict mode flags */
4180 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
4181 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
4182 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
4184 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
4189 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
4190 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
4192 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
4193 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
4196 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
4200 idx = cpk - c->pkeys;
4203 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
4205 pk = cpk->privatekey;
4207 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
4208 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
4211 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
4212 /* Allow any certificate to pass test */
4213 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
4215 rv = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_VALID|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4216 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4225 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
4228 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
4229 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
4230 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
4232 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
4240 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4241 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
4242 if (ok != X509_V_OK)
4245 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4251 /* Check all signature algorithms are consistent with
4252 * signature algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later
4255 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode)
4258 unsigned char rsign = 0;
4259 if (c->peer_sigalgs)
4261 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
4266 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
4267 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
4268 case SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA:
4269 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
4270 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
4273 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
4274 case SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA:
4275 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
4276 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
4280 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
4281 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
4289 /* If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we
4290 * have set preferred signature algorithms check we support
4293 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs)
4296 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
4297 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2)
4299 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
4302 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen)
4310 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
4311 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid))
4313 if (!check_flags) goto end;
4316 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
4317 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4318 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4320 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i),
4325 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4333 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
4334 else if(check_flags)
4335 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4337 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
4338 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
4339 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
4340 else if (!check_flags)
4343 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4344 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
4345 else if (strict_mode)
4347 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4348 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4350 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4351 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0))
4355 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4363 if (!s->server && strict_mode)
4365 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
4370 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
4373 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
4376 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
4381 int cert_type = X509_certificate_type(x, pk);
4382 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_RSA)
4383 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_FIXED_DH;
4384 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_DSA)
4385 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_FIXED_DH;
4390 const unsigned char *ctypes;
4395 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
4399 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
4400 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
4402 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++)
4404 if (ctypes[i] == check_type)
4406 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4410 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
4414 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4417 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
4419 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
4420 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4422 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4424 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
4425 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4427 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4429 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4431 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4432 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp))
4434 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4439 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4443 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4445 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
4446 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
4450 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
4452 if (cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
4453 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4454 else if (cpk->digest)
4455 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4458 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4460 /* When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant
4461 * if the chain is invalid.
4465 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
4466 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4469 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
4470 cpk->valid_flags &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4477 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
4478 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
4480 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
4481 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
4482 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
4483 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA);
4484 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA);
4485 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
4487 /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
4488 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
4490 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);