2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
113 #include <openssl/objects.h>
114 #include <openssl/evp.h>
115 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
116 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
117 #include <openssl/rand.h>
118 #include "ssl_locl.h"
120 const char tls1_version_str[]="TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
122 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
123 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
124 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
125 SSL_SESSION **psess);
126 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
127 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
130 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data={
133 tls1_setup_key_block,
134 tls1_generate_master_secret,
135 tls1_change_cipher_state,
136 tls1_final_finish_mac,
137 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
138 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
139 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
140 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
142 tls1_export_keying_material,
144 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
145 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
149 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_1_enc_data={
152 tls1_setup_key_block,
153 tls1_generate_master_secret,
154 tls1_change_cipher_state,
155 tls1_final_finish_mac,
156 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
157 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
158 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
159 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
161 tls1_export_keying_material,
162 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
163 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
164 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
168 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_2_enc_data={
171 tls1_setup_key_block,
172 tls1_generate_master_secret,
173 tls1_change_cipher_state,
174 tls1_final_finish_mac,
175 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
176 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
177 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
178 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
180 tls1_export_keying_material,
181 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV|SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS|SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
182 |SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
183 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
184 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
188 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
190 /* 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec
191 * is way too long for http, the cache would over fill */
197 if (!ssl3_new(s)) return(0);
198 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
202 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
204 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
205 if (s->tlsext_session_ticket)
207 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
209 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
213 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
216 s->version = s->method->version;
219 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
221 static int nid_list[] =
223 NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
224 NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */
225 NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */
226 NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */
227 NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */
228 NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */
229 NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */
230 NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */
231 NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */
232 NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */
233 NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */
234 NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */
235 NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */
236 NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */
237 NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */
238 NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */
239 NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */
240 NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */
241 NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */
242 NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */
243 NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */
244 NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */
245 NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */
246 NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */
247 NID_secp521r1, /* secp521r1 (25) */
248 NID_brainpoolP256r1, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
249 NID_brainpoolP384r1, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
250 NID_brainpoolP512r1 /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
254 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] =
256 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
257 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
258 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
261 static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] =
263 0,14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
264 0,13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
265 0,25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
266 0,28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
267 0,11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
268 0,12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
269 0,27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
270 0,24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
271 0,9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
272 0,10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
273 0,26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
274 0,22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
275 0,23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
276 0,8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
277 0,6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
278 0,7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
279 0,20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
280 0,21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
281 0,4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
282 0,5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
283 0,18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
284 0,19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
285 0,1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
286 0,2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
287 0,3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
288 0,15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
289 0,16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
290 0,17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
293 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] =
295 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
296 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
299 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
301 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
302 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id >
303 sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0])))
305 return nid_list[curve_id-1];
308 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
310 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
313 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
315 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
317 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
319 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
321 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
323 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
325 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
327 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
329 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
331 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
333 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
335 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
337 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
339 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
341 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
343 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
345 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
347 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
349 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
351 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
353 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
355 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
357 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
359 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
361 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
367 /* Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
370 static void tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
371 const unsigned char **pcurves,
376 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
377 *pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
380 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
381 switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
383 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
384 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
385 *pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
388 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
389 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
393 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
394 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
398 *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
399 *pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
403 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
404 *pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
407 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
408 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
410 const unsigned char *curves;
412 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
413 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
415 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
418 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
421 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
423 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
426 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
428 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
431 else /* Should never happen */
434 tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &curveslen);
435 for (i = 0; i < curveslen; i += 2, curves += 2)
437 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
443 /* Return nth shared curve. If nmatch == -1 return number of
444 * matches. For nmatch == -2 return the NID of the curve to use for
448 int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
450 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
451 size_t preflen, supplen, i, j;
453 /* Can't do anything on client side */
460 /* For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we
461 * already know these are acceptable due to previous
464 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
465 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
466 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
467 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
468 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
469 /* Should never happen */
472 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
475 tls1_get_curvelist(s, !!(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
477 tls1_get_curvelist(s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
482 for (i = 0; i < preflen; i++, pref+=2)
484 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
485 for (j = 0; j < supplen; j++, tsupp+=2)
487 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1])
491 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
492 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id);
503 int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
504 int *curves, size_t ncurves)
506 unsigned char *clist, *p;
508 /* Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works
509 * while curve ids < 32
511 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
512 clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
515 for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++)
517 unsigned long idmask;
519 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
521 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask))
532 *pextlen = ncurves * 2;
536 #define MAX_CURVELIST 25
541 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
544 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
546 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
550 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
552 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
554 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
556 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
557 if (nid == NID_undef)
558 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
559 if (nid == NID_undef)
560 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
561 if (nid == NID_undef)
563 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
564 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
566 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
569 /* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
570 int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
575 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
579 return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
581 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
582 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
588 const EC_METHOD *meth;
591 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
592 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
593 pt = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec);
596 meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(grp);
599 if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
603 /* Determine curve ID */
604 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
605 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
606 /* If we have an ID set it, otherwise set arbitrary explicit curve */
610 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
622 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED)
625 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
627 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
630 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
634 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
635 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
636 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
638 const unsigned char *p;
641 /* If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything
642 * is supported (see RFC4492).
644 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
646 p = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
647 plen = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
648 for (i = 0; i < plen; i++, p++)
658 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
659 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++)
661 tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &p, &plen);
662 for (i = 0; i < plen; i+=2, p+=2)
664 if (p[0] == curve_id[0] && p[1] == curve_id[1])
669 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
676 static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
679 /* If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise
681 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
683 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
684 *pformatslen = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
688 *pformats = ecformats_default;
689 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
691 *pformatslen = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
693 *pformatslen = sizeof(ecformats_default);
697 /* Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks
698 * EC certificates have compatible curves and compression.
700 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
702 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
705 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
708 /* If not EC nothing to do */
709 if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)
714 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec);
718 /* Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a
719 * supported curves extension.
721 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
724 /* Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
725 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
727 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s))
734 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
735 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
736 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
737 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
738 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
740 return 0; /* Should never happen */
741 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
742 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
744 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
748 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
749 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha256();
751 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha384();
756 /* Check EC temporary key is compatible with client extensions */
757 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
759 unsigned char curve_id[2];
760 EC_KEY *ec = s->cert->ecdh_tmp;
761 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
762 /* Allow any curve: not just those peer supports */
763 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
766 /* If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384,
767 * no other curves permitted.
771 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
772 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
773 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
774 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
775 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
779 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
780 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
782 /* If auto or setting curve from callback assume OK */
783 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto || s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
785 /* Otherwise check curve is acceptable */
788 unsigned char curve_tmp[2];
791 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_tmp, NULL, ec))
793 if (!curve_tmp[0] || curve_tmp[1] == curve_id[1])
799 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
801 /* Need a shared curve */
802 if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
808 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
813 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, NULL, ec))
815 /* Set this to allow use of invalid curves for testing */
819 return tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL);
825 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
830 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
832 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
834 /* List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
835 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
838 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
839 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
841 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
844 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
845 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
847 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
850 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
851 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */
853 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
856 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
857 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
858 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
859 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
861 static unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
862 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
863 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
864 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
866 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
867 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
868 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
870 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
871 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
873 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
874 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(TLSEXT_hash_md5)
877 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
878 static unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
879 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
880 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
883 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
885 /* If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
888 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
889 switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
891 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
892 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
893 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
895 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
896 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
899 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
900 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
904 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
905 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs)
907 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
908 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
910 else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs)
912 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
913 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
917 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
919 /* If FIPS mode don't include MD5 which is last */
921 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs) - 2;
924 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
927 /* Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
928 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
930 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
931 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
933 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
934 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
935 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
936 /* Should never happen */
939 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
940 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1])
942 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
945 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
946 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
948 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
949 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
950 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec))
952 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id))
954 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
957 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
962 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
964 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
966 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
967 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
971 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
973 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
975 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
976 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
984 else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
988 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
989 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
990 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i+=2, sent_sigs+=2)
992 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
995 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
996 if (i == sent_sigslen && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
998 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1001 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
1004 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
1007 /* Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they
1010 if (s->session && s->session->sess_cert)
1011 s->session->sess_cert->peer_key->digest = *pmd;
1014 /* Get a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled
1015 * if it isn't supported or doesn't appear in supported signature
1016 * algorithms. Unlike ssl_cipher_get_disabled this applies to a specific
1017 * session and not global settings.
1020 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
1023 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
1024 size_t i, sigalgslen;
1025 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
1028 /* Don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers if we don't suppport them */
1029 if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s))
1030 c->mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
1033 /* Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support
1034 * any for RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just
1037 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
1038 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2)
1042 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1043 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
1047 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
1048 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
1052 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
1053 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
1059 /* Disable auth and static DH if we don't include any appropriate
1060 * signature algorithms.
1064 c->mask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
1065 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHr|SSL_kECDHr;
1069 c->mask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
1070 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHd;
1074 c->mask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
1075 c->mask_k |= SSL_kECDHe;
1077 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1078 if (!kssl_tgt_is_available(s->kssl_ctx))
1080 c->mask_a |= SSL_aKRB5;
1081 c->mask_k |= SSL_kKRB5;
1084 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1085 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1086 if (!s->psk_client_callback)
1088 c->mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
1089 c->mask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
1091 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1095 /* byte_compare is a compare function for qsort(3) that compares bytes. */
1096 static int byte_compare(const void *in_a, const void *in_b)
1098 unsigned char a = *((const unsigned char*) in_a);
1099 unsigned char b = *((const unsigned char*) in_b);
1108 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
1111 unsigned char *ret = p;
1112 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1113 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1115 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
1118 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1119 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1121 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++)
1123 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1125 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1126 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1127 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)
1128 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
1137 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */
1138 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION
1139 && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1144 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1146 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
1148 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1149 unsigned long size_str;
1152 /* check for enough space.
1153 4 for the servername type and entension length
1154 2 for servernamelist length
1155 1 for the hostname type
1156 2 for hostname length
1160 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
1161 || (size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
1164 /* extension type and length */
1165 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1166 s2n(size_str+5,ret);
1168 /* length of servername list */
1169 s2n(size_str+3,ret);
1171 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
1172 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
1174 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
1178 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1183 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1185 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1189 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1191 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1194 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1196 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1203 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1204 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
1205 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
1206 { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the Client Hello message */
1208 int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
1209 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0)
1211 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1215 /* check for enough space.
1216 4 for the srp type type and entension length
1217 1 for the srp user identity
1218 + srp user identity length
1220 if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0) return NULL;
1222 /* fill in the extension */
1223 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp,ret);
1224 s2n(login_len+1,ret);
1225 (*ret++) = (unsigned char) login_len;
1226 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
1231 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1234 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */
1236 const unsigned char *plist;
1239 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1241 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
1242 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1245 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1249 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
1250 s2n(plistlen + 1,ret);
1251 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)plistlen ;
1252 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1255 /* Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message */
1256 plist = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1257 tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &plist, &plistlen);
1259 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) return NULL;
1260 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1261 if (plistlen > 65532)
1263 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1267 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves,ret);
1268 s2n(plistlen + 2, ret);
1270 /* NB: draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt uses a one-byte prefix for
1271 * elliptic_curve_list, but the examples use two bytes.
1272 * http://www1.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg00538.html
1273 * resolves this to two bytes.
1276 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1279 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1281 if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
1284 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
1285 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
1286 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1287 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data)
1289 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1290 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1291 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
1293 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1294 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data,
1296 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1300 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1301 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1303 /* Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len
1306 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0) return NULL;
1307 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1311 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
1317 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
1320 const unsigned char *salg;
1321 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
1322 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < salglen + 6)
1324 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms,ret);
1325 s2n(salglen + 2, ret);
1327 memcpy(ret, salg, salglen);
1331 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1332 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1334 size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len;
1336 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col < 0))
1338 if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1341 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1344 memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col);
1349 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
1352 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
1356 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
1358 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1359 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1365 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
1367 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1374 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0) return NULL;
1375 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1376 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
1378 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
1379 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
1381 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
1383 /* save position of id len */
1384 unsigned char *q = ret;
1385 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1386 /* skip over id len */
1388 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
1394 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
1397 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1398 /* Add Heartbeat extension */
1399 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1402 * 1: peer may send requests
1403 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1405 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1406 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1408 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1411 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1412 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
1414 /* The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its
1415 * support for Next Protocol Negotiation */
1416 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
1418 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1423 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
1425 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 6 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len)
1427 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation,ret);
1428 s2n(2 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len,ret);
1429 s2n(s->alpn_client_proto_list_len,ret);
1430 memcpy(ret, s->alpn_client_proto_list,
1431 s->alpn_client_proto_list_len);
1432 ret += s->alpn_client_proto_list_len;
1435 if(SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s))
1439 ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1441 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1443 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1446 if(ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1448 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1454 /* Add TLS extension Server_Authz_DataFormats to the ClientHello */
1455 /* 2 bytes for extension type */
1456 /* 2 bytes for extension length */
1457 /* 1 byte for the list length */
1458 /* 1 byte for the list (we only support audit proofs) */
1459 if (s->ctx->tlsext_authz_server_audit_proof_cb != NULL)
1461 const unsigned short ext_len = 2;
1462 const unsigned char list_len = 1;
1464 if (limit < ret + 6)
1467 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz, ret);
1468 /* Extension length: 2 bytes */
1470 *(ret++) = list_len;
1471 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_AUTHZDATAFORMAT_audit_proof;
1474 /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
1475 if (s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count)
1478 custom_cli_ext_record* record;
1480 for (i = 0; i < s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count; i++)
1482 const unsigned char* out = NULL;
1483 unsigned short outlen = 0;
1485 record = &s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records[i];
1486 /* NULL callback sends empty extension */
1487 /* -1 from callback omits extension */
1491 cb_retval = record->fn1(s, record->ext_type,
1495 return NULL; /* error */
1496 if (cb_retval == -1)
1497 continue; /* skip this extension */
1499 if (limit < ret + 4 + outlen)
1501 s2n(record->ext_type, ret);
1503 memcpy(ret, out, outlen);
1508 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2) == 0)
1515 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
1518 unsigned char *ret = p;
1519 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1520 int next_proto_neg_seen;
1522 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1523 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1524 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1525 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1526 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1528 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */
1529 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1533 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1535 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
1537 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1539 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1543 if(s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1547 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1549 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1553 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1555 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1558 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1560 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1567 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1570 const unsigned char *plist;
1572 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message */
1575 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1577 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
1578 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1581 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1585 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
1586 s2n(plistlen + 1,ret);
1587 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) plistlen;
1588 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1592 /* Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves extension */
1593 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1595 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected
1596 && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
1598 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1599 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1603 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
1605 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1606 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request,ret);
1610 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1611 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1613 size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len;
1615 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - sol) < 0)
1617 if (sol > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1620 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1623 memcpy(ret, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input, sol);
1632 ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1634 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1636 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1639 if(ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1641 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1647 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x80 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x81)
1648 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG))
1649 { const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1650 0xfd, 0xe8, /*65000*/
1651 0x00, 0x20, /*32 bytes length*/
1652 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1653 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1654 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1655 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17};
1656 if (limit-ret<36) return NULL;
1657 memcpy(ret,cryptopro_ext,36);
1662 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1663 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
1664 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED)
1666 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1669 * 1: peer may send requests
1670 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1672 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1673 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1675 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1680 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1681 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1682 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1683 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb)
1685 const unsigned char *npa;
1686 unsigned int npalen;
1689 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1690 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
1692 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0) return NULL;
1693 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1695 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
1697 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1702 /* If the client supports authz then see whether we have any to offer
1704 if (s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len)
1706 size_t authz_length;
1707 /* By now we already know the new cipher, so we can look ahead
1708 * to see whether the cert we are going to send
1709 * has any authz data attached to it. */
1710 const unsigned char* authz = ssl_get_authz_data(s, &authz_length);
1711 const unsigned char* const orig_authz = authz;
1713 unsigned authz_count = 0;
1715 /* The authz data contains a number of the following structures:
1716 * uint8_t authz_type
1718 * uint8_t data[length]
1720 * First we walk over it to find the number of authz elements. */
1721 for (i = 0; i < authz_length; i++)
1723 unsigned short length;
1727 if (memchr(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
1729 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len) != NULL)
1733 /* n2s increments authz by 2 */
1741 /* Add TLS extension server_authz to the ServerHello message
1742 * 2 bytes for extension type
1743 * 2 bytes for extension length
1744 * 1 byte for the list length
1745 * n bytes for the list */
1746 const unsigned short ext_len = 1 + authz_count;
1748 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ext_len) < 0) return NULL;
1749 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz, ret);
1751 *(ret++) = authz_count;
1752 s->s3->tlsext_authz_promised_to_client = 1;
1756 for (i = 0; i < authz_length; i++)
1758 unsigned short length;
1763 if (memchr(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
1765 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len) != NULL)
1768 /* n2s increments authz by 2 */
1775 /* If custom types were sent in ClientHello, add ServerHello responses */
1776 if (s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count)
1780 for (i = 0; i < s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count; i++)
1783 custom_srv_ext_record *record;
1785 for (j = 0; j < s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records_count; j++)
1787 record = &s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records[j];
1788 if (s->s3->tlsext_custom_types[i] == record->ext_type)
1790 const unsigned char *out = NULL;
1791 unsigned short outlen = 0;
1794 /* NULL callback or -1 omits extension */
1797 cb_retval = record->fn2(s, record->ext_type,
1801 return NULL; /* error */
1802 if (cb_retval == -1)
1803 break; /* skip this extension */
1804 if (limit < ret + 4 + outlen)
1806 s2n(record->ext_type, ret);
1808 memcpy(ret, out, outlen);
1816 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1818 const unsigned char *selected = s->s3->alpn_selected;
1819 unsigned len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
1821 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - 2 - 1 - len) < 0)
1823 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation,ret);
1827 memcpy(ret, selected, len);
1831 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0)
1838 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1839 /* ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1840 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |d|, of length |n|.
1841 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1846 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1847 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1848 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1849 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1851 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, const unsigned char *d, int n) {
1852 unsigned short type, size;
1853 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1854 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1855 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1856 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1857 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1858 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1859 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1861 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1862 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1863 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1864 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1867 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1868 static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock[] = {
1869 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1870 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1871 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1872 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1873 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1874 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1875 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1876 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1879 if (data >= (d+n-2))
1888 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1891 if (data+size > d+n)
1895 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
1897 const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1898 const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock);
1900 if (data + len1 + len2 != d+n)
1902 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0)
1904 if (memcmp(data + len1, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock, len2) != 0)
1909 const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1911 if (data + len != d+n)
1913 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0)
1917 s->s3->is_probably_safari = 1;
1919 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1921 /* tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello is called to process the ALPN extension in a
1923 * data: the contents of the extension, not including the type and length.
1924 * data_len: the number of bytes in |data|
1925 * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a non-zero
1928 * returns: 0 on success. */
1929 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
1930 unsigned data_len, int *al)
1934 const unsigned char *selected;
1935 unsigned char selected_len;
1938 if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb == NULL)
1944 /* data should contain a uint16 length followed by a series of 8-bit,
1945 * length-prefixed strings. */
1946 i = ((unsigned) data[0]) << 8 |
1947 ((unsigned) data[1]);
1956 for (i = 0; i < data_len;)
1958 proto_len = data[i];
1964 if (i + proto_len < i || i + proto_len > data_len)
1970 r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, data_len,
1971 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
1972 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1973 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1974 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1975 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
1976 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected)
1978 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1981 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, selected, selected_len);
1982 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
1987 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1991 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
1993 unsigned short type;
1994 unsigned short size;
1996 unsigned char *data = *p;
1997 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2000 s->servername_done = 0;
2001 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2002 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2003 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2006 /* Clear observed custom extensions */
2007 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count = 0;
2008 if (s->s3->tlsext_custom_types != NULL)
2010 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tlsext_custom_types);
2011 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types = NULL;
2014 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
2016 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2017 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
2020 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2021 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2022 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2025 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2026 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
2027 ssl_check_for_safari(s, data, d, n);
2028 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2030 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
2031 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
2033 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->peer_sigalgs);
2034 s->cert->peer_sigalgs = NULL;
2036 /* Clear any shared sigtnature algorithms */
2037 if (s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
2039 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
2040 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
2042 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
2043 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
2045 s->cert->pkeys[i].digest = NULL;
2046 s->cert->pkeys[i].valid_flags = 0;
2049 if (data >= (d+n-2))
2053 if (data > (d+n-len))
2056 while (data <= (d+n-4))
2061 if (data+size > (d+n))
2064 fprintf(stderr,"Received extension type %d size %d\n",type,size);
2066 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2067 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size,
2068 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2069 /* The servername extension is treated as follows:
2071 - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
2072 - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
2073 in which case an fatal alert is generated.
2074 - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
2075 - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
2076 to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
2077 - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
2078 it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
2079 Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
2080 set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
2081 case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
2082 a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
2083 presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
2084 the value of the Host: field.
2085 - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
2086 if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the session,
2087 i.e. when the session has been established with a servername extension.
2088 - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
2092 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
2094 unsigned char *sdata;
2100 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2107 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2114 servname_type = *(sdata++);
2120 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2123 if (s->servername_done == 0)
2124 switch (servname_type)
2126 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
2129 if(s->session->tlsext_hostname)
2131 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2134 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name)
2136 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2139 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
2141 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2144 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
2145 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len]='\0';
2146 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
2147 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
2148 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
2149 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2152 s->servername_done = 1;
2156 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
2157 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
2158 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
2170 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2175 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2176 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp)
2178 if (size <= 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size -1))
2180 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2183 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
2185 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2188 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
2190 memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len);
2191 s->srp_ctx.login[len]='\0';
2193 if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len)
2195 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2201 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2202 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
2204 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2205 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2207 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1 ||
2208 ecpointformatlist_length < 1)
2210 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2215 if(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
2217 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2218 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
2220 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2221 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
2223 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2226 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
2227 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
2230 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
2231 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2232 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2233 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2234 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2237 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves)
2239 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2240 int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
2241 ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
2243 if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 ||
2244 ellipticcurvelist_length < 1)
2246 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2251 if(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
2253 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2256 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
2257 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL)
2259 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2262 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = ellipticcurvelist_length;
2263 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata, ellipticcurvelist_length);
2266 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
2267 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
2268 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++)
2269 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2270 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2273 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2274 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2275 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input)
2277 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2281 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2284 n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
2285 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
2287 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2291 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2292 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2293 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2294 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2296 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
2297 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2299 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2304 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2306 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2307 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2309 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2313 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
2315 if(!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2317 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2319 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms)
2322 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs || size < 2)
2324 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2329 if (dsize != size || dsize & 1 || !dsize)
2331 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2334 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s, data, dsize))
2336 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2339 /* If sigalgs received and no shared algorithms fatal
2342 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs && !s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
2344 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2345 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS);
2346 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2350 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request
2351 && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
2356 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2360 s->tlsext_status_type = *data++;
2362 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
2364 const unsigned char *sdata;
2366 /* Read in responder_id_list */
2371 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2380 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2384 dsize -= 2 + idsize;
2388 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2393 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL,
2397 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2402 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2403 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2406 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
2407 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
2408 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null()))
2410 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2411 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2414 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(
2415 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id))
2417 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2418 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2423 /* Read in request_extensions */
2426 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2433 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2439 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
2441 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2442 X509_EXTENSION_free);
2445 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
2446 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL,
2448 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts
2449 || (data + dsize != sdata))
2451 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2456 /* We don't know what to do with any other type
2460 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2462 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2463 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
2467 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
2468 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2470 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
2471 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2472 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2474 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2479 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2480 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2481 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0 &&
2482 s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL)
2484 /* We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2487 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2488 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2489 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
2490 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2491 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2492 * anything like that, but this might change).
2494 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2495 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2496 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2497 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2498 * Finished message could have been computed.) */
2499 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2503 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation &&
2504 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb &&
2505 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
2507 if (tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, data, size, al) != 0)
2509 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
2510 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2513 /* session ticket processed earlier */
2514 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
2516 if(ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
2521 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz)
2523 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2524 unsigned char server_authz_dataformatlist_length;
2528 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2532 server_authz_dataformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2534 if (server_authz_dataformatlist_length != size - 1)
2536 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2540 /* Successful session resumption uses the same authz
2541 * information as the original session so we ignore this
2542 * in the case of a session resumption. */
2545 if (s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types != NULL)
2546 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types);
2547 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types =
2548 OPENSSL_malloc(server_authz_dataformatlist_length);
2549 if (!s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types)
2551 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2555 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len =
2556 server_authz_dataformatlist_length;
2557 memcpy(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
2559 server_authz_dataformatlist_length);
2561 /* Sort the types in order to check for duplicates. */
2562 qsort(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
2563 server_authz_dataformatlist_length,
2564 1 /* element size */,
2567 for (i = 0; i < server_authz_dataformatlist_length; i++)
2570 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types[i] ==
2571 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types[i-1])
2573 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2580 /* If this ClientHello extension was unhandled and this is
2581 * a nonresumed connection, check whether the extension is a
2582 * custom TLS Extension (has a custom_srv_ext_record), and if
2583 * so call the callback and record the extension number so that
2584 * an appropriate ServerHello may be later returned.
2586 else if (!s->hit && s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records_count)
2588 custom_srv_ext_record *record;
2590 for (i=0; i < s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records_count; i++)
2592 record = &s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records[i];
2593 if (type == record->ext_type)
2597 /* Error on duplicate TLS Extensions */
2598 for (j = 0; j < s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count; j++)
2600 if (type == s->s3->tlsext_custom_types[j])
2602 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2607 /* NULL callback still notes the extension */
2608 if (record->fn1 && !record->fn1(s, type, data, size, al, record->arg))
2611 /* Add the (non-duplicated) entry */
2612 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count++;
2613 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types = OPENSSL_realloc(
2614 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types,
2615 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count * 2);
2616 if (s->s3->tlsext_custom_types == NULL)
2618 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types = 0;
2619 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2622 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types[
2623 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count - 1] = type;
2635 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2637 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
2638 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
2640 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2641 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2642 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2645 /* If no signature algorithms extension set default values */
2646 if (!s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
2647 ssl_cert_set_default_md(s->cert);
2652 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
2655 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
2657 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2661 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0)
2663 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2669 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2670 /* ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2671 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly fill
2672 * the length of the block. */
2673 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
2675 unsigned int off = 0;
2689 static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
2691 unsigned short length;
2692 unsigned short type;
2693 unsigned short size;
2694 unsigned char *data = *p;
2695 int tlsext_servername = 0;
2696 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2698 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2699 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2702 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
2704 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2705 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
2708 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2709 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2710 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2713 if (data >= (d+n-2))
2717 if (data+length != d+n)
2719 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2723 while(data <= (d+n-4))
2728 if (data+size > (d+n))
2731 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2732 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size,
2733 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2735 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
2737 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0)
2739 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2742 tlsext_servername = 1;
2745 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2746 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
2748 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2749 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2751 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1)
2753 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2756 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2757 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2758 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
2760 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2763 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
2764 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
2766 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist ");
2767 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2768 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2769 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2770 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2773 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2775 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2777 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2778 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2780 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2783 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
2786 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2789 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2791 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2792 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input)
2794 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2798 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2801 n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2802 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
2804 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2808 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2809 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
2810 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2811 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2813 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2815 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2817 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2822 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
2824 /* MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested
2825 * a status request message.
2827 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0))
2829 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2832 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2833 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2835 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2836 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2837 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
2839 unsigned char *selected;
2840 unsigned char selected_len;
2842 /* We must have requested it. */
2843 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL)
2845 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2848 /* The data must be valid */
2849 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size))
2851 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2854 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, size, s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
2856 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2859 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2860 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
2862 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2865 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2866 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2867 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2871 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation)
2875 /* We must have requested it. */
2876 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list == NULL)
2878 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2883 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2886 /* The extension data consists of:
2887 * uint16 list_length
2888 * uint8 proto_length;
2889 * uint8 proto[proto_length]; */
2893 if (len != (unsigned) size - 2)
2895 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2899 if (len != (unsigned) size - 3)
2901 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2904 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
2905 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2906 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
2907 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected)
2909 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2912 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, data + 3, len);
2913 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
2916 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
2918 if(!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2920 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2922 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2923 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
2927 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
2928 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2930 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
2931 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2932 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2934 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2939 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
2941 if(ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
2946 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz)
2948 /* We only support audit proofs. It's an error to send
2949 * an authz hello extension if the client
2950 * didn't request a proof. */
2951 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2952 unsigned char server_authz_dataformatlist_length;
2954 if (!s->ctx->tlsext_authz_server_audit_proof_cb)
2956 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2962 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2966 server_authz_dataformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2967 if (server_authz_dataformatlist_length != size - 1)
2969 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2973 /* We only support audit proofs, so a legal ServerHello
2974 * authz list contains exactly one entry. */
2975 if (server_authz_dataformatlist_length != 1 ||
2976 sdata[0] != TLSEXT_AUTHZDATAFORMAT_audit_proof)
2978 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2982 s->s3->tlsext_authz_server_promised = 1;
2985 /* If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but
2986 * matches a custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c
2988 else if (s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count)
2991 custom_cli_ext_record* record;
2993 for (i = 0; i < s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count; i++)
2995 record = &s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records[i];
2996 if (record->ext_type == type)
2998 if (record->fn2 && !record->fn2(s, type, data, size, al, record->arg))
3010 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3014 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1)
3016 if (s->tlsext_hostname)
3018 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL)
3020 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
3021 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname)
3023 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
3029 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3039 /* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to
3040 * avoid an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server
3041 * hello because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an
3042 * attack. However this would mean we could not connect to any server
3043 * which doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI
3044 * absence on initial connect only.
3046 if (!renegotiate_seen
3047 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
3048 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
3050 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3051 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
3052 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
3060 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
3063 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
3067 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
3069 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
3074 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
3076 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
3077 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
3079 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
3080 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
3082 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
3083 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
3085 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3088 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
3092 /* at callback's request, insist on receiving an appropriate server opaque PRF input */
3093 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
3100 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
3105 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
3107 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
3108 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
3110 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3111 /* The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely in
3112 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
3114 /* The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely in
3115 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
3119 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3120 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3121 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3122 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3124 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
3126 /* This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(),
3127 * but we might be sending an alert in response to the client hello,
3128 * so this has to happen here in
3129 * ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(). */
3133 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
3135 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
3138 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3139 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3144 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
3145 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
3146 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL;
3148 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
3150 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
3151 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len)
3153 /* can only use this extension if we have a server opaque PRF input
3154 * of the same length as the client opaque PRF input! */
3156 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
3157 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
3159 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
3160 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
3162 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3163 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3166 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
3170 if (r == 2 && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
3172 /* The callback wants to enforce use of the extension,
3173 * but we can't do that with the client opaque PRF input;
3174 * abort the handshake.
3176 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3177 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3185 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3186 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3189 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3190 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
3193 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3194 s->servername_done=0;
3200 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
3202 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
3205 /* If status request then ask callback what to do.
3206 * Note: this must be called after servername callbacks in case
3207 * the certificate has changed, and must be called after the cipher
3208 * has been chosen because this may influence which certificate is sent
3210 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
3213 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
3214 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
3215 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
3216 if (certpkey == NULL)
3218 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3221 /* Set current certificate to one we will use so
3222 * SSL_get_certificate et al can pick it up.
3224 s->cert->key = certpkey;
3225 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
3228 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
3229 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3230 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3232 /* status request response should be sent */
3233 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
3234 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
3235 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
3237 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3239 /* something bad happened */
3240 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3241 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3242 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3247 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3252 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3253 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3256 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3257 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
3265 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
3267 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
3268 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
3270 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3271 /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
3272 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension
3273 * it must contain uncompressed.
3275 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3276 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3277 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
3278 (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
3279 ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
3281 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
3283 unsigned char *list;
3284 int found_uncompressed = 0;
3285 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
3286 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
3288 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed)
3290 found_uncompressed = 1;
3294 if (!found_uncompressed)
3296 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
3300 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
3301 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
3303 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3304 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3305 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3306 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3308 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
3309 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0)
3311 /* This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on using opaque PRF inputs.
3312 * So first verify that we really have a value from the server too. */
3314 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
3316 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3317 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3320 /* Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to check
3321 * that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size. */
3322 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL ||
3323 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len)
3325 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3326 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3331 /* If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one
3334 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
3335 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
3338 /* Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows
3339 * there is no response.
3341 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
3343 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
3344 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
3346 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
3347 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
3350 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
3351 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3355 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3356 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3362 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3363 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3366 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3367 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
3370 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3371 s->servername_done=0;
3377 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
3380 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
3382 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
3384 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3388 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
3390 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
3396 /* Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
3397 * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle
3398 * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time.
3400 * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will
3401 * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket
3402 * extension, if any.
3403 * len: the length of the session ID.
3404 * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello.
3405 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3406 * point to the resulting session.
3408 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
3409 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
3410 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
3413 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3414 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
3415 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
3416 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
3417 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
3418 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
3419 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
3422 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
3423 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
3424 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
3425 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
3426 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
3427 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
3429 int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
3430 const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
3432 /* Point after session ID in client hello */
3433 const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
3437 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
3439 /* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present
3440 * to permit stateful resumption.
3442 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
3444 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
3448 /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
3456 /* Skip past cipher list */
3461 /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
3466 /* Now at start of extensions */
3467 if ((p + 2) >= limit)
3470 while ((p + 4) <= limit)
3472 unsigned short type, size;
3475 if (p + size > limit)
3477 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
3482 /* The client will accept a ticket but doesn't
3483 * currently have one. */
3484 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3487 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb)
3489 /* Indicate that the ticket couldn't be
3490 * decrypted rather than generating the session
3491 * from ticket now, trigger abbreviated
3492 * handshake based on external mechanism to
3493 * calculate the master secret later. */
3496 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret);
3499 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
3500 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3502 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
3504 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
3505 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3507 default: /* fatal error */
3516 /* tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
3518 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
3519 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
3520 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
3521 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
3522 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3523 * point to the resulting session.
3526 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3527 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
3528 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
3529 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
3531 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
3532 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
3533 SSL_SESSION **psess)
3536 unsigned char *sdec;
3537 const unsigned char *p;
3538 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
3539 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
3542 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3543 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
3546 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
3547 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3548 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3549 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
3551 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
3552 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
3563 /* Check key name matches */
3564 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
3566 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3567 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
3568 EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3569 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
3571 /* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and
3572 * integrity checks on ticket.
3574 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
3577 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3581 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
3582 HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
3583 HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
3584 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3585 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen))
3587 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
3588 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
3589 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3590 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3591 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
3594 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3597 EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
3598 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0)
3601 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3604 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3608 /* The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to
3609 * detect that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to
3610 * the session structure. If it is empty set length to zero
3611 * as required by standard.
3614 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3615 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3623 /* For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new
3628 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3636 static tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
3637 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3638 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3639 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3640 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3641 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3642 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}
3645 static tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
3646 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
3647 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
3648 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}
3651 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3654 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
3656 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3662 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3665 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
3667 if ((table[i].id) == id)
3668 return table[i].nid;
3673 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md)
3678 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md,
3679 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3682 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3685 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
3686 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
3690 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
3692 return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig,
3693 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3696 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
3700 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
3701 case TLSEXT_hash_md5:
3708 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
3709 case TLSEXT_hash_sha1:
3712 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
3713 case TLSEXT_hash_sha224:
3714 return EVP_sha224();
3716 case TLSEXT_hash_sha256:
3717 return EVP_sha256();
3719 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
3720 case TLSEXT_hash_sha384:
3721 return EVP_sha384();
3723 case TLSEXT_hash_sha512:
3724 return EVP_sha512();
3732 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
3736 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3737 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3738 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3740 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3741 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3742 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3744 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3745 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3746 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3752 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3753 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
3754 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3756 int sign_nid = 0, hash_nid = 0;
3757 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3759 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid)
3761 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md,
3762 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3764 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3766 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid)
3768 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig,
3769 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3771 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3775 if (sign_nid && hash_nid)
3776 OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid,
3777 hash_nid, sign_nid);
3779 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3782 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
3783 static int tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
3784 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3785 const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
3787 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3788 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3789 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i+=2, ptmp+=2)
3791 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3792 if (tls12_get_hash(ptmp[0]) == NULL)
3794 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3796 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j+=2, atmp+=2)
3798 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1])
3803 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3804 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3805 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3807 &shsig->signandhash_nid,
3818 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3819 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3821 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3822 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3824 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3826 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
3827 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3828 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
3830 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3831 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3833 else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
3835 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
3836 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3839 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
3840 if(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb)
3844 allow = c->peer_sigalgs;
3845 allowlen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3851 pref = c->peer_sigalgs;
3852 preflen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3854 nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3857 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3860 nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3861 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3862 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3867 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3869 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
3875 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3876 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
3877 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3879 /* Should never happen */
3883 c->peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
3884 if (!c->peer_sigalgs)
3886 c->peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3887 memcpy(c->peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
3889 tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s);
3891 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3892 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
3894 /* Use first set signature preference to force message
3895 * digest, ignoring any peer preferences.
3897 const unsigned char *sigs = NULL;
3899 sigs = c->conf_sigalgs;
3901 sigs = c->client_sigalgs;
3904 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigs[1]);
3905 md = tls12_get_hash(sigs[0]);
3906 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3907 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3908 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
3910 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3911 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3917 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3918 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++)
3920 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3921 if (idx > 0 && c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL)
3923 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
3924 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3925 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3926 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
3928 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3929 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3934 /* In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't
3935 * use the certificate for signing.
3937 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
3939 /* Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is
3940 * not supported it stays as NULL.
3942 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3943 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest)
3944 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3946 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3947 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest)
3949 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3950 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3953 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3954 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest)
3955 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3962 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3963 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3964 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3966 const unsigned char *psig = s->cert->peer_sigalgs;
3972 if (idx >= (int)s->cert->peer_sigalgslen)
3979 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
3981 return s->cert->peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3984 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3985 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3986 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3988 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
3989 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
3993 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3995 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3997 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3999 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
4001 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
4002 return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
4006 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
4008 tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
4010 unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl;
4011 unsigned short hbtype;
4012 unsigned int payload;
4013 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
4015 /* Read type and payload length first */
4020 if (s->msg_callback)
4021 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
4022 &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
4023 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
4025 if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST)
4027 unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
4030 /* Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes
4031 * message type, plus 2 bytes payload length, plus
4032 * payload, plus padding
4034 buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
4037 /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
4038 *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
4040 memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
4042 /* Random padding */
4043 RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding);
4045 r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, 3 + payload + padding);
4047 if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
4048 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
4049 buffer, 3 + payload + padding,
4050 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
4052 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
4057 else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE)
4061 /* We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int),
4062 * and 16 random bytes, so we just try to read the
4063 * sequence number */
4066 if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq)
4069 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
4077 tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
4079 unsigned char *buf, *p;
4081 unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
4082 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
4084 /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
4085 if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
4086 s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS)
4088 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
4092 /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
4093 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
4095 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
4099 /* ...and no handshake in progress. */
4100 if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake)
4102 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
4106 /* Check if padding is too long, payload and padding
4107 * must not exceed 2^14 - 3 = 16381 bytes in total.
4109 OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381);
4111 /* Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
4112 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
4113 * some random stuff.
4114 * - Message Type, 1 byte
4115 * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
4116 * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
4117 * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
4120 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
4123 *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
4124 /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
4126 /* Sequence number */
4127 s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
4128 /* 16 random bytes */
4129 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16);
4131 /* Random padding */
4132 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding);
4134 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
4137 if (s->msg_callback)
4138 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
4139 buf, 3 + payload + padding,
4140 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
4142 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;
4151 #define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
4156 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
4159 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
4161 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
4164 int sig_alg, hash_alg;
4165 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
4167 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
4169 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
4171 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
4179 if (!strcmp(etmp, "RSA"))
4180 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
4181 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "DSA"))
4182 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
4183 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "ECDSA"))
4184 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_EC;
4187 hash_alg = OBJ_sn2nid(p);
4188 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
4189 hash_alg = OBJ_ln2nid(p);
4190 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
4193 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i+=2)
4195 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg
4196 && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
4199 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
4200 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
4204 /* Set suppored signature algorithms based on a colon separated list
4205 * of the form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512 */
4206 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
4210 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
4214 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
4217 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
4219 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
4224 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
4225 if (sigalgs == NULL)
4227 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i+=2)
4229 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md,
4230 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
4231 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig,
4232 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
4234 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
4242 if (c->client_sigalgs)
4243 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
4244 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
4245 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
4249 if (c->conf_sigalgs)
4250 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
4251 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
4252 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
4258 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
4262 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
4266 if (default_nid == -1)
4268 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
4270 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
4271 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
4272 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
4276 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
4277 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
4281 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
4282 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++)
4284 if(!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
4290 /* Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is
4291 * usable by server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to
4292 * check chains before passing them to the server and it allows the
4293 * server to check chains before attempting to use them.
4296 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
4298 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
4299 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
4300 /* Strict mode flags */
4301 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
4302 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
4303 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
4305 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
4310 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
4311 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
4313 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
4314 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
4317 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
4321 idx = cpk - c->pkeys;
4324 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
4326 pk = cpk->privatekey;
4328 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
4329 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
4332 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
4333 /* Allow any certificate to pass test */
4334 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
4336 rv = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_VALID|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4337 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4346 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
4349 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
4350 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
4351 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
4353 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
4361 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4362 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
4363 if (ok != X509_V_OK)
4366 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4372 /* Check all signature algorithms are consistent with
4373 * signature algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later
4376 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode)
4379 unsigned char rsign = 0;
4380 if (c->peer_sigalgs)
4382 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
4387 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
4388 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
4389 case SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA:
4390 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
4391 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
4394 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
4395 case SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA:
4396 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
4397 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
4401 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
4402 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
4410 /* If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we
4411 * have set preferred signature algorithms check we support
4414 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs)
4417 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
4418 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2)
4420 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
4423 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen)
4431 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
4432 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid))
4434 if (!check_flags) goto end;
4437 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
4438 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4439 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4441 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i),
4446 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4454 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
4455 else if(check_flags)
4456 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4458 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
4459 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
4460 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
4461 else if (!check_flags)
4464 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4465 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
4466 else if (strict_mode)
4468 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4469 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4471 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4472 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0))
4476 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4484 if (!s->server && strict_mode)
4486 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
4491 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
4494 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
4497 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
4502 int cert_type = X509_certificate_type(x, pk);
4503 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_RSA)
4504 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_FIXED_DH;
4505 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_DSA)
4506 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_FIXED_DH;
4511 const unsigned char *ctypes;
4516 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
4520 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
4521 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
4523 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++)
4525 if (ctypes[i] == check_type)
4527 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4531 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
4535 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4538 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
4540 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
4541 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4543 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4545 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
4546 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4548 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4550 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4552 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4553 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp))
4555 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4560 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4564 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4566 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
4567 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
4571 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
4573 if (cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
4574 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4575 else if (cpk->digest)
4576 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4579 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4581 /* When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant
4582 * if the chain is invalid.
4586 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
4587 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4590 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
4591 cpk->valid_flags &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4598 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
4599 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
4601 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
4602 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
4603 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
4604 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA);
4605 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA);
4606 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
4608 /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
4609 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
4611 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);