2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
113 #include <openssl/objects.h>
114 #include <openssl/evp.h>
115 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
116 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
117 #include <openssl/rand.h>
118 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
119 # include <openssl/dh.h>
120 # include <openssl/bn.h>
122 #include "ssl_locl.h"
124 const char tls1_version_str[] = "TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
126 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
127 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
128 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
129 SSL_SESSION **psess);
130 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
131 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
134 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data = {
137 tls1_setup_key_block,
138 tls1_generate_master_secret,
139 tls1_change_cipher_state,
140 tls1_final_finish_mac,
141 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
142 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
143 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
144 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
146 tls1_export_keying_material,
148 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
149 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
153 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_1_enc_data = {
156 tls1_setup_key_block,
157 tls1_generate_master_secret,
158 tls1_change_cipher_state,
159 tls1_final_finish_mac,
160 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
161 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
162 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
163 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
165 tls1_export_keying_material,
166 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
167 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
168 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
172 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_2_enc_data = {
175 tls1_setup_key_block,
176 tls1_generate_master_secret,
177 tls1_change_cipher_state,
178 tls1_final_finish_mac,
179 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
180 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
181 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
182 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
184 tls1_export_keying_material,
185 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
186 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
187 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
188 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
192 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
195 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
196 * http, the cache would over fill
198 return (60 * 60 * 2);
205 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
209 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
211 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
212 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
213 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
217 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
220 s->version = s->method->version;
223 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
226 int nid; /* Curve NID */
227 int secbits; /* Bits of security (from SP800-57) */
228 unsigned int flags; /* Flags: currently just field type */
231 # define TLS_CURVE_CHAR2 0x1
232 # define TLS_CURVE_PRIME 0x0
234 static const tls_curve_info nid_list[] = {
235 {NID_sect163k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163k1 (1) */
236 {NID_sect163r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r1 (2) */
237 {NID_sect163r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r2 (3) */
238 {NID_sect193r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r1 (4) */
239 {NID_sect193r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r2 (5) */
240 {NID_sect233k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233k1 (6) */
241 {NID_sect233r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233r1 (7) */
242 {NID_sect239k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect239k1 (8) */
243 {NID_sect283k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283k1 (9) */
244 {NID_sect283r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283r1 (10) */
245 {NID_sect409k1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409k1 (11) */
246 {NID_sect409r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409r1 (12) */
247 {NID_sect571k1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571k1 (13) */
248 {NID_sect571r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571r1 (14) */
249 {NID_secp160k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160k1 (15) */
250 {NID_secp160r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r1 (16) */
251 {NID_secp160r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r2 (17) */
252 {NID_secp192k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192k1 (18) */
253 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192r1 (19) */
254 {NID_secp224k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224k1 (20) */
255 {NID_secp224r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224r1 (21) */
256 {NID_secp256k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256k1 (22) */
257 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256r1 (23) */
258 {NID_secp384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp384r1 (24) */
259 {NID_secp521r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp521r1 (25) */
260 {NID_brainpoolP256r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
261 {NID_brainpoolP384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
262 {NID_brainpoolP512r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
265 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = {
266 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
267 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
268 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
271 static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] = {
272 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
273 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
274 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
275 0, 28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
276 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
277 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
278 0, 27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
279 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
280 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
281 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
282 0, 26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
283 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
284 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
285 0, 8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
286 0, 6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
287 0, 7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
288 0, 20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
289 0, 21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
290 0, 4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
291 0, 5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
292 0, 18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
293 0, 19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
294 0, 1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
295 0, 2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
296 0, 3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
297 0, 15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
298 0, 16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
299 0, 17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
302 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] = {
303 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
304 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
307 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
309 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
310 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
312 return nid_list[curve_id - 1].nid;
315 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
317 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
319 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
321 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
323 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
325 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
327 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
329 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
331 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
333 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
335 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
337 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
339 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
341 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
343 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
345 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
347 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
349 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
351 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
353 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
355 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
357 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
359 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
361 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
363 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
365 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
367 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
369 case NID_brainpoolP256r1: /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
371 case NID_brainpoolP384r1: /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
373 case NID_brainpoolP512r1: /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
381 * Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
383 * Sets |num_curves| to the number of curves in the list, i.e.,
384 * the length of |pcurves| is 2 * num_curves.
385 * Returns 1 on success and 0 if the client curves list has invalid format.
386 * The latter indicates an internal error: we should not be accepting such
387 * lists in the first place.
388 * TODO(emilia): we should really be storing the curves list in explicitly
389 * parsed form instead. (However, this would affect binary compatibility
390 * so cannot happen in the 1.0.x series.)
392 static int tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
393 const unsigned char **pcurves,
396 size_t pcurveslen = 0;
398 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
399 pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
401 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
402 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
403 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
404 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
405 pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
408 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
409 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
413 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
414 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
418 *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
419 pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
422 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
423 pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
427 /* We do not allow odd length arrays to enter the system. */
428 if (pcurveslen & 1) {
429 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_GET_CURVELIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
433 *num_curves = pcurveslen / 2;
438 /* See if curve is allowed by security callback */
439 static int tls_curve_allowed(SSL *s, const unsigned char *curve, int op)
441 const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
444 if ((curve[1] < 1) || ((size_t)curve[1] > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
446 cinfo = &nid_list[curve[1] - 1];
447 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
448 if (cinfo->flags & TLS_CURVE_CHAR2)
451 return ssl_security(s, op, cinfo->secbits, cinfo->nid, (void *)curve);
454 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
455 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
457 const unsigned char *curves;
458 size_t num_curves, i;
459 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
460 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
462 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
464 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
467 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) {
468 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
470 } else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) {
471 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
473 } else /* Should never happen */
476 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &num_curves))
478 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, curves += 2) {
479 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
480 return tls_curve_allowed(s, p + 1, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK);
486 * Return |nmatch|th shared curve or NID_undef if there is no match.
487 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
488 * For nmatch == -2, return the NID of the curve to use for
489 * an EC tmp key, or NID_undef if there is no match.
491 int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
493 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
494 size_t num_pref, num_supp, i, j;
496 /* Can't do anything on client side */
500 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
502 * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know
503 * these are acceptable due to previous checks.
505 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
506 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
507 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
508 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
509 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
510 /* Should never happen */
513 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
517 * Avoid truncation. tls1_get_curvelist takes an int
518 * but s->options is a long...
520 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
521 (s, (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0, &supp,
523 /* In practice, NID_undef == 0 but let's be precise. */
524 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
525 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
526 (s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE), &pref,
528 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
530 for (i = 0; i < num_pref; i++, pref += 2) {
531 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
532 for (j = 0; j < num_supp; j++, tsupp += 2) {
533 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1]) {
534 if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, pref, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
537 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
538 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id);
546 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
550 int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
551 int *curves, size_t ncurves)
553 unsigned char *clist, *p;
556 * Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works while curve
559 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
560 clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
563 for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++) {
564 unsigned long idmask;
566 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
568 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask)) {
577 *pextlen = ncurves * 2;
581 # define MAX_CURVELIST 28
585 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
588 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
590 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
596 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
598 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
600 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
602 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
603 if (nid == NID_undef)
604 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
605 if (nid == NID_undef)
606 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
607 if (nid == NID_undef)
609 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
610 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
612 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
616 /* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
617 int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
622 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
626 return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
629 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
630 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
635 const EC_METHOD *meth;
638 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
639 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
642 meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(grp);
645 if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
649 /* Determine curve ID */
650 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
651 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
652 /* If we have an ID set it, otherwise set arbitrary explicit curve */
655 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
664 if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
666 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED) {
668 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
670 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
672 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
677 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
678 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
679 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
681 const unsigned char *pformats, *pcurves;
682 size_t num_formats, num_curves, i;
685 * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
686 * supported (see RFC4492).
688 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
689 pformats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
690 num_formats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
691 for (i = 0; i < num_formats; i++, pformats++) {
692 if (*comp_id == *pformats)
695 if (i == num_formats)
700 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
701 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++) {
702 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &pcurves, &num_curves))
704 if (j == 1 && num_curves == 0) {
706 * If we've not received any curves then skip this check.
707 * RFC 4492 does not require the supported elliptic curves extension
708 * so if it is not sent we can just choose any curve.
709 * It is invalid to send an empty list in the elliptic curves
710 * extension, so num_curves == 0 always means no extension.
714 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
715 if (pcurves[0] == curve_id[0] && pcurves[1] == curve_id[1])
720 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
727 static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
731 * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
733 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
734 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
735 *num_formats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
737 *pformats = ecformats_default;
738 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
740 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
742 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default);
747 * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
748 * certificates have compatible curves and compression.
750 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
752 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
755 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
758 /* If not EC nothing to do */
759 if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC) {
763 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec);
768 * Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a supported
771 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
775 * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
776 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
778 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s)) {
784 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
785 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
786 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
787 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
788 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
790 return 0; /* Should never happen */
791 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
792 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
794 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
796 if (set_ee_md == 2) {
797 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
798 s->s3->tmp.md[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha256();
800 s->s3->tmp.md[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha384();
806 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
807 /* Check EC temporary key is compatible with client extensions */
808 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
810 unsigned char curve_id[2];
811 EC_KEY *ec = s->cert->ecdh_tmp;
812 # ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
813 /* Allow any curve: not just those peer supports */
814 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
818 * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
821 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
822 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
823 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
824 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
825 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
826 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
830 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
831 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
833 /* If auto or setting curve from callback assume OK */
834 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto || s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
836 /* Otherwise check curve is acceptable */
838 unsigned char curve_tmp[2];
841 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_tmp, NULL, ec))
843 if (!curve_tmp[0] || curve_tmp[1] == curve_id[1])
849 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto) {
850 /* Need a shared curve */
851 if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
857 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
862 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, NULL, ec))
864 /* Set this to allow use of invalid curves for testing */
868 return tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL);
871 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
875 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
880 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
882 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
885 * List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
886 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
889 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
890 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
892 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
895 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
896 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
898 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
901 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC
902 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */
904 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
907 # define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
908 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
909 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
910 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
912 static const unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
913 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
914 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
915 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
916 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
917 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
920 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
921 static const unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
922 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
923 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
926 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
929 * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
932 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
933 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
934 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
935 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
936 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
938 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
939 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
942 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
943 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
947 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
948 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs) {
949 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
950 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
951 } else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
952 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
953 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
955 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
956 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
961 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
962 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
964 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
965 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
967 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
968 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
969 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
970 /* Should never happen */
973 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
974 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1]) {
975 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
978 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
979 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
980 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
981 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
982 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec))
984 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id)) {
985 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
988 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
989 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
992 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256) {
993 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256) {
994 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
995 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
998 } else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384) {
999 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384) {
1000 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1001 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
1007 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
1011 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
1012 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
1013 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i += 2, sent_sigs += 2) {
1014 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
1017 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
1018 if (i == sent_sigslen
1019 && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1
1020 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
1021 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1024 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
1026 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
1029 /* Make sure security callback allows algorithm */
1030 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK,
1031 EVP_MD_size(*pmd) * 4, EVP_MD_type(*pmd),
1033 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1037 * Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they wish.
1039 s->s3->tmp.peer_md = *pmd;
1044 * Get a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
1045 * supported or doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms. Unlike
1046 * ssl_cipher_get_disabled this applies to a specific session and not global
1049 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
1051 s->s3->tmp.mask_a = 0;
1052 s->s3->tmp.mask_k = 0;
1053 /* Don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers if we don't suppport them */
1054 if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s))
1055 s->s3->tmp.mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
1057 s->s3->tmp.mask_ssl = 0;
1058 ssl_set_sig_mask(&s->s3->tmp.mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
1060 * Disable static DH if we don't include any appropriate signature
1063 if (s->s3->tmp.mask_a & SSL_aRSA)
1064 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kDHr | SSL_kECDHr;
1065 if (s->s3->tmp.mask_a & SSL_aDSS)
1066 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kDHd;
1067 if (s->s3->tmp.mask_a & SSL_aECDSA)
1068 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kECDHe;
1069 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1070 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1071 if (!s->psk_client_callback) {
1072 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
1073 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
1075 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1076 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1077 if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) {
1078 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
1079 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
1084 int ssl_cipher_disabled(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op)
1086 if (c->algorithm_ssl & s->s3->tmp.mask_ssl
1087 || c->algorithm_mkey & s->s3->tmp.mask_k
1088 || c->algorithm_auth & s->s3->tmp.mask_a)
1090 return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c);
1093 static int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s)
1095 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
1097 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL);
1100 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
1101 unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1104 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1105 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1106 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1107 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1109 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1111 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1112 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1114 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++) {
1115 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1117 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1118 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1119 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)
1120 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) {
1131 return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1133 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1134 if (s->renegotiate) {
1137 if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1138 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1142 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1145 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret);
1148 if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1149 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1155 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1156 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION)
1159 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1160 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1161 unsigned long size_str;
1165 * check for enough space.
1166 * 4 for the servername type and entension length
1167 * 2 for servernamelist length
1168 * 1 for the hostname type
1169 * 2 for hostname length
1173 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
1175 strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
1178 /* extension type and length */
1179 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret);
1180 s2n(size_str + 5, ret);
1182 /* length of servername list */
1183 s2n(size_str + 3, ret);
1185 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
1186 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
1188 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
1191 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1192 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
1193 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the
1194 * Client Hello message */
1196 int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
1197 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0) {
1198 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1203 * check for enough space.
1204 * 4 for the srp type type and entension length
1205 * 1 for the srp user identity
1206 * + srp user identity length
1208 if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0)
1211 /* fill in the extension */
1212 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp, ret);
1213 s2n(login_len + 1, ret);
1214 (*ret++) = (unsigned char)login_len;
1215 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
1220 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1223 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message
1226 const unsigned char *pcurves, *pformats;
1227 size_t num_curves, num_formats, curves_list_len;
1229 unsigned char *etmp;
1231 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &pformats, &num_formats);
1233 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0)
1235 if (num_formats > (size_t)lenmax)
1237 if (num_formats > 255) {
1238 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1242 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret);
1243 /* The point format list has 1-byte length. */
1244 s2n(num_formats + 1, ret);
1245 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)num_formats;
1246 memcpy(ret, pformats, num_formats);
1250 * Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message
1252 pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1253 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &pcurves, &num_curves))
1256 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0)
1258 if (num_curves > (size_t)lenmax / 2)
1260 if (num_curves > 65532 / 2) {
1261 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1265 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves, ret);
1267 /* Copy curve ID if supported */
1268 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
1269 if (tls_curve_allowed(s, pcurves, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) {
1270 *etmp++ = pcurves[0];
1271 *etmp++ = pcurves[1];
1275 curves_list_len = etmp - ret - 4;
1277 s2n(curves_list_len + 2, ret);
1278 s2n(curves_list_len, ret);
1279 ret += curves_list_len;
1281 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1283 if (tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1285 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
1286 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
1287 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1288 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data) {
1289 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1290 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1291 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
1293 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1294 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data, ticklen);
1295 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1298 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1299 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1302 * Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len rest for
1305 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0)
1307 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret);
1310 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
1316 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1318 const unsigned char *salg;
1319 unsigned char *etmp;
1320 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
1321 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < salglen + 6)
1323 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms, ret);
1325 /* Skip over lengths for now */
1327 salglen = tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, ret, salg, salglen);
1328 /* Fill in lengths */
1329 s2n(salglen + 2, etmp);
1334 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
1336 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
1340 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
1341 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1342 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1348 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) {
1349 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1355 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0)
1357 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1358 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
1360 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
1361 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
1363 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
1364 /* save position of id len */
1365 unsigned char *q = ret;
1366 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1367 /* skip over id len */
1369 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
1375 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
1377 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1378 /* Add Heartbeat extension */
1379 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1381 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret);
1385 * 1: peer may send requests
1386 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1388 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1389 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1391 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1394 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1395 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1397 * The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its support
1398 * for Next Protocol Negotiation
1400 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
1402 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret);
1407 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1408 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 6 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len)
1410 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret);
1411 s2n(2 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret);
1412 s2n(s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret);
1413 memcpy(ret, s->alpn_client_proto_list, s->alpn_client_proto_list_len);
1414 ret += s->alpn_client_proto_list_len;
1416 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1417 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)) {
1420 /* Returns 0 on success!! */
1421 if (ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1422 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1426 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1429 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret);
1432 if (ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1433 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1439 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->cli_ext);
1440 /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
1441 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 0, &ret, limit, al))
1443 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1444 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac, ret);
1447 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret, ret);
1451 * Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See
1452 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03 NB: because this
1453 * code works out the length of all existing extensions it MUST always
1456 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING) {
1457 int hlen = ret - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1459 if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200) {
1460 hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
1466 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret);
1468 memset(ret, 0, hlen);
1475 if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0)
1478 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1482 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
1483 unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1486 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1487 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1488 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1489 int next_proto_neg_seen;
1491 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1492 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1493 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1494 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe))
1495 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1496 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1501 return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1503 if (s->s3->send_connection_binding) {
1506 if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1507 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1511 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1514 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret);
1517 if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1518 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1525 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1526 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
1529 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1
1530 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1531 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1534 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret);
1537 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1539 const unsigned char *plist;
1542 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message
1546 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1548 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0)
1550 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax)
1552 if (plistlen > 255) {
1553 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1557 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret);
1558 s2n(plistlen + 1, ret);
1559 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)plistlen;
1560 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1565 * Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves
1568 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1570 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected && tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1571 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1573 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret);
1577 if (s->tlsext_status_expected) {
1578 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1580 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1584 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1585 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->srtp_profile) {
1588 /* Returns 0 on success!! */
1589 if (ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1590 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1593 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1596 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret);
1599 if (ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1600 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1607 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x80
1608 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x81)
1609 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG)) {
1610 const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1611 0xfd, 0xe8, /* 65000 */
1612 0x00, 0x20, /* 32 bytes length */
1613 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1614 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1615 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1616 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17
1618 if (limit - ret < 36)
1620 memcpy(ret, cryptopro_ext, 36);
1624 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1625 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
1626 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) {
1627 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1629 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret);
1633 * 1: peer may send requests
1634 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1636 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1637 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1639 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1644 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1645 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1646 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1647 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb) {
1648 const unsigned char *npa;
1649 unsigned int npalen;
1652 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen,
1654 ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1655 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1656 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0)
1658 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret);
1660 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
1662 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1666 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 1, &ret, limit, al))
1668 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1669 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) {
1671 * Don't use encrypt_then_mac if AEAD or RC4 might want to disable
1672 * for other cases too.
1674 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD
1675 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4)
1676 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1678 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac, ret);
1683 if (!s->hit && s->session->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS) {
1684 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret, ret);
1688 if (s->s3->alpn_selected) {
1689 const unsigned char *selected = s->s3->alpn_selected;
1690 unsigned len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
1692 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - 2 - 1 - len) < 0)
1694 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret);
1698 memcpy(ret, selected, len);
1704 if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0)
1707 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1712 * tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello is called to process the ALPN extension in a
1713 * ClientHello. data: the contents of the extension, not including the type
1714 * and length. data_len: the number of bytes in |data| al: a pointer to the
1715 * alert value to send in the event of a non-zero return. returns: 0 on
1718 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
1719 unsigned data_len, int *al)
1723 const unsigned char *selected;
1724 unsigned char selected_len;
1727 if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb == NULL)
1734 * data should contain a uint16 length followed by a series of 8-bit,
1735 * length-prefixed strings.
1737 i = ((unsigned)data[0]) << 8 | ((unsigned)data[1]);
1746 for (i = 0; i < data_len;) {
1747 proto_len = data[i];
1753 if (i + proto_len < i || i + proto_len > data_len)
1759 r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, data_len,
1760 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
1761 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1762 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1763 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
1764 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected) {
1765 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1768 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, selected, selected_len);
1769 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
1774 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1778 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1780 * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1781 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |d|, of length |n|.
1782 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1787 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1788 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1789 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1790 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1792 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
1793 const unsigned char *d, int n)
1795 unsigned short type, size;
1796 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1797 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1798 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1799 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1800 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1801 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1802 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1804 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1805 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1806 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1807 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1810 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1811 static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock[] = {
1812 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1813 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1814 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1815 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1816 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1817 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1818 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1819 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1822 if (data >= (d + n - 2))
1826 if (data > (d + n - 4))
1831 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1834 if (data + size > d + n)
1838 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
1839 const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1840 const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock);
1842 if (data + len1 + len2 != d + n)
1844 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0)
1846 if (memcmp(data + len1, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock, len2) != 0)
1849 const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1851 if (data + len != d + n)
1853 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0)
1857 s->s3->is_probably_safari = 1;
1859 # endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1861 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
1862 unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
1864 unsigned short type;
1865 unsigned short size;
1867 unsigned char *data = *p;
1868 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1870 s->servername_done = 0;
1871 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1872 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1873 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1876 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1877 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
1878 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1879 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1880 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1883 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1884 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1885 ssl_check_for_safari(s, data, d, n);
1886 # endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1888 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
1889 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs);
1890 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = NULL;
1891 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1892 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1895 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1896 OPENSSL_free(s->srp_ctx.login);
1897 s->srp_ctx.login = NULL;
1900 s->srtp_profile = NULL;
1902 if (data >= (d + n - 2))
1906 if (data > (d + n - len))
1909 while (data <= (d + n - 4)) {
1913 if (data + size > (d + n))
1915 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1916 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1917 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
1918 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
1920 renegotiate_seen = 1;
1921 } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
1924 * The servername extension is treated as follows:
1926 * - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
1927 * - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
1928 * in which case an fatal alert is generated.
1929 * - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
1930 * - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
1931 * to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
1932 * - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
1933 * it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
1934 * Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
1935 * set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
1936 * case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
1937 * a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
1938 * presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
1939 * the value of the Host: field.
1940 * - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1941 * if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the
1942 * session, i.e. when the session has been established with a servername
1944 * - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
1948 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
1949 unsigned char *sdata;
1954 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1960 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1966 servname_type = *(sdata++);
1971 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1974 if (s->servername_done == 0)
1975 switch (servname_type) {
1976 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
1978 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname) {
1979 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1982 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) {
1983 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1986 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname =
1987 OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1)) == NULL) {
1988 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1991 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
1992 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len] = '\0';
1993 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
1994 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
1995 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
1996 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1999 s->servername_done = 1;
2002 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
2003 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
2004 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname,
2005 (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
2016 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2021 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2022 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp) {
2023 if (size <= 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size - 1)) {
2024 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2027 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) {
2028 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2031 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1)) == NULL)
2033 memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len);
2034 s->srp_ctx.login[len] = '\0';
2036 if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len) {
2037 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2043 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2044 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
2045 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2046 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2048 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1 ||
2049 ecpointformatlist_length < 1) {
2050 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2054 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2055 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
2056 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2057 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
2058 OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) {
2059 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2062 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
2063 ecpointformatlist_length;
2064 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata,
2065 ecpointformatlist_length);
2067 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves) {
2068 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2069 int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
2070 ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
2072 if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 ||
2073 ellipticcurvelist_length < 1 ||
2074 /* Each NamedCurve is 2 bytes. */
2075 ellipticcurvelist_length & 1) {
2076 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2080 if (s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist) {
2081 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2084 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
2085 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist =
2086 OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL) {
2087 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2090 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length =
2091 ellipticcurvelist_length;
2092 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata,
2093 ellipticcurvelist_length);
2096 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2097 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2098 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2099 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size,
2100 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2102 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2105 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms) {
2107 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs || size < 2) {
2108 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2113 if (dsize != size || dsize & 1 || !dsize) {
2114 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2117 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, data, dsize)) {
2118 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2121 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
2124 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2128 s->tlsext_status_type = *data++;
2130 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
2131 const unsigned char *sdata;
2133 /* Read in responder_id_list */
2137 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2144 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2148 dsize -= 2 + idsize;
2151 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2156 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, &sdata, idsize);
2158 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2161 if (data != sdata) {
2162 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2163 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2166 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
2167 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
2168 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null())) {
2169 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2170 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2173 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id)) {
2174 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2175 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2180 /* Read in request_extensions */
2182 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2187 if (dsize != size) {
2188 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2193 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2194 X509_EXTENSION_free);
2195 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
2196 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &sdata, dsize);
2197 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts || (data + dsize != sdata)) {
2198 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2204 * We don't know what to do with any other type * so ignore it.
2207 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2209 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2210 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
2212 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
2213 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2215 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
2216 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2217 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2220 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2225 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2226 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2227 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0 &&
2228 s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
2230 * We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2233 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2234 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2235 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
2236 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2237 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2238 * anything like that, but this might change).
2240 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2241 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2242 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2243 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2244 * Finished message could have been computed.)
2246 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2250 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation &&
2251 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb && s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2252 if (tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, data, size, al) != 0)
2254 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2255 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
2256 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2260 /* session ticket processed earlier */
2261 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2262 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)
2263 && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2264 if (ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size, al))
2268 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2269 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
2270 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2272 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret) {
2274 s->session->flags |= SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS;
2277 * If this ClientHello extension was unhandled and this is a
2278 * nonresumed connection, check whether the extension is a custom
2279 * TLS Extension (has a custom_srv_ext_record), and if so call the
2280 * callback and record the extension number so that an appropriate
2281 * ServerHello may be later returned.
2284 if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2295 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2297 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
2298 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2299 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2300 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2301 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2308 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d,
2312 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->srv_ext);
2313 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0) {
2314 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2318 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) {
2319 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2325 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2327 * ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2328 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly
2329 * fill the length of the block.
2331 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
2333 unsigned int off = 0;
2346 static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
2347 unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
2349 unsigned short length;
2350 unsigned short type;
2351 unsigned short size;
2352 unsigned char *data = *p;
2353 int tlsext_servername = 0;
2354 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2356 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2357 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2359 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2361 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2362 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
2363 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2364 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2365 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2368 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2369 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2372 if (data >= (d + n - 2))
2376 if (data + length != d + n) {
2377 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2381 while (data <= (d + n - 4)) {
2385 if (data + size > (d + n))
2388 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2389 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2391 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
2392 if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2394 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2395 } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
2396 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
2397 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0) {
2398 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2401 tlsext_servername = 1;
2403 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2404 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
2405 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2406 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2408 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1) {
2409 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2413 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2414 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2415 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
2416 OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) {
2417 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2420 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
2421 ecpointformatlist_length;
2422 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata,
2423 ecpointformatlist_length);
2426 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2428 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2429 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2430 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size,
2431 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2433 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2436 if (!tls_use_ticket(s) || (size > 0)) {
2437 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2440 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2442 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
2444 * MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested a status
2447 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0)) {
2448 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2451 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2452 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2454 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2455 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2456 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2457 unsigned char *selected;
2458 unsigned char selected_len;
2460 /* We must have requested it. */
2461 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL) {
2462 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2465 /* The data must be valid */
2466 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size)) {
2467 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2471 ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data,
2473 s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) !=
2474 SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
2475 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2478 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2479 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated) {
2480 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2483 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2484 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2485 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2489 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation) {
2492 /* We must have requested it. */
2493 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list == NULL) {
2494 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2498 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2502 * The extension data consists of:
2503 * uint16 list_length
2504 * uint8 proto_length;
2505 * uint8 proto[proto_length];
2510 if (len != (unsigned)size - 2) {
2511 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2515 if (len != (unsigned)size - 3) {
2516 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2519 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2520 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
2521 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected) {
2522 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2525 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, data + 3, len);
2526 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
2528 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2529 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
2531 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
2532 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2534 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
2535 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2536 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2539 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2544 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2545 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2546 if (ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size, al))
2550 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2551 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac) {
2552 /* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite */
2553 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD
2554 && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc != SSL_RC4)
2555 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2558 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret) {
2560 s->session->flags |= SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS;
2563 * If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but matches a
2564 * custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c callback
2566 else if (custom_ext_parse(s, 0, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2572 if (data != d + n) {
2573 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2577 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1) {
2578 if (s->tlsext_hostname) {
2579 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) {
2580 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
2581 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname) {
2582 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2586 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2597 * Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to avoid
2598 * an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server hello
2599 * because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an attack.
2600 * However this would mean we could not connect to any server which
2601 * doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI absence on
2602 * initial connect only.
2604 if (!renegotiate_seen && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
2605 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2606 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2607 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2608 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2615 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2621 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2626 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
2628 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2629 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2631 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2633 * The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely
2634 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2637 * The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely
2638 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2642 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2644 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2645 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2646 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
2647 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2649 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2651 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2654 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2655 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2658 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2659 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2662 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2663 s->servername_done = 0;
2668 /* Initialise digests to default values */
2669 static void ssl_set_default_md(SSL *s)
2671 const EVP_MD **pmd = s->s3->tmp.md;
2672 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2673 pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
2675 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2676 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
2677 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = EVP_sha1();
2679 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2680 pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha1();
2684 int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s)
2688 /* Clear any shared sigtnature algorithms */
2689 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
2690 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
2691 s->cert->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
2692 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
2693 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
2694 s->s3->tmp.md[i] = NULL;
2695 s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
2698 /* If sigalgs received process it. */
2699 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs) {
2700 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2701 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2702 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2705 /* Fatal error is no shared signature algorithms */
2706 if (!s->cert->shared_sigalgs) {
2707 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS,
2708 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS);
2709 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2713 ssl_set_default_md(s);
2717 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2721 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
2723 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2724 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2727 * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be
2728 * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed,
2729 * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may
2730 * influence which certificate is sent
2732 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
2734 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
2735 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
2736 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
2737 if (certpkey == NULL) {
2738 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2742 * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
2743 * et al can pick it up.
2745 s->cert->key = certpkey;
2746 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2748 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
2749 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2750 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2752 /* status request response should be sent */
2753 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
2754 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
2755 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2757 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2759 /* something bad happened */
2760 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2761 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2762 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2766 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2770 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2771 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2774 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2775 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2783 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2785 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2786 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2788 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2790 * If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
2791 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension it
2792 * must contain uncompressed.
2794 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2795 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2796 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
2797 && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
2798 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
2799 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
2800 && ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe))
2801 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) {
2802 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
2804 unsigned char *list;
2805 int found_uncompressed = 0;
2806 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2807 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) {
2808 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed) {
2809 found_uncompressed = 1;
2813 if (!found_uncompressed) {
2814 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2815 SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
2819 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2820 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2822 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2824 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2825 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2826 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
2827 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2829 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2831 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2834 * If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one tell the
2837 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
2838 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
2841 * Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows there is no
2844 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
2845 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
2846 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
2847 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2849 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
2850 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2853 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2854 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2859 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2860 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2863 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2864 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2867 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2868 s->servername_done = 0;
2874 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d,
2878 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
2880 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0) {
2881 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2885 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
2886 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
2893 * Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
2894 * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle
2895 * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time.
2897 * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will
2898 * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket
2899 * extension, if any.
2900 * len: the length of the session ID.
2901 * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello.
2902 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2903 * point to the resulting session.
2905 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
2906 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
2907 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
2910 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
2911 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
2912 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
2913 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
2914 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
2915 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
2916 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
2919 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
2920 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
2921 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
2922 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
2923 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
2924 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
2926 int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
2927 const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
2929 /* Point after session ID in client hello */
2930 const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
2934 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2937 * If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
2940 if (!tls_use_ticket(s))
2942 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
2946 /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
2947 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
2953 /* Skip past cipher list */
2958 /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
2963 /* Now at start of extensions */
2964 if ((p + 2) >= limit)
2967 while ((p + 4) <= limit) {
2968 unsigned short type, size;
2971 if (p + size > limit)
2973 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2977 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
2980 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2983 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
2985 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
2986 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
2987 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
2988 * calculate the master secret later.
2992 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret);
2994 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
2995 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2997 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
2999 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
3000 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3002 default: /* fatal error */
3012 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
3014 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
3015 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
3016 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
3017 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
3018 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3019 * point to the resulting session.
3022 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3023 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
3024 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
3025 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
3027 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
3028 int eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id,
3029 int sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess)
3032 unsigned char *sdec;
3033 const unsigned char *p;
3034 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
3035 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
3038 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3039 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
3042 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
3043 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3044 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3045 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
3046 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
3047 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
3056 /* Check key name matches */
3057 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
3059 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3060 EVP_sha256(), NULL);
3061 EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3062 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
3065 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
3068 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
3070 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3074 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
3075 HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
3076 HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
3077 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3078 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) {
3079 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3082 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
3083 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
3084 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3085 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3086 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
3088 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3091 EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
3092 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0) {
3093 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3098 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3101 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3105 * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
3106 * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
3107 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
3111 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3112 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3121 * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
3126 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3133 static const tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
3134 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3135 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3136 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3137 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3138 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3139 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}
3142 static const tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
3143 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
3144 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
3145 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}
3148 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3151 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3152 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3158 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3161 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3162 if ((table[i].id) == id)
3163 return table[i].nid;
3168 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk,
3174 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3177 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3180 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
3181 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
3185 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
3187 return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3193 const EVP_MD *(*mfunc) (void);
3196 static const tls12_hash_info tls12_md_info[] = {
3197 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
3200 {NID_md5, 64, EVP_md5},
3202 {NID_sha1, 80, EVP_sha1},
3203 {NID_sha224, 112, EVP_sha224},
3204 {NID_sha256, 128, EVP_sha256},
3205 {NID_sha384, 192, EVP_sha384},
3206 {NID_sha512, 256, EVP_sha512}
3209 static const tls12_hash_info *tls12_get_hash_info(unsigned char hash_alg)
3213 if (hash_alg > OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md_info))
3215 return tls12_md_info + hash_alg - 1;
3218 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
3220 const tls12_hash_info *inf;
3221 if (hash_alg == TLSEXT_hash_md5 && FIPS_mode())
3223 inf = tls12_get_hash_info(hash_alg);
3224 if (!inf || !inf->mfunc)
3226 return inf->mfunc();
3229 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
3232 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3233 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3234 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3236 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3237 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3238 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3240 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3241 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3242 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3248 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3249 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
3250 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3252 int sign_nid = 0, hash_nid = 0;
3253 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3255 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3256 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3258 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3260 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3261 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3263 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3265 if (psignhash_nid) {
3266 if (sign_nid && hash_nid)
3267 OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid, hash_nid, sign_nid);
3269 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3273 /* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
3274 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(SSL *s, int op, const unsigned char *ptmp)
3276 /* See if we have an entry in the hash table and it is enabled */
3277 const tls12_hash_info *hinf = tls12_get_hash_info(ptmp[0]);
3278 if (!hinf || !hinf->mfunc)
3280 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
3281 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3283 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
3284 return ssl_security(s, op, hinf->secbits, hinf->nid, (void *)ptmp);
3288 * Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported signature
3289 * algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA then RSA is
3293 void ssl_set_sig_mask(unsigned long *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op)
3295 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
3296 size_t i, sigalgslen;
3297 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
3299 * Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any for
3300 * RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just TLS 1.2. To keep
3301 * down calls to security callback only check if we have to.
3303 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
3304 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2) {
3305 switch (sigalgs[1]) {
3306 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3307 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3308 if (!have_rsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3312 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3313 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3314 if (!have_dsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3318 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3319 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3320 if (!have_ecdsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3327 *pmask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
3329 *pmask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
3331 *pmask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
3334 size_t tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, unsigned char *out,
3335 const unsigned char *psig, size_t psiglen)
3337 unsigned char *tmpout = out;
3339 for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i += 2, psig += 2) {
3340 if (tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, psig)) {
3341 *tmpout++ = psig[0];
3342 *tmpout++ = psig[1];
3345 return tmpout - out;
3348 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
3349 static int tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
3350 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3351 const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
3353 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3354 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3355 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i += 2, ptmp += 2) {
3356 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3357 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED, ptmp))
3359 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j += 2, atmp += 2) {
3360 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1]) {
3363 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3364 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3365 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3367 &shsig->signandhash_nid, ptmp);
3377 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3378 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3380 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3381 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3383 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3385 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
3387 OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
3388 c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
3389 c->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
3390 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3391 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3392 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3393 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3394 } else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3395 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
3396 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3398 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
3399 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb) {
3402 allow = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3403 allowlen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
3407 pref = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3408 preflen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
3410 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3412 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3415 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3419 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3420 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3424 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3426 int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
3429 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
3430 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3432 /* Should never happen */
3436 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs);
3437 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
3438 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs == NULL)
3440 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3441 memcpy(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
3445 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3450 const EVP_MD **pmd = s->s3->tmp.md;
3451 int *pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags;
3453 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3454 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s))
3457 # ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3458 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL) {
3460 * Use first set signature preference to force message digest,
3461 * ignoring any peer preferences.
3463 const unsigned char *sigs = NULL;
3465 sigs = c->conf_sigalgs;
3467 sigs = c->client_sigalgs;
3469 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigs[1]);
3470 md = tls12_get_hash(sigs[0]);
3472 pvalid[idx] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3473 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) {
3474 pvalid[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3475 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = md;
3481 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3482 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++) {
3483 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3484 if (idx > 0 && pmd[idx] == NULL) {
3485 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
3487 pvalid[idx] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3488 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) {
3489 pvalid[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3490 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = md;
3496 * In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't use
3497 * the certificate for signing.
3499 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
3501 * Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not
3502 * supported it stays as NULL.
3504 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3505 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] == NULL)
3506 pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
3508 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3509 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] == NULL) {
3510 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
3511 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = EVP_sha1();
3514 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3515 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] == NULL)
3516 pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha1();
3522 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3523 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3524 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3526 const unsigned char *psig = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3531 if (idx >= (int)s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen)
3538 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
3540 return s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3543 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3544 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3545 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3547 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
3548 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
3552 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3554 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3556 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3558 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
3560 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
3561 return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
3564 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
3565 int tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned int length)
3568 unsigned short hbtype;
3569 unsigned int payload;
3570 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3572 if (s->msg_callback)
3573 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3575 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3577 /* Read type and payload length first */
3578 if (1 + 2 + 16 > length)
3579 return 0; /* silently discard */
3582 if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > length)
3583 return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */
3586 if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST) {
3587 unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
3591 * Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes message type,
3592 * plus 2 bytes payload length, plus payload, plus padding
3594 buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3595 if (buffer == NULL) {
3596 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_PROCESS_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3601 /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
3602 *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
3604 memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
3606 /* Random padding */
3607 if (RAND_bytes(bp, padding) <= 0) {
3608 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
3612 r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer,
3613 3 + payload + padding);
3615 if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
3616 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3617 buffer, 3 + payload + padding,
3618 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3620 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
3624 } else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE) {
3628 * We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int), and 16
3629 * random bytes, so we just try to read the sequence number
3633 if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq) {
3635 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
3642 int tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3644 unsigned char *buf, *p;
3646 unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
3647 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3649 /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
3650 if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
3651 s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS) {
3652 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
3656 /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
3657 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) {
3658 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
3662 /* ...and no handshake in progress. */
3663 if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake) {
3664 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
3669 * Check if padding is too long, payload and padding must not exceed 2^14
3670 * - 3 = 16381 bytes in total.
3672 OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381);
3675 * Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
3676 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
3677 * some random stuff.
3678 * - Message Type, 1 byte
3679 * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
3680 * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
3681 * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
3684 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3686 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3691 *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
3692 /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
3694 /* Sequence number */
3695 s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
3696 /* 16 random bytes */
3697 if (RAND_bytes(p, 16) <= 0) {
3698 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3702 /* Random padding */
3703 if (RAND_bytes(p, padding) <= 0) {
3704 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3708 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
3710 if (s->msg_callback)
3711 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3712 buf, 3 + payload + padding,
3713 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3715 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;
3724 # define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
3728 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
3731 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
3733 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
3736 int sig_alg, hash_alg;
3739 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
3741 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
3743 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
3745 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
3753 if (strcmp(etmp, "RSA") == 0)
3754 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
3755 else if (strcmp(etmp, "DSA") == 0)
3756 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
3757 else if (strcmp(etmp, "ECDSA") == 0)
3758 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_EC;
3762 hash_alg = OBJ_sn2nid(p);
3763 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
3764 hash_alg = OBJ_ln2nid(p);
3765 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
3768 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i += 2) {
3769 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
3772 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
3773 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
3778 * Set suppored signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
3779 * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
3781 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
3785 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
3789 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
3792 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen,
3795 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
3800 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
3801 if (sigalgs == NULL)
3803 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i += 2) {
3804 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3805 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3807 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
3814 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
3815 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3816 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
3818 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
3819 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3820 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
3826 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
3830 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
3834 if (default_nid == -1)
3836 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
3838 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
3839 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
3840 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
3845 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
3846 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
3850 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
3851 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++) {
3852 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
3859 * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by
3860 * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before
3861 * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before
3862 * attempting to use them.
3865 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
3867 # define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
3868 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
3869 /* Strict mode flags */
3870 # define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
3871 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
3872 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
3874 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
3879 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
3880 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
3883 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
3884 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
3886 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
3889 idx = cpk - c->pkeys;
3891 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
3892 pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
3894 pk = cpk->privatekey;
3896 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
3897 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
3900 # ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3901 /* Allow any certificate to pass test */
3902 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL) {
3903 rv = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN |
3904 CERT_PKEY_VALID | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
3912 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
3915 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
3916 pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
3918 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
3919 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
3921 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
3928 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
3929 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
3930 if (ok == X509_V_OK)
3931 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
3932 else if (!check_flags)
3937 * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature
3938 * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode.
3940 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode) {
3942 unsigned char rsign = 0;
3943 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs)
3945 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
3948 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
3949 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
3950 case SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA:
3951 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
3952 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
3955 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
3956 case SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA:
3957 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
3958 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
3962 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
3963 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
3972 * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set
3973 * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1.
3975 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs) {
3977 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
3978 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2) {
3979 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
3982 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen) {
3989 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
3990 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid)) {
3994 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
3995 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
3996 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
3997 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i), default_nid)) {
3999 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4006 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
4007 else if (check_flags)
4008 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE | CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4010 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
4011 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
4012 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
4013 else if (!check_flags)
4016 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4017 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
4018 else if (strict_mode) {
4019 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4020 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
4021 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4022 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0)) {
4024 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4031 if (!s->server && strict_mode) {
4032 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
4036 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
4039 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
4042 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
4047 int cert_type = X509_certificate_type(x, pk);
4048 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_RSA)
4049 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_FIXED_DH;
4050 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_DSA)
4051 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_FIXED_DH;
4055 const unsigned char *ctypes;
4059 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
4061 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
4062 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
4064 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++) {
4065 if (ctypes[i] == check_type) {
4066 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4070 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
4073 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4075 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
4077 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
4078 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4080 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
4081 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
4082 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4084 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
4085 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
4086 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4087 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp)) {
4088 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4093 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4096 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME | CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4098 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
4099 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
4103 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
4104 if (*pvalid & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
4105 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4106 else if (s->s3->tmp.md[idx] != NULL)
4107 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4109 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4112 * When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the
4116 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
4119 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
4120 *pvalid &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4127 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
4128 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
4130 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
4131 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
4132 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
4133 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA);
4134 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA);
4135 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
4138 /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
4139 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
4141 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);
4146 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
4147 DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s)
4149 int dh_secbits = 80;
4150 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto == 2)
4151 return DH_get_1024_160();
4152 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) {
4153 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256)
4158 CERT_PKEY *cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
4159 dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(cpk->privatekey);
4162 if (dh_secbits >= 128) {
4168 BN_set_word(dhp->g, 2);
4169 if (dh_secbits >= 192)
4170 dhp->p = get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL);
4172 dhp->p = get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL);
4173 if (!dhp->p || !dhp->g) {
4179 if (dh_secbits >= 112)
4180 return DH_get_2048_224();
4181 return DH_get_1024_160();
4185 static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4188 EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
4190 secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey);
4191 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
4195 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, 0, x);
4197 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, 0, x);
4200 static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4202 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
4203 int secbits = -1, md_nid = NID_undef, sig_nid;
4204 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
4205 if (sig_nid && OBJ_find_sigid_algs(sig_nid, &md_nid, NULL)) {
4207 if (md_nid && (md = EVP_get_digestbynid(md_nid)))
4208 secbits = EVP_MD_size(md) * 4;
4211 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4213 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4216 int ssl_security_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int vfy, int is_ee)
4219 vfy = SSL_SECOP_PEER;
4221 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY | vfy))
4222 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4224 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY | vfy))
4225 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4227 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD | vfy))
4228 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK;
4233 * Check security of a chain, if sk includes the end entity certificate then
4234 * x is NULL. If vfy is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and not sending
4235 * one to the peer. Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
4238 int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x, int vfy)
4240 int rv, start_idx, i;
4242 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
4247 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 1);
4251 for (i = start_idx; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
4252 x = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
4253 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 0);