2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
113 #include <openssl/objects.h>
114 #include <openssl/evp.h>
115 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
116 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
117 #include <openssl/rand.h>
118 #include "ssl_locl.h"
120 const char tls1_version_str[]="TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
122 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
123 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
124 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
125 SSL_SESSION **psess);
128 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data={
131 tls1_setup_key_block,
132 tls1_generate_master_secret,
133 tls1_change_cipher_state,
134 tls1_final_finish_mac,
135 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
136 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
137 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
138 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
140 tls1_export_keying_material,
143 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
145 /* 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec
146 * is way too long for http, the cache would over fill */
152 if (!ssl3_new(s)) return(0);
153 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
157 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
159 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
160 if (s->tlsext_session_ticket)
162 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
164 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
168 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
171 s->version = s->method->version;
174 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
176 static int nid_list[] =
178 NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
179 NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */
180 NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */
181 NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */
182 NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */
183 NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */
184 NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */
185 NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */
186 NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */
187 NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */
188 NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */
189 NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */
190 NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */
191 NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */
192 NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */
193 NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */
194 NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */
195 NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */
196 NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */
197 NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */
198 NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */
199 NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */
200 NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */
201 NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */
202 NID_secp521r1 /* secp521r1 (25) */
205 static int pref_list[] =
207 NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */
208 NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */
209 NID_secp521r1, /* secp521r1 (25) */
210 NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */
211 NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */
212 NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */
213 NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */
214 NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */
215 NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */
216 NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */
217 NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */
218 NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */
219 NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */
220 NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */
221 NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */
222 NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */
223 NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */
224 NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */
225 NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */
226 NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
227 NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */
228 NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */
229 NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */
230 NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */
231 NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */
234 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
236 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
237 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id >
238 sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0])))
240 return nid_list[curve_id-1];
243 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
245 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
248 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
250 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
252 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
254 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
256 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
258 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
260 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
262 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
264 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
266 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
268 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
270 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
272 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
274 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
276 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
278 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
280 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
282 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
284 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
286 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
288 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
290 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
292 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
294 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
296 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
302 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
304 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
306 /* List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
307 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
310 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
311 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
313 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
316 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
317 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
319 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
322 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
323 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */
325 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
328 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
329 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
330 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
331 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
333 static unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
334 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
335 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
336 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
338 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
339 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
340 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
342 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
343 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
345 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
346 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(TLSEXT_hash_md5)
350 int tls12_get_req_sig_algs(SSL *s, unsigned char *p)
352 size_t slen = sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
354 /* If FIPS mode don't include MD5 which is last */
359 memcpy(p, tls12_sigalgs, slen);
363 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
366 unsigned char *ret = p;
368 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */
369 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION
370 && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
375 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
377 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
379 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
380 unsigned long size_str;
383 /* check for enough space.
384 4 for the servername type and entension length
385 2 for servernamelist length
386 1 for the hostname type
387 2 for hostname length
391 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
392 || (size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
395 /* extension type and length */
396 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
399 /* length of servername list */
402 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
403 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
405 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
409 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
414 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
416 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
420 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
422 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
425 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
427 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
434 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
435 #define MIN(x,y) (((x)<(y))?(x):(y))
436 /* we add SRP username the first time only if we have one! */
437 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
438 {/* Add TLS extension SRP username to the Client Hello message */
439 int login_len = MIN(strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) + 1, 255);
442 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
443 if (login_len > lenmax) return NULL;
446 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
449 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp,ret);
450 s2n(login_len+1,ret);
452 (*ret++) = (unsigned char) MIN(strlen(s->srp_ctx.login), 254);
453 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, MIN(strlen(s->srp_ctx.login), 254));
458 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
459 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL &&
460 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
462 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */
465 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
466 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL;
467 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 255)
469 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
473 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
474 s2n(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length + 1,ret);
475 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
476 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
477 ret+=s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
479 if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL &&
480 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
482 /* Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message */
485 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) return NULL;
486 if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL;
487 if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length > 65532)
489 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
493 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves,ret);
494 s2n(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length + 2, ret);
496 /* NB: draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt uses a one-byte prefix for
497 * elliptic_curve_list, but the examples use two bytes.
498 * http://www1.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg00538.html
499 * resolves this to two bytes.
501 s2n(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length, ret);
502 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
503 ret+=s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
505 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
507 if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
510 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
511 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
512 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
513 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data)
515 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
516 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
517 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
519 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
520 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data,
522 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
526 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
527 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
529 /* Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len
532 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0) return NULL;
533 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
537 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
543 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
545 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < sizeof(tls12_sigalgs) + 6)
547 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms,ret);
548 s2n(sizeof(tls12_sigalgs) + 2, ret);
549 s2n(sizeof(tls12_sigalgs), ret);
550 memcpy(ret, tls12_sigalgs, sizeof(tls12_sigalgs));
551 ret += sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
554 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
555 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
556 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
558 size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len;
560 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col < 0))
562 if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
565 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
568 memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col);
573 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp &&
574 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
577 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
581 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
583 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
584 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
590 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
592 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
599 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0) return NULL;
600 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
601 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
603 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
604 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
606 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
608 /* save position of id len */
609 unsigned char *q = ret;
610 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
611 /* skip over id len */
613 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
619 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
622 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
623 /* Add Heartbeat extension */
624 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
627 * 1: peer may send requests
628 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
630 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
631 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
633 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
636 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
637 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
639 /* The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its
640 * support for Next Protocol Negotiation */
641 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
643 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
648 if(SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s))
652 ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
654 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
656 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
659 if(ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
661 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
667 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0)
674 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
677 unsigned char *ret = p;
678 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
679 int next_proto_neg_seen;
682 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */
683 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
687 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
689 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
691 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
693 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
697 if(s->s3->send_connection_binding)
701 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
703 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
707 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
709 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
712 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
714 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
721 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
722 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL &&
723 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
725 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message */
728 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
729 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL;
730 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 255)
732 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
736 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
737 s2n(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length + 1,ret);
738 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
739 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
740 ret+=s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
743 /* Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves extension */
744 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
746 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected
747 && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
749 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
750 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
754 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
756 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
757 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request,ret);
761 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
762 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
763 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
765 size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len;
767 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - sol) < 0)
769 if (sol > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
772 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
775 memcpy(ret, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input, sol);
784 ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
786 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
788 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
791 if(ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
793 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
799 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x80 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x81)
800 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG))
801 { const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
802 0xfd, 0xe8, /*65000*/
803 0x00, 0x20, /*32 bytes length*/
804 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
805 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
806 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
807 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17};
808 if (limit-ret<36) return NULL;
809 memcpy(ret,cryptopro_ext,36);
814 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
815 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
816 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED)
818 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
821 * 1: peer may send requests
822 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
824 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
825 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
827 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
831 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
832 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
833 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
834 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb)
836 const unsigned char *npa;
840 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
841 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
843 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0) return NULL;
844 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
846 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
848 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
853 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0)
860 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
865 unsigned char *data = *p;
866 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
869 s->servername_done = 0;
870 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
871 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
872 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
875 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
876 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
877 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
884 if (data > (d+n-len))
887 while (data <= (d+n-4))
892 if (data+size > (d+n))
895 fprintf(stderr,"Received extension type %d size %d\n",type,size);
897 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
898 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size,
899 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
900 /* The servername extension is treated as follows:
902 - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
903 - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
904 in which case an fatal alert is generated.
905 - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
906 - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
907 to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
908 - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
909 it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
910 Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
911 set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
912 case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
913 a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
914 presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
915 the value of the Host: field.
916 - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
917 if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the session,
918 i.e. when the session has been established with a servername extension.
919 - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
923 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
925 unsigned char *sdata;
931 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
938 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
945 servname_type = *(sdata++);
951 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
954 if (s->servername_done == 0)
955 switch (servname_type)
957 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
960 if(s->session->tlsext_hostname)
962 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
965 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name)
967 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
970 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
972 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
975 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
976 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len]='\0';
977 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
978 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
979 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
980 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
983 s->servername_done = 1;
987 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
988 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
989 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
1001 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1006 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1007 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp)
1012 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
1014 memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len);
1015 s->srp_ctx.login[len]='\0';
1020 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1021 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats &&
1022 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1024 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1025 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
1027 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1)
1029 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1034 if(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
1036 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
1037 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
1039 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
1040 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
1042 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1045 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
1046 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
1049 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
1050 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
1051 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
1052 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
1053 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
1056 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves &&
1057 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1059 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1060 int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
1061 ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
1063 if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2)
1065 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1070 if(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
1072 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1075 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
1076 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL)
1078 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1081 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = ellipticcurvelist_length;
1082 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata, ellipticcurvelist_length);
1085 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
1086 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1087 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++)
1088 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
1089 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
1092 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1093 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1094 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input &&
1095 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1097 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1101 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1104 n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
1105 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
1107 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1111 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
1112 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
1113 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
1114 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
1116 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
1117 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
1119 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1124 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
1126 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
1127 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
1129 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1133 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
1135 if(!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
1137 renegotiate_seen = 1;
1139 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms)
1142 if (sigalg_seen || size < 2)
1144 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1150 if (dsize != size || dsize & 1)
1152 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1155 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s, data, dsize))
1157 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1161 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request &&
1162 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
1167 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1171 s->tlsext_status_type = *data++;
1173 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
1175 const unsigned char *sdata;
1177 /* Read in responder_id_list */
1182 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1191 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1195 dsize -= 2 + idsize;
1199 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1204 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL,
1208 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1213 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
1214 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1217 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
1218 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
1219 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null()))
1221 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
1222 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1225 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(
1226 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id))
1228 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
1229 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1234 /* Read in request_extensions */
1237 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1244 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1250 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
1251 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL,
1253 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts
1254 || (data + dsize != sdata))
1256 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1261 /* We don't know what to do with any other type
1265 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1267 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1268 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
1272 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
1273 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1275 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
1276 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1277 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1282 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1283 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
1284 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
1286 /* We shouldn't accept this extension on a
1289 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
1290 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
1291 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
1292 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
1293 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
1294 * anything like that, but this might change).
1296 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
1297 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
1298 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
1299 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
1300 * Finished message could have been computed.) */
1301 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1305 /* session ticket processed earlier */
1306 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
1308 if(ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
1320 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
1322 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
1323 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
1325 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1326 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
1327 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
1334 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1335 /* ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
1336 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly fill
1337 * the length of the block. */
1338 static int ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
1340 unsigned int off = 0;
1354 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
1356 unsigned short length;
1357 unsigned short type;
1358 unsigned short size;
1359 unsigned char *data = *p;
1360 int tlsext_servername = 0;
1361 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1363 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1364 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1367 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1368 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1369 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1372 if (data >= (d+n-2))
1376 if (data+length != d+n)
1378 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1382 while(data <= (d+n-4))
1387 if (data+size > (d+n))
1390 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1391 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size,
1392 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1394 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1396 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0)
1398 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1401 tlsext_servername = 1;
1404 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1405 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats &&
1406 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1408 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1409 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
1411 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1)
1413 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1416 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
1417 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
1418 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
1420 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1423 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
1424 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
1426 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist ");
1427 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
1428 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
1429 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
1430 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
1433 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1435 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
1437 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
1438 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
1440 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1443 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
1446 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
1449 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
1451 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1452 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input &&
1453 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1455 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1459 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1462 n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
1463 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
1465 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1469 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
1470 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
1471 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
1472 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
1474 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
1476 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
1478 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1483 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request &&
1484 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1486 /* MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested
1487 * a status request message.
1489 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0))
1491 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
1494 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
1495 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
1497 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1498 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
1499 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
1501 unsigned char *selected;
1502 unsigned char selected_len;
1504 /* We must have requested it. */
1505 if ((s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL))
1507 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
1510 /* The data must be valid */
1511 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size))
1513 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1516 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, size, s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
1518 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1521 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
1522 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
1524 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1527 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
1528 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
1529 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1532 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
1534 if(!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
1536 renegotiate_seen = 1;
1538 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1539 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
1543 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
1544 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1546 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
1547 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1548 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1553 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
1555 if(ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
1565 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1569 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1)
1571 if (s->tlsext_hostname)
1573 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL)
1575 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
1576 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname)
1578 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1584 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1594 /* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to
1595 * avoid an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server
1596 * hello because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an
1597 * attack. However this would mean we could not connect to any server
1598 * which doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI
1599 * absence on initial connect only.
1601 if (!renegotiate_seen
1602 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
1603 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
1605 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1606 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
1607 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
1615 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
1617 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1618 /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher suite, send the point formats
1619 * and elliptic curves we support.
1624 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1625 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1627 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++)
1629 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1631 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1632 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1633 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
1639 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION);
1642 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
1643 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(3)) == NULL)
1645 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1648 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 3;
1649 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[0] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
1650 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[1] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
1651 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[2] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
1653 /* we support all named elliptic curves in draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12 */
1654 if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist);
1655 s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = sizeof(pref_list)/sizeof(pref_list[0]) * 2;
1656 if ((s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL)
1658 s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
1659 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1662 for (i = 0, j = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist; (unsigned int)i <
1663 sizeof(pref_list)/sizeof(pref_list[0]); i++)
1665 int id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(pref_list[i]);
1669 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1671 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1675 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
1677 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
1682 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1684 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
1685 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
1687 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
1688 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
1690 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
1691 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
1693 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1696 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
1700 /* at callback's request, insist on receiving an appropriate server opaque PRF input */
1701 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
1708 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
1710 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1711 /* If we are server and using an ECC cipher suite, send the point formats we support
1712 * if the client sent us an ECPointsFormat extension. Note that the server is not
1713 * supposed to send an EllipticCurves extension.
1716 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1717 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1718 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1719 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1723 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
1724 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(3)) == NULL)
1726 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1729 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 3;
1730 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[0] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
1731 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[1] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
1732 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[2] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
1734 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1739 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
1741 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
1742 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1744 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1745 /* The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely in
1746 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
1748 /* The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely in
1749 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
1753 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
1754 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
1755 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
1756 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
1758 /* If status request then ask callback what to do.
1759 * Note: this must be called after servername callbacks in case
1760 * the certificate has changed.
1762 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
1765 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
1768 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
1769 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
1770 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
1772 /* status request response should be sent */
1773 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
1774 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
1775 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
1777 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
1779 /* something bad happened */
1780 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
1781 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1782 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1787 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
1789 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1791 /* This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(),
1792 * but we might be sending an alert in response to the client hello,
1793 * so this has to happen here in ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(). */
1797 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
1799 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
1802 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1803 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1808 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
1809 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
1810 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL;
1812 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1814 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
1815 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len)
1817 /* can only use this extension if we have a server opaque PRF input
1818 * of the same length as the client opaque PRF input! */
1820 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
1821 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
1823 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
1824 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
1826 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1827 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1830 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
1834 if (r == 2 && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
1836 /* The callback wants to enforce use of the extension,
1837 * but we can't do that with the client opaque PRF input;
1838 * abort the handshake.
1840 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1841 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1849 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
1850 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1853 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
1854 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
1857 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
1858 s->servername_done=0;
1864 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
1866 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
1867 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1869 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1870 /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
1871 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension
1872 * it must contain uncompressed.
1874 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1875 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1876 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
1877 (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
1878 ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
1880 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
1882 unsigned char *list;
1883 int found_uncompressed = 0;
1884 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
1885 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
1887 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed)
1889 found_uncompressed = 1;
1893 if (!found_uncompressed)
1895 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
1899 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
1900 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1902 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
1903 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
1904 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
1905 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
1907 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1908 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0)
1910 /* This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on using opaque PRF inputs.
1911 * So first verify that we really have a value from the server too. */
1913 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
1915 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1916 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1919 /* Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to check
1920 * that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size. */
1921 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL ||
1922 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len)
1924 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1925 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1930 /* If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one
1933 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
1934 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
1937 /* Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows
1938 * there is no response.
1940 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
1942 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
1943 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
1945 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
1946 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
1949 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
1950 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1954 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1955 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1961 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
1962 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1965 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
1966 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
1969 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
1970 s->servername_done=0;
1976 /* Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
1977 * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle
1978 * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time.
1980 * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will
1981 * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket
1982 * extension, if any.
1983 * len: the length of the session ID.
1984 * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello.
1985 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
1986 * point to the resulting session.
1988 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
1989 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
1990 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
1993 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
1994 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
1995 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
1996 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
1997 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
1998 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
1999 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
2002 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
2003 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
2004 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
2005 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
2006 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
2007 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
2009 int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
2010 const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
2012 /* Point after session ID in client hello */
2013 const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
2017 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2019 /* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present
2020 * to permit stateful resumption.
2022 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
2024 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
2028 /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
2029 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
2036 /* Skip past cipher list */
2041 /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
2046 /* Now at start of extensions */
2047 if ((p + 2) >= limit)
2050 while ((p + 4) <= limit)
2052 unsigned short type, size;
2055 if (p + size > limit)
2057 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2062 /* The client will accept a ticket but doesn't
2063 * currently have one. */
2064 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2067 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb)
2069 /* Indicate that the ticket couldn't be
2070 * decrypted rather than generating the session
2071 * from ticket now, trigger abbreviated
2072 * handshake based on external mechanism to
2073 * calculate the master secret later. */
2076 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret);
2079 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
2080 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2082 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
2084 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
2085 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2087 default: /* fatal error */
2096 /* tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
2098 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
2099 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
2100 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
2101 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
2102 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2103 * point to the resulting session.
2106 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
2107 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
2108 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
2109 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
2111 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
2112 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
2113 SSL_SESSION **psess)
2116 unsigned char *sdec;
2117 const unsigned char *p;
2118 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
2119 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
2122 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
2123 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
2126 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
2127 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
2128 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
2129 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
2131 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
2132 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
2143 /* Check key name matches */
2144 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
2146 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
2147 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
2148 EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
2149 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
2151 /* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and
2152 * integrity checks on ticket.
2154 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
2157 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
2161 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
2162 HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
2163 HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
2164 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
2165 if (memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen))
2167 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
2168 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
2169 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
2170 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
2171 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
2174 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
2177 EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
2178 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0)
2181 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
2184 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
2188 /* The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to
2189 * detect that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to
2190 * the session structure. If it is empty set length to zero
2191 * as required by standard.
2194 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
2195 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
2203 /* For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new
2208 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
2216 static tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
2217 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
2218 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
2220 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
2221 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
2223 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
2224 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
2225 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
2227 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
2228 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
2229 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}
2233 static tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
2234 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2235 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
2237 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2238 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
2240 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
2241 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}
2245 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
2248 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
2250 if (table[i].nid == nid)
2256 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
2259 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
2261 if (table[i].id == id)
2262 return table[i].nid;
2268 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md)
2271 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md,
2272 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
2275 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
2278 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
2279 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
2283 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
2285 return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig,
2286 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
2289 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
2293 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
2294 case TLSEXT_hash_md5:
2301 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
2302 case TLSEXT_hash_sha1:
2305 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
2306 case TLSEXT_hash_sha224:
2307 return EVP_sha224();
2309 case TLSEXT_hash_sha256:
2310 return EVP_sha256();
2312 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
2313 case TLSEXT_hash_sha384:
2314 return EVP_sha384();
2316 case TLSEXT_hash_sha512:
2317 return EVP_sha512();
2325 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
2327 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
2332 /* Extension ignored for TLS versions below 1.2 */
2333 if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)
2335 /* Should never happen */
2339 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = NULL;
2340 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = NULL;
2341 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = NULL;
2342 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = NULL;
2344 for (i = 0; i < dsize; i += 2)
2346 unsigned char hash_alg = data[i], sig_alg = data[i+1];
2350 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2351 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
2352 idx = SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
2355 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2356 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
2357 idx = SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
2360 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
2361 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
2369 if (c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL)
2371 md = tls12_get_hash(hash_alg);
2374 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
2375 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
2376 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
2383 /* Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not
2384 * supported it stays as NULL.
2386 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2387 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest)
2388 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_dss1();
2390 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2391 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest)
2393 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
2394 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
2397 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
2398 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest)
2399 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_ecdsa();
2406 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2408 tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
2410 unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl;
2411 unsigned short hbtype;
2412 unsigned int payload;
2413 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
2415 /* Read type and payload length first */
2420 if (s->msg_callback)
2421 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
2422 &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
2423 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
2425 if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST)
2427 unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
2430 /* Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes
2431 * message type, plus 2 bytes payload length, plus
2432 * payload, plus padding
2434 buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
2437 /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
2438 *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
2440 memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
2442 r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, 3 + payload + padding);
2444 if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
2445 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
2446 buffer, 3 + payload + padding,
2447 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
2449 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
2454 else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE)
2458 /* We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int),
2459 * and 16 random bytes, so we just try to read the
2460 * sequence number */
2463 if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq)
2466 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
2474 tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
2476 unsigned char *buf, *p;
2478 unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
2479 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
2481 /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
2482 if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
2483 s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS)
2485 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
2489 /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
2490 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
2492 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
2496 /* ...and no handshake in progress. */
2497 if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake)
2499 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
2503 /* Check if padding is too long, payload and padding
2504 * must not exceed 2^14 - 3 = 16381 bytes in total.
2506 OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381);
2508 /* Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
2509 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
2510 * some random stuff.
2511 * - Message Type, 1 byte
2512 * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
2513 * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
2514 * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
2517 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
2520 *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
2521 /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
2523 /* Sequence number */
2524 s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
2525 /* 16 random bytes */
2526 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16);
2528 /* Random padding */
2529 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding);
2531 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
2534 if (s->msg_callback)
2535 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
2536 buf, 3 + payload + padding,
2537 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
2539 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;