2 * Copyright 1995-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
10 /* We need access to the deprecated low level HMAC APIs */
11 #define OPENSSL_SUPPRESS_DEPRECATED
15 #include <openssl/objects.h>
16 #include <openssl/evp.h>
17 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
18 #include <openssl/core_names.h>
19 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
20 #include <openssl/conf.h>
21 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
22 #include <openssl/dh.h>
23 #include <openssl/bn.h>
24 #include <openssl/provider.h>
25 #include "internal/nelem.h"
26 #include "internal/evp.h"
27 #include "internal/tlsgroups.h"
28 #include "ssl_local.h"
29 #include <openssl/ct.h>
31 DEFINE_STACK_OF_CONST(SSL_CIPHER)
33 DEFINE_STACK_OF(X509_NAME)
35 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP *find_sig_alg(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey);
36 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(const SSL *s, int op, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu);
38 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data = {
42 tls1_generate_master_secret,
43 tls1_change_cipher_state,
44 tls1_final_finish_mac,
45 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
46 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
48 tls1_export_keying_material,
50 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
51 tls_close_construct_packet,
55 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_1_enc_data = {
59 tls1_generate_master_secret,
60 tls1_change_cipher_state,
61 tls1_final_finish_mac,
62 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
63 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
65 tls1_export_keying_material,
66 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
67 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
68 tls_close_construct_packet,
72 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_2_enc_data = {
76 tls1_generate_master_secret,
77 tls1_change_cipher_state,
78 tls1_final_finish_mac,
79 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
80 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
82 tls1_export_keying_material,
83 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
84 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
85 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
86 tls_close_construct_packet,
90 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_3_enc_data = {
93 tls13_setup_key_block,
94 tls13_generate_master_secret,
95 tls13_change_cipher_state,
96 tls13_final_finish_mac,
97 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
98 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
100 tls13_export_keying_material,
101 SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF,
102 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
103 tls_close_construct_packet,
107 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
110 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
111 * http, the cache would over fill
113 return (60 * 60 * 2);
120 if (!s->method->ssl_clear(s))
126 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
128 OPENSSL_free(s->ext.session_ticket);
132 int tls1_clear(SSL *s)
137 if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION)
138 s->version = TLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL;
140 s->version = s->method->version;
145 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC)
146 /* Legacy NID to group_id mapping. Only works for groups we know about */
151 {NID_sect163k1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect163k1},
152 {NID_sect163r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect163r1},
153 {NID_sect163r2, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect163r2},
154 {NID_sect193r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect193r1},
155 {NID_sect193r2, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect193r2},
156 {NID_sect233k1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect233k1},
157 {NID_sect233r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect233r1},
158 {NID_sect239k1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect239k1},
159 {NID_sect283k1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect283k1},
160 {NID_sect283r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect283r1},
161 {NID_sect409k1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect409k1},
162 {NID_sect409r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect409r1},
163 {NID_sect571k1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect571k1},
164 {NID_sect571r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect571r1},
165 {NID_secp160k1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp160k1},
166 {NID_secp160r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp160r1},
167 {NID_secp160r2, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp160r2},
168 {NID_secp192k1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp192k1},
169 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp192r1},
170 {NID_secp224k1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp224k1},
171 {NID_secp224r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp224r1},
172 {NID_secp256k1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp256k1},
173 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp256r1},
174 {NID_secp384r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp384r1},
175 {NID_secp521r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp521r1},
176 {NID_brainpoolP256r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP256r1},
177 {NID_brainpoolP384r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP384r1},
178 {NID_brainpoolP512r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP512r1},
179 {EVP_PKEY_X25519, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_x25519},
180 {EVP_PKEY_X448, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_x448},
181 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_paramSetA, 0x0022},
182 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_paramSetB, 0x0023},
183 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_paramSetC, 0x0024},
184 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_paramSetD, 0x0025},
185 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetA, 0x0026},
186 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetB, 0x0027},
187 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetC, 0x0028},
188 {NID_ffdhe2048, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe2048},
189 {NID_ffdhe3072, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe3072},
190 {NID_ffdhe4096, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe4096},
191 {NID_ffdhe6144, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe6144},
192 {NID_ffdhe8192, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe8192}
196 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
197 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = {
198 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
199 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
200 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
202 #endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) */
204 /* The default curves */
205 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC)
206 static const uint16_t supported_groups_default[] = {
207 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
208 29, /* X25519 (29) */
209 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
211 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
212 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
214 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
215 34, /* GC256A (34) */
216 35, /* GC256B (35) */
217 36, /* GC256C (36) */
218 37, /* GC256D (37) */
219 38, /* GC512A (38) */
220 39, /* GC512B (39) */
221 40, /* GC512C (40) */
223 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
224 0x100, /* ffdhe2048 (0x100) */
225 0x101, /* ffdhe3072 (0x101) */
226 0x102, /* ffdhe4096 (0x102) */
227 0x103, /* ffdhe6144 (0x103) */
228 0x104, /* ffdhe8192 (0x104) */
231 #endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) */
233 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
234 static const uint16_t suiteb_curves[] = {
240 struct provider_group_data_st {
242 OSSL_PROVIDER *provider;
245 #define TLS_GROUP_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE 10
246 static OSSL_CALLBACK add_provider_groups;
247 static int add_provider_groups(const OSSL_PARAM params[], void *data)
249 struct provider_group_data_st *pgd = data;
250 SSL_CTX *ctx = pgd->ctx;
251 OSSL_PROVIDER *provider = pgd->provider;
253 TLS_GROUP_INFO *ginf = NULL;
254 EVP_KEYMGMT *keymgmt;
258 if (ctx->group_list_max_len == ctx->group_list_len) {
259 TLS_GROUP_INFO *tmp = NULL;
261 if (ctx->group_list_max_len == 0)
262 tmp = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(TLS_GROUP_INFO)
263 * TLS_GROUP_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE);
265 tmp = OPENSSL_realloc(ctx->group_list,
266 (ctx->group_list_max_len
267 + TLS_GROUP_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE)
268 * sizeof(TLS_GROUP_INFO));
270 SSLerr(0, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
273 ctx->group_list = tmp;
274 memset(tmp + ctx->group_list_max_len,
276 sizeof(TLS_GROUP_INFO) * TLS_GROUP_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE);
277 ctx->group_list_max_len += TLS_GROUP_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE;
280 ginf = &ctx->group_list[ctx->group_list_len];
282 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_NAME);
283 if (p == NULL || p->data_type != OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING) {
284 SSLerr(0, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
287 ginf->tlsname = OPENSSL_strdup(p->data);
288 if (ginf->tlsname == NULL) {
289 SSLerr(0, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
293 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_NAME_INTERNAL);
294 if (p == NULL || p->data_type != OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING) {
295 SSLerr(0, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
298 ginf->realname = OPENSSL_strdup(p->data);
299 if (ginf->realname == NULL) {
300 SSLerr(0, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
304 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_ID);
305 if (p == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_uint(p, &gid) || gid > UINT16_MAX) {
306 SSLerr(0, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
309 ginf->group_id = (uint16_t)gid;
311 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_ALG);
312 if (p == NULL || p->data_type != OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING) {
313 SSLerr(0, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
316 ginf->algorithm = OPENSSL_strdup(p->data);
317 if (ginf->algorithm == NULL) {
318 SSLerr(0, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
322 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_SECURITY_BITS);
323 if (p == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_uint(p, &ginf->secbits)) {
324 SSLerr(0, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
328 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_MIN_TLS);
329 if (p == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p, &ginf->mintls)) {
330 SSLerr(0, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
334 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_MAX_TLS);
335 if (p == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p, &ginf->maxtls)) {
336 SSLerr(0, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
340 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_MIN_DTLS);
341 if (p == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p, &ginf->mindtls)) {
342 SSLerr(0, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
346 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_MAX_DTLS);
347 if (p == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p, &ginf->maxdtls)) {
348 SSLerr(0, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
352 * Now check that the algorithm is actually usable for our property query
353 * string. Regardless of the result we still return success because we have
354 * successfully processed this group, even though we may decide not to use
358 keymgmt = EVP_KEYMGMT_fetch(ctx->libctx, ginf->algorithm, ctx->propq);
359 if (keymgmt != NULL) {
361 * We have successfully fetched the algorithm - however if the provider
362 * doesn't match this one then we ignore it.
364 * Note: We're cheating a little here. Technically if the same algorithm
365 * is available from more than one provider then it is undefined which
366 * implementation you will get back. Theoretically this could be
367 * different every time...we assume here that you'll always get the
368 * same one back if you repeat the exact same fetch. Is this a reasonable
369 * assumption to make (in which case perhaps we should document this
372 if (EVP_KEYMGMT_provider(keymgmt) == provider) {
373 /* We have a match - so we will use this group */
374 ctx->group_list_len++;
377 EVP_KEYMGMT_free(keymgmt);
381 OPENSSL_free(ginf->tlsname);
382 OPENSSL_free(ginf->realname);
383 OPENSSL_free(ginf->algorithm);
384 ginf->tlsname = ginf->realname = NULL;
389 static int discover_provider_groups(OSSL_PROVIDER *provider, void *vctx)
391 struct provider_group_data_st pgd;
394 pgd.provider = provider;
395 return OSSL_PROVIDER_get_capabilities(provider, "TLS-GROUP",
396 add_provider_groups, &pgd);
399 int ssl_load_groups(SSL_CTX *ctx)
401 return OSSL_PROVIDER_do_all(ctx->libctx, discover_provider_groups, ctx);
404 static uint16_t tls1_group_name2id(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *name)
409 /* See if we can identify a nid for this name */
410 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
411 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(name);
413 if (nid == NID_undef)
414 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(name);
415 if (nid == NID_undef)
416 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(name);
418 for (i = 0; i < ctx->group_list_len; i++) {
419 if (strcmp(ctx->group_list[i].tlsname, name) == 0
421 && nid == tls1_group_id2nid(ctx->group_list[i].group_id,
423 return ctx->group_list[i].group_id;
429 const TLS_GROUP_INFO *tls1_group_id_lookup(SSL_CTX *ctx, uint16_t group_id)
433 for (i = 0; i < ctx->group_list_len; i++) {
434 if (ctx->group_list[i].group_id == group_id)
435 return &ctx->group_list[i];
441 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC)
442 int tls1_group_id2nid(uint16_t group_id, int include_unknown)
450 * Return well known Group NIDs - for backwards compatibility. This won't
451 * work for groups we don't know about.
453 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(nid_to_group); i++)
455 if (nid_to_group[i].group_id == group_id)
456 return nid_to_group[i].nid;
458 if (!include_unknown)
460 return TLSEXT_nid_unknown | (int)group_id;
463 static uint16_t tls1_nid2group_id(int nid)
468 * Return well known Group ids - for backwards compatibility. This won't
469 * work for groups we don't know about.
471 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(nid_to_group); i++)
473 if (nid_to_group[i].nid == nid)
474 return nid_to_group[i].group_id;
479 #endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) */
482 * Set *pgroups to the supported groups list and *pgroupslen to
483 * the number of groups supported.
485 void tls1_get_supported_groups(SSL *s, const uint16_t **pgroups,
488 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
489 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
490 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
491 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
492 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
493 *pgroups = suiteb_curves;
494 *pgroupslen = OSSL_NELEM(suiteb_curves);
497 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
498 *pgroups = suiteb_curves;
502 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
503 *pgroups = suiteb_curves + 1;
509 if (s->ext.supportedgroups == NULL) {
510 *pgroups = supported_groups_default;
511 *pgroupslen = OSSL_NELEM(supported_groups_default);
513 *pgroups = s->ext.supportedgroups;
514 *pgroupslen = s->ext.supportedgroups_len;
521 #endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) */
524 int tls_valid_group(SSL *s, uint16_t group_id, int minversion, int maxversion)
526 const TLS_GROUP_INFO *ginfo = tls1_group_id_lookup(s->ctx, group_id);
532 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
533 if (ginfo->mindtls < 0 || ginfo->maxdtls < 0)
535 if (ginfo->maxdtls == 0)
538 ret = DTLS_VERSION_LE(minversion, ginfo->maxdtls);
539 if (ginfo->mindtls > 0)
540 ret &= DTLS_VERSION_GE(maxversion, ginfo->mindtls);
542 if (ginfo->mintls < 0 || ginfo->maxtls < 0)
544 if (ginfo->maxtls == 0)
547 ret = (minversion <= ginfo->maxtls);
548 if (ginfo->mintls > 0)
549 ret &= (maxversion >= ginfo->mintls);
555 /* See if group is allowed by security callback */
556 int tls_group_allowed(SSL *s, uint16_t group, int op)
558 const TLS_GROUP_INFO *ginfo = tls1_group_id_lookup(s->ctx, group);
559 unsigned char gtmp[2];
564 gtmp[0] = group >> 8;
565 gtmp[1] = group & 0xff;
566 return ssl_security(s, op, ginfo->secbits,
567 tls1_group_id2nid(ginfo->group_id, 0), (void *)gtmp);
570 /* Return 1 if "id" is in "list" */
571 static int tls1_in_list(uint16_t id, const uint16_t *list, size_t listlen)
574 for (i = 0; i < listlen; i++)
581 * For nmatch >= 0, return the id of the |nmatch|th shared group or 0
582 * if there is no match.
583 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
584 * For nmatch == -2, return the id of the group to use for
585 * a tmp key, or 0 if there is no match.
587 uint16_t tls1_shared_group(SSL *s, int nmatch)
589 const uint16_t *pref, *supp;
590 size_t num_pref, num_supp, i;
593 /* Can't do anything on client side */
597 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
599 * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know
600 * these are acceptable due to previous checks.
602 unsigned long cid = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->id;
604 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
605 return TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
606 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
607 return TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
608 /* Should never happen */
611 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
615 * If server preference set, our groups are the preference order
616 * otherwise peer decides.
618 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) {
619 tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &pref, &num_pref);
620 tls1_get_peer_groups(s, &supp, &num_supp);
622 tls1_get_peer_groups(s, &pref, &num_pref);
623 tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &supp, &num_supp);
626 for (k = 0, i = 0; i < num_pref; i++) {
627 uint16_t id = pref[i];
629 if (!tls1_in_list(id, supp, num_supp)
630 || !tls_group_allowed(s, id, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
638 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
642 int tls1_set_groups(uint16_t **pext, size_t *pextlen,
643 int *groups, size_t ngroups)
645 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
649 * Bitmap of groups included to detect duplicates: two variables are added
650 * to detect duplicates as some values are more than 32.
652 unsigned long *dup_list = NULL;
653 unsigned long dup_list_egrp = 0;
654 unsigned long dup_list_dhgrp = 0;
657 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_GROUPS, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
660 if ((glist = OPENSSL_malloc(ngroups * sizeof(*glist))) == NULL) {
661 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_GROUPS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
664 for (i = 0; i < ngroups; i++) {
665 unsigned long idmask;
667 id = tls1_nid2group_id(groups[i]);
668 if ((id & 0x00FF) >= (sizeof(unsigned long) * 8))
670 idmask = 1L << (id & 0x00FF);
671 dup_list = (id < 0x100) ? &dup_list_egrp : &dup_list_dhgrp;
672 if (!id || ((*dup_list) & idmask))
686 #endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) */
689 /* TODO(3.0): An arbitrary amount for now. Take another look at this */
690 # define MAX_GROUPLIST 40
695 uint16_t gid_arr[MAX_GROUPLIST];
698 static int gid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
700 gid_cb_st *garg = arg;
707 if (garg->gidcnt == MAX_GROUPLIST)
709 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
711 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
714 gid = tls1_group_name2id(garg->ctx, etmp);
717 for (i = 0; i < garg->gidcnt; i++)
718 if (garg->gid_arr[i] == gid)
720 garg->gid_arr[garg->gidcnt++] = gid;
724 /* Set groups based on a colon separated list */
725 int tls1_set_groups_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, uint16_t **pext, size_t *pextlen,
733 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, gid_cb, &gcb))
739 * gid_cb ensurse there are no duplicates so we can just go ahead and set
742 tmparr = OPENSSL_memdup(gcb.gid_arr, gcb.gidcnt * sizeof(*tmparr));
746 *pextlen = gcb.gidcnt;
750 /* Check a group id matches preferences */
751 int tls1_check_group_id(SSL *s, uint16_t group_id, int check_own_groups)
753 const uint16_t *groups;
759 /* Check for Suite B compliance */
760 if (tls1_suiteb(s) && s->s3.tmp.new_cipher != NULL) {
761 unsigned long cid = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->id;
763 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) {
764 if (group_id != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
766 } else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) {
767 if (group_id != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
770 /* Should never happen */
775 if (check_own_groups) {
776 /* Check group is one of our preferences */
777 tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &groups, &groups_len);
778 if (!tls1_in_list(group_id, groups, groups_len))
782 if (!tls_group_allowed(s, group_id, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK))
785 /* For clients, nothing more to check */
789 /* Check group is one of peers preferences */
790 tls1_get_peer_groups(s, &groups, &groups_len);
793 * RFC 4492 does not require the supported elliptic curves extension
794 * so if it is not sent we can just choose any curve.
795 * It is invalid to send an empty list in the supported groups
796 * extension, so groups_len == 0 always means no extension.
800 return tls1_in_list(group_id, groups, groups_len);
803 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
804 void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
808 * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
810 if (s->ext.ecpointformats) {
811 *pformats = s->ext.ecpointformats;
812 *num_formats = s->ext.ecpointformats_len;
814 *pformats = ecformats_default;
815 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
817 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
819 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default);
823 /* Check a key is compatible with compression extension */
824 static int tls1_check_pkey_comp(SSL *s, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
828 unsigned char comp_id;
831 /* If not an EC key nothing to check */
832 if (!EVP_PKEY_is_a(pkey, "EC"))
834 ec = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey);
835 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
837 /* Get required compression id */
838 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED) {
839 comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
840 } else if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
842 * ec_point_formats extension is not used in TLSv1.3 so we ignore
847 int field_type = EC_GROUP_get_field_type(grp);
849 if (field_type == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
850 comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
851 else if (field_type == NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field)
852 comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
857 * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
858 * supported (see RFC4492).
860 if (s->ext.peer_ecpointformats == NULL)
863 for (i = 0; i < s->ext.peer_ecpointformats_len; i++) {
864 if (s->ext.peer_ecpointformats[i] == comp_id)
870 /* Return group id of a key */
871 static uint16_t tls1_get_group_id(EVP_PKEY *pkey)
873 int curve_nid = evp_pkey_get_EC_KEY_curve_nid(pkey);
875 if (curve_nid == NID_undef)
877 return tls1_nid2group_id(curve_nid);
881 * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
882 * certificates have compatible curves and compression.
884 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int check_ee_md)
888 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
891 /* If not EC nothing to do */
892 if (!EVP_PKEY_is_a(pkey, "EC"))
894 /* Check compression */
895 if (!tls1_check_pkey_comp(s, pkey))
897 group_id = tls1_get_group_id(pkey);
899 * For a server we allow the certificate to not be in our list of supported
902 if (!tls1_check_group_id(s, group_id, !s->server))
905 * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
908 if (check_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s)) {
912 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
913 if (group_id == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
914 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
915 else if (group_id == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
916 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
918 return 0; /* Should never happen */
919 for (i = 0; i < s->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
920 if (check_md == s->shared_sigalgs[i]->sigandhash)
929 * tls1_check_ec_tmp_key - Check EC temporary key compatibility
931 * @cid: Cipher ID we're considering using
933 * Checks that the kECDHE cipher suite we're considering using
934 * is compatible with the client extensions.
936 * Returns 0 when the cipher can't be used or 1 when it can.
938 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
940 /* If not Suite B just need a shared group */
942 return tls1_shared_group(s, 0) != 0;
944 * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
947 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
948 return tls1_check_group_id(s, TLSEXT_curve_P_256, 1);
949 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
950 return tls1_check_group_id(s, TLSEXT_curve_P_384, 1);
957 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
962 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
964 /* Default sigalg schemes */
965 static const uint16_t tls12_sigalgs[] = {
966 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
967 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256,
968 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384,
969 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512,
970 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed25519,
974 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha256,
975 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha384,
976 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha512,
977 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha256,
978 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha384,
979 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha512,
981 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha256,
982 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha384,
983 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha512,
985 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
986 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha224,
987 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1,
989 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha224,
990 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1,
991 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
992 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha224,
993 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1,
995 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha256,
996 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha384,
997 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha512,
999 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
1000 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_intrinsic,
1001 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_intrinsic,
1002 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_gostr34112012_256,
1003 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_gostr34112012_512,
1004 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411,
1008 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1009 static const uint16_t suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
1010 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256,
1011 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384
1015 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP sigalg_lookup_tbl[] = {
1016 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1017 {"ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256,
1018 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
1019 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256, NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 1},
1020 {"ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384,
1021 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
1022 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384, NID_secp384r1, 1},
1023 {"ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512,
1024 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
1025 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA512, NID_secp521r1, 1},
1026 {"ed25519", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed25519,
1027 NID_undef, -1, EVP_PKEY_ED25519, SSL_PKEY_ED25519,
1028 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1029 {"ed448", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed448,
1030 NID_undef, -1, EVP_PKEY_ED448, SSL_PKEY_ED448,
1031 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1032 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha224,
1033 NID_sha224, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
1034 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA224, NID_undef, 1},
1035 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1,
1036 NID_sha1, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
1037 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1, NID_undef, 1},
1039 {"rsa_pss_rsae_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha256,
1040 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
1041 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1042 {"rsa_pss_rsae_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha384,
1043 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
1044 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1045 {"rsa_pss_rsae_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha512,
1046 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
1047 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1048 {"rsa_pss_pss_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha256,
1049 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN,
1050 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1051 {"rsa_pss_pss_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha384,
1052 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN,
1053 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1054 {"rsa_pss_pss_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha512,
1055 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN,
1056 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1057 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha256,
1058 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
1059 NID_sha256WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef, 1},
1060 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha384,
1061 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
1062 NID_sha384WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef, 1},
1063 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha512,
1064 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
1065 NID_sha512WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef, 1},
1066 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha224", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha224,
1067 NID_sha224, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
1068 NID_sha224WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef, 1},
1069 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha1", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1,
1070 NID_sha1, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
1071 NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef, 1},
1072 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
1073 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha256,
1074 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
1075 NID_dsa_with_SHA256, NID_undef, 1},
1076 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha384,
1077 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
1078 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1079 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha512,
1080 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
1081 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1082 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha224,
1083 NID_sha224, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
1084 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1085 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1,
1086 NID_sha1, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
1087 NID_dsaWithSHA1, NID_undef, 1},
1089 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
1090 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_intrinsic,
1091 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX,
1092 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256,
1093 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1094 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_intrinsic,
1095 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX,
1096 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512,
1097 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1098 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_gostr34112012_256,
1099 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX,
1100 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256,
1101 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1102 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_gostr34112012_512,
1103 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX,
1104 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512,
1105 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1106 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411,
1107 NID_id_GostR3411_94, SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX,
1108 NID_id_GostR3410_2001, SSL_PKEY_GOST01,
1109 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1}
1112 /* Legacy sigalgs for TLS < 1.2 RSA TLS signatures */
1113 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP legacy_rsa_sigalg = {
1114 "rsa_pkcs1_md5_sha1", 0,
1115 NID_md5_sha1, SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX,
1116 EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
1117 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1
1121 * Default signature algorithm values used if signature algorithms not present.
1122 * From RFC5246. Note: order must match certificate index order.
1124 static const uint16_t tls_default_sigalg[] = {
1125 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1, /* SSL_PKEY_RSA */
1126 0, /* SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN */
1127 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1, /* SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN */
1128 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1, /* SSL_PKEY_ECC */
1129 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST01 */
1130 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_intrinsic, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256 */
1131 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_intrinsic, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512 */
1132 0, /* SSL_PKEY_ED25519 */
1133 0, /* SSL_PKEY_ED448 */
1136 int ssl_setup_sig_algs(SSL_CTX *ctx)
1139 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
1140 SIGALG_LOOKUP *cache
1141 = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*lu) * OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl));
1142 EVP_PKEY *tmpkey = EVP_PKEY_new();
1145 if (cache == NULL || tmpkey == NULL)
1149 for (i = 0, lu = sigalg_lookup_tbl;
1150 i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl); lu++, i++) {
1156 * Check hash is available.
1157 * TODO(3.0): This test is not perfect. A provider could have support
1158 * for a signature scheme, but not a particular hash. However the hash
1159 * could be available from some other loaded provider. In that case it
1160 * could be that the signature is available, and the hash is available
1161 * independently - but not as a combination. We ignore this for now.
1163 if (lu->hash != NID_undef
1164 && ctx->ssl_digest_methods[lu->hash_idx] == NULL) {
1165 cache[i].enabled = 0;
1169 if (!EVP_PKEY_set_type(tmpkey, lu->sig)) {
1170 cache[i].enabled = 0;
1173 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(ctx->libctx, tmpkey, ctx->propq);
1174 /* If unable to create pctx we assume the sig algorithm is unavailable */
1176 cache[i].enabled = 0;
1177 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
1180 ctx->sigalg_lookup_cache = cache;
1185 OPENSSL_free(cache);
1186 EVP_PKEY_free(tmpkey);
1190 /* Lookup TLS signature algorithm */
1191 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP *tls1_lookup_sigalg(const SSL *s, uint16_t sigalg)
1194 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
1196 for (i = 0, lu = s->ctx->sigalg_lookup_cache;
1197 /* cache should have the same number of elements as sigalg_lookup_tbl */
1198 i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
1200 if (lu->sigalg == sigalg)
1205 /* Lookup hash: return 0 if invalid or not enabled */
1206 int tls1_lookup_md(SSL_CTX *ctx, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu, const EVP_MD **pmd)
1211 /* lu->hash == NID_undef means no associated digest */
1212 if (lu->hash == NID_undef) {
1215 md = ssl_md(ctx, lu->hash_idx);
1225 * Check if key is large enough to generate RSA-PSS signature.
1227 * The key must greater than or equal to 2 * hash length + 2.
1228 * SHA512 has a hash length of 64 bytes, which is incompatible
1229 * with a 128 byte (1024 bit) key.
1231 #define RSA_PSS_MINIMUM_KEY_SIZE(md) (2 * EVP_MD_size(md) + 2)
1232 static int rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(SSL_CTX *ctx, const EVP_PKEY *pkey,
1233 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu)
1239 if (!tls1_lookup_md(ctx, lu, &md) || md == NULL)
1241 if (EVP_PKEY_size(pkey) < RSA_PSS_MINIMUM_KEY_SIZE(md))
1247 * Returns a signature algorithm when the peer did not send a list of supported
1248 * signature algorithms. The signature algorithm is fixed for the certificate
1249 * type. |idx| is a certificate type index (SSL_PKEY_*). When |idx| is -1 the
1250 * certificate type from |s| will be used.
1251 * Returns the signature algorithm to use, or NULL on error.
1253 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP *tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(const SSL *s, int idx)
1259 /* Work out index corresponding to ciphersuite */
1260 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
1261 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(i);
1263 if (clu->amask & s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth) {
1270 * Some GOST ciphersuites allow more than one signature algorithms
1272 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_GOST01 && s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aGOST01) {
1275 for (real_idx = SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512; real_idx >= SSL_PKEY_GOST01;
1277 if (s->cert->pkeys[real_idx].privatekey != NULL) {
1284 * As both SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512 and SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256 indices can be used
1285 * with new (aGOST12-only) ciphersuites, we should find out which one is available really.
1287 else if (idx == SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256) {
1290 for (real_idx = SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512; real_idx >= SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256;
1292 if (s->cert->pkeys[real_idx].privatekey != NULL) {
1299 idx = s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys;
1302 if (idx < 0 || idx >= (int)OSSL_NELEM(tls_default_sigalg))
1304 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) || idx != SSL_PKEY_RSA) {
1305 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, tls_default_sigalg[idx]);
1307 if (!tls1_lookup_md(s->ctx, lu, NULL))
1309 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, lu))
1313 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, &legacy_rsa_sigalg))
1315 return &legacy_rsa_sigalg;
1317 /* Set peer sigalg based key type */
1318 int tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(SSL *s, const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
1321 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
1323 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, &idx) == NULL)
1325 lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, idx);
1328 s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalg = lu;
1332 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, int sent, const uint16_t **psigs)
1335 * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
1338 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1339 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1340 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
1341 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
1342 return OSSL_NELEM(suiteb_sigalgs);
1344 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
1345 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
1348 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
1349 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 1;
1354 * We use client_sigalgs (if not NULL) if we're a server
1355 * and sending a certificate request or if we're a client and
1356 * determining which shared algorithm to use.
1358 if ((s->server == sent) && s->cert->client_sigalgs != NULL) {
1359 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
1360 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
1361 } else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
1362 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
1363 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
1365 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
1366 return OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sigalgs);
1370 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1372 * Called by servers only. Checks that we have a sig alg that supports the
1373 * specified EC curve.
1375 int tls_check_sigalg_curve(const SSL *s, int curve)
1377 const uint16_t *sigs;
1380 if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
1381 sigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
1382 siglen = s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
1384 sigs = tls12_sigalgs;
1385 siglen = OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sigalgs);
1388 for (i = 0; i < siglen; i++) {
1389 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, sigs[i]);
1393 if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_EC
1394 && lu->curve != NID_undef
1395 && curve == lu->curve)
1404 * Return the number of security bits for the signature algorithm, or 0 on
1407 static int sigalg_security_bits(SSL_CTX *ctx, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu)
1409 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1412 if (!tls1_lookup_md(ctx, lu, &md))
1416 int md_type = EVP_MD_type(md);
1418 /* Security bits: half digest bits */
1419 secbits = EVP_MD_size(md) * 4;
1421 * SHA1 and MD5 are known to be broken. Reduce security bits so that
1422 * they're no longer accepted at security level 1. The real values don't
1423 * really matter as long as they're lower than 80, which is our
1425 * https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/014 puts a chosen-prefix attack for
1426 * SHA1 at 2^63.4 and MD5+SHA1 at 2^67.2
1427 * https://documents.epfl.ch/users/l/le/lenstra/public/papers/lat.pdf
1428 * puts a chosen-prefix attack for MD5 at 2^39.
1430 if (md_type == NID_sha1)
1432 else if (md_type == NID_md5_sha1)
1434 else if (md_type == NID_md5)
1437 /* Values from https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8032#section-8.5 */
1438 if (lu->sigalg == TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed25519)
1440 else if (lu->sigalg == TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed448)
1447 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
1448 * algorithms and if so set relevant digest and signature scheme in
1451 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(SSL *s, uint16_t sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
1453 const uint16_t *sent_sigs;
1454 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1456 size_t sent_sigslen, i, cidx;
1458 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
1461 pkeyid = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey);
1462 /* Should never happen */
1465 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1466 /* Disallow DSA for TLS 1.3 */
1467 if (pkeyid == EVP_PKEY_DSA) {
1468 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1469 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1472 /* Only allow PSS for TLS 1.3 */
1473 if (pkeyid == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
1474 pkeyid = EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS;
1476 lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, sig);
1478 * Check sigalgs is known. Disallow SHA1/SHA224 with TLS 1.3. Check key type
1479 * is consistent with signature: RSA keys can be used for RSA-PSS
1482 || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && (lu->hash == NID_sha1 || lu->hash == NID_sha224))
1483 || (pkeyid != lu->sig
1484 && (lu->sig != EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS || pkeyid != EVP_PKEY_RSA))) {
1485 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1486 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1489 /* Check the sigalg is consistent with the key OID */
1490 if (!ssl_cert_lookup_by_nid(EVP_PKEY_id(pkey), &cidx)
1491 || lu->sig_idx != (int)cidx) {
1492 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1493 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1497 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1498 if (pkeyid == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
1500 /* Check point compression is permitted */
1501 if (!tls1_check_pkey_comp(s, pkey)) {
1502 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1503 SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1504 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_POINT_COMPRESSION);
1508 /* For TLS 1.3 or Suite B check curve matches signature algorithm */
1509 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1510 int curve = evp_pkey_get_EC_KEY_curve_nid(pkey);
1512 if (lu->curve != NID_undef && curve != lu->curve) {
1513 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1514 SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
1518 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1519 /* Check curve matches extensions */
1520 if (!tls1_check_group_id(s, tls1_get_group_id(pkey), 1)) {
1521 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1522 SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
1525 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1526 /* Check sigalg matches a permissible Suite B value */
1527 if (sig != TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256
1528 && sig != TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384) {
1529 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1530 SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1531 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1536 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1537 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1538 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1543 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
1544 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sent_sigs);
1545 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i++, sent_sigs++) {
1546 if (sig == *sent_sigs)
1549 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
1550 if (i == sent_sigslen && (lu->hash != NID_sha1
1551 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
1552 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1553 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1556 if (!tls1_lookup_md(s->ctx, lu, &md)) {
1557 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1558 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
1562 * Make sure security callback allows algorithm. For historical
1563 * reasons we have to pass the sigalg as a two byte char array.
1565 sigalgstr[0] = (sig >> 8) & 0xff;
1566 sigalgstr[1] = sig & 0xff;
1567 secbits = sigalg_security_bits(s->ctx, lu);
1569 !ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK, secbits,
1570 md != NULL ? EVP_MD_type(md) : NID_undef,
1571 (void *)sigalgstr)) {
1572 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1573 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1576 /* Store the sigalg the peer uses */
1577 s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalg = lu;
1581 int SSL_get_peer_signature_type_nid(const SSL *s, int *pnid)
1583 if (s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalg == NULL)
1585 *pnid = s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalg->sig;
1589 int SSL_get_signature_type_nid(const SSL *s, int *pnid)
1591 if (s->s3.tmp.sigalg == NULL)
1593 *pnid = s->s3.tmp.sigalg->sig;
1598 * Set a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
1599 * supported, doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms, isn't supported
1600 * by the enabled protocol versions or by the security level.
1602 * This function should only be used for checking which ciphers are supported
1605 * Call ssl_cipher_disabled() to check that it's enabled or not.
1607 int ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
1609 s->s3.tmp.mask_a = 0;
1610 s->s3.tmp.mask_k = 0;
1611 ssl_set_sig_mask(&s->s3.tmp.mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
1612 if (ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &s->s3.tmp.min_ver,
1613 &s->s3.tmp.max_ver, NULL) != 0)
1615 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1616 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1617 if (!s->psk_client_callback) {
1618 s->s3.tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
1619 s->s3.tmp.mask_k |= SSL_PSK;
1621 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1622 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1623 if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) {
1624 s->s3.tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
1625 s->s3.tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
1632 * ssl_cipher_disabled - check that a cipher is disabled or not
1633 * @s: SSL connection that you want to use the cipher on
1634 * @c: cipher to check
1635 * @op: Security check that you want to do
1636 * @ecdhe: If set to 1 then TLSv1 ECDHE ciphers are also allowed in SSLv3
1638 * Returns 1 when it's disabled, 0 when enabled.
1640 int ssl_cipher_disabled(const SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op, int ecdhe)
1642 if (c->algorithm_mkey & s->s3.tmp.mask_k
1643 || c->algorithm_auth & s->s3.tmp.mask_a)
1645 if (s->s3.tmp.max_ver == 0)
1647 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1648 int min_tls = c->min_tls;
1651 * For historical reasons we will allow ECHDE to be selected by a server
1652 * in SSLv3 if we are a client
1654 if (min_tls == TLS1_VERSION && ecdhe
1655 && (c->algorithm_mkey & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) != 0)
1656 min_tls = SSL3_VERSION;
1658 if ((min_tls > s->s3.tmp.max_ver) || (c->max_tls < s->s3.tmp.min_ver))
1661 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (DTLS_VERSION_GT(c->min_dtls, s->s3.tmp.max_ver)
1662 || DTLS_VERSION_LT(c->max_dtls, s->s3.tmp.min_ver)))
1665 return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c);
1668 int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s)
1670 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
1672 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL);
1675 int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s)
1679 /* Clear any shared signature algorithms */
1680 OPENSSL_free(s->shared_sigalgs);
1681 s->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
1682 s->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
1683 /* Clear certificate validity flags */
1684 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
1685 s->s3.tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
1687 * If peer sent no signature algorithms check to see if we support
1688 * the default algorithm for each certificate type
1690 if (s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs == NULL
1691 && s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs == NULL) {
1692 const uint16_t *sent_sigs;
1693 size_t sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sent_sigs);
1695 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
1696 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, i);
1701 /* Check default matches a type we sent */
1702 for (j = 0; j < sent_sigslen; j++) {
1703 if (lu->sigalg == sent_sigs[j]) {
1704 s->s3.tmp.valid_flags[i] = CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
1712 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
1713 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1714 SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1717 if (s->shared_sigalgs != NULL)
1720 /* Fatal error if no shared signature algorithms */
1721 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS,
1722 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS);
1727 * Gets the ticket information supplied by the client if any.
1729 * hello: The parsed ClientHello data
1730 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
1731 * point to the resulting session.
1733 SSL_TICKET_STATUS tls_get_ticket_from_client(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello,
1737 RAW_EXTENSION *ticketext;
1740 s->ext.ticket_expected = 0;
1743 * If tickets disabled or not supported by the protocol version
1744 * (e.g. TLSv1.3) behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
1747 if (s->version <= SSL3_VERSION || !tls_use_ticket(s))
1748 return SSL_TICKET_NONE;
1750 ticketext = &hello->pre_proc_exts[TLSEXT_IDX_session_ticket];
1751 if (!ticketext->present)
1752 return SSL_TICKET_NONE;
1754 size = PACKET_remaining(&ticketext->data);
1756 return tls_decrypt_ticket(s, PACKET_data(&ticketext->data), size,
1757 hello->session_id, hello->session_id_len, ret);
1761 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
1763 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set and we're not doing TLSv1.3 then we are
1764 * expecting a pre-shared key ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for
1765 * session tickets and one will never be decrypted, nor will
1766 * s->ext.ticket_expected be set to 1.
1769 * Sets s->ext.ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
1770 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
1771 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
1772 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
1773 * s->ctx->ext.ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
1774 * Otherwise, s->ext.ticket_expected is set to 0.
1776 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
1777 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extension.
1778 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
1779 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
1780 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
1781 * point to the resulting session.
1783 SSL_TICKET_STATUS tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
1784 size_t eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id,
1785 size_t sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess)
1787 SSL_SESSION *sess = NULL;
1788 unsigned char *sdec;
1789 const unsigned char *p;
1790 int slen, renew_ticket = 0, declen;
1791 SSL_TICKET_STATUS ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1793 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
1794 SSL_HMAC *hctx = NULL;
1795 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL;
1796 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->session_ctx;
1798 if (eticklen == 0) {
1800 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
1801 * one (TLSv1.2 and below), or treated as a fatal error in TLSv1.3
1803 ret = SSL_TICKET_EMPTY;
1806 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->ext.session_secret_cb) {
1808 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
1809 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
1810 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
1811 * calculate the master secret later.
1813 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1817 /* Need at least keyname + iv */
1818 if (eticklen < TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH) {
1819 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1823 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
1824 hctx = ssl_hmac_new(tctx);
1826 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC;
1829 ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
1831 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC;
1834 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
1835 if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb != NULL || tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb != NULL)
1837 if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb != NULL)
1840 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
1843 if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb != NULL)
1844 rv = tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb(s, nctick,
1845 nctick + TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH,
1847 ssl_hmac_get0_EVP_MAC_CTX(hctx),
1849 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
1850 else if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb != NULL)
1851 /* if 0 is returned, write an empty ticket */
1852 rv = tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb(s, nctick,
1853 nctick + TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH,
1854 ctx, ssl_hmac_get0_HMAC_CTX(hctx), 0);
1857 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1861 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1867 EVP_CIPHER *aes256cbc = NULL;
1869 /* Check key name matches */
1870 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->ext.tick_key_name,
1871 TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH) != 0) {
1872 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1876 aes256cbc = EVP_CIPHER_fetch(s->ctx->libctx, "AES-256-CBC",
1878 if (aes256cbc == NULL
1879 || ssl_hmac_init(hctx, tctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key,
1880 sizeof(tctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key),
1882 || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, aes256cbc, NULL,
1883 tctx->ext.secure->tick_aes_key,
1884 etick + TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH) <= 0) {
1885 EVP_CIPHER_free(aes256cbc);
1886 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1889 EVP_CIPHER_free(aes256cbc);
1890 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
1894 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
1897 mlen = ssl_hmac_size(hctx);
1899 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1903 /* Sanity check ticket length: must exceed keyname + IV + HMAC */
1905 TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx) + mlen) {
1906 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1910 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
1911 if (ssl_hmac_update(hctx, etick, eticklen) <= 0
1912 || ssl_hmac_final(hctx, tick_hmac, NULL, sizeof(tick_hmac)) <= 0) {
1913 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1917 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) {
1918 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1921 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
1922 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
1923 p = etick + TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
1924 eticklen -= TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
1925 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
1926 if (sdec == NULL || EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, sdec, &slen, p,
1927 (int)eticklen) <= 0) {
1929 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1932 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(ctx, sdec + slen, &declen) <= 0) {
1934 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1940 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
1944 /* Some additional consistency checks */
1946 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
1948 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1952 * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
1953 * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
1954 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
1958 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
1959 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
1962 ret = SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW;
1964 ret = SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS;
1969 * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
1971 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1974 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
1975 ssl_hmac_free(hctx);
1978 * If set, the decrypt_ticket_cb() is called unless a fatal error was
1979 * detected above. The callback is responsible for checking |ret| before it
1980 * performs any action
1982 if (s->session_ctx->decrypt_ticket_cb != NULL
1983 && (ret == SSL_TICKET_EMPTY
1984 || ret == SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
1985 || ret == SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS
1986 || ret == SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW)) {
1987 size_t keyname_len = eticklen;
1990 if (keyname_len > TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH)
1991 keyname_len = TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH;
1992 retcb = s->session_ctx->decrypt_ticket_cb(s, sess, etick, keyname_len,
1994 s->session_ctx->ticket_cb_data);
1996 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_ABORT:
1997 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
2000 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_IGNORE:
2001 ret = SSL_TICKET_NONE;
2002 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
2006 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_IGNORE_RENEW:
2007 if (ret != SSL_TICKET_EMPTY && ret != SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT)
2008 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
2009 /* else the value of |ret| will already do the right thing */
2010 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
2014 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_USE:
2015 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_USE_RENEW:
2016 if (ret != SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS
2017 && ret != SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW)
2018 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
2019 else if (retcb == SSL_TICKET_RETURN_USE)
2020 ret = SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS;
2022 ret = SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW;
2026 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
2030 if (s->ext.session_secret_cb == NULL || SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2032 case SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT:
2033 case SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW:
2034 case SSL_TICKET_EMPTY:
2035 s->ext.ticket_expected = 1;
2044 /* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
2045 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(const SSL *s, int op, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu)
2047 unsigned char sigalgstr[2];
2050 if (lu == NULL || !lu->enabled)
2052 /* DSA is not allowed in TLS 1.3 */
2053 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
2055 /* TODO(OpenSSL1.2) fully axe DSA/etc. in ClientHello per TLS 1.3 spec */
2056 if (!s->server && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->s3.tmp.min_ver >= TLS1_3_VERSION
2057 && (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_DSA || lu->hash_idx == SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX
2058 || lu->hash_idx == SSL_MD_MD5_IDX
2059 || lu->hash_idx == SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX))
2062 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
2063 if (ssl_cert_is_disabled(lu->sig_idx))
2066 if (lu->sig == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
2067 || lu->sig == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
2068 || lu->sig == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) {
2069 /* We never allow GOST sig algs on the server with TLSv1.3 */
2070 if (s->server && SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
2073 && s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION
2074 && s->s3.tmp.max_ver >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
2076 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
2079 * We're a client that could negotiate TLSv1.3. We only allow GOST
2080 * sig algs if we could negotiate TLSv1.2 or below and we have GOST
2081 * ciphersuites enabled.
2084 if (s->s3.tmp.min_ver >= TLS1_3_VERSION)
2087 sk = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
2088 num = sk != NULL ? sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) : 0;
2089 for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
2090 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
2092 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);
2093 /* Skip disabled ciphers */
2094 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED, 0))
2097 if ((c->algorithm_mkey & (SSL_kGOST | SSL_kGOST18)) != 0)
2105 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
2106 secbits = sigalg_security_bits(s->ctx, lu);
2107 sigalgstr[0] = (lu->sigalg >> 8) & 0xff;
2108 sigalgstr[1] = lu->sigalg & 0xff;
2109 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, lu->hash, (void *)sigalgstr);
2113 * Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported signature
2114 * algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA then RSA is
2118 void ssl_set_sig_mask(uint32_t *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op)
2120 const uint16_t *sigalgs;
2121 size_t i, sigalgslen;
2122 uint32_t disabled_mask = SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS | SSL_aECDSA;
2124 * Go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any
2127 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sigalgs);
2128 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i++, sigalgs++) {
2129 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, *sigalgs);
2130 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu;
2135 clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(lu->sig_idx);
2139 /* If algorithm is disabled see if we can enable it */
2140 if ((clu->amask & disabled_mask) != 0
2141 && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, lu))
2142 disabled_mask &= ~clu->amask;
2144 *pmask_a |= disabled_mask;
2147 int tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
2148 const uint16_t *psig, size_t psiglen)
2153 for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i++, psig++) {
2154 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, *psig);
2156 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, lu))
2158 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, *psig))
2161 * If TLS 1.3 must have at least one valid TLS 1.3 message
2162 * signing algorithm: i.e. neither RSA nor SHA1/SHA224
2164 if (rv == 0 && (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
2165 || (lu->sig != EVP_PKEY_RSA
2166 && lu->hash != NID_sha1
2167 && lu->hash != NID_sha224)))
2171 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_COPY_SIGALGS, SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
2175 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
2176 static size_t tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP **shsig,
2177 const uint16_t *pref, size_t preflen,
2178 const uint16_t *allow, size_t allowlen)
2180 const uint16_t *ptmp, *atmp;
2181 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
2182 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i++, ptmp++) {
2183 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, *ptmp);
2185 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
2186 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED, lu))
2188 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j++, atmp++) {
2189 if (*ptmp == *atmp) {
2200 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
2201 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
2203 const uint16_t *pref, *allow, *conf;
2204 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
2206 const SIGALG_LOOKUP **salgs = NULL;
2208 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
2210 OPENSSL_free(s->shared_sigalgs);
2211 s->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
2212 s->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
2213 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
2214 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
2215 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
2216 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
2217 } else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
2218 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
2219 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
2221 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 0, &conf);
2222 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb) {
2225 allow = s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs;
2226 allowlen = s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
2230 pref = s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs;
2231 preflen = s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
2233 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
2235 if ((salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(*salgs))) == NULL) {
2236 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SHARED_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2239 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
2243 s->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
2244 s->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
2248 int tls1_save_u16(PACKET *pkt, uint16_t **pdest, size_t *pdestlen)
2254 size = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
2256 /* Invalid data length */
2257 if (size == 0 || (size & 1) != 0)
2262 if ((buf = OPENSSL_malloc(size * sizeof(*buf))) == NULL) {
2263 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SAVE_U16, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2266 for (i = 0; i < size && PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &stmp); i++)
2274 OPENSSL_free(*pdest);
2281 int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int cert)
2283 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
2284 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2286 /* Should never happen */
2287 if (s->cert == NULL)
2291 return tls1_save_u16(pkt, &s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs,
2292 &s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgslen);
2294 return tls1_save_u16(pkt, &s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs,
2295 &s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgslen);
2299 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
2301 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s)
2304 uint32_t *pvalid = s->s3.tmp.valid_flags;
2306 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s))
2309 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
2312 for (i = 0; i < s->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
2313 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sigptr = s->shared_sigalgs[i];
2314 int idx = sigptr->sig_idx;
2316 /* Ignore PKCS1 based sig algs in TLSv1.3 */
2317 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && sigptr->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
2319 /* If not disabled indicate we can explicitly sign */
2320 if (pvalid[idx] == 0 && !ssl_cert_is_disabled(idx))
2321 pvalid[idx] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
2326 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
2327 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
2328 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
2330 uint16_t *psig = s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs;
2331 size_t numsigalgs = s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
2332 if (psig == NULL || numsigalgs > INT_MAX)
2335 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
2337 if (idx >= (int)numsigalgs)
2341 *rhash = (unsigned char)((*psig >> 8) & 0xff);
2343 *rsig = (unsigned char)(*psig & 0xff);
2344 lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, *psig);
2346 *psign = lu != NULL ? lu->sig : NID_undef;
2348 *phash = lu != NULL ? lu->hash : NID_undef;
2349 if (psignhash != NULL)
2350 *psignhash = lu != NULL ? lu->sigandhash : NID_undef;
2352 return (int)numsigalgs;
2355 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
2356 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
2357 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
2359 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *shsigalgs;
2360 if (s->shared_sigalgs == NULL
2362 || idx >= (int)s->shared_sigalgslen
2363 || s->shared_sigalgslen > INT_MAX)
2365 shsigalgs = s->shared_sigalgs[idx];
2367 *phash = shsigalgs->hash;
2369 *psign = shsigalgs->sig;
2370 if (psignhash != NULL)
2371 *psignhash = shsigalgs->sigandhash;
2373 *rsig = (unsigned char)(shsigalgs->sigalg & 0xff);
2375 *rhash = (unsigned char)((shsigalgs->sigalg >> 8) & 0xff);
2376 return (int)s->shared_sigalgslen;
2379 /* Maximum possible number of unique entries in sigalgs array */
2380 #define TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT (OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl) * 2)
2384 /* TLSEXT_SIGALG_XXX values */
2385 uint16_t sigalgs[TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT];
2388 static void get_sigorhash(int *psig, int *phash, const char *str)
2390 if (strcmp(str, "RSA") == 0) {
2391 *psig = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
2392 } else if (strcmp(str, "RSA-PSS") == 0 || strcmp(str, "PSS") == 0) {
2393 *psig = EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS;
2394 } else if (strcmp(str, "DSA") == 0) {
2395 *psig = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
2396 } else if (strcmp(str, "ECDSA") == 0) {
2397 *psig = EVP_PKEY_EC;
2399 *phash = OBJ_sn2nid(str);
2400 if (*phash == NID_undef)
2401 *phash = OBJ_ln2nid(str);
2404 /* Maximum length of a signature algorithm string component */
2405 #define TLS_MAX_SIGSTRING_LEN 40
2407 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
2409 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
2411 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *s;
2412 char etmp[TLS_MAX_SIGSTRING_LEN], *p;
2413 int sig_alg = NID_undef, hash_alg = NID_undef;
2416 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT)
2418 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
2420 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
2422 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
2424 * We only allow SignatureSchemes listed in the sigalg_lookup_tbl;
2425 * if there's no '+' in the provided name, look for the new-style combined
2426 * name. If not, match both sig+hash to find the needed SIGALG_LOOKUP.
2427 * Just sig+hash is not unique since TLS 1.3 adds rsa_pss_pss_* and
2428 * rsa_pss_rsae_* that differ only by public key OID; in such cases
2429 * we will pick the _rsae_ variant, by virtue of them appearing earlier
2433 for (i = 0, s = sigalg_lookup_tbl; i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
2435 if (s->name != NULL && strcmp(etmp, s->name) == 0) {
2436 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = s->sigalg;
2440 if (i == OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl))
2447 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, etmp);
2448 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, p);
2449 if (sig_alg == NID_undef || hash_alg == NID_undef)
2451 for (i = 0, s = sigalg_lookup_tbl; i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
2453 if (s->hash == hash_alg && s->sig == sig_alg) {
2454 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = s->sigalg;
2458 if (i == OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl))
2462 /* Reject duplicates */
2463 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt - 1; i++) {
2464 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt - 1]) {
2473 * Set supported signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
2474 * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
2476 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
2480 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
2484 return tls1_set_raw_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
2487 int tls1_set_raw_sigalgs(CERT *c, const uint16_t *psigs, size_t salglen,
2492 if ((sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen * sizeof(*sigalgs))) == NULL) {
2493 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_RAW_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2496 memcpy(sigalgs, psigs, salglen * sizeof(*sigalgs));
2499 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
2500 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
2501 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
2503 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
2504 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
2505 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
2511 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
2513 uint16_t *sigalgs, *sptr;
2518 if ((sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc((salglen / 2) * sizeof(*sigalgs))) == NULL) {
2519 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2522 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i += 2) {
2524 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *curr;
2525 int md_id = *psig_nids++;
2526 int sig_id = *psig_nids++;
2528 for (j = 0, curr = sigalg_lookup_tbl; j < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
2530 if (curr->hash == md_id && curr->sig == sig_id) {
2531 *sptr++ = curr->sigalg;
2536 if (j == OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl))
2541 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
2542 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
2543 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen / 2;
2545 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
2546 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
2547 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen / 2;
2553 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
2557 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(SSL *s, X509 *x, int default_nid)
2559 int sig_nid, use_pc_sigalgs = 0;
2561 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sigalg;
2563 if (default_nid == -1)
2565 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
2567 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
2569 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs != NULL) {
2571 * If we're in TLSv1.3 then we only get here if we're checking the
2572 * chain. If the peer has specified peer_cert_sigalgs then we use them
2573 * otherwise we default to normal sigalgs.
2575 sigalgslen = s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgslen;
2578 sigalgslen = s->shared_sigalgslen;
2580 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i++) {
2581 sigalg = use_pc_sigalgs
2582 ? tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs[i])
2583 : s->shared_sigalgs[i];
2584 if (sigalg != NULL && sig_nid == sigalg->sigandhash)
2590 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
2591 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
2593 const X509_NAME *nm;
2595 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
2596 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++) {
2597 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
2604 * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by
2605 * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before
2606 * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before
2607 * attempting to use them.
2610 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when strict mode not set */
2612 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
2613 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
2614 /* Strict mode flags */
2615 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
2616 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
2617 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
2619 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
2624 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
2625 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
2628 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
2629 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
2631 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
2634 idx = (int)(cpk - c->pkeys);
2636 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
2637 pvalid = s->s3.tmp.valid_flags + idx;
2639 pk = cpk->privatekey;
2641 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
2642 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
2651 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pk, &certidx) == NULL)
2654 pvalid = s->s3.tmp.valid_flags + idx;
2656 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
2657 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
2659 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
2666 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
2667 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
2668 if (ok == X509_V_OK)
2669 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
2670 else if (!check_flags)
2675 * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature
2676 * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode.
2678 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode) {
2681 if (s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs != NULL
2682 || s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs != NULL) {
2684 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
2688 rsign = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
2689 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
2692 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
2693 rsign = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
2694 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
2698 rsign = EVP_PKEY_EC;
2699 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
2702 case SSL_PKEY_GOST01:
2703 rsign = NID_id_GostR3410_2001;
2704 default_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001;
2707 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256:
2708 rsign = NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256;
2709 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_256;
2712 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512:
2713 rsign = NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512;
2714 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_512;
2723 * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set
2724 * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1.
2726 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs) {
2728 const uint16_t *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
2729 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j++, p++) {
2730 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, *p);
2732 if (lu != NULL && lu->hash == NID_sha1 && lu->sig == rsign)
2735 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen) {
2742 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
2743 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2745 * We only get here if the application has called SSL_check_chain(),
2746 * so check_flags is always set.
2748 if (find_sig_alg(s, x, pk) != NULL)
2749 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
2750 } else if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(s, x, default_nid)) {
2754 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
2755 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
2756 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
2757 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(s, sk_X509_value(chain, i), default_nid)) {
2759 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
2766 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
2767 else if (check_flags)
2768 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE | CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
2770 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
2771 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, 1))
2772 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
2773 else if (!check_flags)
2776 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
2777 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
2778 else if (strict_mode) {
2779 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
2780 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
2781 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
2782 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0)) {
2784 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
2791 if (!s->server && strict_mode) {
2792 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
2795 if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(pk, "RSA"))
2796 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
2797 else if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(pk, "DSA"))
2798 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
2799 else if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(pk, "EC"))
2800 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
2803 const uint8_t *ctypes = s->s3.tmp.ctype;
2806 for (j = 0; j < s->s3.tmp.ctype_len; j++, ctypes++) {
2807 if (*ctypes == check_type) {
2808 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
2812 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
2815 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
2818 ca_dn = s->s3.tmp.peer_ca_names;
2820 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
2821 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
2823 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
2824 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
2825 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
2827 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
2828 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
2829 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
2830 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp)) {
2831 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
2836 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
2839 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME | CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
2841 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
2842 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
2846 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
2847 rv |= *pvalid & (CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN);
2849 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
2852 * When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the
2856 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID) {
2859 /* Preserve sign and explicit sign flag, clear rest */
2860 *pvalid &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
2867 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
2868 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
2870 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA);
2871 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN);
2872 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
2873 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
2874 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST01);
2875 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256);
2876 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512);
2877 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ED25519);
2878 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ED448);
2881 /* User level utility function to check a chain is suitable */
2882 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
2884 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);
2887 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2888 DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s)
2892 int dh_secbits = 80;
2893 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto != 2) {
2894 if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aPSK)) {
2895 if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256)
2900 if (s->s3.tmp.cert == NULL)
2902 dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(s->s3.tmp.cert->privatekey);
2910 if (g == NULL || !BN_set_word(g, 2)) {
2915 if (dh_secbits >= 192)
2916 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL);
2917 else if (dh_secbits >= 152)
2918 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_4096(NULL);
2919 else if (dh_secbits >= 128)
2920 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL);
2921 else if (dh_secbits >= 112)
2922 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_2048(NULL);
2924 p = BN_get_rfc2409_prime_1024(NULL);
2925 if (p == NULL || !DH_set0_pqg(dhp, p, NULL, g)) {
2935 static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
2938 EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
2941 * If no parameters this will return -1 and fail using the default
2942 * security callback for any non-zero security level. This will
2943 * reject keys which omit parameters but this only affects DSA and
2944 * omission of parameters is never (?) done in practice.
2946 secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey);
2949 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, 0, x);
2951 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, 0, x);
2954 static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
2956 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
2957 int secbits, nid, pknid;
2958 /* Don't check signature if self signed */
2959 if ((X509_get_extension_flags(x) & EXFLAG_SS) != 0)
2961 if (!X509_get_signature_info(x, &nid, &pknid, &secbits, NULL))
2963 /* If digest NID not defined use signature NID */
2964 if (nid == NID_undef)
2967 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, nid, x);
2969 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, nid, x);
2972 int ssl_security_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int vfy, int is_ee)
2975 vfy = SSL_SECOP_PEER;
2977 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY | vfy))
2978 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
2980 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY | vfy))
2981 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
2983 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD | vfy))
2984 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK;
2989 * Check security of a chain, if |sk| includes the end entity certificate then
2990 * |x| is NULL. If |vfy| is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and not sending
2991 * one to the peer. Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
2994 int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x, int vfy)
2996 int rv, start_idx, i;
2998 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
3003 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 1);
3007 for (i = start_idx; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
3008 x = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
3009 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 0);
3017 * For TLS 1.2 servers check if we have a certificate which can be used
3018 * with the signature algorithm "lu" and return index of certificate.
3021 static int tls12_get_cert_sigalg_idx(const SSL *s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu)
3023 int sig_idx = lu->sig_idx;
3024 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(sig_idx);
3026 /* If not recognised or not supported by cipher mask it is not suitable */
3028 || (clu->amask & s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth) == 0
3029 || (clu->nid == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
3030 && (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kRSA) != 0))
3033 return s->s3.tmp.valid_flags[sig_idx] & CERT_PKEY_VALID ? sig_idx : -1;
3037 * Checks the given cert against signature_algorithm_cert restrictions sent by
3038 * the peer (if any) as well as whether the hash from the sigalg is usable with
3040 * Returns true if the cert is usable and false otherwise.
3042 static int check_cert_usable(SSL *s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sig, X509 *x,
3045 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
3046 int mdnid, pknid, supported;
3050 * If the given EVP_PKEY cannot supporting signing with this sigalg,
3051 * the answer is simply 'no'.
3054 supported = EVP_PKEY_supports_digest_nid(pkey, sig->hash);
3060 * The TLS 1.3 signature_algorithms_cert extension places restrictions
3061 * on the sigalg with which the certificate was signed (by its issuer).
3063 if (s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs != NULL) {
3064 if (!X509_get_signature_info(x, &mdnid, &pknid, NULL, NULL))
3066 for (i = 0; i < s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgslen; i++) {
3067 lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs[i]);
3072 * TODO this does not differentiate between the
3073 * rsa_pss_pss_* and rsa_pss_rsae_* schemes since we do not
3074 * have a chain here that lets us look at the key OID in the
3075 * signing certificate.
3077 if (mdnid == lu->hash && pknid == lu->sig)
3084 * Without signat_algorithms_cert, any certificate for which we have
3085 * a viable public key is permitted.
3091 * Returns true if |s| has a usable certificate configured for use
3092 * with signature scheme |sig|.
3093 * "Usable" includes a check for presence as well as applying
3094 * the signature_algorithm_cert restrictions sent by the peer (if any).
3095 * Returns false if no usable certificate is found.
3097 static int has_usable_cert(SSL *s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sig, int idx)
3099 /* TLS 1.2 callers can override sig->sig_idx, but not TLS 1.3 callers. */
3102 if (!ssl_has_cert(s, idx))
3105 return check_cert_usable(s, sig, s->cert->pkeys[idx].x509,
3106 s->cert->pkeys[idx].privatekey);
3110 * Returns true if the supplied cert |x| and key |pkey| is usable with the
3111 * specified signature scheme |sig|, or false otherwise.
3113 static int is_cert_usable(SSL *s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sig, X509 *x,
3118 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, &idx) == NULL)
3121 /* Check the key is consistent with the sig alg */
3122 if ((int)idx != sig->sig_idx)
3125 return check_cert_usable(s, sig, x, pkey);
3129 * Find a signature scheme that works with the supplied certificate |x| and key
3130 * |pkey|. |x| and |pkey| may be NULL in which case we additionally look at our
3131 * available certs/keys to find one that works.
3133 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP *find_sig_alg(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
3135 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = NULL;
3137 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3142 /* Look for a shared sigalgs matching possible certificates */
3143 for (i = 0; i < s->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
3144 lu = s->shared_sigalgs[i];
3146 /* Skip SHA1, SHA224, DSA and RSA if not PSS */
3147 if (lu->hash == NID_sha1
3148 || lu->hash == NID_sha224
3149 || lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_DSA
3150 || lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
3152 /* Check that we have a cert, and signature_algorithms_cert */
3153 if (!tls1_lookup_md(s->ctx, lu, NULL))
3155 if ((pkey == NULL && !has_usable_cert(s, lu, -1))
3156 || (pkey != NULL && !is_cert_usable(s, lu, x, pkey)))
3159 tmppkey = (pkey != NULL) ? pkey
3160 : s->cert->pkeys[lu->sig_idx].privatekey;
3162 if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
3163 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3165 curve = evp_pkey_get_EC_KEY_curve_nid(tmppkey);
3166 if (lu->curve != NID_undef && curve != lu->curve)
3171 } else if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) {
3172 /* validate that key is large enough for the signature algorithm */
3173 if (!rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(s->ctx, tmppkey, lu))
3179 if (i == s->shared_sigalgslen)
3186 * Choose an appropriate signature algorithm based on available certificates
3187 * Sets chosen certificate and signature algorithm.
3189 * For servers if we fail to find a required certificate it is a fatal error,
3190 * an appropriate error code is set and a TLS alert is sent.
3192 * For clients fatalerrs is set to 0. If a certificate is not suitable it is not
3193 * a fatal error: we will either try another certificate or not present one
3194 * to the server. In this case no error is set.
3196 int tls_choose_sigalg(SSL *s, int fatalerrs)
3198 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = NULL;
3201 s->s3.tmp.cert = NULL;
3202 s->s3.tmp.sigalg = NULL;
3204 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
3205 lu = find_sig_alg(s, NULL, NULL);
3209 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG,
3210 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
3214 /* If ciphersuite doesn't require a cert nothing to do */
3215 if (!(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aCERT))
3217 if (!s->server && !ssl_has_cert(s, s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys))
3220 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
3222 if (s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs != NULL) {
3223 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3226 /* For Suite B need to match signature algorithm to curve */
3229 evp_pkey_get_EC_KEY_curve_nid(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC]
3234 * Find highest preference signature algorithm matching
3237 for (i = 0; i < s->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
3238 lu = s->shared_sigalgs[i];
3241 if ((sig_idx = tls12_get_cert_sigalg_idx(s, lu)) == -1)
3244 int cc_idx = s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys;
3246 sig_idx = lu->sig_idx;
3247 if (cc_idx != sig_idx)
3250 /* Check that we have a cert, and sig_algs_cert */
3251 if (!has_usable_cert(s, lu, sig_idx))
3253 if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) {
3254 /* validate that key is large enough for the signature algorithm */
3255 EVP_PKEY *pkey = s->cert->pkeys[sig_idx].privatekey;
3257 if (!rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(s->ctx, pkey, lu))
3260 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3261 if (curve == -1 || lu->curve == curve)
3265 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3267 * Some Windows-based implementations do not send GOST algorithms indication
3268 * in supported_algorithms extension, so when we have GOST-based ciphersuite,
3269 * we have to assume GOST support.
3271 if (i == s->shared_sigalgslen && s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aGOST01 | SSL_aGOST12)) {
3272 if ((lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, -1)) == NULL) {
3275 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3276 SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG,
3277 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
3281 sig_idx = lu->sig_idx;
3285 if (i == s->shared_sigalgslen) {
3288 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3289 SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG,
3290 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
3295 * If we have no sigalg use defaults
3297 const uint16_t *sent_sigs;
3298 size_t sent_sigslen;
3300 if ((lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, -1)) == NULL) {
3303 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG,
3304 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
3308 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
3309 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sent_sigs);
3310 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i++, sent_sigs++) {
3311 if (lu->sigalg == *sent_sigs
3312 && has_usable_cert(s, lu, lu->sig_idx))
3315 if (i == sent_sigslen) {
3318 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
3319 SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG,
3320 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
3325 if ((lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, -1)) == NULL) {
3328 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG,
3329 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
3335 sig_idx = lu->sig_idx;
3336 s->s3.tmp.cert = &s->cert->pkeys[sig_idx];
3337 s->cert->key = s->s3.tmp.cert;
3338 s->s3.tmp.sigalg = lu;
3342 int SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_max_fragment_length(SSL_CTX *ctx, uint8_t mode)
3344 if (mode != TLSEXT_max_fragment_length_DISABLED
3345 && !IS_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT_VALID(mode)) {
3346 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_TLSEXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH,
3347 SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH);
3351 ctx->ext.max_fragment_len_mode = mode;
3355 int SSL_set_tlsext_max_fragment_length(SSL *ssl, uint8_t mode)
3357 if (mode != TLSEXT_max_fragment_length_DISABLED
3358 && !IS_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT_VALID(mode)) {
3359 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_TLSEXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH,
3360 SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH);
3364 ssl->ext.max_fragment_len_mode = mode;
3368 uint8_t SSL_SESSION_get_max_fragment_length(const SSL_SESSION *session)
3370 return session->ext.max_fragment_len_mode;
3374 * Helper functions for HMAC access with legacy support included.
3376 SSL_HMAC *ssl_hmac_new(const SSL_CTX *ctx)
3378 SSL_HMAC *ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret));
3379 EVP_MAC *mac = NULL;
3383 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3384 if (ctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb == NULL
3385 && ctx->ext.ticket_key_cb != NULL) {
3386 ret->old_ctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
3387 if (ret->old_ctx == NULL)
3392 mac = EVP_MAC_fetch(ctx->libctx, "HMAC", NULL);
3393 if (mac == NULL || (ret->ctx = EVP_MAC_new_ctx(mac)) == NULL)
3398 EVP_MAC_free_ctx(ret->ctx);
3404 void ssl_hmac_free(SSL_HMAC *ctx)
3407 EVP_MAC_free_ctx(ctx->ctx);
3408 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3409 HMAC_CTX_free(ctx->old_ctx);
3415 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3416 HMAC_CTX *ssl_hmac_get0_HMAC_CTX(SSL_HMAC *ctx)
3418 return ctx->old_ctx;
3422 EVP_MAC_CTX *ssl_hmac_get0_EVP_MAC_CTX(SSL_HMAC *ctx)
3427 int ssl_hmac_init(SSL_HMAC *ctx, void *key, size_t len, char *md)
3429 OSSL_PARAM params[3], *p = params;
3431 if (ctx->ctx != NULL) {
3432 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_DIGEST, md, 0);
3433 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_KEY, key, len);
3434 *p = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
3435 if (EVP_MAC_set_ctx_params(ctx->ctx, params) && EVP_MAC_init(ctx->ctx))
3438 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3439 if (ctx->old_ctx != NULL)
3440 return HMAC_Init_ex(ctx->old_ctx, key, len,
3441 EVP_get_digestbyname(md), NULL);
3446 int ssl_hmac_update(SSL_HMAC *ctx, const unsigned char *data, size_t len)
3448 if (ctx->ctx != NULL)
3449 return EVP_MAC_update(ctx->ctx, data, len);
3450 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3451 if (ctx->old_ctx != NULL)
3452 return HMAC_Update(ctx->old_ctx, data, len);
3457 int ssl_hmac_final(SSL_HMAC *ctx, unsigned char *md, size_t *len,
3460 if (ctx->ctx != NULL)
3461 return EVP_MAC_final(ctx->ctx, md, len, max_size);
3462 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3463 if (ctx->old_ctx != NULL) {
3466 if (HMAC_Final(ctx->old_ctx, md, &l) > 0) {
3476 size_t ssl_hmac_size(const SSL_HMAC *ctx)
3478 if (ctx->ctx != NULL)
3479 return EVP_MAC_size(ctx->ctx);
3480 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3481 if (ctx->old_ctx != NULL)
3482 return HMAC_size(ctx->old_ctx);