2 * Copyright 1995-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
12 #include <openssl/objects.h>
13 #include <openssl/evp.h>
14 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
15 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
16 #include <openssl/conf.h>
17 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
18 #include <openssl/dh.h>
19 #include <openssl/bn.h>
20 #include "internal/nelem.h"
22 #include <openssl/ct.h>
24 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data = {
28 tls1_generate_master_secret,
29 tls1_change_cipher_state,
30 tls1_final_finish_mac,
31 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
32 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
34 tls1_export_keying_material,
36 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
37 tls_close_construct_packet,
41 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_1_enc_data = {
45 tls1_generate_master_secret,
46 tls1_change_cipher_state,
47 tls1_final_finish_mac,
48 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
49 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
51 tls1_export_keying_material,
52 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
53 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
54 tls_close_construct_packet,
58 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_2_enc_data = {
62 tls1_generate_master_secret,
63 tls1_change_cipher_state,
64 tls1_final_finish_mac,
65 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
66 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
68 tls1_export_keying_material,
69 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
70 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
71 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
72 tls_close_construct_packet,
76 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_3_enc_data = {
79 tls13_setup_key_block,
80 tls13_generate_master_secret,
81 tls13_change_cipher_state,
82 tls13_final_finish_mac,
83 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
84 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
86 tls13_export_keying_material,
87 SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF,
88 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
89 tls_close_construct_packet,
93 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
96 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
97 * http, the cache would over fill
106 if (!s->method->ssl_clear(s))
112 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
114 OPENSSL_free(s->ext.session_ticket);
118 int tls1_clear(SSL *s)
123 if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION)
124 s->version = TLS_MAX_VERSION;
126 s->version = s->method->version;
131 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
134 * Table of curve information.
135 * Do not delete entries or reorder this array! It is used as a lookup
136 * table: the index of each entry is one less than the TLS curve id.
138 static const TLS_GROUP_INFO nid_list[] = {
139 {NID_sect163k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163k1 (1) */
140 {NID_sect163r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r1 (2) */
141 {NID_sect163r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r2 (3) */
142 {NID_sect193r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r1 (4) */
143 {NID_sect193r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r2 (5) */
144 {NID_sect233k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233k1 (6) */
145 {NID_sect233r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233r1 (7) */
146 {NID_sect239k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect239k1 (8) */
147 {NID_sect283k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283k1 (9) */
148 {NID_sect283r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283r1 (10) */
149 {NID_sect409k1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409k1 (11) */
150 {NID_sect409r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409r1 (12) */
151 {NID_sect571k1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571k1 (13) */
152 {NID_sect571r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571r1 (14) */
153 {NID_secp160k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160k1 (15) */
154 {NID_secp160r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r1 (16) */
155 {NID_secp160r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r2 (17) */
156 {NID_secp192k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192k1 (18) */
157 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192r1 (19) */
158 {NID_secp224k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224k1 (20) */
159 {NID_secp224r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224r1 (21) */
160 {NID_secp256k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256k1 (22) */
161 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256r1 (23) */
162 {NID_secp384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp384r1 (24) */
163 {NID_secp521r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp521r1 (25) */
164 {NID_brainpoolP256r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
165 {NID_brainpoolP384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
166 {NID_brainpoolP512r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
167 {EVP_PKEY_X25519, 128, TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM}, /* X25519 (29) */
170 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = {
171 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
172 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
173 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
176 /* The default curves */
177 static const uint16_t eccurves_default[] = {
178 29, /* X25519 (29) */
179 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
180 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
181 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
184 static const uint16_t suiteb_curves[] = {
189 const TLS_GROUP_INFO *tls1_group_id_lookup(uint16_t curve_id)
191 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
192 if (curve_id < 1 || curve_id > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list))
194 return &nid_list[curve_id - 1];
197 uint16_t tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
200 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(nid_list); i++) {
201 if (nid_list[i].nid == nid)
208 * Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
210 * Sets |num_curves| to the number of curves in the list, i.e.,
211 * the length of |pcurves| is num_curves.
212 * Returns 1 on success and 0 if the client curves list has invalid format.
213 * The latter indicates an internal error: we should not be accepting such
214 * lists in the first place.
216 int tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess, const uint16_t **pcurves,
219 size_t pcurveslen = 0;
222 *pcurves = s->session->ext.supportedgroups;
223 pcurveslen = s->session->ext.supportedgroups_len;
225 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
226 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
227 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
228 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
229 pcurveslen = OSSL_NELEM(suiteb_curves);
232 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
233 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
237 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
238 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 1;
242 *pcurves = s->ext.supportedgroups;
243 pcurveslen = s->ext.supportedgroups_len;
246 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
247 pcurveslen = OSSL_NELEM(eccurves_default);
251 *num_curves = pcurveslen;
255 /* See if curve is allowed by security callback */
256 int tls_curve_allowed(SSL *s, uint16_t curve, int op)
258 const TLS_GROUP_INFO *cinfo;
259 unsigned char ctmp[2];
262 if (curve < 1 || curve > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list))
264 cinfo = &nid_list[curve - 1];
265 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
266 if (cinfo->flags & TLS_CURVE_CHAR2)
269 ctmp[0] = curve >> 8;
270 ctmp[1] = curve & 0xff;
271 return ssl_security(s, op, cinfo->secbits, cinfo->nid, (void *)ctmp);
274 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
275 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
277 const uint16_t *curves;
279 size_t num_curves, i;
280 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
281 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
283 curve_id = (p[1] << 8) | p[2];
284 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
286 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
287 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) {
288 if (curve_id != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
290 } else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) {
291 if (curve_id != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
293 } else /* Should never happen */
296 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &num_curves))
298 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++) {
299 if (curve_id == curves[i])
300 return tls_curve_allowed(s, curve_id, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK);
306 * For nmatch >= 0, return the id of the |nmatch|th shared group or 0
307 * if there is no match.
308 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
309 * For nmatch == -2, return the id of the group to use for
310 * an tmp key, or 0 if there is no match.
312 uint16_t tls1_shared_group(SSL *s, int nmatch)
314 const uint16_t *pref, *supp;
315 size_t num_pref, num_supp, i, j;
318 /* Can't do anything on client side */
322 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
324 * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know
325 * these are acceptable due to previous checks.
327 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
329 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
330 return TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
331 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
332 return TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
333 /* Should never happen */
336 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
340 * Avoid truncation. tls1_get_curvelist takes an int
341 * but s->options is a long...
343 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s,
344 (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0,
347 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s,
348 (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) == 0,
352 for (k = 0, i = 0; i < num_pref; i++) {
353 uint16_t id = pref[i];
355 for (j = 0; j < num_supp; j++) {
357 if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, id, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
367 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
371 int tls1_set_groups(uint16_t **pext, size_t *pextlen,
372 int *groups, size_t ngroups)
377 * Bitmap of groups included to detect duplicates: only works while group
380 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
381 glist = OPENSSL_malloc(ngroups * sizeof(*glist));
384 for (i = 0; i < ngroups; i++) {
385 unsigned long idmask;
387 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Convert for DH groups */
388 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(groups[i]);
390 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask)) {
403 # define MAX_CURVELIST 28
407 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
410 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
412 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
418 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
420 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
422 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
424 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
425 if (nid == NID_undef)
426 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
427 if (nid == NID_undef)
428 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
429 if (nid == NID_undef)
431 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
432 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
434 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
438 /* Set groups based on a colon separate list */
439 int tls1_set_groups_list(uint16_t **pext, size_t *pextlen, const char *str)
443 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
447 return tls1_set_groups(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
450 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
451 static int tls1_set_ec_id(uint16_t *pcurve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
458 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
459 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
462 /* Determine curve ID */
463 curve_nid = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
464 *pcurve_id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curve_nid);
465 /* If no id return error: we don't support arbitrary explicit curves */
469 if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
471 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED) {
472 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
474 if ((nid_list[*pcurve_id - 1].flags & TLS_CURVE_TYPE) == TLS_CURVE_PRIME)
475 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
477 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
483 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
484 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s, uint16_t curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
486 const unsigned char *pformats;
487 const uint16_t *pcurves;
488 size_t num_formats, num_curves, i;
491 * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
492 * supported (see RFC4492).
494 if (comp_id && s->session->ext.ecpointformats) {
495 pformats = s->session->ext.ecpointformats;
496 num_formats = s->session->ext.ecpointformats_len;
497 for (i = 0; i < num_formats; i++, pformats++) {
498 if (*comp_id == *pformats)
501 if (i == num_formats)
506 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
507 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++) {
508 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &pcurves, &num_curves))
510 if (j == 1 && num_curves == 0) {
512 * If we've not received any curves then skip this check.
513 * RFC 4492 does not require the supported elliptic curves extension
514 * so if it is not sent we can just choose any curve.
515 * It is invalid to send an empty list in the elliptic curves
516 * extension, so num_curves == 0 always means no extension.
520 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++) {
521 if (pcurves[i] == curve_id)
526 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
533 void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
537 * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
539 if (s->ext.ecpointformats) {
540 *pformats = s->ext.ecpointformats;
541 *num_formats = s->ext.ecpointformats_len;
543 *pformats = ecformats_default;
544 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
546 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
548 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default);
553 * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
554 * certificates have compatible curves and compression.
556 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int check_ee_md)
558 unsigned char comp_id;
562 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
565 /* If not EC nothing to do */
566 if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) != EVP_PKEY_EC)
568 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(&curve_id, &comp_id, EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey));
572 * Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a supported
575 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : 0, &comp_id);
579 * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
582 if (check_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s)) {
587 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
588 if (curve_id == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
589 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
590 else if (curve_id == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
591 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
593 return 0; /* Should never happen */
594 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
595 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i]->sigandhash)
597 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
604 * tls1_check_ec_tmp_key - Check EC temporary key compatibility
606 * @cid: Cipher ID we're considering using
608 * Checks that the kECDHE cipher suite we're considering using
609 * is compatible with the client extensions.
611 * Returns 0 when the cipher can't be used or 1 when it can.
613 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
616 * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
619 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
622 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
623 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
624 curve_id = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
625 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
626 curve_id = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
629 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
630 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
634 /* Need a shared curve */
635 return tls1_shared_group(s, 0) != 0;
640 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
645 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
647 /* Default sigalg schemes */
648 static const uint16_t tls12_sigalgs[] = {
649 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
650 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256,
651 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384,
652 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512,
653 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed25519,
656 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_sha256,
657 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_sha384,
658 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_sha512,
660 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha256,
661 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha384,
662 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha512,
664 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
665 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha224,
666 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1,
668 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha224,
669 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1,
670 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
671 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha224,
672 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1,
674 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha256,
675 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha384,
676 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha512
680 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
681 static const uint16_t suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
682 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256,
683 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384
687 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP sigalg_lookup_tbl[] = {
688 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
689 {"ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256,
690 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
691 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256, NID_X9_62_prime256v1},
692 {"ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384,
693 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
694 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384, NID_secp384r1},
695 {"ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512,
696 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
697 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA512, NID_secp521r1},
698 {"ed25519", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed25519,
699 NID_undef, -1, EVP_PKEY_ED25519, SSL_PKEY_ED25519,
700 NID_undef, NID_undef},
701 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha224,
702 NID_sha224, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
703 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA224, NID_undef},
704 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1,
705 NID_sha1, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
706 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1, NID_undef},
708 {"rsa_pss_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_sha256,
709 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN,
710 NID_undef, NID_undef},
711 {"rsa_pss_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_sha384,
712 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN,
713 NID_undef, NID_undef},
714 {"rsa_pss_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_sha512,
715 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN,
716 NID_undef, NID_undef},
717 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha256,
718 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
719 NID_sha256WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef},
720 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha384,
721 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
722 NID_sha384WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef},
723 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha512,
724 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
725 NID_sha512WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef},
726 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha224", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha224,
727 NID_sha224, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
728 NID_sha224WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef},
729 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha1", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1,
730 NID_sha1, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
731 NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef},
732 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
733 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha256,
734 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
735 NID_dsa_with_SHA256, NID_undef},
736 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha384,
737 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
738 NID_undef, NID_undef},
739 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha512,
740 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
741 NID_undef, NID_undef},
742 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha224,
743 NID_sha224, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
744 NID_undef, NID_undef},
745 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1,
746 NID_sha1, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
747 NID_dsaWithSHA1, NID_undef},
749 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
750 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_gostr34112012_256,
751 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX,
752 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256,
753 NID_undef, NID_undef},
754 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_gostr34112012_512,
755 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX,
756 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512,
757 NID_undef, NID_undef},
758 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411,
759 NID_id_GostR3411_94, SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX,
760 NID_id_GostR3410_2001, SSL_PKEY_GOST01,
761 NID_undef, NID_undef}
764 /* Legacy sigalgs for TLS < 1.2 RSA TLS signatures */
765 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP legacy_rsa_sigalg = {
766 "rsa_pkcs1_md5_sha1", 0,
767 NID_md5_sha1, SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX,
768 EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
773 * Default signature algorithm values used if signature algorithms not present.
774 * From RFC5246. Note: order must match certificate index order.
776 static const uint16_t tls_default_sigalg[] = {
777 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1, /* SSL_PKEY_RSA */
778 0, /* SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN */
779 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1, /* SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN */
780 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1, /* SSL_PKEY_ECC */
781 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST01 */
782 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_gostr34112012_256, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256 */
783 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_gostr34112012_512, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512 */
784 0 /* SSL_PKEY_ED25519 */
787 /* Lookup TLS signature algorithm */
788 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP *tls1_lookup_sigalg(uint16_t sigalg)
791 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *s;
793 for (i = 0, s = sigalg_lookup_tbl; i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
795 if (s->sigalg == sigalg)
800 /* Lookup hash: return 0 if invalid or not enabled */
801 int tls1_lookup_md(const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu, const EVP_MD **pmd)
806 /* lu->hash == NID_undef means no associated digest */
807 if (lu->hash == NID_undef) {
810 md = ssl_md(lu->hash_idx);
820 * Return a signature algorithm for TLS < 1.2 where the signature type
821 * is fixed by the certificate type.
823 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP *tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(const SSL *s, int idx)
829 /* Work out index corresponding to ciphersuite */
830 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
831 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(i);
833 if (clu->amask & s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth) {
839 idx = s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys;
842 if (idx < 0 || idx >= (int)OSSL_NELEM(tls_default_sigalg))
844 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) || idx != SSL_PKEY_RSA) {
845 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(tls_default_sigalg[idx]);
847 if (!tls1_lookup_md(lu, NULL))
851 return &legacy_rsa_sigalg;
853 /* Set peer sigalg based key type */
854 int tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(SSL *s, const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
857 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
859 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, &idx) == NULL)
861 lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, idx);
864 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg = lu;
868 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, int sent, const uint16_t **psigs)
871 * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
874 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
875 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
876 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
877 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
878 return OSSL_NELEM(suiteb_sigalgs);
880 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
881 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
884 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
885 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 1;
890 * We use client_sigalgs (if not NULL) if we're a server
891 * and sending a certificate request or if we're a client and
892 * determining which shared algorithm to use.
894 if ((s->server == sent) && s->cert->client_sigalgs != NULL) {
895 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
896 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
897 } else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
898 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
899 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
901 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
902 return OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sigalgs);
907 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
908 * algorithms and if so set relevant digest and signature scheme in
911 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(SSL *s, uint16_t sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
913 const uint16_t *sent_sigs;
914 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
916 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
917 int pkeyid = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey);
918 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
920 /* Should never happen */
923 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
924 /* Disallow DSA for TLS 1.3 */
925 if (pkeyid == EVP_PKEY_DSA) {
926 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
929 /* Only allow PSS for TLS 1.3 */
930 if (pkeyid == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
931 pkeyid = EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS;
933 lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(sig);
935 * Check sigalgs is known. Disallow SHA1/SHA224 with TLS 1.3. Check key type
936 * is consistent with signature: RSA keys can be used for RSA-PSS
939 || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && (lu->hash == NID_sha1 || lu->hash == NID_sha224))
940 || (pkeyid != lu->sig
941 && (lu->sig != EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS || pkeyid != EVP_PKEY_RSA))) {
942 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
945 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
946 if (pkeyid == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
947 EC_KEY *ec = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey);
948 int curve = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec));
950 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
951 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) != POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED) {
952 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
953 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_POINT_COMPRESSION);
956 /* For TLS 1.3 check curve matches signature algorithm */
957 if (lu->curve != NID_undef && curve != lu->curve) {
958 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
962 unsigned char comp_id;
965 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
966 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(&curve_id, &comp_id, ec))
968 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id)) {
969 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
972 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
973 /* Check sigalg matches a permissible Suite B value */
974 if (sig != TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256
975 && sig != TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384) {
976 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
977 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
981 * Suite B also requires P-256+SHA256 and P-384+SHA384:
982 * this matches the TLS 1.3 requirements so we can just
983 * check the curve is the expected TLS 1.3 value.
984 * If this fails an inappropriate digest is being used.
986 if (curve != lu->curve) {
987 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
988 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
993 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
998 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
999 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sent_sigs);
1000 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i++, sent_sigs++) {
1001 if (sig == *sent_sigs)
1004 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
1005 if (i == sent_sigslen && (lu->hash != NID_sha1
1006 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
1007 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1010 if (!tls1_lookup_md(lu, &md)) {
1011 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
1016 * Make sure security callback allows algorithm. For historical
1017 * reasons we have to pass the sigalg as a two byte char array.
1019 sigalgstr[0] = (sig >> 8) & 0xff;
1020 sigalgstr[1] = sig & 0xff;
1021 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK,
1022 EVP_MD_size(md) * 4, EVP_MD_type(md),
1023 (void *)sigalgstr)) {
1024 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1028 /* Store the sigalg the peer uses */
1029 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg = lu;
1033 int SSL_get_peer_signature_type_nid(const SSL *s, int *pnid)
1035 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg == NULL)
1037 *pnid = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg->sig;
1042 * Set a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
1043 * supported, doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms, isn't supported
1044 * by the enabled protocol versions or by the security level.
1046 * This function should only be used for checking which ciphers are supported
1049 * Call ssl_cipher_disabled() to check that it's enabled or not.
1051 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
1053 s->s3->tmp.mask_a = 0;
1054 s->s3->tmp.mask_k = 0;
1055 ssl_set_sig_mask(&s->s3->tmp.mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
1056 ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &s->s3->tmp.min_ver, &s->s3->tmp.max_ver);
1057 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1058 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1059 if (!s->psk_client_callback) {
1060 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
1061 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_PSK;
1063 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1064 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1065 if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) {
1066 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
1067 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
1073 * ssl_cipher_disabled - check that a cipher is disabled or not
1074 * @s: SSL connection that you want to use the cipher on
1075 * @c: cipher to check
1076 * @op: Security check that you want to do
1077 * @ecdhe: If set to 1 then TLSv1 ECDHE ciphers are also allowed in SSLv3
1079 * Returns 1 when it's disabled, 0 when enabled.
1081 int ssl_cipher_disabled(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op, int ecdhe)
1083 if (c->algorithm_mkey & s->s3->tmp.mask_k
1084 || c->algorithm_auth & s->s3->tmp.mask_a)
1086 if (s->s3->tmp.max_ver == 0)
1088 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1089 int min_tls = c->min_tls;
1092 * For historical reasons we will allow ECHDE to be selected by a server
1093 * in SSLv3 if we are a client
1095 if (min_tls == TLS1_VERSION && ecdhe
1096 && (c->algorithm_mkey & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) != 0)
1097 min_tls = SSL3_VERSION;
1099 if ((min_tls > s->s3->tmp.max_ver) || (c->max_tls < s->s3->tmp.min_ver))
1102 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (DTLS_VERSION_GT(c->min_dtls, s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
1103 || DTLS_VERSION_LT(c->max_dtls, s->s3->tmp.min_ver)))
1106 return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c);
1109 int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s)
1111 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
1113 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL);
1116 int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s)
1121 /* Clear any shared signature algorithms */
1122 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
1123 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
1124 s->cert->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
1125 /* Clear certificate validity flags */
1126 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
1127 s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
1129 * If peer sent no signature algorithms check to see if we support
1130 * the default algorithm for each certificate type
1132 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs == NULL) {
1133 const uint16_t *sent_sigs;
1134 size_t sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sent_sigs);
1136 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
1137 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, i);
1142 /* Check default matches a type we sent */
1143 for (j = 0; j < sent_sigslen; j++) {
1144 if (lu->sigalg == sent_sigs[j]) {
1145 s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
1153 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
1154 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1155 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1158 if (s->cert->shared_sigalgs != NULL)
1160 /* Fatal error if no shared signature algorithms */
1161 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS);
1162 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1164 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1169 * Gets the ticket information supplied by the client if any.
1171 * hello: The parsed ClientHello data
1172 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
1173 * point to the resulting session.
1175 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
1176 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
1177 * never be decrypted, nor will s->ext.ticket_expected be set to 1.
1180 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
1181 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
1182 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
1183 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
1184 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
1185 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
1186 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
1189 * Sets s->ext.ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
1190 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
1191 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
1192 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
1193 * s->ctx->ext.ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
1194 * Otherwise, s->ext.ticket_expected is set to 0.
1196 TICKET_RETURN tls_get_ticket_from_client(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello,
1201 RAW_EXTENSION *ticketext;
1204 s->ext.ticket_expected = 0;
1207 * If tickets disabled or not supported by the protocol version
1208 * (e.g. TLSv1.3) behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
1211 if (s->version <= SSL3_VERSION || !tls_use_ticket(s))
1214 ticketext = &hello->pre_proc_exts[TLSEXT_IDX_session_ticket];
1215 if (!ticketext->present)
1218 size = PACKET_remaining(&ticketext->data);
1221 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
1224 s->ext.ticket_expected = 1;
1225 return TICKET_EMPTY;
1227 if (s->ext.session_secret_cb) {
1229 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
1230 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
1231 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
1232 * calculate the master secret later.
1234 return TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1237 retv = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, PACKET_data(&ticketext->data), size,
1238 hello->session_id, hello->session_id_len, ret);
1240 case TICKET_NO_DECRYPT:
1241 s->ext.ticket_expected = 1;
1242 return TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1244 case TICKET_SUCCESS:
1245 return TICKET_SUCCESS;
1247 case TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW:
1248 s->ext.ticket_expected = 1;
1249 return TICKET_SUCCESS;
1252 return TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1257 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
1259 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
1260 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extension.
1261 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
1262 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
1263 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
1264 * point to the resulting session.
1266 TICKET_RETURN tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
1267 size_t eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id,
1268 size_t sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess)
1271 unsigned char *sdec;
1272 const unsigned char *p;
1273 int slen, renew_ticket = 0, declen;
1274 TICKET_RETURN ret = TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1276 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
1277 HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL;
1278 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
1279 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->session_ctx;
1281 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
1282 hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
1284 return TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC;
1285 ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
1287 ret = TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC;
1290 if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb) {
1291 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
1292 int rv = tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
1297 ret = TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1303 /* Check key name matches */
1304 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->ext.tick_key_name,
1305 sizeof(tctx->ext.tick_key_name)) != 0) {
1306 ret = TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1309 if (HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->ext.tick_hmac_key,
1310 sizeof(tctx->ext.tick_hmac_key),
1311 EVP_sha256(), NULL) <= 0
1312 || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_256_cbc(), NULL,
1313 tctx->ext.tick_aes_key,
1315 + sizeof(tctx->ext.tick_key_name)) <= 0) {
1320 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
1323 mlen = HMAC_size(hctx);
1327 /* Sanity check ticket length: must exceed keyname + IV + HMAC */
1329 TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx) + mlen) {
1330 ret = TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1334 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
1335 if (HMAC_Update(hctx, etick, eticklen) <= 0
1336 || HMAC_Final(hctx, tick_hmac, NULL) <= 0) {
1339 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
1340 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) {
1341 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
1342 return TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1344 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
1345 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
1346 p = etick + TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
1347 eticklen -= TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
1348 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
1349 if (sdec == NULL || EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, sdec, &slen, p,
1350 (int)eticklen) <= 0) {
1351 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
1353 return TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1355 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(ctx, sdec + slen, &declen) <= 0) {
1356 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
1358 return TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1361 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
1365 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
1369 /* Some additional consistency checks */
1370 if (slen != 0 || sess->session_id_length != 0) {
1371 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
1372 return TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1375 * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
1376 * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
1377 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
1381 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
1382 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
1385 return TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW;
1387 return TICKET_SUCCESS;
1391 * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
1393 return TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1395 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
1396 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
1400 /* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
1401 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(SSL *s, int op, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu)
1403 unsigned char sigalgstr[2];
1406 /* See if sigalgs is recognised and if hash is enabled */
1407 if (!tls1_lookup_md(lu, NULL))
1409 /* DSA is not allowed in TLS 1.3 */
1410 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
1412 /* TODO(OpenSSL1.2) fully axe DSA/etc. in ClientHello per TLS 1.3 spec */
1413 if (!s->server && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->s3->tmp.min_ver >= TLS1_3_VERSION
1414 && (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_DSA || lu->hash_idx == SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX
1415 || lu->hash_idx == SSL_MD_MD5_IDX
1416 || lu->hash_idx == SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX))
1418 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
1419 if (ssl_cert_is_disabled(lu->sig_idx))
1421 if (lu->hash == NID_undef)
1423 /* Security bits: half digest bits */
1424 secbits = EVP_MD_size(ssl_md(lu->hash_idx)) * 4;
1425 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
1426 sigalgstr[0] = (lu->sigalg >> 8) & 0xff;
1427 sigalgstr[1] = lu->sigalg & 0xff;
1428 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, lu->hash, (void *)sigalgstr);
1432 * Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported signature
1433 * algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA then RSA is
1437 void ssl_set_sig_mask(uint32_t *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op)
1439 const uint16_t *sigalgs;
1440 size_t i, sigalgslen;
1441 uint32_t disabled_mask = SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS | SSL_aECDSA;
1443 * Go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any
1446 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sigalgs);
1447 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i ++, sigalgs++) {
1448 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(*sigalgs);
1449 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu;
1454 clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(lu->sig_idx);
1456 /* If algorithm is disabled see if we can enable it */
1457 if ((clu->amask & disabled_mask) != 0
1458 && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, lu))
1459 disabled_mask &= ~clu->amask;
1461 *pmask_a |= disabled_mask;
1464 int tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1465 const uint16_t *psig, size_t psiglen)
1470 for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i++, psig++) {
1471 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(*psig);
1473 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, lu))
1475 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, *psig))
1478 * If TLS 1.3 must have at least one valid TLS 1.3 message
1479 * signing algorithm: i.e. neither RSA nor SHA1/SHA224
1481 if (rv == 0 && (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
1482 || (lu->sig != EVP_PKEY_RSA
1483 && lu->hash != NID_sha1
1484 && lu->hash != NID_sha224)))
1488 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_COPY_SIGALGS, SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
1492 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
1493 static size_t tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP **shsig,
1494 const uint16_t *pref, size_t preflen,
1495 const uint16_t *allow, size_t allowlen)
1497 const uint16_t *ptmp, *atmp;
1498 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
1499 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i++, ptmp++) {
1500 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(*ptmp);
1502 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
1503 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED, lu))
1505 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j++, atmp++) {
1506 if (*ptmp == *atmp) {
1517 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
1518 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
1520 const uint16_t *pref, *allow, *conf;
1521 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
1523 const SIGALG_LOOKUP **salgs = NULL;
1525 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
1527 OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
1528 c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
1529 c->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
1530 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
1531 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
1532 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
1533 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
1534 } else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
1535 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
1536 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
1538 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 0, &conf);
1539 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb) {
1542 allow = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
1543 allowlen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
1547 pref = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
1548 preflen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
1550 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
1552 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(*salgs));
1555 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
1559 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
1560 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
1564 int tls1_save_u16(PACKET *pkt, uint16_t **pdest, size_t *pdestlen)
1570 size = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
1572 /* Invalid data length */
1573 if (size == 0 || (size & 1) != 0)
1578 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(size * sizeof(*buf));
1581 for (i = 0; i < size && PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &stmp); i++)
1589 OPENSSL_free(*pdest);
1596 int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1598 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
1599 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
1601 /* Should never happen */
1602 if (s->cert == NULL)
1605 return tls1_save_u16(pkt, &s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs,
1606 &s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen);
1611 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
1613 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s)
1616 uint32_t *pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags;
1619 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s))
1622 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
1625 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
1626 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs[i];
1627 int idx = sigptr->sig_idx;
1629 /* Ignore PKCS1 based sig algs in TLSv1.3 */
1630 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && sigptr->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
1632 /* If not disabled indicate we can explicitly sign */
1633 if (pvalid[idx] == 0 && !ssl_cert_is_disabled(idx))
1634 pvalid[idx] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
1639 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
1640 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
1641 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
1643 uint16_t *psig = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
1644 size_t numsigalgs = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
1645 if (psig == NULL || numsigalgs > INT_MAX)
1648 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
1650 if (idx >= (int)numsigalgs)
1654 *rhash = (unsigned char)((*psig >> 8) & 0xff);
1656 *rsig = (unsigned char)(*psig & 0xff);
1657 lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(*psig);
1659 *psign = lu != NULL ? lu->sig : NID_undef;
1661 *phash = lu != NULL ? lu->hash : NID_undef;
1662 if (psignhash != NULL)
1663 *psignhash = lu != NULL ? lu->sigandhash : NID_undef;
1665 return (int)numsigalgs;
1668 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
1669 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
1670 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
1672 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *shsigalgs;
1673 if (s->cert->shared_sigalgs == NULL
1675 || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen
1676 || s->cert->shared_sigalgslen > INT_MAX)
1678 shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs[idx];
1680 *phash = shsigalgs->hash;
1682 *psign = shsigalgs->sig;
1683 if (psignhash != NULL)
1684 *psignhash = shsigalgs->sigandhash;
1686 *rsig = (unsigned char)(shsigalgs->sigalg & 0xff);
1688 *rhash = (unsigned char)((shsigalgs->sigalg >> 8) & 0xff);
1689 return (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
1692 /* Maximum possible number of unique entries in sigalgs array */
1693 #define TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT (OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl) * 2)
1697 int sigalgs[TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT];
1700 static void get_sigorhash(int *psig, int *phash, const char *str)
1702 if (strcmp(str, "RSA") == 0) {
1703 *psig = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
1704 } else if (strcmp(str, "RSA-PSS") == 0 || strcmp(str, "PSS") == 0) {
1705 *psig = EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS;
1706 } else if (strcmp(str, "DSA") == 0) {
1707 *psig = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
1708 } else if (strcmp(str, "ECDSA") == 0) {
1709 *psig = EVP_PKEY_EC;
1711 *phash = OBJ_sn2nid(str);
1712 if (*phash == NID_undef)
1713 *phash = OBJ_ln2nid(str);
1716 /* Maximum length of a signature algorithm string component */
1717 #define TLS_MAX_SIGSTRING_LEN 40
1719 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
1721 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
1723 char etmp[TLS_MAX_SIGSTRING_LEN], *p;
1724 int sig_alg = NID_undef, hash_alg = NID_undef;
1727 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT)
1729 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
1731 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
1733 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
1734 /* See if we have a match for TLS 1.3 names */
1736 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *s;
1738 for (i = 0, s = sigalg_lookup_tbl; i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
1740 if (s->name != NULL && strcmp(etmp, s->name) == 0) {
1751 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, etmp);
1752 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, p);
1755 if (sig_alg == NID_undef || (p != NULL && hash_alg == NID_undef))
1758 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i += 2) {
1759 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
1762 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
1763 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
1768 * Set supported signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
1769 * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
1771 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
1775 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
1779 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
1782 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
1784 uint16_t *sigalgs, *sptr;
1789 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc((salglen / 2) * sizeof(*sigalgs));
1790 if (sigalgs == NULL)
1792 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i += 2) {
1794 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *curr;
1795 int md_id = *psig_nids++;
1796 int sig_id = *psig_nids++;
1798 for (j = 0, curr = sigalg_lookup_tbl; j < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
1800 if (curr->hash == md_id && curr->sig == sig_id) {
1801 *sptr++ = curr->sigalg;
1806 if (j == OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl))
1811 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
1812 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
1813 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen / 2;
1815 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
1816 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
1817 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen / 2;
1823 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
1827 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
1831 if (default_nid == -1)
1833 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
1835 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
1836 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
1837 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i]->sigandhash)
1842 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
1843 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
1847 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
1848 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++) {
1849 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
1856 * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by
1857 * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before
1858 * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before
1859 * attempting to use them.
1862 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when strict mode not set */
1864 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
1865 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
1866 /* Strict mode flags */
1867 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
1868 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
1869 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
1871 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
1876 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
1877 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
1880 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
1881 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
1883 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
1886 idx = (int)(cpk - c->pkeys);
1888 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
1889 pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
1891 pk = cpk->privatekey;
1893 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
1894 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
1903 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pk, &certidx) == NULL)
1906 pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
1908 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
1909 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
1911 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
1918 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
1919 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
1920 if (ok == X509_V_OK)
1921 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
1922 else if (!check_flags)
1927 * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature
1928 * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode.
1930 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode) {
1933 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs)
1935 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
1939 rsign = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
1940 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
1943 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
1944 rsign = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
1945 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
1949 rsign = EVP_PKEY_EC;
1950 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
1953 case SSL_PKEY_GOST01:
1954 rsign = NID_id_GostR3410_2001;
1955 default_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001;
1958 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256:
1959 rsign = NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256;
1960 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_256;
1963 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512:
1964 rsign = NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512;
1965 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_512;
1974 * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set
1975 * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1.
1977 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs) {
1979 const uint16_t *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
1980 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j++, p++) {
1981 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(*p);
1983 if (lu != NULL && lu->hash == NID_sha1 && lu->sig == rsign)
1986 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen) {
1993 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
1994 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid)) {
1998 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
1999 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
2000 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
2001 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i), default_nid)) {
2003 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
2010 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
2011 else if (check_flags)
2012 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE | CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
2014 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
2015 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, 1))
2016 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
2017 else if (!check_flags)
2020 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
2021 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
2022 else if (strict_mode) {
2023 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
2024 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
2025 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
2026 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0)) {
2028 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
2035 if (!s->server && strict_mode) {
2036 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
2038 switch (EVP_PKEY_id(pk)) {
2040 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
2043 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
2046 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
2050 const uint8_t *ctypes = s->s3->tmp.ctype;
2053 for (j = 0; j < s->s3->tmp.ctype_len; j++, ctypes++) {
2054 if (*ctypes == check_type) {
2055 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
2059 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
2062 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
2065 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.peer_ca_names;
2067 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
2068 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
2070 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
2071 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
2072 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
2074 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
2075 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
2076 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
2077 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp)) {
2078 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
2083 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
2086 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME | CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
2088 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
2089 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
2093 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
2094 rv |= *pvalid & (CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN);
2096 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
2099 * When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the
2103 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID) {
2106 /* Preserve sign and explicit sign flag, clear rest */
2107 *pvalid &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
2114 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
2115 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
2117 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA);
2118 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN);
2119 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
2120 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
2121 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST01);
2122 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256);
2123 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512);
2124 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ED25519);
2127 /* User level utility function to check a chain is suitable */
2128 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
2130 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);
2133 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2134 DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s)
2136 int dh_secbits = 80;
2137 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto == 2)
2138 return DH_get_1024_160();
2139 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aPSK)) {
2140 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256)
2145 if (s->s3->tmp.cert == NULL)
2147 dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(s->s3->tmp.cert->privatekey);
2150 if (dh_secbits >= 128) {
2158 if (dh_secbits >= 192)
2159 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL);
2161 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL);
2162 if (p == NULL || g == NULL || !DH_set0_pqg(dhp, p, NULL, g)) {
2170 if (dh_secbits >= 112)
2171 return DH_get_2048_224();
2172 return DH_get_1024_160();
2176 static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
2179 EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
2182 * If no parameters this will return -1 and fail using the default
2183 * security callback for any non-zero security level. This will
2184 * reject keys which omit parameters but this only affects DSA and
2185 * omission of parameters is never (?) done in practice.
2187 secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey);
2190 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, 0, x);
2192 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, 0, x);
2195 static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
2197 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
2198 int secbits, nid, pknid;
2199 /* Don't check signature if self signed */
2200 if ((X509_get_extension_flags(x) & EXFLAG_SS) != 0)
2202 if (!X509_get_signature_info(x, &nid, &pknid, &secbits, NULL))
2204 /* If digest NID not defined use signature NID */
2205 if (nid == NID_undef)
2208 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, nid, x);
2210 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, nid, x);
2213 int ssl_security_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int vfy, int is_ee)
2216 vfy = SSL_SECOP_PEER;
2218 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY | vfy))
2219 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
2221 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY | vfy))
2222 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
2224 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD | vfy))
2225 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK;
2230 * Check security of a chain, if |sk| includes the end entity certificate then
2231 * |x| is NULL. If |vfy| is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and not sending
2232 * one to the peer. Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
2235 int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x, int vfy)
2237 int rv, start_idx, i;
2239 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
2244 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 1);
2248 for (i = start_idx; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
2249 x = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
2250 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 0);
2258 * For TLS 1.2 servers check if we have a certificate which can be used
2259 * with the signature algorithm "lu" and return index of certificate.
2262 static int tls12_get_cert_sigalg_idx(const SSL *s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu)
2264 int sig_idx = lu->sig_idx;
2265 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(sig_idx);
2267 /* If not recognised or not supported by cipher mask it is not suitable */
2268 if (clu == NULL || !(clu->amask & s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth))
2271 /* If PSS and we have no PSS cert use RSA */
2272 if (sig_idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN && !ssl_has_cert(s, sig_idx))
2273 sig_idx = SSL_PKEY_RSA;
2275 return s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[sig_idx] & CERT_PKEY_VALID ? sig_idx : -1;
2279 * Choose an appropriate signature algorithm based on available certificates
2280 * Sets chosen certificate and signature algorithm.
2282 * For servers if we fail to find a required certificate it is a fatal error
2283 * and an appropriate error code is set and the TLS alert set in *al.
2285 * For clients al is set to NULL. If a certificate is not suitable it is not
2286 * a fatal error: we will either try another certificate or not present one
2287 * to the server. In this case no error is set.
2289 int tls_choose_sigalg(SSL *s, int *al)
2291 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = NULL;
2294 s->s3->tmp.cert = NULL;
2295 s->s3->tmp.sigalg = NULL;
2297 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2299 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2300 int curve = -1, skip_ec = 0;
2303 /* Look for a certificate matching shared sigalgs */
2304 for (i = 0; i < s->cert->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
2305 lu = s->cert->shared_sigalgs[i];
2307 /* Skip SHA1, SHA224, DSA and RSA if not PSS */
2308 if (lu->hash == NID_sha1
2309 || lu->hash == NID_sha224
2310 || lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_DSA
2311 || lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
2313 if (!tls1_lookup_md(lu, NULL))
2315 if (!ssl_has_cert(s, lu->sig_idx)) {
2316 if (lu->sig_idx != SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN
2317 || !ssl_has_cert(s, SSL_PKEY_RSA))
2319 sig_idx = SSL_PKEY_RSA;
2321 if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
2322 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2324 EC_KEY *ec = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey);
2326 curve = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec));
2327 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec)
2328 != POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED)
2331 if (skip_ec || (lu->curve != NID_undef && curve != lu->curve))
2339 if (i == s->cert->shared_sigalgslen) {
2342 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2343 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG,
2344 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
2348 /* If ciphersuite doesn't require a cert nothing to do */
2349 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aCERT))
2351 if (!s->server && !ssl_has_cert(s, s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys))
2354 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2355 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs != NULL) {
2357 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2360 /* For Suite B need to match signature algorithm to curve */
2361 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
2362 EC_KEY *ec = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey);
2363 curve = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec));
2370 * Find highest preference signature algorithm matching
2373 for (i = 0; i < s->cert->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
2374 lu = s->cert->shared_sigalgs[i];
2377 if ((sig_idx = tls12_get_cert_sigalg_idx(s, lu)) == -1)
2380 int cc_idx = s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys;
2382 sig_idx = lu->sig_idx;
2383 if (cc_idx != sig_idx) {
2384 if (sig_idx != SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN
2385 || cc_idx != SSL_PKEY_RSA)
2387 sig_idx = SSL_PKEY_RSA;
2390 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2391 if (curve == -1 || lu->curve == curve)
2395 if (i == s->cert->shared_sigalgslen) {
2398 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2399 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2404 * If we have no sigalg use defaults
2406 const uint16_t *sent_sigs;
2407 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
2409 if ((lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, -1)) == NULL) {
2412 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2413 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2417 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
2418 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sent_sigs);
2419 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i++, sent_sigs++) {
2420 if (lu->sigalg == *sent_sigs)
2423 if (i == sent_sigslen) {
2426 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
2427 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2432 if ((lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, -1)) == NULL) {
2435 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2436 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2442 sig_idx = lu->sig_idx;
2443 s->s3->tmp.cert = &s->cert->pkeys[sig_idx];
2444 s->cert->key = s->s3->tmp.cert;
2445 s->s3->tmp.sigalg = lu;