2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
113 #include <openssl/objects.h>
114 #include <openssl/evp.h>
115 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
116 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
117 #include <openssl/rand.h>
118 #include "ssl_locl.h"
120 const char tls1_version_str[]="TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
122 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
123 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
124 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
125 SSL_SESSION **psess);
126 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
127 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
130 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data={
133 tls1_setup_key_block,
134 tls1_generate_master_secret,
135 tls1_change_cipher_state,
136 tls1_final_finish_mac,
137 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
138 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
139 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
140 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
142 tls1_export_keying_material,
144 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
145 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
149 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_1_enc_data={
152 tls1_setup_key_block,
153 tls1_generate_master_secret,
154 tls1_change_cipher_state,
155 tls1_final_finish_mac,
156 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
157 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
158 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
159 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
161 tls1_export_keying_material,
162 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
163 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
164 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
168 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_2_enc_data={
171 tls1_setup_key_block,
172 tls1_generate_master_secret,
173 tls1_change_cipher_state,
174 tls1_final_finish_mac,
175 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
176 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
177 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
178 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
180 tls1_export_keying_material,
181 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV|SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS|SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
182 |SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
183 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
184 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
188 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
190 /* 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec
191 * is way too long for http, the cache would over fill */
197 if (!ssl3_new(s)) return(0);
198 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
202 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
204 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
205 if (s->tlsext_session_ticket)
207 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
209 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
213 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
216 s->version = s->method->version;
219 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
221 static int nid_list[] =
223 NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
224 NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */
225 NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */
226 NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */
227 NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */
228 NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */
229 NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */
230 NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */
231 NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */
232 NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */
233 NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */
234 NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */
235 NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */
236 NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */
237 NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */
238 NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */
239 NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */
240 NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */
241 NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */
242 NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */
243 NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */
244 NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */
245 NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */
246 NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */
247 NID_secp521r1 /* secp521r1 (25) */
251 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] =
253 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
254 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
255 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
258 static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] =
260 0,14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
261 0,13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
262 0,25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
263 0,11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
264 0,12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
265 0,24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
266 0,9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
267 0,10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
268 0,22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
269 0,23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
270 0,8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
271 0,6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
272 0,7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
273 0,20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
274 0,21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
275 0,4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
276 0,5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
277 0,18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
278 0,19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
279 0,1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
280 0,2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
281 0,3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
282 0,15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
283 0,16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
284 0,17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
287 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] =
289 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
290 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
293 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
295 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
296 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id >
297 sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0])))
299 return nid_list[curve_id-1];
302 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
304 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
307 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
309 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
311 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
313 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
315 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
317 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
319 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
321 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
323 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
325 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
327 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
329 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
331 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
333 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
335 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
337 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
339 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
341 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
343 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
345 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
347 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
349 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
351 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
353 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
355 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
361 /* Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
364 static void tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
365 const unsigned char **pcurves,
370 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
371 *pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
374 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
375 switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
377 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
378 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
379 *pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
382 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
383 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
387 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
388 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
392 *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
393 *pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
397 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
398 *pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
401 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
402 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
404 const unsigned char *curves;
406 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
407 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
409 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
412 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
415 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
417 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
420 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
422 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
425 else /* Should never happen */
428 tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &curveslen);
429 for (i = 0; i < curveslen; i += 2, curves += 2)
431 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
437 /* Return nth shared curve. If nmatch == -1 return number of
438 * matches. For nmatch == -2 return the NID of the curve to use for
442 int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
444 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
445 size_t preflen, supplen, i, j;
447 /* Can't do anything on client side */
454 /* For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we
455 * already know these are acceptable due to previous
458 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
459 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
460 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
461 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
462 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
463 /* Should never happen */
466 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
469 tls1_get_curvelist(s, !!(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
471 tls1_get_curvelist(s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
476 for (i = 0; i < preflen; i++, pref+=2)
478 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
479 for (j = 0; j < supplen; j++, tsupp+=2)
481 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1])
485 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
486 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id);
497 int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
498 int *curves, size_t ncurves)
500 unsigned char *clist, *p;
502 /* Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works
503 * while curve ids < 32
505 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
506 clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
509 for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++)
511 unsigned long idmask;
513 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
515 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask))
526 *pextlen = ncurves * 2;
530 #define MAX_CURVELIST 25
535 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
538 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
540 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
544 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
546 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
548 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
550 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
551 if (nid == NID_undef)
552 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
553 if (nid == NID_undef)
554 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
555 if (nid == NID_undef)
557 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
558 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
560 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
563 /* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
564 int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
569 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
573 return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
575 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
576 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
582 const EC_METHOD *meth;
585 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
586 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
587 pt = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec);
590 meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(grp);
593 if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
597 /* Determine curve ID */
598 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
599 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
600 /* If we have an ID set it, otherwise set arbitrary explicit curve */
604 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
616 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED)
619 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
621 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
624 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
628 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
629 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
630 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
632 const unsigned char *p;
635 /* If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything
636 * is supported (see RFC4492).
638 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
640 p = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
641 plen = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
642 for (i = 0; i < plen; i++, p++)
652 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
653 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++)
655 tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &p, &plen);
656 for (i = 0; i < plen; i+=2, p+=2)
658 if (p[0] == curve_id[0] && p[1] == curve_id[1])
663 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
670 static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
673 /* If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise
675 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
677 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
678 *pformatslen = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
682 *pformats = ecformats_default;
683 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
685 *pformatslen = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
687 *pformatslen = sizeof(ecformats_default);
691 /* Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks
692 * EC certificates have compatible curves and compression.
694 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
696 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
699 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
702 /* If not EC nothing to do */
703 if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)
708 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec);
712 /* Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a
713 * supported curves extension.
715 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
718 /* Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
719 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
721 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s))
728 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
729 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
730 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
731 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
732 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
734 return 0; /* Should never happen */
735 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
736 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
738 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
742 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
743 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha256();
745 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha384();
750 /* Check EC temporary key is compatible with client extensions */
751 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
753 unsigned char curve_id[2];
754 EC_KEY *ec = s->cert->ecdh_tmp;
755 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
756 /* Allow any curve: not just those peer supports */
757 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
760 /* If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384,
761 * no other curves permitted.
765 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
766 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
767 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
768 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
769 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
773 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
774 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
776 /* If auto or setting curve from callback assume OK */
777 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto || s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
779 /* Otherwise check curve is acceptable */
782 unsigned char curve_tmp[2];
785 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_tmp, NULL, ec))
787 if (!curve_tmp[0] || curve_tmp[1] == curve_id[1])
793 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
795 /* Need a shared curve */
796 if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
802 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
807 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, NULL, ec))
809 /* Set this to allow use of invalid curves for testing */
813 return tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL);
819 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
824 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
826 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
828 /* List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
829 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
832 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
833 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
835 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
838 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
839 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
841 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
844 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
845 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */
847 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
850 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
851 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
852 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
853 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
855 static unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
856 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
857 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
858 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
860 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
861 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
862 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
864 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
865 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
867 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
868 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(TLSEXT_hash_md5)
871 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
872 static unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
873 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
874 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
877 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
879 /* If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
882 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
883 switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
885 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
886 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
887 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
889 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
890 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
893 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
894 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
898 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
899 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs)
901 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
902 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
904 else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs)
906 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
907 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
911 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
913 /* If FIPS mode don't include MD5 which is last */
915 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs) - 2;
918 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
921 /* Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
922 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
924 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
925 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
927 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
928 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
929 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
930 /* Should never happen */
933 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
934 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1])
936 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
939 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
940 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
942 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
943 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
944 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec))
946 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id))
948 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
951 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
956 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
958 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
960 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
961 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
965 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
967 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
969 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
970 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
978 else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
982 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
983 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
984 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i+=2, sent_sigs+=2)
986 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
989 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
990 if (i == sent_sigslen && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
992 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
995 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
998 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
1001 /* Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they
1004 if (s->session && s->session->sess_cert)
1005 s->session->sess_cert->peer_key->digest = *pmd;
1008 /* Get a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled
1009 * if it isn't supported or doesn't appear in supported signature
1010 * algorithms. Unlike ssl_cipher_get_disabled this applies to a specific
1011 * session and not global settings.
1014 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
1017 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
1018 size_t i, sigalgslen;
1019 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
1022 /* Don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers if we don't suppport them */
1023 if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s))
1024 c->mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
1027 /* Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support
1028 * any for RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just
1031 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
1032 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2)
1036 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1037 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
1041 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
1042 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
1046 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
1047 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
1053 /* Disable auth and static DH if we don't include any appropriate
1054 * signature algorithms.
1058 c->mask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
1059 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHr|SSL_kECDHr;
1063 c->mask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
1064 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHd;
1068 c->mask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
1069 c->mask_k |= SSL_kECDHe;
1071 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1072 if (!kssl_tgt_is_available(s->kssl_ctx))
1074 c->mask_a |= SSL_aKRB5;
1075 c->mask_k |= SSL_kKRB5;
1078 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1079 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1080 if (!s->psk_client_callback)
1082 c->mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
1083 c->mask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
1085 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1089 /* byte_compare is a compare function for qsort(3) that compares bytes. */
1090 static int byte_compare(const void *in_a, const void *in_b)
1092 unsigned char a = *((const unsigned char*) in_a);
1093 unsigned char b = *((const unsigned char*) in_b);
1102 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
1105 unsigned char *ret = p;
1106 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1107 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1109 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
1112 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1113 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1115 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++)
1117 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1119 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1120 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1121 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)
1122 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
1131 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */
1132 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION
1133 && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1138 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1140 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
1142 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1143 unsigned long size_str;
1146 /* check for enough space.
1147 4 for the servername type and entension length
1148 2 for servernamelist length
1149 1 for the hostname type
1150 2 for hostname length
1154 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
1155 || (size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
1158 /* extension type and length */
1159 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1160 s2n(size_str+5,ret);
1162 /* length of servername list */
1163 s2n(size_str+3,ret);
1165 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
1166 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
1168 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
1172 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1177 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1179 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1183 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1185 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1188 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1190 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1197 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1198 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
1199 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
1200 { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the Client Hello message */
1202 int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
1203 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0)
1205 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1209 /* check for enough space.
1210 4 for the srp type type and entension length
1211 1 for the srp user identity
1212 + srp user identity length
1214 if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0) return NULL;
1216 /* fill in the extension */
1217 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp,ret);
1218 s2n(login_len+1,ret);
1219 (*ret++) = (unsigned char) login_len;
1220 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
1225 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1228 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */
1230 const unsigned char *plist;
1233 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1235 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
1236 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1239 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1243 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
1244 s2n(plistlen + 1,ret);
1245 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)plistlen ;
1246 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1249 /* Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message */
1250 plist = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1251 tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &plist, &plistlen);
1253 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) return NULL;
1254 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1255 if (plistlen > 65532)
1257 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1261 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves,ret);
1262 s2n(plistlen + 2, ret);
1264 /* NB: draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt uses a one-byte prefix for
1265 * elliptic_curve_list, but the examples use two bytes.
1266 * http://www1.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg00538.html
1267 * resolves this to two bytes.
1270 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1273 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1275 if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
1278 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
1279 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
1280 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1281 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data)
1283 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1284 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1285 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
1287 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1288 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data,
1290 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1294 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1295 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1297 /* Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len
1300 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0) return NULL;
1301 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1305 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
1311 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
1314 const unsigned char *salg;
1315 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
1316 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < salglen + 6)
1318 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms,ret);
1319 s2n(salglen + 2, ret);
1321 memcpy(ret, salg, salglen);
1325 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1326 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1328 size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len;
1330 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col < 0))
1332 if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1335 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1338 memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col);
1343 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
1346 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
1350 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
1352 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1353 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1359 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
1361 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1368 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0) return NULL;
1369 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1370 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
1372 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
1373 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
1375 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
1377 /* save position of id len */
1378 unsigned char *q = ret;
1379 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1380 /* skip over id len */
1382 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
1388 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
1391 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1392 /* Add Heartbeat extension */
1393 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1396 * 1: peer may send requests
1397 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1399 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1400 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1402 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1405 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1406 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
1408 /* The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its
1409 * support for Next Protocol Negotiation */
1410 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
1412 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1417 if(SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s))
1421 ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1423 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1425 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1428 if(ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1430 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1436 /* Add TLS extension Server_Authz_DataFormats to the ClientHello */
1437 /* 2 bytes for extension type */
1438 /* 2 bytes for extension length */
1439 /* 1 byte for the list length */
1440 /* 1 byte for the list (we only support audit proofs) */
1441 if (s->ctx->tlsext_authz_server_audit_proof_cb != NULL)
1443 const unsigned short ext_len = 2;
1444 const unsigned char list_len = 1;
1446 if (limit < ret + 6)
1449 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz, ret);
1450 /* Extension length: 2 bytes */
1452 *(ret++) = list_len;
1453 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_AUTHZDATAFORMAT_audit_proof;
1456 /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
1457 if (s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count)
1460 custom_cli_ext_record* record;
1462 for (i = 0; i < s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count; i++)
1464 const unsigned char* out = NULL;
1465 unsigned short outlen = 0;
1467 record = &s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records[i];
1468 /* NULL callback sends empty extension */
1469 /* -1 from callback omits extension */
1473 cb_retval = record->fn1(s, record->ext_type,
1477 return NULL; /* error */
1478 if (cb_retval == -1)
1479 continue; /* skip this extension */
1481 if (limit < ret + 4 + outlen)
1483 s2n(record->ext_type, ret);
1485 memcpy(ret, out, outlen);
1490 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2) == 0)
1497 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
1500 unsigned char *ret = p;
1501 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1502 int next_proto_neg_seen;
1504 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1505 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1506 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1507 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1508 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1510 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */
1511 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1515 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1517 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
1519 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1521 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1525 if(s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1529 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1531 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1535 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1537 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1540 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1542 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1549 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1552 const unsigned char *plist;
1554 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message */
1557 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1559 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
1560 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1563 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1567 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
1568 s2n(plistlen + 1,ret);
1569 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) plistlen;
1570 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1574 /* Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves extension */
1575 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1577 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected
1578 && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
1580 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1581 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1585 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
1587 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1588 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request,ret);
1592 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1593 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1595 size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len;
1597 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - sol) < 0)
1599 if (sol > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1602 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1605 memcpy(ret, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input, sol);
1614 ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1616 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1618 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1621 if(ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1623 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1629 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x80 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x81)
1630 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG))
1631 { const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1632 0xfd, 0xe8, /*65000*/
1633 0x00, 0x20, /*32 bytes length*/
1634 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1635 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1636 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1637 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17};
1638 if (limit-ret<36) return NULL;
1639 memcpy(ret,cryptopro_ext,36);
1644 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1645 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
1646 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED)
1648 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1651 * 1: peer may send requests
1652 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1654 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1655 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1657 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1662 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1663 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1664 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1665 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb)
1667 const unsigned char *npa;
1668 unsigned int npalen;
1671 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1672 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
1674 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0) return NULL;
1675 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1677 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
1679 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1684 /* If the client supports authz then see whether we have any to offer
1686 if (s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len)
1688 size_t authz_length;
1689 /* By now we already know the new cipher, so we can look ahead
1690 * to see whether the cert we are going to send
1691 * has any authz data attached to it. */
1692 const unsigned char* authz = ssl_get_authz_data(s, &authz_length);
1693 const unsigned char* const orig_authz = authz;
1695 unsigned authz_count = 0;
1697 /* The authz data contains a number of the following structures:
1698 * uint8_t authz_type
1700 * uint8_t data[length]
1702 * First we walk over it to find the number of authz elements. */
1703 for (i = 0; i < authz_length; i++)
1705 unsigned short length;
1709 if (memchr(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
1711 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len) != NULL)
1715 /* n2s increments authz by 2 */
1723 /* Add TLS extension server_authz to the ServerHello message
1724 * 2 bytes for extension type
1725 * 2 bytes for extension length
1726 * 1 byte for the list length
1727 * n bytes for the list */
1728 const unsigned short ext_len = 1 + authz_count;
1730 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ext_len) < 0) return NULL;
1731 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz, ret);
1733 *(ret++) = authz_count;
1734 s->s3->tlsext_authz_promised_to_client = 1;
1738 for (i = 0; i < authz_length; i++)
1740 unsigned short length;
1745 if (memchr(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
1747 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len) != NULL)
1750 /* n2s increments authz by 2 */
1757 /* If custom types were sent in ClientHello, add ServerHello responses */
1758 if (s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count)
1762 for (i = 0; i < s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count; i++)
1765 custom_srv_ext_record *record;
1767 for (j = 0; j < s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records_count; j++)
1769 record = &s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records[j];
1770 if (s->s3->tlsext_custom_types[i] == record->ext_type)
1772 const unsigned char *out = NULL;
1773 unsigned short outlen = 0;
1776 /* NULL callback or -1 omits extension */
1779 cb_retval = record->fn2(s, record->ext_type,
1783 return NULL; /* error */
1784 if (cb_retval == -1)
1785 break; /* skip this extension */
1786 if (limit < ret + 4 + outlen)
1788 s2n(record->ext_type, ret);
1790 memcpy(ret, out, outlen);
1798 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0)
1805 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1806 /* ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1807 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |d|, of length |n|.
1808 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1813 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1814 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1815 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1816 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1818 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, const unsigned char *d, int n) {
1819 unsigned short type, size;
1820 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1821 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1822 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1823 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1824 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1825 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1826 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1828 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1829 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1830 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1831 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1834 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1835 static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock[] = {
1836 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1837 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1838 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1839 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1840 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1841 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1842 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1843 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1846 if (data >= (d+n-2))
1855 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1858 if (data+size > d+n)
1862 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
1864 const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1865 const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock);
1867 if (data + len1 + len2 != d+n)
1869 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0)
1871 if (memcmp(data + len1, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock, len2) != 0)
1876 const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1878 if (data + len != d+n)
1880 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0)
1884 s->s3->is_probably_safari = 1;
1886 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1888 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
1890 unsigned short type;
1891 unsigned short size;
1893 unsigned char *data = *p;
1894 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1897 s->servername_done = 0;
1898 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1899 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1900 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1903 /* Clear observed custom extensions */
1904 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count = 0;
1905 if (s->s3->tlsext_custom_types != NULL)
1907 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tlsext_custom_types);
1908 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types = NULL;
1911 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1912 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1913 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1916 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1917 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1918 ssl_check_for_safari(s, data, d, n);
1919 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1921 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
1922 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
1924 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->peer_sigalgs);
1925 s->cert->peer_sigalgs = NULL;
1927 /* Clear any shared sigtnature algorithms */
1928 if (s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
1930 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
1931 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
1933 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
1934 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
1936 s->cert->pkeys[i].digest = NULL;
1937 s->cert->pkeys[i].valid_flags = 0;
1940 if (data >= (d+n-2))
1944 if (data > (d+n-len))
1947 while (data <= (d+n-4))
1952 if (data+size > (d+n))
1955 fprintf(stderr,"Received extension type %d size %d\n",type,size);
1957 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1958 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size,
1959 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1960 /* The servername extension is treated as follows:
1962 - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
1963 - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
1964 in which case an fatal alert is generated.
1965 - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
1966 - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
1967 to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
1968 - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
1969 it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
1970 Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
1971 set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
1972 case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
1973 a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
1974 presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
1975 the value of the Host: field.
1976 - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1977 if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the session,
1978 i.e. when the session has been established with a servername extension.
1979 - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
1983 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1985 unsigned char *sdata;
1991 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1998 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2005 servname_type = *(sdata++);
2011 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2014 if (s->servername_done == 0)
2015 switch (servname_type)
2017 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
2020 if(s->session->tlsext_hostname)
2022 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2025 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name)
2027 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2030 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
2032 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2035 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
2036 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len]='\0';
2037 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
2038 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
2039 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
2040 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2043 s->servername_done = 1;
2047 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
2048 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
2049 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
2061 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2066 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2067 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp)
2069 if (size <= 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size -1))
2071 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2074 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
2076 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2079 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
2081 memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len);
2082 s->srp_ctx.login[len]='\0';
2084 if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len)
2086 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2092 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2093 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
2095 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2096 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2098 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1 ||
2099 ecpointformatlist_length < 1)
2101 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2106 if(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
2108 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2109 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
2111 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2112 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
2114 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2117 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
2118 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
2121 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
2122 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2123 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2124 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2125 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2128 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves)
2130 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2131 int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
2132 ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
2134 if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 ||
2135 ellipticcurvelist_length < 1)
2137 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2142 if(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
2144 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2147 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
2148 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL)
2150 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2153 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = ellipticcurvelist_length;
2154 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata, ellipticcurvelist_length);
2157 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
2158 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
2159 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++)
2160 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2161 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2164 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2165 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2166 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input)
2168 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2172 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2175 n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
2176 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
2178 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2182 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2183 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2184 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2185 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2187 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
2188 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2190 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2195 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2197 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2198 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2200 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2204 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
2206 if(!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2208 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2210 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms)
2213 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs || size < 2)
2215 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2220 if (dsize != size || dsize & 1 || !dsize)
2222 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2225 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s, data, dsize))
2227 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2230 /* If sigalgs received and no shared algorithms fatal
2233 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs && !s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
2235 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2236 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS);
2237 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2241 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request
2242 && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
2247 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2251 s->tlsext_status_type = *data++;
2253 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
2255 const unsigned char *sdata;
2257 /* Read in responder_id_list */
2262 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2271 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2275 dsize -= 2 + idsize;
2279 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2284 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL,
2288 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2293 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2294 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2297 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
2298 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
2299 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null()))
2301 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2302 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2305 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(
2306 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id))
2308 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2309 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2314 /* Read in request_extensions */
2317 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2324 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2330 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
2332 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2333 X509_EXTENSION_free);
2336 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
2337 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL,
2339 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts
2340 || (data + dsize != sdata))
2342 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2347 /* We don't know what to do with any other type
2351 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2353 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2354 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
2358 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
2359 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2361 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
2362 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2363 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2365 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2370 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2371 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2372 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
2374 /* We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2377 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2378 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2379 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
2380 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2381 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2382 * anything like that, but this might change).
2384 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2385 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2386 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2387 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2388 * Finished message could have been computed.) */
2389 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2393 /* session ticket processed earlier */
2394 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
2396 if(ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
2401 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz)
2403 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2404 unsigned char server_authz_dataformatlist_length;
2408 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2412 server_authz_dataformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2414 if (server_authz_dataformatlist_length != size - 1)
2416 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2420 /* Successful session resumption uses the same authz
2421 * information as the original session so we ignore this
2422 * in the case of a session resumption. */
2425 if (s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types != NULL)
2426 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types);
2427 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types =
2428 OPENSSL_malloc(server_authz_dataformatlist_length);
2429 if (!s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types)
2431 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2435 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len =
2436 server_authz_dataformatlist_length;
2437 memcpy(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
2439 server_authz_dataformatlist_length);
2441 /* Sort the types in order to check for duplicates. */
2442 qsort(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
2443 server_authz_dataformatlist_length,
2444 1 /* element size */,
2447 for (i = 0; i < server_authz_dataformatlist_length; i++)
2450 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types[i] ==
2451 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types[i-1])
2453 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2460 /* If this ClientHello extension was unhandled and this is
2461 * a nonresumed connection, check whether the extension is a
2462 * custom TLS Extension (has a custom_srv_ext_record), and if
2463 * so call the callback and record the extension number so that
2464 * an appropriate ServerHello may be later returned.
2466 else if (!s->hit && s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records_count)
2468 custom_srv_ext_record *record;
2470 for (i=0; i < s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records_count; i++)
2472 record = &s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records[i];
2473 if (type == record->ext_type)
2477 /* Error on duplicate TLS Extensions */
2478 for (j = 0; j < s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count; j++)
2480 if (type == s->s3->tlsext_custom_types[j])
2482 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2487 /* NULL callback still notes the extension */
2488 if (record->fn1 && !record->fn1(s, type, data, size, al, record->arg))
2491 /* Add the (non-duplicated) entry */
2492 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count++;
2493 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types = OPENSSL_realloc(
2494 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types,
2495 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count * 2);
2496 if (s->s3->tlsext_custom_types == NULL)
2498 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types = 0;
2499 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2502 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types[
2503 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count - 1] = type;
2515 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2517 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
2518 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
2520 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2521 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2522 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2525 /* If no signature algorithms extension set default values */
2526 if (!s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
2527 ssl_cert_set_default_md(s->cert);
2532 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
2535 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
2537 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2541 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0)
2543 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2549 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2550 /* ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2551 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly fill
2552 * the length of the block. */
2553 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
2555 unsigned int off = 0;
2569 static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
2571 unsigned short length;
2572 unsigned short type;
2573 unsigned short size;
2574 unsigned char *data = *p;
2575 int tlsext_servername = 0;
2576 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2578 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2579 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2582 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2583 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2584 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2587 if (data >= (d+n-2))
2591 if (data+length != d+n)
2593 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2597 while(data <= (d+n-4))
2602 if (data+size > (d+n))
2605 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2606 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size,
2607 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2609 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
2611 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0)
2613 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2616 tlsext_servername = 1;
2619 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2620 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
2622 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2623 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2625 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1)
2627 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2630 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2631 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2632 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
2634 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2637 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
2638 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
2640 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist ");
2641 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2642 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2643 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2644 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2647 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2649 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2651 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2652 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2654 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2657 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
2660 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2663 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2665 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2666 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input)
2668 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2672 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2675 n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2676 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
2678 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2682 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2683 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
2684 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2685 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2687 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2689 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2691 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2696 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
2698 /* MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested
2699 * a status request message.
2701 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0))
2703 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2706 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2707 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2709 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2710 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2711 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
2713 unsigned char *selected;
2714 unsigned char selected_len;
2716 /* We must have requested it. */
2717 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL)
2719 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2722 /* The data must be valid */
2723 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size))
2725 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2728 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, size, s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
2730 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2733 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2734 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
2736 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2739 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2740 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2741 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2744 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
2746 if(!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2748 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2750 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2751 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
2755 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
2756 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2758 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
2759 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2760 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2762 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2767 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
2769 if(ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
2774 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz)
2776 /* We only support audit proofs. It's an error to send
2777 * an authz hello extension if the client
2778 * didn't request a proof. */
2779 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2780 unsigned char server_authz_dataformatlist_length;
2782 if (!s->ctx->tlsext_authz_server_audit_proof_cb)
2784 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2790 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2794 server_authz_dataformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2795 if (server_authz_dataformatlist_length != size - 1)
2797 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2801 /* We only support audit proofs, so a legal ServerHello
2802 * authz list contains exactly one entry. */
2803 if (server_authz_dataformatlist_length != 1 ||
2804 sdata[0] != TLSEXT_AUTHZDATAFORMAT_audit_proof)
2806 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2810 s->s3->tlsext_authz_server_promised = 1;
2813 /* If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but
2814 * matches a custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c
2816 else if (s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count)
2819 custom_cli_ext_record* record;
2821 for (i = 0; i < s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count; i++)
2823 record = &s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records[i];
2824 if (record->ext_type == type)
2826 if (record->fn2 && !record->fn2(s, type, data, size, al, record->arg))
2838 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2842 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1)
2844 if (s->tlsext_hostname)
2846 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL)
2848 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
2849 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname)
2851 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2857 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2867 /* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to
2868 * avoid an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server
2869 * hello because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an
2870 * attack. However this would mean we could not connect to any server
2871 * which doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI
2872 * absence on initial connect only.
2874 if (!renegotiate_seen
2875 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
2876 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
2878 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2879 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2880 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2888 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2891 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2895 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
2897 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2902 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
2904 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2905 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2907 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2908 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2910 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
2911 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2913 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2916 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2920 /* at callback's request, insist on receiving an appropriate server opaque PRF input */
2921 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2928 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2933 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
2935 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2936 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2938 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2939 /* The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely in
2940 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2942 /* The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely in
2943 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2947 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2948 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2949 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2950 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2952 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2954 /* This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(),
2955 * but we might be sending an alert in response to the client hello,
2956 * so this has to happen here in
2957 * ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(). */
2961 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
2963 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2966 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2967 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2972 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2973 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
2974 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL;
2976 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
2978 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
2979 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len)
2981 /* can only use this extension if we have a server opaque PRF input
2982 * of the same length as the client opaque PRF input! */
2984 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2985 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2987 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
2988 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2990 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2991 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2994 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2998 if (r == 2 && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
3000 /* The callback wants to enforce use of the extension,
3001 * but we can't do that with the client opaque PRF input;
3002 * abort the handshake.
3004 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3005 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3013 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3014 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3017 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3018 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
3021 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3022 s->servername_done=0;
3028 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
3030 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
3033 /* If status request then ask callback what to do.
3034 * Note: this must be called after servername callbacks in case
3035 * the certificate has changed, and must be called after the cipher
3036 * has been chosen because this may influence which certificate is sent
3038 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
3041 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
3042 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
3043 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
3044 if (certpkey == NULL)
3046 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3049 /* Set current certificate to one we will use so
3050 * SSL_get_certificate et al can pick it up.
3052 s->cert->key = certpkey;
3053 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
3056 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
3057 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3058 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3060 /* status request response should be sent */
3061 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
3062 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
3063 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
3065 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3067 /* something bad happened */
3068 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3069 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3070 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3075 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3080 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3081 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3084 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3085 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
3093 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
3095 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
3096 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
3098 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3099 /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
3100 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension
3101 * it must contain uncompressed.
3103 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3104 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3105 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
3106 (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
3107 ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
3109 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
3111 unsigned char *list;
3112 int found_uncompressed = 0;
3113 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
3114 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
3116 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed)
3118 found_uncompressed = 1;
3122 if (!found_uncompressed)
3124 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
3128 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
3129 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
3131 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3132 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3133 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3134 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3136 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
3137 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0)
3139 /* This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on using opaque PRF inputs.
3140 * So first verify that we really have a value from the server too. */
3142 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
3144 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3145 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3148 /* Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to check
3149 * that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size. */
3150 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL ||
3151 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len)
3153 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3154 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3159 /* If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one
3162 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
3163 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
3166 /* Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows
3167 * there is no response.
3169 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
3171 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
3172 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
3174 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
3175 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
3178 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
3179 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3183 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3184 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3190 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3191 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3194 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3195 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
3198 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3199 s->servername_done=0;
3205 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
3208 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
3210 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
3212 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3216 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
3218 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
3224 /* Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
3225 * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle
3226 * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time.
3228 * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will
3229 * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket
3230 * extension, if any.
3231 * len: the length of the session ID.
3232 * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello.
3233 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3234 * point to the resulting session.
3236 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
3237 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
3238 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
3241 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3242 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
3243 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
3244 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
3245 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
3246 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
3247 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
3250 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
3251 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
3252 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
3253 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
3254 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
3255 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
3257 int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
3258 const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
3260 /* Point after session ID in client hello */
3261 const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
3265 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
3267 /* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present
3268 * to permit stateful resumption.
3270 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
3272 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
3276 /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
3284 /* Skip past cipher list */
3289 /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
3294 /* Now at start of extensions */
3295 if ((p + 2) >= limit)
3298 while ((p + 4) <= limit)
3300 unsigned short type, size;
3303 if (p + size > limit)
3305 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
3310 /* The client will accept a ticket but doesn't
3311 * currently have one. */
3312 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3315 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb)
3317 /* Indicate that the ticket couldn't be
3318 * decrypted rather than generating the session
3319 * from ticket now, trigger abbreviated
3320 * handshake based on external mechanism to
3321 * calculate the master secret later. */
3324 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret);
3327 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
3328 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3330 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
3332 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
3333 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3335 default: /* fatal error */
3344 /* tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
3346 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
3347 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
3348 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
3349 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
3350 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3351 * point to the resulting session.
3354 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3355 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
3356 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
3357 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
3359 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
3360 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
3361 SSL_SESSION **psess)
3364 unsigned char *sdec;
3365 const unsigned char *p;
3366 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
3367 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
3370 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3371 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
3374 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
3375 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3376 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3377 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
3379 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
3380 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
3391 /* Check key name matches */
3392 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
3394 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3395 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
3396 EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3397 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
3399 /* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and
3400 * integrity checks on ticket.
3402 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
3405 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3409 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
3410 HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
3411 HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
3412 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3413 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen))
3415 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
3416 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
3417 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3418 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3419 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
3422 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3425 EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
3426 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0)
3429 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3432 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3436 /* The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to
3437 * detect that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to
3438 * the session structure. If it is empty set length to zero
3439 * as required by standard.
3442 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3443 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3451 /* For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new
3456 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3464 static tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
3465 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3466 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3467 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3468 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3469 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3470 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}
3473 static tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
3474 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
3475 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
3476 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}
3479 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3482 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
3484 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3490 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3493 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
3495 if ((table[i].id) == id)
3496 return table[i].nid;
3501 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md)
3506 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md,
3507 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3510 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3513 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
3514 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
3518 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
3520 return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig,
3521 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3524 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
3528 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
3529 case TLSEXT_hash_md5:
3536 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
3537 case TLSEXT_hash_sha1:
3540 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
3541 case TLSEXT_hash_sha224:
3542 return EVP_sha224();
3544 case TLSEXT_hash_sha256:
3545 return EVP_sha256();
3547 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
3548 case TLSEXT_hash_sha384:
3549 return EVP_sha384();
3551 case TLSEXT_hash_sha512:
3552 return EVP_sha512();
3560 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
3564 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3565 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3566 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3568 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3569 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3570 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3572 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3573 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3574 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3580 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3581 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
3582 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3584 int sign_nid = 0, hash_nid = 0;
3585 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3587 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid)
3589 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md,
3590 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3592 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3594 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid)
3596 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig,
3597 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3599 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3603 if (sign_nid && hash_nid)
3604 OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid,
3605 hash_nid, sign_nid);
3607 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3610 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
3611 static int tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
3612 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3613 const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
3615 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3616 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3617 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i+=2, ptmp+=2)
3619 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3620 if (tls12_get_hash(ptmp[0]) == NULL)
3622 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3624 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j+=2, atmp+=2)
3626 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1])
3631 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3632 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3633 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3635 &shsig->signandhash_nid,
3646 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3647 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3649 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3650 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3652 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3654 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
3655 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3656 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
3658 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3659 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3661 else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
3663 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
3664 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3667 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
3668 if(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb)
3672 allow = c->peer_sigalgs;
3673 allowlen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3679 pref = c->peer_sigalgs;
3680 preflen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3682 nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3685 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3688 nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3689 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3690 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3695 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3697 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
3703 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3704 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
3705 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3707 /* Should never happen */
3711 c->peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
3712 if (!c->peer_sigalgs)
3714 c->peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3715 memcpy(c->peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
3717 tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s);
3719 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3720 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
3722 /* Use first set signature preference to force message
3723 * digest, ignoring any peer preferences.
3725 const unsigned char *sigs = NULL;
3727 sigs = c->conf_sigalgs;
3729 sigs = c->client_sigalgs;
3732 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigs[1]);
3733 md = tls12_get_hash(sigs[0]);
3734 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3735 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3736 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
3738 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3739 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3745 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3746 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++)
3748 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3749 if (idx > 0 && c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL)
3751 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
3752 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3753 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3754 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
3756 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3757 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3762 /* In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't
3763 * use the certificate for signing.
3765 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
3767 /* Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is
3768 * not supported it stays as NULL.
3770 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3771 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest)
3772 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3774 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3775 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest)
3777 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3778 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3781 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3782 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest)
3783 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3790 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3791 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3792 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3794 const unsigned char *psig = s->cert->peer_sigalgs;
3800 if (idx >= (int)s->cert->peer_sigalgslen)
3807 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
3809 return s->cert->peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3812 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3813 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3814 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3816 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
3817 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
3821 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3823 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3825 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3827 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
3829 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
3830 return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
3834 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
3836 tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3838 unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl;
3839 unsigned short hbtype;
3840 unsigned int payload;
3841 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3843 /* Read type and payload length first */
3848 if (s->msg_callback)
3849 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3850 &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
3851 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3853 if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST)
3855 unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
3858 /* Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes
3859 * message type, plus 2 bytes payload length, plus
3860 * payload, plus padding
3862 buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3865 /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
3866 *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
3868 memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
3870 /* Random padding */
3871 RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding);
3873 r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, 3 + payload + padding);
3875 if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
3876 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3877 buffer, 3 + payload + padding,
3878 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3880 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
3885 else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE)
3889 /* We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int),
3890 * and 16 random bytes, so we just try to read the
3891 * sequence number */
3894 if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq)
3897 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
3905 tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3907 unsigned char *buf, *p;
3909 unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
3910 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3912 /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
3913 if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
3914 s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS)
3916 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
3920 /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
3921 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
3923 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
3927 /* ...and no handshake in progress. */
3928 if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake)
3930 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
3934 /* Check if padding is too long, payload and padding
3935 * must not exceed 2^14 - 3 = 16381 bytes in total.
3937 OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381);
3939 /* Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
3940 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
3941 * some random stuff.
3942 * - Message Type, 1 byte
3943 * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
3944 * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
3945 * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
3948 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3951 *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
3952 /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
3954 /* Sequence number */
3955 s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
3956 /* 16 random bytes */
3957 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16);
3959 /* Random padding */
3960 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding);
3962 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
3965 if (s->msg_callback)
3966 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3967 buf, 3 + payload + padding,
3968 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3970 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;
3979 #define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
3984 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
3987 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
3989 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
3992 int sig_alg, hash_alg;
3993 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
3995 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
3997 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
3999 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
4007 if (!strcmp(etmp, "RSA"))
4008 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
4009 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "DSA"))
4010 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
4011 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "ECDSA"))
4012 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_EC;
4015 hash_alg = OBJ_sn2nid(p);
4016 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
4017 hash_alg = OBJ_ln2nid(p);
4018 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
4021 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i+=2)
4023 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg
4024 && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
4027 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
4028 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
4032 /* Set suppored signature algorithms based on a colon separated list
4033 * of the form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512 */
4034 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
4038 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
4042 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
4045 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
4047 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
4052 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
4053 if (sigalgs == NULL)
4055 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i+=2)
4057 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md,
4058 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
4059 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig,
4060 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
4062 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
4070 if (c->client_sigalgs)
4071 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
4072 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
4073 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
4077 if (c->conf_sigalgs)
4078 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
4079 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
4080 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
4086 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
4090 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
4094 if (default_nid == -1)
4096 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
4098 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
4099 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
4100 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
4104 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
4105 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
4109 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
4110 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++)
4112 if(!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
4118 /* Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is
4119 * usable by server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to
4120 * check chains before passing them to the server and it allows the
4121 * server to check chains before attempting to use them.
4124 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
4126 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
4127 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
4128 /* Strict mode flags */
4129 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
4130 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
4131 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
4133 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
4138 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
4139 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
4141 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
4142 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
4145 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
4149 idx = cpk - c->pkeys;
4152 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
4154 pk = cpk->privatekey;
4156 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
4157 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
4160 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
4161 /* Allow any certificate to pass test */
4162 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
4164 rv = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_VALID|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4165 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4174 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
4177 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
4178 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
4179 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
4181 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
4189 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4190 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
4191 if (ok != X509_V_OK)
4194 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4200 /* Check all signature algorithms are consistent with
4201 * signature algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later
4204 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode)
4207 unsigned char rsign = 0;
4208 if (c->peer_sigalgs)
4210 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
4215 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
4216 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
4217 case SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA:
4218 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
4219 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
4222 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
4223 case SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA:
4224 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
4225 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
4229 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
4230 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
4238 /* If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we
4239 * have set preferred signature algorithms check we support
4242 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs)
4245 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
4246 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2)
4248 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
4251 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen)
4259 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
4260 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid))
4262 if (!check_flags) goto end;
4265 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
4266 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4267 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4269 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i),
4274 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4282 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
4283 else if(check_flags)
4284 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4286 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
4287 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
4288 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
4289 else if (!check_flags)
4292 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4293 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
4294 else if (strict_mode)
4296 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4297 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4299 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4300 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0))
4304 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4312 if (!s->server && strict_mode)
4314 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
4319 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
4322 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
4325 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
4330 int cert_type = X509_certificate_type(x, pk);
4331 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_RSA)
4332 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_FIXED_DH;
4333 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_DSA)
4334 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_FIXED_DH;
4339 const unsigned char *ctypes;
4344 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
4348 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
4349 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
4351 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++)
4353 if (ctypes[i] == check_type)
4355 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4359 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
4363 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4366 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
4368 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
4369 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4371 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4373 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
4374 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4376 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4378 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4380 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4381 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp))
4383 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4388 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4392 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4394 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
4395 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
4399 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
4401 if (cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
4402 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4403 else if (cpk->digest)
4404 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4407 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4409 /* When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant
4410 * if the chain is invalid.
4414 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
4415 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4418 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
4419 cpk->valid_flags &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4426 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
4427 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
4429 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
4430 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
4431 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
4432 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA);
4433 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA);
4434 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
4436 /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
4437 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
4439 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);