2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
12 #include <openssl/objects.h>
13 #include <openssl/evp.h>
14 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
15 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
16 #include <openssl/conf.h>
17 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
18 #include <openssl/dh.h>
19 #include <openssl/bn.h>
21 #include <openssl/ct.h>
23 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, size_t ticklen,
24 const unsigned char *sess_id, size_t sesslen,
27 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data = {
31 tls1_generate_master_secret,
32 tls1_change_cipher_state,
33 tls1_final_finish_mac,
34 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
35 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
37 tls1_export_keying_material,
39 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
40 tls_close_construct_packet,
44 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_1_enc_data = {
48 tls1_generate_master_secret,
49 tls1_change_cipher_state,
50 tls1_final_finish_mac,
51 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
52 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
54 tls1_export_keying_material,
55 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
56 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
57 tls_close_construct_packet,
61 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_2_enc_data = {
65 tls1_generate_master_secret,
66 tls1_change_cipher_state,
67 tls1_final_finish_mac,
68 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
69 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
71 tls1_export_keying_material,
72 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
73 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
74 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
75 tls_close_construct_packet,
79 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_3_enc_data = {
82 tls13_setup_key_block,
83 tls13_generate_master_secret,
84 tls13_change_cipher_state,
85 tls13_final_finish_mac,
86 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
87 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
89 tls1_export_keying_material,
90 SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF,
91 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
92 tls_close_construct_packet,
96 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
99 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
100 * http, the cache would over fill
102 return (60 * 60 * 2);
109 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
113 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
115 OPENSSL_free(s->ext.session_ticket);
119 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
122 if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION)
123 s->version = TLS_MAX_VERSION;
125 s->version = s->method->version;
128 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
131 int nid; /* Curve NID */
132 int secbits; /* Bits of security (from SP800-57) */
133 unsigned int flags; /* Flags: currently just field type */
137 * Table of curve information.
138 * Do not delete entries or reorder this array! It is used as a lookup
139 * table: the index of each entry is one less than the TLS curve id.
141 static const tls_curve_info nid_list[] = {
142 {NID_sect163k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163k1 (1) */
143 {NID_sect163r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r1 (2) */
144 {NID_sect163r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r2 (3) */
145 {NID_sect193r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r1 (4) */
146 {NID_sect193r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r2 (5) */
147 {NID_sect233k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233k1 (6) */
148 {NID_sect233r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233r1 (7) */
149 {NID_sect239k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect239k1 (8) */
150 {NID_sect283k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283k1 (9) */
151 {NID_sect283r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283r1 (10) */
152 {NID_sect409k1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409k1 (11) */
153 {NID_sect409r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409r1 (12) */
154 {NID_sect571k1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571k1 (13) */
155 {NID_sect571r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571r1 (14) */
156 {NID_secp160k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160k1 (15) */
157 {NID_secp160r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r1 (16) */
158 {NID_secp160r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r2 (17) */
159 {NID_secp192k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192k1 (18) */
160 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192r1 (19) */
161 {NID_secp224k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224k1 (20) */
162 {NID_secp224r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224r1 (21) */
163 {NID_secp256k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256k1 (22) */
164 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256r1 (23) */
165 {NID_secp384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp384r1 (24) */
166 {NID_secp521r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp521r1 (25) */
167 {NID_brainpoolP256r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
168 {NID_brainpoolP384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
169 {NID_brainpoolP512r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
170 {NID_X25519, 128, TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM}, /* X25519 (29) */
173 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = {
174 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
175 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
176 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
179 /* The default curves */
180 static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] = {
181 0, 29, /* X25519 (29) */
182 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
183 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
184 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
187 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] = {
188 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
189 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
192 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id, unsigned int *pflags)
194 const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
195 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
196 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
198 cinfo = nid_list + curve_id - 1;
200 *pflags = cinfo->flags;
204 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
207 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(nid_list); i++) {
208 if (nid_list[i].nid == nid)
215 * Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
217 * Sets |num_curves| to the number of curves in the list, i.e.,
218 * the length of |pcurves| is 2 * num_curves.
219 * Returns 1 on success and 0 if the client curves list has invalid format.
220 * The latter indicates an internal error: we should not be accepting such
221 * lists in the first place.
222 * TODO(emilia): we should really be storing the curves list in explicitly
223 * parsed form instead. (However, this would affect binary compatibility
224 * so cannot happen in the 1.0.x series.)
226 int tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess, const unsigned char **pcurves,
229 size_t pcurveslen = 0;
232 *pcurves = s->session->ext.supportedgroups;
233 pcurveslen = s->session->ext.supportedgroups_len;
235 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
236 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
237 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
238 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
239 pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
242 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
243 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
247 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
248 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
252 *pcurves = s->ext.supportedgroups;
253 pcurveslen = s->ext.supportedgroups_len;
256 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
257 pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
261 /* We do not allow odd length arrays to enter the system. */
262 if (pcurveslen & 1) {
263 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_GET_CURVELIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
267 *num_curves = pcurveslen / 2;
271 /* See if curve is allowed by security callback */
272 int tls_curve_allowed(SSL *s, const unsigned char *curve, int op)
274 const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
277 if ((curve[1] < 1) || ((size_t)curve[1] > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
279 cinfo = &nid_list[curve[1] - 1];
280 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
281 if (cinfo->flags & TLS_CURVE_CHAR2)
284 return ssl_security(s, op, cinfo->secbits, cinfo->nid, (void *)curve);
287 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
288 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
290 const unsigned char *curves;
291 size_t num_curves, i;
292 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
293 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
295 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
297 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
300 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) {
301 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
303 } else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) {
304 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
306 } else /* Should never happen */
309 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &num_curves))
311 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, curves += 2) {
312 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
313 return tls_curve_allowed(s, p + 1, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK);
319 * For nmatch >= 0, return the NID of the |nmatch|th shared group or NID_undef
320 * if there is no match.
321 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
322 * For nmatch == -2, return the NID of the group to use for
323 * an EC tmp key, or NID_undef if there is no match.
325 int tls1_shared_group(SSL *s, int nmatch)
327 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
328 size_t num_pref, num_supp, i, j;
331 /* Can't do anything on client side */
335 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
337 * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know
338 * these are acceptable due to previous checks.
340 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
342 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
343 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
344 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
345 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
346 /* Should never happen */
349 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
353 * Avoid truncation. tls1_get_curvelist takes an int
354 * but s->options is a long...
356 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s,
357 (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0,
359 /* In practice, NID_undef == 0 but let's be precise. */
360 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
361 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s,
362 (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) == 0,
364 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
366 for (k = 0, i = 0; i < num_pref; i++, pref += 2) {
367 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
369 for (j = 0; j < num_supp; j++, tsupp += 2) {
370 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1]) {
371 if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, pref, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
374 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
376 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id, NULL);
384 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
388 int tls1_set_groups(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
389 int *groups, size_t ngroups)
391 unsigned char *glist, *p;
394 * Bitmap of groups included to detect duplicates: only works while group
397 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
398 glist = OPENSSL_malloc(ngroups * 2);
401 for (i = 0, p = glist; i < ngroups; i++) {
402 unsigned long idmask;
404 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Convert for DH groups */
405 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(groups[i]);
407 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask)) {
416 *pextlen = ngroups * 2;
420 # define MAX_CURVELIST 28
424 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
427 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
429 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
435 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
437 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
439 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
441 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
442 if (nid == NID_undef)
443 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
444 if (nid == NID_undef)
445 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
446 if (nid == NID_undef)
448 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
449 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
451 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
455 /* Set groups based on a colon separate list */
456 int tls1_set_groups_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen, const char *str)
460 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
464 return tls1_set_groups(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
467 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
468 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
475 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
476 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
479 /* Determine curve ID */
480 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
481 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
482 /* If no id return error: we don't support arbitrary explicit curves */
486 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
488 if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
490 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED) {
491 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
493 if ((nid_list[id - 1].flags & TLS_CURVE_TYPE) == TLS_CURVE_PRIME)
494 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
496 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
502 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
503 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
504 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
506 const unsigned char *pformats, *pcurves;
507 size_t num_formats, num_curves, i;
510 * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
511 * supported (see RFC4492).
513 if (comp_id && s->session->ext.ecpointformats) {
514 pformats = s->session->ext.ecpointformats;
515 num_formats = s->session->ext.ecpointformats_len;
516 for (i = 0; i < num_formats; i++, pformats++) {
517 if (*comp_id == *pformats)
520 if (i == num_formats)
525 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
526 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++) {
527 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &pcurves, &num_curves))
529 if (j == 1 && num_curves == 0) {
531 * If we've not received any curves then skip this check.
532 * RFC 4492 does not require the supported elliptic curves extension
533 * so if it is not sent we can just choose any curve.
534 * It is invalid to send an empty list in the elliptic curves
535 * extension, so num_curves == 0 always means no extension.
539 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
540 if (pcurves[0] == curve_id[0] && pcurves[1] == curve_id[1])
545 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
552 void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
556 * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
558 if (s->ext.ecpointformats) {
559 *pformats = s->ext.ecpointformats;
560 *num_formats = s->ext.ecpointformats_len;
562 *pformats = ecformats_default;
563 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
565 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
567 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default);
572 * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
573 * certificates have compatible curves and compression.
575 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
577 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
580 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
583 /* If not EC nothing to do */
584 if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) != EVP_PKEY_EC)
586 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey));
590 * Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a supported
593 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
597 * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
598 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
600 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s)) {
606 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
607 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
608 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
609 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
610 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
612 return 0; /* Should never happen */
613 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
614 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
616 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
618 if (set_ee_md == 2) {
619 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
620 s->s3->tmp.md[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha256();
622 s->s3->tmp.md[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha384();
628 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
630 * tls1_check_ec_tmp_key - Check EC temporary key compatibility
632 * @cid: Cipher ID we're considering using
634 * Checks that the kECDHE cipher suite we're considering using
635 * is compatible with the client extensions.
637 * Returns 0 when the cipher can't be used or 1 when it can.
639 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
642 * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
645 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
646 unsigned char curve_id[2];
647 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
648 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
649 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
650 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
651 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
655 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
656 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
660 /* Need a shared curve */
661 if (tls1_shared_group(s, 0))
665 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
669 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
674 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
676 /* Default sigalg schemes */
677 static const unsigned int tls12_sigalgs[] = {
678 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
679 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256,
680 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384,
681 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512,
684 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_sha256,
685 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_sha384,
686 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_sha512,
688 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha256,
689 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha384,
690 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha512,
692 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
693 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1,
695 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1,
696 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
697 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1,
699 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha256,
700 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha384,
701 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha512
705 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
706 static const unsigned int suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
707 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256,
708 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384
712 typedef struct sigalg_lookup_st {
718 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP sigalg_lookup_tbl[] = {
719 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
720 {TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256, NID_sha256, EVP_PKEY_EC},
721 {TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384, NID_sha384, EVP_PKEY_EC},
722 {TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512, NID_sha512, EVP_PKEY_EC},
723 {TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1, NID_sha1, EVP_PKEY_EC},
726 * PSS must appear before PKCS1 so that we prefer that when signing where
729 {TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_sha256, NID_sha256, EVP_PKEY_RSA},
730 {TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_sha384, NID_sha384, EVP_PKEY_RSA},
731 {TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_sha512, NID_sha512, EVP_PKEY_RSA},
732 {TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha256, NID_sha256, EVP_PKEY_RSA},
733 {TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha384, NID_sha384, EVP_PKEY_RSA},
734 {TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha512, NID_sha512, EVP_PKEY_RSA},
735 {TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1, NID_sha1, EVP_PKEY_RSA},
736 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
737 {TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha256, NID_sha256, EVP_PKEY_DSA},
738 {TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha384, NID_sha384, EVP_PKEY_DSA},
739 {TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha512, NID_sha512, EVP_PKEY_DSA},
740 {TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1, NID_sha1, EVP_PKEY_DSA},
742 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
743 {TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_gostr34112012_256, NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256},
744 {TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_gostr34112012_512, NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512},
745 {TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411, NID_id_GostR3411_94, NID_id_GostR3410_2001}
749 static int tls_sigalg_get_hash(unsigned int sigalg)
752 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *curr;
754 for (i = 0, curr = sigalg_lookup_tbl; i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
756 if (curr->sigalg == sigalg)
763 static int tls_sigalg_get_sig(unsigned int sigalg)
766 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *curr;
768 for (i = 0, curr = sigalg_lookup_tbl; i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
770 if (curr->sigalg == sigalg)
776 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, int sent, const unsigned int **psigs)
779 * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
782 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
783 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
784 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
785 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
786 return OSSL_NELEM(suiteb_sigalgs);
788 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
789 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
792 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
793 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 1;
798 * We use client_sigalgs (if not NULL) if we're a server
799 * and sending a certificate request or if we're a client and
800 * determining which shared algorithm to use.
802 if ((s->server == sent) && s->cert->client_sigalgs != NULL) {
803 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
804 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
805 } else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
806 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
807 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
809 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
810 return OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sigalgs);
815 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
816 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
818 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s, unsigned int sig,
821 const unsigned int *sent_sigs;
823 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
824 int pkeyid = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey);
825 /* Should never happen */
828 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
829 if (pkeyid != tls_sigalg_get_sig(sig)) {
830 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
833 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
834 if (pkeyid == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
835 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
836 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
837 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey)))
839 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id)) {
840 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
843 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
844 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
847 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256) {
848 if (tls_sigalg_get_hash(sig) != NID_sha256) {
849 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
850 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
853 } else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384) {
854 if (tls_sigalg_get_hash(sig) != NID_sha384) {
855 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
856 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
862 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
866 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
867 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sent_sigs);
868 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i++, sent_sigs++) {
869 if (sig == *sent_sigs)
872 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
873 if (i == sent_sigslen
874 && (tls_sigalg_get_hash(sig) != NID_sha1
875 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
876 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
879 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(tls_sigalg_get_hash(sig));
881 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
885 * Make sure security callback allows algorithm. For historical reasons we
886 * have to pass the sigalg as a two byte char array.
888 sigalgstr[0] = (sig >> 8) & 0xff;
889 sigalgstr[1] = sig & 0xff;
890 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK,
891 EVP_MD_size(*pmd) * 4, EVP_MD_type(*pmd),
892 (void *)sigalgstr)) {
893 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
897 * Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they wish.
899 s->s3->tmp.peer_md = *pmd;
904 * Set a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
905 * supported, doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms, isn't supported
906 * by the enabled protocol versions or by the security level.
908 * This function should only be used for checking which ciphers are supported
911 * Call ssl_cipher_disabled() to check that it's enabled or not.
913 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
915 s->s3->tmp.mask_a = 0;
916 s->s3->tmp.mask_k = 0;
917 ssl_set_sig_mask(&s->s3->tmp.mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
918 ssl_get_client_min_max_version(s, &s->s3->tmp.min_ver, &s->s3->tmp.max_ver);
919 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
920 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
921 if (!s->psk_client_callback) {
922 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
923 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_PSK;
925 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
926 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
927 if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) {
928 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
929 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
935 * ssl_cipher_disabled - check that a cipher is disabled or not
936 * @s: SSL connection that you want to use the cipher on
937 * @c: cipher to check
938 * @op: Security check that you want to do
940 * Returns 1 when it's disabled, 0 when enabled.
942 int ssl_cipher_disabled(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op)
944 if (c->algorithm_mkey & s->s3->tmp.mask_k
945 || c->algorithm_auth & s->s3->tmp.mask_a)
947 if (s->s3->tmp.max_ver == 0)
949 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && ((c->min_tls > s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
950 || (c->max_tls < s->s3->tmp.min_ver)))
952 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (DTLS_VERSION_GT(c->min_dtls, s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
953 || DTLS_VERSION_LT(c->max_dtls, s->s3->tmp.min_ver)))
956 return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c);
959 int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s)
961 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) || SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
963 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL);
966 /* Initialise digests to default values */
967 void ssl_set_default_md(SSL *s)
969 const EVP_MD **pmd = s->s3->tmp.md;
970 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
971 pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
973 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
974 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
975 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
977 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX);
978 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN];
980 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
981 pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
983 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
984 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX);
985 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX);
986 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX);
990 int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s)
995 /* Clear any shared signature algorithms */
996 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
997 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
998 s->cert->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
999 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
1000 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
1001 s->s3->tmp.md[i] = NULL;
1002 s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
1005 /* If sigalgs received process it. */
1006 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs) {
1007 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
1008 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1009 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1012 /* Fatal error is no shared signature algorithms */
1013 if (!s->cert->shared_sigalgs) {
1014 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS,
1015 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS);
1016 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1020 ssl_set_default_md(s);
1024 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1029 * Gets the ticket information supplied by the client if any.
1031 * hello: The parsed ClientHello data
1032 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
1033 * point to the resulting session.
1035 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
1036 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
1037 * never be decrypted, nor will s->ext.ticket_expected be set to 1.
1040 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
1041 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
1042 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
1043 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
1044 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
1045 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
1046 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
1049 * Sets s->ext.ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
1050 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
1051 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
1052 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
1053 * s->ctx->ext.ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
1054 * Otherwise, s->ext.ticket_expected is set to 0.
1056 int tls_get_ticket_from_client(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello,
1061 RAW_EXTENSION *ticketext;
1064 s->ext.ticket_expected = 0;
1067 * If tickets disabled or not supported by the protocol version
1068 * (e.g. TLSv1.3) behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
1071 if (s->version <= SSL3_VERSION || !tls_use_ticket(s))
1074 ticketext = &hello->pre_proc_exts[TLSEXT_IDX_session_ticket];
1075 if (!ticketext->present)
1078 size = PACKET_remaining(&ticketext->data);
1081 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
1084 s->ext.ticket_expected = 1;
1087 if (s->ext.session_secret_cb) {
1089 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
1090 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
1091 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
1092 * calculate the master secret later.
1097 retv = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, PACKET_data(&ticketext->data), size,
1098 hello->session_id, hello->session_id_len, ret);
1100 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
1101 s->ext.ticket_expected = 1;
1104 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
1107 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
1108 s->ext.ticket_expected = 1;
1111 default: /* fatal error */
1117 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
1119 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
1120 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extension.
1121 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
1122 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
1123 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
1124 * point to the resulting session.
1127 * -2: fatal error, malloc failure.
1128 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
1129 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
1130 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
1131 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
1133 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
1134 size_t eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id,
1135 size_t sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess)
1138 unsigned char *sdec;
1139 const unsigned char *p;
1140 int slen, renew_ticket = 0, ret = -1, declen;
1142 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
1143 HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL;
1144 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
1145 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
1147 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
1148 hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
1151 ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
1156 if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb) {
1157 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
1158 int rv = tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
1169 /* Check key name matches */
1170 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->ext.tick_key_name,
1171 sizeof(tctx->ext.tick_key_name)) != 0) {
1175 if (HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->ext.tick_hmac_key,
1176 sizeof(tctx->ext.tick_hmac_key),
1177 EVP_sha256(), NULL) <= 0
1178 || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_256_cbc(), NULL,
1179 tctx->ext.tick_aes_key,
1180 etick + sizeof(tctx->ext.tick_key_name)) <=
1186 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
1189 mlen = HMAC_size(hctx);
1193 /* Sanity check ticket length: must exceed keyname + IV + HMAC */
1195 TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx) + mlen) {
1200 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
1201 if (HMAC_Update(hctx, etick, eticklen) <= 0
1202 || HMAC_Final(hctx, tick_hmac, NULL) <= 0) {
1205 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
1206 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) {
1207 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
1210 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
1211 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
1212 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
1213 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
1214 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
1215 if (sdec == NULL || EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, sdec, &slen, p,
1216 (int)eticklen) <= 0) {
1217 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
1221 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(ctx, sdec + slen, &declen) <= 0) {
1222 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
1227 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
1231 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
1235 * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
1236 * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
1237 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
1241 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
1242 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
1251 * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
1255 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
1256 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
1260 int tls12_get_sigandhash(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, const EVP_PKEY *pk,
1261 const EVP_MD *md, int *ispss)
1263 int md_id, sig_id, tmpispss = 0;
1265 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *curr;
1269 md_id = EVP_MD_type(md);
1270 sig_id = EVP_PKEY_id(pk);
1271 if (md_id == NID_undef)
1274 for (i = 0, curr = sigalg_lookup_tbl; i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
1276 if (curr->hash == md_id && curr->sig == sig_id) {
1277 if (sig_id == EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
1278 tmpispss = SIGID_IS_PSS(curr->sigalg);
1279 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && tmpispss) {
1283 * Check peer actually sent a PSS sig id - it could have
1284 * been a PKCS1 sig id instead.
1286 for (j = 0; j < s->cert->shared_sigalgslen; j++)
1287 if (s->cert->shared_sigalgs[j].rsigalg == curr->sigalg)
1290 if (j == s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
1294 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, curr->sigalg))
1310 static const tls12_hash_info tls12_md_info[] = {
1311 {NID_md5, 64, SSL_MD_MD5_IDX},
1312 {NID_sha1, 80, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX},
1313 {NID_sha224, 112, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX},
1314 {NID_sha256, 128, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX},
1315 {NID_sha384, 192, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX},
1316 {NID_sha512, 256, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX},
1317 {NID_id_GostR3411_94, 128, SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX},
1318 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, 128, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX},
1319 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, 256, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX},
1322 static const tls12_hash_info *tls12_get_hash_info(int hash_nid)
1325 if (hash_nid == NID_undef)
1328 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md_info); i++) {
1329 if (tls12_md_info[i].nid == hash_nid)
1330 return tls12_md_info + i;
1336 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(int hash_nid)
1338 const tls12_hash_info *inf;
1339 if (hash_nid == NID_md5 && FIPS_mode())
1341 inf = tls12_get_hash_info(hash_nid);
1344 return ssl_md(inf->md_idx);
1347 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(int sig_nid)
1350 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1352 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
1354 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
1356 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
1358 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1360 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
1362 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
1363 case NID_id_GostR3410_2001:
1364 return SSL_PKEY_GOST01;
1366 case NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256:
1367 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256;
1369 case NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512:
1370 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512;
1376 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
1377 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
1378 int *psignhash_nid, unsigned int data)
1380 int sign_nid = NID_undef, hash_nid = NID_undef;
1381 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
1383 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid) {
1384 hash_nid = tls_sigalg_get_hash(data);
1386 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
1388 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid) {
1389 sign_nid = tls_sigalg_get_sig(data);
1391 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
1393 if (psignhash_nid) {
1394 if (sign_nid == NID_undef || hash_nid == NID_undef
1395 || OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid, hash_nid, sign_nid) <= 0)
1396 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
1400 /* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
1401 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(SSL *s, int op, unsigned int ptmp)
1403 /* See if we have an entry in the hash table and it is enabled */
1404 const tls12_hash_info *hinf
1405 = tls12_get_hash_info(tls_sigalg_get_hash(ptmp));
1406 unsigned char sigalgstr[2];
1408 if (hinf == NULL || ssl_md(hinf->md_idx) == NULL)
1410 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
1411 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(tls_sigalg_get_sig(ptmp)) == -1)
1413 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
1414 sigalgstr[0] = (ptmp >> 8) & 0xff;
1415 sigalgstr[1] = ptmp & 0xff;
1416 return ssl_security(s, op, hinf->secbits, hinf->nid, (void *)sigalgstr);
1420 * Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported signature
1421 * algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA then RSA is
1425 void ssl_set_sig_mask(uint32_t *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op)
1427 const unsigned int *sigalgs;
1428 size_t i, sigalgslen;
1429 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
1431 * Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any for
1432 * RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just TLS 1.2. To keep
1433 * down calls to security callback only check if we have to.
1435 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sigalgs);
1436 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i ++, sigalgs++) {
1437 switch (tls_sigalg_get_sig(*sigalgs)) {
1438 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1440 if (!have_rsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, *sigalgs))
1444 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
1446 if (!have_dsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, *sigalgs))
1450 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1452 if (!have_ecdsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, *sigalgs))
1459 *pmask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
1461 *pmask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
1463 *pmask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
1466 int tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1467 const unsigned int *psig, size_t psiglen)
1471 for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i++, psig++) {
1472 if (tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, *psig)) {
1473 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, *psig))
1480 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
1481 static size_t tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
1482 const unsigned int *pref, size_t preflen,
1483 const unsigned int *allow, size_t allowlen)
1485 const unsigned int *ptmp, *atmp;
1486 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
1487 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i++, ptmp++) {
1488 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
1489 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED, *ptmp))
1491 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j++, atmp++) {
1492 if (*ptmp == *atmp) {
1495 shsig->rsigalg = *ptmp;
1496 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
1498 &shsig->signandhash_nid, *ptmp);
1508 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
1509 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
1511 const unsigned int *pref, *allow, *conf;
1512 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
1514 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
1516 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
1518 OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
1519 c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
1520 c->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
1521 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
1522 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
1523 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
1524 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
1525 } else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
1526 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
1527 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
1529 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 0, &conf);
1530 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb) {
1533 allow = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
1534 allowlen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
1538 pref = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
1539 preflen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
1541 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
1543 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
1546 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
1550 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
1551 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
1555 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
1557 int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1562 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
1563 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
1565 /* Should never happen */
1569 size = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
1571 /* Invalid data length */
1572 if ((size & 1) != 0)
1577 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs);
1578 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(size
1579 * sizeof(*s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs));
1580 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs == NULL)
1582 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen = size;
1583 for (i = 0; i < size && PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs[i]);
1593 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s)
1598 const EVP_MD **pmd = s->s3->tmp.md;
1599 uint32_t *pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags;
1601 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
1602 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s))
1605 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
1606 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++) {
1607 /* Ignore PKCS1 based sig algs in TLSv1.3 */
1609 && (sigptr->rsigalg == TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1
1610 || sigptr->rsigalg == TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha256
1611 || sigptr->rsigalg == TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha384
1612 || sigptr->rsigalg == TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha512))
1614 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->sign_nid);
1615 if (idx > 0 && pmd[idx] == NULL) {
1616 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->hash_nid);
1618 pvalid[idx] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
1619 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) {
1620 pvalid[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
1621 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = md;
1627 * In strict mode or TLS1.3 leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't
1628 * use the certificate for signing.
1630 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
1631 && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1633 * Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not
1634 * supported it stays as NULL.
1636 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
1637 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] == NULL)
1638 pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
1640 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1641 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] == NULL) {
1642 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
1643 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = EVP_sha1();
1646 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1647 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] == NULL)
1648 pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha1();
1650 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
1651 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] == NULL)
1652 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] = EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_94);
1653 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] == NULL)
1654 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] =
1655 EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256);
1656 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] == NULL)
1657 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] =
1658 EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512);
1664 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
1665 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
1666 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
1668 unsigned int *psig = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
1669 size_t numsigalgs = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
1670 if (psig == NULL || numsigalgs > INT_MAX)
1673 if (idx >= (int)numsigalgs)
1677 *rhash = (unsigned char)((*psig >> 8) & 0xff);
1679 *rsig = (unsigned char)(*psig & 0xff);
1680 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, *psig);
1682 return (int)numsigalgs;
1685 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
1686 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
1687 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
1689 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
1690 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen
1691 || s->cert->shared_sigalgslen > INT_MAX)
1695 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
1697 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
1699 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
1701 *rsig = (unsigned char)(shsigalgs->rsigalg & 0xff);
1703 *rhash = (unsigned char)((shsigalgs->rsigalg >> 8) & 0xff);
1704 return (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
1707 #define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
1711 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
1714 static void get_sigorhash(int *psig, int *phash, const char *str)
1716 if (strcmp(str, "RSA") == 0) {
1717 *psig = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
1718 } else if (strcmp(str, "DSA") == 0) {
1719 *psig = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
1720 } else if (strcmp(str, "ECDSA") == 0) {
1721 *psig = EVP_PKEY_EC;
1723 *phash = OBJ_sn2nid(str);
1724 if (*phash == NID_undef)
1725 *phash = OBJ_ln2nid(str);
1729 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
1731 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
1734 int sig_alg = NID_undef, hash_alg = NID_undef;
1737 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
1739 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
1741 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
1743 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
1751 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, etmp);
1752 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, p);
1754 if (sig_alg == NID_undef || hash_alg == NID_undef)
1757 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i += 2) {
1758 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
1761 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
1762 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
1767 * Set supported signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
1768 * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
1770 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
1774 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
1778 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
1781 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Needs updating to allow setting of TLS1.3 sig algs */
1782 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
1784 unsigned int *sigalgs, *sptr;
1789 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc((salglen / 2) * sizeof(*sigalgs));
1790 if (sigalgs == NULL)
1793 * TODO(TLS1.3): Somehow we need to be able to set RSA-PSS as well as
1794 * RSA-PKCS1. For now we only allow setting of RSA-PKCS1
1796 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i += 2) {
1798 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *curr;
1799 int md_id = *psig_nids++;
1800 int sig_id = *psig_nids++;
1802 for (j = 0, curr = sigalg_lookup_tbl; j < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
1804 /* Skip setting PSS so we get PKCS1 by default */
1805 if (SIGID_IS_PSS(curr->sigalg))
1807 if (curr->hash == md_id && curr->sig == sig_id) {
1808 *sptr++ = curr->sigalg;
1813 if (j == OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl))
1818 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
1819 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
1820 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen / 2;
1822 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
1823 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
1824 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen / 2;
1830 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
1834 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
1838 if (default_nid == -1)
1840 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
1842 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
1843 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
1844 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
1849 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
1850 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
1854 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
1855 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++) {
1856 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
1863 * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by
1864 * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before
1865 * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before
1866 * attempting to use them.
1869 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
1871 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
1872 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
1873 /* Strict mode flags */
1874 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
1875 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
1876 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
1878 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
1883 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
1884 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
1887 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
1888 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
1890 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
1893 idx = (int)(cpk - c->pkeys);
1895 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
1896 pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
1898 pk = cpk->privatekey;
1900 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
1901 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
1907 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
1910 pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
1912 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
1913 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
1915 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
1922 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
1923 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
1924 if (ok == X509_V_OK)
1925 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
1926 else if (!check_flags)
1931 * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature
1932 * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode.
1934 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode) {
1937 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs)
1939 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
1942 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
1943 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
1944 rsign = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
1945 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
1948 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
1949 rsign = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
1950 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
1954 rsign = EVP_PKEY_EC;
1955 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
1958 case SSL_PKEY_GOST01:
1959 rsign = NID_id_GostR3410_2001;
1960 default_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001;
1963 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256:
1964 rsign = NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256;
1965 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_256;
1968 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512:
1969 rsign = NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512;
1970 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_512;
1979 * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set
1980 * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1.
1982 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs) {
1984 const unsigned int *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
1985 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j++, p++) {
1986 if (tls_sigalg_get_hash(*p) == NID_sha1
1987 && tls_sigalg_get_sig(*p) == rsign)
1990 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen) {
1997 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
1998 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid)) {
2002 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
2003 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
2004 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
2005 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i), default_nid)) {
2007 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
2014 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
2015 else if (check_flags)
2016 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE | CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
2018 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
2019 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
2020 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
2021 else if (!check_flags)
2024 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
2025 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
2026 else if (strict_mode) {
2027 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
2028 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
2029 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
2030 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0)) {
2032 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
2039 if (!s->server && strict_mode) {
2040 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
2042 switch (EVP_PKEY_id(pk)) {
2044 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
2047 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
2050 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
2054 const unsigned char *ctypes;
2058 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
2060 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
2061 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
2063 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++) {
2064 if (ctypes[i] == check_type) {
2065 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
2069 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
2072 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
2074 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
2076 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
2077 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
2079 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
2080 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
2081 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
2083 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
2084 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
2085 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
2086 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp)) {
2087 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
2092 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
2095 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME | CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
2097 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
2098 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
2102 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
2103 if (*pvalid & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
2104 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
2105 else if (s->s3->tmp.md[idx] != NULL)
2106 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
2108 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
2111 * When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the
2115 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
2118 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
2119 *pvalid &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
2126 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
2127 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
2129 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
2130 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
2131 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
2132 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
2133 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST01);
2134 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256);
2135 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512);
2138 /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
2139 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
2141 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);
2144 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2145 DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s)
2147 int dh_secbits = 80;
2148 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto == 2)
2149 return DH_get_1024_160();
2150 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aPSK)) {
2151 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256)
2156 CERT_PKEY *cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
2157 dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(cpk->privatekey);
2160 if (dh_secbits >= 128) {
2168 if (dh_secbits >= 192)
2169 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL);
2171 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL);
2172 if (p == NULL || g == NULL || !DH_set0_pqg(dhp, p, NULL, g)) {
2180 if (dh_secbits >= 112)
2181 return DH_get_2048_224();
2182 return DH_get_1024_160();
2186 static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
2189 EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
2192 * If no parameters this will return -1 and fail using the default
2193 * security callback for any non-zero security level. This will
2194 * reject keys which omit parameters but this only affects DSA and
2195 * omission of parameters is never (?) done in practice.
2197 secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey);
2200 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, 0, x);
2202 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, 0, x);
2205 static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
2207 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
2208 int secbits = -1, md_nid = NID_undef, sig_nid;
2209 /* Don't check signature if self signed */
2210 if ((X509_get_extension_flags(x) & EXFLAG_SS) != 0)
2212 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
2213 if (sig_nid && OBJ_find_sigid_algs(sig_nid, &md_nid, NULL)) {
2215 if (md_nid && (md = EVP_get_digestbynid(md_nid)))
2216 secbits = EVP_MD_size(md) * 4;
2219 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
2221 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
2224 int ssl_security_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int vfy, int is_ee)
2227 vfy = SSL_SECOP_PEER;
2229 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY | vfy))
2230 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
2232 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY | vfy))
2233 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
2235 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD | vfy))
2236 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK;
2241 * Check security of a chain, if sk includes the end entity certificate then
2242 * x is NULL. If vfy is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and not sending
2243 * one to the peer. Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
2246 int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x, int vfy)
2248 int rv, start_idx, i;
2250 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
2255 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 1);
2259 for (i = start_idx; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
2260 x = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
2261 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 0);