2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
113 #include <openssl/objects.h>
114 #include <openssl/evp.h>
115 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
116 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
117 #include <openssl/rand.h>
118 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
119 # include <openssl/dh.h>
120 # include <openssl/bn.h>
122 #include "ssl_locl.h"
124 const char tls1_version_str[] = "TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
126 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
127 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
128 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
129 SSL_SESSION **psess);
130 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
131 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
134 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data = {
137 tls1_setup_key_block,
138 tls1_generate_master_secret,
139 tls1_change_cipher_state,
140 tls1_final_finish_mac,
141 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
142 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
143 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
144 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
146 tls1_export_keying_material,
148 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
149 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
153 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_1_enc_data = {
156 tls1_setup_key_block,
157 tls1_generate_master_secret,
158 tls1_change_cipher_state,
159 tls1_final_finish_mac,
160 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
161 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
162 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
163 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
165 tls1_export_keying_material,
166 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
167 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
168 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
172 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_2_enc_data = {
175 tls1_setup_key_block,
176 tls1_generate_master_secret,
177 tls1_change_cipher_state,
178 tls1_final_finish_mac,
179 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
180 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
181 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
182 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
184 tls1_export_keying_material,
185 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
186 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
187 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
188 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
192 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
195 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
196 * http, the cache would over fill
198 return (60 * 60 * 2);
205 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
209 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
211 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
212 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
213 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
217 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
220 s->version = s->method->version;
223 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
226 int nid; /* Curve NID */
227 int secbits; /* Bits of security (from SP800-57) */
228 unsigned int flags; /* Flags: currently just field type */
231 # define TLS_CURVE_CHAR2 0x1
232 # define TLS_CURVE_PRIME 0x0
234 static const tls_curve_info nid_list[] = {
235 {NID_sect163k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163k1 (1) */
236 {NID_sect163r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r1 (2) */
237 {NID_sect163r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r2 (3) */
238 {NID_sect193r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r1 (4) */
239 {NID_sect193r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r2 (5) */
240 {NID_sect233k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233k1 (6) */
241 {NID_sect233r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233r1 (7) */
242 {NID_sect239k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect239k1 (8) */
243 {NID_sect283k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283k1 (9) */
244 {NID_sect283r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283r1 (10) */
245 {NID_sect409k1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409k1 (11) */
246 {NID_sect409r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409r1 (12) */
247 {NID_sect571k1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571k1 (13) */
248 {NID_sect571r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571r1 (14) */
249 {NID_secp160k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160k1 (15) */
250 {NID_secp160r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r1 (16) */
251 {NID_secp160r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r2 (17) */
252 {NID_secp192k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192k1 (18) */
253 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192r1 (19) */
254 {NID_secp224k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224k1 (20) */
255 {NID_secp224r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224r1 (21) */
256 {NID_secp256k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256k1 (22) */
257 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256r1 (23) */
258 {NID_secp384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp384r1 (24) */
259 {NID_secp521r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp521r1 (25) */
260 {NID_brainpoolP256r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
261 {NID_brainpoolP384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
262 {NID_brainpoolP512r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
265 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = {
266 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
267 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
268 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
271 static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] = {
272 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
273 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
274 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
275 0, 28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
276 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
277 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
278 0, 27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
279 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
280 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
281 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
282 0, 26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
283 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
284 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
285 0, 8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
286 0, 6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
287 0, 7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
288 0, 20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
289 0, 21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
290 0, 4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
291 0, 5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
292 0, 18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
293 0, 19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
294 0, 1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
295 0, 2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
296 0, 3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
297 0, 15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
298 0, 16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
299 0, 17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
302 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] = {
303 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
304 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
307 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
309 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
310 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
312 return nid_list[curve_id - 1].nid;
315 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
317 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
319 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
321 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
323 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
325 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
327 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
329 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
331 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
333 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
335 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
337 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
339 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
341 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
343 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
345 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
347 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
349 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
351 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
353 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
355 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
357 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
359 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
361 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
363 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
365 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
367 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
369 case NID_brainpoolP256r1: /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
371 case NID_brainpoolP384r1: /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
373 case NID_brainpoolP512r1: /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
381 * Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
383 * Sets |num_curves| to the number of curves in the list, i.e.,
384 * the length of |pcurves| is 2 * num_curves.
385 * Returns 1 on success and 0 if the client curves list has invalid format.
386 * The latter indicates an internal error: we should not be accepting such
387 * lists in the first place.
388 * TODO(emilia): we should really be storing the curves list in explicitly
389 * parsed form instead. (However, this would affect binary compatibility
390 * so cannot happen in the 1.0.x series.)
392 static int tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
393 const unsigned char **pcurves,
396 size_t pcurveslen = 0;
398 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
399 pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
401 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
402 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
403 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
404 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
405 pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
408 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
409 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
413 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
414 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
418 *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
419 pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
422 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
423 pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
427 /* We do not allow odd length arrays to enter the system. */
428 if (pcurveslen & 1) {
429 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_GET_CURVELIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
433 *num_curves = pcurveslen / 2;
438 /* See if curve is allowed by security callback */
439 static int tls_curve_allowed(SSL *s, const unsigned char *curve, int op)
441 const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
444 if ((curve[1] < 1) || ((size_t)curve[1] > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
446 cinfo = &nid_list[curve[1] - 1];
447 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
448 if (cinfo->flags & TLS_CURVE_CHAR2)
451 return ssl_security(s, op, cinfo->secbits, cinfo->nid, (void *)curve);
454 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
455 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
457 const unsigned char *curves;
458 size_t num_curves, i;
459 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
460 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
462 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
464 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
467 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) {
468 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
470 } else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) {
471 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
473 } else /* Should never happen */
476 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &num_curves))
478 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, curves += 2) {
479 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
480 return tls_curve_allowed(s, p + 1, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK);
486 * Return |nmatch|th shared curve or NID_undef if there is no match.
487 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
488 * For nmatch == -2, return the NID of the curve to use for
489 * an EC tmp key, or NID_undef if there is no match.
491 int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
493 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
494 size_t num_pref, num_supp, i, j;
496 /* Can't do anything on client side */
500 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
502 * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know
503 * these are acceptable due to previous checks.
505 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
506 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
507 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
508 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
509 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
510 /* Should never happen */
513 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
517 * Avoid truncation. tls1_get_curvelist takes an int
518 * but s->options is a long...
520 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
521 (s, (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0, &supp,
523 /* In practice, NID_undef == 0 but let's be precise. */
524 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
525 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
526 (s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE), &pref,
528 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
530 for (i = 0; i < num_pref; i++, pref += 2) {
531 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
532 for (j = 0; j < num_supp; j++, tsupp += 2) {
533 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1]) {
534 if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, pref, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
537 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
538 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id);
546 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
550 int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
551 int *curves, size_t ncurves)
553 unsigned char *clist, *p;
556 * Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works while curve
559 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
560 clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
563 for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++) {
564 unsigned long idmask;
566 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
568 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask)) {
577 *pextlen = ncurves * 2;
581 # define MAX_CURVELIST 28
585 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
588 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
590 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
596 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
598 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
600 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
602 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
603 if (nid == NID_undef)
604 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
605 if (nid == NID_undef)
606 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
607 if (nid == NID_undef)
609 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
610 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
612 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
616 /* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
617 int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
622 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
626 return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
629 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
630 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
635 const EC_METHOD *meth;
638 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
639 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
642 meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(grp);
645 if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
649 /* Determine curve ID */
650 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
651 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
652 /* If we have an ID set it, otherwise set arbitrary explicit curve */
655 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
664 if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
666 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED) {
668 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
670 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
672 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
677 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
678 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
679 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
681 const unsigned char *pformats, *pcurves;
682 size_t num_formats, num_curves, i;
685 * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
686 * supported (see RFC4492).
688 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
689 pformats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
690 num_formats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
691 for (i = 0; i < num_formats; i++, pformats++) {
692 if (*comp_id == *pformats)
695 if (i == num_formats)
700 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
701 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++) {
702 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &pcurves, &num_curves))
704 if (j == 1 && num_curves == 0) {
706 * If we've not received any curves then skip this check.
707 * RFC 4492 does not require the supported elliptic curves extension
708 * so if it is not sent we can just choose any curve.
709 * It is invalid to send an empty list in the elliptic curves
710 * extension, so num_curves == 0 always means no extension.
714 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
715 if (pcurves[0] == curve_id[0] && pcurves[1] == curve_id[1])
720 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
727 static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
731 * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
733 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
734 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
735 *num_formats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
737 *pformats = ecformats_default;
738 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
740 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
742 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default);
747 * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
748 * certificates have compatible curves and compression.
750 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
752 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
755 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
758 /* If not EC nothing to do */
759 if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC) {
763 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec);
768 * Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a supported
771 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
775 * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
776 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
778 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s)) {
784 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
785 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
786 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
787 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
788 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
790 return 0; /* Should never happen */
791 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
792 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
794 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
796 if (set_ee_md == 2) {
797 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
798 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha256();
800 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha384();
806 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
807 /* Check EC temporary key is compatible with client extensions */
808 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
810 unsigned char curve_id[2];
811 EC_KEY *ec = s->cert->ecdh_tmp;
812 # ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
813 /* Allow any curve: not just those peer supports */
814 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
818 * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
821 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
822 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
823 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
824 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
825 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
826 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
830 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
831 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
833 /* If auto or setting curve from callback assume OK */
834 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto || s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
836 /* Otherwise check curve is acceptable */
838 unsigned char curve_tmp[2];
841 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_tmp, NULL, ec))
843 if (!curve_tmp[0] || curve_tmp[1] == curve_id[1])
849 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto) {
850 /* Need a shared curve */
851 if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
857 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
862 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, NULL, ec))
864 /* Set this to allow use of invalid curves for testing */
868 return tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL);
871 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
875 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
880 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
882 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
885 * List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
886 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
889 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
890 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
892 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
895 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
896 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
898 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
901 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC
902 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */
904 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
907 # define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
908 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
909 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
910 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
912 static const unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
913 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
914 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
915 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
916 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
917 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
920 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
921 static const unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
922 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
923 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
926 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
929 * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
932 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
933 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
934 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
935 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
936 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
938 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
939 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
942 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
943 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
947 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
948 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs) {
949 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
950 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
951 } else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
952 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
953 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
955 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
956 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
961 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
962 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
964 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
965 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
967 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
968 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
969 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
970 /* Should never happen */
973 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
974 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1]) {
975 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
978 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
979 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
980 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
981 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
982 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec))
984 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id)) {
985 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
988 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
989 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
992 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256) {
993 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256) {
994 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
995 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
998 } else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384) {
999 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384) {
1000 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1001 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
1007 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
1011 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
1012 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
1013 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i += 2, sent_sigs += 2) {
1014 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
1017 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
1018 if (i == sent_sigslen
1019 && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1
1020 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
1021 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1024 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
1026 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
1029 /* Make sure security callback allows algorithm */
1030 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK,
1031 EVP_MD_size(*pmd) * 4, EVP_MD_type(*pmd),
1033 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1037 * Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they wish.
1039 if (s->session && s->session->sess_cert)
1040 s->session->sess_cert->peer_key->digest = *pmd;
1045 * Get a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
1046 * supported or doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms. Unlike
1047 * ssl_cipher_get_disabled this applies to a specific session and not global
1050 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
1055 /* Don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers if we don't suppport them */
1056 if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s))
1057 c->mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
1060 ssl_set_sig_mask(&c->mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
1062 * Disable static DH if we don't include any appropriate signature
1065 if (c->mask_a & SSL_aRSA)
1066 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHr | SSL_kECDHr;
1067 if (c->mask_a & SSL_aDSS)
1068 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHd;
1069 if (c->mask_a & SSL_aECDSA)
1070 c->mask_k |= SSL_kECDHe;
1071 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1072 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1073 if (!s->psk_client_callback) {
1074 c->mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
1075 c->mask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
1077 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1078 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1079 if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) {
1080 c->mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
1081 c->mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
1087 int ssl_cipher_disabled(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op)
1090 if (c->algorithm_ssl & ct->mask_ssl || c->algorithm_mkey & ct->mask_k
1091 || c->algorithm_auth & ct->mask_a)
1093 return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c);
1096 static int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s)
1098 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
1100 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL);
1103 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
1104 unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1107 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1108 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1109 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1110 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1112 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1114 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1115 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1117 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++) {
1118 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1120 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1121 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1122 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)
1123 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) {
1134 return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1136 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1137 if (s->renegotiate) {
1140 if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1141 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1145 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1148 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret);
1151 if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1152 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1158 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1159 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION)
1162 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1163 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1164 unsigned long size_str;
1168 * check for enough space.
1169 * 4 for the servername type and entension length
1170 * 2 for servernamelist length
1171 * 1 for the hostname type
1172 * 2 for hostname length
1176 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
1178 strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
1181 /* extension type and length */
1182 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret);
1183 s2n(size_str + 5, ret);
1185 /* length of servername list */
1186 s2n(size_str + 3, ret);
1188 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
1189 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
1191 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
1194 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1195 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
1196 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the
1197 * Client Hello message */
1199 int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
1200 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0) {
1201 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1206 * check for enough space.
1207 * 4 for the srp type type and entension length
1208 * 1 for the srp user identity
1209 * + srp user identity length
1211 if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0)
1214 /* fill in the extension */
1215 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp, ret);
1216 s2n(login_len + 1, ret);
1217 (*ret++) = (unsigned char)login_len;
1218 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
1223 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1226 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message
1229 const unsigned char *pcurves, *pformats;
1230 size_t num_curves, num_formats, curves_list_len;
1232 unsigned char *etmp;
1234 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &pformats, &num_formats);
1236 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0)
1238 if (num_formats > (size_t)lenmax)
1240 if (num_formats > 255) {
1241 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1245 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret);
1246 /* The point format list has 1-byte length. */
1247 s2n(num_formats + 1, ret);
1248 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)num_formats;
1249 memcpy(ret, pformats, num_formats);
1253 * Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message
1255 pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1256 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &pcurves, &num_curves))
1259 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0)
1261 if (num_curves > (size_t)lenmax / 2)
1263 if (num_curves > 65532 / 2) {
1264 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1268 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves, ret);
1270 /* Copy curve ID if supported */
1271 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
1272 if (tls_curve_allowed(s, pcurves, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) {
1273 *etmp++ = pcurves[0];
1274 *etmp++ = pcurves[1];
1278 curves_list_len = etmp - ret - 4;
1280 s2n(curves_list_len + 2, ret);
1281 s2n(curves_list_len, ret);
1282 ret += curves_list_len;
1284 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1286 if (tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1288 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
1289 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
1290 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1291 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data) {
1292 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1293 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1294 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
1296 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1297 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data, ticklen);
1298 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1301 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1302 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1305 * Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len rest for
1308 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0)
1310 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret);
1313 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
1319 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1321 const unsigned char *salg;
1322 unsigned char *etmp;
1323 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
1324 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < salglen + 6)
1326 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms, ret);
1328 /* Skip over lengths for now */
1330 salglen = tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, ret, salg, salglen);
1331 /* Fill in lengths */
1332 s2n(salglen + 2, etmp);
1337 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
1339 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
1343 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
1344 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1345 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1351 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) {
1352 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1358 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0)
1360 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1361 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
1363 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
1364 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
1366 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
1367 /* save position of id len */
1368 unsigned char *q = ret;
1369 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1370 /* skip over id len */
1372 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
1378 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
1380 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1381 /* Add Heartbeat extension */
1382 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1384 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret);
1388 * 1: peer may send requests
1389 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1391 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1392 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1394 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1397 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1398 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1400 * The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its support
1401 * for Next Protocol Negotiation
1403 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
1405 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret);
1410 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1411 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 6 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len)
1413 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret);
1414 s2n(2 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret);
1415 s2n(s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret);
1416 memcpy(ret, s->alpn_client_proto_list, s->alpn_client_proto_list_len);
1417 ret += s->alpn_client_proto_list_len;
1419 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1420 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)) {
1423 /* Returns 0 on success!! */
1424 if (ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1425 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1429 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1432 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret);
1435 if (ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1436 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1442 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->cli_ext);
1443 /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
1444 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 0, &ret, limit, al))
1446 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1447 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac, ret);
1450 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret, ret);
1454 * Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See
1455 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03 NB: because this
1456 * code works out the length of all existing extensions it MUST always
1459 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING) {
1460 int hlen = ret - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1462 if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200) {
1463 hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
1469 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret);
1471 memset(ret, 0, hlen);
1478 if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0)
1481 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1485 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
1486 unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1489 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1490 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1491 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1492 int next_proto_neg_seen;
1494 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1495 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1496 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1497 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe))
1498 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1499 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1504 return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1506 if (s->s3->send_connection_binding) {
1509 if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1510 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1514 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1517 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret);
1520 if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1521 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1528 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1529 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
1532 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1
1533 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1534 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1537 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret);
1540 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1542 const unsigned char *plist;
1545 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message
1549 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1551 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0)
1553 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax)
1555 if (plistlen > 255) {
1556 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1560 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret);
1561 s2n(plistlen + 1, ret);
1562 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)plistlen;
1563 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1568 * Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves
1571 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1573 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected && tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1574 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1576 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret);
1580 if (s->tlsext_status_expected) {
1581 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1583 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1587 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1588 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->srtp_profile) {
1591 /* Returns 0 on success!! */
1592 if (ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1593 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1596 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1599 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret);
1602 if (ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1603 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1610 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x80
1611 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x81)
1612 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG)) {
1613 const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1614 0xfd, 0xe8, /* 65000 */
1615 0x00, 0x20, /* 32 bytes length */
1616 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1617 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1618 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1619 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17
1621 if (limit - ret < 36)
1623 memcpy(ret, cryptopro_ext, 36);
1627 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1628 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
1629 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) {
1630 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1632 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret);
1636 * 1: peer may send requests
1637 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1639 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1640 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1642 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1647 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1648 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1649 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1650 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb) {
1651 const unsigned char *npa;
1652 unsigned int npalen;
1655 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen,
1657 ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1658 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1659 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0)
1661 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret);
1663 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
1665 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1669 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 1, &ret, limit, al))
1671 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1672 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) {
1674 * Don't use encrypt_then_mac if AEAD or RC4 might want to disable
1675 * for other cases too.
1677 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD
1678 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4)
1679 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1681 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac, ret);
1686 if (!s->hit && s->session->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS) {
1687 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret, ret);
1691 if (s->s3->alpn_selected) {
1692 const unsigned char *selected = s->s3->alpn_selected;
1693 unsigned len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
1695 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - 2 - 1 - len) < 0)
1697 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret);
1701 memcpy(ret, selected, len);
1707 if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0)
1710 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1715 * tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello is called to process the ALPN extension in a
1716 * ClientHello. data: the contents of the extension, not including the type
1717 * and length. data_len: the number of bytes in |data| al: a pointer to the
1718 * alert value to send in the event of a non-zero return. returns: 0 on
1721 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
1722 unsigned data_len, int *al)
1726 const unsigned char *selected;
1727 unsigned char selected_len;
1730 if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb == NULL)
1737 * data should contain a uint16 length followed by a series of 8-bit,
1738 * length-prefixed strings.
1740 i = ((unsigned)data[0]) << 8 | ((unsigned)data[1]);
1749 for (i = 0; i < data_len;) {
1750 proto_len = data[i];
1756 if (i + proto_len < i || i + proto_len > data_len)
1762 r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, data_len,
1763 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
1764 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1765 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1766 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
1767 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected) {
1768 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1771 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, selected, selected_len);
1772 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
1777 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1781 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1783 * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1784 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |d|, of length |n|.
1785 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1790 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1791 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1792 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1793 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1795 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
1796 const unsigned char *d, int n)
1798 unsigned short type, size;
1799 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1800 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1801 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1802 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1803 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1804 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1805 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1807 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1808 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1809 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1810 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1813 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1814 static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock[] = {
1815 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1816 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1817 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1818 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1819 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1820 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1821 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1822 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1825 if (data >= (d + n - 2))
1829 if (data > (d + n - 4))
1834 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1837 if (data + size > d + n)
1841 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
1842 const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1843 const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock);
1845 if (data + len1 + len2 != d + n)
1847 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0)
1849 if (memcmp(data + len1, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock, len2) != 0)
1852 const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1854 if (data + len != d + n)
1856 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0)
1860 s->s3->is_probably_safari = 1;
1862 # endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1864 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
1865 unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
1867 unsigned short type;
1868 unsigned short size;
1870 unsigned char *data = *p;
1871 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1873 s->servername_done = 0;
1874 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1875 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1876 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1879 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1880 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
1881 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1882 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1883 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1886 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1887 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1888 ssl_check_for_safari(s, data, d, n);
1889 # endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1891 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
1892 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->peer_sigalgs);
1893 s->cert->peer_sigalgs = NULL;
1894 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1895 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1898 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1899 OPENSSL_free(s->srp_ctx.login);
1900 s->srp_ctx.login = NULL;
1903 s->srtp_profile = NULL;
1905 if (data >= (d + n - 2))
1909 if (data > (d + n - len))
1912 while (data <= (d + n - 4)) {
1916 if (data + size > (d + n))
1918 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1919 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1920 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
1921 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
1923 renegotiate_seen = 1;
1924 } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
1927 * The servername extension is treated as follows:
1929 * - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
1930 * - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
1931 * in which case an fatal alert is generated.
1932 * - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
1933 * - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
1934 * to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
1935 * - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
1936 * it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
1937 * Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
1938 * set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
1939 * case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
1940 * a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
1941 * presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
1942 * the value of the Host: field.
1943 * - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1944 * if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the
1945 * session, i.e. when the session has been established with a servername
1947 * - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
1951 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
1952 unsigned char *sdata;
1957 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1963 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1969 servname_type = *(sdata++);
1974 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1977 if (s->servername_done == 0)
1978 switch (servname_type) {
1979 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
1981 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname) {
1982 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1985 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) {
1986 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1989 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname =
1990 OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1)) == NULL) {
1991 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1994 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
1995 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len] = '\0';
1996 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
1997 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
1998 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
1999 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2002 s->servername_done = 1;
2005 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
2006 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
2007 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname,
2008 (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
2019 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2024 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2025 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp) {
2026 if (size <= 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size - 1)) {
2027 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2030 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) {
2031 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2034 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1)) == NULL)
2036 memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len);
2037 s->srp_ctx.login[len] = '\0';
2039 if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len) {
2040 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2046 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2047 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
2048 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2049 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2051 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1 ||
2052 ecpointformatlist_length < 1) {
2053 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2057 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2058 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
2059 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2060 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
2061 OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) {
2062 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2065 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
2066 ecpointformatlist_length;
2067 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata,
2068 ecpointformatlist_length);
2070 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves) {
2071 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2072 int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
2073 ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
2075 if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 ||
2076 ellipticcurvelist_length < 1 ||
2077 /* Each NamedCurve is 2 bytes. */
2078 ellipticcurvelist_length & 1) {
2079 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2083 if (s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist) {
2084 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2087 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
2088 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist =
2089 OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL) {
2090 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2093 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length =
2094 ellipticcurvelist_length;
2095 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata,
2096 ellipticcurvelist_length);
2099 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2100 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2101 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2102 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size,
2103 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2105 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2108 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms) {
2110 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs || size < 2) {
2111 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2116 if (dsize != size || dsize & 1 || !dsize) {
2117 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2120 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, data, dsize)) {
2121 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2124 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
2127 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2131 s->tlsext_status_type = *data++;
2133 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
2134 const unsigned char *sdata;
2136 /* Read in responder_id_list */
2140 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2147 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2151 dsize -= 2 + idsize;
2154 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2159 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, &sdata, idsize);
2161 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2164 if (data != sdata) {
2165 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2166 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2169 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
2170 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
2171 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null())) {
2172 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2173 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2176 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id)) {
2177 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2178 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2183 /* Read in request_extensions */
2185 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2190 if (dsize != size) {
2191 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2196 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2197 X509_EXTENSION_free);
2198 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
2199 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &sdata, dsize);
2200 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts || (data + dsize != sdata)) {
2201 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2207 * We don't know what to do with any other type * so ignore it.
2210 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2212 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2213 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
2215 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
2216 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2218 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
2219 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2220 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2223 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2228 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2229 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2230 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0 &&
2231 s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
2233 * We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2236 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2237 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2238 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
2239 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2240 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2241 * anything like that, but this might change).
2243 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2244 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2245 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2246 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2247 * Finished message could have been computed.)
2249 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2253 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation &&
2254 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb && s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2255 if (tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, data, size, al) != 0)
2257 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2258 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
2259 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2263 /* session ticket processed earlier */
2264 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2265 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)
2266 && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2267 if (ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size, al))
2271 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2272 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
2273 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2275 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret) {
2277 s->session->flags |= SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS;
2280 * If this ClientHello extension was unhandled and this is a
2281 * nonresumed connection, check whether the extension is a custom
2282 * TLS Extension (has a custom_srv_ext_record), and if so call the
2283 * callback and record the extension number so that an appropriate
2284 * ServerHello may be later returned.
2287 if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2298 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2300 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
2301 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2302 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2303 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2304 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2311 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d,
2315 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->srv_ext);
2316 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0) {
2317 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2321 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) {
2322 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2328 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2330 * ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2331 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly
2332 * fill the length of the block.
2334 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
2336 unsigned int off = 0;
2349 static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
2350 unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
2352 unsigned short length;
2353 unsigned short type;
2354 unsigned short size;
2355 unsigned char *data = *p;
2356 int tlsext_servername = 0;
2357 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2359 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2360 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2362 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2364 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2365 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
2366 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2367 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2368 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2371 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2372 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2375 if (data >= (d + n - 2))
2379 if (data + length != d + n) {
2380 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2384 while (data <= (d + n - 4)) {
2388 if (data + size > (d + n))
2391 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2392 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2394 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
2395 if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2397 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2398 } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
2399 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
2400 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0) {
2401 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2404 tlsext_servername = 1;
2406 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2407 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
2408 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2409 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2411 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1) {
2412 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2416 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2417 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2418 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
2419 OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) {
2420 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2423 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
2424 ecpointformatlist_length;
2425 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata,
2426 ecpointformatlist_length);
2429 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2431 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2432 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2433 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size,
2434 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2436 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2439 if (!tls_use_ticket(s) || (size > 0)) {
2440 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2443 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2445 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
2447 * MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested a status
2450 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0)) {
2451 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2454 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2455 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2457 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2458 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2459 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2460 unsigned char *selected;
2461 unsigned char selected_len;
2463 /* We must have requested it. */
2464 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL) {
2465 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2468 /* The data must be valid */
2469 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size)) {
2470 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2474 ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data,
2476 s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) !=
2477 SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
2478 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2481 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2482 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated) {
2483 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2486 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2487 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2488 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2492 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation) {
2495 /* We must have requested it. */
2496 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list == NULL) {
2497 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2501 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2505 * The extension data consists of:
2506 * uint16 list_length
2507 * uint8 proto_length;
2508 * uint8 proto[proto_length];
2513 if (len != (unsigned)size - 2) {
2514 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2518 if (len != (unsigned)size - 3) {
2519 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2522 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2523 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
2524 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected) {
2525 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2528 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, data + 3, len);
2529 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
2531 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2532 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
2534 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
2535 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2537 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
2538 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2539 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2542 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2547 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2548 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2549 if (ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size, al))
2553 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2554 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac) {
2555 /* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite */
2556 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD
2557 && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc != SSL_RC4)
2558 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2561 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret) {
2563 s->session->flags |= SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS;
2566 * If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but matches a
2567 * custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c callback
2569 else if (custom_ext_parse(s, 0, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2575 if (data != d + n) {
2576 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2580 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1) {
2581 if (s->tlsext_hostname) {
2582 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) {
2583 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
2584 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname) {
2585 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2589 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2600 * Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to avoid
2601 * an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server hello
2602 * because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an attack.
2603 * However this would mean we could not connect to any server which
2604 * doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI absence on
2605 * initial connect only.
2607 if (!renegotiate_seen && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
2608 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2609 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2610 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2611 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2618 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2624 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2629 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
2631 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2632 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2634 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2636 * The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely
2637 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2640 * The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely
2641 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2645 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2647 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2648 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2649 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
2650 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2652 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2654 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2657 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2658 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2661 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2662 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2665 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2666 s->servername_done = 0;
2672 int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s)
2676 /* Clear any shared sigtnature algorithms */
2677 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
2678 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
2679 s->cert->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
2680 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
2681 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
2682 s->cert->pkeys[i].digest = NULL;
2683 s->cert->pkeys[i].valid_flags = 0;
2686 /* If sigalgs received process it. */
2687 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs) {
2688 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2689 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2690 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2693 /* Fatal error is no shared signature algorithms */
2694 if (!s->cert->shared_sigalgs) {
2695 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS,
2696 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS);
2697 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2701 ssl_cert_set_default_md(s->cert);
2704 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2708 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
2710 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2711 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2714 * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be
2715 * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed,
2716 * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may
2717 * influence which certificate is sent
2719 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
2721 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
2722 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
2723 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
2724 if (certpkey == NULL) {
2725 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2729 * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
2730 * et al can pick it up.
2732 s->cert->key = certpkey;
2733 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2735 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
2736 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2737 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2739 /* status request response should be sent */
2740 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
2741 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
2742 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2744 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2746 /* something bad happened */
2747 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2748 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2749 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2753 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2757 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2758 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2761 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2762 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2770 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2772 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2773 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2775 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2777 * If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
2778 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension it
2779 * must contain uncompressed.
2781 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2782 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2783 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
2784 && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
2785 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
2786 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
2787 && ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe))
2788 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) {
2789 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
2791 unsigned char *list;
2792 int found_uncompressed = 0;
2793 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2794 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) {
2795 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed) {
2796 found_uncompressed = 1;
2800 if (!found_uncompressed) {
2801 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2802 SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
2806 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2807 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2809 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2811 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2812 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2813 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
2814 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2816 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2818 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2821 * If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one tell the
2824 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
2825 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
2828 * Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows there is no
2831 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
2832 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
2833 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
2834 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2836 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
2837 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2840 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2841 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2846 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2847 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2850 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2851 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2854 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2855 s->servername_done = 0;
2861 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d,
2865 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
2867 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0) {
2868 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2872 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
2873 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
2880 * Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
2881 * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle
2882 * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time.
2884 * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will
2885 * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket
2886 * extension, if any.
2887 * len: the length of the session ID.
2888 * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello.
2889 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2890 * point to the resulting session.
2892 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
2893 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
2894 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
2897 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
2898 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
2899 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
2900 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
2901 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
2902 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
2903 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
2906 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
2907 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
2908 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
2909 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
2910 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
2911 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
2913 int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
2914 const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
2916 /* Point after session ID in client hello */
2917 const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
2921 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2924 * If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
2927 if (!tls_use_ticket(s))
2929 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
2933 /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
2934 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
2940 /* Skip past cipher list */
2945 /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
2950 /* Now at start of extensions */
2951 if ((p + 2) >= limit)
2954 while ((p + 4) <= limit) {
2955 unsigned short type, size;
2958 if (p + size > limit)
2960 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2964 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
2967 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2970 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
2972 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
2973 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
2974 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
2975 * calculate the master secret later.
2979 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret);
2981 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
2982 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2984 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
2986 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
2987 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2989 default: /* fatal error */
2999 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
3001 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
3002 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
3003 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
3004 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
3005 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3006 * point to the resulting session.
3009 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3010 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
3011 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
3012 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
3014 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
3015 int eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id,
3016 int sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess)
3019 unsigned char *sdec;
3020 const unsigned char *p;
3021 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
3022 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
3025 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3026 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
3029 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
3030 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3031 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3032 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
3033 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
3034 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
3043 /* Check key name matches */
3044 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
3046 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3047 EVP_sha256(), NULL);
3048 EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3049 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
3052 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
3055 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
3057 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3061 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
3062 HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
3063 HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
3064 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3065 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) {
3066 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3069 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
3070 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
3071 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3072 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3073 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
3075 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3078 EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
3079 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0) {
3080 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3085 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3088 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3092 * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
3093 * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
3094 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
3098 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3099 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3108 * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
3113 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3120 static const tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
3121 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3122 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3123 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3124 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3125 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3126 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}
3129 static const tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
3130 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
3131 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
3132 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}
3135 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3138 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3139 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3145 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3148 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3149 if ((table[i].id) == id)
3150 return table[i].nid;
3155 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk,
3161 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3164 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3167 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
3168 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
3172 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
3174 return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3180 const EVP_MD *(*mfunc) (void);
3183 static const tls12_hash_info tls12_md_info[] = {
3184 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
3187 {NID_md5, 64, EVP_md5},
3189 {NID_sha1, 80, EVP_sha1},
3190 {NID_sha224, 112, EVP_sha224},
3191 {NID_sha256, 128, EVP_sha256},
3192 {NID_sha384, 192, EVP_sha384},
3193 {NID_sha512, 256, EVP_sha512}
3196 static const tls12_hash_info *tls12_get_hash_info(unsigned char hash_alg)
3200 if (hash_alg > OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md_info))
3202 return tls12_md_info + hash_alg - 1;
3205 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
3207 const tls12_hash_info *inf;
3208 if (hash_alg == TLSEXT_hash_md5 && FIPS_mode())
3210 inf = tls12_get_hash_info(hash_alg);
3211 if (!inf || !inf->mfunc)
3213 return inf->mfunc();
3216 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
3219 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3220 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3221 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3223 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3224 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3225 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3227 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3228 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3229 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3235 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3236 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
3237 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3239 int sign_nid = 0, hash_nid = 0;
3240 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3242 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3243 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3245 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3247 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3248 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3250 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3252 if (psignhash_nid) {
3253 if (sign_nid && hash_nid)
3254 OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid, hash_nid, sign_nid);
3256 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3260 /* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
3261 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(SSL *s, int op, const unsigned char *ptmp)
3263 /* See if we have an entry in the hash table and it is enabled */
3264 const tls12_hash_info *hinf = tls12_get_hash_info(ptmp[0]);
3265 if (!hinf || !hinf->mfunc)
3267 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
3268 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3270 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
3271 return ssl_security(s, op, hinf->secbits, hinf->nid, (void *)ptmp);
3275 * Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported signature
3276 * algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA then RSA is
3280 void ssl_set_sig_mask(unsigned long *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op)
3282 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
3283 size_t i, sigalgslen;
3284 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
3286 * Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any for
3287 * RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just TLS 1.2. To keep
3288 * down calls to security callback only check if we have to.
3290 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
3291 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2) {
3292 switch (sigalgs[1]) {
3293 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3294 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3295 if (!have_rsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3299 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3300 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3301 if (!have_dsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3305 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3306 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3307 if (!have_ecdsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3314 *pmask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
3316 *pmask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
3318 *pmask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
3321 size_t tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, unsigned char *out,
3322 const unsigned char *psig, size_t psiglen)
3324 unsigned char *tmpout = out;
3326 for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i += 2, psig += 2) {
3327 if (tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, psig)) {
3328 *tmpout++ = psig[0];
3329 *tmpout++ = psig[1];
3332 return tmpout - out;
3335 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
3336 static int tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
3337 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3338 const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
3340 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3341 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3342 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i += 2, ptmp += 2) {
3343 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3344 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED, ptmp))
3346 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j += 2, atmp += 2) {
3347 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1]) {
3350 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3351 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3352 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3354 &shsig->signandhash_nid, ptmp);
3364 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3365 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3367 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3368 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3370 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3372 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
3374 OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
3375 c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
3376 c->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
3377 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3378 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3379 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3380 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3381 } else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3382 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
3383 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3385 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
3386 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb) {
3389 allow = c->peer_sigalgs;
3390 allowlen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3394 pref = c->peer_sigalgs;
3395 preflen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3397 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3399 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3402 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3406 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3407 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3411 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3413 int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
3416 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
3417 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3419 /* Should never happen */
3423 OPENSSL_free(c->peer_sigalgs);
3424 c->peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
3425 if (!c->peer_sigalgs)
3427 c->peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3428 memcpy(c->peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
3432 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3438 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3439 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s))
3442 # ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3443 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL) {
3445 * Use first set signature preference to force message digest,
3446 * ignoring any peer preferences.
3448 const unsigned char *sigs = NULL;
3450 sigs = c->conf_sigalgs;
3452 sigs = c->client_sigalgs;
3454 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigs[1]);
3455 md = tls12_get_hash(sigs[0]);
3456 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3457 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3458 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) {
3459 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags =
3460 CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3461 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3467 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3468 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++) {
3469 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3470 if (idx > 0 && c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL) {
3471 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
3472 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3473 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3474 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) {
3475 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags =
3476 CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3477 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3483 * In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't use
3484 * the certificate for signing.
3486 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
3488 * Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not
3489 * supported it stays as NULL.
3491 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3492 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest)
3493 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3495 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3496 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest) {
3497 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3498 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3501 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3502 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest)
3503 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3509 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3510 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3511 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3513 const unsigned char *psig = s->cert->peer_sigalgs;
3518 if (idx >= (int)s->cert->peer_sigalgslen)
3525 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
3527 return s->cert->peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3530 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3531 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3532 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3534 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
3535 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
3539 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3541 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3543 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3545 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
3547 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
3548 return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
3551 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
3552 int tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned int length)
3555 unsigned short hbtype;
3556 unsigned int payload;
3557 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3559 if (s->msg_callback)
3560 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3562 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3564 /* Read type and payload length first */
3565 if (1 + 2 + 16 > length)
3566 return 0; /* silently discard */
3569 if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > length)
3570 return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */
3573 if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST) {
3574 unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
3578 * Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes message type,
3579 * plus 2 bytes payload length, plus payload, plus padding
3581 buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3582 if (buffer == NULL) {
3583 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_PROCESS_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3588 /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
3589 *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
3591 memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
3593 /* Random padding */
3594 if (RAND_bytes(bp, padding) <= 0) {
3595 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
3599 r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer,
3600 3 + payload + padding);
3602 if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
3603 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3604 buffer, 3 + payload + padding,
3605 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3607 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
3611 } else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE) {
3615 * We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int), and 16
3616 * random bytes, so we just try to read the sequence number
3620 if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq) {
3622 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
3629 int tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3631 unsigned char *buf, *p;
3633 unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
3634 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3636 /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
3637 if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
3638 s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS) {
3639 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
3643 /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
3644 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) {
3645 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
3649 /* ...and no handshake in progress. */
3650 if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake) {
3651 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
3656 * Check if padding is too long, payload and padding must not exceed 2^14
3657 * - 3 = 16381 bytes in total.
3659 OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381);
3662 * Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
3663 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
3664 * some random stuff.
3665 * - Message Type, 1 byte
3666 * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
3667 * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
3668 * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
3671 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3673 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3678 *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
3679 /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
3681 /* Sequence number */
3682 s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
3683 /* 16 random bytes */
3684 if (RAND_bytes(p, 16) <= 0) {
3685 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3689 /* Random padding */
3690 if (RAND_bytes(p, padding) <= 0) {
3691 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3695 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
3697 if (s->msg_callback)
3698 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3699 buf, 3 + payload + padding,
3700 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3702 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;
3711 # define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
3715 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
3718 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
3720 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
3723 int sig_alg, hash_alg;
3726 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
3728 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
3730 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
3732 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
3740 if (strcmp(etmp, "RSA") == 0)
3741 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
3742 else if (strcmp(etmp, "DSA") == 0)
3743 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
3744 else if (strcmp(etmp, "ECDSA") == 0)
3745 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_EC;
3749 hash_alg = OBJ_sn2nid(p);
3750 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
3751 hash_alg = OBJ_ln2nid(p);
3752 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
3755 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i += 2) {
3756 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
3759 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
3760 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
3765 * Set suppored signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
3766 * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
3768 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
3772 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
3776 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
3779 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen,
3782 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
3787 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
3788 if (sigalgs == NULL)
3790 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i += 2) {
3791 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3792 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3794 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
3801 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
3802 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3803 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
3805 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
3806 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3807 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
3813 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
3817 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
3821 if (default_nid == -1)
3823 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
3825 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
3826 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
3827 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
3832 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
3833 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
3837 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
3838 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++) {
3839 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
3846 * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by
3847 * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before
3848 * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before
3849 * attempting to use them.
3852 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
3854 # define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
3855 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
3856 /* Strict mode flags */
3857 # define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
3858 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
3859 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
3861 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
3866 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
3867 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
3869 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
3870 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
3872 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
3875 idx = cpk - c->pkeys;
3877 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
3879 pk = cpk->privatekey;
3881 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
3882 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
3885 # ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3886 /* Allow any certificate to pass test */
3887 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL) {
3888 rv = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN |
3889 CERT_PKEY_VALID | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
3890 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
3897 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
3900 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
3901 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
3902 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
3904 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
3911 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
3912 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
3913 if (ok == X509_V_OK)
3914 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
3915 else if (!check_flags)
3920 * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature
3921 * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode.
3923 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode) {
3925 unsigned char rsign = 0;
3926 if (c->peer_sigalgs)
3928 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
3931 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
3932 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
3933 case SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA:
3934 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
3935 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
3938 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
3939 case SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA:
3940 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
3941 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
3945 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
3946 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
3955 * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set
3956 * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1.
3958 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs) {
3960 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
3961 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2) {
3962 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
3965 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen) {
3972 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
3973 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid)) {
3977 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
3978 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
3979 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
3980 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i), default_nid)) {
3982 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
3989 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
3990 else if (check_flags)
3991 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE | CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
3993 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
3994 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
3995 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
3996 else if (!check_flags)
3999 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4000 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
4001 else if (strict_mode) {
4002 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4003 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
4004 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4005 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0)) {
4007 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4014 if (!s->server && strict_mode) {
4015 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
4019 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
4022 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
4025 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
4030 int cert_type = X509_certificate_type(x, pk);
4031 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_RSA)
4032 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_FIXED_DH;
4033 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_DSA)
4034 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_FIXED_DH;
4038 const unsigned char *ctypes;
4042 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
4044 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
4045 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
4047 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++) {
4048 if (ctypes[i] == check_type) {
4049 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4053 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
4056 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4058 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
4060 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
4061 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4063 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
4064 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
4065 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4067 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
4068 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
4069 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4070 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp)) {
4071 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4076 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4079 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME | CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4081 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
4082 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
4086 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
4087 if (cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
4088 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4089 else if (cpk->digest)
4090 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4092 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4095 * When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the
4099 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
4100 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4102 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
4103 cpk->valid_flags &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4110 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
4111 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
4113 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
4114 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
4115 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
4116 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA);
4117 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA);
4118 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
4121 /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
4122 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
4124 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);
4129 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
4130 DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s)
4132 int dh_secbits = 80;
4133 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto == 2)
4134 return DH_get_1024_160();
4135 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) {
4136 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256)
4141 CERT_PKEY *cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
4142 dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(cpk->privatekey);
4145 if (dh_secbits >= 128) {
4151 BN_set_word(dhp->g, 2);
4152 if (dh_secbits >= 192)
4153 dhp->p = get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL);
4155 dhp->p = get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL);
4156 if (!dhp->p || !dhp->g) {
4162 if (dh_secbits >= 112)
4163 return DH_get_2048_224();
4164 return DH_get_1024_160();
4168 static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4171 EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
4173 secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey);
4174 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
4178 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, 0, x);
4180 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, 0, x);
4183 static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4185 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
4186 int secbits = -1, md_nid = NID_undef, sig_nid;
4187 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
4188 if (sig_nid && OBJ_find_sigid_algs(sig_nid, &md_nid, NULL)) {
4190 if (md_nid && (md = EVP_get_digestbynid(md_nid)))
4191 secbits = EVP_MD_size(md) * 4;
4194 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4196 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4199 int ssl_security_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int vfy, int is_ee)
4202 vfy = SSL_SECOP_PEER;
4204 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY | vfy))
4205 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4207 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY | vfy))
4208 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4210 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD | vfy))
4211 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK;
4216 * Check security of a chain, if sk includes the end entity certificate then
4217 * x is NULL. If vfy is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and not sending
4218 * one to the peer. Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
4221 int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x, int vfy)
4223 int rv, start_idx, i;
4225 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
4230 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 1);
4234 for (i = start_idx; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
4235 x = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
4236 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 0);