2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
113 #include <openssl/objects.h>
114 #include <openssl/evp.h>
115 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
116 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
117 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
118 # include <openssl/ec.h>
121 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
122 #include <openssl/rand.h>
123 #include "ssl_locl.h"
125 const char tls1_version_str[] = "TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
127 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
128 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
129 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
130 SSL_SESSION **psess);
131 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
132 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
135 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data = {
138 tls1_setup_key_block,
139 tls1_generate_master_secret,
140 tls1_change_cipher_state,
141 tls1_final_finish_mac,
142 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
143 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
144 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
145 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
147 tls1_export_keying_material,
149 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
150 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
154 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_1_enc_data = {
157 tls1_setup_key_block,
158 tls1_generate_master_secret,
159 tls1_change_cipher_state,
160 tls1_final_finish_mac,
161 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
162 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
163 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
164 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
166 tls1_export_keying_material,
167 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
168 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
169 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
173 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_2_enc_data = {
176 tls1_setup_key_block,
177 tls1_generate_master_secret,
178 tls1_change_cipher_state,
179 tls1_final_finish_mac,
180 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
181 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
182 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
183 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
185 tls1_export_keying_material,
186 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
187 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
188 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
189 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
193 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
196 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
197 * http, the cache would over fill
199 return (60 * 60 * 2);
206 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
210 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
212 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
213 if (s->tlsext_session_ticket) {
214 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
216 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
220 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
223 s->version = s->method->version;
226 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
228 static int nid_list[] = {
229 NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
230 NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */
231 NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */
232 NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */
233 NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */
234 NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */
235 NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */
236 NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */
237 NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */
238 NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */
239 NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */
240 NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */
241 NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */
242 NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */
243 NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */
244 NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */
245 NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */
246 NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */
247 NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */
248 NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */
249 NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */
250 NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */
251 NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */
252 NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */
253 NID_secp521r1, /* secp521r1 (25) */
254 NID_brainpoolP256r1, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
255 NID_brainpoolP384r1, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
256 NID_brainpoolP512r1 /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
259 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = {
260 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
261 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
262 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
265 static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] = {
266 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
267 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
268 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
270 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
271 0, 28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
272 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
273 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
274 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
276 0, 27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
277 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
278 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
279 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
280 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
282 0, 26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
283 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
284 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
285 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
286 0, 8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
287 0, 6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
288 0, 7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
290 0, 20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
291 0, 21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
292 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
293 0, 4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
294 0, 5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
296 0, 18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
297 0, 19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
298 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
299 0, 1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
300 0, 2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
301 0, 3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
303 0, 15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
304 0, 16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
305 0, 17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
308 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] = {
309 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
310 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
314 /* Brainpool not allowed in FIPS mode */
315 static const unsigned char fips_curves_default[] = {
316 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
317 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
318 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
320 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
321 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
322 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
323 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
325 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
326 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
327 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
328 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
330 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
331 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
332 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
333 0, 8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
334 0, 6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
335 0, 7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
337 0, 20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
338 0, 21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
339 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
340 0, 4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
341 0, 5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
343 0, 18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
344 0, 19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
345 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
346 0, 1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
347 0, 2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
348 0, 3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
350 0, 15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
351 0, 16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
352 0, 17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
356 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
358 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
359 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id >
360 sizeof(nid_list) / sizeof(nid_list[0])))
362 return nid_list[curve_id - 1];
365 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
367 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
369 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
371 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
373 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
375 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
377 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
379 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
381 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
383 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
385 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
387 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
389 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
391 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
393 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
395 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
397 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
399 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
401 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
403 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
405 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
407 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
409 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
411 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
413 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
415 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
417 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
419 case NID_brainpoolP256r1: /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
421 case NID_brainpoolP384r1: /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
423 case NID_brainpoolP512r1: /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
431 * Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
433 * Sets |num_curves| to the number of curves in the list, i.e.,
434 * the length of |pcurves| is 2 * num_curves.
435 * Returns 1 on success and 0 if the client curves list has invalid format.
436 * The latter indicates an internal error: we should not be accepting such
437 * lists in the first place.
438 * TODO(emilia): we should really be storing the curves list in explicitly
439 * parsed form instead. (However, this would affect binary compatibility
440 * so cannot happen in the 1.0.x series.)
442 static int tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
443 const unsigned char **pcurves,
446 size_t pcurveslen = 0;
448 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
449 pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
451 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
452 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
453 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
454 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
455 pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
458 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
459 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
463 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
464 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
468 *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
469 pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
474 *pcurves = fips_curves_default;
475 pcurveslen = sizeof(fips_curves_default);
479 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
480 pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
484 /* We do not allow odd length arrays to enter the system. */
485 if (pcurveslen & 1) {
486 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_GET_CURVELIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
490 *num_curves = pcurveslen / 2;
495 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
496 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
498 const unsigned char *curves;
499 size_t num_curves, i;
500 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
501 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
503 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
505 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
508 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) {
509 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
511 } else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) {
512 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
514 } else /* Should never happen */
517 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &num_curves))
519 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, curves += 2) {
520 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
527 * Return |nmatch|th shared curve or NID_undef if there is no match.
528 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
529 * For nmatch == -2, return the NID of the curve to use for
530 * an EC tmp key, or NID_undef if there is no match.
532 int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
534 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
535 size_t num_pref, num_supp, i, j;
537 /* Can't do anything on client side */
541 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
543 * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know
544 * these are acceptable due to previous checks.
546 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
547 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
548 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
549 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
550 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
551 /* Should never happen */
554 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
558 * Avoid truncation. tls1_get_curvelist takes an int
559 * but s->options is a long...
561 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
562 (s, (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0, &supp,
564 /* In practice, NID_undef == 0 but let's be precise. */
565 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
566 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
567 (s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE), &pref,
569 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
571 for (i = 0; i < num_pref; i++, pref += 2) {
572 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
573 for (j = 0; j < num_supp; j++, tsupp += 2) {
574 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1]) {
576 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
577 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id);
585 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
589 int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
590 int *curves, size_t ncurves)
592 unsigned char *clist, *p;
595 * Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works while curve
598 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
599 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
603 clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
606 for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++) {
607 unsigned long idmask;
609 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
611 /* NB: 25 is last curve ID supported by FIPS module */
612 if (FIPS_mode() && id > 25) {
617 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
618 curve = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(curves[i]);
619 if (!curve || EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(curve))
620 == NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field) {
622 EC_GROUP_free(curve);
626 EC_GROUP_free(curve);
629 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask)) {
639 *pextlen = ncurves * 2;
643 # define MAX_CURVELIST 28
647 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
650 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
652 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
658 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
660 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
662 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
664 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
665 if (nid == NID_undef)
666 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
667 if (nid == NID_undef)
668 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
669 if (nid == NID_undef)
671 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
672 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
674 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
678 /* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
679 int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
684 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
688 return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
691 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
692 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
697 const EC_METHOD *meth;
700 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
701 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
704 meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(grp);
707 if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
711 /* Determine curve ID */
712 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
713 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
714 /* If we have an ID set it, otherwise set arbitrary explicit curve */
717 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
726 if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
728 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED) {
730 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
732 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
734 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
739 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
740 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
741 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
743 const unsigned char *pformats, *pcurves;
744 size_t num_formats, num_curves, i;
747 * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
748 * supported (see RFC4492).
750 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
751 pformats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
752 num_formats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
753 for (i = 0; i < num_formats; i++, pformats++) {
754 if (*comp_id == *pformats)
757 if (i == num_formats)
762 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
763 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++) {
764 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &pcurves, &num_curves))
766 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
767 if (pcurves[0] == curve_id[0] && pcurves[1] == curve_id[1])
772 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
779 static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
783 * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
785 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
786 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
787 *num_formats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
789 *pformats = ecformats_default;
790 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
792 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
794 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default);
799 * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
800 * certificates have compatible curves and compression.
802 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
804 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
807 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
810 /* If not EC nothing to do */
811 if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC) {
815 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec);
820 * Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a supported
823 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
827 * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
828 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
830 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s)) {
836 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
837 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
838 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
839 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
840 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
842 return 0; /* Should never happen */
843 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
844 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
846 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
848 if (set_ee_md == 2) {
849 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
850 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha256();
852 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha384();
858 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
859 /* Check EC temporary key is compatible with client extensions */
860 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
862 unsigned char curve_id[2];
863 EC_KEY *ec = s->cert->ecdh_tmp;
864 # ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
865 /* Allow any curve: not just those peer supports */
866 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
870 * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
873 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
874 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
875 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
876 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
877 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
878 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
882 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
883 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
885 /* If auto or setting curve from callback assume OK */
886 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto || s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
888 /* Otherwise check curve is acceptable */
890 unsigned char curve_tmp[2];
893 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_tmp, NULL, ec))
895 if (!curve_tmp[0] || curve_tmp[1] == curve_id[1])
901 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto) {
902 /* Need a shared curve */
903 if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
909 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
914 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, NULL, ec))
916 /* Set this to allow use of invalid curves for testing */
920 return tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL);
923 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
927 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
932 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
934 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
937 * List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
938 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
941 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
942 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
944 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
947 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
948 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
950 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
953 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
954 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
957 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
960 # define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
961 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
962 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
963 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
965 static unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
966 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
967 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
968 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
970 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
971 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
972 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
974 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
975 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
979 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
980 static unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
981 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
982 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
985 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
988 * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
991 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
992 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
993 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
994 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
995 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
997 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
998 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
1001 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
1002 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
1006 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
1007 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs) {
1008 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
1009 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
1010 } else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
1011 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
1012 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
1014 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
1015 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
1020 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
1021 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
1023 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
1024 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
1026 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
1027 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
1028 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
1029 /* Should never happen */
1032 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
1033 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1]) {
1034 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1037 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1038 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
1039 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
1040 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
1041 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec))
1043 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id)) {
1044 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
1047 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
1048 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1051 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256) {
1052 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256) {
1053 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1054 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
1057 } else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384) {
1058 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384) {
1059 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1060 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
1066 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
1070 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
1071 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
1072 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i += 2, sent_sigs += 2) {
1073 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
1076 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
1077 if (i == sent_sigslen
1078 && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1
1079 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
1080 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1083 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
1085 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
1089 * Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they wish.
1091 if (s->session && s->session->sess_cert)
1092 s->session->sess_cert->peer_key->digest = *pmd;
1097 * Get a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
1098 * supported or doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms. Unlike
1099 * ssl_cipher_get_disabled this applies to a specific session and not global
1102 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
1105 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
1106 size_t i, sigalgslen;
1107 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
1110 /* Don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers if we don't suppport them */
1111 if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s))
1112 c->mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
1116 * Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any for
1117 * RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just TLS 1.2.
1119 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
1120 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2) {
1121 switch (sigalgs[1]) {
1122 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1123 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
1127 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
1128 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
1132 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
1133 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
1140 * Disable auth and static DH if we don't include any appropriate
1141 * signature algorithms.
1144 c->mask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
1145 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHr | SSL_kECDHr;
1148 c->mask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
1149 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHd;
1152 c->mask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
1153 c->mask_k |= SSL_kECDHe;
1155 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1156 if (!kssl_tgt_is_available(s->kssl_ctx)) {
1157 c->mask_a |= SSL_aKRB5;
1158 c->mask_k |= SSL_kKRB5;
1161 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1162 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1163 if (!s->psk_client_callback) {
1164 c->mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
1165 c->mask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
1167 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1168 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1169 if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) {
1170 c->mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
1171 c->mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
1177 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
1178 unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1181 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1182 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1183 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1184 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1186 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1188 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1189 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1191 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++) {
1192 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1194 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1195 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1196 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)
1197 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) {
1205 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */
1206 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1212 return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1214 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1215 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1216 unsigned long size_str;
1220 * check for enough space.
1221 * 4 for the servername type and entension length
1222 * 2 for servernamelist length
1223 * 1 for the hostname type
1224 * 2 for hostname length
1228 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
1230 strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
1233 /* extension type and length */
1234 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret);
1235 s2n(size_str + 5, ret);
1237 /* length of servername list */
1238 s2n(size_str + 3, ret);
1240 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
1241 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
1243 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
1247 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1248 if (s->renegotiate) {
1251 if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1252 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1256 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1259 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret);
1262 if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1263 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1269 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1270 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
1271 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the
1272 * Client Hello message */
1274 int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
1275 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0) {
1276 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1281 * check for enough space.
1282 * 4 for the srp type type and entension length
1283 * 1 for the srp user identity
1284 * + srp user identity length
1286 if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0)
1289 /* fill in the extension */
1290 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp, ret);
1291 s2n(login_len + 1, ret);
1292 (*ret++) = (unsigned char)login_len;
1293 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
1298 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1301 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message
1304 const unsigned char *pcurves, *pformats;
1305 size_t num_curves, num_formats, curves_list_len;
1307 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &pformats, &num_formats);
1309 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0)
1311 if (num_formats > (size_t)lenmax)
1313 if (num_formats > 255) {
1314 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1318 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret);
1319 /* The point format list has 1-byte length. */
1320 s2n(num_formats + 1, ret);
1321 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)num_formats;
1322 memcpy(ret, pformats, num_formats);
1326 * Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message
1328 pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1329 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &pcurves, &num_curves))
1332 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0)
1334 if (num_curves > (size_t)lenmax / 2)
1336 if (num_curves > 65532 / 2) {
1337 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1340 curves_list_len = 2 * num_curves;
1341 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves, ret);
1342 s2n(curves_list_len + 2, ret);
1343 s2n(curves_list_len, ret);
1344 memcpy(ret, pcurves, curves_list_len);
1345 ret += curves_list_len;
1347 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1349 if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)) {
1351 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
1352 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
1353 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1354 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data) {
1355 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1356 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1357 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
1359 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1360 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data, ticklen);
1361 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1364 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1365 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1368 * Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len rest for
1371 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0)
1373 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret);
1376 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
1382 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1384 const unsigned char *salg;
1385 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
1386 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < salglen + 6)
1388 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms, ret);
1389 s2n(salglen + 2, ret);
1391 memcpy(ret, salg, salglen);
1394 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1395 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) {
1396 size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len;
1398 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col < 0))
1400 if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1403 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1406 memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col);
1411 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
1413 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
1417 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
1418 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1419 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1425 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) {
1426 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1432 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0)
1434 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1435 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
1437 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
1438 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
1440 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
1441 /* save position of id len */
1442 unsigned char *q = ret;
1443 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1444 /* skip over id len */
1446 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
1452 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
1454 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1455 /* Add Heartbeat extension */
1456 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1458 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret);
1462 * 1: peer may send requests
1463 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1465 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1466 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1468 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1471 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1472 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1474 * The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its support
1475 * for Next Protocol Negotiation
1477 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
1479 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret);
1484 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1485 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 6 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len)
1487 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret);
1488 s2n(2 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret);
1489 s2n(s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret);
1490 memcpy(ret, s->alpn_client_proto_list, s->alpn_client_proto_list_len);
1491 ret += s->alpn_client_proto_list_len;
1493 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1494 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)) {
1497 ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1499 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1502 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret);
1505 if (ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1506 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1512 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->cli_ext);
1513 /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
1514 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 0, &ret, limit, al))
1518 * Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See
1519 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03 NB: because this
1520 * code works out the length of all existing extensions it MUST always
1523 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING) {
1524 int hlen = ret - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1526 * The code in s23_clnt.c to build ClientHello messages includes the
1527 * 5-byte record header in the buffer, while the code in s3_clnt.c
1530 if (s->state == SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A)
1532 if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200) {
1533 hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
1539 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret);
1541 memset(ret, 0, hlen);
1546 if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0)
1549 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1553 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
1554 unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1557 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1558 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1559 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1560 int next_proto_neg_seen;
1562 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1563 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1564 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1565 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe))
1566 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1567 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1570 * don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation
1572 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1577 return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1579 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1
1580 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1581 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1584 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret);
1588 if (s->s3->send_connection_binding) {
1591 if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1592 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1596 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1599 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret);
1602 if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1603 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1609 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1611 const unsigned char *plist;
1614 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message
1618 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1620 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0)
1622 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax)
1624 if (plistlen > 255) {
1625 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1629 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret);
1630 s2n(plistlen + 1, ret);
1631 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)plistlen;
1632 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1637 * Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves
1640 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1642 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)) {
1643 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1645 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret);
1649 if (s->tlsext_status_expected) {
1650 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1652 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1655 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1656 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) {
1657 size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len;
1659 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - sol) < 0)
1661 if (sol > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1664 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1667 memcpy(ret, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input, sol);
1672 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1673 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->srtp_profile) {
1676 ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1678 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1681 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret);
1684 if (ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1685 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1692 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x80
1693 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x81)
1694 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG)) {
1695 const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1696 0xfd, 0xe8, /* 65000 */
1697 0x00, 0x20, /* 32 bytes length */
1698 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1699 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1700 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1701 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17
1703 if (limit - ret < 36)
1705 memcpy(ret, cryptopro_ext, 36);
1709 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1710 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
1711 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) {
1712 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1714 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret);
1718 * 1: peer may send requests
1719 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1721 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1722 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1724 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1729 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1730 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1731 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1732 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb) {
1733 const unsigned char *npa;
1734 unsigned int npalen;
1737 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen,
1739 ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1740 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1741 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0)
1743 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret);
1745 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
1747 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1751 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 1, &ret, limit, al))
1754 if (s->s3->alpn_selected) {
1755 const unsigned char *selected = s->s3->alpn_selected;
1756 unsigned len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
1758 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - 2 - 1 - len) < 0)
1760 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret);
1764 memcpy(ret, selected, len);
1768 if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0)
1771 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1775 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1777 * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1778 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |d|, of length |n|.
1779 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1784 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1785 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1786 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1787 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1789 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
1790 const unsigned char *d, int n)
1792 unsigned short type, size;
1793 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1794 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1795 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1796 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1797 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1798 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1799 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1801 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1802 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1803 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1804 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1807 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1808 static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock[] = {
1809 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1810 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1811 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1812 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1813 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1814 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1815 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1816 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1819 if (data >= (d + n - 2))
1823 if (data > (d + n - 4))
1828 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1831 if (data + size > d + n)
1835 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
1836 const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1837 const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock);
1839 if (data + len1 + len2 != d + n)
1841 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0)
1843 if (memcmp(data + len1, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock, len2) != 0)
1846 const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1848 if (data + len != d + n)
1850 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0)
1854 s->s3->is_probably_safari = 1;
1856 # endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1859 * tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello is called to process the ALPN extension in a
1860 * ClientHello. data: the contents of the extension, not including the type
1861 * and length. data_len: the number of bytes in |data| al: a pointer to the
1862 * alert value to send in the event of a non-zero return. returns: 0 on
1865 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
1866 unsigned data_len, int *al)
1870 const unsigned char *selected;
1871 unsigned char selected_len;
1874 if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb == NULL)
1881 * data should contain a uint16 length followed by a series of 8-bit,
1882 * length-prefixed strings.
1884 i = ((unsigned)data[0]) << 8 | ((unsigned)data[1]);
1893 for (i = 0; i < data_len;) {
1894 proto_len = data[i];
1900 if (i + proto_len < i || i + proto_len > data_len)
1906 r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, data_len,
1907 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
1908 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1909 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1910 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1911 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
1912 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected) {
1913 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1916 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, selected, selected_len);
1917 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
1922 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1926 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
1927 unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
1929 unsigned short type;
1930 unsigned short size;
1932 unsigned char *data = *p;
1933 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1935 s->servername_done = 0;
1936 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1937 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1938 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1941 if (s->s3->alpn_selected) {
1942 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1943 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
1945 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1946 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1947 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1950 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1951 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1952 ssl_check_for_safari(s, data, d, n);
1953 # endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1955 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
1956 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs) {
1957 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->peer_sigalgs);
1958 s->cert->peer_sigalgs = NULL;
1960 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1961 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) {
1962 OPENSSL_free(s->srp_ctx.login);
1963 s->srp_ctx.login = NULL;
1967 s->srtp_profile = NULL;
1969 if (data >= (d + n - 2))
1973 if (data > (d + n - len))
1976 while (data <= (d + n - 4)) {
1980 if (data + size > (d + n))
1983 fprintf(stderr, "Received extension type %d size %d\n", type, size);
1985 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1986 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1988 * The servername extension is treated as follows:
1990 * - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
1991 * - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
1992 * in which case an fatal alert is generated.
1993 * - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
1994 * - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
1995 * to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
1996 * - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
1997 * it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
1998 * Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
1999 * set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
2000 * case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
2001 * a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
2002 * presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
2003 * the value of the Host: field.
2004 * - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
2005 * if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the
2006 * session, i.e. when the session has been established with a servername
2008 * - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
2012 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
2013 unsigned char *sdata;
2018 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2024 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2030 servname_type = *(sdata++);
2035 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2038 if (s->servername_done == 0)
2039 switch (servname_type) {
2040 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
2042 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname) {
2043 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2046 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) {
2047 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2050 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname =
2051 OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1)) == NULL) {
2052 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2055 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
2056 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len] = '\0';
2057 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
2058 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
2059 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
2060 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2063 s->servername_done = 1;
2066 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
2067 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
2068 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname,
2069 (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
2080 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2085 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2086 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp) {
2087 if (size <= 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size - 1)) {
2088 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2091 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) {
2092 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2095 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1)) == NULL)
2097 memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len);
2098 s->srp_ctx.login[len] = '\0';
2100 if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len) {
2101 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2107 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2108 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
2109 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2110 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2112 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1 ||
2113 ecpointformatlist_length < 1) {
2114 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2118 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
2119 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2120 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
2122 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2123 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
2124 OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) {
2125 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2128 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
2129 ecpointformatlist_length;
2130 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata,
2131 ecpointformatlist_length);
2135 "ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ",
2136 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
2137 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2138 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2139 fprintf(stderr, "%i ", *(sdata++));
2140 fprintf(stderr, "\n");
2142 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves) {
2143 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2144 int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
2145 ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
2147 if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 ||
2148 ellipticcurvelist_length < 1 ||
2149 /* Each NamedCurve is 2 bytes. */
2150 ellipticcurvelist_length & 1) {
2151 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2155 if (s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist) {
2156 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2159 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
2160 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist =
2161 OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL) {
2162 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2165 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length =
2166 ellipticcurvelist_length;
2167 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata,
2168 ellipticcurvelist_length);
2172 "ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ",
2173 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
2174 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
2175 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++)
2176 fprintf(stderr, "%i ", *(sdata++));
2177 fprintf(stderr, "\n");
2180 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2181 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2182 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input) {
2183 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2186 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2189 n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
2190 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2) {
2191 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2195 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) {
2196 /* shouldn't really happen */
2197 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2200 /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2201 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2202 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1);
2204 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input =
2205 BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
2206 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL) {
2207 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2212 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2213 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2214 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size,
2215 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2217 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2220 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
2221 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2223 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2224 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms) {
2226 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs || size < 2) {
2227 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2232 if (dsize != size || dsize & 1 || !dsize) {
2233 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2236 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, data, dsize)) {
2237 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2240 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
2243 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2247 s->tlsext_status_type = *data++;
2249 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
2250 const unsigned char *sdata;
2252 /* Read in responder_id_list */
2256 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2263 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2267 dsize -= 2 + idsize;
2270 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2275 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, &sdata, idsize);
2277 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2280 if (data != sdata) {
2281 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2282 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2285 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
2286 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
2287 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null())) {
2288 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2289 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2292 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id)) {
2293 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2294 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2299 /* Read in request_extensions */
2301 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2306 if (dsize != size) {
2307 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2312 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) {
2313 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2314 X509_EXTENSION_free);
2317 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
2318 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &sdata, dsize);
2319 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts || (data + dsize != sdata)) {
2320 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2326 * We don't know what to do with any other type * so ignore it.
2329 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2331 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2332 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
2334 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
2335 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2337 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
2338 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2339 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2342 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2347 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2348 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2349 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0 &&
2350 s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
2352 * We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2355 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2356 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2357 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
2358 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2359 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2360 * anything like that, but this might change).
2362 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2363 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2364 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2365 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2366 * Finished message could have been computed.)
2368 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2372 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation &&
2373 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb && s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2374 if (tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, data, size, al) != 0)
2376 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2377 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
2378 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2382 /* session ticket processed earlier */
2383 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2384 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)
2385 && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2386 if (ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size, al))
2398 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2400 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
2401 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2402 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2403 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2404 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2412 * Parse any custom extensions found. "data" is the start of the extension data
2413 * and "limit" is the end of the record. TODO: add strict syntax checking.
2416 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_custom_tlsext(SSL *s,
2417 const unsigned char *data,
2418 const unsigned char *limit,
2421 unsigned short type, size, len;
2422 /* If resumed session or no custom extensions nothing to do */
2423 if (s->hit || s->cert->srv_ext.meths_count == 0)
2426 if (data >= limit - 2)
2430 if (data > limit - len)
2433 while (data <= limit - 4) {
2437 if (data + size > limit)
2439 if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1 /* server */ , type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2448 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d,
2452 unsigned char *ptmp = *p;
2454 * Internally supported extensions are parsed first so SNI can be handled
2455 * before custom extensions. An application processing SNI will typically
2456 * switch the parent context using SSL_set_SSL_CTX and custom extensions
2457 * need to be handled by the new SSL_CTX structure.
2459 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0) {
2460 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2464 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) {
2465 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2469 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->srv_ext);
2470 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_custom_tlsext(s, ptmp, d + n, &al) <= 0) {
2471 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2478 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2480 * ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2481 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly
2482 * fill the length of the block.
2484 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
2486 unsigned int off = 0;
2499 static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
2500 unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
2502 unsigned short length;
2503 unsigned short type;
2504 unsigned short size;
2505 unsigned char *data = *p;
2506 int tlsext_servername = 0;
2507 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2509 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2510 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2512 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2514 if (s->s3->alpn_selected) {
2515 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2516 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
2518 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2519 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2520 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2523 if (data >= (d + n - 2))
2527 if (data + length != d + n) {
2528 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2532 while (data <= (d + n - 4)) {
2536 if (data + size > (d + n))
2539 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2540 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2542 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
2543 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0) {
2544 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2547 tlsext_servername = 1;
2549 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2550 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
2551 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2552 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2554 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1) {
2555 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2559 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2560 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
2561 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2562 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
2563 OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) {
2564 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2567 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
2568 ecpointformatlist_length;
2569 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata,
2570 ecpointformatlist_length);
2574 "ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist ");
2575 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2576 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2577 fprintf(stderr, "%i ", *(sdata++));
2578 fprintf(stderr, "\n");
2581 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2583 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2584 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2585 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size,
2586 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2588 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2591 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
2593 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2596 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2598 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2599 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input) {
2600 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2603 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2606 n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2607 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2) {
2608 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2612 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) {
2613 /* shouldn't really happen */
2614 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
2616 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0) {
2617 /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2618 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1);
2620 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input =
2621 BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2624 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) {
2625 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2630 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
2632 * MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested a status
2635 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0)) {
2636 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2639 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2640 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2642 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2643 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2644 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2645 unsigned char *selected;
2646 unsigned char selected_len;
2648 /* We must have requested it. */
2649 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL) {
2650 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2653 /* The data must be valid */
2654 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size)) {
2655 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2659 ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data,
2661 s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) !=
2662 SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
2663 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2666 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2667 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated) {
2668 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2671 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2672 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2673 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2677 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation) {
2680 /* We must have requested it. */
2681 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list == NULL) {
2682 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2686 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2690 * The extension data consists of:
2691 * uint16 list_length
2692 * uint8 proto_length;
2693 * uint8 proto[proto_length];
2698 if (len != (unsigned)size - 2) {
2699 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2703 if (len != (unsigned)size - 3) {
2704 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2707 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
2708 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2709 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
2710 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected) {
2711 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2714 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, data + 3, len);
2715 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
2718 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
2719 if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2721 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2723 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2724 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
2726 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
2727 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2729 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
2730 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2731 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2734 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2739 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2740 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2741 if (ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size, al))
2746 * If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but matches a
2747 * custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c callback
2749 else if (custom_ext_parse(s, 0, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2755 if (data != d + n) {
2756 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2760 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1) {
2761 if (s->tlsext_hostname) {
2762 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) {
2763 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
2764 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname) {
2765 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2769 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2780 * Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to avoid
2781 * an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server hello
2782 * because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an attack.
2783 * However this would mean we could not connect to any server which
2784 * doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI absence on
2785 * initial connect only.
2787 if (!renegotiate_seen && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
2788 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2789 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2790 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2791 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2798 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2801 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2805 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0) {
2806 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0,
2808 ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2813 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL) {
2814 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) {
2815 /* shouldn't really happen */
2816 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2819 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0) {
2820 /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2821 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1);
2823 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input =
2824 BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input,
2825 s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
2827 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL) {
2828 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2829 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2832 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len =
2833 s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2838 * at callback's request, insist on receiving an appropriate
2839 * server opaque PRF input
2841 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len =
2842 s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2849 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2854 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
2856 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2857 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2859 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2861 * The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely
2862 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2865 * The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely
2866 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2870 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2872 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2873 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2874 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
2875 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2877 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2879 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2881 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2884 * This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(), but we
2885 * might be sending an alert in response to the client hello, so this
2886 * has to happen here in ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early().
2891 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0) {
2892 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0,
2894 ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2896 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2897 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2902 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) {
2903 /* shouldn't really happen */
2904 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
2906 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL;
2908 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL) {
2909 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
2910 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len ==
2911 s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len) {
2913 * can only use this extension if we have a server opaque PRF
2914 * input of the same length as the client opaque PRF input!
2917 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0) {
2918 /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2919 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1);
2921 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input =
2922 BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input,
2923 s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
2925 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) {
2926 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2927 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2930 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len =
2931 s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2935 if (r == 2 && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) {
2937 * The callback wants to enforce use of the extension, but we
2938 * can't do that with the client opaque PRF input; abort the
2941 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2942 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2949 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2950 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2953 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2954 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2957 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2958 s->servername_done = 0;
2964 int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s)
2968 /* Clear any shared sigtnature algorithms */
2969 if (s->cert->shared_sigalgs) {
2970 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
2971 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
2972 s->cert->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
2974 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
2975 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
2976 s->cert->pkeys[i].digest = NULL;
2977 s->cert->pkeys[i].valid_flags = 0;
2980 /* If sigalgs received process it. */
2981 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs) {
2982 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2983 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2984 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2987 /* Fatal error is no shared signature algorithms */
2988 if (!s->cert->shared_sigalgs) {
2989 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS,
2990 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS);
2991 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2995 ssl_cert_set_default_md(s->cert);
2998 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3002 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
3004 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
3008 * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be
3009 * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed,
3010 * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may
3011 * influence which certificate is sent
3013 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
3015 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
3016 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
3017 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
3018 if (certpkey == NULL) {
3019 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3023 * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
3024 * et al can pick it up.
3026 s->cert->key = certpkey;
3027 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
3029 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
3030 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3031 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3033 /* status request response should be sent */
3034 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
3035 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
3036 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
3038 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3040 /* something bad happened */
3041 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3042 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3043 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3047 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3051 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3052 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3055 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3056 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
3064 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
3066 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
3067 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
3069 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3071 * If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
3072 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension it
3073 * must contain uncompressed.
3075 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3076 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3077 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
3078 && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
3079 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
3080 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
3081 && ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe))
3082 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) {
3083 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
3085 unsigned char *list;
3086 int found_uncompressed = 0;
3087 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
3088 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) {
3089 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed) {
3090 found_uncompressed = 1;
3094 if (!found_uncompressed) {
3095 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
3096 SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
3100 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
3101 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
3103 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3105 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
3106 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3107 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
3108 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3110 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
3112 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3114 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
3115 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0) {
3117 * This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on
3118 * using opaque PRF inputs. So first verify that we really have a
3119 * value from the server too.
3122 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) {
3123 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3124 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3128 * Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to
3129 * check that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size.
3131 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL ||
3132 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len !=
3133 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len) {
3134 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3135 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3141 * If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one tell the
3144 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
3145 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
3148 * Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows there is no
3151 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp) {
3152 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
3153 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
3155 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
3156 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
3158 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
3159 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3162 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3163 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3168 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3169 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3172 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3173 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
3176 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3177 s->servername_done = 0;
3183 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d,
3187 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
3189 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0) {
3190 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3194 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
3195 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
3202 * Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
3203 * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle
3204 * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time.
3206 * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will
3207 * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket
3208 * extension, if any.
3209 * len: the length of the session ID.
3210 * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello.
3211 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3212 * point to the resulting session.
3214 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
3215 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
3216 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
3219 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3220 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
3221 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
3222 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
3223 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
3224 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
3225 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
3228 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
3229 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
3230 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
3231 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
3232 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
3233 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
3235 int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
3236 const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
3238 /* Point after session ID in client hello */
3239 const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
3243 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
3246 * If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
3249 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
3251 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
3255 /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
3256 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
3262 /* Skip past cipher list */
3267 /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
3272 /* Now at start of extensions */
3273 if ((p + 2) >= limit)
3276 while ((p + 4) <= limit) {
3277 unsigned short type, size;
3280 if (p + size > limit)
3282 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
3286 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
3289 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3292 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
3294 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
3295 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
3296 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
3297 * calculate the master secret later.
3301 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret);
3303 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
3304 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3306 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
3308 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
3309 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3311 default: /* fatal error */
3321 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
3323 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
3324 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
3325 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
3326 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
3327 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3328 * point to the resulting session.
3331 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3332 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
3333 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
3334 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
3336 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
3337 int eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id,
3338 int sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess)
3341 unsigned char *sdec;
3342 const unsigned char *p;
3343 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
3344 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
3347 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3348 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
3351 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
3352 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3353 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3354 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
3355 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
3356 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
3365 /* Check key name matches */
3366 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
3368 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3369 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
3370 EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3371 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
3374 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
3377 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
3379 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3383 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
3384 HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
3385 HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
3386 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3387 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) {
3388 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3391 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
3392 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
3393 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3394 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3395 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
3397 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3400 EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
3401 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0) {
3402 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3407 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3410 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3414 * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
3415 * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
3416 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
3420 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3421 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3430 * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
3435 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3442 static tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
3443 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3444 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3445 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3446 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3447 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3448 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}
3451 static tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
3452 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
3453 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
3454 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}
3457 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3460 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3461 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3467 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3470 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3471 if ((table[i].id) == id)
3472 return table[i].nid;
3477 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk,
3483 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md,
3484 sizeof(tls12_md) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3487 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3490 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
3491 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
3495 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
3497 return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig,
3498 sizeof(tls12_sig) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3501 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
3504 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
3505 case TLSEXT_hash_md5:
3506 # ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
3512 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
3513 case TLSEXT_hash_sha1:
3516 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
3517 case TLSEXT_hash_sha224:
3518 return EVP_sha224();
3520 case TLSEXT_hash_sha256:
3521 return EVP_sha256();
3523 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
3524 case TLSEXT_hash_sha384:
3525 return EVP_sha384();
3527 case TLSEXT_hash_sha512:
3528 return EVP_sha512();
3536 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
3539 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3540 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3541 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3543 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3544 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3545 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3547 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3548 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3549 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3555 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3556 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
3557 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3559 int sign_nid = 0, hash_nid = 0;
3560 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3562 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3563 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md,
3564 sizeof(tls12_md) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3566 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3568 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3569 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig,
3570 sizeof(tls12_sig) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3572 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3574 if (psignhash_nid) {
3575 if (sign_nid && hash_nid)
3576 OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid, hash_nid, sign_nid);
3578 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3582 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
3583 static int tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
3584 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3585 const unsigned char *allow,
3588 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3589 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3590 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i += 2, ptmp += 2) {
3591 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3592 if (tls12_get_hash(ptmp[0]) == NULL)
3594 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3596 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j += 2, atmp += 2) {
3597 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1]) {
3600 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3601 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3602 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3604 &shsig->signandhash_nid, ptmp);
3614 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3615 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3617 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3618 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3620 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3622 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
3623 if (c->shared_sigalgs) {
3624 OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
3625 c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
3626 c->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
3628 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3629 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3630 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3631 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3632 } else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3633 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
3634 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3636 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
3637 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb) {
3640 allow = c->peer_sigalgs;
3641 allowlen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3645 pref = c->peer_sigalgs;
3646 preflen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3648 nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3650 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3653 nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3657 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3658 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3662 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3664 int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
3667 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
3668 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3670 /* Should never happen */
3674 if (c->peer_sigalgs)
3675 OPENSSL_free(c->peer_sigalgs);
3676 c->peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
3677 if (!c->peer_sigalgs)
3679 c->peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3680 memcpy(c->peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
3684 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3690 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3691 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s))
3694 # ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3695 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL) {
3697 * Use first set signature preference to force message digest,
3698 * ignoring any peer preferences.
3700 const unsigned char *sigs = NULL;
3702 sigs = c->conf_sigalgs;
3704 sigs = c->client_sigalgs;
3706 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigs[1]);
3707 md = tls12_get_hash(sigs[0]);
3708 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3709 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3710 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) {
3711 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags =
3712 CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3713 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3719 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3720 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++) {
3721 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3722 if (idx > 0 && c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL) {
3723 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
3724 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3725 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3726 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) {
3727 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags =
3728 CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3729 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3735 * In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't use
3736 * the certificate for signing.
3738 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
3740 * Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not
3741 * supported it stays as NULL.
3743 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3744 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest)
3745 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3747 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3748 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest) {
3749 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3750 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3753 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3754 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest)
3755 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3761 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3762 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3763 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3765 const unsigned char *psig = s->cert->peer_sigalgs;
3770 if (idx >= (int)s->cert->peer_sigalgslen)
3777 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
3779 return s->cert->peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3782 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3783 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3784 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3786 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
3787 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
3791 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3793 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3795 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3797 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
3799 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
3800 return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
3803 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
3804 int tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3806 unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl;
3807 unsigned short hbtype;
3808 unsigned int payload;
3809 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3811 if (s->msg_callback)
3812 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3813 &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
3814 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3816 /* Read type and payload length first */
3817 if (1 + 2 + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
3818 return 0; /* silently discard */
3821 if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
3822 return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */
3825 if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST) {
3826 unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
3830 * Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes message type,
3831 * plus 2 bytes payload length, plus payload, plus padding
3833 buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3836 /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
3837 *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
3839 memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
3841 /* Random padding */
3842 RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding);
3844 r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer,
3845 3 + payload + padding);
3847 if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
3848 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3849 buffer, 3 + payload + padding,
3850 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3852 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
3856 } else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE) {
3860 * We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int), and 16
3861 * random bytes, so we just try to read the sequence number
3865 if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq) {
3867 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
3874 int tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3876 unsigned char *buf, *p;
3878 unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
3879 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3881 /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
3882 if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
3883 s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS) {
3884 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
3888 /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
3889 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) {
3890 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
3894 /* ...and no handshake in progress. */
3895 if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake) {
3896 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
3901 * Check if padding is too long, payload and padding must not exceed 2^14
3902 * - 3 = 16381 bytes in total.
3904 OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381);
3907 * Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
3908 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
3909 * some random stuff.
3910 * - Message Type, 1 byte
3911 * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
3912 * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
3913 * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
3916 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3919 *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
3920 /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
3922 /* Sequence number */
3923 s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
3924 /* 16 random bytes */
3925 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16);
3927 /* Random padding */
3928 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding);
3930 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
3932 if (s->msg_callback)
3933 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3934 buf, 3 + payload + padding,
3935 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3937 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;
3946 # define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
3950 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
3953 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
3955 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
3958 int sig_alg, hash_alg;
3961 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
3963 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
3965 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
3967 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
3975 if (!strcmp(etmp, "RSA"))
3976 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
3977 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "DSA"))
3978 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
3979 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "ECDSA"))
3980 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_EC;
3984 hash_alg = OBJ_sn2nid(p);
3985 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
3986 hash_alg = OBJ_ln2nid(p);
3987 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
3990 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i += 2) {
3991 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
3994 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
3995 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
4000 * Set suppored signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
4001 * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
4003 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
4007 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
4011 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
4014 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen,
4017 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
4022 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
4023 if (sigalgs == NULL)
4025 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i += 2) {
4026 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md,
4027 sizeof(tls12_md) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
4028 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig,
4029 sizeof(tls12_sig) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
4031 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
4038 if (c->client_sigalgs)
4039 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
4040 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
4041 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
4043 if (c->conf_sigalgs)
4044 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
4045 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
4046 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
4052 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
4056 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
4060 if (default_nid == -1)
4062 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
4064 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
4065 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
4066 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
4071 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
4072 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
4076 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
4077 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++) {
4078 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
4085 * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by
4086 * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before
4087 * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before
4088 * attempting to use them.
4091 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
4093 # define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
4094 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
4095 /* Strict mode flags */
4096 # define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
4097 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
4098 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
4100 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
4105 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
4106 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
4108 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
4109 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
4111 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
4114 idx = cpk - c->pkeys;
4116 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
4118 pk = cpk->privatekey;
4120 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
4121 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
4124 # ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
4125 /* Allow any certificate to pass test */
4126 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL) {
4127 rv = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN |
4128 CERT_PKEY_VALID | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4129 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4136 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
4139 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
4140 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
4141 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
4143 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
4150 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4151 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
4152 if (ok == X509_V_OK)
4153 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4154 else if (!check_flags)
4159 * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature
4160 * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode.
4162 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode) {
4164 unsigned char rsign = 0;
4165 if (c->peer_sigalgs)
4167 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
4170 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
4171 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
4172 case SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA:
4173 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
4174 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
4177 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
4178 case SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA:
4179 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
4180 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
4184 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
4185 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
4194 * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set
4195 * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1.
4197 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs) {
4199 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
4200 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2) {
4201 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
4204 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen) {
4211 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
4212 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid)) {
4216 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
4217 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4218 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
4219 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i), default_nid)) {
4221 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4228 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
4229 else if (check_flags)
4230 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE | CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4232 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
4233 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
4234 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
4235 else if (!check_flags)
4238 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4239 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
4240 else if (strict_mode) {
4241 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4242 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
4243 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4244 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0)) {
4246 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4253 if (!s->server && strict_mode) {
4254 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
4258 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
4261 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
4264 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
4269 int cert_type = X509_certificate_type(x, pk);
4270 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_RSA)
4271 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_FIXED_DH;
4272 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_DSA)
4273 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_FIXED_DH;
4277 const unsigned char *ctypes;
4281 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
4283 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
4284 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
4286 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++) {
4287 if (ctypes[i] == check_type) {
4288 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4292 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
4295 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4297 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
4299 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
4300 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4302 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
4303 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
4304 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4306 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
4307 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
4308 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4309 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp)) {
4310 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4315 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4318 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME | CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4320 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
4321 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
4325 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
4326 if (cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
4327 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4328 else if (cpk->digest)
4329 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4331 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4334 * When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the
4338 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
4339 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4341 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
4342 cpk->valid_flags &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4349 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
4350 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
4352 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
4353 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
4354 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
4355 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA);
4356 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA);
4357 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
4360 /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
4361 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
4363 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);