2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
113 #include <openssl/objects.h>
114 #include <openssl/evp.h>
115 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
116 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
117 #include <openssl/rand.h>
118 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
119 #include <openssl/dh.h>
120 #include <openssl/bn.h>
122 #include "ssl_locl.h"
124 const char tls1_version_str[]="TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
126 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
127 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
128 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
129 SSL_SESSION **psess);
130 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
131 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
134 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data={
137 tls1_setup_key_block,
138 tls1_generate_master_secret,
139 tls1_change_cipher_state,
140 tls1_final_finish_mac,
141 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
142 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
143 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
144 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
146 tls1_export_keying_material,
148 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
149 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
153 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_1_enc_data={
156 tls1_setup_key_block,
157 tls1_generate_master_secret,
158 tls1_change_cipher_state,
159 tls1_final_finish_mac,
160 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
161 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
162 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
163 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
165 tls1_export_keying_material,
166 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
167 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
168 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
172 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_2_enc_data={
175 tls1_setup_key_block,
176 tls1_generate_master_secret,
177 tls1_change_cipher_state,
178 tls1_final_finish_mac,
179 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
180 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
181 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
182 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
184 tls1_export_keying_material,
185 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV|SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS|SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
186 |SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
187 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
188 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
192 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
194 /* 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec
195 * is way too long for http, the cache would over fill */
201 if (!ssl3_new(s)) return(0);
202 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
206 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
208 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
209 if (s->tlsext_session_ticket)
211 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
213 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
217 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
220 s->version = s->method->version;
223 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
227 int nid; /* Curve NID */
228 int secbits; /* Bits of security (from SP800-57) */
229 unsigned int flags; /* Flags: currently just field type */
232 #define TLS_CURVE_CHAR2 0x1
233 #define TLS_CURVE_PRIME 0x0
235 static const tls_curve_info nid_list[] =
237 {NID_sect163k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect163k1 (1) */
238 {NID_sect163r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect163r1 (2) */
239 {NID_sect163r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect163r2 (3) */
240 {NID_sect193r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect193r1 (4) */
241 {NID_sect193r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect193r2 (5) */
242 {NID_sect233k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect233k1 (6) */
243 {NID_sect233r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect233r1 (7) */
244 {NID_sect239k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect239k1 (8) */
245 {NID_sect283k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect283k1 (9) */
246 {NID_sect283r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect283r1 (10) */
247 {NID_sect409k1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect409k1 (11) */
248 {NID_sect409r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect409r1 (12) */
249 {NID_sect571k1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect571k1 (13) */
250 {NID_sect571r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect571r1 (14) */
251 {NID_secp160k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp160k1 (15) */
252 {NID_secp160r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp160r1 (16) */
253 {NID_secp160r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp160r2 (17) */
254 {NID_secp192k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp192k1 (18) */
255 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp192r1 (19) */
256 {NID_secp224k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp224k1 (20) */
257 {NID_secp224r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp224r1 (21) */
258 {NID_secp256k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp256k1 (22) */
259 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp256r1 (23) */
260 {NID_secp384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp384r1 (24) */
261 {NID_secp521r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp521r1 (25) */
262 {NID_brainpoolP256r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
263 {NID_brainpoolP384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
264 {NID_brainpoolP512r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* brainpool512r1 (28) */
268 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] =
270 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
271 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
272 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
275 static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] =
277 0,14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
278 0,13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
279 0,25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
280 0,28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
281 0,11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
282 0,12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
283 0,27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
284 0,24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
285 0,9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
286 0,10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
287 0,26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
288 0,22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
289 0,23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
290 0,8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
291 0,6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
292 0,7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
293 0,20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
294 0,21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
295 0,4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
296 0,5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
297 0,18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
298 0,19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
299 0,1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
300 0,2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
301 0,3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
302 0,15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
303 0,16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
304 0,17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
307 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] =
309 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
310 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
313 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
315 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
316 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id >
317 sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0])))
319 return nid_list[curve_id-1].nid;
322 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
324 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
327 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
329 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
331 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
333 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
335 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
337 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
339 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
341 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
343 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
345 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
347 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
349 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
351 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
353 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
355 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
357 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
359 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
361 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
363 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
365 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
367 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
369 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
371 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
373 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
375 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
377 case NID_brainpoolP256r1: /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
379 case NID_brainpoolP384r1: /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
381 case NID_brainpoolP512r1: /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
388 * Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
390 * Sets |num_curves| to the number of curves in the list, i.e.,
391 * the length of |pcurves| is 2 * num_curves.
392 * Returns 1 on success and 0 if the client curves list has invalid format.
393 * The latter indicates an internal error: we should not be accepting such
394 * lists in the first place.
395 * TODO(emilia): we should really be storing the curves list in explicitly
396 * parsed form instead. (However, this would affect binary compatibility
397 * so cannot happen in the 1.0.x series.)
399 static int tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
400 const unsigned char **pcurves,
403 size_t pcurveslen = 0;
406 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
407 pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
411 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
412 switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
414 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
415 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
416 pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
419 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
420 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
424 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
425 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
429 *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
430 pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
434 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
435 pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
439 /* We do not allow odd length arrays to enter the system. */
442 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_GET_CURVELIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
448 *num_curves = pcurveslen / 2;
453 /* See if curve is allowed by security callback */
454 static int tls_curve_allowed(SSL *s, const unsigned char *curve, int op)
456 const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
459 if ((curve[1] < 1) || ((size_t)curve[1] >
460 sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0])))
462 cinfo = &nid_list[curve[1]-1];
463 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
464 if (cinfo->flags & TLS_CURVE_CHAR2)
467 return ssl_security(s, op, cinfo->secbits, cinfo->nid, (void *)curve);
470 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
471 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
473 const unsigned char *curves;
474 size_t num_curves, i;
475 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
476 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
478 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
481 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
484 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
486 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
489 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
491 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
494 else /* Should never happen */
497 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &num_curves))
499 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, curves += 2)
501 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
502 return tls_curve_allowed(s, p + 1, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK);
508 * Return |nmatch|th shared curve or NID_undef if there is no match.
509 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
510 * For nmatch == -2, return the NID of the curve to use for
511 * an EC tmp key, or NID_undef if there is no match.
513 int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
515 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
516 size_t num_pref, num_supp, i, j;
518 /* Can't do anything on client side */
525 /* For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we
526 * already know these are acceptable due to previous
529 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
530 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
531 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
532 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
533 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
534 /* Should never happen */
537 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
541 * Avoid truncation. tls1_get_curvelist takes an int
542 * but s->options is a long...
544 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0,
546 /* In practice, NID_undef == 0 but let's be precise. */
547 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
548 if(!tls1_get_curvelist(s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
550 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
552 for (i = 0; i < num_pref; i++, pref+=2)
554 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
555 for (j = 0; j < num_supp; j++, tsupp+=2)
557 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1])
559 if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, pref, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
563 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
564 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id);
572 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
576 int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
577 int *curves, size_t ncurves)
579 unsigned char *clist, *p;
581 /* Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works
582 * while curve ids < 32
584 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
585 clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
588 for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++)
590 unsigned long idmask;
592 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
594 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask))
605 *pextlen = ncurves * 2;
609 #define MAX_CURVELIST 28
614 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
617 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
619 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
623 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
625 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
627 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
629 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
630 if (nid == NID_undef)
631 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
632 if (nid == NID_undef)
633 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
634 if (nid == NID_undef)
636 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
637 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
639 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
642 /* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
643 int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
648 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
652 return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
654 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
655 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
660 const EC_METHOD *meth;
663 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
664 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
667 meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(grp);
670 if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
674 /* Determine curve ID */
675 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
676 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
677 /* If we have an ID set it, otherwise set arbitrary explicit curve */
681 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
693 if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
695 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED)
698 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
700 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
703 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
707 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
708 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
709 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
711 const unsigned char *pformats, *pcurves;
712 size_t num_formats, num_curves, i;
714 /* If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything
715 * is supported (see RFC4492).
717 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
719 pformats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
720 num_formats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
721 for (i = 0; i < num_formats; i++, pformats++)
723 if (*comp_id == *pformats)
726 if (i == num_formats)
731 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
732 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++)
734 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &pcurves, &num_curves))
736 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2)
738 if (pcurves[0] == curve_id[0] &&
739 pcurves[1] == curve_id[1])
744 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
751 static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
754 /* If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise
756 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
758 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
759 *num_formats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
763 *pformats = ecformats_default;
764 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
766 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
768 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default);
772 /* Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks
773 * EC certificates have compatible curves and compression.
775 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
777 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
780 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
783 /* If not EC nothing to do */
784 if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)
789 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec);
793 /* Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a
794 * supported curves extension.
796 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
799 /* Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
800 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
802 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s))
809 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
810 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
811 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
812 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
813 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
815 return 0; /* Should never happen */
816 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
817 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
819 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
823 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
824 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha256();
826 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha384();
831 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
832 /* Check EC temporary key is compatible with client extensions */
833 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
835 unsigned char curve_id[2];
836 EC_KEY *ec = s->cert->ecdh_tmp;
837 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
838 /* Allow any curve: not just those peer supports */
839 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
842 /* If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384,
843 * no other curves permitted.
847 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
848 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
849 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
850 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
851 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
855 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
856 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
858 /* If auto or setting curve from callback assume OK */
859 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto || s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
861 /* Otherwise check curve is acceptable */
864 unsigned char curve_tmp[2];
867 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_tmp, NULL, ec))
869 if (!curve_tmp[0] || curve_tmp[1] == curve_id[1])
875 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
877 /* Need a shared curve */
878 if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
884 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
889 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, NULL, ec))
891 /* Set this to allow use of invalid curves for testing */
895 return tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL);
898 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
902 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
907 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
909 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
911 /* List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
912 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
915 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
916 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
918 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
921 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
922 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
924 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
927 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
928 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */
930 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
933 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
934 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
935 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
936 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
938 static const unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
939 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
940 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
941 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
943 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
944 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
945 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
947 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
948 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
951 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
952 static const unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
953 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
954 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
957 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
959 /* If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
962 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
963 switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
965 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
966 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
967 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
969 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
970 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
973 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
974 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
978 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
979 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs)
981 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
982 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
984 else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs)
986 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
987 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
991 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
992 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
995 /* Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
996 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
998 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
999 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
1001 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
1002 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
1003 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
1004 /* Should never happen */
1007 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
1008 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1])
1010 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1013 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1014 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
1016 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
1017 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
1018 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec))
1020 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id))
1022 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
1025 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
1030 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
1032 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
1034 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1035 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
1039 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
1041 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
1043 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1044 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
1052 else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
1056 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
1057 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
1058 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i+=2, sent_sigs+=2)
1060 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
1063 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
1064 if (i == sent_sigslen && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
1066 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1069 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
1072 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
1075 /* Make sure security callback allows algorithm */
1076 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK,
1077 EVP_MD_size(*pmd) * 4, EVP_MD_type(*pmd),
1080 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1083 /* Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they
1086 if (s->session && s->session->sess_cert)
1087 s->session->sess_cert->peer_key->digest = *pmd;
1091 /* Get a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled
1092 * if it isn't supported or doesn't appear in supported signature
1093 * algorithms. Unlike ssl_cipher_get_disabled this applies to a specific
1094 * session and not global settings.
1097 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
1102 /* Don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers if we don't suppport them */
1103 if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s))
1104 c->mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
1107 ssl_set_sig_mask(&c->mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
1108 /* Disable static DH if we don't include any appropriate
1109 * signature algorithms.
1111 if (c->mask_a & SSL_aRSA)
1112 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHr|SSL_kECDHr;
1113 if (c->mask_a & SSL_aDSS)
1114 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHd;
1115 if (c->mask_a & SSL_aECDSA)
1116 c->mask_k |= SSL_kECDHe;
1117 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1118 if (!kssl_tgt_is_available(s->kssl_ctx))
1120 c->mask_a |= SSL_aKRB5;
1121 c->mask_k |= SSL_kKRB5;
1124 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1125 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1126 if (!s->psk_client_callback)
1128 c->mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
1129 c->mask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
1131 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1132 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1133 if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP))
1135 c->mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
1136 c->mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
1142 int ssl_cipher_disabled(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op)
1145 if (c->algorithm_ssl & ct->mask_ssl || c->algorithm_mkey & ct->mask_k || c->algorithm_auth & ct->mask_a)
1147 return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c);
1150 static int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s)
1152 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
1154 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL);
1157 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1160 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1161 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1162 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1163 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1165 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
1168 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1169 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1171 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++)
1173 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1175 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1176 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1177 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)
1178 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
1189 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1191 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1196 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1198 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1202 if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1204 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1207 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1209 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1215 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1216 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION)
1219 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
1221 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1222 unsigned long size_str;
1226 * check for enough space.
1227 * 4 for the servername type and entension length
1228 * 2 for servernamelist length
1229 * 1 for the hostname type
1230 * 2 for hostname length
1234 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
1235 || (size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
1238 /* extension type and length */
1239 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1240 s2n(size_str+5,ret);
1242 /* length of servername list */
1243 s2n(size_str+3,ret);
1245 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
1246 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
1248 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
1252 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1253 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
1254 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
1255 { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the Client Hello message */
1257 int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
1258 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0)
1260 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1265 * check for enough space.
1266 * 4 for the srp type type and entension length
1267 * 1 for the srp user identity
1268 * + srp user identity length
1270 if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0) return NULL;
1272 /* fill in the extension */
1273 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp,ret);
1274 s2n(login_len+1,ret);
1275 (*ret++) = (unsigned char) login_len;
1276 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
1281 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1284 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */
1286 const unsigned char *pcurves, *pformats;
1287 size_t num_curves, num_formats, curves_list_len;
1289 unsigned char *etmp;
1291 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &pformats, &num_formats);
1293 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
1294 if (num_formats > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1295 if (num_formats > 255)
1297 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1301 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
1302 /* The point format list has 1-byte length. */
1303 s2n(num_formats + 1,ret);
1304 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)num_formats ;
1305 memcpy(ret, pformats, num_formats);
1308 /* Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message */
1309 pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1310 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &pcurves, &num_curves))
1313 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) return NULL;
1314 if (num_curves > (size_t)lenmax / 2) return NULL;
1315 if (num_curves > 65532 / 2)
1317 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1322 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves,ret);
1324 /* Copy curve ID if supported */
1325 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2)
1327 if (tls_curve_allowed(s, pcurves, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED))
1329 *etmp++ = pcurves[0];
1330 *etmp++ = pcurves[1];
1334 curves_list_len = etmp - ret - 4;
1336 s2n(curves_list_len + 2, ret);
1337 s2n(curves_list_len, ret);
1338 ret += curves_list_len;
1340 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1342 if (tls_use_ticket(s))
1345 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
1346 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
1347 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1348 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data)
1350 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1351 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1352 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
1354 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1355 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data,
1357 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1361 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1362 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1364 /* Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len
1367 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0) return NULL;
1368 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1372 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
1378 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
1381 const unsigned char *salg;
1382 unsigned char *etmp;
1383 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
1384 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < salglen + 6)
1386 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms,ret);
1388 /* Skip over lengths for now */
1390 salglen = tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, ret, salg, salglen);
1391 /* Fill in lengths */
1392 s2n(salglen + 2, etmp);
1397 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1398 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1400 size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len;
1402 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col) < 0)
1404 if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1407 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1410 memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col);
1415 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
1418 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
1422 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
1424 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1425 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1431 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
1433 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1440 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0) return NULL;
1441 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1442 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
1444 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
1445 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
1447 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
1449 /* save position of id len */
1450 unsigned char *q = ret;
1451 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1452 /* skip over id len */
1454 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
1460 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
1463 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1464 /* Add Heartbeat extension */
1465 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1467 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1471 * 1: peer may send requests
1472 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1474 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1475 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1477 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1480 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1481 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
1483 /* The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its
1484 * support for Next Protocol Negotiation */
1485 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
1487 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1492 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
1494 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 6 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len)
1496 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation,ret);
1497 s2n(2 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len,ret);
1498 s2n(s->alpn_client_proto_list_len,ret);
1499 memcpy(ret, s->alpn_client_proto_list,
1500 s->alpn_client_proto_list_len);
1501 ret += s->alpn_client_proto_list_len;
1504 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1505 if(SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s))
1509 ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1511 if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1513 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1516 if(ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1518 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1524 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->cli_ext);
1525 /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
1526 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 0, &ret, limit, al))
1528 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1529 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac,ret);
1533 /* Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators.
1534 * See https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03
1536 * NB: because this code works out the length of all existing
1537 * extensions it MUST always appear last.
1539 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING)
1541 int hlen = ret - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1542 /* The code in s23_clnt.c to build ClientHello messages
1543 * includes the 5-byte record header in the buffer, while
1544 * the code in s3_clnt.c does not.
1546 if (s->state == SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A)
1548 if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200)
1550 hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
1556 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret);
1558 memset(ret, 0, hlen);
1565 if ((extdatalen = ret-orig-2)== 0)
1568 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1572 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1575 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1576 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1577 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1578 int next_proto_neg_seen;
1580 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1581 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1582 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1583 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1584 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1588 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1590 if(s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1594 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1596 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1600 if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1602 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1605 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1607 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1614 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1615 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
1618 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
1620 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1622 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1626 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1629 const unsigned char *plist;
1631 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message */
1634 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1636 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
1637 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1640 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1644 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
1645 s2n(plistlen + 1,ret);
1646 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) plistlen;
1647 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1651 /* Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves extension */
1652 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1654 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected && tls_use_ticket(s))
1656 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1657 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1661 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
1663 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1664 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request,ret);
1668 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1669 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1671 size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len;
1673 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - sol) < 0)
1675 if (sol > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1678 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1681 memcpy(ret, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input, sol);
1686 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1687 if(SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->srtp_profile)
1691 ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1693 if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1695 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1698 if(ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1700 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1707 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x80 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x81)
1708 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG))
1709 { const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1710 0xfd, 0xe8, /*65000*/
1711 0x00, 0x20, /*32 bytes length*/
1712 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1713 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1714 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1715 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17};
1716 if (limit-ret<36) return NULL;
1717 memcpy(ret,cryptopro_ext,36);
1722 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1723 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
1724 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED)
1726 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1728 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1732 * 1: peer may send requests
1733 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1735 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1736 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1738 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1743 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1744 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1745 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1746 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb)
1748 const unsigned char *npa;
1749 unsigned int npalen;
1752 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1753 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
1755 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0) return NULL;
1756 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1758 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
1760 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1764 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 1, &ret, limit, al))
1766 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1767 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
1769 /* Don't use encrypt_then_mac if AEAD or RC4
1770 * might want to disable for other cases too.
1772 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD
1773 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4)
1774 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1777 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac,ret);
1783 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1785 const unsigned char *selected = s->s3->alpn_selected;
1786 unsigned len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
1788 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - 2 - 1 - len) < 0)
1790 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation,ret);
1794 memcpy(ret, selected, len);
1800 if ((extdatalen = ret-orig-2)== 0)
1803 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1807 /* tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello is called to process the ALPN extension in a
1809 * data: the contents of the extension, not including the type and length.
1810 * data_len: the number of bytes in |data|
1811 * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a non-zero
1814 * returns: 0 on success. */
1815 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
1816 unsigned data_len, int *al)
1820 const unsigned char *selected;
1821 unsigned char selected_len;
1824 if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb == NULL)
1830 /* data should contain a uint16 length followed by a series of 8-bit,
1831 * length-prefixed strings. */
1832 i = ((unsigned) data[0]) << 8 |
1833 ((unsigned) data[1]);
1842 for (i = 0; i < data_len;)
1844 proto_len = data[i];
1850 if (i + proto_len < i || i + proto_len > data_len)
1856 r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, data_len,
1857 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
1858 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1859 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1860 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1861 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
1862 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected)
1864 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1867 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, selected, selected_len);
1868 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
1873 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1877 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1879 * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1880 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |d|, of length |n|.
1881 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1886 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1887 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1888 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1889 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1891 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, const unsigned char *d, int n) {
1892 unsigned short type, size;
1893 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1894 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1895 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1896 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1897 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1898 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1899 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1901 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1902 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1903 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1904 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1907 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1908 static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock[] = {
1909 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1910 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1911 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1912 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1913 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1914 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1915 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1916 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1919 if (data >= (d+n-2))
1928 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1931 if (data+size > d+n)
1935 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
1937 const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1938 const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock);
1940 if (data + len1 + len2 != d+n)
1942 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0)
1944 if (memcmp(data + len1, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock, len2) != 0)
1949 const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1951 if (data + len != d+n)
1953 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0)
1957 s->s3->is_probably_safari = 1;
1959 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1962 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
1964 unsigned short type;
1965 unsigned short size;
1967 unsigned char *data = *p;
1968 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1970 s->servername_done = 0;
1971 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1972 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1973 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1976 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1978 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1979 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
1982 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1983 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1984 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1987 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1988 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1989 ssl_check_for_safari(s, data, d, n);
1990 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1992 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
1993 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
1995 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->peer_sigalgs);
1996 s->cert->peer_sigalgs = NULL;
1999 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2000 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2003 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2004 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
2006 OPENSSL_free(s->srp_ctx.login);
2007 s->srp_ctx.login = NULL;
2011 s->srtp_profile = NULL;
2013 if (data >= (d+n-2))
2017 if (data > (d+n-len))
2020 while (data <= (d+n-4))
2025 if (data+size > (d+n))
2028 fprintf(stderr,"Received extension type %d size %d\n",type,size);
2030 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2031 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size,
2032 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2033 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
2035 if(!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2037 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2039 else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
2042 * The servername extension is treated as follows:
2044 * - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
2045 * - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
2046 * in which case an fatal alert is generated.
2047 * - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
2048 * - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
2049 * to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
2050 * - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
2051 * it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
2052 * Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
2053 * set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
2054 * case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
2055 * a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
2056 * presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
2057 * the value of the Host: field.
2058 * - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
2059 * if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the
2060 * session, i.e. when the session has been established with a servername
2062 * - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
2066 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
2068 unsigned char *sdata;
2074 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2081 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2088 servname_type = *(sdata++);
2094 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2097 if (s->servername_done == 0)
2098 switch (servname_type)
2100 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
2103 if(s->session->tlsext_hostname)
2105 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2108 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name)
2110 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2113 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
2115 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2118 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
2119 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len]='\0';
2120 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
2121 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
2122 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
2123 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2126 s->servername_done = 1;
2130 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
2131 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
2132 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
2144 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2149 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2150 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp)
2152 if (size <= 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size -1))
2154 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2157 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
2159 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2162 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
2164 memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len);
2165 s->srp_ctx.login[len]='\0';
2167 if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len)
2169 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2175 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2176 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
2178 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2179 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2181 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1 ||
2182 ecpointformatlist_length < 1)
2184 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2189 if(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
2191 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2192 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
2194 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2195 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
2197 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2200 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
2201 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
2204 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
2205 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2206 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2207 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2208 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2211 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves)
2213 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2214 int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
2215 ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
2217 if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 ||
2218 ellipticcurvelist_length < 1 ||
2219 /* Each NamedCurve is 2 bytes. */
2220 ellipticcurvelist_length & 1)
2222 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2227 if(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
2229 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2232 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
2233 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL)
2235 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2238 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = ellipticcurvelist_length;
2239 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata, ellipticcurvelist_length);
2242 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
2243 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
2244 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++)
2245 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2246 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2249 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2250 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2251 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input)
2253 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2257 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2260 n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
2261 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
2263 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2267 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
2269 /* shouldn't really happen */
2270 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2273 /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2274 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2275 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1);
2277 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
2278 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2280 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2285 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2287 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2288 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2290 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2294 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms)
2297 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs || size < 2)
2299 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2304 if (dsize != size || dsize & 1 || !dsize)
2306 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2309 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, data, dsize))
2311 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2315 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
2320 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2324 s->tlsext_status_type = *data++;
2326 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
2328 const unsigned char *sdata;
2330 /* Read in responder_id_list */
2335 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2344 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2348 dsize -= 2 + idsize;
2352 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2357 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL,
2361 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2366 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2367 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2370 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
2371 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
2372 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null()))
2374 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2375 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2378 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(
2379 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id))
2381 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2382 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2387 /* Read in request_extensions */
2390 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2397 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2403 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
2405 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2406 X509_EXTENSION_free);
2409 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
2410 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL,
2412 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts
2413 || (data + dsize != sdata))
2415 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2420 /* We don't know what to do with any other type
2424 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2426 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2427 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
2431 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
2432 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2434 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
2435 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2436 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2438 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2443 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2444 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2445 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0 &&
2446 s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL)
2449 * We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2452 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2453 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2454 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
2455 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2456 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2457 * anything like that, but this might change).
2459 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2460 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2461 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2462 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2463 * Finished message could have been computed.)
2465 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2469 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation &&
2470 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb &&
2471 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
2473 if (tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, data, size, al) != 0)
2475 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2476 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
2477 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2481 /* session ticket processed earlier */
2482 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2483 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)
2484 && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
2486 if(ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
2491 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2492 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
2493 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2495 /* If this ClientHello extension was unhandled and this is
2496 * a nonresumed connection, check whether the extension is a
2497 * custom TLS Extension (has a custom_srv_ext_record), and if
2498 * so call the callback and record the extension number so that
2499 * an appropriate ServerHello may be later returned.
2503 if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2514 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2516 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
2517 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
2519 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2520 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2521 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2528 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
2531 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->srv_ext);
2532 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
2534 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2538 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0)
2540 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2546 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2547 /* ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2548 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly fill
2549 * the length of the block. */
2550 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
2552 unsigned int off = 0;
2566 static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
2568 unsigned short length;
2569 unsigned short type;
2570 unsigned short size;
2571 unsigned char *data = *p;
2572 int tlsext_servername = 0;
2573 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2575 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2576 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2578 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2580 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
2582 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2583 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
2586 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2587 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2588 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2591 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2592 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2595 if (data >= (d+n-2))
2599 if (data+length != d+n)
2601 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2605 while(data <= (d+n-4))
2610 if (data+size > (d+n))
2613 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2614 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size,
2615 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2618 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
2620 if(!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2622 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2624 else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
2626 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
2628 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0)
2630 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2633 tlsext_servername = 1;
2636 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2637 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
2639 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2640 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2642 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1)
2644 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2649 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2650 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2651 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
2653 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2656 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
2657 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
2660 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist ");
2661 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2662 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2663 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2664 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2667 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2669 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2671 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2672 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2674 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2677 if (!tls_use_ticket(s) || (size > 0))
2679 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2682 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2684 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2685 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input)
2687 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2691 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2694 n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2695 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
2697 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2701 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
2703 /* shouldn't really happen */
2704 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
2706 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2708 /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2709 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1);
2713 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2716 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2718 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2723 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
2725 /* MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested
2726 * a status request message.
2728 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0))
2730 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2733 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2734 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2736 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2737 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2738 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
2740 unsigned char *selected;
2741 unsigned char selected_len;
2743 /* We must have requested it. */
2744 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL)
2746 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2749 /* The data must be valid */
2750 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size))
2752 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2755 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, size, s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
2757 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2760 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2761 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
2763 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2766 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2767 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2768 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2772 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation)
2776 /* We must have requested it. */
2777 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list == NULL)
2779 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2784 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2788 * The extension data consists of:
2789 * uint16 list_length
2790 * uint8 proto_length;
2791 * uint8 proto[proto_length];
2796 if (len != (unsigned) size - 2)
2798 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2802 if (len != (unsigned) size - 3)
2804 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2807 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
2808 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2809 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
2810 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected)
2812 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2815 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, data + 3, len);
2816 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
2818 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2819 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
2823 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
2824 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2826 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
2827 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2828 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2830 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2835 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2836 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
2838 if(ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
2843 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2844 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
2846 /* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite */
2847 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD
2848 && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc != SSL_RC4)
2849 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2852 /* If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but
2853 * matches a custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c
2855 else if (custom_ext_parse(s, 0, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2863 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2867 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1)
2869 if (s->tlsext_hostname)
2871 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL)
2873 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
2874 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname)
2876 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2882 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2892 /* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to
2893 * avoid an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server
2894 * hello because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an
2895 * attack. However this would mean we could not connect to any server
2896 * which doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI
2897 * absence on initial connect only.
2899 if (!renegotiate_seen
2900 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
2901 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
2903 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2904 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2905 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2913 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2916 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2920 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
2922 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2927 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
2929 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
2931 /* shouldn't really happen */
2932 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2935 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2937 /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2938 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1);
2942 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
2944 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2946 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2949 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2953 /* at callback's request, insist on receiving an appropriate server opaque PRF input */
2954 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2961 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2966 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
2968 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2969 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2971 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2972 /* The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely in
2973 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2975 /* The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely in
2976 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2980 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2981 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2982 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2983 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2985 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2987 /* This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(),
2988 * but we might be sending an alert in response to the client hello,
2989 * so this has to happen here in
2990 * ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(). */
2994 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
2996 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2999 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3000 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3005 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
3007 /* shouldn't really happen */
3008 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
3010 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL;
3012 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
3014 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
3015 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len)
3017 /* can only use this extension if we have a server opaque PRF input
3018 * of the same length as the client opaque PRF input! */
3020 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
3022 /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
3023 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1);
3027 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
3029 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
3031 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3032 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3035 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
3039 if (r == 2 && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
3041 /* The callback wants to enforce use of the extension,
3042 * but we can't do that with the client opaque PRF input;
3043 * abort the handshake.
3045 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3046 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3054 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3055 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3058 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3059 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
3062 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3063 s->servername_done=0;
3069 int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3073 /* Clear any shared sigtnature algorithms */
3074 if (s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
3076 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
3077 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
3079 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
3080 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
3082 s->cert->pkeys[i].digest = NULL;
3083 s->cert->pkeys[i].valid_flags = 0;
3086 /* If sigalgs received process it. */
3087 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
3089 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s))
3091 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS,
3092 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3093 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3096 /* Fatal error is no shared signature algorithms */
3097 if (!s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
3099 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS,
3100 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS);
3101 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3106 ssl_cert_set_default_md(s->cert);
3109 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3113 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
3115 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
3118 /* If status request then ask callback what to do.
3119 * Note: this must be called after servername callbacks in case
3120 * the certificate has changed, and must be called after the cipher
3121 * has been chosen because this may influence which certificate is sent
3123 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
3126 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
3127 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
3128 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
3129 if (certpkey == NULL)
3131 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3134 /* Set current certificate to one we will use so
3135 * SSL_get_certificate et al can pick it up.
3137 s->cert->key = certpkey;
3138 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
3141 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
3142 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3143 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3145 /* status request response should be sent */
3146 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
3147 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
3148 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
3150 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3152 /* something bad happened */
3153 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3154 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3155 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3160 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3165 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3166 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3169 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3170 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
3178 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
3180 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
3181 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
3183 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3184 /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
3185 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension
3186 * it must contain uncompressed.
3188 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3189 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3190 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
3191 (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
3192 ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
3194 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
3196 unsigned char *list;
3197 int found_uncompressed = 0;
3198 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
3199 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
3201 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed)
3203 found_uncompressed = 1;
3207 if (!found_uncompressed)
3209 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
3213 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
3214 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
3216 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3217 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3218 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3219 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3221 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
3222 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0)
3224 /* This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on using opaque PRF inputs.
3225 * So first verify that we really have a value from the server too. */
3227 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
3229 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3230 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3233 /* Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to check
3234 * that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size. */
3235 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL ||
3236 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len)
3238 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3239 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3244 /* If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one
3247 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
3248 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
3251 /* Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows
3252 * there is no response.
3254 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
3256 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
3257 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
3259 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
3260 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
3263 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
3264 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3268 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3269 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3275 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3276 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3279 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3280 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
3283 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3284 s->servername_done=0;
3290 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
3293 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
3295 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
3297 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3301 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
3303 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
3310 * Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
3311 * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle
3312 * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time.
3314 * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will
3315 * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket
3316 * extension, if any.
3317 * len: the length of the session ID.
3318 * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello.
3319 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3320 * point to the resulting session.
3322 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
3323 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
3324 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
3327 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3328 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
3329 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
3330 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
3331 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
3332 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
3333 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
3336 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
3337 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
3338 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
3339 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
3340 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
3341 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
3343 int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
3344 const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
3346 /* Point after session ID in client hello */
3347 const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
3351 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
3353 /* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present
3354 * to permit stateful resumption.
3356 if (!tls_use_ticket(s))
3358 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
3362 /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
3370 /* Skip past cipher list */
3375 /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
3380 /* Now at start of extensions */
3381 if ((p + 2) >= limit)
3384 while ((p + 4) <= limit)
3386 unsigned short type, size;
3389 if (p + size > limit)
3391 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
3396 /* The client will accept a ticket but doesn't
3397 * currently have one. */
3398 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3401 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb)
3403 /* Indicate that the ticket couldn't be
3404 * decrypted rather than generating the session
3405 * from ticket now, trigger abbreviated
3406 * handshake based on external mechanism to
3407 * calculate the master secret later. */
3410 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret);
3413 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
3414 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3416 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
3418 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
3419 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3421 default: /* fatal error */
3431 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
3433 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
3434 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
3435 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
3436 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
3437 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3438 * point to the resulting session.
3441 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3442 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
3443 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
3444 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
3446 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
3447 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
3448 SSL_SESSION **psess)
3451 unsigned char *sdec;
3452 const unsigned char *p;
3453 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
3454 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
3457 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3458 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
3461 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
3462 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3463 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3464 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
3466 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
3467 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
3478 /* Check key name matches */
3479 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
3481 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3482 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
3483 EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3484 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
3486 /* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and
3487 * integrity checks on ticket.
3489 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
3492 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3496 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
3497 HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
3498 HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
3499 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3500 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen))
3502 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3505 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
3506 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
3507 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3508 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3509 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
3512 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3515 EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
3516 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0)
3518 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3523 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3526 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3530 /* The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to
3531 * detect that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to
3532 * the session structure. If it is empty set length to zero
3533 * as required by standard.
3536 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3537 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3545 /* For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new
3550 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3558 static const tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
3559 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3560 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3561 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3562 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3563 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3564 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}
3567 static const tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
3568 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
3569 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
3570 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}
3573 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3576 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
3578 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3584 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3587 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
3589 if ((table[i].id) == id)
3590 return table[i].nid;
3595 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md)
3600 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md,
3601 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3604 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3607 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
3608 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
3612 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
3614 return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig,
3615 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3622 const EVP_MD *(*mfunc)(void);
3625 static const tls12_hash_info tls12_md_info[] = {
3626 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
3629 {NID_md5, 64, EVP_md5},
3631 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
3634 {NID_sha1, 80, EVP_sha1},
3636 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
3637 {NID_sha224, 112, 0},
3638 {NID_sha256, 128, 0},
3640 {NID_sha224, 112, EVP_sha224},
3641 {NID_sha256, 128, EVP_sha256},
3643 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
3644 {NID_sha384, 192, 0},
3645 {NID_sha512, 256, 0}
3647 {NID_sha384, 192, EVP_sha384},
3648 {NID_sha512, 256, EVP_sha512}
3652 static const tls12_hash_info *tls12_get_hash_info(unsigned char hash_alg)
3656 if (hash_alg > sizeof(tls12_md_info)/sizeof(tls12_md_info[0]))
3658 return tls12_md_info + hash_alg - 1;
3661 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
3663 const tls12_hash_info *inf;
3664 if (hash_alg == TLSEXT_hash_md5 && FIPS_mode())
3666 inf = tls12_get_hash_info(hash_alg);
3667 if (!inf || !inf->mfunc)
3669 return inf->mfunc();
3672 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
3676 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3677 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3678 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3680 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3681 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3682 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3684 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3685 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3686 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3692 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3693 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
3694 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3696 int sign_nid = 0, hash_nid = 0;
3697 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3699 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid)
3701 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md,
3702 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3704 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3706 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid)
3708 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig,
3709 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3711 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3715 if (sign_nid && hash_nid)
3716 OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid,
3717 hash_nid, sign_nid);
3719 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3722 /* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
3723 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(SSL *s, int op, const unsigned char *ptmp)
3725 /* See if we have an entry in the hash table and it is enabled */
3726 const tls12_hash_info *hinf = tls12_get_hash_info(ptmp[0]);
3727 if (!hinf || !hinf->mfunc)
3729 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
3730 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3732 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
3733 return ssl_security(s, op, hinf->secbits, hinf->nid, (void *)ptmp);
3736 /* Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported
3737 * signature algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA
3738 * then RSA is disabled.
3741 void ssl_set_sig_mask(unsigned long *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op)
3743 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
3744 size_t i, sigalgslen;
3745 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
3746 /* Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support
3747 * any for RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just
3748 * TLS 1.2. To keep down calls to security callback only check
3751 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
3752 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2)
3756 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3757 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3758 if (!have_rsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3762 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3763 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3764 if (!have_dsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3768 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3769 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3770 if (!have_ecdsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3777 *pmask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
3779 *pmask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
3781 *pmask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
3784 size_t tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, unsigned char *out,
3785 const unsigned char *psig, size_t psiglen)
3787 unsigned char *tmpout = out;
3789 for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i += 2, psig += 2)
3791 if (tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, psig))
3793 *tmpout++ = psig[0];
3794 *tmpout++ = psig[1];
3797 return tmpout - out;
3800 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
3801 static int tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
3802 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3803 const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
3805 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3806 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3807 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i+=2, ptmp+=2)
3809 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3810 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED, ptmp))
3812 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j+=2, atmp+=2)
3814 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1])
3819 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3820 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3821 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3823 &shsig->signandhash_nid,
3834 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3835 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3837 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3838 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3840 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3842 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
3843 if (c->shared_sigalgs)
3845 OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
3846 c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
3848 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3849 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
3851 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3852 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3854 else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
3856 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
3857 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3860 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
3861 if(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb)
3865 allow = c->peer_sigalgs;
3866 allowlen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3872 pref = c->peer_sigalgs;
3873 preflen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3875 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3878 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3881 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3882 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3883 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3888 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3890 int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
3893 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
3894 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3896 /* Should never happen */
3900 if (c->peer_sigalgs)
3901 OPENSSL_free(c->peer_sigalgs);
3902 c->peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
3903 if (!c->peer_sigalgs)
3905 c->peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3906 memcpy(c->peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
3910 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3916 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3917 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s))
3920 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3921 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
3923 /* Use first set signature preference to force message
3924 * digest, ignoring any peer preferences.
3926 const unsigned char *sigs = NULL;
3928 sigs = c->conf_sigalgs;
3930 sigs = c->client_sigalgs;
3933 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigs[1]);
3934 md = tls12_get_hash(sigs[0]);
3935 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3936 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3937 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
3939 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3940 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3946 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3947 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++)
3949 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3950 if (idx > 0 && c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL)
3952 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
3953 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3954 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3955 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
3957 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3958 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3963 /* In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't
3964 * use the certificate for signing.
3966 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
3968 /* Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is
3969 * not supported it stays as NULL.
3971 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3972 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest)
3973 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3975 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3976 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest)
3978 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3979 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3982 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3983 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest)
3984 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3991 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3992 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3993 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3995 const unsigned char *psig = s->cert->peer_sigalgs;
4001 if (idx >= (int)s->cert->peer_sigalgslen)
4008 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
4010 return s->cert->peer_sigalgslen / 2;
4013 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
4014 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
4015 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
4017 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
4018 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
4022 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
4024 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
4026 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
4028 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
4030 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
4031 return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
4035 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
4037 tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
4039 unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl;
4040 unsigned short hbtype;
4041 unsigned int payload;
4042 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
4044 if (s->msg_callback)
4045 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
4046 &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
4047 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
4049 /* Read type and payload length first */
4050 if (1 + 2 + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
4051 return 0; /* silently discard */
4054 if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
4055 return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */
4058 if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST)
4060 unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
4063 /* Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes
4064 * message type, plus 2 bytes payload length, plus
4065 * payload, plus padding
4067 buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
4070 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_PROCESS_HEARTBEAT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
4075 /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
4076 *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
4078 memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
4080 /* Random padding */
4081 RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding);
4083 r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, 3 + payload + padding);
4085 if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
4086 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
4087 buffer, 3 + payload + padding,
4088 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
4090 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
4095 else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE)
4099 /* We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int),
4100 * and 16 random bytes, so we just try to read the
4101 * sequence number */
4104 if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq)
4107 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
4115 tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
4117 unsigned char *buf, *p;
4119 unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
4120 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
4122 /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
4123 if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
4124 s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS)
4126 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
4130 /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
4131 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
4133 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
4137 /* ...and no handshake in progress. */
4138 if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake)
4140 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
4144 /* Check if padding is too long, payload and padding
4145 * must not exceed 2^14 - 3 = 16381 bytes in total.
4147 OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381);
4150 * Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
4151 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
4152 * some random stuff.
4153 * - Message Type, 1 byte
4154 * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
4155 * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
4156 * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
4159 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
4162 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
4167 *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
4168 /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
4170 /* Sequence number */
4171 s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
4172 /* 16 random bytes */
4173 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16);
4175 /* Random padding */
4176 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding);
4178 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
4181 if (s->msg_callback)
4182 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
4183 buf, 3 + payload + padding,
4184 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
4186 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;
4195 #define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
4200 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
4203 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
4205 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
4208 int sig_alg, hash_alg;
4209 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
4211 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
4213 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
4215 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
4223 if (!strcmp(etmp, "RSA"))
4224 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
4225 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "DSA"))
4226 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
4227 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "ECDSA"))
4228 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_EC;
4231 hash_alg = OBJ_sn2nid(p);
4232 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
4233 hash_alg = OBJ_ln2nid(p);
4234 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
4237 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i+=2)
4239 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg
4240 && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
4243 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
4244 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
4248 /* Set suppored signature algorithms based on a colon separated list
4249 * of the form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512 */
4250 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
4254 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
4258 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
4261 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
4263 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
4268 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
4269 if (sigalgs == NULL)
4271 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i+=2)
4273 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md,
4274 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
4275 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig,
4276 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
4278 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
4286 if (c->client_sigalgs)
4287 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
4288 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
4289 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
4293 if (c->conf_sigalgs)
4294 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
4295 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
4296 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
4302 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
4306 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
4310 if (default_nid == -1)
4312 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
4314 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
4315 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
4316 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
4320 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
4321 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
4325 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
4326 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++)
4328 if(!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
4334 /* Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is
4335 * usable by server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to
4336 * check chains before passing them to the server and it allows the
4337 * server to check chains before attempting to use them.
4340 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
4342 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
4343 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
4344 /* Strict mode flags */
4345 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
4346 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
4347 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
4349 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
4354 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
4355 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
4357 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
4358 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
4361 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
4365 idx = cpk - c->pkeys;
4368 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
4370 pk = cpk->privatekey;
4372 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
4373 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
4376 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
4377 /* Allow any certificate to pass test */
4378 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
4380 rv = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_VALID|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4381 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4390 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
4393 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
4394 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
4395 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
4397 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
4405 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4406 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
4407 if (ok == X509_V_OK)
4408 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4409 else if (!check_flags)
4413 /* Check all signature algorithms are consistent with
4414 * signature algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later
4417 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode)
4420 unsigned char rsign = 0;
4421 if (c->peer_sigalgs)
4423 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
4428 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
4429 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
4430 case SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA:
4431 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
4432 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
4435 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
4436 case SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA:
4437 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
4438 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
4442 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
4443 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
4451 /* If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we
4452 * have set preferred signature algorithms check we support
4455 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs)
4458 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
4459 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2)
4461 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
4464 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen)
4472 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
4473 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid))
4475 if (!check_flags) goto end;
4478 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
4479 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4480 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4482 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i),
4487 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4495 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
4496 else if(check_flags)
4497 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4499 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
4500 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
4501 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
4502 else if (!check_flags)
4505 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4506 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
4507 else if (strict_mode)
4509 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4510 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4512 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4513 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0))
4517 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4525 if (!s->server && strict_mode)
4527 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
4532 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
4535 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
4538 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
4543 int cert_type = X509_certificate_type(x, pk);
4544 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_RSA)
4545 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_FIXED_DH;
4546 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_DSA)
4547 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_FIXED_DH;
4552 const unsigned char *ctypes;
4557 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
4561 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
4562 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
4564 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++)
4566 if (ctypes[i] == check_type)
4568 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4572 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
4576 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4579 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
4581 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
4582 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4584 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4586 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
4587 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4589 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4591 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4593 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4594 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp))
4596 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4601 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4605 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4607 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
4608 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
4612 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
4614 if (cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
4615 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4616 else if (cpk->digest)
4617 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4620 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4622 /* When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant
4623 * if the chain is invalid.
4627 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
4628 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4631 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
4632 cpk->valid_flags &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4639 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
4640 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
4642 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
4643 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
4644 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
4645 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA);
4646 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA);
4647 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
4649 /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
4650 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
4652 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);
4657 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
4658 DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s)
4660 int dh_secbits = 80;
4661 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto == 2)
4662 return DH_get_1024_160();
4663 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
4665 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256)
4672 CERT_PKEY *cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
4673 dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(cpk->privatekey);
4676 if (dh_secbits >= 128)
4683 BN_set_word(dhp->g, 2);
4684 if (dh_secbits >= 192)
4685 dhp->p = get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL);
4687 dhp->p = get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL);
4688 if (!dhp->p || !dhp->g)
4695 if (dh_secbits >= 112)
4696 return DH_get_2048_224();
4697 return DH_get_1024_160();
4701 static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4704 EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
4707 secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey);
4708 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
4713 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, 0, x);
4715 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, 0, x);
4718 static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4720 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
4721 int secbits = -1, md_nid = NID_undef, sig_nid;
4722 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
4723 if (sig_nid && OBJ_find_sigid_algs(sig_nid, &md_nid, NULL))
4726 if (md_nid && (md = EVP_get_digestbynid(md_nid)))
4727 secbits = EVP_MD_size(md) * 4;
4730 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4732 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4735 int ssl_security_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int vfy, int is_ee)
4738 vfy = SSL_SECOP_PEER;
4741 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY | vfy))
4742 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4746 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY | vfy))
4747 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4749 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD | vfy))
4750 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK;
4754 /* Check security of a chain, if sk includes the end entity certificate
4755 * then x is NULL. If vfy is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and
4756 * not sending one to the peer.
4757 * Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
4760 int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x, int vfy)
4762 int rv, start_idx, i;
4765 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
4771 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 1);
4775 for (i = start_idx; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++)
4777 x = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
4778 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 0);