2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
12 #include <openssl/objects.h>
13 #include <openssl/evp.h>
14 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
15 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
16 #include <openssl/conf.h>
17 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
18 #include <openssl/dh.h>
19 #include <openssl/bn.h>
21 #include <openssl/ct.h>
23 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, size_t ticklen,
24 const unsigned char *sess_id, size_t sesslen,
26 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
27 static int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
29 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data = {
33 tls1_generate_master_secret,
34 tls1_change_cipher_state,
35 tls1_final_finish_mac,
36 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
37 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
39 tls1_export_keying_material,
41 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
42 tls_close_construct_packet,
46 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_1_enc_data = {
50 tls1_generate_master_secret,
51 tls1_change_cipher_state,
52 tls1_final_finish_mac,
53 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
54 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
56 tls1_export_keying_material,
57 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
58 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
59 tls_close_construct_packet,
63 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_2_enc_data = {
67 tls1_generate_master_secret,
68 tls1_change_cipher_state,
69 tls1_final_finish_mac,
70 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
71 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
73 tls1_export_keying_material,
74 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
75 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
76 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
77 tls_close_construct_packet,
81 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_3_enc_data = {
85 tls1_generate_master_secret,
86 tls1_change_cipher_state,
87 tls1_final_finish_mac,
88 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
89 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
91 tls1_export_keying_material,
92 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
93 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
94 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
95 tls_close_construct_packet,
99 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
102 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
103 * http, the cache would over fill
105 return (60 * 60 * 2);
112 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
116 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
118 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
122 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
125 if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION)
126 s->version = TLS_MAX_VERSION;
128 s->version = s->method->version;
131 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
134 int nid; /* Curve NID */
135 int secbits; /* Bits of security (from SP800-57) */
136 unsigned int flags; /* Flags: currently just field type */
140 * Table of curve information.
141 * Do not delete entries or reorder this array! It is used as a lookup
142 * table: the index of each entry is one less than the TLS curve id.
144 static const tls_curve_info nid_list[] = {
145 {NID_sect163k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163k1 (1) */
146 {NID_sect163r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r1 (2) */
147 {NID_sect163r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r2 (3) */
148 {NID_sect193r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r1 (4) */
149 {NID_sect193r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r2 (5) */
150 {NID_sect233k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233k1 (6) */
151 {NID_sect233r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233r1 (7) */
152 {NID_sect239k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect239k1 (8) */
153 {NID_sect283k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283k1 (9) */
154 {NID_sect283r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283r1 (10) */
155 {NID_sect409k1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409k1 (11) */
156 {NID_sect409r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409r1 (12) */
157 {NID_sect571k1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571k1 (13) */
158 {NID_sect571r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571r1 (14) */
159 {NID_secp160k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160k1 (15) */
160 {NID_secp160r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r1 (16) */
161 {NID_secp160r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r2 (17) */
162 {NID_secp192k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192k1 (18) */
163 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192r1 (19) */
164 {NID_secp224k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224k1 (20) */
165 {NID_secp224r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224r1 (21) */
166 {NID_secp256k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256k1 (22) */
167 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256r1 (23) */
168 {NID_secp384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp384r1 (24) */
169 {NID_secp521r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp521r1 (25) */
170 {NID_brainpoolP256r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
171 {NID_brainpoolP384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
172 {NID_brainpoolP512r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
173 {NID_X25519, 128, TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM}, /* X25519 (29) */
176 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = {
177 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
178 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
179 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
182 /* The default curves */
183 static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] = {
184 0, 29, /* X25519 (29) */
185 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
186 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
187 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
190 static const unsigned char eccurves_all[] = {
191 0, 29, /* X25519 (29) */
192 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
193 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
194 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
195 0, 26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
196 0, 27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
197 0, 28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
200 * Remaining curves disabled by default but still permitted if set
201 * via an explicit callback or parameters.
203 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
204 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
205 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
206 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
207 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
208 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
209 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
210 0, 20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
211 0, 21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
212 0, 18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
213 0, 19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
214 0, 15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
215 0, 16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
216 0, 17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
217 0, 8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
218 0, 6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
219 0, 7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
220 0, 4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
221 0, 5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
222 0, 1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
223 0, 2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
224 0, 3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
227 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] = {
228 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
229 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
232 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id, unsigned int *pflags)
234 const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
235 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
236 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
238 cinfo = nid_list + curve_id - 1;
240 *pflags = cinfo->flags;
244 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
247 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(nid_list); i++) {
248 if (nid_list[i].nid == nid)
255 * Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
257 * Sets |num_curves| to the number of curves in the list, i.e.,
258 * the length of |pcurves| is 2 * num_curves.
259 * Returns 1 on success and 0 if the client curves list has invalid format.
260 * The latter indicates an internal error: we should not be accepting such
261 * lists in the first place.
262 * TODO(emilia): we should really be storing the curves list in explicitly
263 * parsed form instead. (However, this would affect binary compatibility
264 * so cannot happen in the 1.0.x series.)
266 static int tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
267 const unsigned char **pcurves, size_t *num_curves)
269 size_t pcurveslen = 0;
271 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
272 pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
274 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
275 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
276 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
277 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
278 pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
281 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
282 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
286 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
287 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
291 *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
292 pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
295 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
296 pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
300 /* We do not allow odd length arrays to enter the system. */
301 if (pcurveslen & 1) {
302 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_GET_CURVELIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
306 *num_curves = pcurveslen / 2;
311 /* See if curve is allowed by security callback */
312 static int tls_curve_allowed(SSL *s, const unsigned char *curve, int op)
314 const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
317 if ((curve[1] < 1) || ((size_t)curve[1] > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
319 cinfo = &nid_list[curve[1] - 1];
320 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
321 if (cinfo->flags & TLS_CURVE_CHAR2)
324 return ssl_security(s, op, cinfo->secbits, cinfo->nid, (void *)curve);
327 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
328 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
330 const unsigned char *curves;
331 size_t num_curves, i;
332 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
333 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
335 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
337 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
340 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) {
341 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
343 } else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) {
344 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
346 } else /* Should never happen */
349 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &num_curves))
351 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, curves += 2) {
352 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
353 return tls_curve_allowed(s, p + 1, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK);
359 * For nmatch >= 0, return the NID of the |nmatch|th shared curve or NID_undef
360 * if there is no match.
361 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
362 * For nmatch == -2, return the NID of the curve to use for
363 * an EC tmp key, or NID_undef if there is no match.
365 int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
367 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
368 size_t num_pref, num_supp, i, j;
370 /* Can't do anything on client side */
374 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
376 * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know
377 * these are acceptable due to previous checks.
379 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
380 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
381 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
382 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
383 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
384 /* Should never happen */
387 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
391 * Avoid truncation. tls1_get_curvelist takes an int
392 * but s->options is a long...
394 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
395 (s, (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0, &supp,
397 /* In practice, NID_undef == 0 but let's be precise. */
398 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
399 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
400 (s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE), &pref, &num_pref))
401 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
404 * If the client didn't send the elliptic_curves extension all of them
407 if (num_supp == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0) {
409 num_supp = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2;
410 } else if (num_pref == 0 &&
411 (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) == 0) {
413 num_pref = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2;
417 for (i = 0; i < num_pref; i++, pref += 2) {
418 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
419 for (j = 0; j < num_supp; j++, tsupp += 2) {
420 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1]) {
421 if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, pref, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
424 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
425 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id, NULL);
433 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
437 int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
438 int *curves, size_t ncurves)
440 unsigned char *clist, *p;
443 * Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works while curve
446 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
447 clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
450 for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++) {
451 unsigned long idmask;
453 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
455 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask)) {
464 *pextlen = ncurves * 2;
468 # define MAX_CURVELIST 28
472 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
475 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
477 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
483 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
485 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
487 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
489 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
490 if (nid == NID_undef)
491 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
492 if (nid == NID_undef)
493 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
494 if (nid == NID_undef)
496 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
497 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
499 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
503 /* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
504 int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen, const char *str)
508 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
512 return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
515 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
516 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
523 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
524 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
527 /* Determine curve ID */
528 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
529 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
530 /* If no id return error: we don't support arbitrary explicit curves */
534 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
536 if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
538 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED) {
539 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
541 if ((nid_list[id - 1].flags & TLS_CURVE_TYPE) == TLS_CURVE_PRIME)
542 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
544 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
550 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
551 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
552 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
554 const unsigned char *pformats, *pcurves;
555 size_t num_formats, num_curves, i;
558 * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
559 * supported (see RFC4492).
561 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
562 pformats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
563 num_formats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
564 for (i = 0; i < num_formats; i++, pformats++) {
565 if (*comp_id == *pformats)
568 if (i == num_formats)
573 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
574 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++) {
575 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &pcurves, &num_curves))
577 if (j == 1 && num_curves == 0) {
579 * If we've not received any curves then skip this check.
580 * RFC 4492 does not require the supported elliptic curves extension
581 * so if it is not sent we can just choose any curve.
582 * It is invalid to send an empty list in the elliptic curves
583 * extension, so num_curves == 0 always means no extension.
587 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
588 if (pcurves[0] == curve_id[0] && pcurves[1] == curve_id[1])
593 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
600 static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
604 * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
606 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
607 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
608 *num_formats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
610 *pformats = ecformats_default;
611 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
613 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
615 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default);
620 * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
621 * certificates have compatible curves and compression.
623 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
625 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
628 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
631 /* If not EC nothing to do */
632 if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) != EVP_PKEY_EC)
634 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey));
638 * Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a supported
641 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
645 * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
646 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
648 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s)) {
654 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
655 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
656 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
657 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
658 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
660 return 0; /* Should never happen */
661 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
662 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
664 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
666 if (set_ee_md == 2) {
667 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
668 s->s3->tmp.md[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha256();
670 s->s3->tmp.md[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha384();
676 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
678 * tls1_check_ec_tmp_key - Check EC temporary key compatibility
680 * @cid: Cipher ID we're considering using
682 * Checks that the kECDHE cipher suite we're considering using
683 * is compatible with the client extensions.
685 * Returns 0 when the cipher can't be used or 1 when it can.
687 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
690 * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
693 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
694 unsigned char curve_id[2];
695 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
696 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
697 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
698 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
699 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
703 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
704 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
708 /* Need a shared curve */
709 if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
713 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
717 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
722 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
725 * List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
726 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
729 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
730 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
732 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
735 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
736 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
738 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
742 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)/* */
744 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
747 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
748 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
749 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
750 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
752 static const unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
753 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
754 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
755 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
756 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
757 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
758 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
759 TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001,
760 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256,
761 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512
765 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
766 static const unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
767 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
768 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
771 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
774 * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
777 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
778 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
779 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
780 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
781 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
783 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
784 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
787 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
788 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
792 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
793 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs) {
794 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
795 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
796 } else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
797 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
798 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
800 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
801 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
806 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
807 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
809 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
810 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
812 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
813 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
814 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
815 /* Should never happen */
818 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
819 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1]) {
820 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
823 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
824 if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
825 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
826 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
827 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey)))
829 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id)) {
830 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
833 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
834 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
837 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256) {
838 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256) {
839 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
840 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
843 } else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384) {
844 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384) {
845 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
846 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
852 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
856 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
857 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
858 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i += 2, sent_sigs += 2) {
859 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
862 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
863 if (i == sent_sigslen
864 && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1
865 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
866 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
869 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
871 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
874 /* Make sure security callback allows algorithm */
875 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK,
876 EVP_MD_size(*pmd) * 4, EVP_MD_type(*pmd), (void *)sig)) {
877 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
881 * Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they wish.
883 s->s3->tmp.peer_md = *pmd;
888 * Set a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
889 * supported, doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms, isn't supported
890 * by the enabled protocol versions or by the security level.
892 * This function should only be used for checking which ciphers are supported
895 * Call ssl_cipher_disabled() to check that it's enabled or not.
897 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
899 s->s3->tmp.mask_a = 0;
900 s->s3->tmp.mask_k = 0;
901 ssl_set_sig_mask(&s->s3->tmp.mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
902 ssl_get_client_min_max_version(s, &s->s3->tmp.min_ver, &s->s3->tmp.max_ver);
903 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
904 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
905 if (!s->psk_client_callback) {
906 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
907 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_PSK;
909 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
910 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
911 if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) {
912 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
913 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
919 * ssl_cipher_disabled - check that a cipher is disabled or not
920 * @s: SSL connection that you want to use the cipher on
921 * @c: cipher to check
922 * @op: Security check that you want to do
924 * Returns 1 when it's disabled, 0 when enabled.
926 int ssl_cipher_disabled(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op)
928 if (c->algorithm_mkey & s->s3->tmp.mask_k
929 || c->algorithm_auth & s->s3->tmp.mask_a)
931 if (s->s3->tmp.max_ver == 0)
933 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && ((c->min_tls > s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
934 || (c->max_tls < s->s3->tmp.min_ver)))
936 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (DTLS_VERSION_GT(c->min_dtls, s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
937 || DTLS_VERSION_LT(c->max_dtls, s->s3->tmp.min_ver)))
940 return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c);
943 static int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s)
945 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
947 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL);
950 static int compare_uint(const void *p1, const void *p2)
952 unsigned int u1 = *((const unsigned int *)p1);
953 unsigned int u2 = *((const unsigned int *)p2);
963 * Per http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.1.4, there may not be
964 * more than one extension of the same type in a ClientHello or ServerHello.
965 * This function does an initial scan over the extensions block to filter those
966 * out. It returns 1 if all extensions are unique, and 0 if the extensions
967 * contain duplicates, could not be successfully parsed, or an internal error
970 static int tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(const PACKET *packet)
972 PACKET extensions = *packet;
973 size_t num_extensions = 0, i = 0;
974 unsigned int *extension_types = NULL;
977 /* First pass: count the extensions. */
978 while (PACKET_remaining(&extensions) > 0) {
981 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions, &type) ||
982 !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions, &extension)) {
988 if (num_extensions <= 1)
991 extension_types = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(unsigned int) * num_extensions);
992 if (extension_types == NULL) {
993 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
997 /* Second pass: gather the extension types. */
998 extensions = *packet;
999 for (i = 0; i < num_extensions; i++) {
1001 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions, &extension_types[i]) ||
1002 !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions, &extension)) {
1003 /* This should not happen. */
1004 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1009 if (PACKET_remaining(&extensions) != 0) {
1010 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1013 /* Sort the extensions and make sure there are no duplicates. */
1014 qsort(extension_types, num_extensions, sizeof(unsigned int), compare_uint);
1015 for (i = 1; i < num_extensions; i++) {
1016 if (extension_types[i - 1] == extension_types[i])
1021 OPENSSL_free(extension_types);
1025 int ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
1027 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1028 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1030 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1032 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1033 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1035 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++) {
1036 const SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1038 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1039 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1040 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK))
1041 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)) {
1049 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1050 if (s->renegotiate) {
1051 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
1052 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1053 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->s3->previous_client_finished,
1054 s->s3->previous_client_finished_len)
1055 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1056 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1060 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1061 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION)
1064 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1065 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1066 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1067 /* Sub-packet for server_name extension */
1068 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1069 /* Sub-packet for servername list (always 1 hostname)*/
1070 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1071 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name)
1072 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->tlsext_hostname,
1073 strlen(s->tlsext_hostname))
1074 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1075 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1076 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1080 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1081 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
1082 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) {
1083 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_srp)
1084 /* Sub-packet for SRP extension */
1085 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1086 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
1087 /* login must not be zero...internal error if so */
1088 || !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt, WPACKET_FLAGS_NON_ZERO_LENGTH)
1089 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->srp_ctx.login,
1090 strlen(s->srp_ctx.login))
1091 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1092 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1093 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1099 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1102 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message
1104 const unsigned char *pcurves, *pformats;
1105 size_t num_curves, num_formats;
1108 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &pformats, &num_formats);
1110 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
1111 /* Sub-packet for formats extension */
1112 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1113 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, pformats, num_formats)
1114 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1115 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1120 * Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message
1122 pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1123 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &pcurves, &num_curves)) {
1124 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1128 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves)
1129 /* Sub-packet for curves extension */
1130 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1131 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1132 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1135 /* Copy curve ID if supported */
1136 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
1137 if (tls_curve_allowed(s, pcurves, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) {
1138 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, pcurves[0])
1139 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, pcurves[1])) {
1140 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
1141 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1146 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1147 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1151 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1153 if (tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1155 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
1156 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
1157 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1158 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data) {
1159 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1160 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1161 if (s->session->tlsext_tick == NULL) {
1162 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1165 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1166 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data, ticklen);
1167 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1170 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1171 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1174 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
1175 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->session->tlsext_tick,
1177 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1183 if (SSL_CLIENT_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1185 const unsigned char *salg;
1187 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
1189 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms)
1190 /* Sub-packet for sig-algs extension */
1191 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1192 /* Sub-packet for the actual list */
1193 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1194 || !tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, pkt, salg, salglen)
1195 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1196 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1197 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1201 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
1202 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
1205 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
1206 /* Sub-packet for status request extension */
1207 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1208 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
1209 /* Sub-packet for the ids */
1210 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1211 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1214 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
1215 unsigned char *idbytes;
1219 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1220 idlen = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1222 /* Sub-packet for an individual id */
1223 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, idlen, &idbytes)
1224 || i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &idbytes) != idlen) {
1225 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1229 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)
1230 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1231 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1234 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) {
1235 unsigned char *extbytes;
1236 int extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1239 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1242 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, extlen, &extbytes)
1243 || i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &extbytes)
1245 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1249 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1250 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1255 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1256 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1261 * 1: peer may send requests
1262 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1264 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1265 mode = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1267 mode = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1269 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
1270 /* Sub-packet for Hearbeat extension */
1271 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1272 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, mode)
1273 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1274 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1280 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1281 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1283 * The client advertises an empty extension to indicate its support
1284 * for Next Protocol Negotiation
1286 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg)
1287 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1288 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1295 * finish_md_len is non-zero during a renegotiation, so
1296 * this avoids sending ALPN during the renegotiation
1297 * (see longer comment below)
1299 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1300 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt,
1301 TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation)
1302 /* Sub-packet ALPN extension */
1303 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1304 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->alpn_client_proto_list,
1305 s->alpn_client_proto_list_len)
1306 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1307 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1310 s->s3->alpn_sent = 1;
1312 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1313 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)) {
1314 STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *clnt = SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s);
1315 SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *prof;
1318 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
1319 /* Sub-packet for SRTP extension */
1320 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1321 /* Sub-packet for the protection profile list */
1322 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1323 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1326 ct = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(clnt);
1327 for (i = 0; i < ct; i++) {
1328 prof = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(clnt, i);
1329 if (prof == NULL || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, prof->id)) {
1330 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1334 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)
1335 /* Add an empty use_mki value */
1336 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)
1337 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1338 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1343 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->cli_ext);
1344 /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
1345 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 0, pkt, al)) {
1346 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1350 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)) {
1351 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
1352 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1353 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1358 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
1359 if (s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
1360 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp)
1361 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1362 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1368 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret)
1369 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1370 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1375 * Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See
1376 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03 NB: because this
1377 * code works out the length of all existing extensions it MUST always
1380 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING) {
1381 unsigned char *padbytes;
1384 if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &hlen)) {
1385 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1389 if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200) {
1390 hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
1396 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_padding)
1397 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, hlen, &padbytes)) {
1398 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1401 memset(padbytes, 0, hlen);
1409 int ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
1411 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1412 int next_proto_neg_seen;
1414 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1415 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1416 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1417 int using_ecc = (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1418 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1421 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1422 || !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt, WPACKET_FLAGS_ABANDON_ON_ZERO_LENGTH)) {
1423 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1427 if (s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
1428 !ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, pkt)) {
1429 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1433 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1434 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
1437 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1
1438 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1439 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1440 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1441 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1445 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1447 const unsigned char *plist;
1450 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message
1452 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1454 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
1455 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1456 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, plist, plistlen)
1457 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1458 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1463 * Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves
1466 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1468 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected && tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1469 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
1470 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1471 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1476 * if we don't add the above TLSEXT, we can't add a session ticket
1479 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
1482 if (s->tlsext_status_expected) {
1483 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
1484 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1485 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1489 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1490 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->srtp_profile) {
1491 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
1492 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1493 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 2)
1494 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->srtp_profile->id)
1495 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)
1496 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1497 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1503 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x80
1504 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x81)
1505 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG)) {
1506 const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1507 0xfd, 0xe8, /* 65000 */
1508 0x00, 0x20, /* 32 bytes length */
1509 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1510 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1511 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1512 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17
1514 if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, cryptopro_ext, sizeof(cryptopro_ext))) {
1515 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1519 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1520 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
1521 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED)) {
1525 * 1: peer may send requests
1526 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1528 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1529 mode = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1531 mode = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1533 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
1534 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1535 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, mode)
1536 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1537 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1544 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1545 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1546 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1547 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb) {
1548 const unsigned char *npa;
1549 unsigned int npalen;
1552 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen,
1554 ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1555 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1556 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg)
1557 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, npa, npalen)) {
1558 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1561 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1565 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 1, pkt, al)) {
1566 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1570 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) {
1572 * Don't use encrypt_then_mac if AEAD or RC4 might want to disable
1573 * for other cases too.
1575 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD
1576 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4
1577 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT
1578 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT12)
1579 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1581 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
1582 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1583 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1588 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) {
1589 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret)
1590 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1591 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1596 if (s->s3->alpn_selected != NULL) {
1597 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt,
1598 TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation)
1599 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1600 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1601 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->s3->alpn_selected,
1602 s->s3->alpn_selected_len)
1603 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1604 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1605 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1611 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1612 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1619 * Save the ALPN extension in a ClientHello.
1620 * pkt: the contents of the ALPN extension, not including type and length.
1621 * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a failure.
1622 * returns: 1 on success, 0 on error.
1624 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
1626 PACKET protocol_list, save_protocol_list, protocol;
1628 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1630 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &protocol_list)
1631 || PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) < 2) {
1635 save_protocol_list = protocol_list;
1637 /* Protocol names can't be empty. */
1638 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&protocol_list, &protocol)
1639 || PACKET_remaining(&protocol) == 0) {
1642 } while (PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) != 0);
1644 if (!PACKET_memdup(&save_protocol_list,
1645 &s->s3->alpn_proposed, &s->s3->alpn_proposed_len)) {
1646 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1654 * Process the ALPN extension in a ClientHello.
1655 * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a failure.
1656 * returns 1 on success, 0 on error.
1658 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello_late(SSL *s, int *al)
1660 const unsigned char *selected = NULL;
1661 unsigned char selected_len = 0;
1663 if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb != NULL && s->s3->alpn_proposed != NULL) {
1664 int r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len,
1665 s->s3->alpn_proposed,
1666 (unsigned int)s->s3->alpn_proposed_len,
1667 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
1669 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1670 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1671 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_memdup(selected, selected_len);
1672 if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
1673 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1676 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
1677 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1678 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
1679 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1682 *al = SSL_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL;
1690 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1692 * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1693 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |hello|.
1694 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1699 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1700 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1701 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1702 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1704 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello)
1710 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1711 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1712 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1713 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1714 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1715 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1716 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1718 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1719 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1720 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1721 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1722 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1723 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1724 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1725 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1726 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1727 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1728 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1729 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1730 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1733 /* Length of the common prefix (first two extensions). */
1734 static const size_t kSafariCommonExtensionsLength = 18;
1736 tmppkt = hello->extensions;
1738 if (!PACKET_forward(&tmppkt, 2)
1739 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt, &type)
1740 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&tmppkt, &sni)) {
1744 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1747 ext_len = TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION ?
1748 sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock) : kSafariCommonExtensionsLength;
1750 s->s3->is_probably_safari = PACKET_equal(&tmppkt, kSafariExtensionsBlock,
1753 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1756 * Loop through all remaining ClientHello extensions that we collected earlier
1757 * and haven't already processed. For each one parse it and update the SSL
1758 * object as required.
1760 * Behaviour upon resumption is extension-specific. If the extension has no
1761 * effect during resumption, it is parsed (to verify its format) but otherwise
1764 * Returns 1 on success and 0 on failure.
1765 * Upon failure, sets |al| to the appropriate alert.
1767 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello, int *al)
1770 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1772 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1773 s->servername_done = 0;
1774 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1775 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1776 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1779 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1780 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
1781 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = 0;
1782 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_proposed);
1783 s->s3->alpn_proposed = NULL;
1784 s->s3->alpn_proposed_len = 0;
1785 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1786 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1787 SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1790 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1791 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1792 ssl_check_for_safari(s, hello);
1793 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1795 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
1796 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs);
1797 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = NULL;
1798 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1800 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1801 OPENSSL_free(s->srp_ctx.login);
1802 s->srp_ctx.login = NULL;
1805 s->srtp_profile = NULL;
1808 * We parse all extensions to ensure the ClientHello is well-formed but,
1809 * unless an extension specifies otherwise, we ignore extensions upon
1812 for (loop = 0; loop < hello->num_extensions; loop++) {
1813 RAW_EXTENSION *currext = &hello->pre_proc_exts[loop];
1815 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1816 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, currext->type,
1817 PACKET_data(&currext->data),
1818 PACKET_remaining(&currext->data),
1819 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1821 if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
1822 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s,
1823 &currext->data, al))
1825 renegotiate_seen = 1;
1826 } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
1829 * The servername extension is treated as follows:
1831 * - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
1832 * - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
1833 * in which case an fatal alert is generated.
1834 * - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
1835 * - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
1836 * to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
1837 * - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
1838 * it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
1839 * Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
1840 * set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
1841 * case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
1842 * a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
1843 * presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
1844 * the value of the Host: field.
1845 * - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1846 * if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the
1847 * session, i.e. when the session has been established with a servername
1849 * - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
1853 else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
1854 unsigned int servname_type;
1855 PACKET sni, hostname;
1857 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&currext->data, &sni)
1858 /* ServerNameList must be at least 1 byte long. */
1859 || PACKET_remaining(&sni) == 0) {
1864 * Although the server_name extension was intended to be
1865 * extensible to new name types, RFC 4366 defined the
1866 * syntax inextensibility and OpenSSL 1.0.x parses it as
1868 * RFC 6066 corrected the mistake but adding new name types
1869 * is nevertheless no longer feasible, so act as if no other
1870 * SNI types can exist, to simplify parsing.
1872 * Also note that the RFC permits only one SNI value per type,
1873 * i.e., we can only have a single hostname.
1875 if (!PACKET_get_1(&sni, &servname_type)
1876 || servname_type != TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name
1877 || !PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&sni, &hostname)) {
1882 if (PACKET_remaining(&hostname) > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) {
1883 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1887 if (PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&hostname)) {
1888 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1892 if (!PACKET_strndup(&hostname, &s->session->tlsext_hostname)) {
1893 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1897 s->servername_done = 1;
1900 * TODO(openssl-team): if the SNI doesn't match, we MUST
1901 * fall back to a full handshake.
1903 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
1904 && PACKET_equal(&hostname, s->session->tlsext_hostname,
1905 strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname));
1908 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1909 else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp) {
1912 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&currext->data, &srp_I))
1915 if (PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&srp_I))
1919 * TODO(openssl-team): currently, we re-authenticate the user
1920 * upon resumption. Instead, we MUST ignore the login.
1922 if (!PACKET_strndup(&srp_I, &s->srp_ctx.login)) {
1923 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1929 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1930 else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
1931 PACKET ec_point_format_list;
1933 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&currext->data,
1934 &ec_point_format_list)
1935 || PACKET_remaining(&ec_point_format_list) == 0) {
1940 if (!PACKET_memdup(&ec_point_format_list,
1941 &s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
1943 session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length)) {
1944 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1948 } else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves) {
1949 PACKET elliptic_curve_list;
1951 /* Each NamedCurve is 2 bytes and we must have at least 1. */
1952 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&currext->data,
1953 &elliptic_curve_list)
1954 || PACKET_remaining(&elliptic_curve_list) == 0
1955 || (PACKET_remaining(&elliptic_curve_list) % 2) != 0) {
1960 if (!PACKET_memdup(&elliptic_curve_list,
1961 &s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist,
1963 session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length)) {
1964 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1969 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1970 else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
1971 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
1972 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s,
1973 PACKET_data(&currext->data),
1974 PACKET_remaining(&currext->data),
1975 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg)) {
1976 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1979 } else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms) {
1980 PACKET supported_sig_algs;
1982 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&currext->data,
1983 &supported_sig_algs)
1984 || (PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) % 2) != 0
1985 || PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) == 0) {
1990 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, PACKET_data(&supported_sig_algs),
1991 PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs))) {
1995 } else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
1996 if (!PACKET_get_1(&currext->data,
1997 (unsigned int *)&s->tlsext_status_type)) {
2000 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
2001 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
2002 const unsigned char *ext_data;
2003 PACKET responder_id_list, exts;
2004 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2
2005 (&currext->data, &responder_id_list))
2009 * We remove any OCSP_RESPIDs from a previous handshake
2010 * to prevent unbounded memory growth - CVE-2016-6304
2012 sk_OCSP_RESPID_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids,
2014 if (PACKET_remaining(&responder_id_list) > 0) {
2015 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null();
2016 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_ids == NULL) {
2017 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2021 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = NULL;
2024 while (PACKET_remaining(&responder_id_list) > 0) {
2026 PACKET responder_id;
2027 const unsigned char *id_data;
2029 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&responder_id_list,
2031 || PACKET_remaining(&responder_id) == 0) {
2035 id_data = PACKET_data(&responder_id);
2036 /* TODO(size_t): Convert d2i_* to size_t */
2037 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, &id_data,
2038 (int)PACKET_remaining(&responder_id));
2042 if (id_data != PACKET_end(&responder_id)) {
2043 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2047 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id)) {
2048 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2049 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2054 /* Read in request_extensions */
2055 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(
2056 &currext->data, &exts))
2059 if (PACKET_remaining(&exts) > 0) {
2060 ext_data = PACKET_data(&exts);
2061 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2062 X509_EXTENSION_free);
2063 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
2064 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &ext_data,
2065 (int)PACKET_remaining(&exts));
2066 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts == NULL
2067 || ext_data != PACKET_end(&exts)) {
2075 * We don't know what to do with any other type so ignore it.
2077 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2080 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2081 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
2082 unsigned int hbtype;
2084 if (!PACKET_get_1(&currext->data, &hbtype)
2085 || PACKET_remaining(&currext->data)) {
2086 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2090 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
2091 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2093 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
2094 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2095 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2098 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2103 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2104 else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg
2105 && s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2107 * We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2110 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2111 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2112 * the initial renegotiation too in certain cases (when
2113 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2114 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2115 * anything like that, but this might change).
2117 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2118 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2119 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2120 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2121 * Finished message could have been computed.)
2123 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2127 else if (currext->type
2128 == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation
2129 && s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2130 if (!tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s,
2131 &currext->data, al))
2135 /* session ticket processed earlier */
2136 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2137 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)
2138 && currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2139 if (ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s,
2140 &currext->data, al))
2144 else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2145 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC))
2146 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2148 * Note: extended master secret extension handled in
2149 * tls_check_client_ems_support()
2153 * If this ClientHello extension was unhandled and this is a
2154 * nonresumed connection, check whether the extension is a custom
2155 * TLS Extension (has a custom_srv_ext_record), and if so call the
2156 * callback and record the extension number so that an appropriate
2157 * ServerHello may be later returned.
2160 if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1, currext->type,
2161 PACKET_data(&currext->data),
2162 PACKET_remaining(&currext->data), al) <= 0)
2167 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2169 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
2170 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2171 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2172 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2173 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2178 * This function currently has no state to clean up, so it returns directly.
2179 * If parsing fails at any point, the function returns early.
2180 * The SSL object may be left with partial data from extensions, but it must
2181 * then no longer be used, and clearing it up will free the leftovers.
2186 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello)
2189 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->srv_ext);
2190 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, hello, &al) <= 0) {
2191 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2194 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) {
2195 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2201 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2203 * ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2204 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly
2205 * fill the length of the block.
2207 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(PACKET *pkt)
2209 PACKET tmp_protocol;
2211 while (PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
2212 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &tmp_protocol)
2213 || PACKET_remaining(&tmp_protocol) == 0)
2221 static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2223 unsigned int length, type, size;
2224 int tlsext_servername = 0;
2225 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2227 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2228 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2230 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2232 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2233 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
2234 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2235 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2236 SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2239 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2241 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
2243 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &length))
2246 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != length) {
2247 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2251 if (!tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(pkt)) {
2252 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2256 while (PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &type) && PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &size)) {
2257 const unsigned char *data;
2260 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &spkt, size)
2261 || !PACKET_peek_bytes(&spkt, &data, size))
2264 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2265 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2267 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
2268 if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, &spkt, al))
2270 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2271 } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
2272 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
2273 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0) {
2274 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2277 tlsext_servername = 1;
2279 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2280 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
2281 unsigned int ecpointformatlist_length;
2282 if (!PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &ecpointformatlist_length)
2283 || ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1) {
2284 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2288 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2289 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2290 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
2291 OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) {
2292 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2295 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
2296 ecpointformatlist_length;
2297 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&spkt,
2298 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
2299 ecpointformatlist_length)) {
2300 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2306 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2308 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2309 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2310 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size,
2311 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2313 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2316 if (!tls_use_ticket(s) || (size > 0)) {
2317 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2320 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2321 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
2323 * MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested a status
2326 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0)) {
2327 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2330 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2331 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2333 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
2335 * Only take it if we asked for it - i.e if there is no CT validation
2336 * callback set, then a custom extension MAY be processing it, so we
2337 * need to let control continue to flow to that.
2339 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp &&
2340 s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
2341 /* Simply copy it off for later processing */
2342 if (s->tlsext_scts != NULL) {
2343 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_scts);
2344 s->tlsext_scts = NULL;
2346 s->tlsext_scts_len = size;
2348 s->tlsext_scts = OPENSSL_malloc(size);
2349 if (s->tlsext_scts == NULL) {
2350 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2353 memcpy(s->tlsext_scts, data, size);
2357 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2358 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2359 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2360 unsigned char *selected;
2361 unsigned char selected_len;
2362 /* We must have requested it. */
2363 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL) {
2364 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2367 /* The data must be valid */
2368 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(&spkt)) {
2369 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2372 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data,
2375 ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) !=
2376 SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
2377 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2381 * Could be non-NULL if server has sent multiple NPN extensions in
2382 * a single Serverhello
2384 OPENSSL_free(s->next_proto_negotiated);
2385 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2386 if (s->next_proto_negotiated == NULL) {
2387 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2390 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2391 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2392 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2396 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation) {
2398 /* We must have requested it. */
2399 if (!s->s3->alpn_sent) {
2400 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2404 * The extension data consists of:
2405 * uint16 list_length
2406 * uint8 proto_length;
2407 * uint8 proto[proto_length];
2409 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&spkt, &len)
2410 || PACKET_remaining(&spkt) != len || !PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &len)
2411 || PACKET_remaining(&spkt) != len) {
2412 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2415 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2416 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
2417 if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
2418 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2421 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&spkt, s->s3->alpn_selected, len)) {
2422 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2425 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
2427 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2428 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
2429 unsigned int hbtype;
2430 if (!PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &hbtype)) {
2431 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2435 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
2436 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2438 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
2439 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2440 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2443 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2448 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2449 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2450 if (ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, &spkt, al))
2454 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac) {
2455 /* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite */
2456 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) &&
2457 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD
2458 && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc != SSL_RC4)
2459 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2460 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret) {
2461 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
2463 s->session->flags |= SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS;
2466 * If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but matches a
2467 * custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c callback
2469 else if (custom_ext_parse(s, 0, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2473 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2474 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2478 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1) {
2479 if (s->tlsext_hostname) {
2480 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) {
2481 s->session->tlsext_hostname =
2482 OPENSSL_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
2483 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname) {
2484 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2488 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2497 * Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to avoid
2498 * an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server hello
2499 * because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an attack.
2500 * However this would mean we could not connect to any server which
2501 * doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI absence
2503 if (!renegotiate_seen && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
2504 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2505 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2506 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2507 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2513 * Check extended master secret extension is consistent with
2516 if (!(s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) !=
2517 !(s->session->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS)) {
2518 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2519 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EXTMS);
2527 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2529 s->s3->alpn_sent = 0;
2533 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2538 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
2540 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2541 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2543 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2545 * The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely
2546 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2549 * The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely
2550 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2554 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2556 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2557 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2558 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
2559 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2561 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2563 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2566 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2567 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2570 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2571 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2574 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2575 s->servername_done = 0;
2581 /* Initialise digests to default values */
2582 void ssl_set_default_md(SSL *s)
2584 const EVP_MD **pmd = s->s3->tmp.md;
2585 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2586 pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
2588 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2589 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2590 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
2592 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX);
2593 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN];
2595 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2596 pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
2598 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2599 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX);
2600 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX);
2601 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX);
2605 int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s)
2610 /* Clear any shared signature algorithms */
2611 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
2612 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
2613 s->cert->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
2614 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
2615 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
2616 s->s3->tmp.md[i] = NULL;
2617 s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
2620 /* If sigalgs received process it. */
2621 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs) {
2622 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2623 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2624 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2627 /* Fatal error is no shared signature algorithms */
2628 if (!s->cert->shared_sigalgs) {
2629 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS,
2630 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS);
2631 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2635 ssl_set_default_md(s);
2639 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2644 * Upon success, returns 1.
2645 * Upon failure, returns 0 and sets |al| to the appropriate fatal alert.
2647 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s, int *al)
2649 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2652 * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be
2653 * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed,
2654 * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may
2655 * influence which certificate is sent
2657 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
2659 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
2660 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
2661 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
2662 if (certpkey != NULL) {
2664 * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
2665 * et al can pick it up.
2667 s->cert->key = certpkey;
2668 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2670 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
2671 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2672 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2674 /* status request response should be sent */
2675 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
2676 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
2677 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2679 /* something bad happened */
2680 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2682 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2688 if (!tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello_late(s, al)) {
2695 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2697 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2698 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2700 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2702 * If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
2703 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension it
2704 * must contain uncompressed.
2706 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2707 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2708 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
2709 && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
2710 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
2711 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
2712 && ((alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) {
2713 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
2715 unsigned char *list;
2716 int found_uncompressed = 0;
2717 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2718 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) {
2719 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed) {
2720 found_uncompressed = 1;
2724 if (!found_uncompressed) {
2725 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2726 SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
2730 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2731 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2733 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2735 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2736 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2737 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
2738 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2740 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2742 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2745 * Ensure we get sensible values passed to tlsext_status_cb in the event
2746 * that we don't receive a status message
2748 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
2749 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
2750 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = 0;
2753 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2754 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2757 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2758 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2761 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2762 s->servername_done = 0;
2768 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2771 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
2773 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, pkt, &al) <= 0) {
2774 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2778 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
2779 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
2786 * Given a list of extensions that we collected earlier, find one of a given
2787 * type and return it.
2789 * |exts| is the set of extensions previously collected.
2790 * |numexts| is the number of extensions that we have.
2791 * |type| the type of the extension that we are looking for.
2793 * Returns a pointer to the found RAW_EXTENSION data, or NULL if not found.
2795 static RAW_EXTENSION *get_extension_by_type(RAW_EXTENSION *exts, size_t numexts,
2800 for (loop = 0; loop < numexts; loop++) {
2801 if (exts[loop].type == type)
2809 * Gets the ticket information supplied by the client if any.
2811 * hello: The parsed ClientHello data
2812 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2813 * point to the resulting session.
2815 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
2816 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
2817 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
2820 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
2821 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
2822 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
2823 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
2824 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
2825 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
2826 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
2829 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
2830 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
2831 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
2832 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
2833 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
2834 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
2836 int tls_get_ticket_from_client(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello,
2840 const unsigned char *etick;
2842 RAW_EXTENSION *ticketext;
2845 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2848 * If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
2851 if (s->version <= SSL3_VERSION || !tls_use_ticket(s))
2854 ticketext = get_extension_by_type(hello->pre_proc_exts,
2855 hello->num_extensions,
2856 TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket);
2857 if (ticketext == NULL)
2860 size = PACKET_remaining(&ticketext->data);
2863 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
2866 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2869 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
2871 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
2872 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
2873 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
2874 * calculate the master secret later.
2878 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&ticketext->data, &etick, size)) {
2879 /* Shouldn't ever happen */
2882 retv = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, etick, size, hello->session_id,
2883 hello->session_id_len, ret);
2885 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
2886 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2889 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
2892 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
2893 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2896 default: /* fatal error */
2902 * Sets the extended master secret flag if the extension is present in the
2908 int tls_check_client_ems_support(SSL *s, const CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello)
2910 RAW_EXTENSION *emsext;
2912 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
2914 if (s->version <= SSL3_VERSION)
2917 emsext = get_extension_by_type(hello->pre_proc_exts, hello->num_extensions,
2918 TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret);
2921 * No extensions is a success - we have successfully discovered that the
2922 * client doesn't support EMS.
2927 /* The extensions must always be empty */
2928 if (PACKET_remaining(&emsext->data) != 0)
2931 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
2937 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
2939 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
2940 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extension.
2941 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
2942 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
2943 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2944 * point to the resulting session.
2947 * -2: fatal error, malloc failure.
2948 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
2949 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
2950 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
2951 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
2953 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
2954 size_t eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id,
2955 size_t sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess)
2958 unsigned char *sdec;
2959 const unsigned char *p;
2960 int slen, renew_ticket = 0, ret = -1, declen;
2962 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
2963 HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL;
2964 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
2965 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
2967 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
2968 hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
2971 ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
2976 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
2977 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
2978 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
2989 /* Check key name matches */
2990 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name,
2991 sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name)) != 0) {
2995 if (HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key,
2996 sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key),
2997 EVP_sha256(), NULL) <= 0
2998 || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_256_cbc(), NULL,
2999 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key,
3000 etick + sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name)) <=
3006 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
3009 mlen = HMAC_size(hctx);
3013 /* Sanity check ticket length: must exceed keyname + IV + HMAC */
3015 TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx) + mlen) {
3020 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
3021 if (HMAC_Update(hctx, etick, eticklen) <= 0
3022 || HMAC_Final(hctx, tick_hmac, NULL) <= 0) {
3025 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3026 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) {
3027 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3030 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
3031 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
3032 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
3033 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
3034 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
3035 if (sdec == NULL || EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, sdec, &slen, p,
3036 (int)eticklen) <= 0) {
3037 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3041 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(ctx, sdec + slen, &declen) <= 0) {
3042 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3047 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3051 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3055 * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
3056 * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
3057 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
3061 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3062 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3071 * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
3075 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3076 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3080 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3087 static const tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
3088 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3089 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3090 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3091 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3092 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3093 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512},
3094 {NID_id_GostR3411_94, TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411},
3095 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256},
3096 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512},
3099 static const tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
3100 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
3101 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
3102 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa},
3103 {NID_id_GostR3410_2001, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001},
3104 {NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256},
3105 {NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512}
3108 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3111 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3112 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3118 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3121 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3122 if ((table[i].id) == id)
3123 return table[i].nid;
3128 int tls12_get_sigandhash(WPACKET *pkt, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md)
3134 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3137 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3140 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, md_id) || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, sig_id))
3146 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
3148 return tls12_find_id(EVP_PKEY_id(pk), tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3155 unsigned char tlsext_hash;
3158 static const tls12_hash_info tls12_md_info[] = {
3159 {NID_md5, 64, SSL_MD_MD5_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3160 {NID_sha1, 80, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3161 {NID_sha224, 112, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3162 {NID_sha256, 128, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3163 {NID_sha384, 192, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3164 {NID_sha512, 256, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha512},
3165 {NID_id_GostR3411_94, 128, SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411},
3166 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, 128, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX,
3167 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256},
3168 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, 256, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX,
3169 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512},
3172 static const tls12_hash_info *tls12_get_hash_info(unsigned char hash_alg)
3178 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md_info); i++) {
3179 if (tls12_md_info[i].tlsext_hash == hash_alg)
3180 return tls12_md_info + i;
3186 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
3188 const tls12_hash_info *inf;
3189 if (hash_alg == TLSEXT_hash_md5 && FIPS_mode())
3191 inf = tls12_get_hash_info(hash_alg);
3194 return ssl_md(inf->md_idx);
3197 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
3200 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3201 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3202 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3204 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3205 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3206 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3208 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3209 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3210 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3212 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3213 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001:
3214 return SSL_PKEY_GOST01;
3216 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256:
3217 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256;
3219 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512:
3220 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512;
3226 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3227 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
3228 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3230 int sign_nid = NID_undef, hash_nid = NID_undef;
3231 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3233 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3234 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3236 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3238 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3239 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3241 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3243 if (psignhash_nid) {
3244 if (sign_nid == NID_undef || hash_nid == NID_undef
3245 || OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid, hash_nid, sign_nid) <= 0)
3246 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3250 /* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
3251 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(SSL *s, int op, const unsigned char *ptmp)
3253 /* See if we have an entry in the hash table and it is enabled */
3254 const tls12_hash_info *hinf = tls12_get_hash_info(ptmp[0]);
3255 if (hinf == NULL || ssl_md(hinf->md_idx) == NULL)
3257 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
3258 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3260 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
3261 return ssl_security(s, op, hinf->secbits, hinf->nid, (void *)ptmp);
3265 * Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported signature
3266 * algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA then RSA is
3270 void ssl_set_sig_mask(uint32_t *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op)
3272 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
3273 size_t i, sigalgslen;
3274 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
3276 * Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any for
3277 * RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just TLS 1.2. To keep
3278 * down calls to security callback only check if we have to.
3280 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
3281 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2) {
3282 switch (sigalgs[1]) {
3283 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3284 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3285 if (!have_rsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3289 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3290 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3291 if (!have_dsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3295 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3296 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3297 if (!have_ecdsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3304 *pmask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
3306 *pmask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
3308 *pmask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
3311 int tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
3312 const unsigned char *psig, size_t psiglen)
3316 for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i += 2, psig += 2) {
3317 if (tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, psig)) {
3318 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, psig[0])
3319 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, psig[1]))
3326 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
3327 static size_t tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
3328 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3329 const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
3331 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3332 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3333 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i += 2, ptmp += 2) {
3334 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3335 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED, ptmp))
3337 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j += 2, atmp += 2) {
3338 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1]) {
3341 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3342 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3343 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3345 &shsig->signandhash_nid, ptmp);
3355 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3356 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3358 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3359 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3361 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3363 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
3365 OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
3366 c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
3367 c->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
3368 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3369 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3370 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3371 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3372 } else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3373 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
3374 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3376 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
3377 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb) {
3380 allow = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3381 allowlen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
3385 pref = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3386 preflen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
3388 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3390 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3393 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3397 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3398 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3402 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3404 int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, size_t dsize)
3407 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
3408 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3410 /* Should never happen */
3414 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs);
3415 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
3416 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs == NULL)
3418 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3419 memcpy(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
3423 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3428 const EVP_MD **pmd = s->s3->tmp.md;
3429 uint32_t *pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags;
3431 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3432 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s))
3435 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3436 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++) {
3437 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3438 if (idx > 0 && pmd[idx] == NULL) {
3439 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
3441 pvalid[idx] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3442 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) {
3443 pvalid[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3444 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = md;
3450 * In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't use
3451 * the certificate for signing.
3453 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
3455 * Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not
3456 * supported it stays as NULL.
3458 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3459 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] == NULL)
3460 pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
3462 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3463 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] == NULL) {
3464 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
3465 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = EVP_sha1();
3468 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3469 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] == NULL)
3470 pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha1();
3472 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3473 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] == NULL)
3474 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] = EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_94);
3475 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] == NULL)
3476 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] =
3477 EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256);
3478 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] == NULL)
3479 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] =
3480 EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512);
3486 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3487 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3488 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3490 const unsigned char *psig = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3491 size_t numsigalgs = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3492 if (psig == NULL || numsigalgs > INT_MAX)
3496 if (idx >= (int)s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen)
3503 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
3505 return (int)numsigalgs;
3508 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3509 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3510 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3512 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
3513 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen
3514 || s->cert->shared_sigalgslen > INT_MAX)
3518 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3520 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3522 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3524 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
3526 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
3527 return (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
3530 #define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
3534 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
3537 static void get_sigorhash(int *psig, int *phash, const char *str)
3539 if (strcmp(str, "RSA") == 0) {
3540 *psig = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
3541 } else if (strcmp(str, "DSA") == 0) {
3542 *psig = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
3543 } else if (strcmp(str, "ECDSA") == 0) {
3544 *psig = EVP_PKEY_EC;
3546 *phash = OBJ_sn2nid(str);
3547 if (*phash == NID_undef)
3548 *phash = OBJ_ln2nid(str);
3552 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
3554 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
3557 int sig_alg = NID_undef, hash_alg = NID_undef;
3560 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
3562 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
3564 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
3566 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
3574 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, etmp);
3575 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, p);
3577 if (sig_alg == NID_undef || hash_alg == NID_undef)
3580 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i += 2) {
3581 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
3584 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
3585 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
3590 * Set supported signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
3591 * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512