2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
113 #include <openssl/objects.h>
114 #include <openssl/evp.h>
115 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
116 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
117 #include <openssl/rand.h>
118 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
119 # include <openssl/dh.h>
120 # include <openssl/bn.h>
122 #include "ssl_locl.h"
124 const char tls1_version_str[] = "TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
126 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
127 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
128 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
129 SSL_SESSION **psess);
130 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
131 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
134 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data = {
137 tls1_setup_key_block,
138 tls1_generate_master_secret,
139 tls1_change_cipher_state,
140 tls1_final_finish_mac,
141 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
142 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
143 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
144 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
146 tls1_export_keying_material,
148 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
149 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
153 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_1_enc_data = {
156 tls1_setup_key_block,
157 tls1_generate_master_secret,
158 tls1_change_cipher_state,
159 tls1_final_finish_mac,
160 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
161 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
162 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
163 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
165 tls1_export_keying_material,
166 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
167 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
168 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
172 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_2_enc_data = {
175 tls1_setup_key_block,
176 tls1_generate_master_secret,
177 tls1_change_cipher_state,
178 tls1_final_finish_mac,
179 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
180 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
181 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
182 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
184 tls1_export_keying_material,
185 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
186 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
187 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
188 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
192 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
195 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
196 * http, the cache would over fill
198 return (60 * 60 * 2);
205 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
209 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
211 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
212 if (s->tlsext_session_ticket) {
213 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
215 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
219 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
222 s->version = s->method->version;
225 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
228 int nid; /* Curve NID */
229 int secbits; /* Bits of security (from SP800-57) */
230 unsigned int flags; /* Flags: currently just field type */
233 # define TLS_CURVE_CHAR2 0x1
234 # define TLS_CURVE_PRIME 0x0
236 static const tls_curve_info nid_list[] = {
237 {NID_sect163k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163k1 (1) */
238 {NID_sect163r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r1 (2) */
239 {NID_sect163r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r2 (3) */
240 {NID_sect193r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r1 (4) */
241 {NID_sect193r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r2 (5) */
242 {NID_sect233k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233k1 (6) */
243 {NID_sect233r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233r1 (7) */
244 {NID_sect239k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect239k1 (8) */
245 {NID_sect283k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283k1 (9) */
246 {NID_sect283r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283r1 (10) */
247 {NID_sect409k1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409k1 (11) */
248 {NID_sect409r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409r1 (12) */
249 {NID_sect571k1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571k1 (13) */
250 {NID_sect571r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571r1 (14) */
251 {NID_secp160k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160k1 (15) */
252 {NID_secp160r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r1 (16) */
253 {NID_secp160r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r2 (17) */
254 {NID_secp192k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192k1 (18) */
255 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192r1 (19) */
256 {NID_secp224k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224k1 (20) */
257 {NID_secp224r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224r1 (21) */
258 {NID_secp256k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256k1 (22) */
259 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256r1 (23) */
260 {NID_secp384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp384r1 (24) */
261 {NID_secp521r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp521r1 (25) */
262 {NID_brainpoolP256r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
263 {NID_brainpoolP384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
264 {NID_brainpoolP512r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
267 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = {
268 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
269 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
270 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
273 static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] = {
274 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
275 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
276 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
277 0, 28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
278 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
279 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
280 0, 27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
281 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
282 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
283 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
284 0, 26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
285 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
286 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
287 0, 8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
288 0, 6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
289 0, 7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
290 0, 20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
291 0, 21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
292 0, 4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
293 0, 5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
294 0, 18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
295 0, 19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
296 0, 1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
297 0, 2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
298 0, 3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
299 0, 15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
300 0, 16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
301 0, 17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
304 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] = {
305 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
306 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
309 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
311 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
312 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id >
313 sizeof(nid_list) / sizeof(nid_list[0])))
315 return nid_list[curve_id - 1].nid;
318 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
320 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
322 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
324 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
326 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
328 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
330 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
332 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
334 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
336 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
338 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
340 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
342 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
344 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
346 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
348 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
350 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
352 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
354 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
356 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
358 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
360 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
362 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
364 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
366 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
368 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
370 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
372 case NID_brainpoolP256r1: /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
374 case NID_brainpoolP384r1: /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
376 case NID_brainpoolP512r1: /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
384 * Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
386 * Sets |num_curves| to the number of curves in the list, i.e.,
387 * the length of |pcurves| is 2 * num_curves.
388 * Returns 1 on success and 0 if the client curves list has invalid format.
389 * The latter indicates an internal error: we should not be accepting such
390 * lists in the first place.
391 * TODO(emilia): we should really be storing the curves list in explicitly
392 * parsed form instead. (However, this would affect binary compatibility
393 * so cannot happen in the 1.0.x series.)
395 static int tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
396 const unsigned char **pcurves,
399 size_t pcurveslen = 0;
401 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
402 pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
404 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
405 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
406 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
407 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
408 pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
411 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
412 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
416 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
417 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
421 *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
422 pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
425 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
426 pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
430 /* We do not allow odd length arrays to enter the system. */
431 if (pcurveslen & 1) {
432 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_GET_CURVELIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
436 *num_curves = pcurveslen / 2;
441 /* See if curve is allowed by security callback */
442 static int tls_curve_allowed(SSL *s, const unsigned char *curve, int op)
444 const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
447 if ((curve[1] < 1) || ((size_t)curve[1] >
448 sizeof(nid_list) / sizeof(nid_list[0])))
450 cinfo = &nid_list[curve[1] - 1];
451 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
452 if (cinfo->flags & TLS_CURVE_CHAR2)
455 return ssl_security(s, op, cinfo->secbits, cinfo->nid, (void *)curve);
458 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
459 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
461 const unsigned char *curves;
462 size_t num_curves, i;
463 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
464 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
466 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
468 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
471 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) {
472 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
474 } else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) {
475 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
477 } else /* Should never happen */
480 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &num_curves))
482 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, curves += 2) {
483 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
484 return tls_curve_allowed(s, p + 1, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK);
490 * Return |nmatch|th shared curve or NID_undef if there is no match.
491 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
492 * For nmatch == -2, return the NID of the curve to use for
493 * an EC tmp key, or NID_undef if there is no match.
495 int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
497 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
498 size_t num_pref, num_supp, i, j;
500 /* Can't do anything on client side */
504 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
506 * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know
507 * these are acceptable due to previous checks.
509 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
510 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
511 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
512 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
513 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
514 /* Should never happen */
517 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
521 * Avoid truncation. tls1_get_curvelist takes an int
522 * but s->options is a long...
524 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
525 (s, (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0, &supp,
527 /* In practice, NID_undef == 0 but let's be precise. */
528 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
529 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
530 (s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE), &pref,
532 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
534 for (i = 0; i < num_pref; i++, pref += 2) {
535 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
536 for (j = 0; j < num_supp; j++, tsupp += 2) {
537 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1]) {
538 if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, pref, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
541 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
542 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id);
550 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
554 int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
555 int *curves, size_t ncurves)
557 unsigned char *clist, *p;
560 * Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works while curve
563 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
564 clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
567 for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++) {
568 unsigned long idmask;
570 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
572 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask)) {
582 *pextlen = ncurves * 2;
586 # define MAX_CURVELIST 28
590 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
593 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
595 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
601 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
603 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
605 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
607 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
608 if (nid == NID_undef)
609 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
610 if (nid == NID_undef)
611 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
612 if (nid == NID_undef)
614 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
615 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
617 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
621 /* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
622 int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
627 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
631 return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
634 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
635 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
640 const EC_METHOD *meth;
643 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
644 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
647 meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(grp);
650 if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
654 /* Determine curve ID */
655 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
656 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
657 /* If we have an ID set it, otherwise set arbitrary explicit curve */
660 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
669 if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
671 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED) {
673 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
675 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
677 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
682 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
683 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
684 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
686 const unsigned char *pformats, *pcurves;
687 size_t num_formats, num_curves, i;
690 * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
691 * supported (see RFC4492).
693 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
694 pformats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
695 num_formats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
696 for (i = 0; i < num_formats; i++, pformats++) {
697 if (*comp_id == *pformats)
700 if (i == num_formats)
705 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
706 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++) {
707 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &pcurves, &num_curves))
709 if (j == 1 && num_curves == 0) {
711 * If we've not received any curves then skip this check.
712 * RFC 4492 does not require the supported elliptic curves extension
713 * so if it is not sent we can just choose any curve.
714 * It is invalid to send an empty list in the elliptic curves
715 * extension, so num_curves == 0 always means no extension.
719 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
720 if (pcurves[0] == curve_id[0] && pcurves[1] == curve_id[1])
725 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
732 static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
736 * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
738 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
739 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
740 *num_formats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
742 *pformats = ecformats_default;
743 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
745 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
747 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default);
752 * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
753 * certificates have compatible curves and compression.
755 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
757 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
760 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
763 /* If not EC nothing to do */
764 if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC) {
768 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec);
773 * Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a supported
776 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
780 * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
781 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
783 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s)) {
789 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
790 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
791 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
792 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
793 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
795 return 0; /* Should never happen */
796 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
797 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
799 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
801 if (set_ee_md == 2) {
802 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
803 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha256();
805 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha384();
811 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
812 /* Check EC temporary key is compatible with client extensions */
813 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
815 unsigned char curve_id[2];
816 EC_KEY *ec = s->cert->ecdh_tmp;
817 # ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
818 /* Allow any curve: not just those peer supports */
819 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
823 * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
826 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
827 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
828 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
829 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
830 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
831 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
835 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
836 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
838 /* If auto or setting curve from callback assume OK */
839 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto || s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
841 /* Otherwise check curve is acceptable */
843 unsigned char curve_tmp[2];
846 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_tmp, NULL, ec))
848 if (!curve_tmp[0] || curve_tmp[1] == curve_id[1])
854 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto) {
855 /* Need a shared curve */
856 if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
862 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
867 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, NULL, ec))
869 /* Set this to allow use of invalid curves for testing */
873 return tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL);
876 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
880 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
885 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
887 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
890 * List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
891 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
894 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
895 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
897 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
900 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
901 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
903 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
906 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC
907 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */
909 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
912 # define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
913 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
914 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
915 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
917 static const unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
918 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
919 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
920 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
921 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
922 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
925 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
926 static const unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
927 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
928 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
931 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
934 * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
937 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
938 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
939 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
940 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
941 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
943 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
944 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
947 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
948 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
952 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
953 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs) {
954 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
955 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
956 } else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
957 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
958 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
960 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
961 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
966 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
967 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
969 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
970 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
972 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
973 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
974 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
975 /* Should never happen */
978 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
979 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1]) {
980 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
983 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
984 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
985 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
986 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
987 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec))
989 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id)) {
990 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
993 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
994 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
997 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256) {
998 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256) {
999 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1000 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
1003 } else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384) {
1004 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384) {
1005 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1006 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
1012 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
1016 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
1017 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
1018 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i += 2, sent_sigs += 2) {
1019 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
1022 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
1023 if (i == sent_sigslen
1024 && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1
1025 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
1026 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1029 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
1031 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
1034 /* Make sure security callback allows algorithm */
1035 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK,
1036 EVP_MD_size(*pmd) * 4, EVP_MD_type(*pmd),
1038 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1042 * Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they wish.
1044 if (s->session && s->session->sess_cert)
1045 s->session->sess_cert->peer_key->digest = *pmd;
1050 * Get a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
1051 * supported or doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms. Unlike
1052 * ssl_cipher_get_disabled this applies to a specific session and not global
1055 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
1060 /* Don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers if we don't suppport them */
1061 if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s))
1062 c->mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
1065 ssl_set_sig_mask(&c->mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
1067 * Disable static DH if we don't include any appropriate signature
1070 if (c->mask_a & SSL_aRSA)
1071 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHr | SSL_kECDHr;
1072 if (c->mask_a & SSL_aDSS)
1073 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHd;
1074 if (c->mask_a & SSL_aECDSA)
1075 c->mask_k |= SSL_kECDHe;
1076 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1077 if (!kssl_tgt_is_available(s->kssl_ctx)) {
1078 c->mask_a |= SSL_aKRB5;
1079 c->mask_k |= SSL_kKRB5;
1082 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1083 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1084 if (!s->psk_client_callback) {
1085 c->mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
1086 c->mask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
1088 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1089 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1090 if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) {
1091 c->mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
1092 c->mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
1098 int ssl_cipher_disabled(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op)
1101 if (c->algorithm_ssl & ct->mask_ssl || c->algorithm_mkey & ct->mask_k
1102 || c->algorithm_auth & ct->mask_a)
1104 return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c);
1107 static int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s)
1109 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
1111 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL);
1114 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
1115 unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1118 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1119 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1120 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1121 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1123 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1125 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1126 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1128 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++) {
1129 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1131 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1132 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1133 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)
1134 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) {
1145 return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1147 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1148 if (s->renegotiate) {
1151 if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1152 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1156 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1159 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret);
1162 if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1163 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1169 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1170 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION)
1173 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1174 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1175 unsigned long size_str;
1179 * check for enough space.
1180 * 4 for the servername type and entension length
1181 * 2 for servernamelist length
1182 * 1 for the hostname type
1183 * 2 for hostname length
1187 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
1189 strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
1192 /* extension type and length */
1193 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret);
1194 s2n(size_str + 5, ret);
1196 /* length of servername list */
1197 s2n(size_str + 3, ret);
1199 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
1200 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
1202 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
1205 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1206 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
1207 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the
1208 * Client Hello message */
1210 int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
1211 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0) {
1212 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1217 * check for enough space.
1218 * 4 for the srp type type and entension length
1219 * 1 for the srp user identity
1220 * + srp user identity length
1222 if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0)
1225 /* fill in the extension */
1226 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp, ret);
1227 s2n(login_len + 1, ret);
1228 (*ret++) = (unsigned char)login_len;
1229 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
1234 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1237 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message
1240 const unsigned char *pcurves, *pformats;
1241 size_t num_curves, num_formats, curves_list_len;
1243 unsigned char *etmp;
1245 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &pformats, &num_formats);
1247 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0)
1249 if (num_formats > (size_t)lenmax)
1251 if (num_formats > 255) {
1252 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1256 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret);
1257 /* The point format list has 1-byte length. */
1258 s2n(num_formats + 1, ret);
1259 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)num_formats;
1260 memcpy(ret, pformats, num_formats);
1264 * Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message
1266 pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1267 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &pcurves, &num_curves))
1270 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0)
1272 if (num_curves > (size_t)lenmax / 2)
1274 if (num_curves > 65532 / 2) {
1275 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1279 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves, ret);
1281 /* Copy curve ID if supported */
1282 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
1283 if (tls_curve_allowed(s, pcurves, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) {
1284 *etmp++ = pcurves[0];
1285 *etmp++ = pcurves[1];
1289 curves_list_len = etmp - ret - 4;
1291 s2n(curves_list_len + 2, ret);
1292 s2n(curves_list_len, ret);
1293 ret += curves_list_len;
1295 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1297 if (tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1299 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
1300 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
1301 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1302 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data) {
1303 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1304 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1305 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
1307 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1308 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data, ticklen);
1309 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1312 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1313 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1316 * Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len rest for
1319 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0)
1321 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret);
1324 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
1330 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1332 const unsigned char *salg;
1333 unsigned char *etmp;
1334 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
1335 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < salglen + 6)
1337 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms, ret);
1339 /* Skip over lengths for now */
1341 salglen = tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, ret, salg, salglen);
1342 /* Fill in lengths */
1343 s2n(salglen + 2, etmp);
1348 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
1350 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
1354 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
1355 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1356 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1362 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) {
1363 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1369 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0)
1371 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1372 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
1374 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
1375 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
1377 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
1378 /* save position of id len */
1379 unsigned char *q = ret;
1380 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1381 /* skip over id len */
1383 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
1389 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
1391 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1392 /* Add Heartbeat extension */
1393 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1395 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret);
1399 * 1: peer may send requests
1400 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1402 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1403 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1405 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1408 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1409 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1411 * The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its support
1412 * for Next Protocol Negotiation
1414 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
1416 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret);
1421 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1422 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 6 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len)
1424 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret);
1425 s2n(2 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret);
1426 s2n(s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret);
1427 memcpy(ret, s->alpn_client_proto_list, s->alpn_client_proto_list_len);
1428 ret += s->alpn_client_proto_list_len;
1430 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1431 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)) {
1434 ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1436 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1439 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret);
1442 if (ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1443 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1449 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->cli_ext);
1450 /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
1451 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 0, &ret, limit, al))
1453 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1454 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac, ret);
1457 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret, ret);
1461 * Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See
1462 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03 NB: because this
1463 * code works out the length of all existing extensions it MUST always
1466 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING) {
1467 int hlen = ret - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1469 * The code in s23_clnt.c to build ClientHello messages includes the
1470 * 5-byte record header in the buffer, while the code in s3_clnt.c
1473 if (s->state == SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A)
1475 if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200) {
1476 hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
1482 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret);
1484 memset(ret, 0, hlen);
1491 if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0)
1494 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1498 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
1499 unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1502 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1503 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1504 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1505 int next_proto_neg_seen;
1507 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1508 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1509 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1510 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe))
1511 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1512 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1517 return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1519 if (s->s3->send_connection_binding) {
1522 if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1523 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1527 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1530 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret);
1533 if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1534 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1541 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1542 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
1545 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1
1546 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1547 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1550 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret);
1553 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1555 const unsigned char *plist;
1558 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message
1562 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1564 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0)
1566 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax)
1568 if (plistlen > 255) {
1569 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1573 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret);
1574 s2n(plistlen + 1, ret);
1575 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)plistlen;
1576 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1581 * Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves
1584 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1586 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected && tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1587 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1589 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret);
1593 if (s->tlsext_status_expected) {
1594 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1596 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1600 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1601 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->srtp_profile) {
1604 ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1606 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1609 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret);
1612 if (ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1613 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1620 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x80
1621 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x81)
1622 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG)) {
1623 const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1624 0xfd, 0xe8, /* 65000 */
1625 0x00, 0x20, /* 32 bytes length */
1626 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1627 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1628 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1629 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17
1631 if (limit - ret < 36)
1633 memcpy(ret, cryptopro_ext, 36);
1637 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1638 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
1639 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) {
1640 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1642 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret);
1646 * 1: peer may send requests
1647 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1649 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1650 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1652 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1657 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1658 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1659 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1660 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb) {
1661 const unsigned char *npa;
1662 unsigned int npalen;
1665 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen,
1667 ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1668 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1669 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0)
1671 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret);
1673 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
1675 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1679 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 1, &ret, limit, al))
1681 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1682 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) {
1684 * Don't use encrypt_then_mac if AEAD or RC4 might want to disable
1685 * for other cases too.
1687 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD
1688 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4)
1689 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1691 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac, ret);
1696 if (!s->hit && s->session->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS) {
1697 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret, ret);
1701 if (s->s3->alpn_selected) {
1702 const unsigned char *selected = s->s3->alpn_selected;
1703 unsigned len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
1705 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - 2 - 1 - len) < 0)
1707 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret);
1711 memcpy(ret, selected, len);
1717 if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0)
1720 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1725 * tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello is called to process the ALPN extension in a
1726 * ClientHello. data: the contents of the extension, not including the type
1727 * and length. data_len: the number of bytes in |data| al: a pointer to the
1728 * alert value to send in the event of a non-zero return. returns: 0 on
1731 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
1732 unsigned data_len, int *al)
1736 const unsigned char *selected;
1737 unsigned char selected_len;
1740 if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb == NULL)
1747 * data should contain a uint16 length followed by a series of 8-bit,
1748 * length-prefixed strings.
1750 i = ((unsigned)data[0]) << 8 | ((unsigned)data[1]);
1759 for (i = 0; i < data_len;) {
1760 proto_len = data[i];
1766 if (i + proto_len < i || i + proto_len > data_len)
1772 r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, data_len,
1773 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
1774 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1775 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1776 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1777 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
1778 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected) {
1779 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1782 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, selected, selected_len);
1783 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
1788 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1792 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1794 * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1795 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |d|, of length |n|.
1796 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1801 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1802 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1803 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1804 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1806 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
1807 const unsigned char *d, int n)
1809 unsigned short type, size;
1810 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1811 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1812 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1813 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1814 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1815 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1816 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1818 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1819 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1820 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1821 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1824 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1825 static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock[] = {
1826 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1827 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1828 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1829 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1830 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1831 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1832 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1833 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1836 if (data >= (d + n - 2))
1840 if (data > (d + n - 4))
1845 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1848 if (data + size > d + n)
1852 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
1853 const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1854 const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock);
1856 if (data + len1 + len2 != d + n)
1858 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0)
1860 if (memcmp(data + len1, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock, len2) != 0)
1863 const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1865 if (data + len != d + n)
1867 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0)
1871 s->s3->is_probably_safari = 1;
1873 # endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1875 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
1876 unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
1878 unsigned short type;
1879 unsigned short size;
1881 unsigned char *data = *p;
1882 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1884 s->servername_done = 0;
1885 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1886 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1887 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1890 if (s->s3->alpn_selected) {
1891 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1892 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
1894 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1895 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1896 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1899 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1900 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1901 ssl_check_for_safari(s, data, d, n);
1902 # endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1904 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
1905 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs) {
1906 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->peer_sigalgs);
1907 s->cert->peer_sigalgs = NULL;
1909 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1910 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1913 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1914 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) {
1915 OPENSSL_free(s->srp_ctx.login);
1916 s->srp_ctx.login = NULL;
1920 s->srtp_profile = NULL;
1922 if (data >= (d + n - 2))
1926 if (data > (d + n - len))
1929 while (data <= (d + n - 4)) {
1933 if (data + size > (d + n))
1935 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1936 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1937 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
1938 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
1940 renegotiate_seen = 1;
1941 } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
1944 * The servername extension is treated as follows:
1946 * - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
1947 * - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
1948 * in which case an fatal alert is generated.
1949 * - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
1950 * - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
1951 * to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
1952 * - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
1953 * it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
1954 * Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
1955 * set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
1956 * case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
1957 * a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
1958 * presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
1959 * the value of the Host: field.
1960 * - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1961 * if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the
1962 * session, i.e. when the session has been established with a servername
1964 * - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
1968 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
1969 unsigned char *sdata;
1974 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1980 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1986 servname_type = *(sdata++);
1991 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1994 if (s->servername_done == 0)
1995 switch (servname_type) {
1996 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
1998 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname) {
1999 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2002 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) {
2003 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2006 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname =
2007 OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1)) == NULL) {
2008 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2011 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
2012 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len] = '\0';
2013 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
2014 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
2015 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
2016 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2019 s->servername_done = 1;
2022 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
2023 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
2024 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname,
2025 (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
2036 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2041 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2042 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp) {
2043 if (size <= 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size - 1)) {
2044 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2047 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) {
2048 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2051 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1)) == NULL)
2053 memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len);
2054 s->srp_ctx.login[len] = '\0';
2056 if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len) {
2057 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2063 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2064 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
2065 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2066 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2068 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1 ||
2069 ecpointformatlist_length < 1) {
2070 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2074 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
2075 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2076 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
2078 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2079 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
2080 OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) {
2081 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2084 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
2085 ecpointformatlist_length;
2086 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata,
2087 ecpointformatlist_length);
2089 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves) {
2090 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2091 int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
2092 ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
2094 if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 ||
2095 ellipticcurvelist_length < 1 ||
2096 /* Each NamedCurve is 2 bytes. */
2097 ellipticcurvelist_length & 1) {
2098 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2102 if (s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist) {
2103 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2106 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
2107 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist =
2108 OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL) {
2109 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2112 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length =
2113 ellipticcurvelist_length;
2114 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata,
2115 ellipticcurvelist_length);
2118 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2119 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2120 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2121 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size,
2122 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2124 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2127 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms) {
2129 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs || size < 2) {
2130 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2135 if (dsize != size || dsize & 1 || !dsize) {
2136 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2139 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, data, dsize)) {
2140 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2143 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
2146 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2150 s->tlsext_status_type = *data++;
2152 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
2153 const unsigned char *sdata;
2155 /* Read in responder_id_list */
2159 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2166 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2170 dsize -= 2 + idsize;
2173 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2178 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, &sdata, idsize);
2180 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2183 if (data != sdata) {
2184 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2185 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2188 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
2189 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
2190 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null())) {
2191 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2192 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2195 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id)) {
2196 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2197 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2202 /* Read in request_extensions */
2204 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2209 if (dsize != size) {
2210 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2215 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) {
2216 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2217 X509_EXTENSION_free);
2220 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
2221 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &sdata, dsize);
2222 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts || (data + dsize != sdata)) {
2223 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2229 * We don't know what to do with any other type * so ignore it.
2232 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2234 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2235 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
2237 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
2238 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2240 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
2241 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2242 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2245 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2250 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2251 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2252 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0 &&
2253 s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
2255 * We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2258 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2259 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2260 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
2261 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2262 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2263 * anything like that, but this might change).
2265 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2266 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2267 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2268 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2269 * Finished message could have been computed.)
2271 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2275 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation &&
2276 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb && s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2277 if (tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, data, size, al) != 0)
2279 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2280 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
2281 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2285 /* session ticket processed earlier */
2286 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2287 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)
2288 && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2289 if (ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size, al))
2293 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2294 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
2295 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2297 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret) {
2299 s->session->flags |= SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS;
2302 * If this ClientHello extension was unhandled and this is a
2303 * nonresumed connection, check whether the extension is a custom
2304 * TLS Extension (has a custom_srv_ext_record), and if so call the
2305 * callback and record the extension number so that an appropriate
2306 * ServerHello may be later returned.
2309 if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2320 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2322 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
2323 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2324 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2325 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2326 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2333 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d,
2337 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->srv_ext);
2338 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0) {
2339 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2343 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) {
2344 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2350 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2352 * ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2353 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly
2354 * fill the length of the block.
2356 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
2358 unsigned int off = 0;
2371 static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
2372 unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
2374 unsigned short length;
2375 unsigned short type;
2376 unsigned short size;
2377 unsigned char *data = *p;
2378 int tlsext_servername = 0;
2379 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2381 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2382 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2384 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2386 if (s->s3->alpn_selected) {
2387 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2388 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
2390 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2391 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2392 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2395 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2396 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2399 if (data >= (d + n - 2))
2403 if (data + length != d + n) {
2404 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2408 while (data <= (d + n - 4)) {
2412 if (data + size > (d + n))
2415 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2416 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2418 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
2419 if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2421 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2422 } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
2423 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
2424 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0) {
2425 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2428 tlsext_servername = 1;
2430 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2431 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
2432 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2433 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2435 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1) {
2436 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2440 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2441 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
2442 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2443 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
2444 OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) {
2445 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2448 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
2449 ecpointformatlist_length;
2450 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata,
2451 ecpointformatlist_length);
2454 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2456 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2457 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2458 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size,
2459 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2461 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2464 if (!tls_use_ticket(s) || (size > 0)) {
2465 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2468 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2470 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
2472 * MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested a status
2475 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0)) {
2476 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2479 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2480 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2482 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2483 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2484 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2485 unsigned char *selected;
2486 unsigned char selected_len;
2488 /* We must have requested it. */
2489 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL) {
2490 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2493 /* The data must be valid */
2494 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size)) {
2495 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2499 ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data,
2501 s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) !=
2502 SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
2503 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2506 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2507 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated) {
2508 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2511 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2512 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2513 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2517 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation) {
2520 /* We must have requested it. */
2521 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list == NULL) {
2522 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2526 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2530 * The extension data consists of:
2531 * uint16 list_length
2532 * uint8 proto_length;
2533 * uint8 proto[proto_length];
2538 if (len != (unsigned)size - 2) {
2539 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2543 if (len != (unsigned)size - 3) {
2544 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2547 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
2548 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2549 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
2550 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected) {
2551 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2554 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, data + 3, len);
2555 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
2557 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2558 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
2560 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
2561 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2563 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
2564 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2565 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2568 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2573 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2574 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2575 if (ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size, al))
2579 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2580 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac) {
2581 /* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite */
2582 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD
2583 && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc != SSL_RC4)
2584 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2587 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret) {
2589 s->session->flags |= SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS;
2592 * If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but matches a
2593 * custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c callback
2595 else if (custom_ext_parse(s, 0, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2601 if (data != d + n) {
2602 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2606 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1) {
2607 if (s->tlsext_hostname) {
2608 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) {
2609 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
2610 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname) {
2611 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2615 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2626 * Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to avoid
2627 * an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server hello
2628 * because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an attack.
2629 * However this would mean we could not connect to any server which
2630 * doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI absence on
2631 * initial connect only.
2633 if (!renegotiate_seen && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
2634 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2635 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2636 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2637 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2644 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2650 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2655 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
2657 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2658 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2660 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2662 * The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely
2663 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2666 * The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely
2667 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2671 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2673 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2674 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2675 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
2676 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2678 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2680 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2683 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2684 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2687 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2688 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2691 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2692 s->servername_done = 0;
2698 int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s)
2702 /* Clear any shared sigtnature algorithms */
2703 if (s->cert->shared_sigalgs) {
2704 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
2705 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
2706 s->cert->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
2708 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
2709 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
2710 s->cert->pkeys[i].digest = NULL;
2711 s->cert->pkeys[i].valid_flags = 0;
2714 /* If sigalgs received process it. */
2715 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs) {
2716 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2717 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2718 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2721 /* Fatal error is no shared signature algorithms */
2722 if (!s->cert->shared_sigalgs) {
2723 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS,
2724 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS);
2725 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2729 ssl_cert_set_default_md(s->cert);
2732 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2736 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
2738 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2742 * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be
2743 * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed,
2744 * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may
2745 * influence which certificate is sent
2747 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
2749 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
2750 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
2751 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
2752 if (certpkey == NULL) {
2753 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2757 * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
2758 * et al can pick it up.
2760 s->cert->key = certpkey;
2761 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2763 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
2764 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2765 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2767 /* status request response should be sent */
2768 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
2769 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
2770 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2772 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2774 /* something bad happened */
2775 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2776 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2777 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2781 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2785 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2786 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2789 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2790 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2798 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2800 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2801 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2803 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2805 * If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
2806 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension it
2807 * must contain uncompressed.
2809 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2810 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2811 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
2812 && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
2813 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
2814 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
2815 && ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe))
2816 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) {
2817 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
2819 unsigned char *list;
2820 int found_uncompressed = 0;
2821 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2822 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) {
2823 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed) {
2824 found_uncompressed = 1;
2828 if (!found_uncompressed) {
2829 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2830 SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
2834 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2835 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2837 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2839 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2840 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2841 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
2842 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2844 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2846 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2849 * If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one tell the
2852 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
2853 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
2856 * Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows there is no
2859 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp) {
2860 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
2861 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
2863 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
2864 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2866 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
2867 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2870 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2871 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2876 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2877 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2880 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2881 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2884 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2885 s->servername_done = 0;
2891 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d,
2895 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
2897 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0) {
2898 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2902 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
2903 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
2910 * Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
2911 * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle
2912 * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time.
2914 * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will
2915 * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket
2916 * extension, if any.
2917 * len: the length of the session ID.
2918 * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello.
2919 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2920 * point to the resulting session.
2922 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
2923 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
2924 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
2927 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
2928 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
2929 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
2930 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
2931 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
2932 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
2933 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
2936 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
2937 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
2938 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
2939 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
2940 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
2941 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
2943 int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
2944 const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
2946 /* Point after session ID in client hello */
2947 const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
2951 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2954 * If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
2957 if (!tls_use_ticket(s))
2959 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
2963 /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
2964 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
2970 /* Skip past cipher list */
2975 /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
2980 /* Now at start of extensions */
2981 if ((p + 2) >= limit)
2984 while ((p + 4) <= limit) {
2985 unsigned short type, size;
2988 if (p + size > limit)
2990 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2994 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
2997 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3000 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
3002 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
3003 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
3004 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
3005 * calculate the master secret later.
3009 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret);
3011 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
3012 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3014 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
3016 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
3017 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3019 default: /* fatal error */
3029 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
3031 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
3032 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
3033 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
3034 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
3035 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3036 * point to the resulting session.
3039 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3040 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
3041 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
3042 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
3044 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
3045 int eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id,
3046 int sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess)
3049 unsigned char *sdec;
3050 const unsigned char *p;
3051 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
3052 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
3055 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3056 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
3059 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
3060 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3061 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3062 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
3063 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
3064 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
3073 /* Check key name matches */
3074 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
3076 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3077 EVP_sha256(), NULL);
3078 EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3079 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
3082 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
3085 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
3087 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3091 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
3092 HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
3093 HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
3094 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3095 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) {
3096 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3099 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
3100 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
3101 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3102 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3103 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
3105 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3108 EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
3109 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0) {
3110 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3115 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3118 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3122 * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
3123 * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
3124 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
3128 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3129 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3138 * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
3143 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3150 static const tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
3151 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3152 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3153 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3154 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3155 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3156 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}
3159 static const tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
3160 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
3161 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
3162 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}
3165 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3168 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3169 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3175 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3178 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3179 if ((table[i].id) == id)
3180 return table[i].nid;
3185 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk,
3191 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md,
3192 sizeof(tls12_md) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3195 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3198 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
3199 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
3203 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
3205 return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig,
3206 sizeof(tls12_sig) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3212 const EVP_MD *(*mfunc) (void);
3215 static const tls12_hash_info tls12_md_info[] = {
3216 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
3219 {NID_md5, 64, EVP_md5},
3221 {NID_sha1, 80, EVP_sha1},
3222 {NID_sha224, 112, EVP_sha224},
3223 {NID_sha256, 128, EVP_sha256},
3224 {NID_sha384, 192, EVP_sha384},
3225 {NID_sha512, 256, EVP_sha512}
3228 static const tls12_hash_info *tls12_get_hash_info(unsigned char hash_alg)
3232 if (hash_alg > sizeof(tls12_md_info) / sizeof(tls12_md_info[0]))
3234 return tls12_md_info + hash_alg - 1;
3237 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
3239 const tls12_hash_info *inf;
3240 if (hash_alg == TLSEXT_hash_md5 && FIPS_mode())
3242 inf = tls12_get_hash_info(hash_alg);
3243 if (!inf || !inf->mfunc)
3245 return inf->mfunc();
3248 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
3251 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3252 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3253 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3255 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3256 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3257 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3259 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3260 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3261 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3267 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3268 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
3269 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3271 int sign_nid = 0, hash_nid = 0;
3272 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3274 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3275 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md,
3276 sizeof(tls12_md) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3278 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3280 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3281 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig,
3282 sizeof(tls12_sig) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3284 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3286 if (psignhash_nid) {
3287 if (sign_nid && hash_nid)
3288 OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid, hash_nid, sign_nid);
3290 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3294 /* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
3295 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(SSL *s, int op, const unsigned char *ptmp)
3297 /* See if we have an entry in the hash table and it is enabled */
3298 const tls12_hash_info *hinf = tls12_get_hash_info(ptmp[0]);
3299 if (!hinf || !hinf->mfunc)
3301 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
3302 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3304 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
3305 return ssl_security(s, op, hinf->secbits, hinf->nid, (void *)ptmp);
3309 * Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported signature
3310 * algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA then RSA is
3314 void ssl_set_sig_mask(unsigned long *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op)
3316 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
3317 size_t i, sigalgslen;
3318 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
3320 * Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any for
3321 * RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just TLS 1.2. To keep
3322 * down calls to security callback only check if we have to.
3324 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
3325 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2) {
3326 switch (sigalgs[1]) {
3327 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3328 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3329 if (!have_rsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3333 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3334 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3335 if (!have_dsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3339 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3340 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3341 if (!have_ecdsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3348 *pmask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
3350 *pmask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
3352 *pmask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
3355 size_t tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, unsigned char *out,
3356 const unsigned char *psig, size_t psiglen)
3358 unsigned char *tmpout = out;
3360 for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i += 2, psig += 2) {
3361 if (tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, psig)) {
3362 *tmpout++ = psig[0];
3363 *tmpout++ = psig[1];
3366 return tmpout - out;
3369 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
3370 static int tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
3371 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3372 const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
3374 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3375 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3376 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i += 2, ptmp += 2) {
3377 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3378 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED, ptmp))
3380 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j += 2, atmp += 2) {
3381 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1]) {
3384 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3385 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3386 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3388 &shsig->signandhash_nid, ptmp);
3398 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3399 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3401 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3402 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3404 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3406 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
3407 if (c->shared_sigalgs) {
3408 OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
3409 c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
3410 c->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
3412 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3413 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3414 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3415 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3416 } else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3417 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
3418 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3420 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
3421 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb) {
3424 allow = c->peer_sigalgs;
3425 allowlen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3429 pref = c->peer_sigalgs;
3430 preflen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3432 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3434 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3437 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3441 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3442 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3446 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3448 int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
3451 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
3452 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3454 /* Should never happen */
3458 if (c->peer_sigalgs)
3459 OPENSSL_free(c->peer_sigalgs);
3460 c->peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
3461 if (!c->peer_sigalgs)
3463 c->peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3464 memcpy(c->peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
3468 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3474 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3475 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s))
3478 # ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3479 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL) {
3481 * Use first set signature preference to force message digest,
3482 * ignoring any peer preferences.
3484 const unsigned char *sigs = NULL;
3486 sigs = c->conf_sigalgs;
3488 sigs = c->client_sigalgs;
3490 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigs[1]);
3491 md = tls12_get_hash(sigs[0]);
3492 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3493 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3494 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) {
3495 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags =
3496 CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3497 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3503 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3504 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++) {
3505 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3506 if (idx > 0 && c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL) {
3507 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
3508 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3509 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3510 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) {
3511 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags =
3512 CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3513 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3519 * In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't use
3520 * the certificate for signing.
3522 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
3524 * Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not
3525 * supported it stays as NULL.
3527 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3528 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest)
3529 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3531 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3532 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest) {
3533 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3534 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3537 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3538 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest)
3539 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3545 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3546 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3547 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3549 const unsigned char *psig = s->cert->peer_sigalgs;
3554 if (idx >= (int)s->cert->peer_sigalgslen)
3561 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
3563 return s->cert->peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3566 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3567 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3568 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3570 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
3571 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
3575 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3577 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3579 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3581 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
3583 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
3584 return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
3587 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
3588 int tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3590 unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl;
3591 unsigned short hbtype;
3592 unsigned int payload;
3593 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3595 if (s->msg_callback)
3596 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3597 &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
3598 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3600 /* Read type and payload length first */
3601 if (1 + 2 + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
3602 return 0; /* silently discard */
3605 if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
3606 return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */
3609 if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST) {
3610 unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
3614 * Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes message type,
3615 * plus 2 bytes payload length, plus payload, plus padding
3617 buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3618 if (buffer == NULL) {
3619 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_PROCESS_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3624 /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
3625 *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
3627 memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
3629 /* Random padding */
3630 RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding);
3632 r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer,
3633 3 + payload + padding);
3635 if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
3636 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3637 buffer, 3 + payload + padding,
3638 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3640 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
3644 } else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE) {
3648 * We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int), and 16
3649 * random bytes, so we just try to read the sequence number
3653 if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq) {
3655 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
3662 int tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3664 unsigned char *buf, *p;
3666 unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
3667 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3669 /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
3670 if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
3671 s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS) {
3672 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
3676 /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
3677 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) {
3678 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
3682 /* ...and no handshake in progress. */
3683 if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake) {
3684 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
3689 * Check if padding is too long, payload and padding must not exceed 2^14
3690 * - 3 = 16381 bytes in total.
3692 OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381);
3695 * Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
3696 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
3697 * some random stuff.
3698 * - Message Type, 1 byte
3699 * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
3700 * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
3701 * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
3704 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3706 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3711 *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
3712 /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
3714 /* Sequence number */
3715 s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
3716 /* 16 random bytes */
3717 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16);
3719 /* Random padding */
3720 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding);
3722 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
3724 if (s->msg_callback)
3725 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3726 buf, 3 + payload + padding,
3727 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3729 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;
3738 # define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
3742 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
3745 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
3747 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
3750 int sig_alg, hash_alg;
3753 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
3755 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
3757 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
3759 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
3767 if (!strcmp(etmp, "RSA"))
3768 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
3769 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "DSA"))
3770 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
3771 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "ECDSA"))
3772 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_EC;
3776 hash_alg = OBJ_sn2nid(p);
3777 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
3778 hash_alg = OBJ_ln2nid(p);
3779 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
3782 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i += 2) {
3783 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
3786 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
3787 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
3792 * Set suppored signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
3793 * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
3795 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
3799 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
3803 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
3806 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen,
3809 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
3814 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
3815 if (sigalgs == NULL)
3817 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i += 2) {
3818 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md,
3819 sizeof(tls12_md) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3820 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig,
3821 sizeof(tls12_sig) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3823 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
3830 if (c->client_sigalgs)
3831 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
3832 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3833 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
3835 if (c->conf_sigalgs)
3836 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
3837 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3838 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
3844 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
3848 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
3852 if (default_nid == -1)
3854 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
3856 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
3857 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
3858 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
3863 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
3864 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
3868 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
3869 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++) {
3870 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
3877 * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by
3878 * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before
3879 * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before
3880 * attempting to use them.
3883 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
3885 # define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
3886 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
3887 /* Strict mode flags */
3888 # define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
3889 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
3890 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
3892 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
3897 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
3898 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
3900 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
3901 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
3903 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
3906 idx = cpk - c->pkeys;
3908 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
3910 pk = cpk->privatekey;
3912 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
3913 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
3916 # ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3917 /* Allow any certificate to pass test */
3918 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL) {
3919 rv = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN |
3920 CERT_PKEY_VALID | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
3921 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
3928 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
3931 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
3932 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
3933 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
3935 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
3942 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
3943 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
3944 if (ok == X509_V_OK)
3945 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
3946 else if (!check_flags)
3951 * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature
3952 * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode.
3954 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode) {
3956 unsigned char rsign = 0;
3957 if (c->peer_sigalgs)
3959 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
3962 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
3963 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
3964 case SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA:
3965 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
3966 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
3969 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
3970 case SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA:
3971 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
3972 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
3976 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
3977 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
3986 * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set
3987 * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1.
3989 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs) {
3991 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
3992 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2) {
3993 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
3996 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen) {
4003 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
4004 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid)) {
4008 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
4009 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4010 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
4011 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i), default_nid)) {
4013 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4020 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
4021 else if (check_flags)
4022 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE | CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4024 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
4025 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
4026 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
4027 else if (!check_flags)
4030 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4031 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
4032 else if (strict_mode) {
4033 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4034 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
4035 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4036 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0)) {
4038 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4045 if (!s->server && strict_mode) {
4046 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
4050 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
4053 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
4056 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
4061 int cert_type = X509_certificate_type(x, pk);
4062 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_RSA)
4063 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_FIXED_DH;
4064 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_DSA)
4065 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_FIXED_DH;
4069 const unsigned char *ctypes;
4073 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
4075 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
4076 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
4078 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++) {
4079 if (ctypes[i] == check_type) {
4080 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4084 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
4087 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4089 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
4091 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
4092 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4094 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
4095 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
4096 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4098 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
4099 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
4100 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4101 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp)) {
4102 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4107 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4110 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME | CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4112 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
4113 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
4117 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
4118 if (cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
4119 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4120 else if (cpk->digest)
4121 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4123 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4126 * When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the
4130 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
4131 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4133 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
4134 cpk->valid_flags &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4141 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
4142 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
4144 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
4145 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
4146 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
4147 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA);
4148 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA);
4149 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
4152 /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
4153 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
4155 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);
4160 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
4161 DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s)
4163 int dh_secbits = 80;
4164 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto == 2)
4165 return DH_get_1024_160();
4166 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) {
4167 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256)
4172 CERT_PKEY *cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
4173 dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(cpk->privatekey);
4176 if (dh_secbits >= 128) {
4182 BN_set_word(dhp->g, 2);
4183 if (dh_secbits >= 192)
4184 dhp->p = get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL);
4186 dhp->p = get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL);
4187 if (!dhp->p || !dhp->g) {
4193 if (dh_secbits >= 112)
4194 return DH_get_2048_224();
4195 return DH_get_1024_160();
4199 static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4202 EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
4204 secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey);
4205 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
4209 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, 0, x);
4211 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, 0, x);
4214 static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4216 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
4217 int secbits = -1, md_nid = NID_undef, sig_nid;
4218 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
4219 if (sig_nid && OBJ_find_sigid_algs(sig_nid, &md_nid, NULL)) {
4221 if (md_nid && (md = EVP_get_digestbynid(md_nid)))
4222 secbits = EVP_MD_size(md) * 4;
4225 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4227 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4230 int ssl_security_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int vfy, int is_ee)
4233 vfy = SSL_SECOP_PEER;
4235 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY | vfy))
4236 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4238 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY | vfy))
4239 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4241 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD | vfy))
4242 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK;
4247 * Check security of a chain, if sk includes the end entity certificate then
4248 * x is NULL. If vfy is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and not sending
4249 * one to the peer. Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
4252 int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x, int vfy)
4254 int rv, start_idx, i;
4256 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
4261 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 1);
4265 for (i = start_idx; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
4266 x = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
4267 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 0);