2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
113 #include <openssl/objects.h>
114 #include <openssl/evp.h>
115 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
116 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
117 #include <openssl/ec.h>
119 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
120 #include <openssl/rand.h>
121 #include "ssl_locl.h"
123 const char tls1_version_str[]="TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
125 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
126 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
127 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
128 SSL_SESSION **psess);
129 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
130 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
133 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data={
136 tls1_setup_key_block,
137 tls1_generate_master_secret,
138 tls1_change_cipher_state,
139 tls1_final_finish_mac,
140 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
141 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
142 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
143 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
145 tls1_export_keying_material,
147 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
148 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
152 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_1_enc_data={
155 tls1_setup_key_block,
156 tls1_generate_master_secret,
157 tls1_change_cipher_state,
158 tls1_final_finish_mac,
159 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
160 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
161 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
162 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
164 tls1_export_keying_material,
165 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
166 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
167 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
171 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_2_enc_data={
174 tls1_setup_key_block,
175 tls1_generate_master_secret,
176 tls1_change_cipher_state,
177 tls1_final_finish_mac,
178 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
179 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
180 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
181 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
183 tls1_export_keying_material,
184 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV|SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS|SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
185 |SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
186 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
187 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
191 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
193 /* 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec
194 * is way too long for http, the cache would over fill */
200 if (!ssl3_new(s)) return(0);
201 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
205 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
207 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
208 if (s->tlsext_session_ticket)
210 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
212 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
216 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
219 s->version = s->method->version;
222 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
224 static int nid_list[] =
226 NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
227 NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */
228 NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */
229 NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */
230 NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */
231 NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */
232 NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */
233 NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */
234 NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */
235 NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */
236 NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */
237 NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */
238 NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */
239 NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */
240 NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */
241 NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */
242 NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */
243 NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */
244 NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */
245 NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */
246 NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */
247 NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */
248 NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */
249 NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */
250 NID_secp521r1, /* secp521r1 (25) */
251 NID_brainpoolP256r1, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
252 NID_brainpoolP384r1, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
253 NID_brainpoolP512r1 /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
257 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] =
259 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
260 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
261 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
264 static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] =
266 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
267 0,14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
268 0,13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
270 0,25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
271 0,28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
272 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
273 0,11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
274 0,12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
276 0,27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
277 0,24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
278 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
279 0,9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
280 0,10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
282 0,26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
283 0,22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
284 0,23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
285 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
286 0,8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
287 0,6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
288 0,7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
290 0,20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
291 0,21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
292 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
293 0,4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
294 0,5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
296 0,18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
297 0,19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
298 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
299 0,1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
300 0,2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
301 0,3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
303 0,15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
304 0,16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
305 0,17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
308 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] =
310 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
311 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
315 /* Brainpool not allowed in FIPS mode */
316 static const unsigned char fips_curves_default[] =
318 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
319 0,14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
320 0,13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
322 0,25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
323 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
324 0,11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
325 0,12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
327 0,24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
328 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
329 0,9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
330 0,10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
332 0,22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
333 0,23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
334 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
335 0,8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
336 0,6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
337 0,7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
339 0,20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
340 0,21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
341 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
342 0,4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
343 0,5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
345 0,18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
346 0,19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
347 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
348 0,1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
349 0,2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
350 0,3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
352 0,15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
353 0,16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
354 0,17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
358 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
360 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
361 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id >
362 sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0])))
364 return nid_list[curve_id-1];
367 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
369 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
372 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
374 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
376 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
378 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
380 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
382 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
384 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
386 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
388 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
390 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
392 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
394 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
396 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
398 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
400 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
402 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
404 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
406 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
408 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
410 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
412 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
414 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
416 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
418 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
420 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
422 case NID_brainpoolP256r1: /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
424 case NID_brainpoolP384r1: /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
426 case NID_brainpoolP512r1: /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
433 * Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
435 * Sets |num_curves| to the number of curves in the list, i.e.,
436 * the length of |pcurves| is 2 * num_curves.
437 * Returns 1 on success and 0 if the client curves list has invalid format.
438 * The latter indicates an internal error: we should not be accepting such
439 * lists in the first place.
440 * TODO(emilia): we should really be storing the curves list in explicitly
441 * parsed form instead. (However, this would affect binary compatibility
442 * so cannot happen in the 1.0.x series.)
444 static int tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
445 const unsigned char **pcurves,
448 size_t pcurveslen = 0;
451 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
452 pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
456 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
457 switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
459 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
460 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
461 pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
464 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
465 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
469 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
470 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
474 *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
475 pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
482 *pcurves = fips_curves_default;
483 *pcurveslen = sizeof(fips_curves_default);
488 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
489 pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
493 /* We do not allow odd length arrays to enter the system. */
496 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_GET_CURVELIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
502 *num_curves = pcurveslen / 2;
506 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
507 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
509 const unsigned char *curves;
510 size_t num_curves, i;
511 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
512 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
514 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
517 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
520 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
522 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
525 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
527 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
530 else /* Should never happen */
533 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &num_curves))
535 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, curves += 2)
537 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
544 * Return |nmatch|th shared curve or NID_undef if there is no match.
545 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
546 * For nmatch == -2, return the NID of the curve to use for
547 * an EC tmp key, or NID_undef if there is no match.
549 int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
551 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
552 size_t num_pref, num_supp, i, j;
554 /* Can't do anything on client side */
561 /* For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we
562 * already know these are acceptable due to previous
565 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
566 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
567 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
568 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
569 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
570 /* Should never happen */
573 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
577 * Avoid truncation. tls1_get_curvelist takes an int
578 * but s->options is a long...
580 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0,
582 /* In practice, NID_undef == 0 but let's be precise. */
583 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
584 if(!tls1_get_curvelist(s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
586 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
588 for (i = 0; i < num_pref; i++, pref+=2)
590 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
591 for (j = 0; j < num_supp; j++, tsupp+=2)
593 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1])
597 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
598 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id);
606 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
610 int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
611 int *curves, size_t ncurves)
613 unsigned char *clist, *p;
615 /* Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works
616 * while curve ids < 32
618 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
619 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
623 clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
626 for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++)
628 unsigned long idmask;
630 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
632 /* NB: 25 is last curve ID supported by FIPS module */
633 if (FIPS_mode() && id > 25)
639 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
640 curve = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(curves[i]);
642 EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(curve))
643 == NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field)
645 if(curve) EC_GROUP_free(curve);
650 EC_GROUP_free(curve);
653 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask))
664 *pextlen = ncurves * 2;
668 #define MAX_CURVELIST 28
673 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
676 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
678 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
682 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
684 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
686 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
688 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
689 if (nid == NID_undef)
690 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
691 if (nid == NID_undef)
692 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
693 if (nid == NID_undef)
695 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
696 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
698 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
701 /* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
702 int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
707 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
711 return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
713 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
714 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
719 const EC_METHOD *meth;
722 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
723 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
726 meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(grp);
729 if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
733 /* Determine curve ID */
734 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
735 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
736 /* If we have an ID set it, otherwise set arbitrary explicit curve */
740 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
752 if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
754 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED)
757 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
759 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
762 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
766 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
767 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
768 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
770 const unsigned char *pformats, *pcurves;
771 size_t num_formats, num_curves, i;
773 /* If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything
774 * is supported (see RFC4492).
776 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
778 pformats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
779 num_formats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
780 for (i = 0; i < num_formats; i++, pformats++)
782 if (*comp_id == *pformats)
785 if (i == num_formats)
790 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
791 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++)
793 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &pcurves, &num_curves))
795 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2)
797 if (pcurves[0] == curve_id[0] &&
798 pcurves[1] == curve_id[1])
803 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
810 static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
813 /* If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise
815 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
817 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
818 *num_formats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
822 *pformats = ecformats_default;
823 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
825 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
827 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default);
831 /* Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks
832 * EC certificates have compatible curves and compression.
834 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
836 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
839 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
842 /* If not EC nothing to do */
843 if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)
848 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec);
852 /* Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a
853 * supported curves extension.
855 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
858 /* Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
859 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
861 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s))
868 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
869 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
870 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
871 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
872 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
874 return 0; /* Should never happen */
875 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
876 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
878 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
882 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
883 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha256();
885 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha384();
890 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
891 /* Check EC temporary key is compatible with client extensions */
892 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
894 unsigned char curve_id[2];
895 EC_KEY *ec = s->cert->ecdh_tmp;
896 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
897 /* Allow any curve: not just those peer supports */
898 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
901 /* If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384,
902 * no other curves permitted.
906 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
907 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
908 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
909 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
910 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
914 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
915 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
917 /* If auto or setting curve from callback assume OK */
918 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto || s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
920 /* Otherwise check curve is acceptable */
923 unsigned char curve_tmp[2];
926 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_tmp, NULL, ec))
928 if (!curve_tmp[0] || curve_tmp[1] == curve_id[1])
934 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
936 /* Need a shared curve */
937 if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
943 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
948 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, NULL, ec))
950 /* Set this to allow use of invalid curves for testing */
954 return tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL);
957 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
961 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
966 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
968 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
970 /* List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
971 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
974 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
975 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
977 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
980 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
981 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
983 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
986 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
987 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */
989 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
992 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
993 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
994 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
995 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
997 static unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
998 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
999 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
1000 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
1002 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
1003 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
1004 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
1006 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
1007 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
1010 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
1011 static unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
1012 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
1013 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
1016 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
1018 /* If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
1021 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1022 switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
1024 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
1025 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
1026 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
1028 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
1029 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
1032 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
1033 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
1037 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
1038 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs)
1040 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
1041 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
1043 else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs)
1045 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
1046 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
1050 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
1051 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
1054 /* Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
1055 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
1057 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
1058 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
1060 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
1061 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
1062 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
1063 /* Should never happen */
1066 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
1067 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1])
1069 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1072 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1073 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
1075 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
1076 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
1077 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec))
1079 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id))
1081 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
1084 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
1089 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
1091 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
1093 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1094 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
1098 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
1100 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
1102 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1103 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
1111 else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
1115 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
1116 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
1117 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i+=2, sent_sigs+=2)
1119 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
1122 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
1123 if (i == sent_sigslen && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
1125 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1128 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
1131 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
1134 /* Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they
1137 if (s->session && s->session->sess_cert)
1138 s->session->sess_cert->peer_key->digest = *pmd;
1141 /* Get a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled
1142 * if it isn't supported or doesn't appear in supported signature
1143 * algorithms. Unlike ssl_cipher_get_disabled this applies to a specific
1144 * session and not global settings.
1147 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
1150 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
1151 size_t i, sigalgslen;
1152 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
1155 /* Don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers if we don't suppport them */
1156 if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s))
1157 c->mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
1160 /* Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support
1161 * any for RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just
1164 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
1165 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2)
1169 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1170 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
1174 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
1175 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
1179 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
1180 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
1186 /* Disable auth and static DH if we don't include any appropriate
1187 * signature algorithms.
1191 c->mask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
1192 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHr|SSL_kECDHr;
1196 c->mask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
1197 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHd;
1201 c->mask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
1202 c->mask_k |= SSL_kECDHe;
1204 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1205 if (!kssl_tgt_is_available(s->kssl_ctx))
1207 c->mask_a |= SSL_aKRB5;
1208 c->mask_k |= SSL_kKRB5;
1211 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1212 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1213 if (!s->psk_client_callback)
1215 c->mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
1216 c->mask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
1218 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1219 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1220 if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP))
1222 c->mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
1223 c->mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
1229 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1232 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1233 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1234 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1235 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1237 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
1240 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1241 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1243 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++)
1245 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1247 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1248 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1249 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)
1250 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
1259 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */
1260 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION
1261 && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1266 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1268 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
1270 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1271 unsigned long size_str;
1274 /* check for enough space.
1275 4 for the servername type and entension length
1276 2 for servernamelist length
1277 1 for the hostname type
1278 2 for hostname length
1282 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
1283 || (size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
1286 /* extension type and length */
1287 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1288 s2n(size_str+5,ret);
1290 /* length of servername list */
1291 s2n(size_str+3,ret);
1293 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
1294 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
1296 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
1300 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1305 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1307 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1311 if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1313 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1316 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1318 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1325 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1326 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
1327 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
1328 { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the Client Hello message */
1330 int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
1331 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0)
1333 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1337 /* check for enough space.
1338 4 for the srp type type and entension length
1339 1 for the srp user identity
1340 + srp user identity length
1342 if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0) return NULL;
1344 /* fill in the extension */
1345 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp,ret);
1346 s2n(login_len+1,ret);
1347 (*ret++) = (unsigned char) login_len;
1348 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
1353 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1356 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */
1358 const unsigned char *pcurves, *pformats;
1359 size_t num_curves, num_formats, curves_list_len;
1361 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &pformats, &num_formats);
1363 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
1364 if (num_formats > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1365 if (num_formats > 255)
1367 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1371 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
1372 /* The point format list has 1-byte length. */
1373 s2n(num_formats + 1,ret);
1374 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)num_formats ;
1375 memcpy(ret, pformats, num_formats);
1378 /* Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message */
1379 pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1380 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &pcurves, &num_curves))
1383 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) return NULL;
1384 if (num_curves > (size_t)lenmax / 2) return NULL;
1385 if (num_curves > 65532 / 2)
1387 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1390 curves_list_len = 2*num_curves;
1391 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves,ret);
1392 s2n(curves_list_len + 2, ret);
1393 s2n(curves_list_len, ret);
1394 memcpy(ret, pcurves, curves_list_len);
1395 ret+=curves_list_len;
1397 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1399 if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
1402 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
1403 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
1404 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1405 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data)
1407 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1408 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1409 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
1411 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1412 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data,
1414 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1418 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1419 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1421 /* Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len
1424 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0) return NULL;
1425 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1429 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
1435 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
1438 const unsigned char *salg;
1439 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
1440 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < salglen + 6)
1442 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms,ret);
1443 s2n(salglen + 2, ret);
1445 memcpy(ret, salg, salglen);
1449 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1450 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1452 size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len;
1454 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col < 0))
1456 if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1459 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1462 memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col);
1467 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
1470 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
1474 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
1476 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1477 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1483 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
1485 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1492 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0) return NULL;
1493 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1494 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
1496 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
1497 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
1499 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
1501 /* save position of id len */
1502 unsigned char *q = ret;
1503 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1504 /* skip over id len */
1506 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
1512 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
1515 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1516 /* Add Heartbeat extension */
1517 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1519 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1522 * 1: peer may send requests
1523 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1525 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1526 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1528 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1531 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1532 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
1534 /* The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its
1535 * support for Next Protocol Negotiation */
1536 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
1538 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1543 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
1545 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 6 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len)
1547 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation,ret);
1548 s2n(2 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len,ret);
1549 s2n(s->alpn_client_proto_list_len,ret);
1550 memcpy(ret, s->alpn_client_proto_list,
1551 s->alpn_client_proto_list_len);
1552 ret += s->alpn_client_proto_list_len;
1555 if(SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s))
1559 ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1561 if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1563 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1566 if(ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1568 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1573 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->cli_ext);
1574 /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
1575 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 0, &ret, limit, al))
1578 /* Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators.
1579 * See https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03
1581 * NB: because this code works out the length of all existing
1582 * extensions it MUST always appear last.
1584 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING)
1586 int hlen = ret - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1587 /* The code in s23_clnt.c to build ClientHello messages
1588 * includes the 5-byte record header in the buffer, while
1589 * the code in s3_clnt.c does not.
1591 if (s->state == SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A)
1593 if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200)
1595 hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
1601 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret);
1603 memset(ret, 0, hlen);
1608 if ((extdatalen = ret-orig-2)== 0)
1611 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1615 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1618 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1619 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1620 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1621 int next_proto_neg_seen;
1623 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1624 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1625 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1626 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1627 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1629 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */
1630 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1634 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1636 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
1638 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1640 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1644 if(s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1648 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1650 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1654 if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1656 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1659 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1661 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1668 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1671 const unsigned char *plist;
1673 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message */
1676 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1678 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
1679 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1682 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1686 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
1687 s2n(plistlen + 1,ret);
1688 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) plistlen;
1689 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1693 /* Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves extension */
1694 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1696 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected
1697 && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
1699 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1700 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1704 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
1706 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1707 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request,ret);
1711 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1712 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1714 size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len;
1716 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - sol) < 0)
1718 if (sol > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1721 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1724 memcpy(ret, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input, sol);
1729 if(SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->srtp_profile)
1733 ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1735 if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1737 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1740 if(ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1742 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1748 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x80 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x81)
1749 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG))
1750 { const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1751 0xfd, 0xe8, /*65000*/
1752 0x00, 0x20, /*32 bytes length*/
1753 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1754 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1755 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1756 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17};
1757 if (limit-ret<36) return NULL;
1758 memcpy(ret,cryptopro_ext,36);
1763 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1764 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
1765 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED)
1767 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1769 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1772 * 1: peer may send requests
1773 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1775 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1776 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1778 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1783 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1784 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1785 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1786 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb)
1788 const unsigned char *npa;
1789 unsigned int npalen;
1792 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1793 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
1795 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0) return NULL;
1796 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1798 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
1800 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1804 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 1, &ret, limit, al))
1807 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1809 const unsigned char *selected = s->s3->alpn_selected;
1810 unsigned len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
1812 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - 2 - 1 - len) < 0)
1814 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation,ret);
1818 memcpy(ret, selected, len);
1822 if ((extdatalen = ret-orig-2)== 0)
1825 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1829 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1830 /* ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1831 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |d|, of length |n|.
1832 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1837 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1838 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1839 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1840 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1842 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, const unsigned char *d, int n) {
1843 unsigned short type, size;
1844 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1845 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1846 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1847 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1848 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1849 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1850 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1852 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1853 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1854 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1855 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1858 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1859 static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock[] = {
1860 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1861 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1862 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1863 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1864 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1865 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1866 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1867 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1870 if (data >= (d+n-2))
1879 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1882 if (data+size > d+n)
1886 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
1888 const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1889 const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock);
1891 if (data + len1 + len2 != d+n)
1893 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0)
1895 if (memcmp(data + len1, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock, len2) != 0)
1900 const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1902 if (data + len != d+n)
1904 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0)
1908 s->s3->is_probably_safari = 1;
1910 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1912 /* tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello is called to process the ALPN extension in a
1914 * data: the contents of the extension, not including the type and length.
1915 * data_len: the number of bytes in |data|
1916 * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a non-zero
1919 * returns: 0 on success. */
1920 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
1921 unsigned data_len, int *al)
1925 const unsigned char *selected;
1926 unsigned char selected_len;
1929 if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb == NULL)
1935 /* data should contain a uint16 length followed by a series of 8-bit,
1936 * length-prefixed strings. */
1937 i = ((unsigned) data[0]) << 8 |
1938 ((unsigned) data[1]);
1947 for (i = 0; i < data_len;)
1949 proto_len = data[i];
1955 if (i + proto_len < i || i + proto_len > data_len)
1961 r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, data_len,
1962 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
1963 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1964 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1965 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1966 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
1967 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected)
1969 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1972 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, selected, selected_len);
1973 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
1978 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1982 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
1984 unsigned short type;
1985 unsigned short size;
1987 unsigned char *data = *p;
1988 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1990 s->servername_done = 0;
1991 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1992 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1993 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1996 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1998 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1999 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
2002 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2003 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2004 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2007 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2008 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
2009 ssl_check_for_safari(s, data, d, n);
2010 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2012 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
2013 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
2015 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->peer_sigalgs);
2016 s->cert->peer_sigalgs = NULL;
2019 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2020 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
2022 OPENSSL_free(s->srp_ctx.login);
2023 s->srp_ctx.login = NULL;
2027 s->srtp_profile = NULL;
2029 if (data >= (d+n-2))
2033 if (data > (d+n-len))
2036 while (data <= (d+n-4))
2041 if (data+size > (d+n))
2044 fprintf(stderr,"Received extension type %d size %d\n",type,size);
2046 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2047 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size,
2048 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2049 /* The servername extension is treated as follows:
2051 - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
2052 - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
2053 in which case an fatal alert is generated.
2054 - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
2055 - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
2056 to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
2057 - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
2058 it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
2059 Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
2060 set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
2061 case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
2062 a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
2063 presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
2064 the value of the Host: field.
2065 - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
2066 if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the session,
2067 i.e. when the session has been established with a servername extension.
2068 - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
2072 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
2074 unsigned char *sdata;
2080 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2087 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2094 servname_type = *(sdata++);
2100 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2103 if (s->servername_done == 0)
2104 switch (servname_type)
2106 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
2109 if(s->session->tlsext_hostname)
2111 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2114 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name)
2116 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2119 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
2121 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2124 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
2125 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len]='\0';
2126 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
2127 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
2128 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
2129 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2132 s->servername_done = 1;
2136 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
2137 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
2138 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
2150 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2155 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2156 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp)
2158 if (size <= 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size -1))
2160 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2163 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
2165 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2168 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
2170 memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len);
2171 s->srp_ctx.login[len]='\0';
2173 if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len)
2175 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2181 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2182 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
2184 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2185 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2187 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1 ||
2188 ecpointformatlist_length < 1)
2190 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2195 if(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
2197 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2198 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
2200 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2201 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
2203 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2206 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
2207 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
2210 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
2211 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2212 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2213 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2214 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2217 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves)
2219 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2220 int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
2221 ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
2223 if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 ||
2224 ellipticcurvelist_length < 1 ||
2225 /* Each NamedCurve is 2 bytes. */
2226 ellipticcurvelist_length & 1)
2228 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2233 if(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
2235 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2238 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
2239 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL)
2241 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2244 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = ellipticcurvelist_length;
2245 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata, ellipticcurvelist_length);
2248 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
2249 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
2250 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++)
2251 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2252 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2255 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2256 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2257 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input)
2259 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2263 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2266 n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
2267 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
2269 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2273 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2274 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2275 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2276 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2278 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
2279 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2281 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2286 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2288 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2289 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2291 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2295 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
2297 if(!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2299 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2301 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms)
2304 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs || size < 2)
2306 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2311 if (dsize != size || dsize & 1 || !dsize)
2313 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2316 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, data, dsize))
2318 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2322 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
2327 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2331 s->tlsext_status_type = *data++;
2333 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
2335 const unsigned char *sdata;
2337 /* Read in responder_id_list */
2342 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2351 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2355 dsize -= 2 + idsize;
2359 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2364 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL,
2368 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2373 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2374 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2377 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
2378 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
2379 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null()))
2381 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2382 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2385 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(
2386 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id))
2388 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2389 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2394 /* Read in request_extensions */
2397 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2404 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2410 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
2412 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2413 X509_EXTENSION_free);
2416 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
2417 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL,
2419 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts
2420 || (data + dsize != sdata))
2422 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2427 /* We don't know what to do with any other type
2431 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2433 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2434 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
2438 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
2439 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2441 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
2442 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2443 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2445 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2450 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2451 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2452 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0 &&
2453 s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL)
2455 /* We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2458 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2459 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2460 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
2461 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2462 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2463 * anything like that, but this might change).
2465 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2466 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2467 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2468 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2469 * Finished message could have been computed.) */
2470 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2474 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation &&
2475 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb &&
2476 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
2478 if (tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, data, size, al) != 0)
2480 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2481 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
2482 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2486 /* session ticket processed earlier */
2487 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)
2488 && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
2490 if(ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
2502 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2504 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
2505 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
2507 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2508 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2509 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2517 * Parse any custom extensions found. "data" is the start of the extension data
2518 * and "limit" is the end of the record. TODO: add strict syntax checking.
2521 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_custom_tlsext(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, const unsigned char *limit, int *al)
2523 unsigned short type, size, len;
2524 /* If resumed session or no custom extensions nothing to do */
2525 if (s->hit || s->cert->srv_ext.meths_count == 0)
2528 if (data >= limit - 2)
2532 if (data > limit - len)
2535 while (data <= limit - 4)
2540 if (data+size > limit)
2542 if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1 /* server */, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2551 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
2554 unsigned char *ptmp = *p;
2556 * Internally supported extensions are parsed first so SNI can be handled
2557 * before custom extensions. An application processing SNI will typically
2558 * switch the parent context using SSL_set_SSL_CTX and custom extensions
2559 * need to be handled by the new SSL_CTX structure.
2561 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
2563 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2567 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0)
2569 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2573 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->srv_ext);
2574 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_custom_tlsext(s, ptmp, d + n, &al) <= 0)
2576 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2583 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2584 /* ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2585 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly fill
2586 * the length of the block. */
2587 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
2589 unsigned int off = 0;
2603 static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
2605 unsigned short length;
2606 unsigned short type;
2607 unsigned short size;
2608 unsigned char *data = *p;
2609 int tlsext_servername = 0;
2610 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2612 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2613 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2615 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2617 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
2619 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2620 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
2623 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2624 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2625 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2628 if (data >= (d+n-2))
2632 if (data+length != d+n)
2634 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2638 while(data <= (d+n-4))
2643 if (data+size > (d+n))
2646 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2647 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size,
2648 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2650 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
2652 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0)
2654 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2657 tlsext_servername = 1;
2660 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2661 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
2663 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2664 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2666 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1)
2668 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2673 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2674 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2675 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
2677 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2680 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
2681 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
2684 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist ");
2685 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2686 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2687 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2688 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2691 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2693 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2695 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2696 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2698 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2701 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
2704 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2707 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2709 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2710 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input)
2712 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2716 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2719 n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2720 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
2722 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2726 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2727 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
2728 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2729 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2731 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2733 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2735 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2740 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
2742 /* MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested
2743 * a status request message.
2745 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0))
2747 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2750 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2751 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2753 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2754 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2755 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
2757 unsigned char *selected;
2758 unsigned char selected_len;
2760 /* We must have requested it. */
2761 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL)
2763 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2766 /* The data must be valid */
2767 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size))
2769 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2772 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, size, s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
2774 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2777 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2778 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
2780 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2783 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2784 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2785 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2789 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation)
2793 /* We must have requested it. */
2794 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list == NULL)
2796 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2801 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2804 /* The extension data consists of:
2805 * uint16 list_length
2806 * uint8 proto_length;
2807 * uint8 proto[proto_length]; */
2811 if (len != (unsigned) size - 2)
2813 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2817 if (len != (unsigned) size - 3)
2819 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2822 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
2823 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2824 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
2825 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected)
2827 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2830 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, data + 3, len);
2831 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
2834 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
2836 if(!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2838 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2840 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2841 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
2845 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
2846 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2848 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
2849 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2850 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2852 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2857 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
2859 if(ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
2863 /* If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but
2864 * matches a custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c
2866 else if (custom_ext_parse(s, 0, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2874 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2878 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1)
2880 if (s->tlsext_hostname)
2882 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL)
2884 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
2885 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname)
2887 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2893 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2903 /* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to
2904 * avoid an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server
2905 * hello because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an
2906 * attack. However this would mean we could not connect to any server
2907 * which doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI
2908 * absence on initial connect only.
2910 if (!renegotiate_seen
2911 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
2912 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
2914 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2915 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2916 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2924 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2927 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2931 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
2933 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2938 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
2940 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2941 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2943 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2944 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2946 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
2947 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2949 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2952 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2956 /* at callback's request, insist on receiving an appropriate server opaque PRF input */
2957 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2964 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2969 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
2971 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2972 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2974 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2975 /* The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely in
2976 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2978 /* The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely in
2979 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2983 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2984 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2985 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2986 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2988 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2990 /* This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(),
2991 * but we might be sending an alert in response to the client hello,
2992 * so this has to happen here in
2993 * ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(). */
2997 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
2999 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
3002 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3003 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3008 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
3009 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
3010 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL;
3012 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
3014 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
3015 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len)
3017 /* can only use this extension if we have a server opaque PRF input
3018 * of the same length as the client opaque PRF input! */
3020 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
3021 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
3023 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
3024 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
3026 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3027 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3030 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
3034 if (r == 2 && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
3036 /* The callback wants to enforce use of the extension,
3037 * but we can't do that with the client opaque PRF input;
3038 * abort the handshake.
3040 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3041 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3049 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3050 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3053 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3054 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
3057 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3058 s->servername_done=0;
3064 int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3068 /* Clear any shared sigtnature algorithms */
3069 if (s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
3071 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
3072 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
3074 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
3075 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
3077 s->cert->pkeys[i].digest = NULL;
3078 s->cert->pkeys[i].valid_flags = 0;
3081 /* If sigalgs received process it. */
3082 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
3084 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s))
3086 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS,
3087 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3088 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3091 /* Fatal error is no shared signature algorithms */
3092 if (!s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
3094 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS,
3095 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS);
3096 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3101 ssl_cert_set_default_md(s->cert);
3104 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3108 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
3110 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
3113 /* If status request then ask callback what to do.
3114 * Note: this must be called after servername callbacks in case
3115 * the certificate has changed, and must be called after the cipher
3116 * has been chosen because this may influence which certificate is sent
3118 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
3121 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
3122 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
3123 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
3124 if (certpkey == NULL)
3126 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3129 /* Set current certificate to one we will use so
3130 * SSL_get_certificate et al can pick it up.
3132 s->cert->key = certpkey;
3133 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
3136 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
3137 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3138 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3140 /* status request response should be sent */
3141 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
3142 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
3143 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
3145 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3147 /* something bad happened */
3148 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3149 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3150 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3155 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3160 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3161 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3164 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3165 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
3173 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
3175 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
3176 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
3178 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3179 /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
3180 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension
3181 * it must contain uncompressed.
3183 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3184 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3185 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
3186 (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
3187 ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
3189 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
3191 unsigned char *list;
3192 int found_uncompressed = 0;
3193 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
3194 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
3196 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed)
3198 found_uncompressed = 1;
3202 if (!found_uncompressed)
3204 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
3208 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
3209 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
3211 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3212 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3213 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3214 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3216 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
3217 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0)
3219 /* This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on using opaque PRF inputs.
3220 * So first verify that we really have a value from the server too. */
3222 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
3224 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3225 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3228 /* Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to check
3229 * that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size. */
3230 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL ||
3231 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len)
3233 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3234 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3239 /* If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one
3242 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
3243 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
3246 /* Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows
3247 * there is no response.
3249 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
3251 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
3252 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
3254 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
3255 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
3258 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
3259 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3263 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3264 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3270 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3271 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3274 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3275 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
3278 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3279 s->servername_done=0;
3285 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
3288 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
3290 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
3292 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3296 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
3298 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
3304 /* Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
3305 * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle
3306 * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time.
3308 * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will
3309 * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket
3310 * extension, if any.
3311 * len: the length of the session ID.
3312 * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello.
3313 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3314 * point to the resulting session.
3316 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
3317 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
3318 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
3321 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3322 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
3323 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
3324 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
3325 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
3326 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
3327 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
3330 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
3331 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
3332 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
3333 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
3334 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
3335 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
3337 int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
3338 const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
3340 /* Point after session ID in client hello */
3341 const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
3345 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
3347 /* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present
3348 * to permit stateful resumption.
3350 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
3352 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
3356 /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
3364 /* Skip past cipher list */
3369 /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
3374 /* Now at start of extensions */
3375 if ((p + 2) >= limit)
3378 while ((p + 4) <= limit)
3380 unsigned short type, size;
3383 if (p + size > limit)
3385 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
3390 /* The client will accept a ticket but doesn't
3391 * currently have one. */
3392 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3395 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb)
3397 /* Indicate that the ticket couldn't be
3398 * decrypted rather than generating the session
3399 * from ticket now, trigger abbreviated
3400 * handshake based on external mechanism to
3401 * calculate the master secret later. */
3404 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret);
3407 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
3408 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3410 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
3412 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
3413 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3415 default: /* fatal error */
3424 /* tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
3426 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
3427 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
3428 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
3429 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
3430 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3431 * point to the resulting session.
3434 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3435 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
3436 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
3437 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
3439 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
3440 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
3441 SSL_SESSION **psess)
3444 unsigned char *sdec;
3445 const unsigned char *p;
3446 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
3447 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
3450 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3451 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
3454 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
3455 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3456 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3457 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
3459 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
3460 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
3471 /* Check key name matches */
3472 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
3474 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3475 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
3476 EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3477 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
3479 /* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and
3480 * integrity checks on ticket.
3482 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
3485 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3489 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
3490 HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
3491 HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
3492 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3493 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen))
3495 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3498 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
3499 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
3500 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3501 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3502 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
3505 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3508 EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
3509 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0)
3511 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3516 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3519 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3523 /* The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to
3524 * detect that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to
3525 * the session structure. If it is empty set length to zero
3526 * as required by standard.
3529 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3530 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3538 /* For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new
3543 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3551 static tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
3552 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3553 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3554 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3555 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3556 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3557 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}
3560 static tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
3561 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
3562 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
3563 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}
3566 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3569 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
3571 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3577 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3580 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
3582 if ((table[i].id) == id)
3583 return table[i].nid;
3588 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md)
3593 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md,
3594 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3597 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3600 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
3601 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
3605 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
3607 return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig,
3608 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3611 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
3615 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
3616 case TLSEXT_hash_md5:
3623 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
3624 case TLSEXT_hash_sha1:
3627 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
3628 case TLSEXT_hash_sha224:
3629 return EVP_sha224();
3631 case TLSEXT_hash_sha256:
3632 return EVP_sha256();
3634 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
3635 case TLSEXT_hash_sha384:
3636 return EVP_sha384();
3638 case TLSEXT_hash_sha512:
3639 return EVP_sha512();
3647 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
3651 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3652 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3653 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3655 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3656 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3657 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3659 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3660 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3661 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3667 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3668 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
3669 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3671 int sign_nid = 0, hash_nid = 0;
3672 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3674 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid)
3676 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md,
3677 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3679 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3681 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid)
3683 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig,
3684 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3686 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3690 if (sign_nid && hash_nid)
3691 OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid,
3692 hash_nid, sign_nid);
3694 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3697 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
3698 static int tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
3699 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3700 const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
3702 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3703 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3704 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i+=2, ptmp+=2)
3706 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3707 if (tls12_get_hash(ptmp[0]) == NULL)
3709 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3711 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j+=2, atmp+=2)
3713 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1])
3718 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3719 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3720 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3722 &shsig->signandhash_nid,
3733 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3734 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3736 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3737 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3739 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3741 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
3742 if (c->shared_sigalgs)
3744 OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
3745 c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
3747 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3748 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
3750 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3751 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3753 else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
3755 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
3756 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3759 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
3760 if(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb)
3764 allow = c->peer_sigalgs;
3765 allowlen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3771 pref = c->peer_sigalgs;
3772 preflen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3774 nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3777 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3780 nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3781 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3782 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3787 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3789 int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
3792 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
3793 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3795 /* Should never happen */
3799 if (c->peer_sigalgs)
3800 OPENSSL_free(c->peer_sigalgs);
3801 c->peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
3802 if (!c->peer_sigalgs)
3804 c->peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3805 memcpy(c->peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
3809 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3815 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3816 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s))
3819 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3820 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
3822 /* Use first set signature preference to force message
3823 * digest, ignoring any peer preferences.
3825 const unsigned char *sigs = NULL;
3827 sigs = c->conf_sigalgs;
3829 sigs = c->client_sigalgs;
3832 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigs[1]);
3833 md = tls12_get_hash(sigs[0]);
3834 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3835 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3836 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
3838 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3839 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3845 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3846 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++)
3848 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3849 if (idx > 0 && c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL)
3851 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
3852 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3853 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3854 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
3856 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3857 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3862 /* In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't
3863 * use the certificate for signing.
3865 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
3867 /* Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is
3868 * not supported it stays as NULL.
3870 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3871 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest)
3872 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3874 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3875 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest)
3877 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3878 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3881 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3882 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest)
3883 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3890 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3891 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3892 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3894 const unsigned char *psig = s->cert->peer_sigalgs;
3900 if (idx >= (int)s->cert->peer_sigalgslen)
3907 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
3909 return s->cert->peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3912 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3913 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3914 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3916 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
3917 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
3921 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3923 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3925 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3927 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
3929 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
3930 return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
3934 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
3936 tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3938 unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl;
3939 unsigned short hbtype;
3940 unsigned int payload;
3941 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3943 if (s->msg_callback)
3944 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3945 &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
3946 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3948 /* Read type and payload length first */
3949 if (1 + 2 + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
3950 return 0; /* silently discard */
3953 if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
3954 return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */
3957 if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST)
3959 unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
3962 /* Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes
3963 * message type, plus 2 bytes payload length, plus
3964 * payload, plus padding
3966 buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3969 /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
3970 *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
3972 memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
3974 /* Random padding */
3975 RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding);
3977 r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, 3 + payload + padding);
3979 if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
3980 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3981 buffer, 3 + payload + padding,
3982 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3984 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
3989 else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE)
3993 /* We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int),
3994 * and 16 random bytes, so we just try to read the
3995 * sequence number */
3998 if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq)
4001 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
4009 tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
4011 unsigned char *buf, *p;
4013 unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
4014 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
4016 /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
4017 if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
4018 s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS)
4020 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
4024 /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
4025 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
4027 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
4031 /* ...and no handshake in progress. */
4032 if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake)
4034 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
4038 /* Check if padding is too long, payload and padding
4039 * must not exceed 2^14 - 3 = 16381 bytes in total.
4041 OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381);
4043 /* Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
4044 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
4045 * some random stuff.
4046 * - Message Type, 1 byte
4047 * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
4048 * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
4049 * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
4052 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
4055 *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
4056 /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
4058 /* Sequence number */
4059 s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
4060 /* 16 random bytes */
4061 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16);
4063 /* Random padding */
4064 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding);
4066 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
4069 if (s->msg_callback)
4070 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
4071 buf, 3 + payload + padding,
4072 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
4074 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;
4083 #define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
4088 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
4091 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
4093 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
4096 int sig_alg, hash_alg;
4097 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
4099 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
4101 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
4103 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
4111 if (!strcmp(etmp, "RSA"))
4112 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
4113 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "DSA"))
4114 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
4115 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "ECDSA"))
4116 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_EC;
4119 hash_alg = OBJ_sn2nid(p);
4120 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
4121 hash_alg = OBJ_ln2nid(p);
4122 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
4125 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i+=2)
4127 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg
4128 && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
4131 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
4132 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
4136 /* Set suppored signature algorithms based on a colon separated list
4137 * of the form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512 */
4138 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
4142 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
4146 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
4149 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
4151 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
4156 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
4157 if (sigalgs == NULL)
4159 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i+=2)
4161 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md,
4162 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
4163 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig,
4164 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
4166 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
4174 if (c->client_sigalgs)
4175 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
4176 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
4177 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
4181 if (c->conf_sigalgs)
4182 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
4183 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
4184 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
4190 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
4194 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
4198 if (default_nid == -1)
4200 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
4202 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
4203 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
4204 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
4208 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
4209 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
4213 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
4214 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++)
4216 if(!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
4222 /* Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is
4223 * usable by server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to
4224 * check chains before passing them to the server and it allows the
4225 * server to check chains before attempting to use them.
4228 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
4230 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
4231 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
4232 /* Strict mode flags */
4233 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
4234 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
4235 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
4237 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
4242 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
4243 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
4245 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
4246 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
4249 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
4253 idx = cpk - c->pkeys;
4256 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
4258 pk = cpk->privatekey;
4260 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
4261 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
4264 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
4265 /* Allow any certificate to pass test */
4266 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
4268 rv = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_VALID|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4269 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4278 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
4281 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
4282 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
4283 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
4285 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
4293 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4294 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
4295 if (ok == X509_V_OK)
4296 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4297 else if (!check_flags)
4301 /* Check all signature algorithms are consistent with
4302 * signature algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later
4305 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode)
4308 unsigned char rsign = 0;
4309 if (c->peer_sigalgs)
4311 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
4316 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
4317 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
4318 case SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA:
4319 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
4320 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
4323 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
4324 case SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA:
4325 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
4326 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
4330 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
4331 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
4339 /* If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we
4340 * have set preferred signature algorithms check we support
4343 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs)
4346 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
4347 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2)
4349 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
4352 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen)
4360 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
4361 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid))
4363 if (!check_flags) goto end;
4366 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
4367 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4368 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4370 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i),
4375 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4383 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
4384 else if(check_flags)
4385 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4387 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
4388 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
4389 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
4390 else if (!check_flags)
4393 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4394 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
4395 else if (strict_mode)
4397 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4398 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4400 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4401 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0))
4405 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4413 if (!s->server && strict_mode)
4415 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
4420 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
4423 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
4426 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
4431 int cert_type = X509_certificate_type(x, pk);
4432 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_RSA)
4433 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_FIXED_DH;
4434 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_DSA)
4435 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_FIXED_DH;
4440 const unsigned char *ctypes;
4445 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
4449 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
4450 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
4452 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++)
4454 if (ctypes[i] == check_type)
4456 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4460 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
4464 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4467 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
4469 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
4470 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4472 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4474 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
4475 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4477 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4479 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4481 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4482 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp))
4484 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4489 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4493 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4495 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
4496 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
4500 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
4502 if (cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
4503 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4504 else if (cpk->digest)
4505 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4508 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4510 /* When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant
4511 * if the chain is invalid.
4515 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
4516 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4519 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
4520 cpk->valid_flags &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4527 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
4528 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
4530 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
4531 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
4532 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
4533 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA);
4534 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA);
4535 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
4537 /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
4538 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
4540 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);