2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
12 #include <openssl/objects.h>
13 #include <openssl/evp.h>
14 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
15 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
16 #include <openssl/conf.h>
17 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
18 #include <openssl/dh.h>
19 #include <openssl/bn.h>
21 #include <openssl/ct.h>
23 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, size_t ticklen,
24 const unsigned char *sess_id, size_t sesslen,
26 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
27 static int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
29 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data = {
33 tls1_generate_master_secret,
34 tls1_change_cipher_state,
35 tls1_final_finish_mac,
36 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
37 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
39 tls1_export_keying_material,
41 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
42 tls_close_construct_packet,
46 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_1_enc_data = {
50 tls1_generate_master_secret,
51 tls1_change_cipher_state,
52 tls1_final_finish_mac,
53 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
54 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
56 tls1_export_keying_material,
57 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
58 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
59 tls_close_construct_packet,
63 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_2_enc_data = {
67 tls1_generate_master_secret,
68 tls1_change_cipher_state,
69 tls1_final_finish_mac,
70 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
71 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
73 tls1_export_keying_material,
74 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
75 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
76 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
77 tls_close_construct_packet,
81 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_3_enc_data = {
85 tls1_generate_master_secret,
86 tls1_change_cipher_state,
87 tls1_final_finish_mac,
88 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
89 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
91 tls1_export_keying_material,
92 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
93 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
94 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
95 tls_close_construct_packet,
99 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
102 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
103 * http, the cache would over fill
105 return (60 * 60 * 2);
112 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
116 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
118 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
122 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
125 if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION)
126 s->version = TLS_MAX_VERSION;
128 s->version = s->method->version;
131 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
134 int nid; /* Curve NID */
135 int secbits; /* Bits of security (from SP800-57) */
136 unsigned int flags; /* Flags: currently just field type */
140 * Table of curve information.
141 * Do not delete entries or reorder this array! It is used as a lookup
142 * table: the index of each entry is one less than the TLS curve id.
144 static const tls_curve_info nid_list[] = {
145 {NID_sect163k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163k1 (1) */
146 {NID_sect163r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r1 (2) */
147 {NID_sect163r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r2 (3) */
148 {NID_sect193r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r1 (4) */
149 {NID_sect193r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r2 (5) */
150 {NID_sect233k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233k1 (6) */
151 {NID_sect233r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233r1 (7) */
152 {NID_sect239k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect239k1 (8) */
153 {NID_sect283k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283k1 (9) */
154 {NID_sect283r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283r1 (10) */
155 {NID_sect409k1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409k1 (11) */
156 {NID_sect409r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409r1 (12) */
157 {NID_sect571k1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571k1 (13) */
158 {NID_sect571r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571r1 (14) */
159 {NID_secp160k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160k1 (15) */
160 {NID_secp160r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r1 (16) */
161 {NID_secp160r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r2 (17) */
162 {NID_secp192k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192k1 (18) */
163 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192r1 (19) */
164 {NID_secp224k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224k1 (20) */
165 {NID_secp224r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224r1 (21) */
166 {NID_secp256k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256k1 (22) */
167 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256r1 (23) */
168 {NID_secp384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp384r1 (24) */
169 {NID_secp521r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp521r1 (25) */
170 {NID_brainpoolP256r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
171 {NID_brainpoolP384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
172 {NID_brainpoolP512r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
173 {NID_X25519, 128, TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM}, /* X25519 (29) */
176 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = {
177 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
178 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
179 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
182 /* The default curves */
183 static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] = {
184 0, 29, /* X25519 (29) */
185 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
186 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
187 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
190 static const unsigned char eccurves_all[] = {
191 0, 29, /* X25519 (29) */
192 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
193 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
194 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
195 0, 26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
196 0, 27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
197 0, 28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
200 * Remaining curves disabled by default but still permitted if set
201 * via an explicit callback or parameters.
203 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
204 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
205 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
206 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
207 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
208 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
209 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
210 0, 20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
211 0, 21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
212 0, 18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
213 0, 19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
214 0, 15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
215 0, 16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
216 0, 17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
217 0, 8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
218 0, 6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
219 0, 7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
220 0, 4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
221 0, 5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
222 0, 1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
223 0, 2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
224 0, 3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
227 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] = {
228 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
229 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
232 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id, unsigned int *pflags)
234 const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
235 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
236 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
238 cinfo = nid_list + curve_id - 1;
240 *pflags = cinfo->flags;
244 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
247 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(nid_list); i++) {
248 if (nid_list[i].nid == nid)
255 * Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
257 * Sets |num_curves| to the number of curves in the list, i.e.,
258 * the length of |pcurves| is 2 * num_curves.
259 * Returns 1 on success and 0 if the client curves list has invalid format.
260 * The latter indicates an internal error: we should not be accepting such
261 * lists in the first place.
262 * TODO(emilia): we should really be storing the curves list in explicitly
263 * parsed form instead. (However, this would affect binary compatibility
264 * so cannot happen in the 1.0.x series.)
266 static int tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
267 const unsigned char **pcurves, size_t *num_curves)
269 size_t pcurveslen = 0;
271 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_supportedgroupslist;
272 pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_supportedgroupslist_length;
274 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
275 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
276 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
277 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
278 pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
281 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
282 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
286 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
287 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
291 *pcurves = s->tlsext_supportedgroupslist;
292 pcurveslen = s->tlsext_supportedgroupslist_length;
295 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
296 pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
300 /* We do not allow odd length arrays to enter the system. */
301 if (pcurveslen & 1) {
302 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_GET_CURVELIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
306 *num_curves = pcurveslen / 2;
311 /* See if curve is allowed by security callback */
312 static int tls_curve_allowed(SSL *s, const unsigned char *curve, int op)
314 const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
317 if ((curve[1] < 1) || ((size_t)curve[1] > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
319 cinfo = &nid_list[curve[1] - 1];
320 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
321 if (cinfo->flags & TLS_CURVE_CHAR2)
324 return ssl_security(s, op, cinfo->secbits, cinfo->nid, (void *)curve);
327 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
328 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
330 const unsigned char *curves;
331 size_t num_curves, i;
332 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
333 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
335 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
337 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
340 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) {
341 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
343 } else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) {
344 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
346 } else /* Should never happen */
349 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &num_curves))
351 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, curves += 2) {
352 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
353 return tls_curve_allowed(s, p + 1, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK);
359 * For nmatch >= 0, return the NID of the |nmatch|th shared group or NID_undef
360 * if there is no match.
361 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
362 * For nmatch == -2, return the NID of the group to use for
363 * an EC tmp key, or NID_undef if there is no match.
365 int tls1_shared_group(SSL *s, int nmatch)
367 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
368 size_t num_pref, num_supp, i, j;
370 /* Can't do anything on client side */
374 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
376 * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know
377 * these are acceptable due to previous checks.
379 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
380 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
381 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
382 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
383 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
384 /* Should never happen */
387 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
391 * Avoid truncation. tls1_get_curvelist takes an int
392 * but s->options is a long...
394 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
395 (s, (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0, &supp,
397 /* In practice, NID_undef == 0 but let's be precise. */
398 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
399 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
400 (s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE), &pref, &num_pref))
401 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
404 * If the client didn't send the elliptic_curves extension all of them
407 if (num_supp == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0) {
409 num_supp = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2;
410 } else if (num_pref == 0 &&
411 (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) == 0) {
413 num_pref = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2;
417 for (i = 0; i < num_pref; i++, pref += 2) {
418 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
419 for (j = 0; j < num_supp; j++, tsupp += 2) {
420 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1]) {
421 if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, pref, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
424 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
425 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id, NULL);
433 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
437 int tls1_set_groups(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
438 int *groups, size_t ngroups)
440 unsigned char *glist, *p;
443 * Bitmap of groups included to detect duplicates: only works while group
446 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
447 glist = OPENSSL_malloc(ngroups * 2);
450 for (i = 0, p = glist; i < ngroups; i++) {
451 unsigned long idmask;
453 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Convert for DH groups */
454 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(groups[i]);
456 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask)) {
465 *pextlen = ngroups * 2;
469 # define MAX_CURVELIST 28
473 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
476 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
478 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
484 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
486 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
488 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
490 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
491 if (nid == NID_undef)
492 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
493 if (nid == NID_undef)
494 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
495 if (nid == NID_undef)
497 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
498 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
500 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
504 /* Set groups based on a colon separate list */
505 int tls1_set_groups_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen, const char *str)
509 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
513 return tls1_set_groups(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
516 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
517 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
524 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
525 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
528 /* Determine curve ID */
529 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
530 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
531 /* If no id return error: we don't support arbitrary explicit curves */
535 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
537 if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
539 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED) {
540 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
542 if ((nid_list[id - 1].flags & TLS_CURVE_TYPE) == TLS_CURVE_PRIME)
543 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
545 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
551 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
552 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
553 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
555 const unsigned char *pformats, *pcurves;
556 size_t num_formats, num_curves, i;
559 * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
560 * supported (see RFC4492).
562 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
563 pformats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
564 num_formats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
565 for (i = 0; i < num_formats; i++, pformats++) {
566 if (*comp_id == *pformats)
569 if (i == num_formats)
574 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
575 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++) {
576 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &pcurves, &num_curves))
578 if (j == 1 && num_curves == 0) {
580 * If we've not received any curves then skip this check.
581 * RFC 4492 does not require the supported elliptic curves extension
582 * so if it is not sent we can just choose any curve.
583 * It is invalid to send an empty list in the elliptic curves
584 * extension, so num_curves == 0 always means no extension.
588 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
589 if (pcurves[0] == curve_id[0] && pcurves[1] == curve_id[1])
594 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
601 static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
605 * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
607 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
608 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
609 *num_formats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
611 *pformats = ecformats_default;
612 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
614 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
616 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default);
621 * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
622 * certificates have compatible curves and compression.
624 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
626 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
629 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
632 /* If not EC nothing to do */
633 if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) != EVP_PKEY_EC)
635 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey));
639 * Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a supported
642 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
646 * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
647 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
649 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s)) {
655 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
656 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
657 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
658 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
659 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
661 return 0; /* Should never happen */
662 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
663 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
665 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
667 if (set_ee_md == 2) {
668 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
669 s->s3->tmp.md[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha256();
671 s->s3->tmp.md[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha384();
677 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
679 * tls1_check_ec_tmp_key - Check EC temporary key compatibility
681 * @cid: Cipher ID we're considering using
683 * Checks that the kECDHE cipher suite we're considering using
684 * is compatible with the client extensions.
686 * Returns 0 when the cipher can't be used or 1 when it can.
688 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
691 * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
694 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
695 unsigned char curve_id[2];
696 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
697 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
698 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
699 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
700 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
704 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
705 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
709 /* Need a shared curve */
710 if (tls1_shared_group(s, 0))
714 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
718 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
723 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
726 * List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
727 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
730 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
731 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
733 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
736 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
737 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
739 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
743 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)/* */
745 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
748 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
749 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
750 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
751 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
753 static const unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
754 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
755 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
756 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
757 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
758 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
759 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
760 TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001,
761 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256,
762 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512
766 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
767 static const unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
768 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
769 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
772 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
775 * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
778 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
779 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
780 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
781 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
782 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
784 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
785 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
788 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
789 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
793 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
794 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs) {
795 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
796 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
797 } else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
798 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
799 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
801 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
802 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
807 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
808 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
810 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
811 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
813 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
814 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
815 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
816 /* Should never happen */
819 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
820 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1]) {
821 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
824 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
825 if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
826 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
827 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
828 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey)))
830 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id)) {
831 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
834 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
835 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
838 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256) {
839 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256) {
840 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
841 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
844 } else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384) {
845 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384) {
846 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
847 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
853 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
857 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
858 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
859 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i += 2, sent_sigs += 2) {
860 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
863 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
864 if (i == sent_sigslen
865 && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1
866 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
867 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
870 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
872 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
875 /* Make sure security callback allows algorithm */
876 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK,
877 EVP_MD_size(*pmd) * 4, EVP_MD_type(*pmd), (void *)sig)) {
878 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
882 * Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they wish.
884 s->s3->tmp.peer_md = *pmd;
889 * Set a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
890 * supported, doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms, isn't supported
891 * by the enabled protocol versions or by the security level.
893 * This function should only be used for checking which ciphers are supported
896 * Call ssl_cipher_disabled() to check that it's enabled or not.
898 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
900 s->s3->tmp.mask_a = 0;
901 s->s3->tmp.mask_k = 0;
902 ssl_set_sig_mask(&s->s3->tmp.mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
903 ssl_get_client_min_max_version(s, &s->s3->tmp.min_ver, &s->s3->tmp.max_ver);
904 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
905 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
906 if (!s->psk_client_callback) {
907 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
908 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_PSK;
910 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
911 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
912 if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) {
913 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
914 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
920 * ssl_cipher_disabled - check that a cipher is disabled or not
921 * @s: SSL connection that you want to use the cipher on
922 * @c: cipher to check
923 * @op: Security check that you want to do
925 * Returns 1 when it's disabled, 0 when enabled.
927 int ssl_cipher_disabled(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op)
929 if (c->algorithm_mkey & s->s3->tmp.mask_k
930 || c->algorithm_auth & s->s3->tmp.mask_a)
932 if (s->s3->tmp.max_ver == 0)
934 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && ((c->min_tls > s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
935 || (c->max_tls < s->s3->tmp.min_ver)))
937 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (DTLS_VERSION_GT(c->min_dtls, s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
938 || DTLS_VERSION_LT(c->max_dtls, s->s3->tmp.min_ver)))
941 return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c);
944 static int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s)
946 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
948 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL);
951 static int compare_uint(const void *p1, const void *p2)
953 unsigned int u1 = *((const unsigned int *)p1);
954 unsigned int u2 = *((const unsigned int *)p2);
964 * Per http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.1.4, there may not be
965 * more than one extension of the same type in a ClientHello or ServerHello.
966 * This function does an initial scan over the extensions block to filter those
967 * out. It returns 1 if all extensions are unique, and 0 if the extensions
968 * contain duplicates, could not be successfully parsed, or an internal error
971 static int tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(const PACKET *packet)
973 PACKET extensions = *packet;
974 size_t num_extensions = 0, i = 0;
975 unsigned int *extension_types = NULL;
978 /* First pass: count the extensions. */
979 while (PACKET_remaining(&extensions) > 0) {
982 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions, &type) ||
983 !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions, &extension)) {
989 if (num_extensions <= 1)
992 extension_types = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(unsigned int) * num_extensions);
993 if (extension_types == NULL) {
994 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
998 /* Second pass: gather the extension types. */
999 extensions = *packet;
1000 for (i = 0; i < num_extensions; i++) {
1002 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions, &extension_types[i]) ||
1003 !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions, &extension)) {
1004 /* This should not happen. */
1005 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1010 if (PACKET_remaining(&extensions) != 0) {
1011 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1014 /* Sort the extensions and make sure there are no duplicates. */
1015 qsort(extension_types, num_extensions, sizeof(unsigned int), compare_uint);
1016 for (i = 1; i < num_extensions; i++) {
1017 if (extension_types[i - 1] == extension_types[i])
1022 OPENSSL_free(extension_types);
1026 int ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
1028 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1029 const unsigned char *pcurves = NULL;
1030 size_t num_curves = 0;
1033 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1034 if ((s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->version <= TLS1_2_VERSION)
1035 || SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1037 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1038 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1040 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++) {
1041 const SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1043 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1044 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1045 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK))
1046 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)) {
1051 } else if (s->version >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
1053 * TODO(TLS1.3): We always use ECC for TLSv1.3 at the moment. This will
1054 * change if we implement DH key shares
1059 if (s->version >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
1060 /* Shouldn't happen! */
1061 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1066 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1067 if (s->renegotiate) {
1068 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
1069 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1070 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->s3->previous_client_finished,
1071 s->s3->previous_client_finished_len)
1072 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1073 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1077 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1078 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION)
1081 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1082 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1083 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1084 /* Sub-packet for server_name extension */
1085 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1086 /* Sub-packet for servername list (always 1 hostname)*/
1087 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1088 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name)
1089 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->tlsext_hostname,
1090 strlen(s->tlsext_hostname))
1091 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1092 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1093 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1097 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1098 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
1099 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) {
1100 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_srp)
1101 /* Sub-packet for SRP extension */
1102 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1103 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
1104 /* login must not be zero...internal error if so */
1105 || !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt, WPACKET_FLAGS_NON_ZERO_LENGTH)
1106 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->srp_ctx.login,
1107 strlen(s->srp_ctx.login))
1108 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1109 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1110 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1116 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1119 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message
1121 const unsigned char *pformats, *pcurvestmp;
1125 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &pformats, &num_formats);
1127 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
1128 /* Sub-packet for formats extension */
1129 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1130 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, pformats, num_formats)
1131 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1132 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1137 * Add TLS extension supported_groups to the ClientHello message
1139 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Add support for DHE groups */
1140 pcurves = s->tlsext_supportedgroupslist;
1141 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &pcurves, &num_curves)) {
1142 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1145 pcurvestmp = pcurves;
1147 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_groups)
1148 /* Sub-packet for supported_groups extension */
1149 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1150 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1151 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1154 /* Copy curve ID if supported */
1155 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurvestmp += 2) {
1156 if (tls_curve_allowed(s, pcurves, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) {
1157 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, pcurvestmp[0])
1158 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, pcurvestmp[1])) {
1159 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
1160 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1165 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1166 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1170 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1172 if (tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1174 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
1175 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
1176 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1177 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data) {
1178 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1179 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1180 if (s->session->tlsext_tick == NULL) {
1181 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1184 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1185 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data, ticklen);
1186 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1189 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1190 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1193 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
1194 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->session->tlsext_tick,
1196 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1202 if (SSL_CLIENT_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1204 const unsigned char *salg;
1206 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
1208 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms)
1209 /* Sub-packet for sig-algs extension */
1210 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1211 /* Sub-packet for the actual list */
1212 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1213 || !tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, pkt, salg, salglen)
1214 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1215 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1216 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1220 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
1221 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
1224 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
1225 /* Sub-packet for status request extension */
1226 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1227 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
1228 /* Sub-packet for the ids */
1229 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1230 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1233 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
1234 unsigned char *idbytes;
1238 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1239 idlen = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1241 /* Sub-packet for an individual id */
1242 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, idlen, &idbytes)
1243 || i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &idbytes) != idlen) {
1244 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1248 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)
1249 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1250 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1253 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) {
1254 unsigned char *extbytes;
1255 int extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1258 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1261 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, extlen, &extbytes)
1262 || i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &extbytes)
1264 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1268 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1269 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1275 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1276 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1278 * The client advertises an empty extension to indicate its support
1279 * for Next Protocol Negotiation
1281 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg)
1282 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1283 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1290 * finish_md_len is non-zero during a renegotiation, so
1291 * this avoids sending ALPN during the renegotiation
1292 * (see longer comment below)
1294 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1295 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt,
1296 TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation)
1297 /* Sub-packet ALPN extension */
1298 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1299 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->alpn_client_proto_list,
1300 s->alpn_client_proto_list_len)
1301 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1302 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1305 s->s3->alpn_sent = 1;
1307 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1308 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)) {
1309 STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *clnt = SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s);
1310 SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *prof;
1313 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
1314 /* Sub-packet for SRTP extension */
1315 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1316 /* Sub-packet for the protection profile list */
1317 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1318 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1321 ct = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(clnt);
1322 for (i = 0; i < ct; i++) {
1323 prof = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(clnt, i);
1324 if (prof == NULL || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, prof->id)) {
1325 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1329 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)
1330 /* Add an empty use_mki value */
1331 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)
1332 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1333 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1338 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->cli_ext);
1339 /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
1340 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 0, pkt, al)) {
1341 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1345 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)) {
1346 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
1347 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1348 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1353 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
1354 if (s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
1355 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp)
1356 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1357 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1363 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret)
1364 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1365 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1369 /* TLS1.3 specific extensions */
1370 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1371 int min_version, max_version, reason, currv;
1372 size_t i, sharessent = 0;
1374 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Should we add this extension for versions < TLS1.3? */
1375 /* supported_versions extension */
1376 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_versions)
1377 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1378 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)) {
1379 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1382 reason = ssl_get_client_min_max_version(s, &min_version, &max_version);
1384 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, reason);
1388 * TODO(TLS1.3): There is some discussion on the TLS list as to wheter
1389 * we should include versions <TLS1.2. For the moment we do. To be
1392 for (currv = max_version; currv >= min_version; currv--) {
1393 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove this first if clause prior to release!! */
1394 if (currv == TLS1_3_VERSION) {
1395 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT)) {
1396 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
1397 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1400 } else if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, currv)) {
1401 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1405 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1406 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1411 /* key_share extension */
1412 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share)
1413 /* Extension data sub-packet */
1414 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1415 /* KeyShare list sub-packet */
1416 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1417 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1422 * TODO(TLS1.3): Make the number of key_shares sent configurable. For
1423 * now, just send one
1425 for (i = 0; i < num_curves && sharessent < 1; i++, pcurves += 2) {
1426 if (tls_curve_allowed(s, pcurves, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) {
1427 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
1428 unsigned int curve_id = 0;
1429 EVP_PKEY *key_share_key = NULL;
1432 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) {
1433 /* Shouldn't happen! */
1434 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
1435 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1439 /* Generate a key for this key_share */
1440 curve_id = (pcurves[0] << 8) | pcurves[1];
1441 key_share_key = ssl_generate_pkey_curve(curve_id);
1442 if (key_share_key == NULL) {
1443 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
1447 /* Encode the public key. */
1448 encodedlen = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(key_share_key,
1450 if (encodedlen == 0) {
1451 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
1452 EVP_PKEY_free(key_share_key);
1456 /* Create KeyShareEntry */
1457 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, curve_id)
1458 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, encodedPoint,
1460 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
1461 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1462 EVP_PKEY_free(key_share_key);
1463 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1468 * TODO(TLS1.3): When changing to send more than one key_share
1469 * we're going to need to be able to save more than one EVP_PKEY
1470 * For now we reuse the existing tmp.pkey
1472 s->s3->group_id = curve_id;
1473 s->s3->tmp.pkey = key_share_key;
1475 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1478 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1479 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1485 * Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See
1486 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03 NB: because this
1487 * code works out the length of all existing extensions it MUST always
1490 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING) {
1491 unsigned char *padbytes;
1494 if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &hlen)) {
1495 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1499 if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200) {
1500 hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
1506 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_padding)
1507 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, hlen, &padbytes)) {
1508 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1511 memset(padbytes, 0, hlen);
1519 int ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
1521 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1522 int next_proto_neg_seen;
1524 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1525 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1526 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1527 int using_ecc = (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1528 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1531 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1532 || !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt, WPACKET_FLAGS_ABANDON_ON_ZERO_LENGTH)) {
1533 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1537 if (s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
1538 !ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, pkt)) {
1539 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1543 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1544 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
1547 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1
1548 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1549 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1550 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1551 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1555 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1557 const unsigned char *plist;
1560 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message
1562 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1564 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
1565 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1566 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, plist, plistlen)
1567 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1568 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1573 * Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves
1576 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1578 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected && tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1579 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
1580 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1581 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1586 * if we don't add the above TLSEXT, we can't add a session ticket
1589 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
1592 if (s->tlsext_status_expected) {
1593 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
1594 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1595 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1599 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1600 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->srtp_profile) {
1601 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
1602 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1603 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 2)
1604 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->srtp_profile->id)
1605 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)
1606 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1607 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1613 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x80
1614 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x81)
1615 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG)) {
1616 const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1617 0xfd, 0xe8, /* 65000 */
1618 0x00, 0x20, /* 32 bytes length */
1619 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1620 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1621 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1622 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17
1624 if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, cryptopro_ext, sizeof(cryptopro_ext))) {
1625 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1630 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1631 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1632 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1633 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb) {
1634 const unsigned char *npa;
1635 unsigned int npalen;
1638 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen,
1640 ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1641 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1642 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg)
1643 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, npa, npalen)) {
1644 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1647 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1651 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 1, pkt, al)) {
1652 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1656 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) {
1658 * Don't use encrypt_then_mac if AEAD or RC4 might want to disable
1659 * for other cases too.
1661 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD
1662 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4
1663 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT
1664 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT12)
1665 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1667 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
1668 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1669 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1674 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) {
1675 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret)
1676 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1677 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1682 if (s->s3->alpn_selected != NULL) {
1683 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt,
1684 TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation)
1685 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1686 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1687 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->s3->alpn_selected,
1688 s->s3->alpn_selected_len)
1689 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1690 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1691 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1697 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1698 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1705 * Save the ALPN extension in a ClientHello.
1706 * pkt: the contents of the ALPN extension, not including type and length.
1707 * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a failure.
1708 * returns: 1 on success, 0 on error.
1710 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
1712 PACKET protocol_list, save_protocol_list, protocol;
1714 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1716 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &protocol_list)
1717 || PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) < 2) {
1721 save_protocol_list = protocol_list;
1723 /* Protocol names can't be empty. */
1724 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&protocol_list, &protocol)
1725 || PACKET_remaining(&protocol) == 0) {
1728 } while (PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) != 0);
1730 if (!PACKET_memdup(&save_protocol_list,
1731 &s->s3->alpn_proposed, &s->s3->alpn_proposed_len)) {
1732 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1740 * Process the ALPN extension in a ClientHello.
1741 * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a failure.
1742 * returns 1 on success, 0 on error.
1744 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello_late(SSL *s, int *al)
1746 const unsigned char *selected = NULL;
1747 unsigned char selected_len = 0;
1749 if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb != NULL && s->s3->alpn_proposed != NULL) {
1750 int r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len,
1751 s->s3->alpn_proposed,
1752 (unsigned int)s->s3->alpn_proposed_len,
1753 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
1755 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1756 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1757 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_memdup(selected, selected_len);
1758 if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
1759 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1762 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
1763 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1764 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
1765 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1768 *al = SSL_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL;
1776 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1778 * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1779 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |hello|.
1780 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1785 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1786 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1787 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1788 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1790 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello)
1796 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1797 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1798 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1799 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1800 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1801 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1802 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1804 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1805 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1806 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1807 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1808 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1809 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1810 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1811 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1812 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1813 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1814 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1815 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1816 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1819 /* Length of the common prefix (first two extensions). */
1820 static const size_t kSafariCommonExtensionsLength = 18;
1822 tmppkt = hello->extensions;
1824 if (!PACKET_forward(&tmppkt, 2)
1825 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt, &type)
1826 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&tmppkt, &sni)) {
1830 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1833 ext_len = TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION ?
1834 sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock) : kSafariCommonExtensionsLength;
1836 s->s3->is_probably_safari = PACKET_equal(&tmppkt, kSafariExtensionsBlock,
1839 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1842 * Loop through all remaining ClientHello extensions that we collected earlier
1843 * and haven't already processed. For each one parse it and update the SSL
1844 * object as required.
1846 * Behaviour upon resumption is extension-specific. If the extension has no
1847 * effect during resumption, it is parsed (to verify its format) but otherwise
1850 * Returns 1 on success and 0 on failure.
1851 * Upon failure, sets |al| to the appropriate alert.
1853 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello, int *al)
1856 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1858 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1859 s->servername_done = 0;
1860 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1861 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1862 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1865 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1866 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
1867 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = 0;
1868 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_proposed);
1869 s->s3->alpn_proposed = NULL;
1870 s->s3->alpn_proposed_len = 0;
1872 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1873 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1874 ssl_check_for_safari(s, hello);
1875 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1877 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
1878 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs);
1879 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = NULL;
1880 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1882 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1883 OPENSSL_free(s->srp_ctx.login);
1884 s->srp_ctx.login = NULL;
1887 s->srtp_profile = NULL;
1890 * We parse all extensions to ensure the ClientHello is well-formed but,
1891 * unless an extension specifies otherwise, we ignore extensions upon
1894 for (loop = 0; loop < hello->num_extensions; loop++) {
1895 RAW_EXTENSION *currext = &hello->pre_proc_exts[loop];
1897 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1898 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, currext->type,
1899 PACKET_data(&currext->data),
1900 PACKET_remaining(&currext->data),
1901 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1903 if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
1904 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s,
1905 &currext->data, al))
1907 renegotiate_seen = 1;
1908 } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
1911 * The servername extension is treated as follows:
1913 * - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
1914 * - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
1915 * in which case an fatal alert is generated.
1916 * - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
1917 * - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
1918 * to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
1919 * - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
1920 * it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
1921 * Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
1922 * set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
1923 * case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
1924 * a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
1925 * presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
1926 * the value of the Host: field.
1927 * - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1928 * if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the
1929 * session, i.e. when the session has been established with a servername
1931 * - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
1935 else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
1936 unsigned int servname_type;
1937 PACKET sni, hostname;
1939 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&currext->data, &sni)
1940 /* ServerNameList must be at least 1 byte long. */
1941 || PACKET_remaining(&sni) == 0) {
1946 * Although the server_name extension was intended to be
1947 * extensible to new name types, RFC 4366 defined the
1948 * syntax inextensibility and OpenSSL 1.0.x parses it as
1950 * RFC 6066 corrected the mistake but adding new name types
1951 * is nevertheless no longer feasible, so act as if no other
1952 * SNI types can exist, to simplify parsing.
1954 * Also note that the RFC permits only one SNI value per type,
1955 * i.e., we can only have a single hostname.
1957 if (!PACKET_get_1(&sni, &servname_type)
1958 || servname_type != TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name
1959 || !PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&sni, &hostname)) {
1964 if (PACKET_remaining(&hostname) > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) {
1965 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1969 if (PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&hostname)) {
1970 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1974 if (!PACKET_strndup(&hostname, &s->session->tlsext_hostname)) {
1975 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1979 s->servername_done = 1;
1982 * TODO(openssl-team): if the SNI doesn't match, we MUST
1983 * fall back to a full handshake.
1985 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
1986 && PACKET_equal(&hostname, s->session->tlsext_hostname,
1987 strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname));
1990 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1991 else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp) {
1994 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&currext->data, &srp_I))
1997 if (PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&srp_I))
2001 * TODO(openssl-team): currently, we re-authenticate the user
2002 * upon resumption. Instead, we MUST ignore the login.
2004 if (!PACKET_strndup(&srp_I, &s->srp_ctx.login)) {
2005 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2011 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2012 else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
2013 PACKET ec_point_format_list;
2015 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&currext->data,
2016 &ec_point_format_list)
2017 || PACKET_remaining(&ec_point_format_list) == 0) {
2022 if (!PACKET_memdup(&ec_point_format_list,
2023 &s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
2025 session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length)) {
2026 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2030 } else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_groups) {
2031 PACKET supported_groups_list;
2033 /* Each group is 2 bytes and we must have at least 1. */
2034 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&currext->data,
2035 &supported_groups_list)
2036 || PACKET_remaining(&supported_groups_list) == 0
2037 || (PACKET_remaining(&supported_groups_list) % 2) != 0) {
2042 if (!PACKET_memdup(&supported_groups_list,
2043 &s->session->tlsext_supportedgroupslist,
2045 session->tlsext_supportedgroupslist_length)) {
2046 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2051 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2052 else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2053 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2054 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s,
2055 PACKET_data(&currext->data),
2056 PACKET_remaining(&currext->data),
2057 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg)) {
2058 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2061 } else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms) {
2062 PACKET supported_sig_algs;
2064 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&currext->data,
2065 &supported_sig_algs)
2066 || (PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) % 2) != 0
2067 || PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) == 0) {
2072 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, PACKET_data(&supported_sig_algs),
2073 PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs))) {
2077 } else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
2078 if (!PACKET_get_1(&currext->data,
2079 (unsigned int *)&s->tlsext_status_type)) {
2082 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
2083 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
2084 const unsigned char *ext_data;
2085 PACKET responder_id_list, exts;
2086 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2
2087 (&currext->data, &responder_id_list))
2091 * We remove any OCSP_RESPIDs from a previous handshake
2092 * to prevent unbounded memory growth - CVE-2016-6304
2094 sk_OCSP_RESPID_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids,
2096 if (PACKET_remaining(&responder_id_list) > 0) {
2097 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null();
2098 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_ids == NULL) {
2099 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2103 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = NULL;
2106 while (PACKET_remaining(&responder_id_list) > 0) {
2108 PACKET responder_id;
2109 const unsigned char *id_data;
2111 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&responder_id_list,
2113 || PACKET_remaining(&responder_id) == 0) {
2117 id_data = PACKET_data(&responder_id);
2118 /* TODO(size_t): Convert d2i_* to size_t */
2119 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, &id_data,
2120 (int)PACKET_remaining(&responder_id));
2124 if (id_data != PACKET_end(&responder_id)) {
2125 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2129 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id)) {
2130 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2131 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2136 /* Read in request_extensions */
2137 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(
2138 &currext->data, &exts))
2141 if (PACKET_remaining(&exts) > 0) {
2142 ext_data = PACKET_data(&exts);
2143 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2144 X509_EXTENSION_free);
2145 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
2146 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &ext_data,
2147 (int)PACKET_remaining(&exts));
2148 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts == NULL
2149 || ext_data != PACKET_end(&exts)) {
2157 * We don't know what to do with any other type so ignore it.
2159 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2162 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2163 else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg
2164 && s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2166 * We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2169 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2170 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2171 * the initial renegotiation too in certain cases (when
2172 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2173 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2174 * anything like that, but this might change).
2176 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2177 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2178 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2179 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2180 * Finished message could have been computed.)
2182 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2186 else if (currext->type
2187 == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation
2188 && s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2189 if (!tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s,
2190 &currext->data, al))
2194 /* session ticket processed earlier */
2195 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2196 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)
2197 && currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2198 if (ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s,
2199 &currext->data, al))
2203 else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2204 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)) {
2205 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2206 } else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share
2207 && s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION) {
2208 unsigned int group_id;
2209 PACKET key_share_list, encoded_pt;
2210 const unsigned char *curves;
2211 size_t num_curves, i;
2213 unsigned int curve_flags;
2216 if (s->s3->peer_tmp != NULL) {
2217 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2218 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2222 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&currext->data, &key_share_list)) {
2223 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2224 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2225 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2229 while (PACKET_remaining(&key_share_list) > 0) {
2230 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&key_share_list, &group_id)
2231 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&key_share_list,
2233 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2234 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2235 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2239 /* Find a share that we can use */
2240 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &num_curves)) {
2241 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2242 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2243 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2246 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, curves += 2) {
2247 unsigned int share_id = (curves[0] << 8) | (curves[1]);
2248 if (group_id == share_id
2249 && tls_curve_allowed(s, curves,
2250 SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK)) {
2255 if (i == num_curves) {
2256 /* Share not suitable */
2260 group_nid = tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(group_id, &curve_flags);
2262 if (group_nid == 0) {
2263 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2264 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2265 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
2269 if ((curve_flags & TLS_CURVE_TYPE) == TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM) {
2270 /* Can happen for some curves, e.g. X25519 */
2271 EVP_PKEY *key = EVP_PKEY_new();
2273 if (key == NULL || !EVP_PKEY_set_type(key, group_nid)) {
2274 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2275 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2279 s->s3->peer_tmp = key;
2281 /* Set up EVP_PKEY with named curve as parameters */
2282 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(EVP_PKEY_EC, NULL);
2284 || EVP_PKEY_paramgen_init(pctx) <= 0
2285 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ec_paramgen_curve_nid(pctx,
2287 || EVP_PKEY_paramgen(pctx, &s->s3->peer_tmp) <= 0) {
2288 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2289 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2290 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2293 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2297 if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->peer_tmp,
2298 PACKET_data(&encoded_pt),
2299 PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt))) {
2300 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2301 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
2307 * Note: extended master secret extension handled in
2308 * tls_check_client_ems_support()
2312 * If this ClientHello extension was unhandled and this is a
2313 * nonresumed connection, check whether the extension is a custom
2314 * TLS Extension (has a custom_srv_ext_record), and if so call the
2315 * callback and record the extension number so that an appropriate
2316 * ServerHello may be later returned.
2319 if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1, currext->type,
2320 PACKET_data(&currext->data),
2321 PACKET_remaining(&currext->data), al) <= 0)
2326 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2328 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
2329 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2330 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2331 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2332 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2337 * This function currently has no state to clean up, so it returns directly.
2338 * If parsing fails at any point, the function returns early.
2339 * The SSL object may be left with partial data from extensions, but it must
2340 * then no longer be used, and clearing it up will free the leftovers.
2345 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello)
2348 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->srv_ext);
2349 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, hello, &al) <= 0) {
2350 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2353 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) {
2354 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2360 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2362 * ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2363 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly
2364 * fill the length of the block.
2366 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(PACKET *pkt)
2368 PACKET tmp_protocol;
2370 while (PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
2371 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &tmp_protocol)
2372 || PACKET_remaining(&tmp_protocol) == 0)
2380 static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2382 unsigned int length, type, size;
2383 int tlsext_servername = 0;
2384 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2386 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2387 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2389 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2391 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2392 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
2394 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2396 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
2398 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &length))
2401 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != length) {
2402 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2406 if (!tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(pkt)) {
2407 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2411 while (PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &type) && PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &size)) {
2412 const unsigned char *data;
2415 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &spkt, size)
2416 || !PACKET_peek_bytes(&spkt, &data, size))
2419 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2420 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2422 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
2423 if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, &spkt, al))
2425 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2426 } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
2427 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
2428 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0) {
2429 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2432 tlsext_servername = 1;
2434 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2435 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
2436 unsigned int ecpointformatlist_length;
2437 if (!PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &ecpointformatlist_length)
2438 || ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1) {
2439 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2443 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2444 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2445 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
2446 OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) {
2447 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2450 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
2451 ecpointformatlist_length;
2452 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&spkt,
2453 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
2454 ecpointformatlist_length)) {
2455 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2461 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2463 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2464 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2465 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size,
2466 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2468 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2471 if (!tls_use_ticket(s) || (size > 0)) {
2472 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2475 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2476 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
2478 * MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested a status
2481 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0)) {
2482 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2485 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2486 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2488 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
2490 * Only take it if we asked for it - i.e if there is no CT validation
2491 * callback set, then a custom extension MAY be processing it, so we
2492 * need to let control continue to flow to that.
2494 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp &&
2495 s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
2496 /* Simply copy it off for later processing */
2497 if (s->tlsext_scts != NULL) {
2498 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_scts);
2499 s->tlsext_scts = NULL;
2501 s->tlsext_scts_len = size;
2503 s->tlsext_scts = OPENSSL_malloc(size);
2504 if (s->tlsext_scts == NULL) {
2505 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2508 memcpy(s->tlsext_scts, data, size);
2512 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2513 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2514 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2515 unsigned char *selected;
2516 unsigned char selected_len;
2517 /* We must have requested it. */
2518 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL) {
2519 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2522 /* The data must be valid */
2523 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(&spkt)) {
2524 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2527 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data,
2530 ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) !=
2531 SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
2532 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2536 * Could be non-NULL if server has sent multiple NPN extensions in
2537 * a single Serverhello
2539 OPENSSL_free(s->next_proto_negotiated);
2540 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2541 if (s->next_proto_negotiated == NULL) {
2542 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2545 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2546 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2547 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2551 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation) {
2553 /* We must have requested it. */
2554 if (!s->s3->alpn_sent) {
2555 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2559 * The extension data consists of:
2560 * uint16 list_length
2561 * uint8 proto_length;
2562 * uint8 proto[proto_length];
2564 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&spkt, &len)
2565 || PACKET_remaining(&spkt) != len || !PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &len)
2566 || PACKET_remaining(&spkt) != len) {
2567 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2570 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2571 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
2572 if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
2573 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2576 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&spkt, s->s3->alpn_selected, len)) {
2577 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2580 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
2582 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2583 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2584 if (ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, &spkt, al))
2588 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac) {
2589 /* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite */
2590 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) &&
2591 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD
2592 && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc != SSL_RC4)
2593 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2594 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret) {
2595 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
2597 s->session->flags |= SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS;
2600 * If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but matches a
2601 * custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c callback
2603 else if (custom_ext_parse(s, 0, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2607 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2608 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2612 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1) {
2613 if (s->tlsext_hostname) {
2614 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) {
2615 s->session->tlsext_hostname =
2616 OPENSSL_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
2617 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname) {
2618 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2622 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2631 * Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to avoid
2632 * an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server hello
2633 * because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an attack.
2634 * However this would mean we could not connect to any server which
2635 * doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI absence
2637 if (!renegotiate_seen && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
2638 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2639 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2640 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2641 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2647 * Check extended master secret extension is consistent with
2650 if (!(s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) !=
2651 !(s->session->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS)) {
2652 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2653 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EXTMS);
2661 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2663 s->s3->alpn_sent = 0;
2667 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2672 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
2674 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2675 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2677 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2679 * The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely
2680 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2683 * The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely
2684 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2688 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2690 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2691 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2692 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
2693 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2695 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2697 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2700 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2701 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2704 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2705 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2708 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2709 s->servername_done = 0;
2715 /* Initialise digests to default values */
2716 void ssl_set_default_md(SSL *s)
2718 const EVP_MD **pmd = s->s3->tmp.md;
2719 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2720 pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
2722 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2723 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2724 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
2726 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX);
2727 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN];
2729 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2730 pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
2732 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2733 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX);
2734 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX);
2735 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX);
2739 int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s)
2744 /* Clear any shared signature algorithms */
2745 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
2746 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
2747 s->cert->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
2748 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
2749 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
2750 s->s3->tmp.md[i] = NULL;
2751 s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
2754 /* If sigalgs received process it. */
2755 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs) {
2756 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2757 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2758 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2761 /* Fatal error is no shared signature algorithms */
2762 if (!s->cert->shared_sigalgs) {
2763 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS,
2764 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS);
2765 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2769 ssl_set_default_md(s);
2773 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2778 * Upon success, returns 1.
2779 * Upon failure, returns 0 and sets |al| to the appropriate fatal alert.
2781 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s, int *al)
2783 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2786 * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be
2787 * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed,
2788 * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may
2789 * influence which certificate is sent
2791 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
2793 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
2794 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
2795 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
2796 if (certpkey != NULL) {
2798 * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
2799 * et al can pick it up.
2801 s->cert->key = certpkey;
2802 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2804 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
2805 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2806 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2808 /* status request response should be sent */
2809 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
2810 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
2811 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2813 /* something bad happened */
2814 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2816 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2822 if (!tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello_late(s, al)) {
2829 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2831 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2832 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2834 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2836 * If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
2837 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension it
2838 * must contain uncompressed.
2840 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2841 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2842 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
2843 && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
2844 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
2845 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
2846 && ((alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) {
2847 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
2849 unsigned char *list;
2850 int found_uncompressed = 0;
2851 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2852 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) {
2853 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed) {
2854 found_uncompressed = 1;
2858 if (!found_uncompressed) {
2859 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2860 SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
2864 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2865 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2867 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2869 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2870 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2871 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
2872 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2874 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2876 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2879 * Ensure we get sensible values passed to tlsext_status_cb in the event
2880 * that we don't receive a status message
2882 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
2883 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
2884 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = 0;
2887 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2888 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2891 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2892 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2895 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2896 s->servername_done = 0;
2902 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2905 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
2907 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, pkt, &al) <= 0) {
2908 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2912 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
2913 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
2920 * Given a list of extensions that we collected earlier, find one of a given
2921 * type and return it.
2923 * |exts| is the set of extensions previously collected.
2924 * |numexts| is the number of extensions that we have.
2925 * |type| the type of the extension that we are looking for.
2927 * Returns a pointer to the found RAW_EXTENSION data, or NULL if not found.
2929 RAW_EXTENSION *tls_get_extension_by_type(RAW_EXTENSION *exts, size_t numexts,
2934 for (loop = 0; loop < numexts; loop++) {
2935 if (exts[loop].type == type)
2943 * Gets the ticket information supplied by the client if any.
2945 * hello: The parsed ClientHello data
2946 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2947 * point to the resulting session.
2949 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
2950 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
2951 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
2954 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
2955 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
2956 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
2957 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
2958 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
2959 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
2960 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
2963 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
2964 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
2965 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
2966 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
2967 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
2968 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
2970 int tls_get_ticket_from_client(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello,
2974 const unsigned char *etick;
2976 RAW_EXTENSION *ticketext;
2979 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2982 * If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
2985 if (s->version <= SSL3_VERSION || !tls_use_ticket(s))
2988 ticketext = tls_get_extension_by_type(hello->pre_proc_exts,
2989 hello->num_extensions,
2990 TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket);
2991 if (ticketext == NULL)
2994 size = PACKET_remaining(&ticketext->data);
2997 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
3000 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3003 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
3005 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
3006 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
3007 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
3008 * calculate the master secret later.
3012 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&ticketext->data, &etick, size)) {
3013 /* Shouldn't ever happen */
3016 retv = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, etick, size, hello->session_id,
3017 hello->session_id_len, ret);
3019 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
3020 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3023 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
3026 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
3027 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3030 default: /* fatal error */
3036 * Sets the extended master secret flag if the extension is present in the
3042 int tls_check_client_ems_support(SSL *s, const CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello)
3044 RAW_EXTENSION *emsext;
3046 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
3048 if (s->version <= SSL3_VERSION)
3051 emsext = tls_get_extension_by_type(hello->pre_proc_exts,
3052 hello->num_extensions,
3053 TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret);
3056 * No extensions is a success - we have successfully discovered that the
3057 * client doesn't support EMS.
3062 /* The extensions must always be empty */
3063 if (PACKET_remaining(&emsext->data) != 0)
3066 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
3072 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
3074 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
3075 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extension.
3076 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
3077 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
3078 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3079 * point to the resulting session.
3082 * -2: fatal error, malloc failure.
3083 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3084 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
3085 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
3086 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
3088 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
3089 size_t eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id,
3090 size_t sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess)
3093 unsigned char *sdec;
3094 const unsigned char *p;
3095 int slen, renew_ticket = 0, ret = -1, declen;
3097 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
3098 HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL;
3099 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
3100 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3102 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
3103 hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
3106 ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
3111 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
3112 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
3113 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
3124 /* Check key name matches */
3125 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name,
3126 sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name)) != 0) {
3130 if (HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key,
3131 sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key),
3132 EVP_sha256(), NULL) <= 0
3133 || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_256_cbc(), NULL,
3134 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key,
3135 etick + sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name)) <=
3141 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
3144 mlen = HMAC_size(hctx);
3148 /* Sanity check ticket length: must exceed keyname + IV + HMAC */
3150 TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx) + mlen) {
3155 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
3156 if (HMAC_Update(hctx, etick, eticklen) <= 0
3157 || HMAC_Final(hctx, tick_hmac, NULL) <= 0) {
3160 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3161 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) {
3162 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3165 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
3166 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
3167 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
3168 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
3169 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
3170 if (sdec == NULL || EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, sdec, &slen, p,
3171 (int)eticklen) <= 0) {
3172 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3176 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(ctx, sdec + slen, &declen) <= 0) {
3177 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3182 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3186 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3190 * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
3191 * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
3192 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
3196 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3197 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3206 * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
3210 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3211 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3215 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3222 static const tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
3223 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3224 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3225 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3226 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3227 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3228 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512},
3229 {NID_id_GostR3411_94, TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411},
3230 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256},
3231 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512},
3234 static const tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
3235 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
3236 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
3237 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa},
3238 {NID_id_GostR3410_2001, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001},
3239 {NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256},
3240 {NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512}
3243 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3246 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3247 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3253 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3256 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3257 if ((table[i].id) == id)
3258 return table[i].nid;
3263 int tls12_get_sigandhash(WPACKET *pkt, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md)
3269 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3272 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3275 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, md_id) || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, sig_id))
3281 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
3283 return tls12_find_id(EVP_PKEY_id(pk), tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3290 unsigned char tlsext_hash;
3293 static const tls12_hash_info tls12_md_info[] = {
3294 {NID_md5, 64, SSL_MD_MD5_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3295 {NID_sha1, 80, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3296 {NID_sha224, 112, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3297 {NID_sha256, 128, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3298 {NID_sha384, 192, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3299 {NID_sha512, 256, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha512},
3300 {NID_id_GostR3411_94, 128, SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411},
3301 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, 128, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX,
3302 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256},
3303 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, 256, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX,
3304 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512},
3307 static const tls12_hash_info *tls12_get_hash_info(unsigned char hash_alg)
3313 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md_info); i++) {
3314 if (tls12_md_info[i].tlsext_hash == hash_alg)
3315 return tls12_md_info + i;
3321 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
3323 const tls12_hash_info *inf;
3324 if (hash_alg == TLSEXT_hash_md5 && FIPS_mode())
3326 inf = tls12_get_hash_info(hash_alg);
3329 return ssl_md(inf->md_idx);
3332 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
3335 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3336 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3337 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3339 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3340 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3341 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3343 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3344 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3345 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3347 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3348 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001:
3349 return SSL_PKEY_GOST01;
3351 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256:
3352 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256;
3354 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512:
3355 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512;
3361 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3362 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
3363 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3365 int sign_nid = NID_undef, hash_nid = NID_undef;
3366 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3368 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3369 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3371 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3373 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3374 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3376 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3378 if (psignhash_nid) {
3379 if (sign_nid == NID_undef || hash_nid == NID_undef
3380 || OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid, hash_nid, sign_nid) <= 0)
3381 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3385 /* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
3386 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(SSL *s, int op, const unsigned char *ptmp)
3388 /* See if we have an entry in the hash table and it is enabled */
3389 const tls12_hash_info *hinf = tls12_get_hash_info(ptmp[0]);
3390 if (hinf == NULL || ssl_md(hinf->md_idx) == NULL)
3392 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
3393 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3395 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
3396 return ssl_security(s, op, hinf->secbits, hinf->nid, (void *)ptmp);
3400 * Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported signature
3401 * algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA then RSA is
3405 void ssl_set_sig_mask(uint32_t *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op)
3407 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
3408 size_t i, sigalgslen;
3409 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
3411 * Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any for
3412 * RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just TLS 1.2. To keep
3413 * down calls to security callback only check if we have to.
3415 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
3416 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2) {
3417 switch (sigalgs[1]) {
3418 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3419 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3420 if (!have_rsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3424 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3425 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3426 if (!have_dsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3430 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3431 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3432 if (!have_ecdsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3439 *pmask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
3441 *pmask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
3443 *pmask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
3446 int tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
3447 const unsigned char *psig, size_t psiglen)
3451 for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i += 2, psig += 2) {
3452 if (tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, psig)) {
3453 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, psig[0])
3454 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, psig[1]))
3461 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
3462 static size_t tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
3463 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3464 const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
3466 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3467 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3468 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i += 2, ptmp += 2) {
3469 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3470 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED, ptmp))
3472 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j += 2, atmp += 2) {
3473 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1]) {
3476 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3477 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3478 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3480 &shsig->signandhash_nid, ptmp);
3490 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3491 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3493 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3494 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3496 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3498 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
3500 OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
3501 c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
3502 c->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
3503 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3504 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3505 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3506 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3507 } else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3508 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
3509 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3511 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
3512 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb) {
3515 allow = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3516 allowlen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
3520 pref = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3521 preflen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
3523 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3525 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3528 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3532 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3533 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3537 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3539 int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, size_t dsize)
3542 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
3543 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3545 /* Should never happen */
3549 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs);
3550 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
3551 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs == NULL)
3553 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3554 memcpy(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
3558 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3563 const EVP_MD **pmd = s->s3->tmp.md;
3564 uint32_t *pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags;
3566 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3567 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s))
3570 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3571 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++) {
3572 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3573 if (idx > 0 && pmd[idx] == NULL) {
3574 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
3576 pvalid[idx] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3577 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) {
3578 pvalid[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3579 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = md;
3585 * In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't use
3586 * the certificate for signing.
3588 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
3590 * Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not
3591 * supported it stays as NULL.
3593 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3594 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] == NULL)
3595 pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
3597 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3598 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] == NULL) {
3599 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
3600 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = EVP_sha1();
3603 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3604 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] == NULL)
3605 pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha1();
3607 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3608 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] == NULL)
3609 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] = EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_94);
3610 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] == NULL)
3611 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] =
3612 EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256);
3613 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] == NULL)
3614 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] =
3615 EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512);
3621 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3622 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3623 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3625 const unsigned char *psig = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3626 size_t numsigalgs = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3627 if (psig == NULL || numsigalgs > INT_MAX)
3631 if (idx >= (int)s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen)
3638 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
3640 return (int)numsigalgs;
3643 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3644 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3645 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3647 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
3648 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen
3649 || s->cert->shared_sigalgslen > INT_MAX)
3653 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3655 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3657 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3659 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
3661 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
3662 return (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
3665 #define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
3669 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
3672 static void get_sigorhash(int *psig, int *phash, const char *str)
3674 if (strcmp(str, "RSA") == 0) {
3675 *psig = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
3676 } else if (strcmp(str, "DSA") == 0) {
3677 *psig = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
3678 } else if (strcmp(str, "ECDSA") == 0) {
3679 *psig = EVP_PKEY_EC;
3681 *phash = OBJ_sn2nid(str);
3682 if (*phash == NID_undef)
3683 *phash = OBJ_ln2nid(str);
3687 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
3689 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
3692 int sig_alg = NID_undef, hash_alg = NID_undef;
3695 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
3697 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
3699 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
3701 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
3709 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, etmp);
3710 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, p);
3712 if (sig_alg == NID_undef || hash_alg == NID_undef)
3715 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i += 2) {
3716 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
3719 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
3720 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
3725 * Set supported signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
3726 * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
3728 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
3732 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
3736 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
3739 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
3741 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
3746 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
3747 if (sigalgs == NULL)
3749 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i += 2) {
3750 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3751 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3753 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
3760 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
3761 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3762 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
3764 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
3765 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3766 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
3772 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
3776 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
3780 if (default_nid == -1)
3782 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
3784 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
3785 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
3786 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
3791 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
3792 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
3796 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
3797 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++) {
3798 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
3805 * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by
3806 * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before
3807 * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before
3808 * attempting to use them.
3811 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
3813 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
3814 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
3815 /* Strict mode flags */
3816 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
3817 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
3818 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
3820 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
3825 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
3826 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
3829 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
3830 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
3832 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
3835 idx = (int)(cpk - c->pkeys);
3837 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
3838 pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
3840 pk = cpk->privatekey;
3842 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
3843 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
3849 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
3852 pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
3854 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
3855 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
3857 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
3864 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
3865 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
3866 if (ok == X509_V_OK)
3867 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
3868 else if (!check_flags)
3873 * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature
3874 * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode.
3876 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode) {
3878 unsigned char rsign = 0;
3879 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs)
3881 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
3884 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
3885 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
3886 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
3887 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
3890 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
3891 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
3892 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
3896 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
3897 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
3900 case SSL_PKEY_GOST01:
3901 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001;
3902 default_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001;
3905 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256:
3906 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256;
3907 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_256;
3910 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512:
3911 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512;
3912 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_512;
3921 * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set
3922 * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1.
3924 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs) {
3926 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
3927 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2) {
3928 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
3931 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen) {
3938 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
3939 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid)) {
3943 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
3944 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
3945 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
3946 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i), default_nid)) {
3948 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
3955 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
3956 else if (check_flags)
3957 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE | CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
3959 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
3960 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
3961 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
3962 else if (!check_flags)
3965 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
3966 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
3967 else if (strict_mode) {
3968 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
3969 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
3970 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
3971 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0)) {
3973 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
3980 if (!s->server && strict_mode) {
3981 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
3983 switch (EVP_PKEY_id(pk)) {
3985 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
3988 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
3991 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
3995 const unsigned char *ctypes;
3999 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
4001 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
4002 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
4004 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++) {
4005 if (ctypes[i] == check_type) {
4006 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4010 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
4013 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4015 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
4017 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
4018 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4020 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
4021 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
4022 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4024 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
4025 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
4026 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4027 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp)) {
4028 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4033 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4036 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME | CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4038 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
4039 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
4043 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
4044 if (*pvalid & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
4045 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4046 else if (s->s3->tmp.md[idx] != NULL)
4047 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4049 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4052 * When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the
4056 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
4059 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
4060 *pvalid &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4067 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
4068 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
4070 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
4071 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
4072 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
4073 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
4074 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST01);
4075 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256);
4076 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512);
4079 /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
4080 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
4082 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);
4085 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
4086 DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s)
4088 int dh_secbits = 80;
4089 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto == 2)
4090 return DH_get_1024_160();
4091 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aPSK)) {
4092 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256)
4097 CERT_PKEY *cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
4098 dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(cpk->privatekey);
4101 if (dh_secbits >= 128) {
4109 if (dh_secbits >= 192)
4110 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL);
4112 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL);
4113 if (p == NULL || g == NULL || !DH_set0_pqg(dhp, p, NULL, g)) {
4121 if (dh_secbits >= 112)
4122 return DH_get_2048_224();
4123 return DH_get_1024_160();
4127 static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4130 EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
4133 * If no parameters this will return -1 and fail using the default
4134 * security callback for any non-zero security level. This will
4135 * reject keys which omit parameters but this only affects DSA and
4136 * omission of parameters is never (?) done in practice.
4138 secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey);
4141 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, 0, x);
4143 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, 0, x);
4146 static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4148 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
4149 int secbits = -1, md_nid = NID_undef, sig_nid;
4150 /* Don't check signature if self signed */
4151 if ((X509_get_extension_flags(x) & EXFLAG_SS) != 0)
4153 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
4154 if (sig_nid && OBJ_find_sigid_algs(sig_nid, &md_nid, NULL)) {
4156 if (md_nid && (md = EVP_get_digestbynid(md_nid)))
4157 secbits = EVP_MD_size(md) * 4;
4160 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4162 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4165 int ssl_security_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int vfy, int is_ee)
4168 vfy = SSL_SECOP_PEER;
4170 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY | vfy))
4171 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4173 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY | vfy))
4174 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4176 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD | vfy))
4177 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK;
4182 * Check security of a chain, if sk includes the end entity certificate then
4183 * x is NULL. If vfy is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and not sending
4184 * one to the peer. Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
4187 int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x, int vfy)
4189 int rv, start_idx, i;
4191 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
4196 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 1);
4200 for (i = start_idx; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
4201 x = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
4202 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 0);