2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
12 #include <openssl/objects.h>
13 #include <openssl/evp.h>
14 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
15 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
16 #include <openssl/conf.h>
17 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
18 #include <openssl/dh.h>
19 #include <openssl/bn.h>
21 #include <openssl/ct.h>
23 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, size_t ticklen,
24 const unsigned char *sess_id, size_t sesslen,
26 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
27 static int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
29 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data = {
33 tls1_generate_master_secret,
34 tls1_change_cipher_state,
35 tls1_final_finish_mac,
36 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
37 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
39 tls1_export_keying_material,
41 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
42 tls_close_construct_packet,
46 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_1_enc_data = {
50 tls1_generate_master_secret,
51 tls1_change_cipher_state,
52 tls1_final_finish_mac,
53 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
54 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
56 tls1_export_keying_material,
57 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
58 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
59 tls_close_construct_packet,
63 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_2_enc_data = {
67 tls1_generate_master_secret,
68 tls1_change_cipher_state,
69 tls1_final_finish_mac,
70 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
71 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
73 tls1_export_keying_material,
74 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
75 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
76 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
77 tls_close_construct_packet,
81 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_3_enc_data = {
85 tls1_generate_master_secret,
86 tls1_change_cipher_state,
87 tls1_final_finish_mac,
88 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
89 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
91 tls1_export_keying_material,
92 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
93 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
94 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
95 tls_close_construct_packet,
99 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
102 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
103 * http, the cache would over fill
105 return (60 * 60 * 2);
112 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
116 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
118 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
122 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
125 if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION)
126 s->version = TLS_MAX_VERSION;
128 s->version = s->method->version;
131 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
134 int nid; /* Curve NID */
135 int secbits; /* Bits of security (from SP800-57) */
136 unsigned int flags; /* Flags: currently just field type */
140 * Table of curve information.
141 * Do not delete entries or reorder this array! It is used as a lookup
142 * table: the index of each entry is one less than the TLS curve id.
144 static const tls_curve_info nid_list[] = {
145 {NID_sect163k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163k1 (1) */
146 {NID_sect163r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r1 (2) */
147 {NID_sect163r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r2 (3) */
148 {NID_sect193r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r1 (4) */
149 {NID_sect193r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r2 (5) */
150 {NID_sect233k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233k1 (6) */
151 {NID_sect233r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233r1 (7) */
152 {NID_sect239k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect239k1 (8) */
153 {NID_sect283k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283k1 (9) */
154 {NID_sect283r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283r1 (10) */
155 {NID_sect409k1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409k1 (11) */
156 {NID_sect409r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409r1 (12) */
157 {NID_sect571k1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571k1 (13) */
158 {NID_sect571r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571r1 (14) */
159 {NID_secp160k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160k1 (15) */
160 {NID_secp160r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r1 (16) */
161 {NID_secp160r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r2 (17) */
162 {NID_secp192k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192k1 (18) */
163 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192r1 (19) */
164 {NID_secp224k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224k1 (20) */
165 {NID_secp224r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224r1 (21) */
166 {NID_secp256k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256k1 (22) */
167 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256r1 (23) */
168 {NID_secp384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp384r1 (24) */
169 {NID_secp521r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp521r1 (25) */
170 {NID_brainpoolP256r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
171 {NID_brainpoolP384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
172 {NID_brainpoolP512r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
173 {NID_X25519, 128, TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM}, /* X25519 (29) */
176 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = {
177 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
178 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
179 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
182 /* The default curves */
183 static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] = {
184 0, 29, /* X25519 (29) */
185 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
186 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
187 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
190 static const unsigned char eccurves_all[] = {
191 0, 29, /* X25519 (29) */
192 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
193 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
194 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
195 0, 26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
196 0, 27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
197 0, 28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
200 * Remaining curves disabled by default but still permitted if set
201 * via an explicit callback or parameters.
203 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
204 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
205 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
206 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
207 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
208 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
209 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
210 0, 20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
211 0, 21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
212 0, 18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
213 0, 19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
214 0, 15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
215 0, 16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
216 0, 17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
217 0, 8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
218 0, 6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
219 0, 7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
220 0, 4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
221 0, 5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
222 0, 1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
223 0, 2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
224 0, 3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
227 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] = {
228 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
229 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
232 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id, unsigned int *pflags)
234 const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
235 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
236 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
238 cinfo = nid_list + curve_id - 1;
240 *pflags = cinfo->flags;
244 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
247 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(nid_list); i++) {
248 if (nid_list[i].nid == nid)
255 * Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
257 * Sets |num_curves| to the number of curves in the list, i.e.,
258 * the length of |pcurves| is 2 * num_curves.
259 * Returns 1 on success and 0 if the client curves list has invalid format.
260 * The latter indicates an internal error: we should not be accepting such
261 * lists in the first place.
262 * TODO(emilia): we should really be storing the curves list in explicitly
263 * parsed form instead. (However, this would affect binary compatibility
264 * so cannot happen in the 1.0.x series.)
266 static int tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
267 const unsigned char **pcurves, size_t *num_curves)
269 size_t pcurveslen = 0;
271 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_supportedgroupslist;
272 pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_supportedgroupslist_length;
274 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
275 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
276 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
277 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
278 pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
281 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
282 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
286 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
287 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
291 *pcurves = s->tlsext_supportedgroupslist;
292 pcurveslen = s->tlsext_supportedgroupslist_length;
295 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
296 pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
300 /* We do not allow odd length arrays to enter the system. */
301 if (pcurveslen & 1) {
302 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_GET_CURVELIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
306 *num_curves = pcurveslen / 2;
311 /* See if curve is allowed by security callback */
312 static int tls_curve_allowed(SSL *s, const unsigned char *curve, int op)
314 const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
317 if ((curve[1] < 1) || ((size_t)curve[1] > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
319 cinfo = &nid_list[curve[1] - 1];
320 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
321 if (cinfo->flags & TLS_CURVE_CHAR2)
324 return ssl_security(s, op, cinfo->secbits, cinfo->nid, (void *)curve);
327 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
328 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
330 const unsigned char *curves;
331 size_t num_curves, i;
332 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
333 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
335 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
337 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
340 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) {
341 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
343 } else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) {
344 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
346 } else /* Should never happen */
349 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &num_curves))
351 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, curves += 2) {
352 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
353 return tls_curve_allowed(s, p + 1, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK);
359 * For nmatch >= 0, return the NID of the |nmatch|th shared group or NID_undef
360 * if there is no match.
361 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
362 * For nmatch == -2, return the NID of the group to use for
363 * an EC tmp key, or NID_undef if there is no match.
365 int tls1_shared_group(SSL *s, int nmatch)
367 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
368 size_t num_pref, num_supp, i, j;
370 /* Can't do anything on client side */
374 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
376 * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know
377 * these are acceptable due to previous checks.
379 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
380 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
381 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
382 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
383 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
384 /* Should never happen */
387 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
391 * Avoid truncation. tls1_get_curvelist takes an int
392 * but s->options is a long...
394 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
395 (s, (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0, &supp,
397 /* In practice, NID_undef == 0 but let's be precise. */
398 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
399 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
400 (s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE), &pref, &num_pref))
401 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
404 * If the client didn't send the elliptic_curves extension all of them
407 if (num_supp == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0) {
409 num_supp = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2;
410 } else if (num_pref == 0 &&
411 (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) == 0) {
413 num_pref = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2;
417 for (i = 0; i < num_pref; i++, pref += 2) {
418 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
419 for (j = 0; j < num_supp; j++, tsupp += 2) {
420 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1]) {
421 if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, pref, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
424 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
425 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id, NULL);
433 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
437 int tls1_set_groups(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
438 int *groups, size_t ngroups)
440 unsigned char *glist, *p;
443 * Bitmap of groups included to detect duplicates: only works while group
446 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
447 glist = OPENSSL_malloc(ngroups * 2);
450 for (i = 0, p = glist; i < ngroups; i++) {
451 unsigned long idmask;
453 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Convert for DH groups */
454 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(groups[i]);
456 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask)) {
465 *pextlen = ngroups * 2;
469 # define MAX_CURVELIST 28
473 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
476 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
478 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
484 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
486 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
488 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
490 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
491 if (nid == NID_undef)
492 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
493 if (nid == NID_undef)
494 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
495 if (nid == NID_undef)
497 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
498 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
500 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
504 /* Set groups based on a colon separate list */
505 int tls1_set_groups_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen, const char *str)
509 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
513 return tls1_set_groups(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
516 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
517 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
524 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
525 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
528 /* Determine curve ID */
529 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
530 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
531 /* If no id return error: we don't support arbitrary explicit curves */
535 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
537 if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
539 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED) {
540 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
542 if ((nid_list[id - 1].flags & TLS_CURVE_TYPE) == TLS_CURVE_PRIME)
543 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
545 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
551 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
552 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
553 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
555 const unsigned char *pformats, *pcurves;
556 size_t num_formats, num_curves, i;
559 * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
560 * supported (see RFC4492).
562 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
563 pformats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
564 num_formats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
565 for (i = 0; i < num_formats; i++, pformats++) {
566 if (*comp_id == *pformats)
569 if (i == num_formats)
574 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
575 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++) {
576 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &pcurves, &num_curves))
578 if (j == 1 && num_curves == 0) {
580 * If we've not received any curves then skip this check.
581 * RFC 4492 does not require the supported elliptic curves extension
582 * so if it is not sent we can just choose any curve.
583 * It is invalid to send an empty list in the elliptic curves
584 * extension, so num_curves == 0 always means no extension.
588 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
589 if (pcurves[0] == curve_id[0] && pcurves[1] == curve_id[1])
594 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
601 static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
605 * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
607 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
608 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
609 *num_formats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
611 *pformats = ecformats_default;
612 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
614 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
616 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default);
621 * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
622 * certificates have compatible curves and compression.
624 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
626 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
629 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
632 /* If not EC nothing to do */
633 if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) != EVP_PKEY_EC)
635 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey));
639 * Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a supported
642 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
646 * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
647 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
649 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s)) {
655 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
656 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
657 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
658 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
659 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
661 return 0; /* Should never happen */
662 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
663 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
665 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
667 if (set_ee_md == 2) {
668 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
669 s->s3->tmp.md[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha256();
671 s->s3->tmp.md[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha384();
677 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
679 * tls1_check_ec_tmp_key - Check EC temporary key compatibility
681 * @cid: Cipher ID we're considering using
683 * Checks that the kECDHE cipher suite we're considering using
684 * is compatible with the client extensions.
686 * Returns 0 when the cipher can't be used or 1 when it can.
688 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
691 * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
694 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
695 unsigned char curve_id[2];
696 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
697 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
698 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
699 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
700 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
704 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
705 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
709 /* Need a shared curve */
710 if (tls1_shared_group(s, 0))
714 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
718 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
723 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
726 * List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
727 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
730 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
731 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
733 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
736 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
737 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
739 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
743 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)/* */
745 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
748 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
749 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
750 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
751 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
753 static const unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
754 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
755 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
756 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
757 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
758 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
759 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
760 TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001,
761 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256,
762 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512
766 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
767 static const unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
768 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
769 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
772 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
775 * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
778 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
779 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
780 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
781 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
782 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
784 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
785 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
788 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
789 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
793 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
794 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs) {
795 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
796 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
797 } else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
798 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
799 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
801 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
802 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
807 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
808 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
810 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
811 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
813 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
814 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
815 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
816 /* Should never happen */
819 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
820 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1]) {
821 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
824 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
825 if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
826 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
827 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
828 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey)))
830 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id)) {
831 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
834 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
835 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
838 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256) {
839 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256) {
840 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
841 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
844 } else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384) {
845 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384) {
846 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
847 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
853 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
857 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
858 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
859 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i += 2, sent_sigs += 2) {
860 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
863 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
864 if (i == sent_sigslen
865 && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1
866 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
867 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
870 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
872 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
875 /* Make sure security callback allows algorithm */
876 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK,
877 EVP_MD_size(*pmd) * 4, EVP_MD_type(*pmd), (void *)sig)) {
878 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
882 * Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they wish.
884 s->s3->tmp.peer_md = *pmd;
889 * Set a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
890 * supported, doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms, isn't supported
891 * by the enabled protocol versions or by the security level.
893 * This function should only be used for checking which ciphers are supported
896 * Call ssl_cipher_disabled() to check that it's enabled or not.
898 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
900 s->s3->tmp.mask_a = 0;
901 s->s3->tmp.mask_k = 0;
902 ssl_set_sig_mask(&s->s3->tmp.mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
903 ssl_get_client_min_max_version(s, &s->s3->tmp.min_ver, &s->s3->tmp.max_ver);
904 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
905 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
906 if (!s->psk_client_callback) {
907 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
908 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_PSK;
910 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
911 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
912 if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) {
913 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
914 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
920 * ssl_cipher_disabled - check that a cipher is disabled or not
921 * @s: SSL connection that you want to use the cipher on
922 * @c: cipher to check
923 * @op: Security check that you want to do
925 * Returns 1 when it's disabled, 0 when enabled.
927 int ssl_cipher_disabled(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op)
929 if (c->algorithm_mkey & s->s3->tmp.mask_k
930 || c->algorithm_auth & s->s3->tmp.mask_a)
932 if (s->s3->tmp.max_ver == 0)
934 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && ((c->min_tls > s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
935 || (c->max_tls < s->s3->tmp.min_ver)))
937 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (DTLS_VERSION_GT(c->min_dtls, s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
938 || DTLS_VERSION_LT(c->max_dtls, s->s3->tmp.min_ver)))
941 return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c);
944 static int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s)
946 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
948 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL);
951 static int compare_uint(const void *p1, const void *p2)
953 unsigned int u1 = *((const unsigned int *)p1);
954 unsigned int u2 = *((const unsigned int *)p2);
964 * Per http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.1.4, there may not be
965 * more than one extension of the same type in a ClientHello or ServerHello.
966 * This function does an initial scan over the extensions block to filter those
967 * out. It returns 1 if all extensions are unique, and 0 if the extensions
968 * contain duplicates, could not be successfully parsed, or an internal error
971 static int tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(const PACKET *packet)
973 PACKET extensions = *packet;
974 size_t num_extensions = 0, i = 0;
975 unsigned int *extension_types = NULL;
978 /* First pass: count the extensions. */
979 while (PACKET_remaining(&extensions) > 0) {
982 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions, &type) ||
983 !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions, &extension)) {
989 if (num_extensions <= 1)
992 extension_types = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(unsigned int) * num_extensions);
993 if (extension_types == NULL) {
994 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
998 /* Second pass: gather the extension types. */
999 extensions = *packet;
1000 for (i = 0; i < num_extensions; i++) {
1002 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions, &extension_types[i]) ||
1003 !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions, &extension)) {
1004 /* This should not happen. */
1005 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1010 if (PACKET_remaining(&extensions) != 0) {
1011 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1014 /* Sort the extensions and make sure there are no duplicates. */
1015 qsort(extension_types, num_extensions, sizeof(unsigned int), compare_uint);
1016 for (i = 1; i < num_extensions; i++) {
1017 if (extension_types[i - 1] == extension_types[i])
1022 OPENSSL_free(extension_types);
1026 int ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
1028 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1029 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1031 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1033 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1034 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1036 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++) {
1037 const SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1039 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1040 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1041 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK))
1042 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)) {
1050 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1051 if (s->renegotiate) {
1052 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
1053 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1054 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->s3->previous_client_finished,
1055 s->s3->previous_client_finished_len)
1056 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1057 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1061 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1062 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION)
1065 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1066 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1067 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1068 /* Sub-packet for server_name extension */
1069 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1070 /* Sub-packet for servername list (always 1 hostname)*/
1071 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1072 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name)
1073 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->tlsext_hostname,
1074 strlen(s->tlsext_hostname))
1075 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1076 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1077 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1081 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1082 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
1083 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) {
1084 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_srp)
1085 /* Sub-packet for SRP extension */
1086 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1087 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
1088 /* login must not be zero...internal error if so */
1089 || !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt, WPACKET_FLAGS_NON_ZERO_LENGTH)
1090 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->srp_ctx.login,
1091 strlen(s->srp_ctx.login))
1092 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1093 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1094 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1100 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1103 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message
1105 const unsigned char *pcurves, *pformats;
1106 size_t num_curves, num_formats;
1109 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &pformats, &num_formats);
1111 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
1112 /* Sub-packet for formats extension */
1113 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1114 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, pformats, num_formats)
1115 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1116 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1121 * Add TLS extension supported_groups to the ClientHello message
1123 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Add support for DHE groups */
1124 pcurves = s->tlsext_supportedgroupslist;
1125 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &pcurves, &num_curves)) {
1126 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1130 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_groups)
1131 /* Sub-packet for supported_groups extension */
1132 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1133 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1134 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1137 /* Copy curve ID if supported */
1138 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
1139 if (tls_curve_allowed(s, pcurves, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) {
1140 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, pcurves[0])
1141 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, pcurves[1])) {
1142 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
1143 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1148 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1149 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1153 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1155 if (tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1157 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
1158 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
1159 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1160 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data) {
1161 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1162 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1163 if (s->session->tlsext_tick == NULL) {
1164 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1167 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1168 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data, ticklen);
1169 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1172 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1173 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1176 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
1177 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->session->tlsext_tick,
1179 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1185 if (SSL_CLIENT_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1187 const unsigned char *salg;
1189 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
1191 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms)
1192 /* Sub-packet for sig-algs extension */
1193 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1194 /* Sub-packet for the actual list */
1195 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1196 || !tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, pkt, salg, salglen)
1197 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1198 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1199 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1203 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
1204 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
1207 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
1208 /* Sub-packet for status request extension */
1209 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1210 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
1211 /* Sub-packet for the ids */
1212 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1213 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1216 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
1217 unsigned char *idbytes;
1221 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1222 idlen = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1224 /* Sub-packet for an individual id */
1225 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, idlen, &idbytes)
1226 || i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &idbytes) != idlen) {
1227 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1231 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)
1232 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1233 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1236 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) {
1237 unsigned char *extbytes;
1238 int extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1241 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1244 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, extlen, &extbytes)
1245 || i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &extbytes)
1247 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1251 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1252 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1258 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1259 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1261 * The client advertises an empty extension to indicate its support
1262 * for Next Protocol Negotiation
1264 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg)
1265 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1266 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1273 * finish_md_len is non-zero during a renegotiation, so
1274 * this avoids sending ALPN during the renegotiation
1275 * (see longer comment below)
1277 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1278 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt,
1279 TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation)
1280 /* Sub-packet ALPN extension */
1281 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1282 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->alpn_client_proto_list,
1283 s->alpn_client_proto_list_len)
1284 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1285 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1288 s->s3->alpn_sent = 1;
1290 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1291 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)) {
1292 STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *clnt = SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s);
1293 SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *prof;
1296 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
1297 /* Sub-packet for SRTP extension */
1298 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1299 /* Sub-packet for the protection profile list */
1300 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1301 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1304 ct = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(clnt);
1305 for (i = 0; i < ct; i++) {
1306 prof = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(clnt, i);
1307 if (prof == NULL || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, prof->id)) {
1308 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1312 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)
1313 /* Add an empty use_mki value */
1314 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)
1315 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1316 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1321 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->cli_ext);
1322 /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
1323 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 0, pkt, al)) {
1324 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1328 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)) {
1329 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
1330 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1331 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1336 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
1337 if (s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
1338 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp)
1339 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1340 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1346 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret)
1347 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1348 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1352 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1353 int min_version, max_version, reason, currv;
1354 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_versions)
1355 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1356 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)) {
1357 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1360 reason = ssl_get_client_min_max_version(s, &min_version, &max_version);
1362 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, reason);
1366 * TODO(TLS1.3): There is some discussion on the TLS list as to wheter
1367 * we should include versions <TLS1.2. For the moment we do. To be
1370 for (currv = max_version; currv >= min_version; currv--) {
1371 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove this first if clause prior to release!! */
1372 if (currv == TLS1_3_VERSION) {
1373 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT)) {
1374 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
1375 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1378 } else if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, currv)) {
1379 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1383 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1384 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1390 * Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See
1391 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03 NB: because this
1392 * code works out the length of all existing extensions it MUST always
1395 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING) {
1396 unsigned char *padbytes;
1399 if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &hlen)) {
1400 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1404 if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200) {
1405 hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
1411 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_padding)
1412 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, hlen, &padbytes)) {
1413 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1416 memset(padbytes, 0, hlen);
1424 int ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
1426 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1427 int next_proto_neg_seen;
1429 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1430 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1431 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1432 int using_ecc = (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1433 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1436 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1437 || !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt, WPACKET_FLAGS_ABANDON_ON_ZERO_LENGTH)) {
1438 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1442 if (s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
1443 !ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, pkt)) {
1444 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1448 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1449 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
1452 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1
1453 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1454 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1455 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1456 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1460 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1462 const unsigned char *plist;
1465 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message
1467 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1469 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
1470 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1471 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, plist, plistlen)
1472 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1473 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1478 * Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves
1481 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1483 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected && tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1484 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
1485 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1486 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1491 * if we don't add the above TLSEXT, we can't add a session ticket
1494 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
1497 if (s->tlsext_status_expected) {
1498 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
1499 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1500 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1504 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1505 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->srtp_profile) {
1506 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
1507 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1508 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 2)
1509 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->srtp_profile->id)
1510 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)
1511 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1512 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1518 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x80
1519 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x81)
1520 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG)) {
1521 const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1522 0xfd, 0xe8, /* 65000 */
1523 0x00, 0x20, /* 32 bytes length */
1524 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1525 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1526 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1527 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17
1529 if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, cryptopro_ext, sizeof(cryptopro_ext))) {
1530 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1535 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1536 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1537 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1538 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb) {
1539 const unsigned char *npa;
1540 unsigned int npalen;
1543 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen,
1545 ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1546 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1547 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg)
1548 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, npa, npalen)) {
1549 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1552 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1556 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 1, pkt, al)) {
1557 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1561 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) {
1563 * Don't use encrypt_then_mac if AEAD or RC4 might want to disable
1564 * for other cases too.
1566 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD
1567 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4
1568 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT
1569 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT12)
1570 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1572 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
1573 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1574 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1579 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) {
1580 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret)
1581 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1582 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1587 if (s->s3->alpn_selected != NULL) {
1588 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt,
1589 TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation)
1590 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1591 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1592 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->s3->alpn_selected,
1593 s->s3->alpn_selected_len)
1594 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1595 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1596 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1602 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1603 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1610 * Save the ALPN extension in a ClientHello.
1611 * pkt: the contents of the ALPN extension, not including type and length.
1612 * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a failure.
1613 * returns: 1 on success, 0 on error.
1615 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
1617 PACKET protocol_list, save_protocol_list, protocol;
1619 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1621 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &protocol_list)
1622 || PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) < 2) {
1626 save_protocol_list = protocol_list;
1628 /* Protocol names can't be empty. */
1629 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&protocol_list, &protocol)
1630 || PACKET_remaining(&protocol) == 0) {
1633 } while (PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) != 0);
1635 if (!PACKET_memdup(&save_protocol_list,
1636 &s->s3->alpn_proposed, &s->s3->alpn_proposed_len)) {
1637 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1645 * Process the ALPN extension in a ClientHello.
1646 * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a failure.
1647 * returns 1 on success, 0 on error.
1649 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello_late(SSL *s, int *al)
1651 const unsigned char *selected = NULL;
1652 unsigned char selected_len = 0;
1654 if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb != NULL && s->s3->alpn_proposed != NULL) {
1655 int r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len,
1656 s->s3->alpn_proposed,
1657 (unsigned int)s->s3->alpn_proposed_len,
1658 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
1660 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1661 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1662 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_memdup(selected, selected_len);
1663 if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
1664 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1667 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
1668 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1669 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
1670 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1673 *al = SSL_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL;
1681 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1683 * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1684 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |hello|.
1685 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1690 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1691 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1692 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1693 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1695 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello)
1701 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1702 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1703 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1704 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1705 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1706 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1707 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1709 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1710 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1711 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1712 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1713 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1714 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1715 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1716 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1717 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1718 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1719 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1720 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1721 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1724 /* Length of the common prefix (first two extensions). */
1725 static const size_t kSafariCommonExtensionsLength = 18;
1727 tmppkt = hello->extensions;
1729 if (!PACKET_forward(&tmppkt, 2)
1730 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt, &type)
1731 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&tmppkt, &sni)) {
1735 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1738 ext_len = TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION ?
1739 sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock) : kSafariCommonExtensionsLength;
1741 s->s3->is_probably_safari = PACKET_equal(&tmppkt, kSafariExtensionsBlock,
1744 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1747 * Loop through all remaining ClientHello extensions that we collected earlier
1748 * and haven't already processed. For each one parse it and update the SSL
1749 * object as required.
1751 * Behaviour upon resumption is extension-specific. If the extension has no
1752 * effect during resumption, it is parsed (to verify its format) but otherwise
1755 * Returns 1 on success and 0 on failure.
1756 * Upon failure, sets |al| to the appropriate alert.
1758 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello, int *al)
1761 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1763 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1764 s->servername_done = 0;
1765 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1766 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1767 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1770 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1771 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
1772 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = 0;
1773 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_proposed);
1774 s->s3->alpn_proposed = NULL;
1775 s->s3->alpn_proposed_len = 0;
1777 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1778 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1779 ssl_check_for_safari(s, hello);
1780 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1782 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
1783 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs);
1784 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = NULL;
1785 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1787 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1788 OPENSSL_free(s->srp_ctx.login);
1789 s->srp_ctx.login = NULL;
1792 s->srtp_profile = NULL;
1795 * We parse all extensions to ensure the ClientHello is well-formed but,
1796 * unless an extension specifies otherwise, we ignore extensions upon
1799 for (loop = 0; loop < hello->num_extensions; loop++) {
1800 RAW_EXTENSION *currext = &hello->pre_proc_exts[loop];
1802 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1803 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, currext->type,
1804 PACKET_data(&currext->data),
1805 PACKET_remaining(&currext->data),
1806 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1808 if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
1809 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s,
1810 &currext->data, al))
1812 renegotiate_seen = 1;
1813 } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
1816 * The servername extension is treated as follows:
1818 * - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
1819 * - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
1820 * in which case an fatal alert is generated.
1821 * - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
1822 * - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
1823 * to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
1824 * - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
1825 * it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
1826 * Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
1827 * set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
1828 * case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
1829 * a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
1830 * presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
1831 * the value of the Host: field.
1832 * - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1833 * if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the
1834 * session, i.e. when the session has been established with a servername
1836 * - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
1840 else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
1841 unsigned int servname_type;
1842 PACKET sni, hostname;
1844 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&currext->data, &sni)
1845 /* ServerNameList must be at least 1 byte long. */
1846 || PACKET_remaining(&sni) == 0) {
1851 * Although the server_name extension was intended to be
1852 * extensible to new name types, RFC 4366 defined the
1853 * syntax inextensibility and OpenSSL 1.0.x parses it as
1855 * RFC 6066 corrected the mistake but adding new name types
1856 * is nevertheless no longer feasible, so act as if no other
1857 * SNI types can exist, to simplify parsing.
1859 * Also note that the RFC permits only one SNI value per type,
1860 * i.e., we can only have a single hostname.
1862 if (!PACKET_get_1(&sni, &servname_type)
1863 || servname_type != TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name
1864 || !PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&sni, &hostname)) {
1869 if (PACKET_remaining(&hostname) > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) {
1870 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1874 if (PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&hostname)) {
1875 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1879 if (!PACKET_strndup(&hostname, &s->session->tlsext_hostname)) {
1880 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1884 s->servername_done = 1;
1887 * TODO(openssl-team): if the SNI doesn't match, we MUST
1888 * fall back to a full handshake.
1890 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
1891 && PACKET_equal(&hostname, s->session->tlsext_hostname,
1892 strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname));
1895 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1896 else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp) {
1899 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&currext->data, &srp_I))
1902 if (PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&srp_I))
1906 * TODO(openssl-team): currently, we re-authenticate the user
1907 * upon resumption. Instead, we MUST ignore the login.
1909 if (!PACKET_strndup(&srp_I, &s->srp_ctx.login)) {
1910 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1916 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1917 else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
1918 PACKET ec_point_format_list;
1920 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&currext->data,
1921 &ec_point_format_list)
1922 || PACKET_remaining(&ec_point_format_list) == 0) {
1927 if (!PACKET_memdup(&ec_point_format_list,
1928 &s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
1930 session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length)) {
1931 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1935 } else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_groups) {
1936 PACKET supported_groups_list;
1938 /* Each group is 2 bytes and we must have at least 1. */
1939 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&currext->data,
1940 &supported_groups_list)
1941 || PACKET_remaining(&supported_groups_list) == 0
1942 || (PACKET_remaining(&supported_groups_list) % 2) != 0) {
1947 if (!PACKET_memdup(&supported_groups_list,
1948 &s->session->tlsext_supportedgroupslist,
1950 session->tlsext_supportedgroupslist_length)) {
1951 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1956 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1957 else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
1958 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
1959 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s,
1960 PACKET_data(&currext->data),
1961 PACKET_remaining(&currext->data),
1962 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg)) {
1963 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1966 } else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms) {
1967 PACKET supported_sig_algs;
1969 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&currext->data,
1970 &supported_sig_algs)
1971 || (PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) % 2) != 0
1972 || PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) == 0) {
1977 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, PACKET_data(&supported_sig_algs),
1978 PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs))) {
1982 } else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
1983 if (!PACKET_get_1(&currext->data,
1984 (unsigned int *)&s->tlsext_status_type)) {
1987 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
1988 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
1989 const unsigned char *ext_data;
1990 PACKET responder_id_list, exts;
1991 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2
1992 (&currext->data, &responder_id_list))
1996 * We remove any OCSP_RESPIDs from a previous handshake
1997 * to prevent unbounded memory growth - CVE-2016-6304
1999 sk_OCSP_RESPID_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids,
2001 if (PACKET_remaining(&responder_id_list) > 0) {
2002 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null();
2003 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_ids == NULL) {
2004 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2008 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = NULL;
2011 while (PACKET_remaining(&responder_id_list) > 0) {
2013 PACKET responder_id;
2014 const unsigned char *id_data;
2016 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&responder_id_list,
2018 || PACKET_remaining(&responder_id) == 0) {
2022 id_data = PACKET_data(&responder_id);
2023 /* TODO(size_t): Convert d2i_* to size_t */
2024 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, &id_data,
2025 (int)PACKET_remaining(&responder_id));
2029 if (id_data != PACKET_end(&responder_id)) {
2030 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2034 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id)) {
2035 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2036 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2041 /* Read in request_extensions */
2042 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(
2043 &currext->data, &exts))
2046 if (PACKET_remaining(&exts) > 0) {
2047 ext_data = PACKET_data(&exts);
2048 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2049 X509_EXTENSION_free);
2050 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
2051 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &ext_data,
2052 (int)PACKET_remaining(&exts));
2053 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts == NULL
2054 || ext_data != PACKET_end(&exts)) {
2062 * We don't know what to do with any other type so ignore it.
2064 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2067 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2068 else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg
2069 && s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2071 * We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2074 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2075 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2076 * the initial renegotiation too in certain cases (when
2077 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2078 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2079 * anything like that, but this might change).
2081 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2082 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2083 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2084 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2085 * Finished message could have been computed.)
2087 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2091 else if (currext->type
2092 == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation
2093 && s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2094 if (!tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s,
2095 &currext->data, al))
2099 /* session ticket processed earlier */
2100 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2101 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)
2102 && currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2103 if (ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s,
2104 &currext->data, al))
2108 else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2109 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC))
2110 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2112 * Note: extended master secret extension handled in
2113 * tls_check_client_ems_support()
2117 * If this ClientHello extension was unhandled and this is a
2118 * nonresumed connection, check whether the extension is a custom
2119 * TLS Extension (has a custom_srv_ext_record), and if so call the
2120 * callback and record the extension number so that an appropriate
2121 * ServerHello may be later returned.
2124 if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1, currext->type,
2125 PACKET_data(&currext->data),
2126 PACKET_remaining(&currext->data), al) <= 0)
2131 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2133 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
2134 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2135 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2136 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2137 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2142 * This function currently has no state to clean up, so it returns directly.
2143 * If parsing fails at any point, the function returns early.
2144 * The SSL object may be left with partial data from extensions, but it must
2145 * then no longer be used, and clearing it up will free the leftovers.
2150 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello)
2153 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->srv_ext);
2154 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, hello, &al) <= 0) {
2155 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2158 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) {
2159 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2165 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2167 * ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2168 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly
2169 * fill the length of the block.
2171 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(PACKET *pkt)
2173 PACKET tmp_protocol;
2175 while (PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
2176 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &tmp_protocol)
2177 || PACKET_remaining(&tmp_protocol) == 0)
2185 static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2187 unsigned int length, type, size;
2188 int tlsext_servername = 0;
2189 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2191 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2192 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2194 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2196 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2197 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
2199 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2201 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
2203 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &length))
2206 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != length) {
2207 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2211 if (!tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(pkt)) {
2212 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2216 while (PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &type) && PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &size)) {
2217 const unsigned char *data;
2220 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &spkt, size)
2221 || !PACKET_peek_bytes(&spkt, &data, size))
2224 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2225 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2227 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
2228 if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, &spkt, al))
2230 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2231 } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
2232 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
2233 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0) {
2234 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2237 tlsext_servername = 1;
2239 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2240 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
2241 unsigned int ecpointformatlist_length;
2242 if (!PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &ecpointformatlist_length)
2243 || ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1) {
2244 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2248 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2249 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2250 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
2251 OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) {
2252 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2255 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
2256 ecpointformatlist_length;
2257 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&spkt,
2258 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
2259 ecpointformatlist_length)) {
2260 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2266 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2268 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2269 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2270 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size,
2271 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2273 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2276 if (!tls_use_ticket(s) || (size > 0)) {
2277 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2280 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2281 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
2283 * MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested a status
2286 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0)) {
2287 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2290 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2291 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2293 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
2295 * Only take it if we asked for it - i.e if there is no CT validation
2296 * callback set, then a custom extension MAY be processing it, so we
2297 * need to let control continue to flow to that.
2299 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp &&
2300 s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
2301 /* Simply copy it off for later processing */
2302 if (s->tlsext_scts != NULL) {
2303 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_scts);
2304 s->tlsext_scts = NULL;
2306 s->tlsext_scts_len = size;
2308 s->tlsext_scts = OPENSSL_malloc(size);
2309 if (s->tlsext_scts == NULL) {
2310 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2313 memcpy(s->tlsext_scts, data, size);
2317 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2318 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2319 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2320 unsigned char *selected;
2321 unsigned char selected_len;
2322 /* We must have requested it. */
2323 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL) {
2324 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2327 /* The data must be valid */
2328 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(&spkt)) {
2329 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2332 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data,
2335 ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) !=
2336 SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
2337 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2341 * Could be non-NULL if server has sent multiple NPN extensions in
2342 * a single Serverhello
2344 OPENSSL_free(s->next_proto_negotiated);
2345 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2346 if (s->next_proto_negotiated == NULL) {
2347 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2350 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2351 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2352 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2356 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation) {
2358 /* We must have requested it. */
2359 if (!s->s3->alpn_sent) {
2360 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2364 * The extension data consists of:
2365 * uint16 list_length
2366 * uint8 proto_length;
2367 * uint8 proto[proto_length];
2369 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&spkt, &len)
2370 || PACKET_remaining(&spkt) != len || !PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &len)
2371 || PACKET_remaining(&spkt) != len) {
2372 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2375 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2376 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
2377 if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
2378 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2381 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&spkt, s->s3->alpn_selected, len)) {
2382 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2385 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
2387 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2388 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2389 if (ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, &spkt, al))
2393 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac) {
2394 /* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite */
2395 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) &&
2396 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD
2397 && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc != SSL_RC4)
2398 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2399 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret) {
2400 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
2402 s->session->flags |= SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS;
2405 * If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but matches a
2406 * custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c callback
2408 else if (custom_ext_parse(s, 0, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2412 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2413 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2417 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1) {
2418 if (s->tlsext_hostname) {
2419 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) {
2420 s->session->tlsext_hostname =
2421 OPENSSL_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
2422 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname) {
2423 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2427 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2436 * Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to avoid
2437 * an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server hello
2438 * because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an attack.
2439 * However this would mean we could not connect to any server which
2440 * doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI absence
2442 if (!renegotiate_seen && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
2443 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2444 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2445 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2446 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2452 * Check extended master secret extension is consistent with
2455 if (!(s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) !=
2456 !(s->session->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS)) {
2457 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2458 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EXTMS);
2466 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2468 s->s3->alpn_sent = 0;
2472 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2477 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
2479 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2480 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2482 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2484 * The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely
2485 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2488 * The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely
2489 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2493 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2495 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2496 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2497 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
2498 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2500 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2502 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2505 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2506 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2509 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2510 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2513 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2514 s->servername_done = 0;
2520 /* Initialise digests to default values */
2521 void ssl_set_default_md(SSL *s)
2523 const EVP_MD **pmd = s->s3->tmp.md;
2524 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2525 pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
2527 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2528 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2529 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
2531 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX);
2532 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN];
2534 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2535 pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
2537 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2538 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX);
2539 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX);
2540 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX);
2544 int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s)
2549 /* Clear any shared signature algorithms */
2550 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
2551 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
2552 s->cert->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
2553 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
2554 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
2555 s->s3->tmp.md[i] = NULL;
2556 s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
2559 /* If sigalgs received process it. */
2560 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs) {
2561 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2562 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2563 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2566 /* Fatal error is no shared signature algorithms */
2567 if (!s->cert->shared_sigalgs) {
2568 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS,
2569 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS);
2570 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2574 ssl_set_default_md(s);
2578 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2583 * Upon success, returns 1.
2584 * Upon failure, returns 0 and sets |al| to the appropriate fatal alert.
2586 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s, int *al)
2588 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2591 * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be
2592 * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed,
2593 * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may
2594 * influence which certificate is sent
2596 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
2598 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
2599 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
2600 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
2601 if (certpkey != NULL) {
2603 * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
2604 * et al can pick it up.
2606 s->cert->key = certpkey;
2607 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2609 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
2610 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2611 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2613 /* status request response should be sent */
2614 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
2615 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
2616 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2618 /* something bad happened */
2619 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2621 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2627 if (!tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello_late(s, al)) {
2634 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2636 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2637 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2639 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2641 * If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
2642 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension it
2643 * must contain uncompressed.
2645 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2646 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2647 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
2648 && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
2649 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
2650 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
2651 && ((alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) {
2652 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
2654 unsigned char *list;
2655 int found_uncompressed = 0;
2656 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2657 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) {
2658 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed) {
2659 found_uncompressed = 1;
2663 if (!found_uncompressed) {
2664 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2665 SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
2669 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2670 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2672 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2674 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2675 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2676 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
2677 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2679 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2681 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2684 * Ensure we get sensible values passed to tlsext_status_cb in the event
2685 * that we don't receive a status message
2687 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
2688 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
2689 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = 0;
2692 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2693 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2696 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2697 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2700 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2701 s->servername_done = 0;
2707 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2710 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
2712 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, pkt, &al) <= 0) {
2713 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2717 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
2718 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
2725 * Given a list of extensions that we collected earlier, find one of a given
2726 * type and return it.
2728 * |exts| is the set of extensions previously collected.
2729 * |numexts| is the number of extensions that we have.
2730 * |type| the type of the extension that we are looking for.
2732 * Returns a pointer to the found RAW_EXTENSION data, or NULL if not found.
2734 RAW_EXTENSION *tls_get_extension_by_type(RAW_EXTENSION *exts, size_t numexts,
2739 for (loop = 0; loop < numexts; loop++) {
2740 if (exts[loop].type == type)
2748 * Gets the ticket information supplied by the client if any.
2750 * hello: The parsed ClientHello data
2751 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2752 * point to the resulting session.
2754 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
2755 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
2756 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
2759 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
2760 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
2761 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
2762 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
2763 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
2764 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
2765 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
2768 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
2769 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
2770 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
2771 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
2772 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
2773 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
2775 int tls_get_ticket_from_client(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello,
2779 const unsigned char *etick;
2781 RAW_EXTENSION *ticketext;
2784 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2787 * If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
2790 if (s->version <= SSL3_VERSION || !tls_use_ticket(s))
2793 ticketext = tls_get_extension_by_type(hello->pre_proc_exts,
2794 hello->num_extensions,
2795 TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket);
2796 if (ticketext == NULL)
2799 size = PACKET_remaining(&ticketext->data);
2802 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
2805 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2808 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
2810 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
2811 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
2812 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
2813 * calculate the master secret later.
2817 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&ticketext->data, &etick, size)) {
2818 /* Shouldn't ever happen */
2821 retv = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, etick, size, hello->session_id,
2822 hello->session_id_len, ret);
2824 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
2825 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2828 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
2831 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
2832 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2835 default: /* fatal error */
2841 * Sets the extended master secret flag if the extension is present in the
2847 int tls_check_client_ems_support(SSL *s, const CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello)
2849 RAW_EXTENSION *emsext;
2851 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
2853 if (s->version <= SSL3_VERSION)
2856 emsext = tls_get_extension_by_type(hello->pre_proc_exts,
2857 hello->num_extensions,
2858 TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret);
2861 * No extensions is a success - we have successfully discovered that the
2862 * client doesn't support EMS.
2867 /* The extensions must always be empty */
2868 if (PACKET_remaining(&emsext->data) != 0)
2871 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
2877 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
2879 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
2880 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extension.
2881 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
2882 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
2883 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2884 * point to the resulting session.
2887 * -2: fatal error, malloc failure.
2888 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
2889 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
2890 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
2891 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
2893 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
2894 size_t eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id,
2895 size_t sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess)
2898 unsigned char *sdec;
2899 const unsigned char *p;
2900 int slen, renew_ticket = 0, ret = -1, declen;
2902 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
2903 HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL;
2904 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
2905 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
2907 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
2908 hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
2911 ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
2916 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
2917 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
2918 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
2929 /* Check key name matches */
2930 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name,
2931 sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name)) != 0) {
2935 if (HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key,
2936 sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key),
2937 EVP_sha256(), NULL) <= 0
2938 || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_256_cbc(), NULL,
2939 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key,
2940 etick + sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name)) <=
2946 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
2949 mlen = HMAC_size(hctx);
2953 /* Sanity check ticket length: must exceed keyname + IV + HMAC */
2955 TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx) + mlen) {
2960 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
2961 if (HMAC_Update(hctx, etick, eticklen) <= 0
2962 || HMAC_Final(hctx, tick_hmac, NULL) <= 0) {
2965 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
2966 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) {
2967 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
2970 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
2971 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
2972 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
2973 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
2974 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
2975 if (sdec == NULL || EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, sdec, &slen, p,
2976 (int)eticklen) <= 0) {
2977 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
2981 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(ctx, sdec + slen, &declen) <= 0) {
2982 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
2987 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
2991 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
2995 * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
2996 * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
2997 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
3001 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3002 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3011 * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
3015 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3016 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3020 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3027 static const tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
3028 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3029 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3030 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3031 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3032 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3033 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512},
3034 {NID_id_GostR3411_94, TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411},
3035 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256},
3036 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512},
3039 static const tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
3040 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
3041 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
3042 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa},
3043 {NID_id_GostR3410_2001, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001},
3044 {NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256},
3045 {NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512}
3048 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3051 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3052 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3058 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3061 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3062 if ((table[i].id) == id)
3063 return table[i].nid;
3068 int tls12_get_sigandhash(WPACKET *pkt, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md)
3074 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3077 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3080 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, md_id) || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, sig_id))
3086 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
3088 return tls12_find_id(EVP_PKEY_id(pk), tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3095 unsigned char tlsext_hash;
3098 static const tls12_hash_info tls12_md_info[] = {
3099 {NID_md5, 64, SSL_MD_MD5_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3100 {NID_sha1, 80, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3101 {NID_sha224, 112, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3102 {NID_sha256, 128, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3103 {NID_sha384, 192, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3104 {NID_sha512, 256, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha512},
3105 {NID_id_GostR3411_94, 128, SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411},
3106 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, 128, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX,
3107 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256},
3108 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, 256, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX,
3109 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512},
3112 static const tls12_hash_info *tls12_get_hash_info(unsigned char hash_alg)
3118 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md_info); i++) {
3119 if (tls12_md_info[i].tlsext_hash == hash_alg)
3120 return tls12_md_info + i;
3126 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
3128 const tls12_hash_info *inf;
3129 if (hash_alg == TLSEXT_hash_md5 && FIPS_mode())
3131 inf = tls12_get_hash_info(hash_alg);
3134 return ssl_md(inf->md_idx);
3137 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
3140 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3141 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3142 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3144 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3145 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3146 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3148 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3149 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3150 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3152 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3153 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001:
3154 return SSL_PKEY_GOST01;
3156 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256:
3157 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256;
3159 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512:
3160 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512;
3166 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3167 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
3168 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3170 int sign_nid = NID_undef, hash_nid = NID_undef;
3171 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3173 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3174 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3176 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3178 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3179 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3181 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3183 if (psignhash_nid) {
3184 if (sign_nid == NID_undef || hash_nid == NID_undef
3185 || OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid, hash_nid, sign_nid) <= 0)
3186 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3190 /* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
3191 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(SSL *s, int op, const unsigned char *ptmp)
3193 /* See if we have an entry in the hash table and it is enabled */
3194 const tls12_hash_info *hinf = tls12_get_hash_info(ptmp[0]);
3195 if (hinf == NULL || ssl_md(hinf->md_idx) == NULL)
3197 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
3198 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3200 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
3201 return ssl_security(s, op, hinf->secbits, hinf->nid, (void *)ptmp);
3205 * Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported signature
3206 * algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA then RSA is
3210 void ssl_set_sig_mask(uint32_t *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op)
3212 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
3213 size_t i, sigalgslen;
3214 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
3216 * Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any for
3217 * RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just TLS 1.2. To keep
3218 * down calls to security callback only check if we have to.
3220 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
3221 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2) {
3222 switch (sigalgs[1]) {
3223 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3224 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3225 if (!have_rsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3229 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3230 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3231 if (!have_dsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3235 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3236 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3237 if (!have_ecdsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3244 *pmask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
3246 *pmask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
3248 *pmask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
3251 int tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
3252 const unsigned char *psig, size_t psiglen)
3256 for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i += 2, psig += 2) {
3257 if (tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, psig)) {
3258 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, psig[0])
3259 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, psig[1]))
3266 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
3267 static size_t tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
3268 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3269 const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
3271 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3272 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3273 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i += 2, ptmp += 2) {
3274 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3275 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED, ptmp))
3277 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j += 2, atmp += 2) {
3278 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1]) {
3281 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3282 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3283 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3285 &shsig->signandhash_nid, ptmp);
3295 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3296 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3298 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3299 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3301 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3303 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
3305 OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
3306 c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
3307 c->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
3308 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3309 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3310 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3311 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3312 } else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3313 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
3314 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3316 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
3317 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb) {
3320 allow = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3321 allowlen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
3325 pref = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3326 preflen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
3328 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3330 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3333 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3337 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3338 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3342 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3344 int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, size_t dsize)
3347 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
3348 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3350 /* Should never happen */
3354 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs);
3355 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
3356 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs == NULL)
3358 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3359 memcpy(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
3363 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3368 const EVP_MD **pmd = s->s3->tmp.md;
3369 uint32_t *pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags;
3371 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3372 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s))
3375 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3376 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++) {
3377 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3378 if (idx > 0 && pmd[idx] == NULL) {
3379 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
3381 pvalid[idx] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3382 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) {
3383 pvalid[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3384 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = md;
3390 * In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't use
3391 * the certificate for signing.
3393 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
3395 * Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not
3396 * supported it stays as NULL.
3398 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3399 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] == NULL)
3400 pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
3402 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3403 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] == NULL) {
3404 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
3405 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = EVP_sha1();
3408 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3409 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] == NULL)
3410 pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha1();
3412 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3413 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] == NULL)
3414 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] = EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_94);
3415 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] == NULL)
3416 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] =
3417 EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256);
3418 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] == NULL)
3419 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] =
3420 EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512);
3426 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3427 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3428 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3430 const unsigned char *psig = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3431 size_t numsigalgs = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3432 if (psig == NULL || numsigalgs > INT_MAX)
3436 if (idx >= (int)s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen)
3443 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
3445 return (int)numsigalgs;
3448 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3449 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3450 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3452 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
3453 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen
3454 || s->cert->shared_sigalgslen > INT_MAX)
3458 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3460 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3462 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3464 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
3466 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
3467 return (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
3470 #define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
3474 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
3477 static void get_sigorhash(int *psig, int *phash, const char *str)
3479 if (strcmp(str, "RSA") == 0) {
3480 *psig = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
3481 } else if (strcmp(str, "DSA") == 0) {
3482 *psig = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
3483 } else if (strcmp(str, "ECDSA") == 0) {
3484 *psig = EVP_PKEY_EC;
3486 *phash = OBJ_sn2nid(str);
3487 if (*phash == NID_undef)
3488 *phash = OBJ_ln2nid(str);
3492 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
3494 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
3497 int sig_alg = NID_undef, hash_alg = NID_undef;
3500 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
3502 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
3504 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
3506 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
3514 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, etmp);
3515 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, p);
3517 if (sig_alg == NID_undef || hash_alg == NID_undef)
3520 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i += 2) {
3521 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
3524 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
3525 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
3530 * Set supported signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
3531 * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
3533 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
3537 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
3541 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
3544 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
3546 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
3551 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
3552 if (sigalgs == NULL)
3554 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i += 2) {
3555 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3556 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3558 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
3565 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
3566 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3567 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
3569 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
3570 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3571 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
3577 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
3581 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
3585 if (default_nid == -1)
3587 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
3589 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
3590 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
3591 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
3596 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
3597 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
3601 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
3602 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++) {
3603 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
3610 * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by
3611 * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before
3612 * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before
3613 * attempting to use them.
3616 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
3618 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
3619 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
3620 /* Strict mode flags */
3621 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
3622 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
3623 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
3625 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
3630 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
3631 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
3634 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
3635 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
3637 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
3640 idx = (int)(cpk - c->pkeys);
3642 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
3643 pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
3645 pk = cpk->privatekey;
3647 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
3648 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
3654 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
3657 pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
3659 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
3660 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
3662 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
3669 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
3670 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
3671 if (ok == X509_V_OK)
3672 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
3673 else if (!check_flags)
3678 * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature
3679 * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode.
3681 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode) {
3683 unsigned char rsign = 0;
3684 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs)
3686 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
3689 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
3690 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
3691 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
3692 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
3695 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
3696 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
3697 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
3701 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
3702 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
3705 case SSL_PKEY_GOST01:
3706 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001;
3707 default_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001;
3710 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256:
3711 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256;
3712 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_256;
3715 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512:
3716 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512;
3717 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_512;
3726 * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set
3727 * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1.
3729 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs) {
3731 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
3732 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2) {
3733 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
3736 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen) {
3743 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
3744 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid)) {
3748 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
3749 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
3750 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
3751 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i), default_nid)) {
3753 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
3760 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
3761 else if (check_flags)
3762 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE | CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
3764 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
3765 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
3766 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
3767 else if (!check_flags)
3770 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
3771 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
3772 else if (strict_mode) {
3773 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
3774 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
3775 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
3776 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0)) {
3778 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
3785 if (!s->server && strict_mode) {
3786 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
3788 switch (EVP_PKEY_id(pk)) {
3790 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
3793 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
3796 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
3800 const unsigned char *ctypes;
3804 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
3806 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
3807 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
3809 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++) {
3810 if (ctypes[i] == check_type) {
3811 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
3815 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
3818 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
3820 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
3822 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
3823 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
3825 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
3826 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
3827 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
3829 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
3830 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
3831 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
3832 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp)) {
3833 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
3838 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
3841 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME | CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
3843 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
3844 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
3848 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
3849 if (*pvalid & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
3850 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
3851 else if (s->s3->tmp.md[idx] != NULL)
3852 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
3854 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3857 * When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the
3861 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
3864 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
3865 *pvalid &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3872 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
3873 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
3875 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
3876 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
3877 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
3878 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
3879 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST01);
3880 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256);
3881 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512);
3884 /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
3885 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
3887 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);
3890 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3891 DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s)
3893 int dh_secbits = 80;
3894 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto == 2)
3895 return DH_get_1024_160();
3896 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aPSK)) {
3897 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256)
3902 CERT_PKEY *cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
3903 dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(cpk->privatekey);
3906 if (dh_secbits >= 128) {
3914 if (dh_secbits >= 192)
3915 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL);
3917 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL);
3918 if (p == NULL || g == NULL || !DH_set0_pqg(dhp, p, NULL, g)) {
3926 if (dh_secbits >= 112)
3927 return DH_get_2048_224();
3928 return DH_get_1024_160();
3932 static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
3935 EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
3938 * If no parameters this will return -1 and fail using the default
3939 * security callback for any non-zero security level. This will
3940 * reject keys which omit parameters but this only affects DSA and
3941 * omission of parameters is never (?) done in practice.
3943 secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey);
3946 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, 0, x);
3948 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, 0, x);
3951 static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
3953 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
3954 int secbits = -1, md_nid = NID_undef, sig_nid;
3955 /* Don't check signature if self signed */
3956 if ((X509_get_extension_flags(x) & EXFLAG_SS) != 0)
3958 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
3959 if (sig_nid && OBJ_find_sigid_algs(sig_nid, &md_nid, NULL)) {
3961 if (md_nid && (md = EVP_get_digestbynid(md_nid)))
3962 secbits = EVP_MD_size(md) * 4;
3965 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
3967 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
3970 int ssl_security_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int vfy, int is_ee)
3973 vfy = SSL_SECOP_PEER;
3975 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY | vfy))
3976 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
3978 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY | vfy))
3979 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
3981 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD | vfy))
3982 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK;
3987 * Check security of a chain, if sk includes the end entity certificate then
3988 * x is NULL. If vfy is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and not sending
3989 * one to the peer. Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
3992 int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x, int vfy)
3994 int rv, start_idx, i;
3996 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
4001 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 1);
4005 for (i = start_idx; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
4006 x = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
4007 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 0);