2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
12 #include <openssl/objects.h>
13 #include <openssl/evp.h>
14 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
15 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
16 #include <openssl/conf.h>
17 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
18 #include <openssl/dh.h>
19 #include <openssl/bn.h>
21 #include <openssl/ct.h>
23 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, size_t ticklen,
24 const unsigned char *sess_id, size_t sesslen,
26 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
27 static int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
29 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data = {
33 tls1_generate_master_secret,
34 tls1_change_cipher_state,
35 tls1_final_finish_mac,
36 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
37 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
39 tls1_export_keying_material,
41 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
42 tls_close_construct_packet,
46 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_1_enc_data = {
50 tls1_generate_master_secret,
51 tls1_change_cipher_state,
52 tls1_final_finish_mac,
53 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
54 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
56 tls1_export_keying_material,
57 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
58 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
59 tls_close_construct_packet,
63 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_2_enc_data = {
67 tls1_generate_master_secret,
68 tls1_change_cipher_state,
69 tls1_final_finish_mac,
70 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
71 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
73 tls1_export_keying_material,
74 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
75 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
76 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
77 tls_close_construct_packet,
81 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_3_enc_data = {
85 tls1_generate_master_secret,
86 tls1_change_cipher_state,
87 tls1_final_finish_mac,
88 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
89 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
91 tls1_export_keying_material,
92 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
93 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
94 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
95 tls_close_construct_packet,
99 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
102 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
103 * http, the cache would over fill
105 return (60 * 60 * 2);
112 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
116 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
118 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
122 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
125 if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION)
126 s->version = TLS_MAX_VERSION;
128 s->version = s->method->version;
131 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
134 int nid; /* Curve NID */
135 int secbits; /* Bits of security (from SP800-57) */
136 unsigned int flags; /* Flags: currently just field type */
140 * Table of curve information.
141 * Do not delete entries or reorder this array! It is used as a lookup
142 * table: the index of each entry is one less than the TLS curve id.
144 static const tls_curve_info nid_list[] = {
145 {NID_sect163k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163k1 (1) */
146 {NID_sect163r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r1 (2) */
147 {NID_sect163r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r2 (3) */
148 {NID_sect193r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r1 (4) */
149 {NID_sect193r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r2 (5) */
150 {NID_sect233k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233k1 (6) */
151 {NID_sect233r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233r1 (7) */
152 {NID_sect239k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect239k1 (8) */
153 {NID_sect283k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283k1 (9) */
154 {NID_sect283r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283r1 (10) */
155 {NID_sect409k1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409k1 (11) */
156 {NID_sect409r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409r1 (12) */
157 {NID_sect571k1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571k1 (13) */
158 {NID_sect571r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571r1 (14) */
159 {NID_secp160k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160k1 (15) */
160 {NID_secp160r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r1 (16) */
161 {NID_secp160r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r2 (17) */
162 {NID_secp192k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192k1 (18) */
163 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192r1 (19) */
164 {NID_secp224k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224k1 (20) */
165 {NID_secp224r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224r1 (21) */
166 {NID_secp256k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256k1 (22) */
167 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256r1 (23) */
168 {NID_secp384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp384r1 (24) */
169 {NID_secp521r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp521r1 (25) */
170 {NID_brainpoolP256r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
171 {NID_brainpoolP384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
172 {NID_brainpoolP512r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
173 {NID_X25519, 128, TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM}, /* X25519 (29) */
176 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = {
177 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
178 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
179 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
182 /* The default curves */
183 static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] = {
184 0, 29, /* X25519 (29) */
185 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
186 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
187 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
190 static const unsigned char eccurves_all[] = {
191 0, 29, /* X25519 (29) */
192 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
193 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
194 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
195 0, 26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
196 0, 27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
197 0, 28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
200 * Remaining curves disabled by default but still permitted if set
201 * via an explicit callback or parameters.
203 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
204 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
205 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
206 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
207 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
208 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
209 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
210 0, 20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
211 0, 21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
212 0, 18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
213 0, 19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
214 0, 15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
215 0, 16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
216 0, 17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
217 0, 8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
218 0, 6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
219 0, 7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
220 0, 4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
221 0, 5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
222 0, 1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
223 0, 2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
224 0, 3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
227 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] = {
228 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
229 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
232 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id, unsigned int *pflags)
234 const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
235 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
236 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
238 cinfo = nid_list + curve_id - 1;
240 *pflags = cinfo->flags;
244 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
247 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(nid_list); i++) {
248 if (nid_list[i].nid == nid)
255 * Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
257 * Sets |num_curves| to the number of curves in the list, i.e.,
258 * the length of |pcurves| is 2 * num_curves.
259 * Returns 1 on success and 0 if the client curves list has invalid format.
260 * The latter indicates an internal error: we should not be accepting such
261 * lists in the first place.
262 * TODO(emilia): we should really be storing the curves list in explicitly
263 * parsed form instead. (However, this would affect binary compatibility
264 * so cannot happen in the 1.0.x series.)
266 static int tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
267 const unsigned char **pcurves, size_t *num_curves)
269 size_t pcurveslen = 0;
271 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_supportedgroupslist;
272 pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_supportedgroupslist_length;
274 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
275 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
276 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
277 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
278 pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
281 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
282 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
286 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
287 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
291 *pcurves = s->tlsext_supportedgroupslist;
292 pcurveslen = s->tlsext_supportedgroupslist_length;
295 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
296 pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
300 /* We do not allow odd length arrays to enter the system. */
301 if (pcurveslen & 1) {
302 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_GET_CURVELIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
306 *num_curves = pcurveslen / 2;
311 /* See if curve is allowed by security callback */
312 static int tls_curve_allowed(SSL *s, const unsigned char *curve, int op)
314 const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
317 if ((curve[1] < 1) || ((size_t)curve[1] > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
319 cinfo = &nid_list[curve[1] - 1];
320 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
321 if (cinfo->flags & TLS_CURVE_CHAR2)
324 return ssl_security(s, op, cinfo->secbits, cinfo->nid, (void *)curve);
327 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
328 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
330 const unsigned char *curves;
331 size_t num_curves, i;
332 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
333 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
335 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
337 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
340 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) {
341 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
343 } else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) {
344 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
346 } else /* Should never happen */
349 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &num_curves))
351 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, curves += 2) {
352 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
353 return tls_curve_allowed(s, p + 1, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK);
359 * For nmatch >= 0, return the NID of the |nmatch|th shared group or NID_undef
360 * if there is no match.
361 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
362 * For nmatch == -2, return the NID of the group to use for
363 * an EC tmp key, or NID_undef if there is no match.
365 int tls1_shared_group(SSL *s, int nmatch)
367 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
368 size_t num_pref, num_supp, i, j;
370 /* Can't do anything on client side */
374 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
376 * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know
377 * these are acceptable due to previous checks.
379 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
380 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
381 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
382 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
383 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
384 /* Should never happen */
387 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
391 * Avoid truncation. tls1_get_curvelist takes an int
392 * but s->options is a long...
394 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
395 (s, (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0, &supp,
397 /* In practice, NID_undef == 0 but let's be precise. */
398 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
399 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
400 (s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE), &pref, &num_pref))
401 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
404 * If the client didn't send the elliptic_curves extension all of them
407 if (num_supp == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0) {
409 num_supp = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2;
410 } else if (num_pref == 0 &&
411 (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) == 0) {
413 num_pref = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2;
417 for (i = 0; i < num_pref; i++, pref += 2) {
418 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
419 for (j = 0; j < num_supp; j++, tsupp += 2) {
420 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1]) {
421 if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, pref, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
424 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
425 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id, NULL);
433 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
437 int tls1_set_groups(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
438 int *groups, size_t ngroups)
440 unsigned char *glist, *p;
443 * Bitmap of groups included to detect duplicates: only works while group
446 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
447 glist = OPENSSL_malloc(ngroups * 2);
450 for (i = 0, p = glist; i < ngroups; i++) {
451 unsigned long idmask;
453 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Convert for DH groups */
454 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(groups[i]);
456 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask)) {
465 *pextlen = ngroups * 2;
469 # define MAX_CURVELIST 28
473 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
476 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
478 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
484 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
486 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
488 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
490 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
491 if (nid == NID_undef)
492 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
493 if (nid == NID_undef)
494 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
495 if (nid == NID_undef)
497 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
498 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
500 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
504 /* Set groups based on a colon separate list */
505 int tls1_set_groups_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen, const char *str)
509 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
513 return tls1_set_groups(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
516 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
517 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
524 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
525 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
528 /* Determine curve ID */
529 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
530 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
531 /* If no id return error: we don't support arbitrary explicit curves */
535 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
537 if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
539 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED) {
540 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
542 if ((nid_list[id - 1].flags & TLS_CURVE_TYPE) == TLS_CURVE_PRIME)
543 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
545 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
551 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
552 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
553 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
555 const unsigned char *pformats, *pcurves;
556 size_t num_formats, num_curves, i;
559 * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
560 * supported (see RFC4492).
562 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
563 pformats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
564 num_formats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
565 for (i = 0; i < num_formats; i++, pformats++) {
566 if (*comp_id == *pformats)
569 if (i == num_formats)
574 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
575 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++) {
576 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &pcurves, &num_curves))
578 if (j == 1 && num_curves == 0) {
580 * If we've not received any curves then skip this check.
581 * RFC 4492 does not require the supported elliptic curves extension
582 * so if it is not sent we can just choose any curve.
583 * It is invalid to send an empty list in the elliptic curves
584 * extension, so num_curves == 0 always means no extension.
588 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
589 if (pcurves[0] == curve_id[0] && pcurves[1] == curve_id[1])
594 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
601 static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
605 * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
607 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
608 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
609 *num_formats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
611 *pformats = ecformats_default;
612 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
614 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
616 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default);
621 * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
622 * certificates have compatible curves and compression.
624 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
626 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
629 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
632 /* If not EC nothing to do */
633 if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) != EVP_PKEY_EC)
635 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey));
639 * Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a supported
642 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
646 * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
647 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
649 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s)) {
655 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
656 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
657 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
658 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
659 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
661 return 0; /* Should never happen */
662 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
663 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
665 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
667 if (set_ee_md == 2) {
668 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
669 s->s3->tmp.md[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha256();
671 s->s3->tmp.md[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha384();
677 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
679 * tls1_check_ec_tmp_key - Check EC temporary key compatibility
681 * @cid: Cipher ID we're considering using
683 * Checks that the kECDHE cipher suite we're considering using
684 * is compatible with the client extensions.
686 * Returns 0 when the cipher can't be used or 1 when it can.
688 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
691 * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
694 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
695 unsigned char curve_id[2];
696 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
697 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
698 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
699 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
700 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
704 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
705 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
709 /* Need a shared curve */
710 if (tls1_shared_group(s, 0))
714 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
718 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
723 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
726 * List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
727 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
730 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
731 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
733 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
736 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
737 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
739 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
743 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)/* */
745 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
748 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
749 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
750 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
751 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
753 static const unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
754 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
755 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
756 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
757 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
758 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
759 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
760 TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001,
761 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256,
762 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512
766 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
767 static const unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
768 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
769 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
772 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
775 * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
778 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
779 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
780 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
781 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
782 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
784 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
785 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
788 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
789 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
793 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
794 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs) {
795 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
796 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
797 } else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
798 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
799 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
801 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
802 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
807 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
808 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
810 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
811 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
813 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
814 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
815 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
816 /* Should never happen */
819 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
820 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1]) {
821 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
824 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
825 if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
826 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
827 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
828 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey)))
830 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id)) {
831 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
834 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
835 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
838 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256) {
839 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256) {
840 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
841 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
844 } else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384) {
845 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384) {
846 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
847 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
853 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
857 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
858 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
859 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i += 2, sent_sigs += 2) {
860 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
863 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
864 if (i == sent_sigslen
865 && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1
866 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
867 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
870 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
872 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
875 /* Make sure security callback allows algorithm */
876 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK,
877 EVP_MD_size(*pmd) * 4, EVP_MD_type(*pmd), (void *)sig)) {
878 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
882 * Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they wish.
884 s->s3->tmp.peer_md = *pmd;
889 * Set a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
890 * supported, doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms, isn't supported
891 * by the enabled protocol versions or by the security level.
893 * This function should only be used for checking which ciphers are supported
896 * Call ssl_cipher_disabled() to check that it's enabled or not.
898 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
900 s->s3->tmp.mask_a = 0;
901 s->s3->tmp.mask_k = 0;
902 ssl_set_sig_mask(&s->s3->tmp.mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
903 ssl_get_client_min_max_version(s, &s->s3->tmp.min_ver, &s->s3->tmp.max_ver);
904 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
905 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
906 if (!s->psk_client_callback) {
907 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
908 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_PSK;
910 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
911 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
912 if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) {
913 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
914 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
920 * ssl_cipher_disabled - check that a cipher is disabled or not
921 * @s: SSL connection that you want to use the cipher on
922 * @c: cipher to check
923 * @op: Security check that you want to do
925 * Returns 1 when it's disabled, 0 when enabled.
927 int ssl_cipher_disabled(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op)
929 if (c->algorithm_mkey & s->s3->tmp.mask_k
930 || c->algorithm_auth & s->s3->tmp.mask_a)
932 if (s->s3->tmp.max_ver == 0)
934 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && ((c->min_tls > s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
935 || (c->max_tls < s->s3->tmp.min_ver)))
937 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (DTLS_VERSION_GT(c->min_dtls, s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
938 || DTLS_VERSION_LT(c->max_dtls, s->s3->tmp.min_ver)))
941 return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c);
944 static int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s)
946 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
948 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL);
951 static int compare_uint(const void *p1, const void *p2)
953 unsigned int u1 = *((const unsigned int *)p1);
954 unsigned int u2 = *((const unsigned int *)p2);
964 * Per http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.1.4, there may not be
965 * more than one extension of the same type in a ClientHello or ServerHello.
966 * This function does an initial scan over the extensions block to filter those
967 * out. It returns 1 if all extensions are unique, and 0 if the extensions
968 * contain duplicates, could not be successfully parsed, or an internal error
971 static int tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(const PACKET *packet)
973 PACKET extensions = *packet;
974 size_t num_extensions = 0, i = 0;
975 unsigned int *extension_types = NULL;
978 /* First pass: count the extensions. */
979 while (PACKET_remaining(&extensions) > 0) {
982 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions, &type) ||
983 !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions, &extension)) {
989 if (num_extensions <= 1)
992 extension_types = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(unsigned int) * num_extensions);
993 if (extension_types == NULL) {
994 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
998 /* Second pass: gather the extension types. */
999 extensions = *packet;
1000 for (i = 0; i < num_extensions; i++) {
1002 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions, &extension_types[i]) ||
1003 !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions, &extension)) {
1004 /* This should not happen. */
1005 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1010 if (PACKET_remaining(&extensions) != 0) {
1011 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1014 /* Sort the extensions and make sure there are no duplicates. */
1015 qsort(extension_types, num_extensions, sizeof(unsigned int), compare_uint);
1016 for (i = 1; i < num_extensions; i++) {
1017 if (extension_types[i - 1] == extension_types[i])
1022 OPENSSL_free(extension_types);
1026 int ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
1028 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1029 const unsigned char *pcurves = NULL;
1030 size_t num_curves = 0;
1033 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1034 if ((s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->version <= TLS1_2_VERSION)
1035 || SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1037 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1038 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1040 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++) {
1041 const SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1043 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1044 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1045 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK))
1046 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)) {
1051 } else if (s->version >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
1053 * TODO(TLS1.3): We always use ECC for TLSv1.3 at the moment. This will
1054 * change if we implement DH key shares
1059 if (s->version >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
1060 /* Shouldn't happen! */
1061 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1066 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1067 if (s->renegotiate) {
1068 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
1069 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1070 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->s3->previous_client_finished,
1071 s->s3->previous_client_finished_len)
1072 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1073 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1077 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1078 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION)
1081 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1082 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1083 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1084 /* Sub-packet for server_name extension */
1085 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1086 /* Sub-packet for servername list (always 1 hostname)*/
1087 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1088 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name)
1089 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->tlsext_hostname,
1090 strlen(s->tlsext_hostname))
1091 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1092 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1093 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1097 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1098 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
1099 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) {
1100 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_srp)
1101 /* Sub-packet for SRP extension */
1102 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1103 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
1104 /* login must not be zero...internal error if so */
1105 || !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt, WPACKET_FLAGS_NON_ZERO_LENGTH)
1106 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->srp_ctx.login,
1107 strlen(s->srp_ctx.login))
1108 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1109 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1110 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1116 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1119 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message
1121 const unsigned char *pformats, *pcurvestmp;
1125 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &pformats, &num_formats);
1127 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
1128 /* Sub-packet for formats extension */
1129 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1130 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, pformats, num_formats)
1131 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1132 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1137 * Add TLS extension supported_groups to the ClientHello message
1139 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Add support for DHE groups */
1140 pcurves = s->tlsext_supportedgroupslist;
1141 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &pcurves, &num_curves)) {
1142 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1145 pcurvestmp = pcurves;
1147 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_groups)
1148 /* Sub-packet for supported_groups extension */
1149 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1150 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1151 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1154 /* Copy curve ID if supported */
1155 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurvestmp += 2) {
1156 if (tls_curve_allowed(s, pcurves, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) {
1157 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, pcurvestmp[0])
1158 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, pcurvestmp[1])) {
1159 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
1160 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1165 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1166 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1170 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1172 if (tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1174 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
1175 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
1176 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1177 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data) {
1178 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1179 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1180 if (s->session->tlsext_tick == NULL) {
1181 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1184 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1185 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data, ticklen);
1186 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1189 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1190 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1193 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
1194 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->session->tlsext_tick,
1196 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1202 if (SSL_CLIENT_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1204 const unsigned char *salg;
1206 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
1208 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms)
1209 /* Sub-packet for sig-algs extension */
1210 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1211 /* Sub-packet for the actual list */
1212 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1213 || !tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, pkt, salg, salglen)
1214 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1215 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1216 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1220 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
1221 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
1224 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
1225 /* Sub-packet for status request extension */
1226 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1227 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
1228 /* Sub-packet for the ids */
1229 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1230 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1233 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
1234 unsigned char *idbytes;
1238 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1239 idlen = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1241 /* Sub-packet for an individual id */
1242 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, idlen, &idbytes)
1243 || i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &idbytes) != idlen) {
1244 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1248 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)
1249 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1250 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1253 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) {
1254 unsigned char *extbytes;
1255 int extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1258 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1261 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, extlen, &extbytes)
1262 || i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &extbytes)
1264 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1268 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1269 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1275 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1276 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1278 * The client advertises an empty extension to indicate its support
1279 * for Next Protocol Negotiation
1281 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg)
1282 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1283 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1290 * finish_md_len is non-zero during a renegotiation, so
1291 * this avoids sending ALPN during the renegotiation
1292 * (see longer comment below)
1294 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1295 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt,
1296 TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation)
1297 /* Sub-packet ALPN extension */
1298 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1299 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->alpn_client_proto_list,
1300 s->alpn_client_proto_list_len)
1301 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1302 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1305 s->s3->alpn_sent = 1;
1307 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1308 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)) {
1309 STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *clnt = SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s);
1310 SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *prof;
1313 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
1314 /* Sub-packet for SRTP extension */
1315 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1316 /* Sub-packet for the protection profile list */
1317 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1318 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1321 ct = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(clnt);
1322 for (i = 0; i < ct; i++) {
1323 prof = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(clnt, i);
1324 if (prof == NULL || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, prof->id)) {
1325 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1329 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)
1330 /* Add an empty use_mki value */
1331 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)
1332 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1333 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1338 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->cli_ext);
1339 /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
1340 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 0, pkt, al)) {
1341 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1345 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)) {
1346 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
1347 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1348 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1353 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
1354 if (s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
1355 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp)
1356 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1357 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1363 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret)
1364 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1365 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1369 /* TLS1.3 specific extensions */
1370 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1371 int min_version, max_version, reason, currv;
1372 size_t i, sharessent = 0;
1374 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Should we add this extension for versions < TLS1.3? */
1375 /* supported_versions extension */
1376 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_versions)
1377 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1378 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)) {
1379 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1382 reason = ssl_get_client_min_max_version(s, &min_version, &max_version);
1384 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, reason);
1388 * TODO(TLS1.3): There is some discussion on the TLS list as to wheter
1389 * we should include versions <TLS1.2. For the moment we do. To be
1392 for (currv = max_version; currv >= min_version; currv--) {
1393 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove this first if clause prior to release!! */
1394 if (currv == TLS1_3_VERSION) {
1395 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT)) {
1396 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
1397 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1400 } else if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, currv)) {
1401 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1405 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1406 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1411 /* key_share extension */
1412 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share)
1413 /* Extension data sub-packet */
1414 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1415 /* KeyShare list sub-packet */
1416 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1417 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1422 * TODO(TLS1.3): Make the number of key_shares sent configurable. For
1423 * now, just send one
1425 for (i = 0; i < num_curves && sharessent < 1; i++, pcurves += 2) {
1426 if (tls_curve_allowed(s, pcurves, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) {
1427 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
1428 unsigned int curve_id = 0;
1429 EVP_PKEY *key_share_key = NULL;
1432 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) {
1433 /* Shouldn't happen! */
1434 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
1435 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1439 /* Generate a key for this key_share */
1440 curve_id = (pcurves[0] << 8) | pcurves[1];
1441 key_share_key = ssl_generate_pkey_curve(curve_id);
1442 if (key_share_key == NULL) {
1443 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
1447 /* Encode the public key. */
1448 encodedlen = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(key_share_key,
1450 if (encodedlen == 0) {
1451 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
1452 EVP_PKEY_free(key_share_key);
1456 /* Create KeyShareEntry */
1457 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, curve_id)
1458 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, encodedPoint,
1460 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
1461 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1462 EVP_PKEY_free(key_share_key);
1463 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1468 * TODO(TLS1.3): When changing to send more than one key_share
1469 * we're going to need to be able to save more than one EVP_PKEY
1470 * For now we reuse the existing tmp.pkey
1472 s->s3->group_id = curve_id;
1473 s->s3->tmp.pkey = key_share_key;
1475 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1478 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1479 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1485 * Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See
1486 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03 NB: because this
1487 * code works out the length of all existing extensions it MUST always
1490 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING) {
1491 unsigned char *padbytes;
1494 if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &hlen)) {
1495 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1499 if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200) {
1500 hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
1506 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_padding)
1507 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, hlen, &padbytes)) {
1508 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1511 memset(padbytes, 0, hlen);
1519 int ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
1521 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1522 int next_proto_neg_seen;
1524 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1525 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1526 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1527 int using_ecc = (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1528 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1531 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1532 || !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt, WPACKET_FLAGS_ABANDON_ON_ZERO_LENGTH)) {
1533 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1537 if (s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
1538 !ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, pkt)) {
1539 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1543 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1544 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
1547 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1
1548 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1549 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1550 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1551 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1555 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1557 const unsigned char *plist;
1560 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message
1562 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1564 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
1565 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1566 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, plist, plistlen)
1567 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1568 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1573 * Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves
1576 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1578 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected && tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1579 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
1580 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1581 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1586 * if we don't add the above TLSEXT, we can't add a session ticket
1589 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
1592 if (s->tlsext_status_expected) {
1593 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
1594 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1595 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1599 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1600 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->srtp_profile) {
1601 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
1602 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1603 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 2)
1604 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->srtp_profile->id)
1605 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)
1606 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1607 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1613 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x80
1614 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x81)
1615 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG)) {
1616 const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1617 0xfd, 0xe8, /* 65000 */
1618 0x00, 0x20, /* 32 bytes length */
1619 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1620 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1621 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1622 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17
1624 if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, cryptopro_ext, sizeof(cryptopro_ext))) {
1625 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1630 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1631 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1632 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1633 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb) {
1634 const unsigned char *npa;
1635 unsigned int npalen;
1638 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen,
1640 ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1641 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1642 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg)
1643 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, npa, npalen)) {
1644 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1647 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1652 if (s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION && !s->hit) {
1653 unsigned char *encodedPoint;
1654 size_t encoded_pt_len = 0;
1655 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL;
1657 ckey = s->s3->peer_tmp;
1659 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1663 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share)
1664 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1665 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->s3->group_id)) {
1666 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1670 skey = ssl_generate_pkey(ckey);
1672 /* Generate encoding of server key */
1673 encoded_pt_len = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(skey, &encodedPoint);
1674 if (encoded_pt_len == 0) {
1675 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
1676 EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
1680 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len)
1681 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1682 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1683 EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
1684 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1687 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1689 s->s3->tmp.pkey = skey;
1691 if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) {
1692 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1693 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1698 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 1, pkt, al)) {
1699 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1703 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) {
1705 * Don't use encrypt_then_mac if AEAD or RC4 might want to disable
1706 * for other cases too.
1708 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD
1709 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4
1710 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT
1711 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT12)
1712 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1714 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
1715 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1716 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1721 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) {
1722 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret)
1723 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1724 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1729 if (s->s3->alpn_selected != NULL) {
1730 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt,
1731 TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation)
1732 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1733 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1734 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->s3->alpn_selected,
1735 s->s3->alpn_selected_len)
1736 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1737 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1738 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1744 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1745 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1752 * Save the ALPN extension in a ClientHello.
1753 * pkt: the contents of the ALPN extension, not including type and length.
1754 * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a failure.
1755 * returns: 1 on success, 0 on error.
1757 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
1759 PACKET protocol_list, save_protocol_list, protocol;
1761 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1763 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &protocol_list)
1764 || PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) < 2) {
1768 save_protocol_list = protocol_list;
1770 /* Protocol names can't be empty. */
1771 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&protocol_list, &protocol)
1772 || PACKET_remaining(&protocol) == 0) {
1775 } while (PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) != 0);
1777 if (!PACKET_memdup(&save_protocol_list,
1778 &s->s3->alpn_proposed, &s->s3->alpn_proposed_len)) {
1779 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1787 * Process the ALPN extension in a ClientHello.
1788 * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a failure.
1789 * returns 1 on success, 0 on error.
1791 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello_late(SSL *s, int *al)
1793 const unsigned char *selected = NULL;
1794 unsigned char selected_len = 0;
1796 if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb != NULL && s->s3->alpn_proposed != NULL) {
1797 int r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len,
1798 s->s3->alpn_proposed,
1799 (unsigned int)s->s3->alpn_proposed_len,
1800 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
1802 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1803 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1804 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_memdup(selected, selected_len);
1805 if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
1806 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1809 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
1810 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1811 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
1812 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1815 *al = SSL_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL;
1823 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1825 * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1826 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |hello|.
1827 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1832 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1833 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1834 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1835 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1837 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello)
1843 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1844 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1845 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1846 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1847 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1848 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1849 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1851 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1852 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1853 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1854 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1855 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1856 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1857 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1858 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1859 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1860 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1861 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1862 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1863 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1866 /* Length of the common prefix (first two extensions). */
1867 static const size_t kSafariCommonExtensionsLength = 18;
1869 tmppkt = hello->extensions;
1871 if (!PACKET_forward(&tmppkt, 2)
1872 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt, &type)
1873 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&tmppkt, &sni)) {
1877 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1880 ext_len = TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION ?
1881 sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock) : kSafariCommonExtensionsLength;
1883 s->s3->is_probably_safari = PACKET_equal(&tmppkt, kSafariExtensionsBlock,
1886 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1890 * Process the supported_groups extension if present. Returns success if the
1891 * extension is absent, or if it has been successfully processed.
1897 static int tls_process_supported_groups(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello)
1899 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1900 PACKET supported_groups_list;
1901 RAW_EXTENSION *suppgroups = tls_get_extension_by_type(hello->pre_proc_exts,
1902 hello->num_extensions,
1903 TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_groups);
1905 if (suppgroups == NULL)
1908 /* Each group is 2 bytes and we must have at least 1. */
1909 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&suppgroups->data,
1910 &supported_groups_list)
1911 || PACKET_remaining(&supported_groups_list) == 0
1912 || (PACKET_remaining(&supported_groups_list) % 2) != 0) {
1917 && !PACKET_memdup(&supported_groups_list,
1918 &s->session->tlsext_supportedgroupslist,
1919 &s->session->tlsext_supportedgroupslist_length)) {
1927 * Checks a list of |groups| to determine if the |group_id| is in it. If it is
1928 * and |checkallow| is 1 then additionally check if the group is allowed to be
1932 * 1 if the group is in the list (and allowed if |checkallow| is 1)
1935 static int check_in_list(SSL *s, unsigned int group_id,
1936 const unsigned char *groups, size_t num_groups,
1941 if (groups == NULL || num_groups == 0)
1944 for (i = 0; i < num_groups; i++, groups += 2) {
1945 unsigned int share_id = (groups[0] << 8) | (groups[1]);
1946 if (group_id == share_id
1947 && (!checkallow || tls_curve_allowed(s, groups,
1948 SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK))) {
1953 if (i == num_groups) {
1962 * Loop through all remaining ClientHello extensions that we collected earlier
1963 * and haven't already processed. For each one parse it and update the SSL
1964 * object as required.
1966 * Behaviour upon resumption is extension-specific. If the extension has no
1967 * effect during resumption, it is parsed (to verify its format) but otherwise
1970 * Returns 1 on success and 0 on failure.
1971 * Upon failure, sets |al| to the appropriate alert.
1973 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello, int *al)
1976 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1978 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1979 s->servername_done = 0;
1980 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1981 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1982 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1985 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1986 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
1987 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = 0;
1988 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_proposed);
1989 s->s3->alpn_proposed = NULL;
1990 s->s3->alpn_proposed_len = 0;
1992 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1993 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1994 ssl_check_for_safari(s, hello);
1995 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1997 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
1998 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs);
1999 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = NULL;
2000 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2002 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2003 OPENSSL_free(s->srp_ctx.login);
2004 s->srp_ctx.login = NULL;
2007 s->srtp_profile = NULL;
2010 * We process the supported_groups extension first so that is done before
2011 * we get to key_share which needs to use the information in it.
2013 if (!tls_process_supported_groups(s, hello)) {
2014 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2019 * We parse all extensions to ensure the ClientHello is well-formed but,
2020 * unless an extension specifies otherwise, we ignore extensions upon
2023 for (loop = 0; loop < hello->num_extensions; loop++) {
2024 RAW_EXTENSION *currext = &hello->pre_proc_exts[loop];
2026 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2027 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, currext->type,
2028 PACKET_data(&currext->data),
2029 PACKET_remaining(&currext->data),
2030 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2032 if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
2033 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s,
2034 &currext->data, al))
2036 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2037 } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
2040 * The servername extension is treated as follows:
2042 * - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
2043 * - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
2044 * in which case an fatal alert is generated.
2045 * - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
2046 * - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
2047 * to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
2048 * - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
2049 * it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
2050 * Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
2051 * set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
2052 * case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
2053 * a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
2054 * presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
2055 * the value of the Host: field.
2056 * - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
2057 * if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the
2058 * session, i.e. when the session has been established with a servername
2060 * - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
2064 else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
2065 unsigned int servname_type;
2066 PACKET sni, hostname;
2068 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&currext->data, &sni)
2069 /* ServerNameList must be at least 1 byte long. */
2070 || PACKET_remaining(&sni) == 0) {
2075 * Although the server_name extension was intended to be
2076 * extensible to new name types, RFC 4366 defined the
2077 * syntax inextensibility and OpenSSL 1.0.x parses it as
2079 * RFC 6066 corrected the mistake but adding new name types
2080 * is nevertheless no longer feasible, so act as if no other
2081 * SNI types can exist, to simplify parsing.
2083 * Also note that the RFC permits only one SNI value per type,
2084 * i.e., we can only have a single hostname.
2086 if (!PACKET_get_1(&sni, &servname_type)
2087 || servname_type != TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name
2088 || !PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&sni, &hostname)) {
2093 if (PACKET_remaining(&hostname) > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) {
2094 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2098 if (PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&hostname)) {
2099 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2103 if (!PACKET_strndup(&hostname, &s->session->tlsext_hostname)) {
2104 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2108 s->servername_done = 1;
2111 * TODO(openssl-team): if the SNI doesn't match, we MUST
2112 * fall back to a full handshake.
2114 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
2115 && PACKET_equal(&hostname, s->session->tlsext_hostname,
2116 strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname));
2119 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2120 else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp) {
2123 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&currext->data, &srp_I))
2126 if (PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&srp_I))
2130 * TODO(openssl-team): currently, we re-authenticate the user
2131 * upon resumption. Instead, we MUST ignore the login.
2133 if (!PACKET_strndup(&srp_I, &s->srp_ctx.login)) {
2134 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2140 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2141 else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
2142 PACKET ec_point_format_list;
2144 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&currext->data,
2145 &ec_point_format_list)
2146 || PACKET_remaining(&ec_point_format_list) == 0) {
2151 if (!PACKET_memdup(&ec_point_format_list,
2152 &s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
2154 session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length)) {
2155 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2160 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2161 else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2162 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2163 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s,
2164 PACKET_data(&currext->data),
2165 PACKET_remaining(&currext->data),
2166 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg)) {
2167 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2170 } else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms) {
2171 PACKET supported_sig_algs;
2173 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&currext->data,
2174 &supported_sig_algs)
2175 || (PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) % 2) != 0
2176 || PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) == 0) {
2181 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, PACKET_data(&supported_sig_algs),
2182 PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs))) {
2186 } else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
2187 if (!PACKET_get_1(&currext->data,
2188 (unsigned int *)&s->tlsext_status_type)) {
2191 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
2192 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
2193 const unsigned char *ext_data;
2194 PACKET responder_id_list, exts;
2195 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2
2196 (&currext->data, &responder_id_list))
2200 * We remove any OCSP_RESPIDs from a previous handshake
2201 * to prevent unbounded memory growth - CVE-2016-6304
2203 sk_OCSP_RESPID_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids,
2205 if (PACKET_remaining(&responder_id_list) > 0) {
2206 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null();
2207 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_ids == NULL) {
2208 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2212 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = NULL;
2215 while (PACKET_remaining(&responder_id_list) > 0) {
2217 PACKET responder_id;
2218 const unsigned char *id_data;
2220 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&responder_id_list,
2222 || PACKET_remaining(&responder_id) == 0) {
2226 id_data = PACKET_data(&responder_id);
2227 /* TODO(size_t): Convert d2i_* to size_t */
2228 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, &id_data,
2229 (int)PACKET_remaining(&responder_id));
2233 if (id_data != PACKET_end(&responder_id)) {
2234 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2238 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id)) {
2239 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2240 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2245 /* Read in request_extensions */
2246 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(
2247 &currext->data, &exts))
2250 if (PACKET_remaining(&exts) > 0) {
2251 ext_data = PACKET_data(&exts);
2252 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2253 X509_EXTENSION_free);
2254 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
2255 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &ext_data,
2256 (int)PACKET_remaining(&exts));
2257 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts == NULL
2258 || ext_data != PACKET_end(&exts)) {
2266 * We don't know what to do with any other type so ignore it.
2268 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2271 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2272 else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg
2273 && s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2275 * We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2278 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2279 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2280 * the initial renegotiation too in certain cases (when
2281 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2282 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2283 * anything like that, but this might change).
2285 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2286 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2287 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2288 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2289 * Finished message could have been computed.)
2291 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2295 else if (currext->type
2296 == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation
2297 && s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2298 if (!tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s,
2299 &currext->data, al))
2303 /* session ticket processed earlier */
2304 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2305 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)
2306 && currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2307 if (ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s,
2308 &currext->data, al))
2312 else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2313 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)) {
2314 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2315 } else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share
2316 && s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION && !s->hit) {
2317 unsigned int group_id;
2318 PACKET key_share_list, encoded_pt;
2319 const unsigned char *curves;
2321 int group_nid, found = 0;
2322 unsigned int curve_flags;
2325 if (s->s3->peer_tmp != NULL) {
2326 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2327 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2331 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&currext->data, &key_share_list)) {
2332 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2333 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2334 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2338 while (PACKET_remaining(&key_share_list) > 0) {
2339 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&key_share_list, &group_id)
2340 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&key_share_list,
2342 || PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt) == 0) {
2343 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2344 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2345 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2350 * If we already found a suitable key_share we loop through the
2351 * rest to verify the structure, but don't process them.
2356 /* Check this share is in supported_groups */
2357 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 1, &curves, &num_curves)) {
2358 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2359 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2360 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2363 if (!check_in_list(s, group_id, curves, num_curves, 0)) {
2364 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2365 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2366 SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE);
2370 /* Find a share that we can use */
2371 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &num_curves)) {
2372 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2373 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2374 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2377 if (!check_in_list(s, group_id, curves, num_curves, 1)) {
2378 /* Share not suitable */
2382 group_nid = tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(group_id, &curve_flags);
2384 if (group_nid == 0) {
2385 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2386 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2387 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
2391 if ((curve_flags & TLS_CURVE_TYPE) == TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM) {
2392 /* Can happen for some curves, e.g. X25519 */
2393 EVP_PKEY *key = EVP_PKEY_new();
2395 if (key == NULL || !EVP_PKEY_set_type(key, group_nid)) {
2396 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2397 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2401 s->s3->peer_tmp = key;
2403 /* Set up EVP_PKEY with named curve as parameters */
2404 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(EVP_PKEY_EC, NULL);
2406 || EVP_PKEY_paramgen_init(pctx) <= 0
2407 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ec_paramgen_curve_nid(pctx,
2409 || EVP_PKEY_paramgen(pctx, &s->s3->peer_tmp) <= 0) {
2410 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2411 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2412 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2415 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2418 s->s3->group_id = group_id;
2420 if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->peer_tmp,
2421 PACKET_data(&encoded_pt),
2422 PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt))) {
2423 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2424 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
2432 * Note: extended master secret extension handled in
2433 * tls_check_client_ems_support()
2437 * If this ClientHello extension was unhandled and this is a
2438 * nonresumed connection, check whether the extension is a custom
2439 * TLS Extension (has a custom_srv_ext_record), and if so call the
2440 * callback and record the extension number so that an appropriate
2441 * ServerHello may be later returned.
2444 if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1, currext->type,
2445 PACKET_data(&currext->data),
2446 PACKET_remaining(&currext->data), al) <= 0)
2451 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2453 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
2454 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2455 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2456 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2457 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2462 * This function currently has no state to clean up, so it returns directly.
2463 * If parsing fails at any point, the function returns early.
2464 * The SSL object may be left with partial data from extensions, but it must
2465 * then no longer be used, and clearing it up will free the leftovers.
2470 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello)
2473 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->srv_ext);
2474 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, hello, &al) <= 0) {
2475 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2478 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) {
2479 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2485 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2487 * ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2488 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly
2489 * fill the length of the block.
2491 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(PACKET *pkt)
2493 PACKET tmp_protocol;
2495 while (PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
2496 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &tmp_protocol)
2497 || PACKET_remaining(&tmp_protocol) == 0)
2505 static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2507 unsigned int length, type, size;
2508 int tlsext_servername = 0;
2509 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2511 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2512 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2514 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2516 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2517 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
2519 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2521 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
2523 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &length))
2526 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != length) {
2527 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2531 if (!tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(pkt)) {
2532 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2536 while (PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &type) && PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &size)) {
2537 const unsigned char *data;
2540 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &spkt, size)
2541 || !PACKET_peek_bytes(&spkt, &data, size))
2544 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2545 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2547 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
2548 if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, &spkt, al))
2550 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2551 } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
2552 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
2553 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0) {
2554 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2557 tlsext_servername = 1;
2559 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2560 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
2561 unsigned int ecpointformatlist_length;
2562 if (!PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &ecpointformatlist_length)
2563 || ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1) {
2564 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2568 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2569 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2570 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
2571 OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) {
2572 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2575 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
2576 ecpointformatlist_length;
2577 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&spkt,
2578 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
2579 ecpointformatlist_length)) {
2580 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2586 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2588 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2589 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2590 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size,
2591 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2593 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2596 if (!tls_use_ticket(s) || (size > 0)) {
2597 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2600 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2601 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
2603 * MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested a status
2606 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0)) {
2607 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2610 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2611 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2613 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
2615 * Only take it if we asked for it - i.e if there is no CT validation
2616 * callback set, then a custom extension MAY be processing it, so we
2617 * need to let control continue to flow to that.
2619 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp &&
2620 s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
2621 /* Simply copy it off for later processing */
2622 if (s->tlsext_scts != NULL) {
2623 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_scts);
2624 s->tlsext_scts = NULL;
2626 s->tlsext_scts_len = size;
2628 s->tlsext_scts = OPENSSL_malloc(size);
2629 if (s->tlsext_scts == NULL) {
2630 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2633 memcpy(s->tlsext_scts, data, size);
2637 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2638 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2639 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2640 unsigned char *selected;
2641 unsigned char selected_len;
2642 /* We must have requested it. */
2643 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL) {
2644 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2647 /* The data must be valid */
2648 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(&spkt)) {
2649 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2652 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data,
2655 ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) !=
2656 SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
2657 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2661 * Could be non-NULL if server has sent multiple NPN extensions in
2662 * a single Serverhello
2664 OPENSSL_free(s->next_proto_negotiated);
2665 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2666 if (s->next_proto_negotiated == NULL) {
2667 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2670 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2671 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2672 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2676 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation) {
2678 /* We must have requested it. */
2679 if (!s->s3->alpn_sent) {
2680 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2684 * The extension data consists of:
2685 * uint16 list_length
2686 * uint8 proto_length;
2687 * uint8 proto[proto_length];
2689 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&spkt, &len)
2690 || PACKET_remaining(&spkt) != len || !PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &len)
2691 || PACKET_remaining(&spkt) != len) {
2692 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2695 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2696 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
2697 if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
2698 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2701 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&spkt, s->s3->alpn_selected, len)) {
2702 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2705 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
2707 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2708 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2709 if (ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, &spkt, al))
2713 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac) {
2714 /* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite */
2715 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) &&
2716 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD
2717 && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc != SSL_RC4)
2718 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2719 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret &&
2720 (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) || s->version < TLS1_3_VERSION)) {
2721 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
2723 s->session->flags |= SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS;
2724 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share
2725 && s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION) {
2726 unsigned int group_id;
2728 EVP_PKEY *ckey = s->s3->tmp.pkey, *skey = NULL;
2732 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2733 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2737 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&spkt, &group_id)) {
2738 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2739 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2740 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2744 if (group_id != s->s3->group_id) {
2746 * This isn't for the group that we sent in the original
2749 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2750 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2751 SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE);
2755 skey = ssl_generate_pkey(ckey);
2757 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&spkt, &encoded_pt)) {
2758 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2759 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2760 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2764 if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(skey, PACKET_data(&encoded_pt),
2765 PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt))) {
2766 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2767 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
2771 if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 1) == 0) {
2772 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2773 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2774 EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
2777 EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
2779 * If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but matches a
2780 * custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c callback
2782 } else if (custom_ext_parse(s, 0, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2786 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2787 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2791 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1) {
2792 if (s->tlsext_hostname) {
2793 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) {
2794 s->session->tlsext_hostname =
2795 OPENSSL_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
2796 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname) {
2797 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2801 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2810 * Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to avoid
2811 * an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server hello
2812 * because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an attack.
2813 * However this would mean we could not connect to any server which
2814 * doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI absence
2816 if (!renegotiate_seen && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
2817 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2818 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2819 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2820 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2826 * Check extended master secret extension is consistent with
2829 if (!(s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) !=
2830 !(s->session->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS)) {
2831 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2832 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EXTMS);
2840 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2842 s->s3->alpn_sent = 0;
2846 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2851 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
2853 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2854 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2856 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2858 * The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely
2859 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2862 * The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely
2863 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2867 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2869 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2870 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2871 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
2872 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2874 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2876 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2879 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2880 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2883 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2884 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2887 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2888 s->servername_done = 0;
2894 /* Initialise digests to default values */
2895 void ssl_set_default_md(SSL *s)
2897 const EVP_MD **pmd = s->s3->tmp.md;
2898 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2899 pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
2901 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2902 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2903 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
2905 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX);
2906 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN];
2908 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2909 pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
2911 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2912 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX);
2913 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX);
2914 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX);
2918 int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s)
2923 /* Clear any shared signature algorithms */
2924 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
2925 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
2926 s->cert->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
2927 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
2928 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
2929 s->s3->tmp.md[i] = NULL;
2930 s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
2933 /* If sigalgs received process it. */
2934 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs) {
2935 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2936 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2937 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2940 /* Fatal error is no shared signature algorithms */
2941 if (!s->cert->shared_sigalgs) {
2942 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS,
2943 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS);
2944 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2948 ssl_set_default_md(s);
2952 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2957 * Upon success, returns 1.
2958 * Upon failure, returns 0 and sets |al| to the appropriate fatal alert.
2960 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s, int *al)
2962 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2965 * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be
2966 * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed,
2967 * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may
2968 * influence which certificate is sent
2970 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
2972 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
2973 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
2974 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
2975 if (certpkey != NULL) {
2977 * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
2978 * et al can pick it up.
2980 s->cert->key = certpkey;
2981 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2983 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
2984 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2985 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2987 /* status request response should be sent */
2988 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
2989 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
2990 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2992 /* something bad happened */
2993 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2995 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3001 if (!tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello_late(s, al)) {
3008 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
3010 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
3011 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
3013 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3015 * If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
3016 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension it
3017 * must contain uncompressed.
3019 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3020 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3021 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
3022 && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
3023 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
3024 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
3025 && ((alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) {
3026 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
3028 unsigned char *list;
3029 int found_uncompressed = 0;
3030 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
3031 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) {
3032 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed) {
3033 found_uncompressed = 1;
3037 if (!found_uncompressed) {
3038 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
3039 SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
3043 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
3044 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
3046 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3048 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
3049 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3050 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
3051 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3053 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
3055 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3058 * Ensure we get sensible values passed to tlsext_status_cb in the event
3059 * that we don't receive a status message
3061 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
3062 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
3063 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = 0;
3066 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3067 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3070 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3071 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
3074 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3075 s->servername_done = 0;
3081 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3084 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
3086 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, pkt, &al) <= 0) {
3087 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3091 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
3092 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
3099 * Given a list of extensions that we collected earlier, find one of a given
3100 * type and return it.
3102 * |exts| is the set of extensions previously collected.
3103 * |numexts| is the number of extensions that we have.
3104 * |type| the type of the extension that we are looking for.
3106 * Returns a pointer to the found RAW_EXTENSION data, or NULL if not found.
3108 RAW_EXTENSION *tls_get_extension_by_type(RAW_EXTENSION *exts, size_t numexts,
3113 for (loop = 0; loop < numexts; loop++) {
3114 if (exts[loop].type == type)
3122 * Gets the ticket information supplied by the client if any.
3124 * hello: The parsed ClientHello data
3125 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3126 * point to the resulting session.
3128 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
3129 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
3130 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
3133 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3134 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
3135 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
3136 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
3137 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
3138 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
3139 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
3142 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
3143 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
3144 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
3145 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
3146 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
3147 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
3149 int tls_get_ticket_from_client(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello,
3153 const unsigned char *etick;
3155 RAW_EXTENSION *ticketext;
3158 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
3161 * If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
3164 if (s->version <= SSL3_VERSION || !tls_use_ticket(s))
3167 ticketext = tls_get_extension_by_type(hello->pre_proc_exts,
3168 hello->num_extensions,
3169 TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket);
3170 if (ticketext == NULL)
3173 size = PACKET_remaining(&ticketext->data);
3176 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
3179 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3182 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
3184 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
3185 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
3186 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
3187 * calculate the master secret later.
3191 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&ticketext->data, &etick, size)) {
3192 /* Shouldn't ever happen */
3195 retv = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, etick, size, hello->session_id,
3196 hello->session_id_len, ret);
3198 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
3199 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3202 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
3205 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
3206 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3209 default: /* fatal error */
3215 * Sets the extended master secret flag if the extension is present in the
3216 * ClientHello and we can support it
3221 int tls_check_client_ems_support(SSL *s, const CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello)
3223 RAW_EXTENSION *emsext;
3225 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
3227 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (s->version < TLS1_VERSION
3228 || s->version > TLS1_2_VERSION))
3231 emsext = tls_get_extension_by_type(hello->pre_proc_exts,
3232 hello->num_extensions,
3233 TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret);
3236 * No extensions is a success - we have successfully discovered that the
3237 * client doesn't support EMS.
3242 /* The extensions must always be empty */
3243 if (PACKET_remaining(&emsext->data) != 0)
3246 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
3252 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
3254 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
3255 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extension.
3256 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
3257 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
3258 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3259 * point to the resulting session.
3262 * -2: fatal error, malloc failure.
3263 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3264 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
3265 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
3266 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
3268 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
3269 size_t eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id,
3270 size_t sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess)
3273 unsigned char *sdec;
3274 const unsigned char *p;
3275 int slen, renew_ticket = 0, ret = -1, declen;
3277 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
3278 HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL;
3279 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
3280 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3282 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
3283 hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
3286 ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
3291 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
3292 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
3293 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
3304 /* Check key name matches */
3305 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name,
3306 sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name)) != 0) {
3310 if (HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key,
3311 sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key),
3312 EVP_sha256(), NULL) <= 0
3313 || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_256_cbc(), NULL,
3314 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key,
3315 etick + sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name)) <=
3321 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
3324 mlen = HMAC_size(hctx);
3328 /* Sanity check ticket length: must exceed keyname + IV + HMAC */
3330 TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx) + mlen) {
3335 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
3336 if (HMAC_Update(hctx, etick, eticklen) <= 0
3337 || HMAC_Final(hctx, tick_hmac, NULL) <= 0) {
3340 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3341 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) {
3342 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3345 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
3346 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
3347 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
3348 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
3349 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
3350 if (sdec == NULL || EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, sdec, &slen, p,
3351 (int)eticklen) <= 0) {
3352 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3356 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(ctx, sdec + slen, &declen) <= 0) {
3357 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3362 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3366 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3370 * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
3371 * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
3372 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
3376 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3377 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3386 * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
3390 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3391 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3395 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3402 static const tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
3403 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3404 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3405 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3406 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3407 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3408 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512},
3409 {NID_id_GostR3411_94, TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411},
3410 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256},
3411 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512},
3414 static const tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
3415 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
3416 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
3417 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa},
3418 {NID_id_GostR3410_2001, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001},
3419 {NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256},
3420 {NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512}
3423 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3426 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3427 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3433 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3436 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3437 if ((table[i].id) == id)
3438 return table[i].nid;
3443 int tls12_get_sigandhash(WPACKET *pkt, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md)
3449 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3452 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3455 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, md_id) || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, sig_id))
3461 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
3463 return tls12_find_id(EVP_PKEY_id(pk), tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3470 unsigned char tlsext_hash;
3473 static const tls12_hash_info tls12_md_info[] = {
3474 {NID_md5, 64, SSL_MD_MD5_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3475 {NID_sha1, 80, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3476 {NID_sha224, 112, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3477 {NID_sha256, 128, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3478 {NID_sha384, 192, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3479 {NID_sha512, 256, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha512},
3480 {NID_id_GostR3411_94, 128, SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411},
3481 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, 128, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX,
3482 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256},
3483 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, 256, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX,
3484 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512},
3487 static const tls12_hash_info *tls12_get_hash_info(unsigned char hash_alg)
3493 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md_info); i++) {
3494 if (tls12_md_info[i].tlsext_hash == hash_alg)
3495 return tls12_md_info + i;
3501 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
3503 const tls12_hash_info *inf;
3504 if (hash_alg == TLSEXT_hash_md5 && FIPS_mode())
3506 inf = tls12_get_hash_info(hash_alg);
3509 return ssl_md(inf->md_idx);
3512 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
3515 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3516 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3517 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3519 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3520 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3521 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3523 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3524 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3525 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3527 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3528 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001:
3529 return SSL_PKEY_GOST01;
3531 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256:
3532 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256;
3534 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512:
3535 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512;
3541 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3542 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
3543 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3545 int sign_nid = NID_undef, hash_nid = NID_undef;
3546 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3548 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3549 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3551 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3553 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3554 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3556 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3558 if (psignhash_nid) {
3559 if (sign_nid == NID_undef || hash_nid == NID_undef
3560 || OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid, hash_nid, sign_nid) <= 0)
3561 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3565 /* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
3566 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(SSL *s, int op, const unsigned char *ptmp)
3568 /* See if we have an entry in the hash table and it is enabled */
3569 const tls12_hash_info *hinf = tls12_get_hash_info(ptmp[0]);
3570 if (hinf == NULL || ssl_md(hinf->md_idx) == NULL)
3572 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
3573 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3575 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
3576 return ssl_security(s, op, hinf->secbits, hinf->nid, (void *)ptmp);
3580 * Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported signature
3581 * algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA then RSA is
3585 void ssl_set_sig_mask(uint32_t *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op)
3587 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
3588 size_t i, sigalgslen;
3589 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
3591 * Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any for
3592 * RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just TLS 1.2. To keep
3593 * down calls to security callback only check if we have to.
3595 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
3596 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2) {
3597 switch (sigalgs[1]) {
3598 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3599 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3600 if (!have_rsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3604 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3605 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3606 if (!have_dsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3610 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3611 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3612 if (!have_ecdsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3619 *pmask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
3621 *pmask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
3623 *pmask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
3626 int tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
3627 const unsigned char *psig, size_t psiglen)
3631 for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i += 2, psig += 2) {
3632 if (tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, psig)) {
3633 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, psig[0])
3634 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, psig[1]))
3641 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
3642 static size_t tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
3643 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3644 const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
3646 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3647 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3648 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i += 2, ptmp += 2) {
3649 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3650 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED, ptmp))
3652 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j += 2, atmp += 2) {
3653 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1]) {
3656 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3657 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3658 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3660 &shsig->signandhash_nid, ptmp);
3670 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3671 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3673 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3674 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3676 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3678 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
3680 OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
3681 c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
3682 c->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
3683 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3684 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3685 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3686 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3687 } else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3688 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
3689 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3691 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
3692 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb) {
3695 allow = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3696 allowlen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
3700 pref = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3701 preflen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
3703 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3705 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3708 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3712 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3713 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3717 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3719 int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, size_t dsize)
3722 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
3723 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3725 /* Should never happen */
3729 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs);
3730 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
3731 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs == NULL)
3733 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3734 memcpy(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
3738 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3743 const EVP_MD **pmd = s->s3->tmp.md;
3744 uint32_t *pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags;
3746 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3747 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s))
3750 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3751 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++) {
3752 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3753 if (idx > 0 && pmd[idx] == NULL) {
3754 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
3756 pvalid[idx] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3757 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) {
3758 pvalid[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3759 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = md;
3765 * In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't use
3766 * the certificate for signing.
3768 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
3770 * Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not
3771 * supported it stays as NULL.
3773 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3774 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] == NULL)
3775 pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
3777 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3778 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] == NULL) {
3779 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
3780 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = EVP_sha1();
3783 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3784 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] == NULL)
3785 pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha1();
3787 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3788 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] == NULL)
3789 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] = EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_94);
3790 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] == NULL)
3791 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] =
3792 EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256);
3793 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] == NULL)
3794 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] =
3795 EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512);
3801 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3802 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3803 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3805 const unsigned char *psig = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3806 size_t numsigalgs = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3807 if (psig == NULL || numsigalgs > INT_MAX)
3811 if (idx >= (int)s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen)
3818 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
3820 return (int)numsigalgs;
3823 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3824 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3825 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3827 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
3828 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen
3829 || s->cert->shared_sigalgslen > INT_MAX)
3833 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3835 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3837 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3839 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
3841 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
3842 return (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
3845 #define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
3849 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
3852 static void get_sigorhash(int *psig, int *phash, const char *str)
3854 if (strcmp(str, "RSA") == 0) {
3855 *psig = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
3856 } else if (strcmp(str, "DSA") == 0) {
3857 *psig = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
3858 } else if (strcmp(str, "ECDSA") == 0) {
3859 *psig = EVP_PKEY_EC;
3861 *phash = OBJ_sn2nid(str);
3862 if (*phash == NID_undef)
3863 *phash = OBJ_ln2nid(str);
3867 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
3869 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
3872 int sig_alg = NID_undef, hash_alg = NID_undef;
3875 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
3877 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
3879 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
3881 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
3889 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, etmp);
3890 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, p);
3892 if (sig_alg == NID_undef || hash_alg == NID_undef)
3895 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i += 2) {
3896 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
3899 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
3900 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
3905 * Set supported signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
3906 * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
3908 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
3912 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
3916 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
3919 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
3921 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
3926 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
3927 if (sigalgs == NULL)
3929 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i += 2) {
3930 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3931 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3933 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
3940 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
3941 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3942 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
3944 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
3945 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3946 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
3952 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
3956 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
3960 if (default_nid == -1)
3962 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
3964 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
3965 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
3966 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
3971 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
3972 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
3976 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
3977 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++) {
3978 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
3985 * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by
3986 * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before
3987 * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before
3988 * attempting to use them.
3991 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
3993 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
3994 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
3995 /* Strict mode flags */
3996 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
3997 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
3998 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
4000 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
4005 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
4006 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
4009 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
4010 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
4012 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
4015 idx = (int)(cpk - c->pkeys);
4017 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
4018 pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
4020 pk = cpk->privatekey;
4022 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
4023 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
4029 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
4032 pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
4034 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
4035 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
4037 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
4044 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4045 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
4046 if (ok == X509_V_OK)
4047 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4048 else if (!check_flags)
4053 * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature
4054 * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode.
4056 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode) {
4058 unsigned char rsign = 0;
4059 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs)
4061 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
4064 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
4065 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
4066 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
4067 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
4070 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
4071 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
4072 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
4076 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
4077 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
4080 case SSL_PKEY_GOST01:
4081 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001;
4082 default_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001;
4085 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256:
4086 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256;
4087 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_256;
4090 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512:
4091 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512;
4092 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_512;
4101 * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set
4102 * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1.
4104 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs) {
4106 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
4107 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2) {
4108 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
4111 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen) {
4118 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
4119 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid)) {
4123 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
4124 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4125 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
4126 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i), default_nid)) {
4128 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4135 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
4136 else if (check_flags)
4137 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE | CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4139 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
4140 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
4141 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
4142 else if (!check_flags)
4145 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4146 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
4147 else if (strict_mode) {
4148 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4149 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
4150 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4151 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0)) {
4153 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4160 if (!s->server && strict_mode) {
4161 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
4163 switch (EVP_PKEY_id(pk)) {
4165 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
4168 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
4171 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
4175 const unsigned char *ctypes;
4179 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
4181 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
4182 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
4184 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++) {
4185 if (ctypes[i] == check_type) {
4186 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4190 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
4193 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4195 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
4197 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
4198 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4200 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
4201 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))