2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
12 #include <openssl/objects.h>
13 #include <openssl/evp.h>
14 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
15 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
16 #include <openssl/conf.h>
17 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
18 #include <openssl/dh.h>
19 #include <openssl/bn.h>
21 #include <openssl/ct.h>
23 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, size_t ticklen,
24 const unsigned char *sess_id, size_t sesslen,
26 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
27 static int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
29 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data = {
33 tls1_generate_master_secret,
34 tls1_change_cipher_state,
35 tls1_final_finish_mac,
36 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
37 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
39 tls1_export_keying_material,
41 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
42 tls_close_construct_packet,
46 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_1_enc_data = {
50 tls1_generate_master_secret,
51 tls1_change_cipher_state,
52 tls1_final_finish_mac,
53 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
54 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
56 tls1_export_keying_material,
57 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
58 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
59 tls_close_construct_packet,
63 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_2_enc_data = {
67 tls1_generate_master_secret,
68 tls1_change_cipher_state,
69 tls1_final_finish_mac,
70 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
71 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
73 tls1_export_keying_material,
74 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
75 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
76 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
77 tls_close_construct_packet,
81 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_3_enc_data = {
85 tls1_generate_master_secret,
86 tls1_change_cipher_state,
87 tls1_final_finish_mac,
88 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
89 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
91 tls1_export_keying_material,
92 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
93 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
94 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
95 tls_close_construct_packet,
99 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
102 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
103 * http, the cache would over fill
105 return (60 * 60 * 2);
112 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
116 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
118 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
122 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
125 if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION)
126 s->version = TLS_MAX_VERSION;
128 s->version = s->method->version;
131 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
134 int nid; /* Curve NID */
135 int secbits; /* Bits of security (from SP800-57) */
136 unsigned int flags; /* Flags: currently just field type */
140 * Table of curve information.
141 * Do not delete entries or reorder this array! It is used as a lookup
142 * table: the index of each entry is one less than the TLS curve id.
144 static const tls_curve_info nid_list[] = {
145 {NID_sect163k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163k1 (1) */
146 {NID_sect163r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r1 (2) */
147 {NID_sect163r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r2 (3) */
148 {NID_sect193r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r1 (4) */
149 {NID_sect193r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r2 (5) */
150 {NID_sect233k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233k1 (6) */
151 {NID_sect233r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233r1 (7) */
152 {NID_sect239k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect239k1 (8) */
153 {NID_sect283k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283k1 (9) */
154 {NID_sect283r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283r1 (10) */
155 {NID_sect409k1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409k1 (11) */
156 {NID_sect409r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409r1 (12) */
157 {NID_sect571k1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571k1 (13) */
158 {NID_sect571r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571r1 (14) */
159 {NID_secp160k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160k1 (15) */
160 {NID_secp160r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r1 (16) */
161 {NID_secp160r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r2 (17) */
162 {NID_secp192k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192k1 (18) */
163 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192r1 (19) */
164 {NID_secp224k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224k1 (20) */
165 {NID_secp224r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224r1 (21) */
166 {NID_secp256k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256k1 (22) */
167 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256r1 (23) */
168 {NID_secp384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp384r1 (24) */
169 {NID_secp521r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp521r1 (25) */
170 {NID_brainpoolP256r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
171 {NID_brainpoolP384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
172 {NID_brainpoolP512r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
173 {NID_X25519, 128, TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM}, /* X25519 (29) */
176 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = {
177 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
178 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
179 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
182 /* The default curves */
183 static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] = {
184 0, 29, /* X25519 (29) */
185 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
186 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
187 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
190 static const unsigned char eccurves_all[] = {
191 0, 29, /* X25519 (29) */
192 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
193 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
194 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
195 0, 26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
196 0, 27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
197 0, 28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
200 * Remaining curves disabled by default but still permitted if set
201 * via an explicit callback or parameters.
203 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
204 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
205 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
206 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
207 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
208 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
209 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
210 0, 20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
211 0, 21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
212 0, 18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
213 0, 19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
214 0, 15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
215 0, 16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
216 0, 17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
217 0, 8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
218 0, 6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
219 0, 7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
220 0, 4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
221 0, 5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
222 0, 1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
223 0, 2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
224 0, 3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
227 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] = {
228 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
229 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
232 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id, unsigned int *pflags)
234 const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
235 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
236 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
238 cinfo = nid_list + curve_id - 1;
240 *pflags = cinfo->flags;
244 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
247 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(nid_list); i++) {
248 if (nid_list[i].nid == nid)
255 * Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
257 * Sets |num_curves| to the number of curves in the list, i.e.,
258 * the length of |pcurves| is 2 * num_curves.
259 * Returns 1 on success and 0 if the client curves list has invalid format.
260 * The latter indicates an internal error: we should not be accepting such
261 * lists in the first place.
262 * TODO(emilia): we should really be storing the curves list in explicitly
263 * parsed form instead. (However, this would affect binary compatibility
264 * so cannot happen in the 1.0.x series.)
266 static int tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
267 const unsigned char **pcurves, size_t *num_curves)
269 size_t pcurveslen = 0;
271 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_supportedgroupslist;
272 pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_supportedgroupslist_length;
274 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
275 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
276 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
277 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
278 pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
281 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
282 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
286 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
287 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
291 *pcurves = s->tlsext_supportedgroupslist;
292 pcurveslen = s->tlsext_supportedgroupslist_length;
295 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
296 pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
300 /* We do not allow odd length arrays to enter the system. */
301 if (pcurveslen & 1) {
302 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_GET_CURVELIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
306 *num_curves = pcurveslen / 2;
311 /* See if curve is allowed by security callback */
312 static int tls_curve_allowed(SSL *s, const unsigned char *curve, int op)
314 const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
317 if ((curve[1] < 1) || ((size_t)curve[1] > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
319 cinfo = &nid_list[curve[1] - 1];
320 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
321 if (cinfo->flags & TLS_CURVE_CHAR2)
324 return ssl_security(s, op, cinfo->secbits, cinfo->nid, (void *)curve);
327 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
328 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
330 const unsigned char *curves;
331 size_t num_curves, i;
332 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
333 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
335 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
337 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
340 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) {
341 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
343 } else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) {
344 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
346 } else /* Should never happen */
349 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &num_curves))
351 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, curves += 2) {
352 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
353 return tls_curve_allowed(s, p + 1, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK);
359 * For nmatch >= 0, return the NID of the |nmatch|th shared group or NID_undef
360 * if there is no match.
361 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
362 * For nmatch == -2, return the NID of the group to use for
363 * an EC tmp key, or NID_undef if there is no match.
365 int tls1_shared_group(SSL *s, int nmatch)
367 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
368 size_t num_pref, num_supp, i, j;
370 /* Can't do anything on client side */
374 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
376 * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know
377 * these are acceptable due to previous checks.
379 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
380 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
381 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
382 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
383 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
384 /* Should never happen */
387 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
391 * Avoid truncation. tls1_get_curvelist takes an int
392 * but s->options is a long...
394 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
395 (s, (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0, &supp,
397 /* In practice, NID_undef == 0 but let's be precise. */
398 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
399 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
400 (s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE), &pref, &num_pref))
401 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
404 * If the client didn't send the elliptic_curves extension all of them
407 if (num_supp == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0) {
409 num_supp = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2;
410 } else if (num_pref == 0 &&
411 (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) == 0) {
413 num_pref = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2;
417 for (i = 0; i < num_pref; i++, pref += 2) {
418 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
419 for (j = 0; j < num_supp; j++, tsupp += 2) {
420 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1]) {
421 if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, pref, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
424 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
425 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id, NULL);
433 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
437 int tls1_set_groups(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
438 int *groups, size_t ngroups)
440 unsigned char *glist, *p;
443 * Bitmap of groups included to detect duplicates: only works while group
446 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
447 glist = OPENSSL_malloc(ngroups * 2);
450 for (i = 0, p = glist; i < ngroups; i++) {
451 unsigned long idmask;
453 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Convert for DH groups */
454 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(groups[i]);
456 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask)) {
465 *pextlen = ngroups * 2;
469 # define MAX_CURVELIST 28
473 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
476 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
478 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
484 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
486 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
488 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
490 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
491 if (nid == NID_undef)
492 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
493 if (nid == NID_undef)
494 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
495 if (nid == NID_undef)
497 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
498 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
500 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
504 /* Set groups based on a colon separate list */
505 int tls1_set_groups_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen, const char *str)
509 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
513 return tls1_set_groups(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
516 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
517 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
524 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
525 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
528 /* Determine curve ID */
529 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
530 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
531 /* If no id return error: we don't support arbitrary explicit curves */
535 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
537 if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
539 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED) {
540 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
542 if ((nid_list[id - 1].flags & TLS_CURVE_TYPE) == TLS_CURVE_PRIME)
543 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
545 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
551 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
552 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
553 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
555 const unsigned char *pformats, *pcurves;
556 size_t num_formats, num_curves, i;
559 * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
560 * supported (see RFC4492).
562 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
563 pformats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
564 num_formats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
565 for (i = 0; i < num_formats; i++, pformats++) {
566 if (*comp_id == *pformats)
569 if (i == num_formats)
574 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
575 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++) {
576 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &pcurves, &num_curves))
578 if (j == 1 && num_curves == 0) {
580 * If we've not received any curves then skip this check.
581 * RFC 4492 does not require the supported elliptic curves extension
582 * so if it is not sent we can just choose any curve.
583 * It is invalid to send an empty list in the elliptic curves
584 * extension, so num_curves == 0 always means no extension.
588 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
589 if (pcurves[0] == curve_id[0] && pcurves[1] == curve_id[1])
594 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
601 static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
605 * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
607 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
608 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
609 *num_formats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
611 *pformats = ecformats_default;
612 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
614 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
616 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default);
621 * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
622 * certificates have compatible curves and compression.
624 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
626 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
629 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
632 /* If not EC nothing to do */
633 if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) != EVP_PKEY_EC)
635 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey));
639 * Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a supported
642 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
646 * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
647 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
649 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s)) {
655 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
656 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
657 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
658 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
659 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
661 return 0; /* Should never happen */
662 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
663 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
665 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
667 if (set_ee_md == 2) {
668 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
669 s->s3->tmp.md[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha256();
671 s->s3->tmp.md[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha384();
677 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
679 * tls1_check_ec_tmp_key - Check EC temporary key compatibility
681 * @cid: Cipher ID we're considering using
683 * Checks that the kECDHE cipher suite we're considering using
684 * is compatible with the client extensions.
686 * Returns 0 when the cipher can't be used or 1 when it can.
688 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
691 * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
694 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
695 unsigned char curve_id[2];
696 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
697 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
698 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
699 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
700 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
704 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
705 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
709 /* Need a shared curve */
710 if (tls1_shared_group(s, 0))
714 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
718 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
723 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
726 * List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
727 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
730 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
731 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
733 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
736 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
737 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
739 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
743 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)/* */
745 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
748 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
749 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
750 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
751 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
753 static const unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
754 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
755 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
756 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
757 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
758 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
759 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
760 TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001,
761 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256,
762 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512
766 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
767 static const unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
768 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
769 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
772 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
775 * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
778 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
779 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
780 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
781 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
782 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
784 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
785 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
788 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
789 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
793 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
794 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs) {
795 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
796 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
797 } else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
798 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
799 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
801 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
802 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
807 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
808 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
810 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
811 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
813 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
814 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
815 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
816 /* Should never happen */
819 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
820 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1]) {
821 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
824 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
825 if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
826 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
827 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
828 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey)))
830 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id)) {
831 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
834 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
835 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
838 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256) {
839 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256) {
840 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
841 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
844 } else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384) {
845 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384) {
846 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
847 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
853 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
857 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
858 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
859 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i += 2, sent_sigs += 2) {
860 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
863 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
864 if (i == sent_sigslen
865 && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1
866 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
867 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
870 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
872 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
875 /* Make sure security callback allows algorithm */
876 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK,
877 EVP_MD_size(*pmd) * 4, EVP_MD_type(*pmd), (void *)sig)) {
878 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
882 * Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they wish.
884 s->s3->tmp.peer_md = *pmd;
889 * Set a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
890 * supported, doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms, isn't supported
891 * by the enabled protocol versions or by the security level.
893 * This function should only be used for checking which ciphers are supported
896 * Call ssl_cipher_disabled() to check that it's enabled or not.
898 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
900 s->s3->tmp.mask_a = 0;
901 s->s3->tmp.mask_k = 0;
902 ssl_set_sig_mask(&s->s3->tmp.mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
903 ssl_get_client_min_max_version(s, &s->s3->tmp.min_ver, &s->s3->tmp.max_ver);
904 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
905 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
906 if (!s->psk_client_callback) {
907 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
908 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_PSK;
910 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
911 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
912 if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) {
913 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
914 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
920 * ssl_cipher_disabled - check that a cipher is disabled or not
921 * @s: SSL connection that you want to use the cipher on
922 * @c: cipher to check
923 * @op: Security check that you want to do
925 * Returns 1 when it's disabled, 0 when enabled.
927 int ssl_cipher_disabled(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op)
929 if (c->algorithm_mkey & s->s3->tmp.mask_k
930 || c->algorithm_auth & s->s3->tmp.mask_a)
932 if (s->s3->tmp.max_ver == 0)
934 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && ((c->min_tls > s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
935 || (c->max_tls < s->s3->tmp.min_ver)))
937 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (DTLS_VERSION_GT(c->min_dtls, s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
938 || DTLS_VERSION_LT(c->max_dtls, s->s3->tmp.min_ver)))
941 return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c);
944 static int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s)
946 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
948 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL);
951 static int compare_uint(const void *p1, const void *p2)
953 unsigned int u1 = *((const unsigned int *)p1);
954 unsigned int u2 = *((const unsigned int *)p2);
964 * Per http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.1.4, there may not be
965 * more than one extension of the same type in a ClientHello or ServerHello.
966 * This function does an initial scan over the extensions block to filter those
967 * out. It returns 1 if all extensions are unique, and 0 if the extensions
968 * contain duplicates, could not be successfully parsed, or an internal error
971 static int tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(const PACKET *packet)
973 PACKET extensions = *packet;
974 size_t num_extensions = 0, i = 0;
975 unsigned int *extension_types = NULL;
978 /* First pass: count the extensions. */
979 while (PACKET_remaining(&extensions) > 0) {
982 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions, &type) ||
983 !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions, &extension)) {
989 if (num_extensions <= 1)
992 extension_types = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(unsigned int) * num_extensions);
993 if (extension_types == NULL) {
994 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
998 /* Second pass: gather the extension types. */
999 extensions = *packet;
1000 for (i = 0; i < num_extensions; i++) {
1002 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions, &extension_types[i]) ||
1003 !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions, &extension)) {
1004 /* This should not happen. */
1005 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1010 if (PACKET_remaining(&extensions) != 0) {
1011 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1014 /* Sort the extensions and make sure there are no duplicates. */
1015 qsort(extension_types, num_extensions, sizeof(unsigned int), compare_uint);
1016 for (i = 1; i < num_extensions; i++) {
1017 if (extension_types[i - 1] == extension_types[i])
1022 OPENSSL_free(extension_types);
1026 int ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
1028 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1029 const unsigned char *pcurves = NULL;
1030 size_t num_curves = 0;
1033 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1034 if ((s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->version <= TLS1_2_VERSION)
1035 || SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1037 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1038 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1040 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++) {
1041 const SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1043 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1044 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1045 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK))
1046 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)) {
1051 } else if (s->version >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
1053 * TODO(TLS1.3): We always use ECC for TLSv1.3 at the moment. This will
1054 * change if we implement DH key shares
1059 if (s->version >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
1060 /* Shouldn't happen! */
1061 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1066 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1067 if (s->renegotiate) {
1068 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
1069 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1070 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->s3->previous_client_finished,
1071 s->s3->previous_client_finished_len)
1072 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1073 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1077 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1078 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION)
1081 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1082 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1083 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1084 /* Sub-packet for server_name extension */
1085 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1086 /* Sub-packet for servername list (always 1 hostname)*/
1087 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1088 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name)
1089 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->tlsext_hostname,
1090 strlen(s->tlsext_hostname))
1091 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1092 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1093 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1097 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1098 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
1099 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) {
1100 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_srp)
1101 /* Sub-packet for SRP extension */
1102 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1103 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
1104 /* login must not be zero...internal error if so */
1105 || !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt, WPACKET_FLAGS_NON_ZERO_LENGTH)
1106 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->srp_ctx.login,
1107 strlen(s->srp_ctx.login))
1108 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1109 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1110 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1116 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1119 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message
1121 const unsigned char *pformats, *pcurvestmp;
1125 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &pformats, &num_formats);
1127 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
1128 /* Sub-packet for formats extension */
1129 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1130 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, pformats, num_formats)
1131 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1132 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1137 * Add TLS extension supported_groups to the ClientHello message
1139 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Add support for DHE groups */
1140 pcurves = s->tlsext_supportedgroupslist;
1141 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &pcurves, &num_curves)) {
1142 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1145 pcurvestmp = pcurves;
1147 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_groups)
1148 /* Sub-packet for supported_groups extension */
1149 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1150 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1151 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1154 /* Copy curve ID if supported */
1155 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurvestmp += 2) {
1156 if (tls_curve_allowed(s, pcurves, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) {
1157 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, pcurvestmp[0])
1158 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, pcurvestmp[1])) {
1159 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
1160 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1165 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1166 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1170 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1172 if (tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1174 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
1175 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
1176 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1177 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data) {
1178 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1179 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1180 if (s->session->tlsext_tick == NULL) {
1181 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1184 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1185 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data, ticklen);
1186 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1189 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1190 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1193 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
1194 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->session->tlsext_tick,
1196 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1202 if (SSL_CLIENT_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1204 const unsigned char *salg;
1206 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
1208 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms)
1209 /* Sub-packet for sig-algs extension */
1210 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1211 /* Sub-packet for the actual list */
1212 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1213 || !tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, pkt, salg, salglen)
1214 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1215 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1216 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1220 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
1221 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
1224 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
1225 /* Sub-packet for status request extension */
1226 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1227 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
1228 /* Sub-packet for the ids */
1229 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1230 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1233 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
1234 unsigned char *idbytes;
1238 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1239 idlen = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1241 /* Sub-packet for an individual id */
1242 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, idlen, &idbytes)
1243 || i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &idbytes) != idlen) {
1244 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1248 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)
1249 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1250 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1253 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) {
1254 unsigned char *extbytes;
1255 int extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1258 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1261 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, extlen, &extbytes)
1262 || i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &extbytes)
1264 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1268 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1269 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1275 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1276 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1278 * The client advertises an empty extension to indicate its support
1279 * for Next Protocol Negotiation
1281 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg)
1282 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1283 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1290 * finish_md_len is non-zero during a renegotiation, so
1291 * this avoids sending ALPN during the renegotiation
1292 * (see longer comment below)
1294 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1295 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt,
1296 TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation)
1297 /* Sub-packet ALPN extension */
1298 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1299 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->alpn_client_proto_list,
1300 s->alpn_client_proto_list_len)
1301 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1302 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1305 s->s3->alpn_sent = 1;
1307 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1308 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)) {
1309 STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *clnt = SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s);
1310 SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *prof;
1313 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
1314 /* Sub-packet for SRTP extension */
1315 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1316 /* Sub-packet for the protection profile list */
1317 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1318 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1321 ct = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(clnt);
1322 for (i = 0; i < ct; i++) {
1323 prof = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(clnt, i);
1324 if (prof == NULL || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, prof->id)) {
1325 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1329 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)
1330 /* Add an empty use_mki value */
1331 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)
1332 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1333 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1338 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->cli_ext);
1339 /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
1340 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 0, pkt, al)) {
1341 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1345 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)) {
1346 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
1347 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1348 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1353 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
1354 if (s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
1355 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp)
1356 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1357 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1363 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret)
1364 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1365 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1369 /* TLS1.3 specific extensions */
1370 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1371 int min_version, max_version, reason, currv;
1372 size_t i, sharessent = 0;
1374 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Should we add this extension for versions < TLS1.3? */
1375 /* supported_versions extension */
1376 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_versions)
1377 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1378 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)) {
1379 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1382 reason = ssl_get_client_min_max_version(s, &min_version, &max_version);
1384 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, reason);
1388 * TODO(TLS1.3): There is some discussion on the TLS list as to wheter
1389 * we should include versions <TLS1.2. For the moment we do. To be
1392 for (currv = max_version; currv >= min_version; currv--) {
1393 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove this first if clause prior to release!! */
1394 if (currv == TLS1_3_VERSION) {
1395 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT)) {
1396 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
1397 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1400 } else if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, currv)) {
1401 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1405 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1406 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1411 /* key_share extension */
1412 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share)
1413 /* Extension data sub-packet */
1414 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1415 /* KeyShare list sub-packet */
1416 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1417 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1422 * TODO(TLS1.3): Make the number of key_shares sent configurable. For
1423 * now, just send one
1425 for (i = 0; i < num_curves && sharessent < 1; i++, pcurves += 2) {
1426 if (tls_curve_allowed(s, pcurves, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) {
1427 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
1428 unsigned int curve_id = 0;
1429 EVP_PKEY *key_share_key = NULL;
1432 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) {
1433 /* Shouldn't happen! */
1434 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
1435 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1439 /* Generate a key for this key_share */
1440 curve_id = (pcurves[0] << 8) | pcurves[1];
1441 key_share_key = ssl_generate_pkey_curve(curve_id);
1442 if (key_share_key == NULL) {
1443 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
1447 /* Encode the public key. */
1448 encodedlen = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(key_share_key,
1450 if (encodedlen == 0) {
1451 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
1452 EVP_PKEY_free(key_share_key);
1456 /* Create KeyShareEntry */
1457 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, curve_id)
1458 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, encodedPoint,
1460 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
1461 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1462 EVP_PKEY_free(key_share_key);
1463 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1468 * TODO(TLS1.3): When changing to send more than one key_share
1469 * we're going to need to be able to save more than one EVP_PKEY
1470 * For now we reuse the existing tmp.pkey
1472 s->s3->group_id = curve_id;
1473 s->s3->tmp.pkey = key_share_key;
1475 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1478 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1479 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1485 * Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See
1486 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03 NB: because this
1487 * code works out the length of all existing extensions it MUST always
1490 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING) {
1491 unsigned char *padbytes;
1494 if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &hlen)) {
1495 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1499 if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200) {
1500 hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
1506 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_padding)
1507 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, hlen, &padbytes)) {
1508 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1511 memset(padbytes, 0, hlen);
1519 int ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
1521 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1522 int next_proto_neg_seen;
1524 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1525 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1526 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1527 int using_ecc = (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1528 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1531 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1532 || !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt, WPACKET_FLAGS_ABANDON_ON_ZERO_LENGTH)) {
1533 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1537 if (s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
1538 !ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, pkt)) {
1539 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1543 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1544 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
1547 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1
1548 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1549 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1550 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1551 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1555 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1557 const unsigned char *plist;
1560 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message
1562 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1564 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
1565 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1566 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, plist, plistlen)
1567 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1568 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1573 * Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves
1576 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1578 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected && tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1579 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
1580 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1581 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1586 * if we don't add the above TLSEXT, we can't add a session ticket
1589 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
1592 if (s->tlsext_status_expected) {
1593 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
1594 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1595 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1599 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1600 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->srtp_profile) {
1601 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
1602 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1603 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 2)
1604 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->srtp_profile->id)
1605 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)
1606 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1607 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1613 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x80
1614 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x81)
1615 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG)) {
1616 const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1617 0xfd, 0xe8, /* 65000 */
1618 0x00, 0x20, /* 32 bytes length */
1619 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1620 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1621 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1622 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17
1624 if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, cryptopro_ext, sizeof(cryptopro_ext))) {
1625 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1630 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1631 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1632 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1633 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb) {
1634 const unsigned char *npa;
1635 unsigned int npalen;
1638 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen,
1640 ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1641 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1642 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg)
1643 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, npa, npalen)) {
1644 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1647 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1652 if (s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION) {
1653 unsigned char *encodedPoint;
1654 size_t encoded_pt_len = 0;
1655 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL;
1657 ckey = s->s3->peer_tmp;
1659 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1663 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share)
1664 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1665 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->s3->group_id)) {
1666 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1670 skey = ssl_generate_pkey(ckey);
1672 /* Generate encoding of server key */
1673 encoded_pt_len = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(skey, &encodedPoint);
1674 if (encoded_pt_len == 0) {
1675 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
1676 EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
1680 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len)
1681 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1682 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1683 EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
1684 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1688 s->s3->tmp.pkey = skey;
1689 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1692 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 1, pkt, al)) {
1693 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1697 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) {
1699 * Don't use encrypt_then_mac if AEAD or RC4 might want to disable
1700 * for other cases too.
1702 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD
1703 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4
1704 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT
1705 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT12)
1706 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1708 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
1709 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1710 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1715 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) {
1716 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret)
1717 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1718 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1723 if (s->s3->alpn_selected != NULL) {
1724 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt,
1725 TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation)
1726 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1727 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1728 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->s3->alpn_selected,
1729 s->s3->alpn_selected_len)
1730 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1731 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1732 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1738 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1739 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1746 * Save the ALPN extension in a ClientHello.
1747 * pkt: the contents of the ALPN extension, not including type and length.
1748 * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a failure.
1749 * returns: 1 on success, 0 on error.
1751 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
1753 PACKET protocol_list, save_protocol_list, protocol;
1755 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1757 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &protocol_list)
1758 || PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) < 2) {
1762 save_protocol_list = protocol_list;
1764 /* Protocol names can't be empty. */
1765 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&protocol_list, &protocol)
1766 || PACKET_remaining(&protocol) == 0) {
1769 } while (PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) != 0);
1771 if (!PACKET_memdup(&save_protocol_list,
1772 &s->s3->alpn_proposed, &s->s3->alpn_proposed_len)) {
1773 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1781 * Process the ALPN extension in a ClientHello.
1782 * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a failure.
1783 * returns 1 on success, 0 on error.
1785 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello_late(SSL *s, int *al)
1787 const unsigned char *selected = NULL;
1788 unsigned char selected_len = 0;
1790 if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb != NULL && s->s3->alpn_proposed != NULL) {
1791 int r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len,
1792 s->s3->alpn_proposed,
1793 (unsigned int)s->s3->alpn_proposed_len,
1794 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
1796 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1797 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1798 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_memdup(selected, selected_len);
1799 if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
1800 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1803 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
1804 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1805 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
1806 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1809 *al = SSL_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL;
1817 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1819 * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1820 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |hello|.
1821 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1826 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1827 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1828 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1829 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1831 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello)
1837 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1838 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1839 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1840 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1841 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1842 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1843 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1845 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1846 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1847 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1848 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1849 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1850 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1851 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1852 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1853 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1854 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1855 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1856 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1857 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1860 /* Length of the common prefix (first two extensions). */
1861 static const size_t kSafariCommonExtensionsLength = 18;
1863 tmppkt = hello->extensions;
1865 if (!PACKET_forward(&tmppkt, 2)
1866 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt, &type)
1867 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&tmppkt, &sni)) {
1871 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1874 ext_len = TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION ?
1875 sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock) : kSafariCommonExtensionsLength;
1877 s->s3->is_probably_safari = PACKET_equal(&tmppkt, kSafariExtensionsBlock,
1880 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1883 * Loop through all remaining ClientHello extensions that we collected earlier
1884 * and haven't already processed. For each one parse it and update the SSL
1885 * object as required.
1887 * Behaviour upon resumption is extension-specific. If the extension has no
1888 * effect during resumption, it is parsed (to verify its format) but otherwise
1891 * Returns 1 on success and 0 on failure.
1892 * Upon failure, sets |al| to the appropriate alert.
1894 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello, int *al)
1897 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1899 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1900 s->servername_done = 0;
1901 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1902 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1903 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1906 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1907 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
1908 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = 0;
1909 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_proposed);
1910 s->s3->alpn_proposed = NULL;
1911 s->s3->alpn_proposed_len = 0;
1913 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1914 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1915 ssl_check_for_safari(s, hello);
1916 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1918 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
1919 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs);
1920 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = NULL;
1921 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1923 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1924 OPENSSL_free(s->srp_ctx.login);
1925 s->srp_ctx.login = NULL;
1928 s->srtp_profile = NULL;
1931 * We parse all extensions to ensure the ClientHello is well-formed but,
1932 * unless an extension specifies otherwise, we ignore extensions upon
1935 for (loop = 0; loop < hello->num_extensions; loop++) {
1936 RAW_EXTENSION *currext = &hello->pre_proc_exts[loop];
1938 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1939 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, currext->type,
1940 PACKET_data(&currext->data),
1941 PACKET_remaining(&currext->data),
1942 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1944 if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
1945 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s,
1946 &currext->data, al))
1948 renegotiate_seen = 1;
1949 } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
1952 * The servername extension is treated as follows:
1954 * - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
1955 * - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
1956 * in which case an fatal alert is generated.
1957 * - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
1958 * - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
1959 * to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
1960 * - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
1961 * it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
1962 * Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
1963 * set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
1964 * case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
1965 * a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
1966 * presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
1967 * the value of the Host: field.
1968 * - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1969 * if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the
1970 * session, i.e. when the session has been established with a servername
1972 * - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
1976 else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
1977 unsigned int servname_type;
1978 PACKET sni, hostname;
1980 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&currext->data, &sni)
1981 /* ServerNameList must be at least 1 byte long. */
1982 || PACKET_remaining(&sni) == 0) {
1987 * Although the server_name extension was intended to be
1988 * extensible to new name types, RFC 4366 defined the
1989 * syntax inextensibility and OpenSSL 1.0.x parses it as
1991 * RFC 6066 corrected the mistake but adding new name types
1992 * is nevertheless no longer feasible, so act as if no other
1993 * SNI types can exist, to simplify parsing.
1995 * Also note that the RFC permits only one SNI value per type,
1996 * i.e., we can only have a single hostname.
1998 if (!PACKET_get_1(&sni, &servname_type)
1999 || servname_type != TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name
2000 || !PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&sni, &hostname)) {
2005 if (PACKET_remaining(&hostname) > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) {
2006 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2010 if (PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&hostname)) {
2011 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2015 if (!PACKET_strndup(&hostname, &s->session->tlsext_hostname)) {
2016 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2020 s->servername_done = 1;
2023 * TODO(openssl-team): if the SNI doesn't match, we MUST
2024 * fall back to a full handshake.
2026 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
2027 && PACKET_equal(&hostname, s->session->tlsext_hostname,
2028 strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname));
2031 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2032 else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp) {
2035 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&currext->data, &srp_I))
2038 if (PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&srp_I))
2042 * TODO(openssl-team): currently, we re-authenticate the user
2043 * upon resumption. Instead, we MUST ignore the login.
2045 if (!PACKET_strndup(&srp_I, &s->srp_ctx.login)) {
2046 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2052 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2053 else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
2054 PACKET ec_point_format_list;
2056 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&currext->data,
2057 &ec_point_format_list)
2058 || PACKET_remaining(&ec_point_format_list) == 0) {
2063 if (!PACKET_memdup(&ec_point_format_list,
2064 &s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
2066 session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length)) {
2067 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2071 } else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_groups) {
2072 PACKET supported_groups_list;
2074 /* Each group is 2 bytes and we must have at least 1. */
2075 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&currext->data,
2076 &supported_groups_list)
2077 || PACKET_remaining(&supported_groups_list) == 0
2078 || (PACKET_remaining(&supported_groups_list) % 2) != 0) {
2083 if (!PACKET_memdup(&supported_groups_list,
2084 &s->session->tlsext_supportedgroupslist,
2086 session->tlsext_supportedgroupslist_length)) {
2087 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2092 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2093 else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2094 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2095 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s,
2096 PACKET_data(&currext->data),
2097 PACKET_remaining(&currext->data),
2098 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg)) {
2099 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2102 } else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms) {
2103 PACKET supported_sig_algs;
2105 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&currext->data,
2106 &supported_sig_algs)
2107 || (PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) % 2) != 0
2108 || PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) == 0) {
2113 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, PACKET_data(&supported_sig_algs),
2114 PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs))) {
2118 } else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
2119 if (!PACKET_get_1(&currext->data,
2120 (unsigned int *)&s->tlsext_status_type)) {
2123 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
2124 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
2125 const unsigned char *ext_data;
2126 PACKET responder_id_list, exts;
2127 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2
2128 (&currext->data, &responder_id_list))
2132 * We remove any OCSP_RESPIDs from a previous handshake
2133 * to prevent unbounded memory growth - CVE-2016-6304
2135 sk_OCSP_RESPID_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids,
2137 if (PACKET_remaining(&responder_id_list) > 0) {
2138 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null();
2139 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_ids == NULL) {
2140 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2144 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = NULL;
2147 while (PACKET_remaining(&responder_id_list) > 0) {
2149 PACKET responder_id;
2150 const unsigned char *id_data;
2152 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&responder_id_list,
2154 || PACKET_remaining(&responder_id) == 0) {
2158 id_data = PACKET_data(&responder_id);
2159 /* TODO(size_t): Convert d2i_* to size_t */
2160 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, &id_data,
2161 (int)PACKET_remaining(&responder_id));
2165 if (id_data != PACKET_end(&responder_id)) {
2166 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2170 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id)) {
2171 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2172 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2177 /* Read in request_extensions */
2178 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(
2179 &currext->data, &exts))
2182 if (PACKET_remaining(&exts) > 0) {
2183 ext_data = PACKET_data(&exts);
2184 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2185 X509_EXTENSION_free);
2186 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
2187 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &ext_data,
2188 (int)PACKET_remaining(&exts));
2189 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts == NULL
2190 || ext_data != PACKET_end(&exts)) {
2198 * We don't know what to do with any other type so ignore it.
2200 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2203 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2204 else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg
2205 && s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2207 * We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2210 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2211 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2212 * the initial renegotiation too in certain cases (when
2213 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2214 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2215 * anything like that, but this might change).
2217 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2218 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2219 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2220 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2221 * Finished message could have been computed.)
2223 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2227 else if (currext->type
2228 == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation
2229 && s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2230 if (!tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s,
2231 &currext->data, al))
2235 /* session ticket processed earlier */
2236 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2237 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)
2238 && currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2239 if (ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s,
2240 &currext->data, al))
2244 else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2245 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)) {
2246 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2247 } else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share
2248 && s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION) {
2249 unsigned int group_id;
2250 PACKET key_share_list, encoded_pt;
2251 const unsigned char *curves;
2252 size_t num_curves, i;
2254 unsigned int curve_flags;
2257 if (s->s3->peer_tmp != NULL) {
2258 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2259 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2263 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&currext->data, &key_share_list)) {
2264 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2265 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2266 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2270 while (PACKET_remaining(&key_share_list) > 0) {
2271 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&key_share_list, &group_id)
2272 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&key_share_list,
2274 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2275 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2276 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2280 /* Find a share that we can use */
2281 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &num_curves)) {
2282 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2283 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2284 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2287 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, curves += 2) {
2288 unsigned int share_id = (curves[0] << 8) | (curves[1]);
2289 if (group_id == share_id
2290 && tls_curve_allowed(s, curves,
2291 SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK)) {
2296 if (i == num_curves) {
2297 /* Share not suitable */
2301 group_nid = tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(group_id, &curve_flags);
2303 if (group_nid == 0) {
2304 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2305 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2306 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
2310 if ((curve_flags & TLS_CURVE_TYPE) == TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM) {
2311 /* Can happen for some curves, e.g. X25519 */
2312 EVP_PKEY *key = EVP_PKEY_new();
2314 if (key == NULL || !EVP_PKEY_set_type(key, group_nid)) {
2315 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2316 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2320 s->s3->peer_tmp = key;
2322 /* Set up EVP_PKEY with named curve as parameters */
2323 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(EVP_PKEY_EC, NULL);
2325 || EVP_PKEY_paramgen_init(pctx) <= 0
2326 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ec_paramgen_curve_nid(pctx,
2328 || EVP_PKEY_paramgen(pctx, &s->s3->peer_tmp) <= 0) {
2329 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2330 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2331 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2334 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2337 s->s3->group_id = group_id;
2339 if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->peer_tmp,
2340 PACKET_data(&encoded_pt),
2341 PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt))) {
2342 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2343 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
2349 * Note: extended master secret extension handled in
2350 * tls_check_client_ems_support()
2354 * If this ClientHello extension was unhandled and this is a
2355 * nonresumed connection, check whether the extension is a custom
2356 * TLS Extension (has a custom_srv_ext_record), and if so call the
2357 * callback and record the extension number so that an appropriate
2358 * ServerHello may be later returned.
2361 if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1, currext->type,
2362 PACKET_data(&currext->data),
2363 PACKET_remaining(&currext->data), al) <= 0)
2368 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2370 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
2371 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2372 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2373 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2374 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2379 * This function currently has no state to clean up, so it returns directly.
2380 * If parsing fails at any point, the function returns early.
2381 * The SSL object may be left with partial data from extensions, but it must
2382 * then no longer be used, and clearing it up will free the leftovers.
2387 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello)
2390 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->srv_ext);
2391 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, hello, &al) <= 0) {
2392 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2395 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) {
2396 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2402 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2404 * ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2405 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly
2406 * fill the length of the block.
2408 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(PACKET *pkt)
2410 PACKET tmp_protocol;
2412 while (PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
2413 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &tmp_protocol)
2414 || PACKET_remaining(&tmp_protocol) == 0)
2422 static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2424 unsigned int length, type, size;
2425 int tlsext_servername = 0;
2426 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2428 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2429 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2431 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2433 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2434 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
2436 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2438 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
2440 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &length))
2443 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != length) {
2444 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2448 if (!tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(pkt)) {
2449 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2453 while (PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &type) && PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &size)) {
2454 const unsigned char *data;
2457 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &spkt, size)
2458 || !PACKET_peek_bytes(&spkt, &data, size))
2461 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2462 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2464 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
2465 if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, &spkt, al))
2467 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2468 } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
2469 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
2470 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0) {
2471 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2474 tlsext_servername = 1;
2476 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2477 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
2478 unsigned int ecpointformatlist_length;
2479 if (!PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &ecpointformatlist_length)
2480 || ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1) {
2481 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2485 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2486 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2487 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
2488 OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) {
2489 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2492 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
2493 ecpointformatlist_length;
2494 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&spkt,
2495 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
2496 ecpointformatlist_length)) {
2497 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2503 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2505 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2506 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2507 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size,
2508 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2510 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2513 if (!tls_use_ticket(s) || (size > 0)) {
2514 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2517 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2518 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
2520 * MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested a status
2523 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0)) {
2524 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2527 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2528 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2530 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
2532 * Only take it if we asked for it - i.e if there is no CT validation
2533 * callback set, then a custom extension MAY be processing it, so we
2534 * need to let control continue to flow to that.
2536 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp &&
2537 s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
2538 /* Simply copy it off for later processing */
2539 if (s->tlsext_scts != NULL) {
2540 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_scts);
2541 s->tlsext_scts = NULL;
2543 s->tlsext_scts_len = size;
2545 s->tlsext_scts = OPENSSL_malloc(size);
2546 if (s->tlsext_scts == NULL) {
2547 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2550 memcpy(s->tlsext_scts, data, size);
2554 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2555 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2556 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2557 unsigned char *selected;
2558 unsigned char selected_len;
2559 /* We must have requested it. */
2560 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL) {
2561 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2564 /* The data must be valid */
2565 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(&spkt)) {
2566 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2569 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data,
2572 ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) !=
2573 SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
2574 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2578 * Could be non-NULL if server has sent multiple NPN extensions in
2579 * a single Serverhello
2581 OPENSSL_free(s->next_proto_negotiated);
2582 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2583 if (s->next_proto_negotiated == NULL) {
2584 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2587 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2588 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2589 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2593 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation) {
2595 /* We must have requested it. */
2596 if (!s->s3->alpn_sent) {
2597 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2601 * The extension data consists of:
2602 * uint16 list_length
2603 * uint8 proto_length;
2604 * uint8 proto[proto_length];
2606 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&spkt, &len)
2607 || PACKET_remaining(&spkt) != len || !PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &len)
2608 || PACKET_remaining(&spkt) != len) {
2609 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2612 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2613 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
2614 if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
2615 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2618 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&spkt, s->s3->alpn_selected, len)) {
2619 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2622 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
2624 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2625 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2626 if (ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, &spkt, al))
2630 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac) {
2631 /* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite */
2632 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) &&
2633 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD
2634 && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc != SSL_RC4)
2635 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2636 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret) {
2637 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
2639 s->session->flags |= SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS;
2642 * If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but matches a
2643 * custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c callback
2645 else if (custom_ext_parse(s, 0, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2649 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2650 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2654 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1) {
2655 if (s->tlsext_hostname) {
2656 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) {
2657 s->session->tlsext_hostname =
2658 OPENSSL_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
2659 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname) {
2660 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2664 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2673 * Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to avoid
2674 * an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server hello
2675 * because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an attack.
2676 * However this would mean we could not connect to any server which
2677 * doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI absence
2679 if (!renegotiate_seen && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
2680 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2681 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2682 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2683 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2689 * Check extended master secret extension is consistent with
2692 if (!(s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) !=
2693 !(s->session->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS)) {
2694 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2695 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EXTMS);
2703 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2705 s->s3->alpn_sent = 0;
2709 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2714 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
2716 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2717 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2719 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2721 * The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely
2722 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2725 * The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely
2726 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2730 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2732 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2733 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2734 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
2735 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2737 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2739 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2742 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2743 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2746 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2747 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2750 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2751 s->servername_done = 0;
2757 /* Initialise digests to default values */
2758 void ssl_set_default_md(SSL *s)
2760 const EVP_MD **pmd = s->s3->tmp.md;
2761 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2762 pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
2764 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2765 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2766 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
2768 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX);
2769 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN];
2771 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2772 pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
2774 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2775 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX);
2776 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX);
2777 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX);
2781 int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s)
2786 /* Clear any shared signature algorithms */
2787 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
2788 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
2789 s->cert->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
2790 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
2791 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
2792 s->s3->tmp.md[i] = NULL;
2793 s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
2796 /* If sigalgs received process it. */
2797 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs) {
2798 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2799 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2800 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2803 /* Fatal error is no shared signature algorithms */
2804 if (!s->cert->shared_sigalgs) {
2805 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS,
2806 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS);
2807 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2811 ssl_set_default_md(s);
2815 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2820 * Upon success, returns 1.
2821 * Upon failure, returns 0 and sets |al| to the appropriate fatal alert.
2823 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s, int *al)
2825 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2828 * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be
2829 * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed,
2830 * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may
2831 * influence which certificate is sent
2833 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
2835 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
2836 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
2837 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
2838 if (certpkey != NULL) {
2840 * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
2841 * et al can pick it up.
2843 s->cert->key = certpkey;
2844 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2846 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
2847 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2848 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2850 /* status request response should be sent */
2851 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
2852 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
2853 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2855 /* something bad happened */
2856 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2858 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2864 if (!tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello_late(s, al)) {
2871 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2873 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2874 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2876 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2878 * If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
2879 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension it
2880 * must contain uncompressed.
2882 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2883 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2884 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
2885 && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
2886 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
2887 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
2888 && ((alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) {
2889 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
2891 unsigned char *list;
2892 int found_uncompressed = 0;
2893 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2894 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) {
2895 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed) {
2896 found_uncompressed = 1;
2900 if (!found_uncompressed) {
2901 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2902 SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
2906 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2907 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2909 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2911 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2912 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2913 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
2914 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2916 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2918 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2921 * Ensure we get sensible values passed to tlsext_status_cb in the event
2922 * that we don't receive a status message
2924 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
2925 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
2926 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = 0;
2929 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2930 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2933 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2934 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2937 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2938 s->servername_done = 0;
2944 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2947 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
2949 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, pkt, &al) <= 0) {
2950 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2954 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
2955 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
2962 * Given a list of extensions that we collected earlier, find one of a given
2963 * type and return it.
2965 * |exts| is the set of extensions previously collected.
2966 * |numexts| is the number of extensions that we have.
2967 * |type| the type of the extension that we are looking for.
2969 * Returns a pointer to the found RAW_EXTENSION data, or NULL if not found.
2971 RAW_EXTENSION *tls_get_extension_by_type(RAW_EXTENSION *exts, size_t numexts,
2976 for (loop = 0; loop < numexts; loop++) {
2977 if (exts[loop].type == type)
2985 * Gets the ticket information supplied by the client if any.
2987 * hello: The parsed ClientHello data
2988 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2989 * point to the resulting session.
2991 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
2992 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
2993 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
2996 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
2997 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
2998 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
2999 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
3000 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
3001 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
3002 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
3005 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
3006 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
3007 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
3008 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
3009 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
3010 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
3012 int tls_get_ticket_from_client(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello,
3016 const unsigned char *etick;
3018 RAW_EXTENSION *ticketext;
3021 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
3024 * If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
3027 if (s->version <= SSL3_VERSION || !tls_use_ticket(s))
3030 ticketext = tls_get_extension_by_type(hello->pre_proc_exts,
3031 hello->num_extensions,
3032 TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket);
3033 if (ticketext == NULL)
3036 size = PACKET_remaining(&ticketext->data);
3039 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
3042 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3045 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
3047 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
3048 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
3049 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
3050 * calculate the master secret later.
3054 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&ticketext->data, &etick, size)) {
3055 /* Shouldn't ever happen */
3058 retv = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, etick, size, hello->session_id,
3059 hello->session_id_len, ret);
3061 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
3062 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3065 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
3068 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
3069 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3072 default: /* fatal error */
3078 * Sets the extended master secret flag if the extension is present in the
3084 int tls_check_client_ems_support(SSL *s, const CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello)
3086 RAW_EXTENSION *emsext;
3088 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
3090 if (s->version <= SSL3_VERSION)
3093 emsext = tls_get_extension_by_type(hello->pre_proc_exts,
3094 hello->num_extensions,
3095 TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret);
3098 * No extensions is a success - we have successfully discovered that the
3099 * client doesn't support EMS.
3104 /* The extensions must always be empty */
3105 if (PACKET_remaining(&emsext->data) != 0)
3108 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
3114 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
3116 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
3117 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extension.
3118 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
3119 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
3120 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3121 * point to the resulting session.
3124 * -2: fatal error, malloc failure.
3125 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3126 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
3127 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
3128 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
3130 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
3131 size_t eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id,
3132 size_t sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess)
3135 unsigned char *sdec;
3136 const unsigned char *p;
3137 int slen, renew_ticket = 0, ret = -1, declen;
3139 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
3140 HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL;
3141 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
3142 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3144 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
3145 hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
3148 ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
3153 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
3154 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
3155 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
3166 /* Check key name matches */
3167 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name,
3168 sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name)) != 0) {
3172 if (HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key,
3173 sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key),
3174 EVP_sha256(), NULL) <= 0
3175 || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_256_cbc(), NULL,
3176 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key,
3177 etick + sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name)) <=
3183 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
3186 mlen = HMAC_size(hctx);
3190 /* Sanity check ticket length: must exceed keyname + IV + HMAC */
3192 TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx) + mlen) {
3197 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
3198 if (HMAC_Update(hctx, etick, eticklen) <= 0
3199 || HMAC_Final(hctx, tick_hmac, NULL) <= 0) {
3202 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3203 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) {
3204 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3207 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
3208 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
3209 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
3210 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
3211 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
3212 if (sdec == NULL || EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, sdec, &slen, p,
3213 (int)eticklen) <= 0) {
3214 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3218 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(ctx, sdec + slen, &declen) <= 0) {
3219 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3224 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3228 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3232 * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
3233 * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
3234 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
3238 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3239 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3248 * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
3252 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3253 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3257 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3264 static const tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
3265 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3266 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3267 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3268 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3269 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3270 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512},
3271 {NID_id_GostR3411_94, TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411},
3272 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256},
3273 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512},
3276 static const tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
3277 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
3278 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
3279 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa},
3280 {NID_id_GostR3410_2001, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001},
3281 {NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256},
3282 {NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512}
3285 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3288 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3289 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3295 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3298 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3299 if ((table[i].id) == id)
3300 return table[i].nid;
3305 int tls12_get_sigandhash(WPACKET *pkt, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md)
3311 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3314 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3317 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, md_id) || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, sig_id))
3323 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
3325 return tls12_find_id(EVP_PKEY_id(pk), tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3332 unsigned char tlsext_hash;
3335 static const tls12_hash_info tls12_md_info[] = {
3336 {NID_md5, 64, SSL_MD_MD5_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3337 {NID_sha1, 80, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3338 {NID_sha224, 112, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3339 {NID_sha256, 128, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3340 {NID_sha384, 192, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3341 {NID_sha512, 256, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha512},
3342 {NID_id_GostR3411_94, 128, SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411},
3343 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, 128, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX,
3344 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256},
3345 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, 256, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX,
3346 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512},
3349 static const tls12_hash_info *tls12_get_hash_info(unsigned char hash_alg)
3355 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md_info); i++) {
3356 if (tls12_md_info[i].tlsext_hash == hash_alg)
3357 return tls12_md_info + i;
3363 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
3365 const tls12_hash_info *inf;
3366 if (hash_alg == TLSEXT_hash_md5 && FIPS_mode())
3368 inf = tls12_get_hash_info(hash_alg);
3371 return ssl_md(inf->md_idx);
3374 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
3377 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3378 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3379 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3381 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3382 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3383 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3385 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3386 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3387 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3389 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3390 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001:
3391 return SSL_PKEY_GOST01;
3393 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256:
3394 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256;
3396 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512:
3397 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512;
3403 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3404 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
3405 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3407 int sign_nid = NID_undef, hash_nid = NID_undef;
3408 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3410 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3411 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3413 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3415 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3416 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3418 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3420 if (psignhash_nid) {
3421 if (sign_nid == NID_undef || hash_nid == NID_undef
3422 || OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid, hash_nid, sign_nid) <= 0)
3423 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3427 /* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
3428 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(SSL *s, int op, const unsigned char *ptmp)
3430 /* See if we have an entry in the hash table and it is enabled */
3431 const tls12_hash_info *hinf = tls12_get_hash_info(ptmp[0]);
3432 if (hinf == NULL || ssl_md(hinf->md_idx) == NULL)
3434 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
3435 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3437 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
3438 return ssl_security(s, op, hinf->secbits, hinf->nid, (void *)ptmp);
3442 * Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported signature
3443 * algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA then RSA is
3447 void ssl_set_sig_mask(uint32_t *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op)
3449 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
3450 size_t i, sigalgslen;
3451 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
3453 * Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any for
3454 * RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just TLS 1.2. To keep
3455 * down calls to security callback only check if we have to.
3457 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
3458 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2) {
3459 switch (sigalgs[1]) {
3460 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3461 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3462 if (!have_rsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3466 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3467 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3468 if (!have_dsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3472 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3473 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3474 if (!have_ecdsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3481 *pmask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
3483 *pmask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
3485 *pmask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
3488 int tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
3489 const unsigned char *psig, size_t psiglen)
3493 for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i += 2, psig += 2) {
3494 if (tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, psig)) {
3495 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, psig[0])
3496 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, psig[1]))
3503 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
3504 static size_t tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
3505 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3506 const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
3508 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3509 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3510 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i += 2, ptmp += 2) {
3511 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3512 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED, ptmp))
3514 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j += 2, atmp += 2) {
3515 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1]) {
3518 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3519 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3520 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3522 &shsig->signandhash_nid, ptmp);
3532 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3533 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3535 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3536 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3538 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3540 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
3542 OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
3543 c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
3544 c->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
3545 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3546 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3547 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3548 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3549 } else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3550 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
3551 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3553 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
3554 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb) {
3557 allow = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3558 allowlen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
3562 pref = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3563 preflen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
3565 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3567 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3570 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3574 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3575 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3579 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3581 int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, size_t dsize)
3584 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
3585 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3587 /* Should never happen */
3591 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs);
3592 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
3593 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs == NULL)
3595 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3596 memcpy(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
3600 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3605 const EVP_MD **pmd = s->s3->tmp.md;
3606 uint32_t *pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags;
3608 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3609 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s))
3612 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3613 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++) {
3614 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3615 if (idx > 0 && pmd[idx] == NULL) {
3616 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
3618 pvalid[idx] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3619 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) {
3620 pvalid[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3621 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = md;
3627 * In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't use
3628 * the certificate for signing.
3630 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
3632 * Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not
3633 * supported it stays as NULL.
3635 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3636 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] == NULL)
3637 pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
3639 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3640 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] == NULL) {
3641 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
3642 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = EVP_sha1();
3645 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3646 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] == NULL)
3647 pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha1();
3649 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3650 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] == NULL)
3651 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] = EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_94);
3652 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] == NULL)
3653 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] =
3654 EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256);
3655 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] == NULL)
3656 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] =
3657 EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512);
3663 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3664 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3665 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3667 const unsigned char *psig = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3668 size_t numsigalgs = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3669 if (psig == NULL || numsigalgs > INT_MAX)
3673 if (idx >= (int)s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen)
3680 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
3682 return (int)numsigalgs;
3685 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3686 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3687 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3689 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
3690 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen
3691 || s->cert->shared_sigalgslen > INT_MAX)
3695 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3697 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3699 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3701 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
3703 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
3704 return (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
3707 #define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
3711 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
3714 static void get_sigorhash(int *psig, int *phash, const char *str)
3716 if (strcmp(str, "RSA") == 0) {
3717 *psig = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
3718 } else if (strcmp(str, "DSA") == 0) {
3719 *psig = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
3720 } else if (strcmp(str, "ECDSA") == 0) {
3721 *psig = EVP_PKEY_EC;
3723 *phash = OBJ_sn2nid(str);
3724 if (*phash == NID_undef)
3725 *phash = OBJ_ln2nid(str);
3729 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
3731 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
3734 int sig_alg = NID_undef, hash_alg = NID_undef;
3737 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
3739 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
3741 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
3743 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
3751 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, etmp);
3752 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, p);
3754 if (sig_alg == NID_undef || hash_alg == NID_undef)
3757 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i += 2) {
3758 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
3761 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
3762 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
3767 * Set supported signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
3768 * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
3770 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
3774 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
3778 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
3781 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
3783 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
3788 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
3789 if (sigalgs == NULL)
3791 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i += 2) {
3792 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3793 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3795 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
3802 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
3803 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3804 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
3806 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
3807 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3808 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
3814 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
3818 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
3822 if (default_nid == -1)
3824 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
3826 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
3827 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
3828 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
3833 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
3834 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
3838 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
3839 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++) {
3840 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
3847 * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by
3848 * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before
3849 * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before
3850 * attempting to use them.
3853 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
3855 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
3856 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
3857 /* Strict mode flags */
3858 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
3859 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
3860 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
3862 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
3867 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
3868 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
3871 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
3872 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
3874 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
3877 idx = (int)(cpk - c->pkeys);
3879 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
3880 pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
3882 pk = cpk->privatekey;
3884 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
3885 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
3891 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
3894 pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
3896 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
3897 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
3899 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
3906 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
3907 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
3908 if (ok == X509_V_OK)
3909 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
3910 else if (!check_flags)
3915 * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature
3916 * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode.
3918 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode) {
3920 unsigned char rsign = 0;
3921 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs)
3923 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
3926 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
3927 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
3928 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
3929 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
3932 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
3933 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
3934 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
3938 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
3939 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
3942 case SSL_PKEY_GOST01:
3943 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001;
3944 default_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001;
3947 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256:
3948 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256;
3949 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_256;
3952 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512:
3953 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512;
3954 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_512;
3963 * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set
3964 * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1.
3966 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs) {
3968 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
3969 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2) {
3970 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
3973 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen) {
3980 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
3981 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid)) {
3985 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
3986 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
3987 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
3988 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i), default_nid)) {
3990 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
3997 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
3998 else if (check_flags)
3999 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE | CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4001 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
4002 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
4003 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
4004 else if (!check_flags)
4007 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4008 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
4009 else if (strict_mode) {
4010 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4011 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
4012 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4013 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0)) {
4015 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4022 if (!s->server && strict_mode) {
4023 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
4025 switch (EVP_PKEY_id(pk)) {
4027 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
4030 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
4033 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
4037 const unsigned char *ctypes;
4041 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
4043 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
4044 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
4046 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++) {
4047 if (ctypes[i] == check_type) {
4048 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4052 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
4055 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4057 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
4059 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
4060 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4062 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
4063 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
4064 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4066 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
4067 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
4068 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4069 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp)) {
4070 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4075 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4078 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME | CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4080 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
4081 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
4085 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
4086 if (*pvalid & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
4087 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4088 else if (s->s3->tmp.md[idx] != NULL)
4089 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4091 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4094 * When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the
4098 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
4101 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
4102 *pvalid &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4109 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
4110 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
4112 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
4113 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
4114 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
4115 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
4116 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST01);
4117 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256);
4118 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512);
4121 /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
4122 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
4124 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);
4127 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
4128 DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s)
4130 int dh_secbits = 80;
4131 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto == 2)
4132 return DH_get_1024_160();
4133 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aPSK)) {
4134 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256)
4139 CERT_PKEY *cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
4140 dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(cpk->privatekey);
4143 if (dh_secbits >= 128) {
4151 if (dh_secbits >= 192)
4152 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL);
4154 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL);
4155 if (p == NULL || g == NULL || !DH_set0_pqg(dhp, p, NULL, g)) {
4163 if (dh_secbits >= 112)
4164 return DH_get_2048_224();
4165 return DH_get_1024_160();
4169 static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4172 EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
4175 * If no parameters this will return -1 and fail using the default
4176 * security callback for any non-zero security level. This will
4177 * reject keys which omit parameters but this only affects DSA and
4178 * omission of parameters is never (?) done in practice.
4180 secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey);
4183 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, 0, x);
4185 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, 0, x);
4188 static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4190 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
4191 int secbits = -1, md_nid = NID_undef, sig_nid;
4192 /* Don't check signature if self signed */
4193 if ((X509_get_extension_flags(x) & EXFLAG_SS) != 0)
4195 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
4196 if (sig_nid && OBJ_find_sigid_algs(sig_nid, &md_nid, NULL)) {
4198 if (md_nid && (md = EVP_get_digestbynid(md_nid)))
4199 secbits = EVP_MD_size(md) * 4;
4202 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4204 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4207 int ssl_security_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int vfy, int is_ee)
4210 vfy = SSL_SECOP_PEER;
4212 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY | vfy))
4213 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4215 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY | vfy))
4216 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4218 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD | vfy))
4219 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK;
4224 * Check security of a chain, if sk includes the end entity certificate then
4225 * x is NULL. If vfy is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and not sending
4226 * one to the peer. Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
4229 int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x, int vfy)
4231 int rv, start_idx, i;
4233 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
4238 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 1);
4242 for (i = start_idx; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
4243 x = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
4244 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 0);