2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
113 #include <openssl/objects.h>
114 #include <openssl/evp.h>
115 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
116 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
117 #include <openssl/rand.h>
118 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
119 # include <openssl/dh.h>
120 # include <openssl/bn.h>
122 #include "ssl_locl.h"
124 const char tls1_version_str[] = "TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
126 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
127 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
128 SSL_SESSION **psess);
129 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
130 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
132 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data = {
135 tls1_setup_key_block,
136 tls1_generate_master_secret,
137 tls1_change_cipher_state,
138 tls1_final_finish_mac,
139 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
140 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
141 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
142 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
144 tls1_export_keying_material,
146 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
147 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
151 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_1_enc_data = {
154 tls1_setup_key_block,
155 tls1_generate_master_secret,
156 tls1_change_cipher_state,
157 tls1_final_finish_mac,
158 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
159 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
160 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
161 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
163 tls1_export_keying_material,
164 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
165 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
166 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
170 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_2_enc_data = {
173 tls1_setup_key_block,
174 tls1_generate_master_secret,
175 tls1_change_cipher_state,
176 tls1_final_finish_mac,
177 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
178 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
179 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
180 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
182 tls1_export_keying_material,
183 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
184 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
185 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
186 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
190 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
193 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
194 * http, the cache would over fill
196 return (60 * 60 * 2);
203 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
207 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
209 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
213 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
216 s->version = s->method->version;
219 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
222 int nid; /* Curve NID */
223 int secbits; /* Bits of security (from SP800-57) */
224 unsigned int flags; /* Flags: currently just field type */
227 # define TLS_CURVE_CHAR2 0x1
228 # define TLS_CURVE_PRIME 0x0
230 static const tls_curve_info nid_list[] = {
231 {NID_sect163k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163k1 (1) */
232 {NID_sect163r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r1 (2) */
233 {NID_sect163r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r2 (3) */
234 {NID_sect193r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r1 (4) */
235 {NID_sect193r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r2 (5) */
236 {NID_sect233k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233k1 (6) */
237 {NID_sect233r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233r1 (7) */
238 {NID_sect239k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect239k1 (8) */
239 {NID_sect283k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283k1 (9) */
240 {NID_sect283r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283r1 (10) */
241 {NID_sect409k1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409k1 (11) */
242 {NID_sect409r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409r1 (12) */
243 {NID_sect571k1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571k1 (13) */
244 {NID_sect571r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571r1 (14) */
245 {NID_secp160k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160k1 (15) */
246 {NID_secp160r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r1 (16) */
247 {NID_secp160r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r2 (17) */
248 {NID_secp192k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192k1 (18) */
249 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192r1 (19) */
250 {NID_secp224k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224k1 (20) */
251 {NID_secp224r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224r1 (21) */
252 {NID_secp256k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256k1 (22) */
253 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256r1 (23) */
254 {NID_secp384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp384r1 (24) */
255 {NID_secp521r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp521r1 (25) */
256 {NID_brainpoolP256r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
257 {NID_brainpoolP384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
258 {NID_brainpoolP512r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
261 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = {
262 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
263 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
264 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
267 /* The client's default curves / the server's 'auto' curves. */
268 static const unsigned char eccurves_auto[] = {
269 /* Prefer P-256 which has the fastest and most secure implementations. */
270 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
271 /* Other >= 256-bit prime curves. */
272 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
273 0, 28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
274 0, 27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
275 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
276 0, 26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
277 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
278 /* >= 256-bit binary curves. */
279 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
280 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
281 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
282 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
283 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
284 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
287 static const unsigned char eccurves_all[] = {
288 /* Prefer P-256 which has the fastest and most secure implementations. */
289 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
290 /* Other >= 256-bit prime curves. */
291 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
292 0, 28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
293 0, 27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
294 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
295 0, 26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
296 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
297 /* >= 256-bit binary curves. */
298 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
299 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
300 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
301 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
302 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
303 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
305 * Remaining curves disabled by default but still permitted if set
306 * via an explicit callback or parameters.
308 0, 20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
309 0, 21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
310 0, 18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
311 0, 19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
312 0, 15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
313 0, 16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
314 0, 17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
315 0, 8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
316 0, 6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
317 0, 7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
318 0, 4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
319 0, 5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
320 0, 1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
321 0, 2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
322 0, 3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
326 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] = {
327 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
328 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
331 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
333 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
334 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
336 return nid_list[curve_id - 1].nid;
339 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
341 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
343 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
345 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
347 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
349 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
351 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
353 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
355 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
357 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
359 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
361 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
363 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
365 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
367 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
369 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
371 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
373 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
375 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
377 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
379 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
381 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
383 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
385 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
387 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
389 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
391 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
393 case NID_brainpoolP256r1: /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
395 case NID_brainpoolP384r1: /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
397 case NID_brainpoolP512r1: /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
405 * Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
407 * Sets |num_curves| to the number of curves in the list, i.e.,
408 * the length of |pcurves| is 2 * num_curves.
409 * Returns 1 on success and 0 if the client curves list has invalid format.
410 * The latter indicates an internal error: we should not be accepting such
411 * lists in the first place.
412 * TODO(emilia): we should really be storing the curves list in explicitly
413 * parsed form instead. (However, this would affect binary compatibility
414 * so cannot happen in the 1.0.x series.)
416 static int tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
417 const unsigned char **pcurves,
420 size_t pcurveslen = 0;
422 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
423 pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
425 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
426 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
427 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
428 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
429 pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
432 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
433 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
437 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
438 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
442 *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
443 pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
446 if (!s->server || (s->cert && s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)) {
447 *pcurves = eccurves_auto;
448 pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_auto);
450 *pcurves = eccurves_all;
451 pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_all);
456 /* We do not allow odd length arrays to enter the system. */
457 if (pcurveslen & 1) {
458 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_GET_CURVELIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
462 *num_curves = pcurveslen / 2;
467 /* See if curve is allowed by security callback */
468 static int tls_curve_allowed(SSL *s, const unsigned char *curve, int op)
470 const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
473 if ((curve[1] < 1) || ((size_t)curve[1] > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
475 cinfo = &nid_list[curve[1] - 1];
476 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
477 if (cinfo->flags & TLS_CURVE_CHAR2)
480 return ssl_security(s, op, cinfo->secbits, cinfo->nid, (void *)curve);
483 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
484 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
486 const unsigned char *curves;
487 size_t num_curves, i;
488 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
489 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
491 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
493 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
496 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) {
497 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
499 } else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) {
500 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
502 } else /* Should never happen */
505 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &num_curves))
507 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, curves += 2) {
508 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
509 return tls_curve_allowed(s, p + 1, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK);
515 * Return |nmatch|th shared curve or NID_undef if there is no match.
516 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
517 * For nmatch == -2, return the NID of the curve to use for
518 * an EC tmp key, or NID_undef if there is no match.
520 int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
522 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
523 size_t num_pref, num_supp, i, j;
525 /* Can't do anything on client side */
529 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
531 * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know
532 * these are acceptable due to previous checks.
534 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
535 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
536 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
537 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
538 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
539 /* Should never happen */
542 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
546 * Avoid truncation. tls1_get_curvelist takes an int
547 * but s->options is a long...
549 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
550 (s, (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0, &supp,
552 /* In practice, NID_undef == 0 but let's be precise. */
553 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
554 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
555 (s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE), &pref,
557 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
560 * If the client didn't send the elliptic_curves extension all of them
563 if (num_supp == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0) {
565 num_supp = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2;
566 } else if (num_pref == 0 &&
567 (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) == 0) {
569 num_pref = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2;
573 for (i = 0; i < num_pref; i++, pref += 2) {
574 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
575 for (j = 0; j < num_supp; j++, tsupp += 2) {
576 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1]) {
577 if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, pref, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
580 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
581 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id);
589 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
593 int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
594 int *curves, size_t ncurves)
596 unsigned char *clist, *p;
599 * Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works while curve
602 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
603 clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
606 for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++) {
607 unsigned long idmask;
609 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
611 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask)) {
620 *pextlen = ncurves * 2;
624 # define MAX_CURVELIST 28
628 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
631 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
633 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
639 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
641 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
643 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
645 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
646 if (nid == NID_undef)
647 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
648 if (nid == NID_undef)
649 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
650 if (nid == NID_undef)
652 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
653 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
655 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
659 /* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
660 int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
665 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
669 return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
672 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
673 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
678 const EC_METHOD *meth;
681 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
682 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
685 meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(grp);
688 if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
692 /* Determine curve ID */
693 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
694 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
695 /* If we have an ID set it, otherwise set arbitrary explicit curve */
698 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
707 if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
709 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED) {
711 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
713 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
715 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
720 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
721 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
722 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
724 const unsigned char *pformats, *pcurves;
725 size_t num_formats, num_curves, i;
728 * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
729 * supported (see RFC4492).
731 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
732 pformats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
733 num_formats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
734 for (i = 0; i < num_formats; i++, pformats++) {
735 if (*comp_id == *pformats)
738 if (i == num_formats)
743 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
744 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++) {
745 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &pcurves, &num_curves))
747 if (j == 1 && num_curves == 0) {
749 * If we've not received any curves then skip this check.
750 * RFC 4492 does not require the supported elliptic curves extension
751 * so if it is not sent we can just choose any curve.
752 * It is invalid to send an empty list in the elliptic curves
753 * extension, so num_curves == 0 always means no extension.
757 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
758 if (pcurves[0] == curve_id[0] && pcurves[1] == curve_id[1])
763 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
770 static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
774 * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
776 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
777 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
778 *num_formats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
780 *pformats = ecformats_default;
781 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
783 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
785 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default);
790 * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
791 * certificates have compatible curves and compression.
793 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
795 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
798 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
801 /* If not EC nothing to do */
802 if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC) {
806 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec);
811 * Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a supported
814 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
818 * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
819 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
821 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s)) {
827 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
828 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
829 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
830 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
831 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
833 return 0; /* Should never happen */
834 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
835 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
837 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
839 if (set_ee_md == 2) {
840 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
841 s->s3->tmp.md[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha256();
843 s->s3->tmp.md[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha384();
849 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
850 /* Check EC temporary key is compatible with client extensions */
851 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
853 unsigned char curve_id[2];
854 EC_KEY *ec = s->cert->ecdh_tmp;
855 # ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
856 /* Allow any curve: not just those peer supports */
857 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
861 * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
864 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
865 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
866 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
867 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
868 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
869 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
873 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
874 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
876 /* If auto or setting curve from callback assume OK */
877 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto || s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
879 /* Otherwise check curve is acceptable */
881 unsigned char curve_tmp[2];
884 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_tmp, NULL, ec))
886 if (!curve_tmp[0] || curve_tmp[1] == curve_id[1])
892 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto) {
893 /* Need a shared curve */
894 if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
900 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
905 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, NULL, ec))
907 /* Set this to allow use of invalid curves for testing */
911 return tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL);
914 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
918 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
923 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
926 * List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
927 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
930 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
931 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
933 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
936 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
937 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
939 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
943 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */
945 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
948 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
949 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
950 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
951 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
953 static const unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
954 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
955 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
956 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
957 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
958 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
961 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
962 static const unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
963 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
964 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
967 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
970 * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
973 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
974 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
975 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
976 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
977 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
979 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
980 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
983 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
984 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
988 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
989 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs) {
990 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
991 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
992 } else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
993 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
994 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
996 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
997 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
1002 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
1003 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
1005 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
1006 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
1008 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
1009 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
1010 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
1011 /* Should never happen */
1014 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
1015 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1]) {
1016 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1019 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1020 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
1021 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
1022 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
1023 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec))
1025 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id)) {
1026 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
1029 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
1030 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1033 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256) {
1034 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256) {
1035 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1036 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
1039 } else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384) {
1040 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384) {
1041 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1042 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
1048 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
1052 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
1053 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
1054 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i += 2, sent_sigs += 2) {
1055 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
1058 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
1059 if (i == sent_sigslen
1060 && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1
1061 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
1062 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1065 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
1067 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
1070 /* Make sure security callback allows algorithm */
1071 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK,
1072 EVP_MD_size(*pmd) * 4, EVP_MD_type(*pmd),
1074 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1078 * Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they wish.
1080 s->s3->tmp.peer_md = *pmd;
1085 * Get a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
1086 * supported or doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms. Unlike
1087 * ssl_cipher_get_disabled this applies to a specific session and not global
1090 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
1092 s->s3->tmp.mask_a = 0;
1093 s->s3->tmp.mask_k = 0;
1094 /* Don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers if we don't suppport them */
1095 if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s))
1096 s->s3->tmp.mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
1098 s->s3->tmp.mask_ssl = 0;
1099 ssl_set_sig_mask(&s->s3->tmp.mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
1101 * Disable static DH if we don't include any appropriate signature
1104 if (s->s3->tmp.mask_a & SSL_aRSA)
1105 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kDHr | SSL_kECDHr;
1106 if (s->s3->tmp.mask_a & SSL_aDSS)
1107 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kDHd;
1108 if (s->s3->tmp.mask_a & SSL_aECDSA)
1109 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kECDHe;
1110 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1111 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1112 if (!s->psk_client_callback) {
1113 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
1114 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
1116 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1117 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1118 if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) {
1119 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
1120 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
1125 int ssl_cipher_disabled(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op)
1127 if (c->algorithm_ssl & s->s3->tmp.mask_ssl
1128 || c->algorithm_mkey & s->s3->tmp.mask_k
1129 || c->algorithm_auth & s->s3->tmp.mask_a)
1131 return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c);
1134 static int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s)
1136 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
1138 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL);
1141 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
1142 unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1145 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1146 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1147 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1148 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1150 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1152 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1153 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1155 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++) {
1156 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1158 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1159 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1160 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)
1161 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) {
1172 return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1174 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1175 if (s->renegotiate) {
1178 if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1179 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1183 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1186 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret);
1189 if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1190 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1196 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1197 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION)
1200 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1201 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1202 unsigned long size_str;
1206 * check for enough space.
1207 * 4 for the servername type and entension length
1208 * 2 for servernamelist length
1209 * 1 for the hostname type
1210 * 2 for hostname length
1214 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
1216 strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
1219 /* extension type and length */
1220 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret);
1221 s2n(size_str + 5, ret);
1223 /* length of servername list */
1224 s2n(size_str + 3, ret);
1226 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
1227 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
1229 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
1232 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1233 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
1234 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the
1235 * Client Hello message */
1237 int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
1238 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0) {
1239 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1244 * check for enough space.
1245 * 4 for the srp type type and entension length
1246 * 1 for the srp user identity
1247 * + srp user identity length
1249 if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0)
1252 /* fill in the extension */
1253 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp, ret);
1254 s2n(login_len + 1, ret);
1255 (*ret++) = (unsigned char)login_len;
1256 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
1261 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1264 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message
1267 const unsigned char *pcurves, *pformats;
1268 size_t num_curves, num_formats, curves_list_len;
1270 unsigned char *etmp;
1272 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &pformats, &num_formats);
1274 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0)
1276 if (num_formats > (size_t)lenmax)
1278 if (num_formats > 255) {
1279 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1283 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret);
1284 /* The point format list has 1-byte length. */
1285 s2n(num_formats + 1, ret);
1286 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)num_formats;
1287 memcpy(ret, pformats, num_formats);
1291 * Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message
1293 pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1294 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &pcurves, &num_curves))
1297 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0)
1299 if (num_curves > (size_t)lenmax / 2)
1301 if (num_curves > 65532 / 2) {
1302 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1306 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves, ret);
1308 /* Copy curve ID if supported */
1309 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
1310 if (tls_curve_allowed(s, pcurves, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) {
1311 *etmp++ = pcurves[0];
1312 *etmp++ = pcurves[1];
1316 curves_list_len = etmp - ret - 4;
1318 s2n(curves_list_len + 2, ret);
1319 s2n(curves_list_len, ret);
1320 ret += curves_list_len;
1322 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1324 if (tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1326 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
1327 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
1328 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1329 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data) {
1330 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1331 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1332 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
1334 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1335 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data, ticklen);
1336 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1339 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1340 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1343 * Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len rest for
1346 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0)
1348 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret);
1351 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
1357 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1359 const unsigned char *salg;
1360 unsigned char *etmp;
1361 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
1362 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < salglen + 6)
1364 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms, ret);
1366 /* Skip over lengths for now */
1368 salglen = tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, ret, salg, salglen);
1369 /* Fill in lengths */
1370 s2n(salglen + 2, etmp);
1375 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
1377 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
1381 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
1382 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1383 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1389 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) {
1390 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1396 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0)
1398 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1399 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
1401 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
1402 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
1404 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
1405 /* save position of id len */
1406 unsigned char *q = ret;
1407 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1408 /* skip over id len */
1410 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
1416 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
1418 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1419 /* Add Heartbeat extension */
1420 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1422 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret);
1426 * 1: peer may send requests
1427 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1429 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1430 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1432 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1435 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1436 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1438 * The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its support
1439 * for Next Protocol Negotiation
1441 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
1443 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret);
1448 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1449 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 6 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len)
1451 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret);
1452 s2n(2 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret);
1453 s2n(s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret);
1454 memcpy(ret, s->alpn_client_proto_list, s->alpn_client_proto_list_len);
1455 ret += s->alpn_client_proto_list_len;
1457 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1458 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)) {
1461 /* Returns 0 on success!! */
1462 if (ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1463 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1467 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1470 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret);
1473 if (ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1474 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1480 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->cli_ext);
1481 /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
1482 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 0, &ret, limit, al))
1484 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1485 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac, ret);
1488 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret, ret);
1492 * Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See
1493 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03 NB: because this
1494 * code works out the length of all existing extensions it MUST always
1497 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING) {
1498 int hlen = ret - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1500 if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200) {
1501 hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
1507 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret);
1509 memset(ret, 0, hlen);
1516 if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0)
1519 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1523 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
1524 unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1527 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1528 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1529 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1530 int next_proto_neg_seen;
1532 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1533 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1534 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1535 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe))
1536 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1537 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1542 return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1544 if (s->s3->send_connection_binding) {
1547 if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1548 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1552 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1555 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret);
1558 if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1559 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1566 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1567 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
1570 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1
1571 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1572 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1575 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret);
1578 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1580 const unsigned char *plist;
1583 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message
1587 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1589 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0)
1591 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax)
1593 if (plistlen > 255) {
1594 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1598 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret);
1599 s2n(plistlen + 1, ret);
1600 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)plistlen;
1601 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1606 * Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves
1609 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1611 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected && tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1612 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1614 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret);
1618 if (s->tlsext_status_expected) {
1619 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1621 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1625 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1626 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->srtp_profile) {
1629 /* Returns 0 on success!! */
1630 if (ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1631 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1634 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1637 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret);
1640 if (ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1641 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1648 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x80
1649 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x81)
1650 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG)) {
1651 const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1652 0xfd, 0xe8, /* 65000 */
1653 0x00, 0x20, /* 32 bytes length */
1654 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1655 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1656 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1657 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17
1659 if (limit - ret < 36)
1661 memcpy(ret, cryptopro_ext, 36);
1665 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1666 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
1667 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) {
1668 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1670 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret);
1674 * 1: peer may send requests
1675 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1677 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1678 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1680 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1685 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1686 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1687 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1688 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb) {
1689 const unsigned char *npa;
1690 unsigned int npalen;
1693 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen,
1695 ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1696 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1697 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0)
1699 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret);
1701 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
1703 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1707 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 1, &ret, limit, al))
1709 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1710 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) {
1712 * Don't use encrypt_then_mac if AEAD or RC4 might want to disable
1713 * for other cases too.
1715 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD
1716 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4)
1717 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1719 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac, ret);
1724 if (!s->hit && s->session->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS) {
1725 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret, ret);
1729 if (s->s3->alpn_selected) {
1730 const unsigned char *selected = s->s3->alpn_selected;
1731 unsigned len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
1733 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - 2 - 1 - len) < 0)
1735 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret);
1739 memcpy(ret, selected, len);
1745 if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0)
1748 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1753 * tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello is called to process the ALPN extension in a
1754 * ClientHello. data: the contents of the extension, not including the type
1755 * and length. data_len: the number of bytes in |data| al: a pointer to the
1756 * alert value to send in the event of a non-zero return. returns: 0 on
1759 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
1760 unsigned data_len, int *al)
1764 const unsigned char *selected;
1765 unsigned char selected_len;
1768 if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb == NULL)
1775 * data should contain a uint16 length followed by a series of 8-bit,
1776 * length-prefixed strings.
1778 i = ((unsigned)data[0]) << 8 | ((unsigned)data[1]);
1787 for (i = 0; i < data_len;) {
1788 proto_len = data[i];
1794 if (i + proto_len < i || i + proto_len > data_len)
1800 r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, data_len,
1801 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
1802 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1803 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1804 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
1805 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected) {
1806 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1809 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, selected, selected_len);
1810 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
1815 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1819 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1821 * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1822 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |d|, of length |n|.
1823 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1828 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1829 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1830 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1831 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1833 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
1834 const unsigned char *d, int n)
1836 unsigned short type, size;
1837 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1838 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1839 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1840 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1841 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1842 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1843 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1845 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1846 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1847 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1848 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1851 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1852 static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock[] = {
1853 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1854 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1855 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1856 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1857 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1858 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1859 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1860 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1863 if (data >= (d + n - 2))
1867 if (data > (d + n - 4))
1872 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1875 if (data + size > d + n)
1879 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
1880 const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1881 const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock);
1883 if (data + len1 + len2 != d + n)
1885 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0)
1887 if (memcmp(data + len1, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock, len2) != 0)
1890 const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1892 if (data + len != d + n)
1894 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0)
1898 s->s3->is_probably_safari = 1;
1900 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1902 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
1903 unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
1905 unsigned short type;
1906 unsigned short size;
1908 unsigned char *data = *p;
1909 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1911 s->servername_done = 0;
1912 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1913 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1914 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1917 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1918 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
1919 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1920 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1921 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1924 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1925 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1926 ssl_check_for_safari(s, data, d, n);
1927 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1929 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
1930 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs);
1931 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = NULL;
1932 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1933 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1936 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1937 OPENSSL_free(s->srp_ctx.login);
1938 s->srp_ctx.login = NULL;
1941 s->srtp_profile = NULL;
1943 if (data >= (d + n - 2))
1947 if (data > (d + n - len))
1950 while (data <= (d + n - 4)) {
1954 if (data + size > (d + n))
1956 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1957 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1958 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
1959 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
1961 renegotiate_seen = 1;
1962 } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
1965 * The servername extension is treated as follows:
1967 * - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
1968 * - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
1969 * in which case an fatal alert is generated.
1970 * - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
1971 * - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
1972 * to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
1973 * - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
1974 * it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
1975 * Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
1976 * set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
1977 * case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
1978 * a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
1979 * presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
1980 * the value of the Host: field.
1981 * - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1982 * if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the
1983 * session, i.e. when the session has been established with a servername
1985 * - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
1989 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
1990 unsigned char *sdata;
1995 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2001 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2007 servname_type = *(sdata++);
2012 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2015 if (s->servername_done == 0)
2016 switch (servname_type) {
2017 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
2019 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname) {
2020 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2023 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) {
2024 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2027 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname =
2028 OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1)) == NULL) {
2029 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2032 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
2033 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len] = '\0';
2034 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
2035 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
2036 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
2037 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2040 s->servername_done = 1;
2043 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
2044 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
2045 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname,
2046 (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
2057 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2062 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2063 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp) {
2064 if (size == 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size - 1)) {
2065 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2068 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) {
2069 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2072 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1)) == NULL)
2074 memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len);
2075 s->srp_ctx.login[len] = '\0';
2077 if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len) {
2078 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2084 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2085 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
2086 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2087 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2089 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1 ||
2090 ecpointformatlist_length < 1) {
2091 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2095 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2096 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
2097 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2098 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
2099 OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) {
2100 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2103 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
2104 ecpointformatlist_length;
2105 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata,
2106 ecpointformatlist_length);
2108 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves) {
2109 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2110 int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
2111 ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
2113 if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 ||
2114 ellipticcurvelist_length < 1 ||
2115 /* Each NamedCurve is 2 bytes. */
2116 ellipticcurvelist_length & 1) {
2117 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2121 if (s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist) {
2122 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2125 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
2126 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist =
2127 OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL) {
2128 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2131 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length =
2132 ellipticcurvelist_length;
2133 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata,
2134 ellipticcurvelist_length);
2137 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2138 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2139 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2140 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size,
2141 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2143 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2146 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms) {
2148 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs || size < 2) {
2149 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2154 if (dsize != size || dsize & 1 || !dsize) {
2155 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2158 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, data, dsize)) {
2159 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2162 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
2165 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2169 s->tlsext_status_type = *data++;
2171 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
2172 const unsigned char *sdata;
2174 /* Read in responder_id_list */
2178 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2185 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2189 dsize -= 2 + idsize;
2192 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2197 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, &sdata, idsize);
2199 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2202 if (data != sdata) {
2203 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2204 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2207 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
2208 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
2209 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null())) {
2210 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2211 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2214 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id)) {
2215 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2216 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2221 /* Read in request_extensions */
2223 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2228 if (dsize != size) {
2229 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2234 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2235 X509_EXTENSION_free);
2236 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
2237 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &sdata, dsize);
2238 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts || (data + dsize != sdata)) {
2239 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2245 * We don't know what to do with any other type * so ignore it.
2248 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2250 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2251 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
2253 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
2254 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2256 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
2257 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2258 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2261 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2266 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2267 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2268 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0 &&
2269 s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
2271 * We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2274 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2275 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2276 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
2277 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2278 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2279 * anything like that, but this might change).
2281 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2282 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2283 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2284 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2285 * Finished message could have been computed.)
2287 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2291 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation &&
2292 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb && s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2293 if (tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, data, size, al) != 0)
2295 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2296 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
2297 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2301 /* session ticket processed earlier */
2302 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2303 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)
2304 && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2305 if (ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size, al))
2309 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2310 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
2311 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2313 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret) {
2315 s->session->flags |= SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS;
2318 * If this ClientHello extension was unhandled and this is a
2319 * nonresumed connection, check whether the extension is a custom
2320 * TLS Extension (has a custom_srv_ext_record), and if so call the
2321 * callback and record the extension number so that an appropriate
2322 * ServerHello may be later returned.
2325 if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2336 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2338 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
2339 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2340 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2341 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2342 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2349 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d,
2353 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->srv_ext);
2354 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0) {
2355 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2359 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) {
2360 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2366 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2368 * ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2369 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly
2370 * fill the length of the block.
2372 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
2374 unsigned int off = 0;
2387 static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
2388 unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
2390 unsigned short length;
2391 unsigned short type;
2392 unsigned short size;
2393 unsigned char *data = *p;
2394 int tlsext_servername = 0;
2395 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2397 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2398 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2400 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2402 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2403 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
2404 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2405 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2406 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2409 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2410 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2413 if (data >= (d + n - 2))
2417 if (data + length != d + n) {
2418 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2422 while (data <= (d + n - 4)) {
2426 if (data + size > (d + n))
2429 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2430 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2432 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
2433 if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2435 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2436 } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
2437 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
2438 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0) {
2439 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2442 tlsext_servername = 1;
2444 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2445 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
2446 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2447 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2449 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1) {
2450 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2454 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2455 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2456 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
2457 OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) {
2458 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2461 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
2462 ecpointformatlist_length;
2463 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata,
2464 ecpointformatlist_length);
2467 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2469 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2470 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2471 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size,
2472 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2474 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2477 if (!tls_use_ticket(s) || (size > 0)) {
2478 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2481 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2483 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
2485 * MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested a status
2488 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0)) {
2489 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2492 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2493 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2495 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2496 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2497 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2498 unsigned char *selected;
2499 unsigned char selected_len;
2501 /* We must have requested it. */
2502 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL) {
2503 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2506 /* The data must be valid */
2507 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size)) {
2508 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2512 ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data,
2514 s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) !=
2515 SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
2516 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2519 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2520 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated) {
2521 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2524 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2525 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2526 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2530 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation) {
2533 /* We must have requested it. */
2534 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list == NULL) {
2535 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2539 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2543 * The extension data consists of:
2544 * uint16 list_length
2545 * uint8 proto_length;
2546 * uint8 proto[proto_length];
2551 if (len != (unsigned)size - 2) {
2552 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2556 if (len != (unsigned)size - 3) {
2557 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2560 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2561 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
2562 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected) {
2563 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2566 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, data + 3, len);
2567 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
2569 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2570 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
2572 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
2573 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2575 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
2576 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2577 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2580 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2585 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2586 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2587 if (ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size, al))
2591 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2592 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac) {
2593 /* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite */
2594 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD
2595 && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc != SSL_RC4)
2596 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2599 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret) {
2601 s->session->flags |= SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS;
2604 * If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but matches a
2605 * custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c callback
2607 else if (custom_ext_parse(s, 0, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2613 if (data != d + n) {
2614 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2618 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1) {
2619 if (s->tlsext_hostname) {
2620 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) {
2621 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
2622 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname) {
2623 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2627 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2638 * Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to avoid
2639 * an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server hello
2640 * because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an attack.
2641 * However this would mean we could not connect to any server which
2642 * doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI absence on
2643 * initial connect only.
2645 if (!renegotiate_seen && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
2646 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2647 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2648 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2649 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2656 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2662 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2667 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
2669 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2670 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2672 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2674 * The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely
2675 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2678 * The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely
2679 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2683 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2685 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2686 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2687 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
2688 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2690 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2692 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2695 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2696 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2699 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2700 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2703 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2704 s->servername_done = 0;
2709 /* Initialise digests to default values */
2710 static void ssl_set_default_md(SSL *s)
2712 const EVP_MD **pmd = s->s3->tmp.md;
2713 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2714 pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
2716 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2717 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
2718 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = EVP_sha1();
2720 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2721 pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha1();
2725 int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s)
2729 /* Clear any shared sigtnature algorithms */
2730 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
2731 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
2732 s->cert->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
2733 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
2734 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
2735 s->s3->tmp.md[i] = NULL;
2736 s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
2739 /* If sigalgs received process it. */
2740 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs) {
2741 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2742 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2743 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2746 /* Fatal error is no shared signature algorithms */
2747 if (!s->cert->shared_sigalgs) {
2748 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS,
2749 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS);
2750 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2754 ssl_set_default_md(s);
2758 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2762 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
2764 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2765 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2768 * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be
2769 * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed,
2770 * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may
2771 * influence which certificate is sent
2773 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
2775 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
2776 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
2777 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
2778 if (certpkey == NULL) {
2779 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2783 * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
2784 * et al can pick it up.
2786 s->cert->key = certpkey;
2787 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2789 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
2790 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2791 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2793 /* status request response should be sent */
2794 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
2795 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
2796 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2798 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2800 /* something bad happened */
2801 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2802 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2803 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2807 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2811 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2812 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2815 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2816 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2824 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2826 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2827 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2829 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2831 * If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
2832 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension it
2833 * must contain uncompressed.
2835 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2836 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2837 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
2838 && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
2839 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
2840 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
2841 && ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe))
2842 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) {
2843 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
2845 unsigned char *list;
2846 int found_uncompressed = 0;
2847 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2848 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) {
2849 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed) {
2850 found_uncompressed = 1;
2854 if (!found_uncompressed) {
2855 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2856 SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
2860 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2861 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2863 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2865 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2866 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2867 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
2868 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2870 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2872 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2875 * If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one tell the
2878 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
2879 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
2882 * Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows there is no
2885 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
2886 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
2887 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
2888 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2890 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
2891 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2894 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2895 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2900 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2901 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2904 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2905 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2908 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2909 s->servername_done = 0;
2915 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d,
2919 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
2921 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0) {
2922 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2926 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
2927 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
2934 * Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
2935 * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle
2936 * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time.
2938 * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will
2939 * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket
2940 * extension, if any.
2941 * len: the length of the session ID.
2942 * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello.
2943 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2944 * point to the resulting session.
2946 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
2947 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
2948 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
2951 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
2952 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
2953 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
2954 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
2955 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
2956 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
2957 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
2960 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
2961 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
2962 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
2963 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
2964 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
2965 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
2967 int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
2968 const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
2970 /* Point after session ID in client hello */
2971 const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
2975 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2978 * If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
2981 if (!tls_use_ticket(s))
2983 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
2987 /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
2988 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
2994 /* Skip past cipher list */
2999 /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
3004 /* Now at start of extensions */
3005 if ((p + 2) >= limit)
3008 while ((p + 4) <= limit) {
3009 unsigned short type, size;
3012 if (p + size > limit)
3014 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
3018 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
3021 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3024 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
3026 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
3027 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
3028 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
3029 * calculate the master secret later.
3033 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret);
3035 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
3036 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3038 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
3040 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
3041 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3043 default: /* fatal error */
3053 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
3055 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
3056 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
3057 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
3058 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
3059 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3060 * point to the resulting session.
3063 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3064 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
3065 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
3066 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
3068 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
3069 int eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id,
3070 int sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess)
3073 unsigned char *sdec;
3074 const unsigned char *p;
3075 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
3076 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
3079 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3080 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
3083 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
3084 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3085 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3086 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
3087 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
3088 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
3097 /* Check key name matches */
3098 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
3100 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3101 EVP_sha256(), NULL);
3102 EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3103 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
3106 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
3109 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
3111 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3115 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
3116 HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
3117 HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
3118 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3119 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) {
3120 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3123 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
3124 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
3125 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3126 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3127 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
3129 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3132 EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
3133 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0) {
3134 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3139 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3142 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3146 * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
3147 * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
3148 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
3152 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3153 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3162 * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
3167 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3174 static const tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
3175 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3176 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3177 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3178 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3179 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3180 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}
3183 static const tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
3184 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
3185 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
3186 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}
3189 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3192 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3193 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3199 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3202 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3203 if ((table[i].id) == id)
3204 return table[i].nid;
3209 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk,
3215 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3218 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3221 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
3222 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
3226 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
3228 return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3234 const EVP_MD *(*mfunc) (void);
3237 static const tls12_hash_info tls12_md_info[] = {
3238 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
3241 {NID_md5, 64, EVP_md5},
3243 {NID_sha1, 80, EVP_sha1},
3244 {NID_sha224, 112, EVP_sha224},
3245 {NID_sha256, 128, EVP_sha256},
3246 {NID_sha384, 192, EVP_sha384},
3247 {NID_sha512, 256, EVP_sha512}
3250 static const tls12_hash_info *tls12_get_hash_info(unsigned char hash_alg)
3254 if (hash_alg > OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md_info))
3256 return tls12_md_info + hash_alg - 1;
3259 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
3261 const tls12_hash_info *inf;
3262 if (hash_alg == TLSEXT_hash_md5 && FIPS_mode())
3264 inf = tls12_get_hash_info(hash_alg);
3265 if (!inf || !inf->mfunc)
3267 return inf->mfunc();
3270 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
3273 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3274 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3275 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3277 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3278 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3279 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3281 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3282 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3283 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3289 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3290 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
3291 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3293 int sign_nid = 0, hash_nid = 0;
3294 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3296 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3297 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3299 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3301 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3302 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3304 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3306 if (psignhash_nid) {
3307 if (sign_nid && hash_nid)
3308 OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid, hash_nid, sign_nid);
3310 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3314 /* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
3315 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(SSL *s, int op, const unsigned char *ptmp)
3317 /* See if we have an entry in the hash table and it is enabled */
3318 const tls12_hash_info *hinf = tls12_get_hash_info(ptmp[0]);
3319 if (!hinf || !hinf->mfunc)
3321 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
3322 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3324 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
3325 return ssl_security(s, op, hinf->secbits, hinf->nid, (void *)ptmp);
3329 * Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported signature
3330 * algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA then RSA is
3334 void ssl_set_sig_mask(unsigned long *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op)
3336 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
3337 size_t i, sigalgslen;
3338 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
3340 * Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any for
3341 * RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just TLS 1.2. To keep
3342 * down calls to security callback only check if we have to.
3344 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
3345 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2) {
3346 switch (sigalgs[1]) {
3347 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3348 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3349 if (!have_rsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3353 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3354 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3355 if (!have_dsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3359 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3360 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3361 if (!have_ecdsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3368 *pmask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
3370 *pmask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
3372 *pmask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
3375 size_t tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, unsigned char *out,
3376 const unsigned char *psig, size_t psiglen)
3378 unsigned char *tmpout = out;
3380 for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i += 2, psig += 2) {
3381 if (tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, psig)) {
3382 *tmpout++ = psig[0];
3383 *tmpout++ = psig[1];
3386 return tmpout - out;
3389 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
3390 static int tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
3391 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3392 const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
3394 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3395 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3396 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i += 2, ptmp += 2) {
3397 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3398 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED, ptmp))
3400 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j += 2, atmp += 2) {
3401 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1]) {
3404 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3405 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3406 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3408 &shsig->signandhash_nid, ptmp);
3418 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3419 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3421 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3422 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3424 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3426 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
3428 OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
3429 c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
3430 c->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
3431 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3432 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3433 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3434 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3435 } else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3436 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
3437 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3439 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
3440 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb) {
3443 allow = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3444 allowlen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
3448 pref = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3449 preflen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
3451 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3453 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3456 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3460 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3461 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3465 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3467 int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
3470 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
3471 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3473 /* Should never happen */
3477 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs);
3478 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
3479 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs == NULL)
3481 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3482 memcpy(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
3486 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3491 const EVP_MD **pmd = s->s3->tmp.md;
3492 int *pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags;
3494 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3495 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s))
3498 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3499 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL) {
3501 * Use first set signature preference to force message digest,
3502 * ignoring any peer preferences.
3504 const unsigned char *sigs = NULL;
3506 sigs = c->conf_sigalgs;
3508 sigs = c->client_sigalgs;
3510 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigs[1]);
3511 md = tls12_get_hash(sigs[0]);
3513 pvalid[idx] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3514 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) {
3515 pvalid[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3516 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = md;
3522 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3523 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++) {
3524 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3525 if (idx > 0 && pmd[idx] == NULL) {
3526 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
3528 pvalid[idx] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3529 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) {
3530 pvalid[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3531 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = md;
3537 * In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't use
3538 * the certificate for signing.
3540 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
3542 * Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not
3543 * supported it stays as NULL.
3545 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3546 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] == NULL)
3547 pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
3549 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3550 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] == NULL) {
3551 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
3552 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = EVP_sha1();
3555 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3556 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] == NULL)
3557 pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha1();
3563 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3564 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3565 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3567 const unsigned char *psig = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3572 if (idx >= (int)s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen)
3579 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
3581 return s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3584 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3585 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3586 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3588 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
3589 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
3593 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3595 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3597 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3599 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
3601 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
3602 return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
3605 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
3606 int tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned int length)
3609 unsigned short hbtype;
3610 unsigned int payload;
3611 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3613 if (s->msg_callback)
3614 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3616 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3618 /* Read type and payload length first */
3619 if (1 + 2 + 16 > length)
3620 return 0; /* silently discard */
3623 if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > length)
3624 return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */
3627 if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST) {
3628 unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
3632 * Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes message type,
3633 * plus 2 bytes payload length, plus payload, plus padding
3635 buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3636 if (buffer == NULL) {
3637 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_PROCESS_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3642 /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
3643 *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
3645 memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
3647 /* Random padding */
3648 if (RAND_bytes(bp, padding) <= 0) {
3649 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
3653 r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer,
3654 3 + payload + padding);
3656 if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
3657 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3658 buffer, 3 + payload + padding,
3659 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3661 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
3665 } else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE) {
3669 * We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int), and 16
3670 * random bytes, so we just try to read the sequence number
3674 if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq) {
3676 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
3683 int tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3685 unsigned char *buf, *p;
3687 unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
3688 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3690 /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
3691 if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
3692 s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS) {
3693 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
3697 /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
3698 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) {
3699 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
3703 /* ...and no handshake in progress. */
3704 if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake) {
3705 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
3710 * Check if padding is too long, payload and padding must not exceed 2^14
3711 * - 3 = 16381 bytes in total.
3713 OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381);
3716 * Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
3717 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
3718 * some random stuff.
3719 * - Message Type, 1 byte
3720 * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
3721 * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
3722 * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
3725 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3727 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3732 *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
3733 /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
3735 /* Sequence number */
3736 s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
3737 /* 16 random bytes */
3738 if (RAND_bytes(p, 16) <= 0) {
3739 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3743 /* Random padding */
3744 if (RAND_bytes(p, padding) <= 0) {
3745 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3749 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
3751 if (s->msg_callback)
3752 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3753 buf, 3 + payload + padding,
3754 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3756 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;
3765 #define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
3769 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
3772 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
3774 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
3777 int sig_alg, hash_alg;
3780 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
3782 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
3784 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
3786 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
3794 if (strcmp(etmp, "RSA") == 0)
3795 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
3796 else if (strcmp(etmp, "DSA") == 0)
3797 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
3798 else if (strcmp(etmp, "ECDSA") == 0)
3799 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_EC;
3803 hash_alg = OBJ_sn2nid(p);
3804 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
3805 hash_alg = OBJ_ln2nid(p);
3806 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
3809 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i += 2) {
3810 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
3813 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
3814 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
3819 * Set suppored signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
3820 * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
3822 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
3826 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
3830 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
3833 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen,
3836 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
3841 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
3842 if (sigalgs == NULL)
3844 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i += 2) {
3845 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3846 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3848 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
3855 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
3856 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3857 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
3859 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
3860 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3861 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
3867 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
3871 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
3875 if (default_nid == -1)
3877 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
3879 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
3880 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
3881 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
3886 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
3887 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
3891 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
3892 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++) {
3893 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
3900 * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by
3901 * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before
3902 * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before
3903 * attempting to use them.
3906 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
3908 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
3909 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
3910 /* Strict mode flags */
3911 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
3912 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
3913 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
3915 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
3920 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
3921 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
3924 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
3925 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
3927 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
3930 idx = cpk - c->pkeys;
3932 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
3933 pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
3935 pk = cpk->privatekey;
3937 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
3938 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
3941 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3942 /* Allow any certificate to pass test */
3943 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL) {
3944 rv = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN |
3945 CERT_PKEY_VALID | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
3953 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
3956 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
3957 pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
3959 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
3960 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
3962 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
3969 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
3970 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
3971 if (ok == X509_V_OK)
3972 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
3973 else if (!check_flags)
3978 * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature
3979 * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode.
3981 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode) {
3983 unsigned char rsign = 0;
3984 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs)
3986 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
3989 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
3990 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
3991 case SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA:
3992 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
3993 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
3996 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
3997 case SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA:
3998 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
3999 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
4003 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
4004 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
4013 * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set
4014 * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1.
4016 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs) {
4018 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
4019 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2) {
4020 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
4023 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen) {
4030 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
4031 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid)) {
4035 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
4036 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4037 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
4038 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i), default_nid)) {
4040 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4047 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
4048 else if (check_flags)
4049 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE | CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4051 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
4052 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
4053 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
4054 else if (!check_flags)
4057 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4058 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
4059 else if (strict_mode) {
4060 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4061 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
4062 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4063 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0)) {
4065 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4072 if (!s->server && strict_mode) {
4073 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
4077 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
4080 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
4083 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
4088 int cert_type = X509_certificate_type(x, pk);
4089 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_RSA)
4090 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_FIXED_DH;
4091 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_DSA)
4092 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_FIXED_DH;
4096 const unsigned char *ctypes;
4100 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
4102 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
4103 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
4105 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++) {
4106 if (ctypes[i] == check_type) {
4107 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4111 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
4114 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4116 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
4118 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
4119 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4121 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
4122 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
4123 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4125 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
4126 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
4127 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4128 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp)) {
4129 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4134 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4137 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME | CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4139 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
4140 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
4144 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
4145 if (*pvalid & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
4146 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4147 else if (s->s3->tmp.md[idx] != NULL)
4148 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4150 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4153 * When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the
4157 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
4160 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
4161 *pvalid &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4168 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
4169 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
4171 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
4172 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
4173 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
4174 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA);
4175 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA);
4176 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
4179 /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
4180 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
4182 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);
4186 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
4187 DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s)
4189 int dh_secbits = 80;
4190 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto == 2)
4191 return DH_get_1024_160();
4192 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) {
4193 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256)
4198 CERT_PKEY *cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
4199 dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(cpk->privatekey);
4202 if (dh_secbits >= 128) {
4208 BN_set_word(dhp->g, 2);
4209 if (dh_secbits >= 192)
4210 dhp->p = get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL);
4212 dhp->p = get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL);
4213 if (!dhp->p || !dhp->g) {
4219 if (dh_secbits >= 112)
4220 return DH_get_2048_224();
4221 return DH_get_1024_160();
4225 static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4228 EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
4230 secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey);
4231 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
4235 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, 0, x);
4237 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, 0, x);
4240 static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4242 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
4243 int secbits = -1, md_nid = NID_undef, sig_nid;
4244 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
4245 if (sig_nid && OBJ_find_sigid_algs(sig_nid, &md_nid, NULL)) {
4247 if (md_nid && (md = EVP_get_digestbynid(md_nid)))
4248 secbits = EVP_MD_size(md) * 4;
4251 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4253 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4256 int ssl_security_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int vfy, int is_ee)
4259 vfy = SSL_SECOP_PEER;
4261 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY | vfy))
4262 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4264 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY | vfy))
4265 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4267 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD | vfy))
4268 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK;
4273 * Check security of a chain, if sk includes the end entity certificate then
4274 * x is NULL. If vfy is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and not sending
4275 * one to the peer. Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
4278 int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x, int vfy)
4280 int rv, start_idx, i;
4282 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
4287 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 1);
4291 for (i = start_idx; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
4292 x = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
4293 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 0);