2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
12 #include <openssl/objects.h>
13 #include <openssl/evp.h>
14 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
15 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
16 #include <openssl/conf.h>
17 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
18 #include <openssl/dh.h>
19 #include <openssl/bn.h>
21 #include <openssl/ct.h>
23 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data = {
27 tls1_generate_master_secret,
28 tls1_change_cipher_state,
29 tls1_final_finish_mac,
30 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
31 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
33 tls1_export_keying_material,
35 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
36 tls_close_construct_packet,
40 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_1_enc_data = {
44 tls1_generate_master_secret,
45 tls1_change_cipher_state,
46 tls1_final_finish_mac,
47 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
48 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
50 tls1_export_keying_material,
51 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
52 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
53 tls_close_construct_packet,
57 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_2_enc_data = {
61 tls1_generate_master_secret,
62 tls1_change_cipher_state,
63 tls1_final_finish_mac,
64 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
65 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
67 tls1_export_keying_material,
68 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
69 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
70 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
71 tls_close_construct_packet,
75 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_3_enc_data = {
78 tls13_setup_key_block,
79 tls13_generate_master_secret,
80 tls13_change_cipher_state,
81 tls13_final_finish_mac,
82 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
83 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
85 tls13_export_keying_material,
86 SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF,
87 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
88 tls_close_construct_packet,
92 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
95 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
96 * http, the cache would over fill
105 if (!s->method->ssl_clear(s))
111 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
113 OPENSSL_free(s->ext.session_ticket);
117 int tls1_clear(SSL *s)
122 if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION)
123 s->version = TLS_MAX_VERSION;
125 s->version = s->method->version;
130 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
133 int nid; /* Curve NID */
134 int secbits; /* Bits of security (from SP800-57) */
135 unsigned int flags; /* Flags: currently just field type */
139 * Table of curve information.
140 * Do not delete entries or reorder this array! It is used as a lookup
141 * table: the index of each entry is one less than the TLS curve id.
143 static const tls_curve_info nid_list[] = {
144 {NID_sect163k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163k1 (1) */
145 {NID_sect163r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r1 (2) */
146 {NID_sect163r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r2 (3) */
147 {NID_sect193r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r1 (4) */
148 {NID_sect193r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r2 (5) */
149 {NID_sect233k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233k1 (6) */
150 {NID_sect233r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233r1 (7) */
151 {NID_sect239k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect239k1 (8) */
152 {NID_sect283k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283k1 (9) */
153 {NID_sect283r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283r1 (10) */
154 {NID_sect409k1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409k1 (11) */
155 {NID_sect409r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409r1 (12) */
156 {NID_sect571k1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571k1 (13) */
157 {NID_sect571r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571r1 (14) */
158 {NID_secp160k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160k1 (15) */
159 {NID_secp160r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r1 (16) */
160 {NID_secp160r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r2 (17) */
161 {NID_secp192k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192k1 (18) */
162 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192r1 (19) */
163 {NID_secp224k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224k1 (20) */
164 {NID_secp224r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224r1 (21) */
165 {NID_secp256k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256k1 (22) */
166 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256r1 (23) */
167 {NID_secp384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp384r1 (24) */
168 {NID_secp521r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp521r1 (25) */
169 {NID_brainpoolP256r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
170 {NID_brainpoolP384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
171 {NID_brainpoolP512r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
172 {EVP_PKEY_X25519, 128, TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM}, /* X25519 (29) */
175 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = {
176 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
177 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
178 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
181 /* The default curves */
182 static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] = {
183 0, 29, /* X25519 (29) */
184 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
185 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
186 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
189 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] = {
190 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
191 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
194 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id, unsigned int *pflags)
196 const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
197 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
198 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
200 cinfo = nid_list + curve_id - 1;
202 *pflags = cinfo->flags;
206 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
209 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(nid_list); i++) {
210 if (nid_list[i].nid == nid)
217 * Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
219 * Sets |num_curves| to the number of curves in the list, i.e.,
220 * the length of |pcurves| is 2 * num_curves.
221 * Returns 1 on success and 0 if the client curves list has invalid format.
222 * The latter indicates an internal error: we should not be accepting such
223 * lists in the first place.
224 * TODO(emilia): we should really be storing the curves list in explicitly
225 * parsed form instead. (However, this would affect binary compatibility
226 * so cannot happen in the 1.0.x series.)
228 int tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess, const unsigned char **pcurves,
231 size_t pcurveslen = 0;
234 *pcurves = s->session->ext.supportedgroups;
235 pcurveslen = s->session->ext.supportedgroups_len;
237 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
238 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
239 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
240 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
241 pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
244 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
245 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
249 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
250 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
254 *pcurves = s->ext.supportedgroups;
255 pcurveslen = s->ext.supportedgroups_len;
258 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
259 pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
263 /* We do not allow odd length arrays to enter the system. */
264 if (pcurveslen & 1) {
265 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_GET_CURVELIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
269 *num_curves = pcurveslen / 2;
273 /* See if curve is allowed by security callback */
274 int tls_curve_allowed(SSL *s, const unsigned char *curve, int op)
276 const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
279 if ((curve[1] < 1) || ((size_t)curve[1] > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
281 cinfo = &nid_list[curve[1] - 1];
282 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
283 if (cinfo->flags & TLS_CURVE_CHAR2)
286 return ssl_security(s, op, cinfo->secbits, cinfo->nid, (void *)curve);
289 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
290 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
292 const unsigned char *curves;
293 size_t num_curves, i;
294 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
295 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
297 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
299 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
302 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) {
303 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
305 } else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) {
306 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
308 } else /* Should never happen */
311 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &num_curves))
313 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, curves += 2) {
314 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
315 return tls_curve_allowed(s, p + 1, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK);
321 * For nmatch >= 0, return the NID of the |nmatch|th shared group or NID_undef
322 * if there is no match.
323 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
324 * For nmatch == -2, return the NID of the group to use for
325 * an EC tmp key, or NID_undef if there is no match.
327 int tls1_shared_group(SSL *s, int nmatch)
329 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
330 size_t num_pref, num_supp, i, j;
333 /* Can't do anything on client side */
337 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
339 * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know
340 * these are acceptable due to previous checks.
342 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
344 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
345 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
346 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
347 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
348 /* Should never happen */
351 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
355 * Avoid truncation. tls1_get_curvelist takes an int
356 * but s->options is a long...
358 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s,
359 (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0,
361 /* In practice, NID_undef == 0 but let's be precise. */
362 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
363 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s,
364 (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) == 0,
366 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
368 for (k = 0, i = 0; i < num_pref; i++, pref += 2) {
369 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
371 for (j = 0; j < num_supp; j++, tsupp += 2) {
372 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1]) {
373 if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, pref, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
376 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
378 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id, NULL);
386 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
390 int tls1_set_groups(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
391 int *groups, size_t ngroups)
393 unsigned char *glist, *p;
396 * Bitmap of groups included to detect duplicates: only works while group
399 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
400 glist = OPENSSL_malloc(ngroups * 2);
403 for (i = 0, p = glist; i < ngroups; i++) {
404 unsigned long idmask;
406 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Convert for DH groups */
407 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(groups[i]);
409 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask)) {
418 *pextlen = ngroups * 2;
422 # define MAX_CURVELIST 28
426 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
429 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
431 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
437 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
439 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
441 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
443 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
444 if (nid == NID_undef)
445 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
446 if (nid == NID_undef)
447 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
448 if (nid == NID_undef)
450 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
451 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
453 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
457 /* Set groups based on a colon separate list */
458 int tls1_set_groups_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen, const char *str)
462 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
466 return tls1_set_groups(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
469 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
470 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
477 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
478 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
481 /* Determine curve ID */
482 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
483 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
484 /* If no id return error: we don't support arbitrary explicit curves */
488 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
490 if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
492 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED) {
493 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
495 if ((nid_list[id - 1].flags & TLS_CURVE_TYPE) == TLS_CURVE_PRIME)
496 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
498 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
504 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
505 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
506 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
508 const unsigned char *pformats, *pcurves;
509 size_t num_formats, num_curves, i;
512 * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
513 * supported (see RFC4492).
515 if (comp_id && s->session->ext.ecpointformats) {
516 pformats = s->session->ext.ecpointformats;
517 num_formats = s->session->ext.ecpointformats_len;
518 for (i = 0; i < num_formats; i++, pformats++) {
519 if (*comp_id == *pformats)
522 if (i == num_formats)
527 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
528 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++) {
529 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &pcurves, &num_curves))
531 if (j == 1 && num_curves == 0) {
533 * If we've not received any curves then skip this check.
534 * RFC 4492 does not require the supported elliptic curves extension
535 * so if it is not sent we can just choose any curve.
536 * It is invalid to send an empty list in the elliptic curves
537 * extension, so num_curves == 0 always means no extension.
541 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
542 if (pcurves[0] == curve_id[0] && pcurves[1] == curve_id[1])
547 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
554 void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
558 * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
560 if (s->ext.ecpointformats) {
561 *pformats = s->ext.ecpointformats;
562 *num_formats = s->ext.ecpointformats_len;
564 *pformats = ecformats_default;
565 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
567 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
569 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default);
574 * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
575 * certificates have compatible curves and compression.
577 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int check_ee_md)
579 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
582 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
585 /* If not EC nothing to do */
586 if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) != EVP_PKEY_EC)
588 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey));
592 * Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a supported
595 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
599 * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
602 if (check_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s)) {
608 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
609 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
610 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
611 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
612 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
614 return 0; /* Should never happen */
615 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
616 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i]->sigandhash)
618 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
625 * tls1_check_ec_tmp_key - Check EC temporary key compatibility
627 * @cid: Cipher ID we're considering using
629 * Checks that the kECDHE cipher suite we're considering using
630 * is compatible with the client extensions.
632 * Returns 0 when the cipher can't be used or 1 when it can.
634 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
637 * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
640 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
641 unsigned char curve_id[2];
642 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
643 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
644 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
645 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
646 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
650 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
651 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
655 /* Need a shared curve */
656 if (tls1_shared_group(s, 0))
663 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
668 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
670 /* Default sigalg schemes */
671 static const uint16_t tls12_sigalgs[] = {
672 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
673 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256,
674 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384,
675 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512,
676 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed25519,
679 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_sha256,
680 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_sha384,
681 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_sha512,
683 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha256,
684 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha384,
685 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha512,
687 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
688 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha224,
689 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1,
691 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha224,
692 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1,
693 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
694 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha224,
695 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1,
697 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha256,
698 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha384,
699 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha512
703 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
704 static const uint16_t suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
705 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256,
706 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384
710 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP sigalg_lookup_tbl[] = {
711 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
712 {"ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256,
713 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
714 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256, NID_X9_62_prime256v1},
715 {"ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384,
716 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
717 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384, NID_secp384r1},
718 {"ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512,
719 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
720 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA512, NID_secp521r1},
721 {"ed25519", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed25519,
722 NID_undef, -1, EVP_PKEY_ED25519, SSL_PKEY_ED25519,
723 NID_undef, NID_undef},
724 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha224,
725 NID_sha224, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
726 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA224, NID_undef},
727 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1,
728 NID_sha1, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
729 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1, NID_undef},
731 {"rsa_pss_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_sha256,
732 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN,
733 NID_undef, NID_undef},
734 {"rsa_pss_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_sha384,
735 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN,
736 NID_undef, NID_undef},
737 {"rsa_pss_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_sha512,
738 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN,
739 NID_undef, NID_undef},
740 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha256,
741 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
742 NID_sha256WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef},
743 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha384,
744 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
745 NID_sha384WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef},
746 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha512,
747 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
748 NID_sha512WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef},
749 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha224", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha224,
750 NID_sha224, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
751 NID_sha224WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef},
752 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha1", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1,
753 NID_sha1, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
754 NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef},
755 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
756 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha256,
757 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
758 NID_dsa_with_SHA256, NID_undef},
759 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha384,
760 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
761 NID_undef, NID_undef},
762 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha512,
763 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
764 NID_undef, NID_undef},
765 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha224,
766 NID_sha224, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
767 NID_undef, NID_undef},
768 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1,
769 NID_sha1, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
770 NID_dsaWithSHA1, NID_undef},
772 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
773 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_gostr34112012_256,
774 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX,
775 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256,
776 NID_undef, NID_undef},
777 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_gostr34112012_512,
778 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX,
779 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512,
780 NID_undef, NID_undef},
781 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411,
782 NID_id_GostR3411_94, SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX,
783 NID_id_GostR3410_2001, SSL_PKEY_GOST01,
784 NID_undef, NID_undef}
787 /* Legacy sigalgs for TLS < 1.2 RSA TLS signatures */
788 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP legacy_rsa_sigalg = {
789 "rsa_pkcs1_md5_sha1", 0,
790 NID_md5_sha1, SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX,
791 EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
796 * Default signature algorithm values used if signature algorithms not present.
797 * From RFC5246. Note: order must match certificate index order.
799 static const uint16_t tls_default_sigalg[] = {
800 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1, /* SSL_PKEY_RSA */
801 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1, /* SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN */
802 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1, /* SSL_PKEY_ECC */
803 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST01 */
804 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_gostr34112012_256, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256 */
805 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_gostr34112012_512, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512 */
806 0 /* SSL_PKEY_ED25519 */
809 /* Lookup TLS signature algorithm */
810 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP *tls1_lookup_sigalg(uint16_t sigalg)
813 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *s;
815 for (i = 0, s = sigalg_lookup_tbl; i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
817 if (s->sigalg == sigalg)
822 /* Lookup hash: return 0 if invalid or not enabled */
823 int tls1_lookup_md(const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu, const EVP_MD **pmd)
828 /* lu->hash == NID_undef means no associated digest */
829 if (lu->hash == NID_undef) {
832 md = ssl_md(lu->hash_idx);
842 * Return a signature algorithm for TLS < 1.2 where the signature type
843 * is fixed by the certificate type.
845 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP *tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(const SSL *s, int idx)
851 /* Work out index corresponding to ciphersuite */
852 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
853 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(i);
855 if (clu->amask & s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth) {
861 idx = s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys;
864 if (idx < 0 || idx >= (int)OSSL_NELEM(tls_default_sigalg))
866 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) || idx != SSL_PKEY_RSA) {
867 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(tls_default_sigalg[idx]);
869 if (!tls1_lookup_md(lu, NULL))
873 return &legacy_rsa_sigalg;
875 /* Set peer sigalg based key type */
876 int tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(SSL *s, const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
879 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
881 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, &idx) == NULL)
883 lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, idx);
886 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg = lu;
890 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, int sent, const uint16_t **psigs)
893 * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
896 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
897 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
898 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
899 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
900 return OSSL_NELEM(suiteb_sigalgs);
902 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
903 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
906 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
907 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 1;
912 * We use client_sigalgs (if not NULL) if we're a server
913 * and sending a certificate request or if we're a client and
914 * determining which shared algorithm to use.
916 if ((s->server == sent) && s->cert->client_sigalgs != NULL) {
917 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
918 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
919 } else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
920 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
921 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
923 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
924 return OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sigalgs);
929 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
930 * algorithms and if so set relevant digest and signature scheme in
933 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(SSL *s, uint16_t sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
935 const uint16_t *sent_sigs;
936 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
938 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
939 int pkeyid = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey);
940 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
942 /* Should never happen */
945 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
946 /* Disallow DSA for TLS 1.3 */
947 if (pkeyid == EVP_PKEY_DSA) {
948 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
951 /* Only allow PSS for TLS 1.3 */
952 if (pkeyid == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
953 pkeyid = EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS;
955 lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(sig);
957 * Check sigalgs is known. Disallow SHA1/SHA224 with TLS 1.3. Check key type
958 * is consistent with signature: RSA keys can be used for RSA-PSS
961 || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && (lu->hash == NID_sha1 || lu->hash == NID_sha224))
962 || (pkeyid != lu->sig
963 && (lu->sig != EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS || pkeyid != EVP_PKEY_RSA))) {
964 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
967 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
968 if (pkeyid == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
969 EC_KEY *ec = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey);
970 int curve = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec));
972 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
973 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) != POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED) {
974 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
975 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_POINT_COMPRESSION);
978 /* For TLS 1.3 check curve matches signature algorithm */
979 if (lu->curve != NID_undef && curve != lu->curve) {
980 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
984 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
986 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
987 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, ec))
989 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id)) {
990 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
993 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
994 /* Check sigalg matches a permissible Suite B value */
995 if (sig != TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256
996 && sig != TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384) {
997 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
998 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1002 * Suite B also requires P-256+SHA256 and P-384+SHA384:
1003 * this matches the TLS 1.3 requirements so we can just
1004 * check the curve is the expected TLS 1.3 value.
1005 * If this fails an inappropriate digest is being used.
1007 if (curve != lu->curve) {
1008 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1009 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
1014 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1019 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
1020 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sent_sigs);
1021 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i++, sent_sigs++) {
1022 if (sig == *sent_sigs)
1025 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
1026 if (i == sent_sigslen && (lu->hash != NID_sha1
1027 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
1028 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1031 if (!tls1_lookup_md(lu, &md)) {
1032 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
1037 * Make sure security callback allows algorithm. For historical
1038 * reasons we have to pass the sigalg as a two byte char array.
1040 sigalgstr[0] = (sig >> 8) & 0xff;
1041 sigalgstr[1] = sig & 0xff;
1042 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK,
1043 EVP_MD_size(md) * 4, EVP_MD_type(md),
1044 (void *)sigalgstr)) {
1045 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1049 /* Store the sigalg the peer uses */
1050 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg = lu;
1054 int SSL_get_peer_signature_type_nid(const SSL *s, int *pnid)
1056 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg == NULL)
1058 *pnid = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg->sig;
1063 * Set a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
1064 * supported, doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms, isn't supported
1065 * by the enabled protocol versions or by the security level.
1067 * This function should only be used for checking which ciphers are supported
1070 * Call ssl_cipher_disabled() to check that it's enabled or not.
1072 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
1074 s->s3->tmp.mask_a = 0;
1075 s->s3->tmp.mask_k = 0;
1076 ssl_set_sig_mask(&s->s3->tmp.mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
1077 ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &s->s3->tmp.min_ver, &s->s3->tmp.max_ver);
1078 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1079 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1080 if (!s->psk_client_callback) {
1081 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
1082 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_PSK;
1084 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1085 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1086 if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) {
1087 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
1088 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
1094 * ssl_cipher_disabled - check that a cipher is disabled or not
1095 * @s: SSL connection that you want to use the cipher on
1096 * @c: cipher to check
1097 * @op: Security check that you want to do
1098 * @ecdhe: If set to 1 then TLSv1 ECDHE ciphers are also allowed in SSLv3
1100 * Returns 1 when it's disabled, 0 when enabled.
1102 int ssl_cipher_disabled(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op, int ecdhe)
1104 if (c->algorithm_mkey & s->s3->tmp.mask_k
1105 || c->algorithm_auth & s->s3->tmp.mask_a)
1107 if (s->s3->tmp.max_ver == 0)
1109 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1110 int min_tls = c->min_tls;
1113 * For historical reasons we will allow ECHDE to be selected by a server
1114 * in SSLv3 if we are a client
1116 if (min_tls == TLS1_VERSION && ecdhe
1117 && (c->algorithm_mkey & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) != 0)
1118 min_tls = SSL3_VERSION;
1120 if ((min_tls > s->s3->tmp.max_ver) || (c->max_tls < s->s3->tmp.min_ver))
1123 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (DTLS_VERSION_GT(c->min_dtls, s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
1124 || DTLS_VERSION_LT(c->max_dtls, s->s3->tmp.min_ver)))
1127 return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c);
1130 int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s)
1132 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
1134 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL);
1137 int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s)
1142 /* Clear any shared signature algorithms */
1143 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
1144 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
1145 s->cert->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
1146 /* Clear certificate validity flags */
1147 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
1148 s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
1150 * If peer sent no signature algorithms check to see if we support
1151 * the default algorithm for each certificate type
1153 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs == NULL) {
1154 const uint16_t *sent_sigs;
1155 size_t sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sent_sigs);
1157 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
1158 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, i);
1163 /* Check default matches a type we sent */
1164 for (j = 0; j < sent_sigslen; j++) {
1165 if (lu->sigalg == sent_sigs[j]) {
1166 s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
1174 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
1175 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1176 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1179 if (s->cert->shared_sigalgs != NULL)
1181 /* Fatal error if no shared signature algorithms */
1182 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS);
1183 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1185 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1190 * Gets the ticket information supplied by the client if any.
1192 * hello: The parsed ClientHello data
1193 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
1194 * point to the resulting session.
1196 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
1197 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
1198 * never be decrypted, nor will s->ext.ticket_expected be set to 1.
1201 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
1202 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
1203 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
1204 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
1205 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
1206 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
1207 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
1210 * Sets s->ext.ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
1211 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
1212 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
1213 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
1214 * s->ctx->ext.ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
1215 * Otherwise, s->ext.ticket_expected is set to 0.
1217 TICKET_RETURN tls_get_ticket_from_client(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello,
1222 RAW_EXTENSION *ticketext;
1225 s->ext.ticket_expected = 0;
1228 * If tickets disabled or not supported by the protocol version
1229 * (e.g. TLSv1.3) behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
1232 if (s->version <= SSL3_VERSION || !tls_use_ticket(s))
1235 ticketext = &hello->pre_proc_exts[TLSEXT_IDX_session_ticket];
1236 if (!ticketext->present)
1239 size = PACKET_remaining(&ticketext->data);
1242 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
1245 s->ext.ticket_expected = 1;
1246 return TICKET_EMPTY;
1248 if (s->ext.session_secret_cb) {
1250 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
1251 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
1252 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
1253 * calculate the master secret later.
1255 return TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1258 retv = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, PACKET_data(&ticketext->data), size,
1259 hello->session_id, hello->session_id_len, ret);
1261 case TICKET_NO_DECRYPT:
1262 s->ext.ticket_expected = 1;
1263 return TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1265 case TICKET_SUCCESS:
1266 return TICKET_SUCCESS;
1268 case TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW:
1269 s->ext.ticket_expected = 1;
1270 return TICKET_SUCCESS;
1273 return TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1278 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
1280 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
1281 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extension.
1282 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
1283 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
1284 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
1285 * point to the resulting session.
1287 TICKET_RETURN tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
1288 size_t eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id,
1289 size_t sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess)
1292 unsigned char *sdec;
1293 const unsigned char *p;
1294 int slen, renew_ticket = 0, declen;
1295 TICKET_RETURN ret = TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1297 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
1298 HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL;
1299 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
1300 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->session_ctx;
1302 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
1303 hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
1305 return TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC;
1306 ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
1308 ret = TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC;
1311 if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb) {
1312 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
1313 int rv = tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
1318 ret = TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1324 /* Check key name matches */
1325 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->ext.tick_key_name,
1326 sizeof(tctx->ext.tick_key_name)) != 0) {
1327 ret = TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1330 if (HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->ext.tick_hmac_key,
1331 sizeof(tctx->ext.tick_hmac_key),
1332 EVP_sha256(), NULL) <= 0
1333 || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_256_cbc(), NULL,
1334 tctx->ext.tick_aes_key,
1336 + sizeof(tctx->ext.tick_key_name)) <= 0) {
1341 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
1344 mlen = HMAC_size(hctx);
1348 /* Sanity check ticket length: must exceed keyname + IV + HMAC */
1350 TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx) + mlen) {
1351 ret = TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1355 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
1356 if (HMAC_Update(hctx, etick, eticklen) <= 0
1357 || HMAC_Final(hctx, tick_hmac, NULL) <= 0) {
1360 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
1361 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) {
1362 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
1363 return TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1365 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
1366 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
1367 p = etick + TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
1368 eticklen -= TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
1369 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
1370 if (sdec == NULL || EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, sdec, &slen, p,
1371 (int)eticklen) <= 0) {
1372 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
1374 return TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1376 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(ctx, sdec + slen, &declen) <= 0) {
1377 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
1379 return TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1382 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
1386 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
1390 /* Some additional consistency checks */
1391 if (slen != 0 || sess->session_id_length != 0) {
1392 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
1393 return TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1396 * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
1397 * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
1398 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
1402 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
1403 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
1406 return TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW;
1408 return TICKET_SUCCESS;
1412 * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
1414 return TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1416 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
1417 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
1421 /* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
1422 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(SSL *s, int op, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu)
1424 unsigned char sigalgstr[2];
1427 /* See if sigalgs is recognised and if hash is enabled */
1428 if (!tls1_lookup_md(lu, NULL))
1430 /* DSA is not allowed in TLS 1.3 */
1431 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
1433 /* TODO(OpenSSL1.2) fully axe DSA/etc. in ClientHello per TLS 1.3 spec */
1434 if (!s->server && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->s3->tmp.min_ver >= TLS1_3_VERSION
1435 && (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_DSA || lu->hash_idx == SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX
1436 || lu->hash_idx == SSL_MD_MD5_IDX
1437 || lu->hash_idx == SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX))
1439 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
1440 if (ssl_cert_is_disabled(lu->sig_idx))
1442 if (lu->hash == NID_undef)
1444 /* Security bits: half digest bits */
1445 secbits = EVP_MD_size(ssl_md(lu->hash_idx)) * 4;
1446 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
1447 sigalgstr[0] = (lu->sigalg >> 8) & 0xff;
1448 sigalgstr[1] = lu->sigalg & 0xff;
1449 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, lu->hash, (void *)sigalgstr);
1453 * Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported signature
1454 * algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA then RSA is
1458 void ssl_set_sig_mask(uint32_t *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op)
1460 const uint16_t *sigalgs;
1461 size_t i, sigalgslen;
1462 uint32_t disabled_mask = SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS | SSL_aECDSA;
1464 * Go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any
1467 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sigalgs);
1468 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i ++, sigalgs++) {
1469 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(*sigalgs);
1470 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu;
1475 clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(lu->sig_idx);
1477 /* If algorithm is disabled see if we can enable it */
1478 if ((clu->amask & disabled_mask) != 0
1479 && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, lu))
1480 disabled_mask &= ~clu->amask;
1482 *pmask_a |= disabled_mask;
1485 int tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1486 const uint16_t *psig, size_t psiglen)
1491 for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i++, psig++) {
1492 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(*psig);
1494 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, lu))
1496 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, *psig))
1499 * If TLS 1.3 must have at least one valid TLS 1.3 message
1500 * signing algorithm: i.e. neither RSA nor SHA1/SHA224
1502 if (rv == 0 && (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
1503 || (lu->sig != EVP_PKEY_RSA
1504 && lu->hash != NID_sha1
1505 && lu->hash != NID_sha224)))
1509 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_COPY_SIGALGS, SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
1513 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
1514 static size_t tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP **shsig,
1515 const uint16_t *pref, size_t preflen,
1516 const uint16_t *allow, size_t allowlen)
1518 const uint16_t *ptmp, *atmp;
1519 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
1520 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i++, ptmp++) {
1521 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(*ptmp);
1523 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
1524 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED, lu))
1526 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j++, atmp++) {
1527 if (*ptmp == *atmp) {
1538 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
1539 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
1541 const uint16_t *pref, *allow, *conf;
1542 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
1544 const SIGALG_LOOKUP **salgs = NULL;
1546 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
1548 OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
1549 c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
1550 c->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
1551 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
1552 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
1553 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
1554 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
1555 } else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
1556 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
1557 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
1559 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 0, &conf);
1560 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb) {
1563 allow = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
1564 allowlen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
1568 pref = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
1569 preflen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
1571 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
1573 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(*salgs));
1576 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
1580 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
1581 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
1585 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
1587 int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1593 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
1594 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
1596 /* Should never happen */
1600 size = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
1602 /* Invalid data length */
1603 if (size == 0 || (size & 1) != 0)
1608 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs);
1609 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(size
1610 * sizeof(*s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs));
1611 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs == NULL)
1613 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen = size;
1614 for (i = 0; i < size && PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &stmp); i++)
1615 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs[i] = stmp;
1623 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s)
1626 uint32_t *pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags;
1629 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s))
1632 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
1635 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
1636 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs[i];
1637 int idx = sigptr->sig_idx;
1639 /* Ignore PKCS1 based sig algs in TLSv1.3 */
1640 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && sigptr->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
1642 /* If not disabled indicate we can explicitly sign */
1643 if (pvalid[idx] == 0 && !ssl_cert_is_disabled(idx))
1644 pvalid[idx] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
1649 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
1650 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
1651 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
1653 uint16_t *psig = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
1654 size_t numsigalgs = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
1655 if (psig == NULL || numsigalgs > INT_MAX)
1658 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
1660 if (idx >= (int)numsigalgs)
1664 *rhash = (unsigned char)((*psig >> 8) & 0xff);
1666 *rsig = (unsigned char)(*psig & 0xff);
1667 lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(*psig);
1669 *psign = lu != NULL ? lu->sig : NID_undef;
1671 *phash = lu != NULL ? lu->hash : NID_undef;
1672 if (psignhash != NULL)
1673 *psignhash = lu != NULL ? lu->sigandhash : NID_undef;
1675 return (int)numsigalgs;
1678 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
1679 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
1680 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
1682 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *shsigalgs;
1683 if (s->cert->shared_sigalgs == NULL
1685 || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen
1686 || s->cert->shared_sigalgslen > INT_MAX)
1688 shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs[idx];
1690 *phash = shsigalgs->hash;
1692 *psign = shsigalgs->sig;
1693 if (psignhash != NULL)
1694 *psignhash = shsigalgs->sigandhash;
1696 *rsig = (unsigned char)(shsigalgs->sigalg & 0xff);
1698 *rhash = (unsigned char)((shsigalgs->sigalg >> 8) & 0xff);
1699 return (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
1702 /* Maximum possible number of unique entries in sigalgs array */
1703 #define TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT (OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl) * 2)
1707 int sigalgs[TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT];
1710 static void get_sigorhash(int *psig, int *phash, const char *str)
1712 if (strcmp(str, "RSA") == 0) {
1713 *psig = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
1714 } else if (strcmp(str, "RSA-PSS") == 0 || strcmp(str, "PSS") == 0) {
1715 *psig = EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS;
1716 } else if (strcmp(str, "DSA") == 0) {
1717 *psig = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
1718 } else if (strcmp(str, "ECDSA") == 0) {
1719 *psig = EVP_PKEY_EC;
1721 *phash = OBJ_sn2nid(str);
1722 if (*phash == NID_undef)
1723 *phash = OBJ_ln2nid(str);
1726 /* Maximum length of a signature algorithm string component */
1727 #define TLS_MAX_SIGSTRING_LEN 40
1729 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
1731 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
1733 char etmp[TLS_MAX_SIGSTRING_LEN], *p;
1734 int sig_alg = NID_undef, hash_alg = NID_undef;
1737 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT)
1739 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
1741 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
1743 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
1744 /* See if we have a match for TLS 1.3 names */
1746 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *s;
1748 for (i = 0, s = sigalg_lookup_tbl; i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
1750 if (s->name != NULL && strcmp(etmp, s->name) == 0) {
1761 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, etmp);
1762 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, p);
1765 if (sig_alg == NID_undef || (p != NULL && hash_alg == NID_undef))
1768 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i += 2) {
1769 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
1772 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
1773 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
1778 * Set supported signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
1779 * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
1781 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
1785 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
1789 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
1792 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
1794 uint16_t *sigalgs, *sptr;
1799 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc((salglen / 2) * sizeof(*sigalgs));
1800 if (sigalgs == NULL)
1802 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i += 2) {
1804 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *curr;
1805 int md_id = *psig_nids++;
1806 int sig_id = *psig_nids++;
1808 for (j = 0, curr = sigalg_lookup_tbl; j < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
1810 if (curr->hash == md_id && curr->sig == sig_id) {
1811 *sptr++ = curr->sigalg;
1816 if (j == OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl))
1821 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
1822 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
1823 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen / 2;
1825 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
1826 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
1827 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen / 2;
1833 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
1837 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
1841 if (default_nid == -1)
1843 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
1845 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
1846 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
1847 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i]->sigandhash)
1852 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
1853 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
1857 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
1858 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++) {
1859 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
1866 * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by
1867 * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before
1868 * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before
1869 * attempting to use them.
1872 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when strict mode not set */
1874 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
1875 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
1876 /* Strict mode flags */
1877 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
1878 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
1879 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
1881 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
1886 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
1887 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
1890 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
1891 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
1893 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
1896 idx = (int)(cpk - c->pkeys);
1898 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
1899 pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
1901 pk = cpk->privatekey;
1903 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
1904 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
1913 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pk, &certidx) == NULL)
1916 pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
1918 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
1919 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
1921 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
1928 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
1929 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
1930 if (ok == X509_V_OK)
1931 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
1932 else if (!check_flags)
1937 * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature
1938 * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode.
1940 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode) {
1943 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs)
1945 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
1949 rsign = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
1950 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
1953 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
1954 rsign = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
1955 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
1959 rsign = EVP_PKEY_EC;
1960 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
1963 case SSL_PKEY_GOST01:
1964 rsign = NID_id_GostR3410_2001;
1965 default_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001;
1968 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256:
1969 rsign = NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256;
1970 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_256;
1973 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512:
1974 rsign = NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512;
1975 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_512;
1984 * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set
1985 * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1.
1987 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs) {
1989 const uint16_t *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
1990 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j++, p++) {
1991 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(*p);
1993 if (lu != NULL && lu->hash == NID_sha1 && lu->sig == rsign)
1996 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen) {
2003 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
2004 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid)) {
2008 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
2009 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
2010 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
2011 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i), default_nid)) {
2013 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
2020 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
2021 else if (check_flags)
2022 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE | CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
2024 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
2025 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, 1))
2026 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
2027 else if (!check_flags)
2030 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
2031 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
2032 else if (strict_mode) {
2033 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
2034 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
2035 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
2036 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0)) {
2038 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
2045 if (!s->server && strict_mode) {
2046 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
2048 switch (EVP_PKEY_id(pk)) {
2050 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
2053 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
2056 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
2060 const uint8_t *ctypes = s->s3->tmp.ctype;
2063 for (j = 0; j < s->s3->tmp.ctype_len; j++, ctypes++) {
2064 if (*ctypes == check_type) {
2065 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
2069 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
2072 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
2075 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.peer_ca_names;
2077 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
2078 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
2080 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
2081 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
2082 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
2084 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
2085 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
2086 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
2087 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp)) {
2088 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
2093 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
2096 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME | CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
2098 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
2099 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
2103 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
2104 rv |= *pvalid & (CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN);
2106 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
2109 * When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the
2113 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID) {
2116 /* Preserve sign and explicit sign flag, clear rest */
2117 *pvalid &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
2124 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
2125 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
2127 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA);
2128 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
2129 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
2130 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST01);
2131 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256);
2132 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512);
2133 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ED25519);
2136 /* User level utility function to check a chain is suitable */
2137 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
2139 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);
2142 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2143 DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s)
2145 int dh_secbits = 80;
2146 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto == 2)
2147 return DH_get_1024_160();
2148 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aPSK)) {
2149 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256)
2154 if (s->s3->tmp.cert == NULL)
2156 dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(s->s3->tmp.cert->privatekey);
2159 if (dh_secbits >= 128) {
2167 if (dh_secbits >= 192)
2168 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL);
2170 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL);
2171 if (p == NULL || g == NULL || !DH_set0_pqg(dhp, p, NULL, g)) {
2179 if (dh_secbits >= 112)
2180 return DH_get_2048_224();
2181 return DH_get_1024_160();
2185 static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
2188 EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
2191 * If no parameters this will return -1 and fail using the default
2192 * security callback for any non-zero security level. This will
2193 * reject keys which omit parameters but this only affects DSA and
2194 * omission of parameters is never (?) done in practice.
2196 secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey);
2199 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, 0, x);
2201 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, 0, x);
2204 static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
2206 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
2207 int secbits, nid, pknid;
2208 /* Don't check signature if self signed */
2209 if ((X509_get_extension_flags(x) & EXFLAG_SS) != 0)
2211 if (!X509_get_signature_info(x, &nid, &pknid, &secbits, NULL))
2213 /* If digest NID not defined use signature NID */
2214 if (nid == NID_undef)
2217 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, nid, x);
2219 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, nid, x);
2222 int ssl_security_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int vfy, int is_ee)
2225 vfy = SSL_SECOP_PEER;
2227 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY | vfy))
2228 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
2230 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY | vfy))
2231 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
2233 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD | vfy))
2234 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK;
2239 * Check security of a chain, if |sk| includes the end entity certificate then
2240 * |x| is NULL. If |vfy| is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and not sending
2241 * one to the peer. Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
2244 int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x, int vfy)
2246 int rv, start_idx, i;
2248 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
2253 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 1);
2257 for (i = start_idx; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
2258 x = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
2259 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 0);
2267 * For TLS 1.2 servers check if we have a certificate which can be used
2268 * with the signature algorithm "lu".
2271 static int tls12_check_cert_sigalg(const SSL *s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu)
2273 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(lu->sig_idx);
2275 /* If not recognised or not supported by cipher mask it is not suitable */
2276 if (clu == NULL || !(clu->amask & s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth))
2279 return s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[lu->sig_idx] & CERT_PKEY_VALID ? 1 : 0;
2283 * Choose an appropriate signature algorithm based on available certificates
2284 * Sets chosen certificate and signature algorithm.
2286 * For servers if we fail to find a required certificate it is a fatal error
2287 * and an appropriate error code is set and the TLS alert set in *al.
2289 * For clients al is set to NULL. If a certificate is not suitable it is not
2290 * a fatal error: we will either try another certificate or not present one
2291 * to the server. In this case no error is set.
2293 int tls_choose_sigalg(SSL *s, int *al)
2295 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = NULL;
2297 s->s3->tmp.cert = NULL;
2298 s->s3->tmp.sigalg = NULL;
2300 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2302 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2303 int curve = -1, skip_ec = 0;
2306 /* Look for a certificate matching shared sigalgs */
2307 for (i = 0; i < s->cert->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
2308 lu = s->cert->shared_sigalgs[i];
2310 /* Skip SHA1, SHA224, DSA and RSA if not PSS */
2311 if (lu->hash == NID_sha1
2312 || lu->hash == NID_sha224
2313 || lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_DSA
2314 || lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
2316 if (!tls1_lookup_md(lu, NULL))
2318 if (!ssl_has_cert(s, lu->sig_idx))
2320 if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
2321 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2323 EC_KEY *ec = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey);
2325 curve = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec));
2326 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec)
2327 != POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED)
2330 if (skip_ec || (lu->curve != NID_undef && curve != lu->curve))
2338 if (i == s->cert->shared_sigalgslen) {
2341 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2342 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG,
2343 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
2347 /* If ciphersuite doesn't require a cert nothing to do */
2348 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aCERT))
2350 if (!s->server && !ssl_has_cert(s, s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys))
2353 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2354 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs != NULL) {
2356 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2359 /* For Suite B need to match signature algorithm to curve */
2360 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
2361 EC_KEY *ec = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey);
2362 curve = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec));
2369 * Find highest preference signature algorithm matching
2372 for (i = 0; i < s->cert->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
2373 lu = s->cert->shared_sigalgs[i];
2376 if (!tls12_check_cert_sigalg(s, lu))
2378 } else if (lu->sig_idx != s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys) {
2381 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2382 if (curve == -1 || lu->curve == curve)
2386 if (i == s->cert->shared_sigalgslen) {
2389 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2390 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2395 * If we have no sigalg use defaults
2397 const uint16_t *sent_sigs;
2398 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
2400 if ((lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, -1)) == NULL) {
2403 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2404 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2408 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
2409 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sent_sigs);
2410 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i++, sent_sigs++) {
2411 if (lu->sigalg == *sent_sigs)
2414 if (i == sent_sigslen) {
2417 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
2418 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2423 if ((lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, -1)) == NULL) {
2426 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2427 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2432 s->s3->tmp.cert = &s->cert->pkeys[lu->sig_idx];
2433 s->cert->key = s->s3->tmp.cert;
2434 s->s3->tmp.sigalg = lu;