2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
10 /* ====================================================================
11 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
13 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
14 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
16 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
17 * license provided above.
19 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
20 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
23 /* ====================================================================
24 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
26 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
27 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
30 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
31 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
32 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
34 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
35 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
36 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
38 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
39 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
40 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
41 * to make use of the Contribution.
43 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
44 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
45 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
46 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
51 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
52 #include "statem_locl.h"
53 #include "internal/constant_time_locl.h"
54 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
55 #include <openssl/rand.h>
56 #include <openssl/objects.h>
57 #include <openssl/evp.h>
58 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
59 #include <openssl/x509.h>
60 #include <openssl/dh.h>
61 #include <openssl/bn.h>
62 #include <openssl/md5.h>
64 static STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s,
65 PACKET *cipher_suites,
67 **skp, int sslv2format,
71 * ossl_statem_server13_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
72 * handshake state transitions when a TLSv1.3 server is reading messages from
73 * the client. The message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|.
74 * The current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
76 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
77 * (transition not allowed)
79 static int ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
81 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
84 * TODO(TLS1.3): This is still based on the TLSv1.2 state machine. Over time
85 * we will update this to look more like real TLSv1.3
89 * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_BEFORE because at that stage we have
90 * not negotiated TLSv1.3 yet, so that case is handled by
91 * ossl_statem_server_read_transition()
93 switch (st->hand_state) {
97 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
98 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
99 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
100 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT;
104 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
105 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
112 if (s->session->peer == NULL) {
113 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
114 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
118 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
119 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY;
125 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
126 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
127 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
133 /* No valid transition found */
134 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
135 SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER13_READ_TRANSITION,
136 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
141 * ossl_statem_server_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
142 * handshake state transitions when the server is reading messages from the
143 * client. The message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|. The
144 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
146 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
147 * (transition not allowed)
149 int ossl_statem_server_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
151 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
153 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
154 if (!ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(s, mt))
159 switch (st->hand_state) {
164 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
165 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
166 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO;
171 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
173 * If we get a CKE message after a ServerDone then either
174 * 1) We didn't request a Certificate
176 * 2) If we did request one then
177 * a) We allow no Certificate to be returned
179 * b) We are running SSL3 (in TLS1.0+ the client must return a 0
180 * list if we requested a certificate)
182 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
183 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
184 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
185 if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)
186 && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
188 * This isn't an unexpected message as such - we're just
189 * not going to accept it because we require a client
192 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL,
193 SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
194 SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION,
195 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
198 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
202 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
205 } else if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
206 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
207 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT;
214 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
215 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
220 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
222 * We should only process a CertificateVerify message if we have
223 * received a Certificate from the client. If so then |s->session->peer|
224 * will be non NULL. In some instances a CertificateVerify message is
225 * not required even if the peer has sent a Certificate (e.g. such as in
226 * the case of static DH). In that case |st->no_cert_verify| should be
229 if (s->session->peer == NULL || st->no_cert_verify) {
230 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
232 * For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH
233 * pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is
234 * not sent. Also for GOST ciphersuites when the client uses
235 * its key from the certificate for key exchange.
237 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
241 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
242 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY;
248 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
249 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
250 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
255 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
256 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
257 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) {
258 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO) {
259 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO;
264 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
265 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
268 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
273 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
274 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
275 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
276 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
282 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
283 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
284 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
291 /* No valid transition found */
292 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
293 SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
298 * Should we send a ServerKeyExchange message?
300 * Valid return values are:
304 static int send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
306 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
309 * only send a ServerKeyExchange if DH or fortezza but we have a
310 * sign only certificate PSK: may send PSK identity hints For
311 * ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange message only if
312 * the cipher suite is either ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases,
313 * the server certificate contains the server's public key for
316 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)
318 * PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if
321 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
322 /* Only send SKE if we have identity hint for plain PSK */
323 || ((alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK))
324 && s->cert->psk_identity_hint)
325 /* For other PSK always send SKE */
326 || (alg_k & (SSL_PSK & (SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK)))
328 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
329 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
330 || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
340 * Should we send a CertificateRequest message?
342 * Valid return values are:
346 static int send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
349 /* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
350 s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER
352 * if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert
353 * during re-negotiation:
355 && ((s->session->peer == NULL) ||
356 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE))
358 * never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see
359 * section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in
362 && (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
364 * ... except when the application insists on
365 * verification (against the specs, but statem_clnt.c accepts
368 || (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
369 /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
370 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)
372 * With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests
375 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aPSK)) {
383 * ossl_statem_server13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
384 * move to next when a TLSv1.3 server is writing messages to be sent to the
387 static WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(SSL *s)
389 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
392 * TODO(TLS1.3): This is still based on the TLSv1.2 state machine. Over time
393 * we will update this to look more like real TLSv1.3
397 * No case for TLS_ST_BEFORE, because at that stage we have not negotiated
398 * TLSv1.3 yet, so that is handled by ossl_statem_server_write_transition()
401 switch (st->hand_state) {
403 /* Shouldn't happen */
404 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
406 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
407 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO;
408 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
410 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
412 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
413 else if (send_certificate_request(s))
414 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
416 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
418 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
420 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
421 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
422 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
425 st->hand_state = s->tlsext_status_expected ? TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS
426 : TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
427 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
429 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS:
430 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
431 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
433 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
434 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
436 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
437 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
438 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
439 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
444 * ossl_statem_server_write_transition() works out what handshake state to move
445 * to next when the server is writing messages to be sent to the client.
447 WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server_write_transition(SSL *s)
449 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
452 * Note that before the ClientHello we don't know what version we are going
453 * to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later
457 return ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(s);
459 switch (st->hand_state) {
461 /* Shouldn't happen */
462 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
465 /* Just go straight to trying to read from the client */
466 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
469 /* We must be trying to renegotiate */
470 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ;
471 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
473 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
474 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
475 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
476 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
478 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
479 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->d1->cookie_verified
480 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE))
481 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
483 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO;
484 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
486 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
487 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
489 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
491 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
492 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
494 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
496 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
497 /* normal PSK or SRP */
498 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth &
499 (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
500 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
501 } else if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) {
502 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH;
503 } else if (send_certificate_request(s)) {
504 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
506 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE;
509 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
512 if (s->tlsext_status_expected) {
513 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS;
514 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
518 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS:
519 if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) {
520 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH;
521 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
525 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH:
526 if (send_certificate_request(s)) {
527 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
528 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
532 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
533 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE;
534 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
536 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
537 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
539 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
541 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
542 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
543 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
544 } else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) {
545 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
547 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
549 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
551 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
552 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
553 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
555 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
556 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
557 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
559 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
561 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
563 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
564 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
565 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
570 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
571 * the server to the client.
573 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
575 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
577 switch (st->hand_state) {
579 /* No pre work to be done */
582 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
585 dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s);
588 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
590 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
591 dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s);
592 /* We don't buffer this message so don't use the timer */
597 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
598 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
600 * Messages we write from now on should be bufferred and
601 * retransmitted if necessary, so we need to use the timer now
607 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
608 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
609 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)))
610 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
612 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
614 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
615 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
617 * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
618 * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer
624 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
625 s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
626 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
627 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
630 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
632 * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
633 * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer. This might have
634 * already been set to 0 if we sent a NewSessionTicket message,
635 * but we'll set it again here in case we didn't.
639 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
642 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst);
645 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
649 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
650 * server to the client.
652 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
654 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
658 switch (st->hand_state) {
660 /* No post work to be done */
663 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
664 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
666 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
667 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
672 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
673 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
675 /* HelloVerifyRequest resets Finished MAC */
676 if (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER && !ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
677 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
681 * The next message should be another ClientHello which we need to
682 * treat like it was the first packet
687 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
688 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
689 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
690 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
691 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
694 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no
697 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
698 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
700 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
701 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
702 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0,
704 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
708 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
709 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
713 * TODO(TLS1.3): This actually causes a problem. We don't yet know
714 * whether the next record we are going to receive is an unencrypted
715 * alert, or an encrypted handshake message. We're going to need
716 * something clever in the record layer for this.
718 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
719 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)
720 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
721 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)
722 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
723 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE |SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ))
728 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
729 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
730 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->hit) {
732 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
735 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
739 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
740 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
742 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
747 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
750 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
751 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
755 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
756 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
758 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
759 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
761 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
764 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
768 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
769 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
770 s->session->master_key, s->handshake_secret, 0,
771 &s->session->master_key_length)
772 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
773 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
779 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
783 * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the
786 * Valid return values are:
790 int ossl_statem_server_construct_message(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
791 confunc_f *confunc, int *mt)
793 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
795 switch (st->hand_state) {
797 /* Shouldn't happen */
800 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
802 *confunc = dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
804 *confunc = tls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
805 *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
808 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
809 *confunc = dtls_construct_hello_verify_request;
810 *mt = DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
813 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
814 /* No construction function needed */
816 *mt = SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST;
819 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
820 *confunc = tls_construct_server_hello;
821 *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO;
825 *confunc = tls_construct_server_certificate;
826 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE;
829 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH:
830 *confunc = tls_construct_server_key_exchange;
831 *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE;
834 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
835 *confunc = tls_construct_certificate_request;
836 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST;
839 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
840 *confunc = tls_construct_server_done;
841 *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
844 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
845 *confunc = tls_construct_new_session_ticket;
846 *mt = SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET;
849 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS:
850 *confunc = tls_construct_cert_status;
851 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
854 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
855 *confunc = tls_construct_finished;
856 *mt = SSL3_MT_FINISHED;
864 * Maximum size (excluding the Handshake header) of a ClientHello message,
865 * calculated as follows:
867 * 2 + # client_version
868 * 32 + # only valid length for random
869 * 1 + # length of session_id
870 * 32 + # maximum size for session_id
871 * 2 + # length of cipher suites
872 * 2^16-2 + # maximum length of cipher suites array
873 * 1 + # length of compression_methods
874 * 2^8-1 + # maximum length of compression methods
875 * 2 + # length of extensions
876 * 2^16-1 # maximum length of extensions
878 #define CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH 131396
880 #define CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH 2048
881 #define NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH 514
884 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
885 * reading. Excludes the message header.
887 size_t ossl_statem_server_max_message_size(SSL *s)
889 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
891 switch (st->hand_state) {
893 /* Shouldn't happen */
896 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
897 return CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH;
900 return s->max_cert_list;
902 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
903 return CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH;
905 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
906 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
908 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
909 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
910 return NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH;
913 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
914 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH;
916 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
917 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH;
922 * Process a message that the server has received from the client.
924 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_server_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
926 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
928 switch (st->hand_state) {
930 /* Shouldn't happen */
931 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
933 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
934 return tls_process_client_hello(s, pkt);
937 return tls_process_client_certificate(s, pkt);
939 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
940 return tls_process_client_key_exchange(s, pkt);
942 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
943 return tls_process_cert_verify(s, pkt);
945 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
946 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
947 return tls_process_next_proto(s, pkt);
950 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
951 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt);
953 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
954 return tls_process_finished(s, pkt);
959 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
962 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
964 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
966 switch (st->hand_state) {
968 /* Shouldn't happen */
971 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
972 return tls_post_process_client_hello(s, wst);
974 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
975 return tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(s, wst);
977 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
978 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
979 if ( /* Is this SCTP? */
980 BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))
981 /* Are we renegotiating? */
982 && s->renegotiate && BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
983 s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
984 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
985 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
986 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
987 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 1);
990 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 0);
993 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
995 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
998 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
999 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al)
1001 int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE;
1003 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1005 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
1006 (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL)) {
1007 if (s->srp_ctx.login == NULL) {
1009 * RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, we do so if There is no srp
1012 ret = SSL3_AL_FATAL;
1013 *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
1015 ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s, al);
1022 int dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(WPACKET *pkt, unsigned char *cookie,
1025 /* Always use DTLS 1.0 version: see RFC 6347 */
1026 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, DTLS1_VERSION)
1027 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, cookie, cookie_len))
1033 int dtls_construct_hello_verify_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
1035 unsigned int cookie_leni;
1036 if (s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb == NULL ||
1037 s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->cookie,
1038 &cookie_leni) == 0 ||
1039 cookie_leni > 255) {
1040 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST,
1041 SSL_R_COOKIE_GEN_CALLBACK_FAILURE);
1044 s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_leni;
1046 if (!dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(pkt, s->d1->cookie,
1047 s->d1->cookie_len)) {
1048 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1055 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1057 int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1061 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
1062 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1063 SSL_COMP *comp = NULL;
1065 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL;
1067 /* |cookie| will only be initialized for DTLS. */
1068 PACKET session_id, compression, extensions, cookie;
1069 static const unsigned char null_compression = 0;
1070 CLIENTHELLO_MSG clienthello;
1073 * First, parse the raw ClientHello data into the CLIENTHELLO_MSG structure.
1075 memset(&clienthello, 0, sizeof(clienthello));
1076 clienthello.isv2 = RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer);
1077 PACKET_null_init(&cookie);
1079 if (clienthello.isv2) {
1083 * An SSLv3/TLSv1 backwards-compatible CLIENT-HELLO in an SSLv2
1084 * header is sent directly on the wire, not wrapped as a TLS
1085 * record. Our record layer just processes the message length and passes
1086 * the rest right through. Its format is:
1088 * 0-1 msg_length - decoded by the record layer
1089 * 2 msg_type - s->init_msg points here
1091 * 5-6 cipher_spec_length
1092 * 7-8 session_id_length
1093 * 9-10 challenge_length
1097 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &mt)
1098 || mt != SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
1100 * Should never happen. We should have tested this in the record
1101 * layer in order to have determined that this is a SSLv2 record
1102 * in the first place
1104 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1109 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &clienthello.legacy_version)) {
1110 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1111 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1115 /* Parse the message and load client random. */
1116 if (clienthello.isv2) {
1118 * Handle an SSLv2 backwards compatible ClientHello
1119 * Note, this is only for SSLv3+ using the backward compatible format.
1120 * Real SSLv2 is not supported, and is rejected below.
1122 unsigned int ciphersuite_len, session_id_len, challenge_len;
1125 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ciphersuite_len)
1126 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &session_id_len)
1127 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &challenge_len)) {
1128 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1129 SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1130 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1134 if (session_id_len > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH) {
1135 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1136 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1140 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &clienthello.ciphersuites,
1142 || !PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, clienthello.session_id, session_id_len)
1143 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &challenge, challenge_len)
1144 /* No extensions. */
1145 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1146 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1147 SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1148 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1151 clienthello.session_id_len = session_id_len;
1153 /* Load the client random and compression list. We use SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1154 * here rather than sizeof(clienthello.random) because that is the limit
1155 * for SSLv3 and it is fixed. It won't change even if
1156 * sizeof(clienthello.random) does.
1158 challenge_len = challenge_len > SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1159 ? SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE : challenge_len;
1160 memset(clienthello.random, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1161 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&challenge,
1162 clienthello.random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE -
1163 challenge_len, challenge_len)
1164 /* Advertise only null compression. */
1165 || !PACKET_buf_init(&compression, &null_compression, 1)) {
1166 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1167 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1171 PACKET_null_init(&clienthello.extensions);
1173 /* Regular ClientHello. */
1174 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, clienthello.random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)
1175 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)
1176 || !PACKET_copy_all(&session_id, clienthello.session_id,
1177 SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH,
1178 &clienthello.session_id_len)) {
1179 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1180 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1184 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1185 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookie)) {
1186 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1187 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1190 if (!PACKET_copy_all(&cookie, clienthello.dtls_cookie,
1191 DTLS1_COOKIE_LENGTH,
1192 &clienthello.dtls_cookie_len)) {
1193 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1194 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1198 * If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one,
1199 * just return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet.
1200 * So check cookie length...
1202 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
1203 if (clienthello.dtls_cookie_len == 0)
1208 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &clienthello.ciphersuites)) {
1209 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1210 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1214 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &compression)) {
1215 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1216 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1220 /* Could be empty. */
1221 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) {
1222 PACKET_null_init(&clienthello.extensions);
1224 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &clienthello.extensions)) {
1225 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1226 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1232 if (!PACKET_copy_all(&compression, clienthello.compressions,
1233 MAX_COMPRESSIONS_SIZE,
1234 &clienthello.compressions_len)) {
1235 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1236 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1240 /* Preserve the raw extensions PACKET for later use */
1241 extensions = clienthello.extensions;
1242 if (!tls_collect_extensions(&extensions, &clienthello.pre_proc_exts,
1243 &clienthello.num_extensions, &al)) {
1244 /* SSLerr already been called */
1248 /* Finished parsing the ClientHello, now we can start processing it */
1250 /* Set up the client_random */
1251 memcpy(s->s3->client_random, clienthello.random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1253 /* Choose the version */
1255 if (clienthello.isv2) {
1256 if (clienthello.legacy_version == SSL2_VERSION
1257 || (clienthello.legacy_version & 0xff00)
1258 != (SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR << 8)) {
1260 * This is real SSLv2 or something complete unknown. We don't
1263 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
1267 s->client_version = clienthello.legacy_version;
1270 * Do SSL/TLS version negotiation if applicable. For DTLS we just check
1271 * versions are potentially compatible. Version negotiation comes later.
1273 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1274 protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s, &clienthello);
1275 } else if (s->method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION &&
1276 DTLS_VERSION_LT((int)clienthello.legacy_version, s->version)) {
1277 protverr = SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW;
1283 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
1284 if ((!s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash)) {
1285 /* like ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
1286 s->version = s->client_version = clienthello.legacy_version;
1288 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1292 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1293 /* Empty cookie was already handled above by returning early. */
1294 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
1295 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) {
1296 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, clienthello.dtls_cookie,
1297 clienthello.dtls_cookie_len) == 0) {
1298 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1299 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1300 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1302 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1304 /* default verification */
1305 } else if (s->d1->cookie_len != clienthello.dtls_cookie_len
1306 || memcmp(clienthello.dtls_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
1307 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) {
1308 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1309 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1312 s->d1->cookie_verified = 1;
1314 if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
1315 protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s, &clienthello);
1316 if (protverr != 0) {
1317 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
1318 s->version = s->client_version;
1319 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1327 /* We need to do this before getting the session */
1328 if (!tls_check_client_ems_support(s, &clienthello)) {
1329 /* Only fails if the extension is malformed */
1330 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1331 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1336 * We don't allow resumption in a backwards compatible ClientHello.
1337 * TODO(openssl-team): in TLS1.1+, session_id MUST be empty.
1339 * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in
1340 * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally
1341 * ignore resumption requests with flag
1342 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
1343 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on
1344 * this for security won't even compile against older library versions).
1345 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to
1346 * request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains
1347 * unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the
1348 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be
1351 if (clienthello.isv2 ||
1353 (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) {
1354 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
1357 i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, &clienthello);
1359 * Only resume if the session's version matches the negotiated
1361 * RFC 5246 does not provide much useful advice on resumption
1362 * with a different protocol version. It doesn't forbid it but
1363 * the sanity of such behaviour would be questionable.
1364 * In practice, clients do not accept a version mismatch and
1365 * will abort the handshake with an error.
1367 if (i == 1 && s->version == s->session->ssl_version) {
1368 /* previous session */
1370 } else if (i == -1) {
1374 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
1379 if (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s, &clienthello.ciphersuites, &ciphers,
1380 clienthello.isv2, &al) == NULL) {
1384 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
1387 id = s->session->cipher->id;
1390 fprintf(stderr, "client sent %d ciphers\n", sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers));
1392 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) {
1393 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i);
1395 fprintf(stderr, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
1396 i, sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
1405 * we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked
1408 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1409 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1410 SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
1415 for (loop = 0; loop < clienthello.compressions_len; loop++) {
1416 if (clienthello.compressions[loop] == 0)
1420 if (loop >= clienthello.compressions_len) {
1422 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1423 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
1427 /* TLS extensions */
1428 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s, &clienthello)) {
1429 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
1433 /* Check we've got a key_share for TLSv1.3 */
1434 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->s3->peer_tmp == NULL && !s->hit) {
1435 /* No suitable share */
1436 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Send a HelloRetryRequest */
1437 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1438 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_KEY_SHARE);
1443 * Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this handshake
1444 * for not reused session only. We need to generate server_random before
1445 * calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow SessionTicket
1446 * processing to use it in key derivation.
1450 pos = s->s3->server_random;
1451 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0) {
1456 if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
1457 const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
1459 * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for
1460 * backwards compat reasons
1462 int master_key_length;
1464 master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1465 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
1466 &master_key_length, ciphers,
1468 s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)
1469 && master_key_length > 0) {
1470 s->session->master_key_length = master_key_length;
1472 s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
1473 s->session->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
1477 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1479 pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s,
1484 if (pref_cipher == NULL) {
1485 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1486 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1490 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher;
1491 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
1492 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1493 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
1494 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1499 * Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1500 * options, we will now look for them. We have complen-1 compression
1501 * algorithms from the client, starting at q.
1503 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = NULL;
1504 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1505 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1506 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1507 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
1509 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1510 /* Can't disable compression */
1511 if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
1512 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1513 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1516 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1517 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++) {
1518 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
1519 if (comp_id == comp->id) {
1520 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1524 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) {
1525 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1526 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1529 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1530 for (k = 0; k < clienthello.compressions_len; k++) {
1531 if (clienthello.compressions[k] == comp_id)
1534 if (k >= clienthello.compressions_len) {
1535 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1536 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1537 SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
1542 else if (ssl_allow_compression(s) && s->ctx->comp_methods) {
1543 /* See if we have a match */
1544 int m, nn, v, done = 0;
1547 nn = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1548 for (m = 0; m < nn; m++) {
1549 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
1551 for (o = 0; o < clienthello.compressions_len; o++) {
1552 if (v == clienthello.compressions[o]) {
1561 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1567 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1568 * using compression.
1570 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1571 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1577 * Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher
1581 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1582 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
1584 s->session->compress_meth = (comp == NULL) ? 0 : comp->id;
1586 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
1587 s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
1588 if (ciphers == NULL) {
1589 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1590 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1594 if (!tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s)) {
1595 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1600 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1601 OPENSSL_free(clienthello.pre_proc_exts);
1602 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
1604 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1606 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1608 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1609 OPENSSL_free(clienthello.pre_proc_exts);
1611 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1614 WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_hello(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
1616 int al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1617 const SSL_CIPHER *cipher;
1619 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
1621 /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
1622 if (s->cert->cert_cb) {
1623 int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
1625 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1626 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1627 SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR);
1631 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
1634 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1637 ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1639 if (cipher == NULL) {
1640 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1641 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1644 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = cipher;
1645 /* check whether we should disable session resumption */
1646 if (s->not_resumable_session_cb != NULL)
1647 s->session->not_resumable = s->not_resumable_session_cb(s,
1648 ((cipher->algorithm_mkey & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)) != 0));
1649 if (s->session->not_resumable)
1650 /* do not send a session ticket */
1651 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
1653 /* Session-id reuse */
1654 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher;
1657 if (!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) {
1658 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
1659 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1665 * we now have the following setup.
1667 * cipher_list - our preferred list of ciphers
1668 * ciphers - the clients preferred list of ciphers
1669 * compression - basically ignored right now
1670 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1671 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1672 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1673 * s->s3->tmp.new_cipher- the new cipher to use.
1676 /* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */
1677 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) {
1678 if (!ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s, &al)) {
1679 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1680 SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1687 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1688 if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) {
1690 if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s, &al)) < 0) {
1692 * callback indicates further work to be done
1694 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
1697 if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE) {
1699 * This is not really an error but the only means to for
1700 * a client to detect whether srp is supported.
1702 if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY)
1703 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1704 SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1706 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1707 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
1714 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
1716 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1717 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1721 int tls_construct_server_hello(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
1723 int compm, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1727 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove the DRAFT conditional before release */
1728 version = SSL_IS_TLS13(s) ? TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT : s->version;
1729 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, version)
1731 * Random stuff. Filling of the server_random takes place in
1732 * tls_process_client_hello()
1734 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1735 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1740 * There are several cases for the session ID to send
1741 * back in the server hello:
1742 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
1743 * we send back the old session ID.
1744 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
1745 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
1746 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
1747 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
1749 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
1750 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
1751 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
1752 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
1755 if (s->session->not_resumable ||
1756 (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
1758 s->session->session_id_length = 0;
1760 sl = s->session->session_id_length;
1761 if (sl > sizeof(s->session->session_id)) {
1762 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1766 /* set up the compression method */
1767 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1770 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1773 compm = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
1776 if ((!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
1777 && !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->session->session_id, sl))
1778 || !s->method->put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, pkt, &len)
1779 || (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
1780 && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, compm))
1781 || !ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s)
1782 || !ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, pkt, &al)) {
1783 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1789 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1793 int tls_construct_server_done(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
1795 if (!s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
1796 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
1797 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1804 int tls_construct_server_key_exchange(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
1806 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1807 EVP_PKEY *pkdh = NULL;
1809 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1810 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
1811 size_t encodedlen = 0;
1815 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1816 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, i;
1819 EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
1820 size_t paramlen, paramoffset;
1822 if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, ¶moffset)) {
1823 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1827 if (md_ctx == NULL) {
1828 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1832 type = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1834 r[0] = r[1] = r[2] = r[3] = NULL;
1835 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1836 /* Plain PSK or RSAPSK nothing to do */
1837 if (type & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
1839 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1840 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1841 if (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
1842 CERT *cert = s->cert;
1844 EVP_PKEY *pkdhp = NULL;
1847 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto) {
1848 DH *dhp = ssl_get_auto_dh(s);
1849 pkdh = EVP_PKEY_new();
1850 if (pkdh == NULL || dhp == NULL) {
1852 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1853 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1856 EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(pkdh, dhp);
1859 pkdhp = cert->dh_tmp;
1861 if ((pkdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL)) {
1862 DH *dhp = s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s, 0, 1024);
1863 pkdh = ssl_dh_to_pkey(dhp);
1865 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1866 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1871 if (pkdhp == NULL) {
1872 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1873 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1874 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1877 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH,
1878 EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkdhp), 0, pkdhp)) {
1879 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1880 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1881 SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
1884 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) {
1885 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1886 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1890 s->s3->tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey(pkdhp);
1892 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey == NULL) {
1893 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
1897 dh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
1899 EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh);
1902 DH_get0_pqg(dh, &r[0], NULL, &r[1]);
1903 DH_get0_key(dh, &r[2], NULL);
1906 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1907 if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
1910 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) {
1911 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1912 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1916 /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */
1917 nid = tls1_shared_group(s, -2);
1918 curve_id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(nid);
1919 if (curve_id == 0) {
1920 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1921 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
1924 s->s3->tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey_curve(curve_id);
1925 /* Generate a new key for this curve */
1926 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey == NULL) {
1927 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
1931 /* Encode the public key. */
1932 encodedlen = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->tmp.pkey,
1934 if (encodedlen == 0) {
1935 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
1940 * We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we
1941 * can set these to NULLs
1948 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1949 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1950 if (type & SSL_kSRP) {
1951 if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
1952 (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
1953 (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) || (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL)) {
1954 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1955 SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
1958 r[0] = s->srp_ctx.N;
1959 r[1] = s->srp_ctx.g;
1960 r[2] = s->srp_ctx.s;
1961 r[3] = s->srp_ctx.B;
1965 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1966 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1967 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
1971 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP))
1972 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)) {
1973 if ((pkey = ssl_get_sign_pkey(s, s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, &md))
1975 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1982 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1983 if (type & SSL_PSK) {
1984 size_t len = (s->cert->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
1985 ? 0 : strlen(s->cert->psk_identity_hint);
1988 * It should not happen that len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN - we already
1989 * checked this when we set the identity hint - but just in case
1991 if (len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
1992 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->cert->psk_identity_hint,
1994 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1995 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2001 for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
2002 unsigned char *binval;
2005 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2006 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) {
2007 res = WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt);
2010 res = WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt);
2013 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2014 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2018 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2020 * for interoperability with some versions of the Microsoft TLS
2021 * stack, we need to zero pad the DHE pub key to the same length
2024 if ((i == 2) && (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK))) {
2025 size_t len = BN_num_bytes(r[0]) - BN_num_bytes(r[2]);
2028 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, len, &binval)) {
2029 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2030 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2033 memset(binval, 0, len);
2037 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, BN_num_bytes(r[i]), &binval)
2038 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2039 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2040 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2044 BN_bn2bin(r[i], binval);
2047 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2048 if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2050 * We only support named (not generic) curves. In this situation, the
2051 * ServerKeyExchange message has: [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
2052 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by the actual encoded
2055 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
2056 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)
2057 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, curve_id)
2058 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, encodedPoint, encodedlen)) {
2059 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2060 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2063 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2064 encodedPoint = NULL;
2071 * n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4]) and p
2072 * points to the space at the end.
2075 unsigned char *sigbytes1, *sigbytes2;
2076 unsigned int siglen;
2078 /* Get length of the parameters we have written above */
2079 if (!WPACKET_get_length(pkt, ¶mlen)) {
2080 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2081 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2084 /* send signature algorithm */
2085 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2086 if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(pkt, pkey, md)) {
2087 /* Should never happen */
2088 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2089 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2094 fprintf(stderr, "Using hash %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
2097 * Create the signature. We don't know the actual length of the sig
2098 * until after we've created it, so we reserve enough bytes for it
2099 * up front, and then properly allocate them in the WPACKET
2102 if (!WPACKET_sub_reserve_bytes_u16(pkt, EVP_PKEY_size(pkey),
2104 || EVP_SignInit_ex(md_ctx, md, NULL) <= 0
2105 || EVP_SignUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
2106 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
2107 || EVP_SignUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
2108 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
2109 || EVP_SignUpdate(md_ctx, s->init_buf->data + paramoffset,
2111 || EVP_SignFinal(md_ctx, sigbytes1, &siglen, pkey) <= 0
2112 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, siglen, &sigbytes2)
2113 || sigbytes1 != sigbytes2) {
2114 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2115 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2119 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
2120 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2121 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2122 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
2127 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2130 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2132 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2133 EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh);
2135 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2136 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2138 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2142 int tls_construct_certificate_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2145 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk = NULL;
2147 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
2148 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
2149 || !ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s, pkt)
2150 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2151 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2155 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2156 const unsigned char *psigs;
2157 size_t nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &psigs);
2158 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
2159 || !tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, pkt, psigs, nl)
2160 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2161 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2162 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2167 /* Start sub-packet for client CA list */
2168 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
2169 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2173 sk = SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
2175 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) {
2176 unsigned char *namebytes;
2177 X509_NAME *name = sk_X509_NAME_value(sk, i);
2181 || (namelen = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL)) < 0
2182 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, namelen,
2184 || i2d_X509_NAME(name, &namebytes) != namelen) {
2185 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2186 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2191 /* else no CA names */
2193 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2194 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2198 s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 1;
2202 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2206 static int tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2208 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2209 unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
2211 PACKET psk_identity;
2213 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity)) {
2214 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2215 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2218 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2219 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2220 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2223 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL) {
2224 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2225 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
2229 if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity, &s->session->psk_identity)) {
2230 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2231 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2235 psklen = s->psk_server_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity,
2238 if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
2239 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2240 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2242 } else if (psklen == 0) {
2244 * PSK related to the given identity not found
2246 *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
2247 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2248 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2252 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.psk);
2253 s->s3->tmp.psk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen);
2254 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
2256 if (s->s3->tmp.psk == NULL) {
2257 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2258 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2262 s->s3->tmp.psklen = psklen;
2266 /* Should never happen */
2267 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2268 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2273 static int tls_process_cke_rsa(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2275 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2276 unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
2278 unsigned char decrypt_good, version_good;
2279 size_t j, padding_len;
2280 PACKET enc_premaster;
2282 unsigned char *rsa_decrypt = NULL;
2285 rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey);
2287 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2288 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2292 /* SSLv3 and pre-standard DTLS omit the length bytes. */
2293 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
2294 enc_premaster = *pkt;
2296 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &enc_premaster)
2297 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2298 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2299 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2305 * We want to be sure that the plaintext buffer size makes it safe to
2306 * iterate over the entire size of a premaster secret
2307 * (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). Reject overly short RSA keys because
2308 * their ciphertext cannot accommodate a premaster secret anyway.
2310 if (RSA_size(rsa) < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
2311 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2312 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
2316 rsa_decrypt = OPENSSL_malloc(RSA_size(rsa));
2317 if (rsa_decrypt == NULL) {
2318 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2319 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2324 * We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of
2325 * Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246,
2326 * section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of the TLS RFC and
2327 * generates a random premaster secret for the case that the decrypt
2328 * fails. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1
2331 if (RAND_bytes(rand_premaster_secret, sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0)
2335 * Decrypt with no padding. PKCS#1 padding will be removed as part of
2336 * the timing-sensitive code below.
2338 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
2339 decrypt_len = (int)RSA_private_decrypt((int)PACKET_remaining(&enc_premaster),
2340 PACKET_data(&enc_premaster),
2341 rsa_decrypt, rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING);
2342 if (decrypt_len < 0)
2345 /* Check the padding. See RFC 3447, section 7.2.2. */
2348 * The smallest padded premaster is 11 bytes of overhead. Small keys
2349 * are publicly invalid, so this may return immediately. This ensures
2350 * PS is at least 8 bytes.
2352 if (decrypt_len < 11 + SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
2353 *al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2354 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2358 padding_len = decrypt_len - SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
2359 decrypt_good = constant_time_eq_int_8(rsa_decrypt[0], 0) &
2360 constant_time_eq_int_8(rsa_decrypt[1], 2);
2361 for (j = 2; j < padding_len - 1; j++) {
2362 decrypt_good &= ~constant_time_is_zero_8(rsa_decrypt[j]);
2364 decrypt_good &= constant_time_is_zero_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len - 1]);
2367 * If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct then
2368 * version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero. The
2369 * Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
2370 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version number
2371 * check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks are done in
2372 * constant time and are treated like any other decryption error.
2375 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len],
2376 (unsigned)(s->client_version >> 8));
2378 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len + 1],
2379 (unsigned)(s->client_version & 0xff));
2382 * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2383 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2384 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2385 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
2386 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
2387 * protocol version. If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such
2390 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) {
2391 unsigned char workaround_good;
2392 workaround_good = constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len],
2393 (unsigned)(s->version >> 8));
2395 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len + 1],
2396 (unsigned)(s->version & 0xff));
2397 version_good |= workaround_good;
2401 * Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good to
2402 * remain non-zero (0xff).
2404 decrypt_good &= version_good;
2407 * Now copy rand_premaster_secret over from p using
2408 * decrypt_good_mask. If decryption failed, then p does not
2409 * contain valid plaintext, however, a check above guarantees
2410 * it is still sufficiently large to read from.
2412 for (j = 0; j < sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); j++) {
2413 rsa_decrypt[padding_len + j] =
2414 constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good,
2415 rsa_decrypt[padding_len + j],
2416 rand_premaster_secret[j]);
2419 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, rsa_decrypt + padding_len,
2420 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret), 0)) {
2421 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2422 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2428 OPENSSL_free(rsa_decrypt);
2431 /* Should never happen */
2432 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2433 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2438 static int tls_process_cke_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2440 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2441 EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL;
2445 const unsigned char *data;
2446 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL;
2449 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != i) {
2450 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2451 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
2452 SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2455 skey = s->s3->tmp.pkey;
2457 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2458 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2462 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) {
2463 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2464 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2467 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) {
2468 /* We already checked we have enough data */
2469 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2470 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2473 ckey = EVP_PKEY_new();
2474 if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) == 0) {
2475 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, SSL_R_BN_LIB);
2478 cdh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey);
2479 pub_key = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL);
2481 if (pub_key == NULL || !DH_set0_key(cdh, pub_key, NULL)) {
2482 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2483 if (pub_key != NULL)
2488 if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) {
2489 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2490 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2495 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
2496 s->s3->tmp.pkey = NULL;
2498 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2501 /* Should never happen */
2502 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2503 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2508 static int tls_process_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2510 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2511 EVP_PKEY *skey = s->s3->tmp.pkey;
2512 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL;
2515 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) {
2516 /* We don't support ECDH client auth */
2517 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2518 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
2522 const unsigned char *data;
2525 * Get client's public key from encoded point in the
2526 * ClientKeyExchange message.
2529 /* Get encoded point length */
2530 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &i) || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)
2531 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2532 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2533 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2536 ckey = EVP_PKEY_new();
2537 if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) <= 0) {
2538 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2541 if (EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey, data, i) == 0) {
2542 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2543 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2548 if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) {
2549 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2550 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2555 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
2556 s->s3->tmp.pkey = NULL;
2558 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2562 /* Should never happen */
2563 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2564 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2569 static int tls_process_cke_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2571 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2573 const unsigned char *data;
2575 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i)
2576 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) {
2577 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2578 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
2581 if ((s->srp_ctx.A = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL)) == NULL) {
2582 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2585 if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0 || BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A)) {
2586 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2587 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
2590 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
2591 s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
2592 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
2593 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2597 if (!srp_generate_server_master_secret(s)) {
2598 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2604 /* Should never happen */
2605 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2606 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2611 static int tls_process_cke_gost(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2613 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2614 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
2615 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
2616 unsigned char premaster_secret[32];
2617 const unsigned char *start;
2618 size_t outlen = 32, inlen;
2619 unsigned long alg_a;
2622 size_t sess_key_len;
2623 const unsigned char *data;
2626 /* Get our certificate private key */
2627 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2628 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST12) {
2630 * New GOST ciphersuites have SSL_aGOST01 bit too
2632 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512].privatekey;
2634 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256].privatekey;
2637 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
2639 } else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01) {
2640 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
2643 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL);
2644 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
2645 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2646 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2649 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0) {
2650 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2651 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2655 * If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
2656 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
2657 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use a
2658 * client certificate for authorization only.
2660 client_pub_pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2661 if (client_pub_pkey) {
2662 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
2665 /* Decrypt session key */
2666 sess_key_len = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
2667 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, sess_key_len)) {
2668 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2669 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2672 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
2673 if (ASN1_get_object((const unsigned char **)&data, &Tlen, &Ttag,
2674 &Tclass, (long)sess_key_len) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED
2675 || Ttag != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE || Tclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL) {
2676 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2677 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2682 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt
2683 (pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, start, inlen) <= 0) {
2684 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2685 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2688 /* Generate master secret */
2689 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, premaster_secret,
2690 sizeof(premaster_secret), 0)) {
2691 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2692 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2695 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2696 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
2697 (pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
2698 s->statem.no_cert_verify = 1;
2702 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2705 /* Should never happen */
2706 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2707 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2712 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2715 unsigned long alg_k;
2717 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2719 /* For PSK parse and retrieve identity, obtain PSK key */
2720 if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK) && !tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(s, pkt, &al))
2723 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
2724 /* Identity extracted earlier: should be nothing left */
2725 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2726 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2727 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2728 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2731 /* PSK handled by ssl_generate_master_secret */
2732 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, NULL, 0, 0)) {
2733 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2734 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2737 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
2738 if (!tls_process_cke_rsa(s, pkt, &al))
2740 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
2741 if (!tls_process_cke_dhe(s, pkt, &al))
2743 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2744 if (!tls_process_cke_ecdhe(s, pkt, &al))
2746 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
2747 if (!tls_process_cke_srp(s, pkt, &al))
2749 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
2750 if (!tls_process_cke_gost(s, pkt, &al))
2753 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2754 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2755 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
2759 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
2762 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2763 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2764 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.psk, s->s3->tmp.psklen);
2765 s->s3->tmp.psk = NULL;
2767 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2768 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2771 WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
2773 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
2774 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
2775 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
2776 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
2777 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
2779 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
2782 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
2783 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
2785 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
2786 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
2787 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0,
2789 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2793 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
2794 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
2799 if ((wst == WORK_MORE_B)
2801 && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))
2802 /* Are we renegotiating? */
2804 /* Are we going to skip the CertificateVerify? */
2805 && (s->session->peer == NULL || s->statem.no_cert_verify)
2806 && BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
2807 s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
2808 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
2809 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
2810 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
2811 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 1);
2814 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 0);
2818 if (s->statem.no_cert_verify || !s->session->peer) {
2820 * No certificate verify or no peer certificate so we no longer need
2821 * the handshake_buffer
2823 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
2824 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2827 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
2829 if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
2830 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2831 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2832 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2836 * For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer. If we support
2837 * extms we've done this already so this is a no-op
2839 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) {
2840 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2845 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
2848 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2850 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2851 const unsigned char *sig, *data;
2852 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2853 unsigned char *gost_data = NULL;
2855 int al, ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2859 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
2863 EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2866 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2867 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2871 peer = s->session->peer;
2872 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(peer);
2873 type = X509_certificate_type(peer, pkey);
2875 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
2876 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
2877 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
2878 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2882 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
2884 * If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare signature without
2885 * length field (CryptoPro implementations at least till CSP 4.0)
2887 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2888 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 64
2889 && EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) {
2894 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2897 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &sig, 2)) {
2898 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2901 rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, s, sig, pkey);
2903 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2905 } else if (rv == 0) {
2906 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2910 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
2913 /* Use default digest for this key type */
2914 int idx = ssl_cert_type(NULL, pkey);
2916 md = s->s3->tmp.md[idx];
2918 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2923 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &len)) {
2924 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2925 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2929 j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
2930 if (((int)len > j) || ((int)PACKET_remaining(pkt) > j)
2931 || (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)) {
2932 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
2933 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2936 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, len)) {
2937 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2938 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2942 hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
2943 if (hdatalen <= 0) {
2944 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2945 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2950 fprintf(stderr, "Using client verify alg %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
2952 if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(mctx, md, NULL)
2953 || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen)) {
2954 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2955 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2958 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2960 int pktype = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey);
2961 if (pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2001
2962 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
2963 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512) {
2964 if ((gost_data = OPENSSL_malloc(len)) == NULL) {
2965 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2966 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2969 BUF_reverse(gost_data, data, len);
2975 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION
2976 && !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET,
2977 (int)s->session->master_key_length,
2978 s->session->master_key)) {
2979 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2980 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2984 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(mctx, data, len, pkey) <= 0) {
2985 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2986 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
2990 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
2993 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2994 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2996 BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
2997 s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
2998 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
2999 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3000 OPENSSL_free(gost_data);
3005 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3007 int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3009 unsigned long l, llen;
3010 const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes;
3011 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
3014 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
3015 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3019 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &llen)
3020 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &spkt, llen)
3021 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3022 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3023 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3027 while (PACKET_remaining(&spkt) > 0) {
3028 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(&spkt, &l)
3029 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&spkt, &certbytes, l)) {
3030 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3031 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3032 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3036 certstart = certbytes;
3037 x = d2i_X509(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, l);
3039 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
3042 if (certbytes != (certstart + l)) {
3043 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3044 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3045 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3048 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
3049 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3055 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) {
3056 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
3057 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
3058 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3059 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3060 SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
3063 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
3064 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3065 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
3066 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3067 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3068 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3071 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
3072 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
3077 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
3079 al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
3080 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3081 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
3085 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, i);
3086 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3089 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(sk, 0));
3091 al = SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3092 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3093 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
3098 X509_free(s->session->peer);
3099 s->session->peer = sk_X509_shift(sk);
3100 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
3102 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->peer_chain, X509_free);
3103 s->session->peer_chain = sk;
3106 * Freeze the handshake buffer. For <TLS1.3 we do this after the CKE
3109 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) {
3110 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3111 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3116 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own
3117 * certificate, while we do include it in statem_clnt.c
3120 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
3124 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3125 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3128 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
3132 int tls_construct_server_certificate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3136 cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
3138 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3142 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, pkt, cpk)) {
3143 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3150 int tls_construct_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3152 unsigned char *senc = NULL;
3153 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL;
3154 HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL;
3155 unsigned char *p, *encdata1, *encdata2, *macdata1, *macdata2;
3156 const unsigned char *const_p;
3157 int len, slen_full, slen, lenfinal;
3160 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3161 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
3162 unsigned char key_name[TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH];
3164 size_t macoffset, macendoffset;
3166 /* get session encoding length */
3167 slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
3169 * Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too
3172 if (slen_full == 0 || slen_full > 0xFF00) {
3173 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3176 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
3178 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3182 ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
3183 hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
3184 if (ctx == NULL || hctx == NULL) {
3185 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3190 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p))
3194 * create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up
3197 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
3200 sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
3202 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
3203 if (slen == 0 || slen > slen_full) { /* shouldn't ever happen */
3204 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3208 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p)) {
3209 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3212 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3215 * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does
3216 * all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx.
3218 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
3219 /* if 0 is returned, write an empty ticket */
3220 int ret = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, ctx,
3225 /* Put timeout and length */
3226 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, 0)
3227 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
3228 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
3229 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3233 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3234 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3239 iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
3241 const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = EVP_aes_256_cbc();
3243 iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher);
3244 if (RAND_bytes(iv, iv_len) <= 0)
3246 if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, cipher, NULL,
3247 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv))
3249 if (!HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key,
3250 sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key),
3251 EVP_sha256(), NULL))
3253 memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name,
3254 sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name));
3258 * Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only): We leave this unspecified
3259 * for resumed session (for simplicity), and guess that tickets for
3260 * new sessions will live as long as their sessions.
3262 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout)
3263 /* Now the actual ticket data */
3264 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
3265 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &macoffset)
3266 /* Output key name */
3267 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, key_name, sizeof(key_name))
3269 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, iv, iv_len)
3270 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, slen + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH,
3272 /* Encrypt session data */
3273 || !EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, encdata1, &len, senc, slen)
3274 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, len, &encdata2)
3275 || encdata1 != encdata2
3276 || !EVP_EncryptFinal(ctx, encdata1 + len, &lenfinal)
3277 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, lenfinal, &encdata2)
3278 || encdata1 + len != encdata2
3279 || len + lenfinal > slen + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH
3280 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &macendoffset)
3281 || !HMAC_Update(hctx,
3282 (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + macoffset,
3283 macendoffset - macoffset)
3284 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, &macdata1)
3285 || !HMAC_Final(hctx, macdata1, &hlen)
3286 || hlen > EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
3287 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, hlen, &macdata2)
3288 || macdata1 != macdata2
3289 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
3290 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3293 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3294 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3300 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3301 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3302 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3306 int tls_construct_cert_status(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3308 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->tlsext_status_type)
3309 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u24(pkt, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp,
3310 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen)) {
3311 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_STATUS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3312 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3319 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3321 * tls_process_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message.
3322 * It sets the next_proto member in s if found
3324 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_next_proto(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3326 PACKET next_proto, padding;
3327 size_t next_proto_len;
3330 * The payload looks like:
3332 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
3333 * uint8 padding_len;
3334 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
3336 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &next_proto)
3337 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &padding)
3338 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
3339 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEXT_PROTO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3343 if (!PACKET_memdup(&next_proto, &s->next_proto_negotiated, &next_proto_len)) {
3344 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = 0;
3348 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = (unsigned char)next_proto_len;
3350 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
3352 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3353 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3357 #define SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN 3
3359 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s,
3360 PACKET *cipher_suites,
3361 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **skp,
3362 int sslv2format, int *al)
3364 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
3365 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
3367 /* 3 = SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN > TLS_CIPHER_LEN = 2. */
3368 unsigned char cipher[SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN];
3370 s->s3->send_connection_binding = 0;
3372 n = sslv2format ? SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN : TLS_CIPHER_LEN;
3374 if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites) == 0) {
3375 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
3376 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3380 if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites) % n != 0) {
3381 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,
3382 SSL_R_ERROR_IN_RECEIVED_CIPHER_LIST);
3383 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3387 if ((skp == NULL) || (*skp == NULL)) {
3388 sk = sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null(); /* change perhaps later */
3390 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3391 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3396 sk_SSL_CIPHER_zero(sk);
3399 if (!PACKET_memdup(cipher_suites, &s->s3->tmp.ciphers_raw,
3400 &s->s3->tmp.ciphers_rawlen)) {
3401 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3405 while (PACKET_copy_bytes(cipher_suites, cipher, n)) {
3407 * SSLv3 ciphers wrapped in an SSLv2-compatible ClientHello have the
3408 * first byte set to zero, while true SSLv2 ciphers have a non-zero
3409 * first byte. We don't support any true SSLv2 ciphers, so skip them.
3411 if (sslv2format && cipher[0] != '\0')
3414 /* Check for TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV */
3415 if ((cipher[n - 2] == ((SSL3_CK_SCSV >> 8) & 0xff)) &&
3416 (cipher[n - 1] == (SSL3_CK_SCSV & 0xff))) {
3417 /* SCSV fatal if renegotiating */
3418 if (s->renegotiate) {
3419 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,
3420 SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING);
3421 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3424 s->s3->send_connection_binding = 1;
3428 /* Check for TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV */
3429 if ((cipher[n - 2] == ((SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV >> 8) & 0xff)) &&
3430 (cipher[n - 1] == (SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV & 0xff))) {
3432 * The SCSV indicates that the client previously tried a higher
3433 * version. Fail if the current version is an unexpected
3436 if (!ssl_check_version_downgrade(s)) {
3437 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,
3438 SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
3439 *al = SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK;
3445 /* For SSLv2-compat, ignore leading 0-byte. */
3446 c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, sslv2format ? &cipher[1] : cipher);
3448 if (!sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(sk, c)) {
3449 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3450 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3455 if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites) > 0) {
3456 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3457 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3465 if ((skp == NULL) || (*skp == NULL))
3466 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(sk);