2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
10 /* ====================================================================
11 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
13 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
14 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
16 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
17 * license provided above.
19 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
20 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
23 /* ====================================================================
24 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
26 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
27 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
30 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
31 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
32 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
34 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
35 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
36 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
38 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
39 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
40 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
41 * to make use of the Contribution.
43 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
44 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
45 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
46 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
51 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
52 #include "statem_locl.h"
53 #include "internal/constant_time_locl.h"
54 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
55 #include <openssl/rand.h>
56 #include <openssl/objects.h>
57 #include <openssl/evp.h>
58 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
59 #include <openssl/x509.h>
60 #include <openssl/dh.h>
61 #include <openssl/bn.h>
62 #include <openssl/md5.h>
64 static int tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt);
65 static STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s,
66 PACKET *cipher_suites,
68 **skp, int sslv2format,
72 * ossl_statem_server13_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
73 * handshake state transitions when a TLSv1.3 server is reading messages from
74 * the client. The message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|.
75 * The current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
77 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
78 * (transition not allowed)
80 static int ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
82 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
85 * TODO(TLS1.3): This is still based on the TLSv1.2 state machine. Over time
86 * we will update this to look more like real TLSv1.3
90 * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_BEFORE because at that stage we have
91 * not negotiated TLSv1.3 yet, so that case is handled by
92 * ossl_statem_server_read_transition()
94 switch (st->hand_state) {
98 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
99 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
100 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
101 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT;
105 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
106 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
113 if (s->session->peer == NULL) {
114 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
115 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
119 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
120 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY;
126 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
127 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
128 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
134 /* No valid transition found */
135 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
136 SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER13_READ_TRANSITION,
137 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
142 * ossl_statem_server_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
143 * handshake state transitions when the server is reading messages from the
144 * client. The message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|. The
145 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
147 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
148 * (transition not allowed)
150 int ossl_statem_server_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
152 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
154 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
155 if (!ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(s, mt))
160 switch (st->hand_state) {
165 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
166 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
167 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO;
172 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
174 * If we get a CKE message after a ServerDone then either
175 * 1) We didn't request a Certificate
177 * 2) If we did request one then
178 * a) We allow no Certificate to be returned
180 * b) We are running SSL3 (in TLS1.0+ the client must return a 0
181 * list if we requested a certificate)
183 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
184 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
185 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
186 if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)
187 && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
189 * This isn't an unexpected message as such - we're just
190 * not going to accept it because we require a client
193 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL,
194 SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
195 SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION,
196 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
199 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
203 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
206 } else if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
207 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
208 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT;
215 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
216 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
221 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
223 * We should only process a CertificateVerify message if we have
224 * received a Certificate from the client. If so then |s->session->peer|
225 * will be non NULL. In some instances a CertificateVerify message is
226 * not required even if the peer has sent a Certificate (e.g. such as in
227 * the case of static DH). In that case |st->no_cert_verify| should be
230 if (s->session->peer == NULL || st->no_cert_verify) {
231 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
233 * For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH
234 * pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is
235 * not sent. Also for GOST ciphersuites when the client uses
236 * its key from the certificate for key exchange.
238 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
242 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
243 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY;
249 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
250 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
251 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
256 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
257 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
258 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) {
259 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO) {
260 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO;
265 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
266 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
269 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
274 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
275 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
276 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
277 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
283 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
284 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
285 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
292 /* No valid transition found */
293 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
294 SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
299 * Should we send a ServerKeyExchange message?
301 * Valid return values are:
305 static int send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
307 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
310 * only send a ServerKeyExchange if DH or fortezza but we have a
311 * sign only certificate PSK: may send PSK identity hints For
312 * ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange message only if
313 * the cipher suite is either ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases,
314 * the server certificate contains the server's public key for
317 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)
319 * PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if
322 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
323 /* Only send SKE if we have identity hint for plain PSK */
324 || ((alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK))
325 && s->cert->psk_identity_hint)
326 /* For other PSK always send SKE */
327 || (alg_k & (SSL_PSK & (SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK)))
329 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
330 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
331 || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
341 * Should we send a CertificateRequest message?
343 * Valid return values are:
347 static int send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
350 /* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
351 s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER
353 * if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert
354 * during re-negotiation:
356 && ((s->session->peer == NULL) ||
357 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE))
359 * never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see
360 * section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in
363 && (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
365 * ... except when the application insists on
366 * verification (against the specs, but statem_clnt.c accepts
369 || (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
370 /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
371 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)
373 * With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests
376 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aPSK)) {
384 * ossl_statem_server13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
385 * move to next when a TLSv1.3 server is writing messages to be sent to the
388 static WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(SSL *s)
390 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
393 * TODO(TLS1.3): This is still based on the TLSv1.2 state machine. Over time
394 * we will update this to look more like real TLSv1.3
398 * No case for TLS_ST_BEFORE, because at that stage we have not negotiated
399 * TLSv1.3 yet, so that is handled by ossl_statem_server_write_transition()
402 switch (st->hand_state) {
404 /* Shouldn't happen */
405 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
407 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
408 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO;
409 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
411 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
412 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
413 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
415 case TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
417 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
418 else if (send_certificate_request(s))
419 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
421 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
423 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
425 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
426 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
427 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
430 st->hand_state = s->tlsext_status_expected ? TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS
431 : TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
432 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
434 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS:
435 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
436 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
438 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
439 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
441 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
442 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
443 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
444 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
449 * ossl_statem_server_write_transition() works out what handshake state to move
450 * to next when the server is writing messages to be sent to the client.
452 WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server_write_transition(SSL *s)
454 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
457 * Note that before the ClientHello we don't know what version we are going
458 * to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later
462 return ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(s);
464 switch (st->hand_state) {
466 /* Shouldn't happen */
467 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
470 /* Just go straight to trying to read from the client */
471 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
474 /* We must be trying to renegotiate */
475 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ;
476 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
478 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
479 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
480 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
481 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
483 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
484 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->d1->cookie_verified
485 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE))
486 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
488 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO;
489 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
491 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
492 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
494 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
496 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
497 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
499 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
501 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
502 /* normal PSK or SRP */
503 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth &
504 (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
505 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
506 } else if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) {
507 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH;
508 } else if (send_certificate_request(s)) {
509 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
511 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE;
514 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
517 if (s->tlsext_status_expected) {
518 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS;
519 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
523 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS:
524 if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) {
525 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH;
526 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
530 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH:
531 if (send_certificate_request(s)) {
532 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
533 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
537 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
538 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE;
539 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
541 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
542 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
544 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
546 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
547 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
548 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
549 } else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) {
550 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
552 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
554 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
556 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
557 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
558 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
560 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
561 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
562 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
564 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
566 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
568 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
569 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
570 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
575 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
576 * the server to the client.
578 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
580 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
582 switch (st->hand_state) {
584 /* No pre work to be done */
587 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
590 dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s);
593 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
595 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
596 dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s);
597 /* We don't buffer this message so don't use the timer */
602 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
603 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
605 * Messages we write from now on should be bufferred and
606 * retransmitted if necessary, so we need to use the timer now
612 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
613 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
614 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)))
615 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
617 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
619 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
620 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
622 * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
623 * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer
629 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
630 s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
631 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
632 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
635 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
637 * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
638 * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer. This might have
639 * already been set to 0 if we sent a NewSessionTicket message,
640 * but we'll set it again here in case we didn't.
644 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
647 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst);
650 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
654 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
655 * server to the client.
657 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
659 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
663 switch (st->hand_state) {
665 /* No post work to be done */
668 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
669 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
671 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
672 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
677 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
678 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
680 /* HelloVerifyRequest resets Finished MAC */
681 if (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER && !ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
682 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
686 * The next message should be another ClientHello which we need to
687 * treat like it was the first packet
692 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
693 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
694 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
695 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
696 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
699 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no
702 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
703 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
705 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
706 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
707 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0,
709 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
713 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
714 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
718 * TODO(TLS1.3): This actually causes a problem. We don't yet know
719 * whether the next record we are going to receive is an unencrypted
720 * alert, or an encrypted handshake message. We're going to need
721 * something clever in the record layer for this.
723 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
724 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)
725 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
726 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)
727 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
728 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE |SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ))
733 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
734 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
735 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->hit) {
737 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
740 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
744 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
745 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
747 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
752 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
755 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
756 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
760 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
761 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
763 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
764 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
766 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
769 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
773 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
774 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
775 s->session->master_key, s->handshake_secret, 0,
776 &s->session->master_key_length)
777 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
778 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
784 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
788 * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the
791 * Valid return values are:
795 int ossl_statem_server_construct_message(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
796 confunc_f *confunc, int *mt)
798 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
800 switch (st->hand_state) {
802 /* Shouldn't happen */
805 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
807 *confunc = dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
809 *confunc = tls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
810 *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
813 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
814 *confunc = dtls_construct_hello_verify_request;
815 *mt = DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
818 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
819 /* No construction function needed */
821 *mt = SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST;
824 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
825 *confunc = tls_construct_server_hello;
826 *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO;
830 *confunc = tls_construct_server_certificate;
831 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE;
834 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH:
835 *confunc = tls_construct_server_key_exchange;
836 *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE;
839 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
840 *confunc = tls_construct_certificate_request;
841 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST;
844 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
845 *confunc = tls_construct_server_done;
846 *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
849 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
850 *confunc = tls_construct_new_session_ticket;
851 *mt = SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET;
854 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS:
855 *confunc = tls_construct_cert_status;
856 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
859 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
860 *confunc = tls_construct_finished;
861 *mt = SSL3_MT_FINISHED;
864 case TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
865 *confunc = tls_construct_encrypted_extensions;
866 *mt = SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
874 * Maximum size (excluding the Handshake header) of a ClientHello message,
875 * calculated as follows:
877 * 2 + # client_version
878 * 32 + # only valid length for random
879 * 1 + # length of session_id
880 * 32 + # maximum size for session_id
881 * 2 + # length of cipher suites
882 * 2^16-2 + # maximum length of cipher suites array
883 * 1 + # length of compression_methods
884 * 2^8-1 + # maximum length of compression methods
885 * 2 + # length of extensions
886 * 2^16-1 # maximum length of extensions
888 #define CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH 131396
890 #define CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH 2048
891 #define NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH 514
894 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
895 * reading. Excludes the message header.
897 size_t ossl_statem_server_max_message_size(SSL *s)
899 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
901 switch (st->hand_state) {
903 /* Shouldn't happen */
906 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
907 return CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH;
910 return s->max_cert_list;
912 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
913 return CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH;
915 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
916 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
918 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
919 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
920 return NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH;
923 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
924 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH;
926 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
927 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH;
932 * Process a message that the server has received from the client.
934 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_server_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
936 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
938 switch (st->hand_state) {
940 /* Shouldn't happen */
941 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
943 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
944 return tls_process_client_hello(s, pkt);
947 return tls_process_client_certificate(s, pkt);
949 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
950 return tls_process_client_key_exchange(s, pkt);
952 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
953 return tls_process_cert_verify(s, pkt);
955 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
956 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
957 return tls_process_next_proto(s, pkt);
960 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
961 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt);
963 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
964 return tls_process_finished(s, pkt);
969 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
972 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
974 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
976 switch (st->hand_state) {
978 /* Shouldn't happen */
981 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
982 return tls_post_process_client_hello(s, wst);
984 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
985 return tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(s, wst);
987 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
988 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
989 if ( /* Is this SCTP? */
990 BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))
991 /* Are we renegotiating? */
992 && s->renegotiate && BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
993 s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
994 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
995 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
996 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
997 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 1);
1000 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 0);
1003 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
1005 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
1008 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1009 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al)
1011 int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE;
1013 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1015 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
1016 (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL)) {
1017 if (s->srp_ctx.login == NULL) {
1019 * RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, we do so if There is no srp
1022 ret = SSL3_AL_FATAL;
1023 *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
1025 ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s, al);
1032 int dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(WPACKET *pkt, unsigned char *cookie,
1035 /* Always use DTLS 1.0 version: see RFC 6347 */
1036 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, DTLS1_VERSION)
1037 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, cookie, cookie_len))
1043 int dtls_construct_hello_verify_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
1045 unsigned int cookie_leni;
1046 if (s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb == NULL ||
1047 s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->cookie,
1048 &cookie_leni) == 0 ||
1049 cookie_leni > 255) {
1050 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST,
1051 SSL_R_COOKIE_GEN_CALLBACK_FAILURE);
1054 s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_leni;
1056 if (!dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(pkt, s->d1->cookie,
1057 s->d1->cookie_len)) {
1058 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1065 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1067 * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1068 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |hello|.
1069 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1074 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1075 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1076 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1077 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1079 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello)
1085 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1086 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1087 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1088 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1089 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1090 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1091 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1093 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1094 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1095 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1096 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1097 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1098 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1099 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1100 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1101 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1102 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1103 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1104 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1105 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1108 /* Length of the common prefix (first two extensions). */
1109 static const size_t kSafariCommonExtensionsLength = 18;
1111 tmppkt = hello->extensions;
1113 if (!PACKET_forward(&tmppkt, 2)
1114 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt, &type)
1115 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&tmppkt, &sni)) {
1119 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1122 ext_len = TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION ?
1123 sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock) : kSafariCommonExtensionsLength;
1125 s->s3->is_probably_safari = PACKET_equal(&tmppkt, kSafariExtensionsBlock,
1128 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1131 * Process all remaining ClientHello extensions that we collected earlier and
1132 * haven't already processed.
1134 * Behaviour upon resumption is extension-specific. If the extension has no
1135 * effect during resumption, it is parsed (to verify its format) but otherwise
1136 * ignored. Returns 1 on success and 0 on failure. Upon failure, sets |al| to
1137 * the appropriate alert.
1139 static int tls_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello, int *al)
1141 /* Reset various flags that might get set by extensions during parsing */
1142 s->servername_done = 0;
1143 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1144 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1145 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1148 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1149 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
1150 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = 0;
1151 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_proposed);
1152 s->s3->alpn_proposed = NULL;
1153 s->s3->alpn_proposed_len = 0;
1155 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1156 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1157 ssl_check_for_safari(s, hello);
1158 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1160 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
1161 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs);
1162 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = NULL;
1163 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1165 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1166 OPENSSL_free(s->srp_ctx.login);
1167 s->srp_ctx.login = NULL;
1170 s->srtp_profile = NULL;
1173 * We process the supported_groups extension first so that is done before
1174 * we get to key_share which needs to use the information in it.
1176 if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_groups, EXT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1177 hello->pre_proc_exts, hello->num_extensions, al)) {
1181 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
1183 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)
1184 && tls_get_extension_by_type(hello->pre_proc_exts,
1185 hello->num_extensions,
1186 TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) == NULL) {
1187 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1188 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
1189 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
1193 return tls_parse_all_extensions(s, EXT_CLIENT_HELLO, hello->pre_proc_exts,
1194 hello->num_extensions, al);
1198 * Check the results of extension parsing. Currently just calls the servername
1199 * callback. Returns 1 for success or 0 for failure.
1201 static int tls_check_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
1203 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
1204 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1206 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
1207 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
1208 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
1209 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
1210 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
1211 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
1212 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
1215 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
1216 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1219 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
1220 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
1223 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
1224 s->servername_done = 0;
1233 * Parse the extensions in the ClientHello that were collected earlier. Returns
1234 * 1 for success or 0 for failure.
1236 static int tls_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello)
1240 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->srv_ext);
1242 if (tls_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, hello, &al) <= 0) {
1243 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1247 if (!tls_check_clienthello_tlsext(s)) {
1248 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1255 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1257 int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1261 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
1262 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1263 SSL_COMP *comp = NULL;
1265 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL;
1267 /* |cookie| will only be initialized for DTLS. */
1268 PACKET session_id, compression, extensions, cookie;
1269 static const unsigned char null_compression = 0;
1270 CLIENTHELLO_MSG clienthello;
1273 * First, parse the raw ClientHello data into the CLIENTHELLO_MSG structure.
1275 memset(&clienthello, 0, sizeof(clienthello));
1276 clienthello.isv2 = RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer);
1277 PACKET_null_init(&cookie);
1279 if (clienthello.isv2) {
1283 * An SSLv3/TLSv1 backwards-compatible CLIENT-HELLO in an SSLv2
1284 * header is sent directly on the wire, not wrapped as a TLS
1285 * record. Our record layer just processes the message length and passes
1286 * the rest right through. Its format is:
1288 * 0-1 msg_length - decoded by the record layer
1289 * 2 msg_type - s->init_msg points here
1291 * 5-6 cipher_spec_length
1292 * 7-8 session_id_length
1293 * 9-10 challenge_length
1297 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &mt)
1298 || mt != SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
1300 * Should never happen. We should have tested this in the record
1301 * layer in order to have determined that this is a SSLv2 record
1302 * in the first place
1304 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1309 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &clienthello.legacy_version)) {
1310 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1311 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1315 /* Parse the message and load client random. */
1316 if (clienthello.isv2) {
1318 * Handle an SSLv2 backwards compatible ClientHello
1319 * Note, this is only for SSLv3+ using the backward compatible format.
1320 * Real SSLv2 is not supported, and is rejected below.
1322 unsigned int ciphersuite_len, session_id_len, challenge_len;
1325 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ciphersuite_len)
1326 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &session_id_len)
1327 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &challenge_len)) {
1328 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1329 SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1330 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1334 if (session_id_len > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH) {
1335 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1336 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1340 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &clienthello.ciphersuites,
1342 || !PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, clienthello.session_id, session_id_len)
1343 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &challenge, challenge_len)
1344 /* No extensions. */
1345 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1346 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1347 SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1348 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1351 clienthello.session_id_len = session_id_len;
1353 /* Load the client random and compression list. We use SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1354 * here rather than sizeof(clienthello.random) because that is the limit
1355 * for SSLv3 and it is fixed. It won't change even if
1356 * sizeof(clienthello.random) does.
1358 challenge_len = challenge_len > SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1359 ? SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE : challenge_len;
1360 memset(clienthello.random, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1361 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&challenge,
1362 clienthello.random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE -
1363 challenge_len, challenge_len)
1364 /* Advertise only null compression. */
1365 || !PACKET_buf_init(&compression, &null_compression, 1)) {
1366 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1367 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1371 PACKET_null_init(&clienthello.extensions);
1373 /* Regular ClientHello. */
1374 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, clienthello.random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)
1375 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)
1376 || !PACKET_copy_all(&session_id, clienthello.session_id,
1377 SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH,
1378 &clienthello.session_id_len)) {
1379 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1380 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1384 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1385 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookie)) {
1386 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1387 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1390 if (!PACKET_copy_all(&cookie, clienthello.dtls_cookie,
1391 DTLS1_COOKIE_LENGTH,
1392 &clienthello.dtls_cookie_len)) {
1393 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1394 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1398 * If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one,
1399 * just return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet.
1400 * So check cookie length...
1402 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
1403 if (clienthello.dtls_cookie_len == 0)
1408 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &clienthello.ciphersuites)) {
1409 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1410 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1414 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &compression)) {
1415 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1416 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1420 /* Could be empty. */
1421 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) {
1422 PACKET_null_init(&clienthello.extensions);
1424 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &clienthello.extensions)) {
1425 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1426 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1432 if (!PACKET_copy_all(&compression, clienthello.compressions,
1433 MAX_COMPRESSIONS_SIZE,
1434 &clienthello.compressions_len)) {
1435 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1436 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1440 /* Preserve the raw extensions PACKET for later use */
1441 extensions = clienthello.extensions;
1442 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions, EXT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1443 &clienthello.pre_proc_exts,
1444 &clienthello.num_extensions, &al)) {
1445 /* SSLerr already been called */
1449 /* Finished parsing the ClientHello, now we can start processing it */
1451 /* Set up the client_random */
1452 memcpy(s->s3->client_random, clienthello.random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1454 /* Choose the version */
1456 if (clienthello.isv2) {
1457 if (clienthello.legacy_version == SSL2_VERSION
1458 || (clienthello.legacy_version & 0xff00)
1459 != (SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR << 8)) {
1461 * This is real SSLv2 or something complete unknown. We don't
1464 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
1468 s->client_version = clienthello.legacy_version;
1471 * Do SSL/TLS version negotiation if applicable. For DTLS we just check
1472 * versions are potentially compatible. Version negotiation comes later.
1474 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1475 protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s, &clienthello);
1476 } else if (s->method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION &&
1477 DTLS_VERSION_LT((int)clienthello.legacy_version, s->version)) {
1478 protverr = SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW;
1484 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
1485 if ((!s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash)) {
1486 /* like ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
1487 s->version = s->client_version = clienthello.legacy_version;
1489 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1493 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1494 /* Empty cookie was already handled above by returning early. */
1495 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
1496 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) {
1497 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, clienthello.dtls_cookie,
1498 clienthello.dtls_cookie_len) == 0) {
1499 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1500 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1501 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1503 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1505 /* default verification */
1506 } else if (s->d1->cookie_len != clienthello.dtls_cookie_len
1507 || memcmp(clienthello.dtls_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
1508 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) {
1509 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1510 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1513 s->d1->cookie_verified = 1;
1515 if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
1516 protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s, &clienthello);
1517 if (protverr != 0) {
1518 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
1519 s->version = s->client_version;
1520 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1528 /* We need to do this before getting the session */
1529 if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret,
1531 clienthello.pre_proc_exts,
1532 clienthello.num_extensions, &al)) {
1533 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1538 * We don't allow resumption in a backwards compatible ClientHello.
1539 * TODO(openssl-team): in TLS1.1+, session_id MUST be empty.
1541 * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in
1542 * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally
1543 * ignore resumption requests with flag
1544 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
1545 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on
1546 * this for security won't even compile against older library versions).
1547 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to
1548 * request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains
1549 * unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the
1550 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be
1553 if (clienthello.isv2 ||
1555 (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) {
1556 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
1559 i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, &clienthello);
1561 * Only resume if the session's version matches the negotiated
1563 * RFC 5246 does not provide much useful advice on resumption
1564 * with a different protocol version. It doesn't forbid it but
1565 * the sanity of such behaviour would be questionable.
1566 * In practice, clients do not accept a version mismatch and
1567 * will abort the handshake with an error.
1569 if (i == 1 && s->version == s->session->ssl_version) {
1570 /* previous session */
1572 } else if (i == -1) {
1576 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
1581 if (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s, &clienthello.ciphersuites, &ciphers,
1582 clienthello.isv2, &al) == NULL) {
1586 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
1589 id = s->session->cipher->id;
1592 fprintf(stderr, "client sent %d ciphers\n", sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers));
1594 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) {
1595 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i);
1597 fprintf(stderr, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
1598 i, sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
1607 * we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked
1610 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1611 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1612 SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
1617 for (loop = 0; loop < clienthello.compressions_len; loop++) {
1618 if (clienthello.compressions[loop] == 0)
1622 if (loop >= clienthello.compressions_len) {
1624 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1625 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
1629 /* TLS extensions */
1630 if (!tls_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s, &clienthello)) {
1631 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
1635 /* Check we've got a key_share for TLSv1.3 */
1636 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->s3->peer_tmp == NULL && !s->hit) {
1637 /* No suitable share */
1638 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Send a HelloRetryRequest */
1639 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1640 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_KEY_SHARE);
1645 * Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this handshake
1646 * for not reused session only. We need to generate server_random before
1647 * calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow SessionTicket
1648 * processing to use it in key derivation.
1652 pos = s->s3->server_random;
1653 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0) {
1658 if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
1659 const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
1661 * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for
1662 * backwards compat reasons
1664 int master_key_length;
1666 master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1667 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
1668 &master_key_length, ciphers,
1670 s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)
1671 && master_key_length > 0) {
1672 s->session->master_key_length = master_key_length;
1674 s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
1675 s->session->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
1679 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1681 pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s,
1686 if (pref_cipher == NULL) {
1687 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1688 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1692 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher;
1693 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
1694 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1695 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
1696 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1701 * Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1702 * options, we will now look for them. We have complen-1 compression
1703 * algorithms from the client, starting at q.
1705 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = NULL;
1706 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1707 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1708 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1709 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
1711 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1712 /* Can't disable compression */
1713 if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
1714 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1715 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1718 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1719 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++) {
1720 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
1721 if (comp_id == comp->id) {
1722 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1726 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) {
1727 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1728 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1731 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1732 for (k = 0; k < clienthello.compressions_len; k++) {
1733 if (clienthello.compressions[k] == comp_id)
1736 if (k >= clienthello.compressions_len) {
1737 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1738 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1739 SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
1744 else if (ssl_allow_compression(s) && s->ctx->comp_methods) {
1745 /* See if we have a match */
1746 int m, nn, v, done = 0;
1749 nn = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1750 for (m = 0; m < nn; m++) {
1751 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
1753 for (o = 0; o < clienthello.compressions_len; o++) {
1754 if (v == clienthello.compressions[o]) {
1763 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1769 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1770 * using compression.
1772 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1773 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1779 * Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher
1783 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1784 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
1786 s->session->compress_meth = (comp == NULL) ? 0 : comp->id;
1788 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
1789 s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
1790 if (ciphers == NULL) {
1791 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1792 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1796 if (!tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s)) {
1797 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1802 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1803 OPENSSL_free(clienthello.pre_proc_exts);
1804 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
1806 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1808 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1810 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1811 OPENSSL_free(clienthello.pre_proc_exts);
1813 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1816 WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_hello(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
1818 int al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1819 const SSL_CIPHER *cipher;
1821 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
1823 /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
1824 if (s->cert->cert_cb) {
1825 int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
1827 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1828 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1829 SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR);
1833 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
1836 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1839 ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1841 if (cipher == NULL) {
1842 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1843 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1846 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = cipher;
1847 /* check whether we should disable session resumption */
1848 if (s->not_resumable_session_cb != NULL)
1849 s->session->not_resumable = s->not_resumable_session_cb(s,
1850 ((cipher->algorithm_mkey & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)) != 0));
1851 if (s->session->not_resumable)
1852 /* do not send a session ticket */
1853 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
1855 /* Session-id reuse */
1856 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher;
1859 if (!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) {
1860 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
1861 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1867 * we now have the following setup.
1869 * cipher_list - our preferred list of ciphers
1870 * ciphers - the clients preferred list of ciphers
1871 * compression - basically ignored right now
1872 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1873 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1874 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1875 * s->s3->tmp.new_cipher- the new cipher to use.
1878 /* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */
1879 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) {
1880 if (!ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s, &al)) {
1881 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1882 SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1889 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1890 if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) {
1892 if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s, &al)) < 0) {
1894 * callback indicates further work to be done
1896 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
1899 if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE) {
1901 * This is not really an error but the only means to for
1902 * a client to detect whether srp is supported.
1904 if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY)
1905 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1906 SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1908 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1909 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
1916 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
1918 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1919 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1923 int tls_construct_server_hello(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
1925 int compm, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1929 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove the DRAFT conditional before release */
1930 version = SSL_IS_TLS13(s) ? TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT : s->version;
1931 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, version)
1933 * Random stuff. Filling of the server_random takes place in
1934 * tls_process_client_hello()
1936 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1937 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1942 * There are several cases for the session ID to send
1943 * back in the server hello:
1944 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
1945 * we send back the old session ID.
1946 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
1947 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
1948 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
1949 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
1951 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
1952 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
1953 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
1954 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
1957 if (s->session->not_resumable ||
1958 (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
1960 s->session->session_id_length = 0;
1962 sl = s->session->session_id_length;
1963 if (sl > sizeof(s->session->session_id)) {
1964 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1968 /* set up the compression method */
1969 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1972 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1975 compm = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
1978 if ((!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
1979 && !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->session->session_id, sl))
1980 || !s->method->put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, pkt, &len)
1981 || (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
1982 && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, compm))
1984 * TODO(TLS1.3): For now we add all 1.2 and 1.3 extensions. Later
1985 * we will do this based on the actual protocol
1987 || !tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt,
1988 EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
1989 | EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO, &al)) {
1990 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1996 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2000 int tls_construct_server_done(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2002 if (!s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
2003 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
2004 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2011 int tls_construct_server_key_exchange(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2013 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2014 EVP_PKEY *pkdh = NULL;
2016 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2017 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
2018 size_t encodedlen = 0;
2022 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
2023 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, i;
2026 EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2027 size_t paramlen, paramoffset;
2029 if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, ¶moffset)) {
2030 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2034 if (md_ctx == NULL) {
2035 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2039 type = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2041 r[0] = r[1] = r[2] = r[3] = NULL;
2042 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2043 /* Plain PSK or RSAPSK nothing to do */
2044 if (type & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
2046 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
2047 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2048 if (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
2049 CERT *cert = s->cert;
2051 EVP_PKEY *pkdhp = NULL;
2054 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto) {
2055 DH *dhp = ssl_get_auto_dh(s);
2056 pkdh = EVP_PKEY_new();
2057 if (pkdh == NULL || dhp == NULL) {
2059 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2060 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2063 EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(pkdh, dhp);
2066 pkdhp = cert->dh_tmp;
2068 if ((pkdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL)) {
2069 DH *dhp = s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s, 0, 1024);
2070 pkdh = ssl_dh_to_pkey(dhp);
2072 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2073 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2078 if (pkdhp == NULL) {
2079 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2080 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2081 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2084 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH,
2085 EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkdhp), 0, pkdhp)) {
2086 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2087 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2088 SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
2091 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) {
2092 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2093 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2097 s->s3->tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey(pkdhp);
2099 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey == NULL) {
2100 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2104 dh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
2106 EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh);
2109 DH_get0_pqg(dh, &r[0], NULL, &r[1]);
2110 DH_get0_key(dh, &r[2], NULL);
2113 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2114 if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2117 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) {
2118 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2119 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2123 /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */
2124 nid = tls1_shared_group(s, -2);
2125 curve_id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(nid);
2126 if (curve_id == 0) {
2127 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2128 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
2131 s->s3->tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey_curve(curve_id);
2132 /* Generate a new key for this curve */
2133 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey == NULL) {
2134 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2138 /* Encode the public key. */
2139 encodedlen = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->tmp.pkey,
2141 if (encodedlen == 0) {
2142 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2147 * We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we
2148 * can set these to NULLs
2155 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2156 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2157 if (type & SSL_kSRP) {
2158 if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
2159 (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
2160 (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) || (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL)) {
2161 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2162 SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
2165 r[0] = s->srp_ctx.N;
2166 r[1] = s->srp_ctx.g;
2167 r[2] = s->srp_ctx.s;
2168 r[3] = s->srp_ctx.B;
2172 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2173 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2174 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
2178 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP))
2179 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)) {
2180 if ((pkey = ssl_get_sign_pkey(s, s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, &md))
2182 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2189 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2190 if (type & SSL_PSK) {
2191 size_t len = (s->cert->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
2192 ? 0 : strlen(s->cert->psk_identity_hint);
2195 * It should not happen that len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN - we already
2196 * checked this when we set the identity hint - but just in case
2198 if (len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
2199 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->cert->psk_identity_hint,
2201 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2202 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2208 for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
2209 unsigned char *binval;
2212 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2213 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) {
2214 res = WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt);
2217 res = WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt);
2220 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2221 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2225 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2227 * for interoperability with some versions of the Microsoft TLS
2228 * stack, we need to zero pad the DHE pub key to the same length
2231 if ((i == 2) && (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK))) {
2232 size_t len = BN_num_bytes(r[0]) - BN_num_bytes(r[2]);
2235 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, len, &binval)) {
2236 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2237 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2240 memset(binval, 0, len);
2244 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, BN_num_bytes(r[i]), &binval)
2245 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2246 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2247 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2251 BN_bn2bin(r[i], binval);
2254 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2255 if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2257 * We only support named (not generic) curves. In this situation, the
2258 * ServerKeyExchange message has: [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
2259 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by the actual encoded
2262 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
2263 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)
2264 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, curve_id)
2265 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, encodedPoint, encodedlen)) {
2266 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2267 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2270 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2271 encodedPoint = NULL;
2278 * n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4]) and p
2279 * points to the space at the end.
2282 unsigned char *sigbytes1, *sigbytes2;
2283 unsigned int siglen;
2285 /* Get length of the parameters we have written above */
2286 if (!WPACKET_get_length(pkt, ¶mlen)) {
2287 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2288 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2291 /* send signature algorithm */
2292 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2293 if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(pkt, pkey, md)) {
2294 /* Should never happen */
2295 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2296 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2301 fprintf(stderr, "Using hash %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
2304 * Create the signature. We don't know the actual length of the sig
2305 * until after we've created it, so we reserve enough bytes for it
2306 * up front, and then properly allocate them in the WPACKET
2309 if (!WPACKET_sub_reserve_bytes_u16(pkt, EVP_PKEY_size(pkey),
2311 || EVP_SignInit_ex(md_ctx, md, NULL) <= 0
2312 || EVP_SignUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
2313 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
2314 || EVP_SignUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
2315 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
2316 || EVP_SignUpdate(md_ctx, s->init_buf->data + paramoffset,
2318 || EVP_SignFinal(md_ctx, sigbytes1, &siglen, pkey) <= 0
2319 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, siglen, &sigbytes2)
2320 || sigbytes1 != sigbytes2) {
2321 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2322 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2326 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
2327 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2328 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2329 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
2334 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2337 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2339 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2340 EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh);
2342 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2343 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2345 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2349 int tls_construct_certificate_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2352 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk = NULL;
2354 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
2355 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
2356 || !ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s, pkt)
2357 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2358 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2362 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2363 const unsigned char *psigs;
2364 size_t nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &psigs);
2365 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
2366 || !tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, pkt, psigs, nl)
2367 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2368 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2369 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2374 /* Start sub-packet for client CA list */
2375 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
2376 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2380 sk = SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
2382 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) {
2383 unsigned char *namebytes;
2384 X509_NAME *name = sk_X509_NAME_value(sk, i);
2388 || (namelen = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL)) < 0
2389 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, namelen,
2391 || i2d_X509_NAME(name, &namebytes) != namelen) {
2392 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2393 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2398 /* else no CA names */
2400 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2401 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2405 s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 1;
2409 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2413 static int tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2415 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2416 unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
2418 PACKET psk_identity;
2420 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity)) {
2421 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2422 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2425 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2426 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2427 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2430 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL) {
2431 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2432 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
2436 if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity, &s->session->psk_identity)) {
2437 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2438 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2442 psklen = s->psk_server_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity,
2445 if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
2446 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2447 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2449 } else if (psklen == 0) {
2451 * PSK related to the given identity not found
2453 *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
2454 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2455 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2459 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.psk);
2460 s->s3->tmp.psk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen);
2461 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
2463 if (s->s3->tmp.psk == NULL) {
2464 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2465 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2469 s->s3->tmp.psklen = psklen;
2473 /* Should never happen */
2474 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2475 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2480 static int tls_process_cke_rsa(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2482 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2483 unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
2485 unsigned char decrypt_good, version_good;
2486 size_t j, padding_len;
2487 PACKET enc_premaster;
2489 unsigned char *rsa_decrypt = NULL;
2492 rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey);
2494 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2495 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2499 /* SSLv3 and pre-standard DTLS omit the length bytes. */
2500 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
2501 enc_premaster = *pkt;
2503 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &enc_premaster)
2504 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2505 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2506 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2512 * We want to be sure that the plaintext buffer size makes it safe to
2513 * iterate over the entire size of a premaster secret
2514 * (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). Reject overly short RSA keys because
2515 * their ciphertext cannot accommodate a premaster secret anyway.
2517 if (RSA_size(rsa) < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
2518 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2519 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
2523 rsa_decrypt = OPENSSL_malloc(RSA_size(rsa));
2524 if (rsa_decrypt == NULL) {
2525 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2526 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2531 * We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of
2532 * Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246,
2533 * section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of the TLS RFC and
2534 * generates a random premaster secret for the case that the decrypt
2535 * fails. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1
2538 if (RAND_bytes(rand_premaster_secret, sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0)
2542 * Decrypt with no padding. PKCS#1 padding will be removed as part of
2543 * the timing-sensitive code below.
2545 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
2546 decrypt_len = (int)RSA_private_decrypt((int)PACKET_remaining(&enc_premaster),
2547 PACKET_data(&enc_premaster),
2548 rsa_decrypt, rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING);
2549 if (decrypt_len < 0)
2552 /* Check the padding. See RFC 3447, section 7.2.2. */
2555 * The smallest padded premaster is 11 bytes of overhead. Small keys
2556 * are publicly invalid, so this may return immediately. This ensures
2557 * PS is at least 8 bytes.
2559 if (decrypt_len < 11 + SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
2560 *al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2561 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2565 padding_len = decrypt_len - SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
2566 decrypt_good = constant_time_eq_int_8(rsa_decrypt[0], 0) &
2567 constant_time_eq_int_8(rsa_decrypt[1], 2);
2568 for (j = 2; j < padding_len - 1; j++) {
2569 decrypt_good &= ~constant_time_is_zero_8(rsa_decrypt[j]);
2571 decrypt_good &= constant_time_is_zero_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len - 1]);
2574 * If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct then
2575 * version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero. The
2576 * Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
2577 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version number
2578 * check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks are done in
2579 * constant time and are treated like any other decryption error.
2582 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len],
2583 (unsigned)(s->client_version >> 8));
2585 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len + 1],
2586 (unsigned)(s->client_version & 0xff));
2589 * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2590 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2591 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2592 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
2593 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
2594 * protocol version. If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such
2597 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) {
2598 unsigned char workaround_good;
2599 workaround_good = constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len],
2600 (unsigned)(s->version >> 8));
2602 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len + 1],
2603 (unsigned)(s->version & 0xff));
2604 version_good |= workaround_good;
2608 * Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good to
2609 * remain non-zero (0xff).
2611 decrypt_good &= version_good;
2614 * Now copy rand_premaster_secret over from p using
2615 * decrypt_good_mask. If decryption failed, then p does not
2616 * contain valid plaintext, however, a check above guarantees
2617 * it is still sufficiently large to read from.
2619 for (j = 0; j < sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); j++) {
2620 rsa_decrypt[padding_len + j] =
2621 constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good,
2622 rsa_decrypt[padding_len + j],
2623 rand_premaster_secret[j]);
2626 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, rsa_decrypt + padding_len,
2627 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret), 0)) {
2628 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2629 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2635 OPENSSL_free(rsa_decrypt);
2638 /* Should never happen */
2639 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2640 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2645 static int tls_process_cke_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2647 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2648 EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL;
2652 const unsigned char *data;
2653 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL;
2656 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != i) {
2657 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2658 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
2659 SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2662 skey = s->s3->tmp.pkey;
2664 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2665 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2669 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) {
2670 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2671 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2674 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) {
2675 /* We already checked we have enough data */
2676 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2677 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2680 ckey = EVP_PKEY_new();
2681 if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) == 0) {
2682 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, SSL_R_BN_LIB);
2685 cdh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey);
2686 pub_key = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL);
2688 if (pub_key == NULL || !DH_set0_key(cdh, pub_key, NULL)) {
2689 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2690 if (pub_key != NULL)
2695 if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) {
2696 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2697 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2702 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
2703 s->s3->tmp.pkey = NULL;
2705 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2708 /* Should never happen */
2709 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2710 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2715 static int tls_process_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2717 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2718 EVP_PKEY *skey = s->s3->tmp.pkey;
2719 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL;
2722 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) {
2723 /* We don't support ECDH client auth */
2724 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2725 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
2729 const unsigned char *data;
2732 * Get client's public key from encoded point in the
2733 * ClientKeyExchange message.
2736 /* Get encoded point length */
2737 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &i) || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)
2738 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2739 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2740 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2743 ckey = EVP_PKEY_new();
2744 if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) <= 0) {
2745 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2748 if (EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey, data, i) == 0) {
2749 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2750 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2755 if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) {
2756 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2757 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2762 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
2763 s->s3->tmp.pkey = NULL;
2765 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2769 /* Should never happen */
2770 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2771 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2776 static int tls_process_cke_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2778 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2780 const unsigned char *data;
2782 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i)
2783 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) {
2784 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2785 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
2788 if ((s->srp_ctx.A = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL)) == NULL) {
2789 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2792 if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0 || BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A)) {
2793 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2794 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
2797 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
2798 s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
2799 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
2800 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2804 if (!srp_generate_server_master_secret(s)) {
2805 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2811 /* Should never happen */
2812 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2813 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2818 static int tls_process_cke_gost(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2820 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2821 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
2822 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
2823 unsigned char premaster_secret[32];
2824 const unsigned char *start;
2825 size_t outlen = 32, inlen;
2826 unsigned long alg_a;
2829 size_t sess_key_len;
2830 const unsigned char *data;
2833 /* Get our certificate private key */
2834 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2835 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST12) {
2837 * New GOST ciphersuites have SSL_aGOST01 bit too
2839 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512].privatekey;
2841 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256].privatekey;
2844 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
2846 } else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01) {
2847 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
2850 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL);
2851 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
2852 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2853 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2856 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0) {
2857 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2858 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2862 * If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
2863 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
2864 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use a
2865 * client certificate for authorization only.
2867 client_pub_pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2868 if (client_pub_pkey) {
2869 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
2872 /* Decrypt session key */
2873 sess_key_len = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
2874 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, sess_key_len)) {
2875 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2876 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2879 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
2880 if (ASN1_get_object((const unsigned char **)&data, &Tlen, &Ttag,
2881 &Tclass, (long)sess_key_len) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED
2882 || Ttag != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE || Tclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL) {
2883 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2884 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2889 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt
2890 (pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, start, inlen) <= 0) {
2891 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2892 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2895 /* Generate master secret */
2896 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, premaster_secret,
2897 sizeof(premaster_secret), 0)) {
2898 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2899 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2902 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2903 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
2904 (pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
2905 s->statem.no_cert_verify = 1;
2909 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2912 /* Should never happen */
2913 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2914 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2919 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2922 unsigned long alg_k;
2924 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2926 /* For PSK parse and retrieve identity, obtain PSK key */
2927 if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK) && !tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(s, pkt, &al))
2930 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
2931 /* Identity extracted earlier: should be nothing left */
2932 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2933 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2934 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2935 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2938 /* PSK handled by ssl_generate_master_secret */
2939 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, NULL, 0, 0)) {
2940 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2941 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2944 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
2945 if (!tls_process_cke_rsa(s, pkt, &al))
2947 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
2948 if (!tls_process_cke_dhe(s, pkt, &al))
2950 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2951 if (!tls_process_cke_ecdhe(s, pkt, &al))
2953 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
2954 if (!tls_process_cke_srp(s, pkt, &al))
2956 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
2957 if (!tls_process_cke_gost(s, pkt, &al))
2960 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2961 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2962 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
2966 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
2969 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2970 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2971 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.psk, s->s3->tmp.psklen);
2972 s->s3->tmp.psk = NULL;
2974 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2975 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2978 WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
2980 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
2981 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
2982 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
2983 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
2984 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
2986 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
2989 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
2990 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
2992 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
2993 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
2994 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0,
2996 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3000 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
3001 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
3006 if ((wst == WORK_MORE_B)
3008 && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))
3009 /* Are we renegotiating? */
3011 /* Are we going to skip the CertificateVerify? */
3012 && (s->session->peer == NULL || s->statem.no_cert_verify)
3013 && BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
3014 s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
3015 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
3016 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
3017 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
3018 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 1);
3021 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 0);
3025 if (s->statem.no_cert_verify || !s->session->peer) {
3027 * No certificate verify or no peer certificate so we no longer need
3028 * the handshake_buffer
3030 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
3031 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3034 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3036 if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
3037 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
3038 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3039 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3043 * For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer. If we support
3044 * extms we've done this already so this is a no-op
3046 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) {
3047 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3052 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3055 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3057 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
3058 const unsigned char *sig, *data;
3059 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3060 unsigned char *gost_data = NULL;
3062 int al, ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3066 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
3070 EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
3073 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3074 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3078 peer = s->session->peer;
3079 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(peer);
3080 type = X509_certificate_type(peer, pkey);
3082 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
3083 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
3084 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
3085 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3089 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
3091 * If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare signature without
3092 * length field (CryptoPro implementations at least till CSP 4.0)
3094 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3095 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 64
3096 && EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) {
3101 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
3104 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &sig, 2)) {
3105 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3108 rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, s, sig, pkey);
3110 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3112 } else if (rv == 0) {
3113 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3117 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
3120 /* Use default digest for this key type */
3121 int idx = ssl_cert_type(NULL, pkey);
3123 md = s->s3->tmp.md[idx];
3125 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3130 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &len)) {
3131 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3132 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3136 j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
3137 if (((int)len > j) || ((int)PACKET_remaining(pkt) > j)
3138 || (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)) {
3139 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
3140 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3143 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, len)) {
3144 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3145 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3149 hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
3150 if (hdatalen <= 0) {
3151 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3152 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3157 fprintf(stderr, "Using client verify alg %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
3159 if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(mctx, md, NULL)
3160 || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen)) {
3161 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
3162 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3165 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3167 int pktype = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey);
3168 if (pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2001
3169 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
3170 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512) {
3171 if ((gost_data = OPENSSL_malloc(len)) == NULL) {
3172 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3173 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3176 BUF_reverse(gost_data, data, len);
3182 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION
3183 && !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET,
3184 (int)s->session->master_key_length,
3185 s->session->master_key)) {
3186 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
3187 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3191 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(mctx, data, len, pkey) <= 0) {
3192 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3193 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
3197 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
3200 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3201 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3203 BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
3204 s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
3205 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
3206 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3207 OPENSSL_free(gost_data);
3212 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3214 int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3216 unsigned long l, llen;
3217 const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes;
3218 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
3221 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
3222 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3226 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &llen)
3227 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &spkt, llen)
3228 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3229 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3230 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3234 while (PACKET_remaining(&spkt) > 0) {
3235 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(&spkt, &l)
3236 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&spkt, &certbytes, l)) {
3237 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3238 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3239 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3243 certstart = certbytes;
3244 x = d2i_X509(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, l);
3246 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
3249 if (certbytes != (certstart + l)) {
3250 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3251 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3252 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3255 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
3256 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3262 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) {
3263 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
3264 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
3265 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3266 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3267 SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
3270 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
3271 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3272 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
3273 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3274 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3275 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3278 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
3279 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
3284 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
3286 al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
3287 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3288 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
3292 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, i);
3293 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3296 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(sk, 0));
3298 al = SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3299 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3300 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
3305 X509_free(s->session->peer);
3306 s->session->peer = sk_X509_shift(sk);
3307 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
3309 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->peer_chain, X509_free);
3310 s->session->peer_chain = sk;
3313 * Freeze the handshake buffer. For <TLS1.3 we do this after the CKE
3316 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) {
3317 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3318 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3323 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own
3324 * certificate, while we do include it in statem_clnt.c
3327 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
3331 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3332 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3335 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
3339 int tls_construct_server_certificate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3343 cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
3345 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3349 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, pkt, cpk)) {
3350 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3357 int tls_construct_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3359 unsigned char *senc = NULL;
3360 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL;
3361 HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL;
3362 unsigned char *p, *encdata1, *encdata2, *macdata1, *macdata2;
3363 const unsigned char *const_p;
3364 int len, slen_full, slen, lenfinal;
3367 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3368 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
3369 unsigned char key_name[TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH];
3371 size_t macoffset, macendoffset;
3373 /* get session encoding length */
3374 slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
3376 * Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too
3379 if (slen_full == 0 || slen_full > 0xFF00) {
3380 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3383 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
3385 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3389 ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
3390 hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
3391 if (ctx == NULL || hctx == NULL) {
3392 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3397 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p))
3401 * create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up
3404 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
3407 sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
3409 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
3410 if (slen == 0 || slen > slen_full) { /* shouldn't ever happen */
3411 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3415 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p)) {
3416 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3419 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3422 * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does
3423 * all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx.
3425 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
3426 /* if 0 is returned, write an empty ticket */
3427 int ret = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, ctx,
3432 /* Put timeout and length */
3433 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, 0)
3434 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
3435 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
3436 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3440 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3441 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3446 iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
3448 const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = EVP_aes_256_cbc();
3450 iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher);
3451 if (RAND_bytes(iv, iv_len) <= 0)
3453 if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, cipher, NULL,
3454 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv))
3456 if (!HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key,
3457 sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key),
3458 EVP_sha256(), NULL))
3460 memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name,
3461 sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name));
3465 * Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only): We leave this unspecified
3466 * for resumed session (for simplicity), and guess that tickets for
3467 * new sessions will live as long as their sessions.
3469 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout)
3470 /* Now the actual ticket data */
3471 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
3472 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &macoffset)
3473 /* Output key name */
3474 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, key_name, sizeof(key_name))
3476 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, iv, iv_len)
3477 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, slen + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH,
3479 /* Encrypt session data */
3480 || !EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, encdata1, &len, senc, slen)
3481 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, len, &encdata2)
3482 || encdata1 != encdata2
3483 || !EVP_EncryptFinal(ctx, encdata1 + len, &lenfinal)
3484 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, lenfinal, &encdata2)
3485 || encdata1 + len != encdata2
3486 || len + lenfinal > slen + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH
3487 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &macendoffset)
3488 || !HMAC_Update(hctx,
3489 (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + macoffset,
3490 macendoffset - macoffset)
3491 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, &macdata1)
3492 || !HMAC_Final(hctx, macdata1, &hlen)
3493 || hlen > EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
3494 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, hlen, &macdata2)
3495 || macdata1 != macdata2
3496 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
3497 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3500 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3501 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3507 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3508 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3509 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3513 int tls_construct_cert_status(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3515 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->tlsext_status_type)
3516 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u24(pkt, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp,
3517 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen)) {
3518 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_STATUS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3519 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3526 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3528 * tls_process_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message.
3529 * It sets the next_proto member in s if found
3531 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_next_proto(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3533 PACKET next_proto, padding;
3534 size_t next_proto_len;
3537 * The payload looks like:
3539 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
3540 * uint8 padding_len;
3541 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
3543 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &next_proto)
3544 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &padding)
3545 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
3546 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEXT_PROTO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3550 if (!PACKET_memdup(&next_proto, &s->next_proto_negotiated, &next_proto_len)) {
3551 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = 0;
3555 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = (unsigned char)next_proto_len;
3557 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
3559 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3560 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3564 static int tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3566 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Zero length encrypted extensions message for now */
3567 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
3568 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3569 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3576 #define SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN 3
3578 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s,
3579 PACKET *cipher_suites,
3580 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **skp,
3581 int sslv2format, int *al)
3583 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
3584 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
3586 /* 3 = SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN > TLS_CIPHER_LEN = 2. */
3587 unsigned char cipher[SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN];
3589 s->s3->send_connection_binding = 0;
3591 n = sslv2format ? SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN : TLS_CIPHER_LEN;
3593 if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites) == 0) {
3594 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
3595 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3599 if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites) % n != 0) {
3600 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,
3601 SSL_R_ERROR_IN_RECEIVED_CIPHER_LIST);
3602 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3606 if ((skp == NULL) || (*skp == NULL)) {
3607 sk = sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null(); /* change perhaps later */
3609 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3610 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3615 sk_SSL_CIPHER_zero(sk);
3618 if (!PACKET_memdup(cipher_suites, &s->s3->tmp.ciphers_raw,
3619 &s->s3->tmp.ciphers_rawlen)) {
3620 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3624 while (PACKET_copy_bytes(cipher_suites, cipher, n)) {
3626 * SSLv3 ciphers wrapped in an SSLv2-compatible ClientHello have the
3627 * first byte set to zero, while true SSLv2 ciphers have a non-zero
3628 * first byte. We don't support any true SSLv2 ciphers, so skip them.
3630 if (sslv2format && cipher[0] != '\0')
3633 /* Check for TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV */
3634 if ((cipher[n - 2] == ((SSL3_CK_SCSV >> 8) & 0xff)) &&
3635 (cipher[n - 1] == (SSL3_CK_SCSV & 0xff))) {
3636 /* SCSV fatal if renegotiating */
3637 if (s->renegotiate) {
3638 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,
3639 SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING);
3640 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3643 s->s3->send_connection_binding = 1;
3647 /* Check for TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV */
3648 if ((cipher[n - 2] == ((SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV >> 8) & 0xff)) &&
3649 (cipher[n - 1] == (SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV & 0xff))) {
3651 * The SCSV indicates that the client previously tried a higher
3652 * version. Fail if the current version is an unexpected
3655 if (!ssl_check_version_downgrade(s)) {
3656 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,
3657 SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
3658 *al = SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK;
3664 /* For SSLv2-compat, ignore leading 0-byte. */
3665 c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, sslv2format ? &cipher[1] : cipher);
3667 if (!sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(sk, c)) {
3668 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3669 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3674 if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites) > 0) {
3675 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3676 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3684 if ((skp == NULL) || (*skp == NULL))
3685 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(sk);