2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
10 /* ====================================================================
11 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
13 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
14 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
16 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
17 * license provided above.
19 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
20 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
23 /* ====================================================================
24 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
26 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
27 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
30 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
31 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
32 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
34 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
35 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
36 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
38 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
39 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
40 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
41 * to make use of the Contribution.
43 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
44 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
45 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
46 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
51 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
52 #include "statem_locl.h"
53 #include "internal/constant_time_locl.h"
54 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
55 #include <openssl/rand.h>
56 #include <openssl/objects.h>
57 #include <openssl/evp.h>
58 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
59 #include <openssl/x509.h>
60 #include <openssl/dh.h>
61 #include <openssl/bn.h>
62 #include <openssl/md5.h>
64 static STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s,
65 PACKET *cipher_suites,
67 **skp, int sslv2format,
71 * ossl_statem_server13_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
72 * handshake state transitions when a TLSv1.3 server is reading messages from
73 * the client. The message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|.
74 * The current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
76 * Valid return values are:
77 * 1: Success (transition allowed)
78 * 0: Error (transition not allowed)
80 static int ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
82 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
85 * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_BEFORE because at that stage we have
86 * not negotiated TLSv1.3 yet, so that case is handled by
87 * ossl_statem_server_read_transition()
89 switch (st->hand_state) {
93 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
94 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
95 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
96 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT;
100 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
101 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
108 if (s->session->peer == NULL) {
109 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
110 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
114 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
115 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY;
121 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
122 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
123 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
128 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
129 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
130 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
135 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
136 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
137 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
143 /* No valid transition found */
144 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
145 SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER13_READ_TRANSITION,
146 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
151 * ossl_statem_server_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
152 * handshake state transitions when the server is reading messages from the
153 * client. The message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|. The
154 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
156 * Valid return values are:
157 * 1: Success (transition allowed)
158 * 0: Error (transition not allowed)
160 int ossl_statem_server_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
162 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
164 if (s->method->version == TLS1_3_VERSION)
165 return ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(s, mt);
167 switch (st->hand_state) {
172 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
173 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
174 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO;
179 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
181 * If we get a CKE message after a ServerDone then either
182 * 1) We didn't request a Certificate
184 * 2) If we did request one then
185 * a) We allow no Certificate to be returned
187 * b) We are running SSL3 (in TLS1.0+ the client must return a 0
188 * list if we requested a certificate)
190 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
191 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
192 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
193 if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)
194 && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
196 * This isn't an unexpected message as such - we're just
197 * not going to accept it because we require a client
200 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL,
201 SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
202 SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION,
203 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
206 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
210 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
213 } else if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
214 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
215 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT;
222 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
223 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
228 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
230 * We should only process a CertificateVerify message if we have
231 * received a Certificate from the client. If so then |s->session->peer|
232 * will be non NULL. In some instances a CertificateVerify message is
233 * not required even if the peer has sent a Certificate (e.g. such as in
234 * the case of static DH). In that case |st->no_cert_verify| should be
237 if (s->session->peer == NULL || st->no_cert_verify) {
238 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
240 * For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH
241 * pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is
242 * not sent. Also for GOST ciphersuites when the client uses
243 * its key from the certificate for key exchange.
245 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
249 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
250 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY;
256 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
257 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
258 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
263 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
264 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
265 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) {
266 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO) {
267 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO;
272 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
273 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
276 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
281 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
282 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
283 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
284 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
290 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
291 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
292 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
298 /* No valid transition found */
299 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
300 SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
305 * Should we send a ServerKeyExchange message?
307 * Valid return values are:
311 static int send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
313 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
316 * only send a ServerKeyExchange if DH or fortezza but we have a
317 * sign only certificate PSK: may send PSK identity hints For
318 * ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange message only if
319 * the cipher suite is either ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases,
320 * the server certificate contains the server's public key for
323 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)
325 * PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if
328 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
329 /* Only send SKE if we have identity hint for plain PSK */
330 || ((alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK))
331 && s->cert->psk_identity_hint)
332 /* For other PSK always send SKE */
333 || (alg_k & (SSL_PSK & (SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK)))
335 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
336 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
337 || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
347 * Should we send a CertificateRequest message?
349 * Valid return values are:
353 static int send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
356 /* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
357 s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER
359 * if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert
360 * during re-negotiation:
362 && ((s->session->peer == NULL) ||
363 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE))
365 * never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see
366 * section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in
369 && (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
371 * ... except when the application insists on
372 * verification (against the specs, but statem_clnt.c accepts
375 || (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
376 /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
377 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)
379 * With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests
382 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aPSK)) {
390 * ossl_statem_server13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
391 * move to next when a TLSv1.3 server is writing messages to be sent to the
395 * WRITE_TRAN_ERROR - an error occurred
396 * WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE - Successful transition, more writing to be done
397 * WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED - Successful transition, no more writing to be done
399 static WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(SSL *s)
401 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
404 * No case for TLS_ST_BEFORE, because at that stage we have not negotiated
405 * TLSv1.3 yet, so that is handled by ossl_statem_server_write_transition()
408 switch (st->hand_state) {
410 /* Shouldn't happen */
411 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
413 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
414 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO;
415 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
417 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
419 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
420 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
422 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
424 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
426 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
429 if (s->tlsext_status_expected) {
430 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS;
431 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
435 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS:
436 if (send_certificate_request(s)) {
437 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
438 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
442 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
443 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE;
444 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
446 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
447 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
449 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
451 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
452 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
453 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
454 } else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) {
455 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
457 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
459 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
461 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
462 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
463 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
465 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
466 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
467 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
469 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
471 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
473 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
474 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
475 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
480 * ossl_statem_server_write_transition() works out what handshake state to move
481 * to next when the server is writing messages to be sent to the client.
484 * WRITE_TRAN_ERROR - an error occurred
485 * WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE - Successful transition, more writing to be done
486 * WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED - Successful transition, no more writing to be done
488 WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server_write_transition(SSL *s)
490 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
493 * Note that before the ClientHello we don't know what version we are going
494 * to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later
497 if (s->method->version == TLS1_3_VERSION)
498 return ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(s);
500 switch (st->hand_state) {
502 /* Shouldn't happen */
503 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
506 /* Just go straight to trying to read from the client */
507 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
510 /* We must be trying to renegotiate */
511 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ;
512 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
514 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
515 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
516 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
517 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
519 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
520 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->d1->cookie_verified
521 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE))
522 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
524 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO;
525 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
527 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
528 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
530 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
532 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
533 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
535 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
537 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
538 /* normal PSK or SRP */
539 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth &
540 (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
541 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
542 } else if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) {
543 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH;
544 } else if (send_certificate_request(s)) {
545 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
547 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE;
550 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
553 if (s->tlsext_status_expected) {
554 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS;
555 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
559 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS:
560 if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) {
561 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH;
562 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
566 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH:
567 if (send_certificate_request(s)) {
568 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
569 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
573 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
574 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE;
575 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
577 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
578 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
580 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
582 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
583 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
584 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
585 } else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) {
586 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
588 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
590 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
592 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
593 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
594 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
596 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
597 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
598 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
600 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
602 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
604 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
605 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
606 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
611 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
612 * the server to the client.
614 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
616 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
618 switch (st->hand_state) {
620 /* No pre work to be done */
623 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
626 dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s);
629 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
631 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
632 dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s);
633 /* We don't buffer this message so don't use the timer */
638 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
639 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
641 * Messages we write from now on should be bufferred and
642 * retransmitted if necessary, so we need to use the timer now
648 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
649 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
650 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)))
651 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
653 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
655 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
656 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
658 * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
659 * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer
665 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
666 s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
667 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
668 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
671 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
673 * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
674 * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer. This might have
675 * already been set to 0 if we sent a NewSessionTicket message,
676 * but we'll set it again here in case we didn't.
680 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
683 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst);
686 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
690 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
691 * server to the client.
693 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
695 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
699 switch (st->hand_state) {
701 /* No post work to be done */
704 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
705 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
707 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
708 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
713 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
714 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
716 /* HelloVerifyRequest resets Finished MAC */
717 if (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER && !ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
718 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
722 * The next message should be another ClientHello which we need to
723 * treat like it was the first packet
728 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
729 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
730 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
731 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
732 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
735 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no
738 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
739 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
741 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
742 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
743 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0,
745 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
749 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
750 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
755 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
756 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
757 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->hit) {
759 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
762 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
766 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
767 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
769 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
774 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
777 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
778 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
782 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
783 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
785 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
786 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
788 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
791 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
798 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
802 * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the
805 * Valid return values are:
809 int ossl_statem_server_construct_message(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
810 confunc_f *confunc, int *mt)
812 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
814 switch (st->hand_state) {
816 /* Shouldn't happen */
819 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
821 *confunc = dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
823 *confunc = tls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
824 *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
827 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
828 *confunc = dtls_construct_hello_verify_request;
829 *mt = DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
832 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
833 /* No construction function needed */
835 *mt = SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST;
838 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
839 *confunc = tls_construct_server_hello;
840 *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO;
844 *confunc = tls_construct_server_certificate;
845 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE;
848 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH:
849 *confunc = tls_construct_server_key_exchange;
850 *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE;
853 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
854 *confunc = tls_construct_certificate_request;
855 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST;
858 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
859 *confunc = tls_construct_server_done;
860 *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
863 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
864 *confunc = tls_construct_new_session_ticket;
865 *mt = SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET;
868 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS:
869 *confunc = tls_construct_cert_status;
870 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
873 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
874 *confunc = tls_construct_finished;
875 *mt = SSL3_MT_FINISHED;
883 * Maximum size (excluding the Handshake header) of a ClientHello message,
884 * calculated as follows:
886 * 2 + # client_version
887 * 32 + # only valid length for random
888 * 1 + # length of session_id
889 * 32 + # maximum size for session_id
890 * 2 + # length of cipher suites
891 * 2^16-2 + # maximum length of cipher suites array
892 * 1 + # length of compression_methods
893 * 2^8-1 + # maximum length of compression methods
894 * 2 + # length of extensions
895 * 2^16-1 # maximum length of extensions
897 #define CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH 131396
899 #define CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH 2048
900 #define NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH 514
903 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
904 * reading. Excludes the message header.
906 size_t ossl_statem_server_max_message_size(SSL *s)
908 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
910 switch (st->hand_state) {
912 /* Shouldn't happen */
915 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
916 return CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH;
919 return s->max_cert_list;
921 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
922 return CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH;
924 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
925 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
927 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
928 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
929 return NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH;
932 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
933 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH;
935 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
936 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH;
941 * Process a message that the server has received from the client.
943 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_server_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
945 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
947 switch (st->hand_state) {
949 /* Shouldn't happen */
950 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
952 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
953 return tls_process_client_hello(s, pkt);
956 return tls_process_client_certificate(s, pkt);
958 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
959 return tls_process_client_key_exchange(s, pkt);
961 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
962 return tls_process_cert_verify(s, pkt);
964 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
965 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
966 return tls_process_next_proto(s, pkt);
969 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
970 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt);
972 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
973 return tls_process_finished(s, pkt);
978 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
981 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
983 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
985 switch (st->hand_state) {
987 /* Shouldn't happen */
990 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
991 return tls_post_process_client_hello(s, wst);
993 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
994 return tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(s, wst);
996 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
997 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
998 if ( /* Is this SCTP? */
999 BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))
1000 /* Are we renegotiating? */
1001 && s->renegotiate && BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
1002 s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
1003 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
1004 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
1005 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
1006 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 1);
1009 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 0);
1012 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
1017 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1018 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al)
1020 int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE;
1022 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1024 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
1025 (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL)) {
1026 if (s->srp_ctx.login == NULL) {
1028 * RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, we do so if There is no srp
1031 ret = SSL3_AL_FATAL;
1032 *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
1034 ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s, al);
1041 int dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(WPACKET *pkt, unsigned char *cookie,
1044 /* Always use DTLS 1.0 version: see RFC 6347 */
1045 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, DTLS1_VERSION)
1046 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, cookie, cookie_len))
1052 int dtls_construct_hello_verify_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
1054 unsigned int cookie_leni;
1055 if (s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb == NULL ||
1056 s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->cookie,
1057 &cookie_leni) == 0 ||
1058 cookie_leni > 255) {
1059 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST,
1060 SSL_R_COOKIE_GEN_CALLBACK_FAILURE);
1063 s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_leni;
1065 if (!dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(pkt, s->d1->cookie,
1066 s->d1->cookie_len)) {
1067 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1074 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1076 int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1080 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
1081 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1082 SSL_COMP *comp = NULL;
1084 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL;
1086 /* |cookie| will only be initialized for DTLS. */
1087 PACKET session_id, compression, extensions, cookie;
1088 static const unsigned char null_compression = 0;
1089 CLIENTHELLO_MSG clienthello;
1092 * First, parse the raw ClientHello data into the CLIENTHELLO_MSG structure.
1094 memset(&clienthello, 0, sizeof(clienthello));
1095 clienthello.isv2 = RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer);
1096 PACKET_null_init(&cookie);
1098 if (clienthello.isv2) {
1102 * An SSLv3/TLSv1 backwards-compatible CLIENT-HELLO in an SSLv2
1103 * header is sent directly on the wire, not wrapped as a TLS
1104 * record. Our record layer just processes the message length and passes
1105 * the rest right through. Its format is:
1107 * 0-1 msg_length - decoded by the record layer
1108 * 2 msg_type - s->init_msg points here
1110 * 5-6 cipher_spec_length
1111 * 7-8 session_id_length
1112 * 9-10 challenge_length
1116 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &mt)
1117 || mt != SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
1119 * Should never happen. We should have tested this in the record
1120 * layer in order to have determined that this is a SSLv2 record
1121 * in the first place
1123 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1128 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &clienthello.legacy_version)) {
1129 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1130 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1134 /* Parse the message and load client random. */
1135 if (clienthello.isv2) {
1137 * Handle an SSLv2 backwards compatible ClientHello
1138 * Note, this is only for SSLv3+ using the backward compatible format.
1139 * Real SSLv2 is not supported, and is rejected below.
1141 unsigned int ciphersuite_len, session_id_len, challenge_len;
1144 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ciphersuite_len)
1145 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &session_id_len)
1146 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &challenge_len)) {
1147 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1148 SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1149 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1153 if (session_id_len > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH) {
1154 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1155 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1159 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &clienthello.ciphersuites,
1161 || !PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, clienthello.session_id, session_id_len)
1162 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &challenge, challenge_len)
1163 /* No extensions. */
1164 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1165 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1166 SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1167 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1170 clienthello.session_id_len = session_id_len;
1172 /* Load the client random and compression list. We use SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1173 * here rather than sizeof(clienthello.random) because that is the limit
1174 * for SSLv3 and it is fixed. It won't change even if
1175 * sizeof(clienthello.random) does.
1177 challenge_len = challenge_len > SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1178 ? SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE : challenge_len;
1179 memset(clienthello.random, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1180 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&challenge,
1181 clienthello.random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE -
1182 challenge_len, challenge_len)
1183 /* Advertise only null compression. */
1184 || !PACKET_buf_init(&compression, &null_compression, 1)) {
1185 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1186 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1190 PACKET_null_init(&clienthello.extensions);
1192 /* Regular ClientHello. */
1193 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, clienthello.random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)
1194 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)
1195 || !PACKET_copy_all(&session_id, clienthello.session_id,
1196 SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH,
1197 &clienthello.session_id_len)) {
1198 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1199 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1203 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1204 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookie)) {
1205 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1206 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1209 if (!PACKET_copy_all(&cookie, clienthello.dtls_cookie,
1210 DTLS1_COOKIE_LENGTH,
1211 &clienthello.dtls_cookie_len)) {
1212 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1213 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1217 * If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one,
1218 * just return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet.
1219 * So check cookie length...
1221 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
1222 if (clienthello.dtls_cookie_len == 0)
1227 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &clienthello.ciphersuites)) {
1228 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1229 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1233 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &compression)) {
1234 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1235 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1239 /* Could be empty. */
1240 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) {
1241 PACKET_null_init(&clienthello.extensions);
1243 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &clienthello.extensions)) {
1244 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1245 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1251 if (!PACKET_copy_all(&compression, clienthello.compressions,
1252 MAX_COMPRESSIONS_SIZE,
1253 &clienthello.compressions_len)) {
1254 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1255 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1259 /* Preserve the raw extensions PACKET for later use */
1260 extensions = clienthello.extensions;
1261 if (!tls_collect_extensions(&extensions, &clienthello.pre_proc_exts,
1262 &clienthello.num_extensions, &al)) {
1263 /* SSLerr already been called */
1267 /* Finished parsing the ClientHello, now we can start processing it */
1269 /* Set up the client_random */
1270 memcpy(s->s3->client_random, clienthello.random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1272 /* Choose the version */
1274 if (clienthello.isv2) {
1275 if (clienthello.legacy_version == SSL2_VERSION
1276 || (clienthello.legacy_version & 0xff00)
1277 != (SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR << 8)) {
1279 * This is real SSLv2 or something complete unknown. We don't
1282 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
1286 s->client_version = clienthello.legacy_version;
1289 * Do SSL/TLS version negotiation if applicable. For DTLS we just check
1290 * versions are potentially compatible. Version negotiation comes later.
1292 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1293 protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s, &clienthello);
1294 } else if (s->method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION &&
1295 DTLS_VERSION_LT((int)clienthello.legacy_version, s->version)) {
1296 protverr = SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW;
1302 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
1303 if ((!s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash)) {
1304 /* like ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
1305 s->version = s->client_version = clienthello.legacy_version;
1307 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1311 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1312 /* Empty cookie was already handled above by returning early. */
1313 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
1314 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) {
1315 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, clienthello.dtls_cookie,
1316 clienthello.dtls_cookie_len) == 0) {
1317 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1318 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1319 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1321 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1323 /* default verification */
1324 } else if (s->d1->cookie_len != clienthello.dtls_cookie_len
1325 || memcmp(clienthello.dtls_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
1326 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) {
1327 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1328 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1331 s->d1->cookie_verified = 1;
1333 if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
1334 protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s, &clienthello);
1335 if (protverr != 0) {
1336 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
1337 s->version = s->client_version;
1338 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1346 /* We need to do this before getting the session */
1347 if (!tls_check_client_ems_support(s, &clienthello)) {
1348 /* Only fails if the extension is malformed */
1349 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1350 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1355 * We don't allow resumption in a backwards compatible ClientHello.
1356 * TODO(openssl-team): in TLS1.1+, session_id MUST be empty.
1358 * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in
1359 * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally
1360 * ignore resumption requests with flag
1361 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
1362 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on
1363 * this for security won't even compile against older library versions).
1364 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to
1365 * request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains
1366 * unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the
1367 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be
1370 if (clienthello.isv2 ||
1372 (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) {
1373 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
1376 i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, &clienthello);
1378 * Only resume if the session's version matches the negotiated
1380 * RFC 5246 does not provide much useful advice on resumption
1381 * with a different protocol version. It doesn't forbid it but
1382 * the sanity of such behaviour would be questionable.
1383 * In practice, clients do not accept a version mismatch and
1384 * will abort the handshake with an error.
1386 if (i == 1 && s->version == s->session->ssl_version) {
1387 /* previous session */
1389 } else if (i == -1) {
1393 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
1398 if (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s, &clienthello.ciphersuites, &ciphers,
1399 clienthello.isv2, &al) == NULL) {
1403 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
1406 id = s->session->cipher->id;
1409 fprintf(stderr, "client sent %d ciphers\n", sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers));
1411 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) {
1412 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i);
1414 fprintf(stderr, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
1415 i, sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
1424 * we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked
1427 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1428 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1429 SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
1434 for (loop = 0; loop < clienthello.compressions_len; loop++) {
1435 if (clienthello.compressions[loop] == 0)
1439 if (loop >= clienthello.compressions_len) {
1441 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1442 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
1446 /* TLS extensions */
1447 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s, &clienthello)) {
1448 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
1452 /* Check we've got a key_share for TLSv1.3 */
1453 if (s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION && s->s3->peer_tmp == NULL) {
1454 /* No suitable share */
1455 /* TODO(1.3): Send a HelloRetryRequest */
1456 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1457 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_KEY_SHARE);
1462 * Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this handshake
1463 * for not reused session only. We need to generate server_random before
1464 * calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow SessionTicket
1465 * processing to use it in key derivation.
1469 pos = s->s3->server_random;
1470 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0) {
1475 if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
1476 const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
1478 * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for
1479 * backwards compat reasons
1481 int master_key_length;
1483 master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1484 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
1485 &master_key_length, ciphers,
1487 s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)
1488 && master_key_length > 0) {
1489 s->session->master_key_length = master_key_length;
1491 s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
1492 s->session->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
1496 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1498 pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s,
1503 if (pref_cipher == NULL) {
1504 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1505 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1509 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher;
1510 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
1511 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1512 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
1513 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1518 * Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1519 * options, we will now look for them. We have complen-1 compression
1520 * algorithms from the client, starting at q.
1522 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = NULL;
1523 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1524 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1525 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1526 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
1528 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1529 /* Can't disable compression */
1530 if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
1531 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1532 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1535 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1536 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++) {
1537 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
1538 if (comp_id == comp->id) {
1539 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1543 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) {
1544 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1545 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1548 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1549 for (k = 0; k < clienthello.compressions_len; k++) {
1550 if (clienthello.compressions[k] == comp_id)
1553 if (k >= clienthello.compressions_len) {
1554 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1555 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1556 SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
1561 else if (ssl_allow_compression(s) && s->ctx->comp_methods) {
1562 /* See if we have a match */
1563 int m, nn, v, done = 0;
1566 nn = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1567 for (m = 0; m < nn; m++) {
1568 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
1570 for (o = 0; o < clienthello.compressions_len; o++) {
1571 if (v == clienthello.compressions[o]) {
1580 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1586 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1587 * using compression.
1589 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1590 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1596 * Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher
1600 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1601 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
1603 s->session->compress_meth = (comp == NULL) ? 0 : comp->id;
1605 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
1606 s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
1607 if (ciphers == NULL) {
1608 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1609 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1613 if (!tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s)) {
1614 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1619 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1620 OPENSSL_free(clienthello.pre_proc_exts);
1621 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
1623 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1625 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1627 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1628 OPENSSL_free(clienthello.pre_proc_exts);
1630 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1633 WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_hello(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
1635 int al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1636 const SSL_CIPHER *cipher;
1638 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
1640 /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
1641 if (s->cert->cert_cb) {
1642 int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
1644 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1645 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1646 SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR);
1650 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
1653 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1656 ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1658 if (cipher == NULL) {
1659 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1660 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1663 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = cipher;
1664 /* check whether we should disable session resumption */
1665 if (s->not_resumable_session_cb != NULL)
1666 s->session->not_resumable = s->not_resumable_session_cb(s,
1667 ((cipher->algorithm_mkey & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)) != 0));
1668 if (s->session->not_resumable)
1669 /* do not send a session ticket */
1670 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
1672 /* Session-id reuse */
1673 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher;
1676 if (!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) {
1677 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
1678 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1684 * we now have the following setup.
1686 * cipher_list - our preferred list of ciphers
1687 * ciphers - the clients preferred list of ciphers
1688 * compression - basically ignored right now
1689 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1690 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1691 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1692 * s->s3->tmp.new_cipher- the new cipher to use.
1695 /* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */
1696 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) {
1697 if (!ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s, &al)) {
1698 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1699 SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1706 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1707 if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) {
1709 if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s, &al)) < 0) {
1711 * callback indicates further work to be done
1713 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
1716 if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE) {
1718 * This is not really an error but the only means to for
1719 * a client to detect whether srp is supported.
1721 if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY)
1722 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1723 SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1725 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1726 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
1733 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
1735 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1736 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1740 int tls_construct_server_hello(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
1742 int compm, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1746 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove the DRAFT conditional before release */
1747 version = SSL_IS_TLS13(s) ? TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT : s->version;
1748 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, version)
1750 * Random stuff. Filling of the server_random takes place in
1751 * tls_process_client_hello()
1753 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1754 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1759 * There are several cases for the session ID to send
1760 * back in the server hello:
1761 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
1762 * we send back the old session ID.
1763 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
1764 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
1765 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
1766 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
1768 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
1769 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
1770 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
1771 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
1774 if (s->session->not_resumable ||
1775 (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
1777 s->session->session_id_length = 0;
1779 sl = s->session->session_id_length;
1780 if (sl > sizeof(s->session->session_id)) {
1781 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1785 /* set up the compression method */
1786 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1789 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1792 compm = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
1795 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->session->session_id, sl)
1796 || !s->method->put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, pkt, &len)
1797 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, compm)
1798 || !ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s)
1799 || !ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, pkt, &al)) {
1800 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1806 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1810 int tls_construct_server_done(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
1812 if (!s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
1813 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
1814 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1821 int tls_construct_server_key_exchange(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
1823 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1824 EVP_PKEY *pkdh = NULL;
1826 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1827 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
1828 size_t encodedlen = 0;
1832 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1833 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, i;
1836 EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
1837 size_t paramlen, paramoffset;
1839 if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, ¶moffset)) {
1840 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1844 if (md_ctx == NULL) {
1845 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1849 type = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1851 r[0] = r[1] = r[2] = r[3] = NULL;
1852 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1853 /* Plain PSK or RSAPSK nothing to do */
1854 if (type & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
1856 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1857 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1858 if (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
1859 CERT *cert = s->cert;
1861 EVP_PKEY *pkdhp = NULL;
1864 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto) {
1865 DH *dhp = ssl_get_auto_dh(s);
1866 pkdh = EVP_PKEY_new();
1867 if (pkdh == NULL || dhp == NULL) {
1869 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1870 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1873 EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(pkdh, dhp);
1876 pkdhp = cert->dh_tmp;
1878 if ((pkdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL)) {
1879 DH *dhp = s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s, 0, 1024);
1880 pkdh = ssl_dh_to_pkey(dhp);
1882 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1883 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1888 if (pkdhp == NULL) {
1889 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1890 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1891 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1894 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH,
1895 EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkdhp), 0, pkdhp)) {
1896 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1897 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1898 SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
1901 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) {
1902 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1903 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1907 s->s3->tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey(pkdhp);
1909 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey == NULL) {
1910 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
1914 dh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
1916 EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh);
1919 DH_get0_pqg(dh, &r[0], NULL, &r[1]);
1920 DH_get0_key(dh, &r[2], NULL);
1923 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1924 if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
1927 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) {
1928 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1929 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1933 /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */
1934 nid = tls1_shared_group(s, -2);
1935 curve_id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(nid);
1936 if (curve_id == 0) {
1937 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1938 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
1941 s->s3->tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey_curve(curve_id);
1942 /* Generate a new key for this curve */
1943 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey == NULL) {
1944 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
1948 /* Encode the public key. */
1949 encodedlen = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->tmp.pkey,
1951 if (encodedlen == 0) {
1952 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
1957 * We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we
1958 * can set these to NULLs
1965 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1966 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1967 if (type & SSL_kSRP) {
1968 if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
1969 (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
1970 (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) || (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL)) {
1971 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1972 SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
1975 r[0] = s->srp_ctx.N;
1976 r[1] = s->srp_ctx.g;
1977 r[2] = s->srp_ctx.s;
1978 r[3] = s->srp_ctx.B;
1982 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1983 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1984 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
1988 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP))
1989 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)) {
1990 if ((pkey = ssl_get_sign_pkey(s, s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, &md))
1992 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1999 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2000 if (type & SSL_PSK) {
2001 size_t len = (s->cert->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
2002 ? 0 : strlen(s->cert->psk_identity_hint);
2005 * It should not happen that len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN - we already
2006 * checked this when we set the identity hint - but just in case
2008 if (len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
2009 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->cert->psk_identity_hint,
2011 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2012 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2018 for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
2019 unsigned char *binval;
2022 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2023 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) {
2024 res = WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt);
2027 res = WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt);
2030 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2031 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2035 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2037 * for interoperability with some versions of the Microsoft TLS
2038 * stack, we need to zero pad the DHE pub key to the same length
2041 if ((i == 2) && (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK))) {
2042 size_t len = BN_num_bytes(r[0]) - BN_num_bytes(r[2]);
2045 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, len, &binval)) {
2046 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2047 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2050 memset(binval, 0, len);
2054 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, BN_num_bytes(r[i]), &binval)
2055 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2056 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2057 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2061 BN_bn2bin(r[i], binval);
2064 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2065 if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2067 * We only support named (not generic) curves. In this situation, the
2068 * ServerKeyExchange message has: [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
2069 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by the actual encoded
2072 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
2073 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)
2074 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, curve_id)
2075 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, encodedPoint, encodedlen)) {
2076 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2077 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2080 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2081 encodedPoint = NULL;
2088 * n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4]) and p
2089 * points to the space at the end.
2092 unsigned char *sigbytes1, *sigbytes2;
2093 unsigned int siglen;
2095 /* Get length of the parameters we have written above */
2096 if (!WPACKET_get_length(pkt, ¶mlen)) {
2097 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2098 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2101 /* send signature algorithm */
2102 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2103 if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(pkt, pkey, md)) {
2104 /* Should never happen */
2105 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2106 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2111 fprintf(stderr, "Using hash %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
2114 * Create the signature. We don't know the actual length of the sig
2115 * until after we've created it, so we reserve enough bytes for it
2116 * up front, and then properly allocate them in the WPACKET
2119 if (!WPACKET_sub_reserve_bytes_u16(pkt, EVP_PKEY_size(pkey),
2121 || EVP_SignInit_ex(md_ctx, md, NULL) <= 0
2122 || EVP_SignUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
2123 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
2124 || EVP_SignUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
2125 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
2126 || EVP_SignUpdate(md_ctx, s->init_buf->data + paramoffset,
2128 || EVP_SignFinal(md_ctx, sigbytes1, &siglen, pkey) <= 0
2129 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, siglen, &sigbytes2)
2130 || sigbytes1 != sigbytes2) {
2131 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2132 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2136 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
2137 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2138 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2139 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
2144 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2147 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2149 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2150 EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh);
2152 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2153 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2155 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2159 int tls_construct_certificate_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2162 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk = NULL;
2164 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
2165 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
2166 || !ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s, pkt)
2167 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2168 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2172 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2173 const unsigned char *psigs;
2174 size_t nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &psigs);
2175 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
2176 || !tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, pkt, psigs, nl)
2177 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2178 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2179 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2184 /* Start sub-packet for client CA list */
2185 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
2186 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2190 sk = SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
2192 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) {
2193 unsigned char *namebytes;
2194 X509_NAME *name = sk_X509_NAME_value(sk, i);
2198 || (namelen = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL)) < 0
2199 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, namelen,
2201 || i2d_X509_NAME(name, &namebytes) != namelen) {
2202 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2203 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2208 /* else no CA names */
2210 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2211 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2215 s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 1;
2219 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2223 static int tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2225 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2226 unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
2228 PACKET psk_identity;
2230 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity)) {
2231 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2232 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2235 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2236 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2237 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2240 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL) {
2241 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2242 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
2246 if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity, &s->session->psk_identity)) {
2247 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2248 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2252 psklen = s->psk_server_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity,
2255 if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
2256 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2257 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2259 } else if (psklen == 0) {
2261 * PSK related to the given identity not found
2263 *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
2264 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2265 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2269 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.psk);
2270 s->s3->tmp.psk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen);
2271 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
2273 if (s->s3->tmp.psk == NULL) {
2274 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2275 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2279 s->s3->tmp.psklen = psklen;
2283 /* Should never happen */
2284 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2285 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2290 static int tls_process_cke_rsa(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2292 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2293 unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
2295 unsigned char decrypt_good, version_good;
2296 size_t j, padding_len;
2297 PACKET enc_premaster;
2299 unsigned char *rsa_decrypt = NULL;
2302 rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey);
2304 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2305 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2309 /* SSLv3 and pre-standard DTLS omit the length bytes. */
2310 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
2311 enc_premaster = *pkt;
2313 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &enc_premaster)
2314 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2315 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2316 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2322 * We want to be sure that the plaintext buffer size makes it safe to
2323 * iterate over the entire size of a premaster secret
2324 * (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). Reject overly short RSA keys because
2325 * their ciphertext cannot accommodate a premaster secret anyway.
2327 if (RSA_size(rsa) < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
2328 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2329 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
2333 rsa_decrypt = OPENSSL_malloc(RSA_size(rsa));
2334 if (rsa_decrypt == NULL) {
2335 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2336 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2341 * We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of
2342 * Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246,
2343 * section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of the TLS RFC and
2344 * generates a random premaster secret for the case that the decrypt
2345 * fails. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1
2348 if (RAND_bytes(rand_premaster_secret, sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0)
2352 * Decrypt with no padding. PKCS#1 padding will be removed as part of
2353 * the timing-sensitive code below.
2355 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
2356 decrypt_len = (int)RSA_private_decrypt((int)PACKET_remaining(&enc_premaster),
2357 PACKET_data(&enc_premaster),
2358 rsa_decrypt, rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING);
2359 if (decrypt_len < 0)
2362 /* Check the padding. See RFC 3447, section 7.2.2. */
2365 * The smallest padded premaster is 11 bytes of overhead. Small keys
2366 * are publicly invalid, so this may return immediately. This ensures
2367 * PS is at least 8 bytes.
2369 if (decrypt_len < 11 + SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
2370 *al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2371 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2375 padding_len = decrypt_len - SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
2376 decrypt_good = constant_time_eq_int_8(rsa_decrypt[0], 0) &
2377 constant_time_eq_int_8(rsa_decrypt[1], 2);
2378 for (j = 2; j < padding_len - 1; j++) {
2379 decrypt_good &= ~constant_time_is_zero_8(rsa_decrypt[j]);
2381 decrypt_good &= constant_time_is_zero_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len - 1]);
2384 * If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct then
2385 * version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero. The
2386 * Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
2387 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version number
2388 * check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks are done in
2389 * constant time and are treated like any other decryption error.
2392 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len],
2393 (unsigned)(s->client_version >> 8));
2395 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len + 1],
2396 (unsigned)(s->client_version & 0xff));
2399 * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2400 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2401 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2402 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
2403 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
2404 * protocol version. If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such
2407 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) {
2408 unsigned char workaround_good;
2409 workaround_good = constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len],
2410 (unsigned)(s->version >> 8));
2412 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len + 1],
2413 (unsigned)(s->version & 0xff));
2414 version_good |= workaround_good;
2418 * Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good to
2419 * remain non-zero (0xff).
2421 decrypt_good &= version_good;
2424 * Now copy rand_premaster_secret over from p using
2425 * decrypt_good_mask. If decryption failed, then p does not
2426 * contain valid plaintext, however, a check above guarantees
2427 * it is still sufficiently large to read from.
2429 for (j = 0; j < sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); j++) {
2430 rsa_decrypt[padding_len + j] =
2431 constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good,
2432 rsa_decrypt[padding_len + j],
2433 rand_premaster_secret[j]);
2436 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, rsa_decrypt + padding_len,
2437 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret), 0)) {
2438 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2439 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2445 OPENSSL_free(rsa_decrypt);
2448 /* Should never happen */
2449 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2450 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2455 static int tls_process_cke_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2457 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2458 EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL;
2462 const unsigned char *data;
2463 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL;
2466 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != i) {
2467 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2468 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
2469 SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2472 skey = s->s3->tmp.pkey;
2474 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2475 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2479 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) {
2480 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2481 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2484 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) {
2485 /* We already checked we have enough data */
2486 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2487 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2490 ckey = EVP_PKEY_new();
2491 if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) == 0) {
2492 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, SSL_R_BN_LIB);
2495 cdh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey);
2496 pub_key = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL);
2498 if (pub_key == NULL || !DH_set0_key(cdh, pub_key, NULL)) {
2499 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2500 if (pub_key != NULL)
2505 if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) {
2506 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2507 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2512 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
2513 s->s3->tmp.pkey = NULL;
2515 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2518 /* Should never happen */
2519 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2520 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2525 static int tls_process_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2527 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2528 EVP_PKEY *skey = s->s3->tmp.pkey;
2529 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL;
2532 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) {
2533 /* We don't support ECDH client auth */
2534 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2535 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
2539 const unsigned char *data;
2542 * Get client's public key from encoded point in the
2543 * ClientKeyExchange message.
2546 /* Get encoded point length */
2547 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &i) || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)
2548 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2549 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2550 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2553 ckey = EVP_PKEY_new();
2554 if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) <= 0) {
2555 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2558 if (EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey, data, i) == 0) {
2559 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2560 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2565 if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) {
2566 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2567 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2572 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
2573 s->s3->tmp.pkey = NULL;
2575 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2579 /* Should never happen */
2580 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2581 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2586 static int tls_process_cke_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2588 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2590 const unsigned char *data;
2592 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i)
2593 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) {
2594 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2595 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
2598 if ((s->srp_ctx.A = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL)) == NULL) {
2599 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2602 if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0 || BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A)) {
2603 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2604 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
2607 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
2608 s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
2609 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
2610 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2614 if (!srp_generate_server_master_secret(s)) {
2615 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2621 /* Should never happen */
2622 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2623 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2628 static int tls_process_cke_gost(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2630 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2631 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
2632 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
2633 unsigned char premaster_secret[32];
2634 const unsigned char *start;
2635 size_t outlen = 32, inlen;
2636 unsigned long alg_a;
2639 size_t sess_key_len;
2640 const unsigned char *data;
2643 /* Get our certificate private key */
2644 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2645 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST12) {
2647 * New GOST ciphersuites have SSL_aGOST01 bit too
2649 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512].privatekey;
2651 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256].privatekey;
2654 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
2656 } else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01) {
2657 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
2660 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL);
2661 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
2662 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2663 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2666 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0) {
2667 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2668 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2672 * If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
2673 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
2674 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use a
2675 * client certificate for authorization only.
2677 client_pub_pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2678 if (client_pub_pkey) {
2679 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
2682 /* Decrypt session key */
2683 sess_key_len = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
2684 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, sess_key_len)) {
2685 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2686 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2689 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
2690 if (ASN1_get_object((const unsigned char **)&data, &Tlen, &Ttag,
2691 &Tclass, (long)sess_key_len) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED
2692 || Ttag != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE || Tclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL) {
2693 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2694 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2699 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt
2700 (pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, start, inlen) <= 0) {
2701 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2702 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2705 /* Generate master secret */
2706 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, premaster_secret,
2707 sizeof(premaster_secret), 0)) {
2708 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2709 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2712 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2713 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
2714 (pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
2715 s->statem.no_cert_verify = 1;
2719 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2722 /* Should never happen */
2723 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2724 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2729 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2732 unsigned long alg_k;
2734 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2736 /* For PSK parse and retrieve identity, obtain PSK key */
2737 if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK) && !tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(s, pkt, &al))
2740 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
2741 /* Identity extracted earlier: should be nothing left */
2742 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2743 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2744 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2745 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2748 /* PSK handled by ssl_generate_master_secret */
2749 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, NULL, 0, 0)) {
2750 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2751 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2754 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
2755 if (!tls_process_cke_rsa(s, pkt, &al))
2757 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
2758 if (!tls_process_cke_dhe(s, pkt, &al))
2760 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2761 if (!tls_process_cke_ecdhe(s, pkt, &al))
2763 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
2764 if (!tls_process_cke_srp(s, pkt, &al))
2766 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
2767 if (!tls_process_cke_gost(s, pkt, &al))
2770 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2771 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2772 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
2776 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
2779 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2780 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2781 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.psk, s->s3->tmp.psklen);
2782 s->s3->tmp.psk = NULL;
2784 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2785 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2788 WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
2790 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
2791 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
2792 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
2793 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
2794 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
2796 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
2799 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
2800 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
2802 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
2803 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
2804 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0,
2806 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2810 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
2811 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
2816 if ((wst == WORK_MORE_B)
2818 && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))
2819 /* Are we renegotiating? */
2821 /* Are we going to skip the CertificateVerify? */
2822 && (s->session->peer == NULL || s->statem.no_cert_verify)
2823 && BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
2824 s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
2825 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
2826 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
2827 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
2828 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 1);
2831 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 0);
2835 if (s->statem.no_cert_verify || !s->session->peer) {
2837 * No certificate verify or no peer certificate so we no longer need
2838 * the handshake_buffer
2840 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
2841 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2844 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
2846 if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
2847 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2848 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2849 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2853 * For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer. If we support
2854 * extms we've done this already so this is a no-op
2856 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) {
2857 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2862 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
2865 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2867 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2868 const unsigned char *sig, *data;
2869 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2870 unsigned char *gost_data = NULL;
2872 int al, ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2876 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
2880 EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2883 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2884 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2888 peer = s->session->peer;
2889 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(peer);
2890 type = X509_certificate_type(peer, pkey);
2892 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
2893 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
2894 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
2895 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2899 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
2901 * If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare signature without
2902 * length field (CryptoPro implementations at least till CSP 4.0)
2904 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2905 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 64
2906 && EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) {
2911 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2914 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &sig, 2)) {
2915 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2918 rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, s, sig, pkey);
2920 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2922 } else if (rv == 0) {
2923 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2927 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
2930 /* Use default digest for this key type */
2931 int idx = ssl_cert_type(NULL, pkey);
2933 md = s->s3->tmp.md[idx];
2935 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2940 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &len)) {
2941 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2942 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2946 j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
2947 if (((int)len > j) || ((int)PACKET_remaining(pkt) > j)
2948 || (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)) {
2949 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
2950 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2953 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, len)) {
2954 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2955 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2959 hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
2960 if (hdatalen <= 0) {
2961 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2962 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2967 fprintf(stderr, "Using client verify alg %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
2969 if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(mctx, md, NULL)
2970 || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen)) {
2971 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2972 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2975 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2977 int pktype = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey);
2978 if (pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2001
2979 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
2980 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512) {
2981 if ((gost_data = OPENSSL_malloc(len)) == NULL) {
2982 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2983 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2986 BUF_reverse(gost_data, data, len);
2992 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION
2993 && !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET,
2994 (int)s->session->master_key_length,
2995 s->session->master_key)) {
2996 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2997 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3001 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(mctx, data, len, pkey) <= 0) {
3002 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3003 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
3007 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
3010 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3011 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3013 BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
3014 s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
3015 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
3016 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3017 OPENSSL_free(gost_data);
3022 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3024 int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3026 unsigned long l, llen;
3027 const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes;
3028 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
3031 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
3032 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3036 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &llen)
3037 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &spkt, llen)
3038 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3039 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3040 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3044 while (PACKET_remaining(&spkt) > 0) {
3045 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(&spkt, &l)
3046 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&spkt, &certbytes, l)) {
3047 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3048 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3049 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3053 certstart = certbytes;
3054 x = d2i_X509(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, l);
3056 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
3059 if (certbytes != (certstart + l)) {
3060 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3061 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3062 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3065 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
3066 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3072 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) {
3073 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
3074 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
3075 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3076 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3077 SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
3080 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
3081 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3082 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
3083 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3084 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3085 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3088 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
3089 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
3094 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
3096 al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
3097 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3098 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
3102 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, i);
3103 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3106 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(sk, 0));
3108 al = SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3109 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3110 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
3115 X509_free(s->session->peer);
3116 s->session->peer = sk_X509_shift(sk);
3117 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
3119 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->peer_chain, X509_free);
3120 s->session->peer_chain = sk;
3123 * Freeze the handshake buffer. For <TLS1.3 we do this after the CKE
3126 if (s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) {
3127 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3128 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3133 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own
3134 * certificate, while we do include it in statem_clnt.c
3137 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
3141 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3142 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3145 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
3149 int tls_construct_server_certificate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3153 cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
3155 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3159 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, pkt, cpk)) {
3160 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3167 int tls_construct_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3169 unsigned char *senc = NULL;
3170 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL;
3171 HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL;
3172 unsigned char *p, *encdata1, *encdata2, *macdata1, *macdata2;
3173 const unsigned char *const_p;
3174 int len, slen_full, slen, lenfinal;
3177 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3178 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
3179 unsigned char key_name[TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH];
3181 size_t macoffset, macendoffset;
3183 /* get session encoding length */
3184 slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
3186 * Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too
3189 if (slen_full == 0 || slen_full > 0xFF00) {
3190 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3193 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
3195 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3199 ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
3200 hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
3201 if (ctx == NULL || hctx == NULL) {
3202 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3207 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p))
3211 * create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up
3214 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
3217 sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
3219 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
3220 if (slen == 0 || slen > slen_full) { /* shouldn't ever happen */
3221 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3225 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p)) {
3226 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3229 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3232 * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does
3233 * all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx.
3235 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
3236 /* if 0 is returned, write an empty ticket */
3237 int ret = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, ctx,
3242 /* Put timeout and length */
3243 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, 0)
3244 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
3245 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
3246 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3250 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3251 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3256 iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
3258 const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = EVP_aes_256_cbc();
3260 iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher);
3261 if (RAND_bytes(iv, iv_len) <= 0)
3263 if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, cipher, NULL,
3264 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv))
3266 if (!HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key,
3267 sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key),
3268 EVP_sha256(), NULL))
3270 memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name,
3271 sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name));
3275 * Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only): We leave this unspecified
3276 * for resumed session (for simplicity), and guess that tickets for
3277 * new sessions will live as long as their sessions.
3279 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout)
3280 /* Now the actual ticket data */
3281 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
3282 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &macoffset)
3283 /* Output key name */
3284 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, key_name, sizeof(key_name))
3286 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, iv, iv_len)
3287 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, slen + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH,
3289 /* Encrypt session data */
3290 || !EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, encdata1, &len, senc, slen)
3291 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, len, &encdata2)
3292 || encdata1 != encdata2
3293 || !EVP_EncryptFinal(ctx, encdata1 + len, &lenfinal)
3294 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, lenfinal, &encdata2)
3295 || encdata1 + len != encdata2
3296 || len + lenfinal > slen + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH
3297 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &macendoffset)
3298 || !HMAC_Update(hctx,
3299 (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + macoffset,
3300 macendoffset - macoffset)
3301 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, &macdata1)
3302 || !HMAC_Final(hctx, macdata1, &hlen)
3303 || hlen > EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
3304 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, hlen, &macdata2)
3305 || macdata1 != macdata2
3306 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
3307 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3310 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3311 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3317 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3318 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3319 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3323 int tls_construct_cert_status(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3325 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->tlsext_status_type)
3326 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u24(pkt, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp,
3327 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen)) {
3328 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_STATUS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3329 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3336 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3338 * tls_process_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message.
3339 * It sets the next_proto member in s if found
3341 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_next_proto(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3343 PACKET next_proto, padding;
3344 size_t next_proto_len;
3347 * The payload looks like:
3349 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
3350 * uint8 padding_len;
3351 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
3353 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &next_proto)
3354 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &padding)
3355 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
3356 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEXT_PROTO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3360 if (!PACKET_memdup(&next_proto, &s->next_proto_negotiated, &next_proto_len)) {
3361 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = 0;
3365 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = (unsigned char)next_proto_len;
3367 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
3369 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3370 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3374 #define SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN 3
3376 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s,
3377 PACKET *cipher_suites,
3378 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **skp,
3379 int sslv2format, int *al)
3381 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
3382 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
3384 /* 3 = SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN > TLS_CIPHER_LEN = 2. */
3385 unsigned char cipher[SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN];
3387 s->s3->send_connection_binding = 0;
3389 n = sslv2format ? SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN : TLS_CIPHER_LEN;
3391 if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites) == 0) {
3392 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
3393 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3397 if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites) % n != 0) {
3398 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,
3399 SSL_R_ERROR_IN_RECEIVED_CIPHER_LIST);
3400 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3404 if ((skp == NULL) || (*skp == NULL)) {
3405 sk = sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null(); /* change perhaps later */
3407 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3408 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3413 sk_SSL_CIPHER_zero(sk);
3416 if (!PACKET_memdup(cipher_suites, &s->s3->tmp.ciphers_raw,
3417 &s->s3->tmp.ciphers_rawlen)) {
3418 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3422 while (PACKET_copy_bytes(cipher_suites, cipher, n)) {
3424 * SSLv3 ciphers wrapped in an SSLv2-compatible ClientHello have the
3425 * first byte set to zero, while true SSLv2 ciphers have a non-zero
3426 * first byte. We don't support any true SSLv2 ciphers, so skip them.
3428 if (sslv2format && cipher[0] != '\0')
3431 /* Check for TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV */
3432 if ((cipher[n - 2] == ((SSL3_CK_SCSV >> 8) & 0xff)) &&
3433 (cipher[n - 1] == (SSL3_CK_SCSV & 0xff))) {
3434 /* SCSV fatal if renegotiating */
3435 if (s->renegotiate) {
3436 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,
3437 SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING);
3438 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3441 s->s3->send_connection_binding = 1;
3445 /* Check for TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV */
3446 if ((cipher[n - 2] == ((SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV >> 8) & 0xff)) &&
3447 (cipher[n - 1] == (SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV & 0xff))) {
3449 * The SCSV indicates that the client previously tried a higher
3450 * version. Fail if the current version is an unexpected
3453 if (!ssl_check_version_downgrade(s)) {
3454 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,
3455 SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
3456 *al = SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK;
3462 /* For SSLv2-compat, ignore leading 0-byte. */
3463 c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, sslv2format ? &cipher[1] : cipher);
3465 if (!sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(sk, c)) {
3466 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3467 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3472 if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites) > 0) {
3473 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3474 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3482 if ((skp == NULL) || (*skp == NULL))
3483 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(sk);