2 * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
4 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
6 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
7 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
8 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
9 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
13 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
14 #include "statem_locl.h"
15 #include "internal/constant_time_locl.h"
16 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
17 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
18 #include <openssl/rand.h>
19 #include <openssl/objects.h>
20 #include <openssl/evp.h>
21 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
22 #include <openssl/x509.h>
23 #include <openssl/dh.h>
24 #include <openssl/bn.h>
25 #include <openssl/md5.h>
27 static int tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt);
30 * ossl_statem_server13_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
31 * handshake state transitions when a TLSv1.3 server is reading messages from
32 * the client. The message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|.
33 * The current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
35 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
36 * (transition not allowed)
38 static int ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
40 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
43 * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_BEFORE because at that stage we have
44 * not negotiated TLSv1.3 yet, so that case is handled by
45 * ossl_statem_server_read_transition()
47 switch (st->hand_state) {
51 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
52 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
53 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
54 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO;
58 } else if (s->ext.early_data == SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED) {
59 if (mt == SSL3_MT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA) {
60 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA;
67 case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
68 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
69 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
70 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
71 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT;
75 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
76 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
83 if (s->session->peer == NULL) {
84 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
85 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
89 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
90 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY;
96 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
97 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
98 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
105 * Its never ok to start processing handshake messages in the middle of
106 * early data (i.e. before we've received the end of early data alert)
108 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING)
111 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
112 && s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
113 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT;
117 if (mt == SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE) {
118 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE;
124 /* No valid transition found */
129 * ossl_statem_server_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
130 * handshake state transitions when the server is reading messages from the
131 * client. The message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|. The
132 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
134 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
135 * (transition not allowed)
137 int ossl_statem_server_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
139 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
141 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
142 if (!ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(s, mt))
147 switch (st->hand_state) {
153 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
154 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
155 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO;
160 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
162 * If we get a CKE message after a ServerDone then either
163 * 1) We didn't request a Certificate
165 * 2) If we did request one then
166 * a) We allow no Certificate to be returned
168 * b) We are running SSL3 (in TLS1.0+ the client must return a 0
169 * list if we requested a certificate)
171 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
172 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
173 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
174 if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)
175 && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
177 * This isn't an unexpected message as such - we're just
178 * not going to accept it because we require a client
181 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
182 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION,
183 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
186 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
190 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
193 } else if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
194 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
195 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT;
202 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
203 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
208 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
210 * We should only process a CertificateVerify message if we have
211 * received a Certificate from the client. If so then |s->session->peer|
212 * will be non NULL. In some instances a CertificateVerify message is
213 * not required even if the peer has sent a Certificate (e.g. such as in
214 * the case of static DH). In that case |st->no_cert_verify| should be
217 if (s->session->peer == NULL || st->no_cert_verify) {
218 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
220 * For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH
221 * pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is
222 * not sent. Also for GOST ciphersuites when the client uses
223 * its key from the certificate for key exchange.
225 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
229 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
230 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY;
236 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
237 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
238 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
243 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
244 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
245 if (s->s3->npn_seen) {
246 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO) {
247 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO;
252 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
253 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
256 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
261 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
262 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
263 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
264 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
270 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
271 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
272 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
279 /* No valid transition found */
280 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
284 * CCS messages don't have a message sequence number so this is probably
285 * because of an out-of-order CCS. We'll just drop it.
288 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
289 rbio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
290 BIO_clear_retry_flags(rbio);
291 BIO_set_retry_read(rbio);
294 SSLfatal(s, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
295 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION,
296 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
301 * Should we send a ServerKeyExchange message?
303 * Valid return values are:
307 static int send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
309 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
312 * only send a ServerKeyExchange if DH or fortezza but we have a
313 * sign only certificate PSK: may send PSK identity hints For
314 * ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange message only if
315 * the cipher suite is either ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases,
316 * the server certificate contains the server's public key for
319 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)
321 * PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if
324 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
325 /* Only send SKE if we have identity hint for plain PSK */
326 || ((alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK))
327 && s->cert->psk_identity_hint)
328 /* For other PSK always send SKE */
329 || (alg_k & (SSL_PSK & (SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK)))
331 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
332 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
333 || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
343 * Should we send a CertificateRequest message?
345 * Valid return values are:
349 int send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
352 /* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
353 s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER
355 * don't request if post-handshake-only unless doing
356 * post-handshake in TLSv1.3:
358 && (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_POST_HANDSHAKE)
359 || s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING)
361 * if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert
364 && (s->certreqs_sent < 1 ||
365 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE))
367 * never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see
368 * section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in
371 && (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
373 * ... except when the application insists on
374 * verification (against the specs, but statem_clnt.c accepts
377 || (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
378 /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
379 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)
381 * With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests
384 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aPSK)) {
392 * ossl_statem_server13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
393 * move to next when a TLSv1.3 server is writing messages to be sent to the
396 static WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(SSL *s)
398 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
401 * No case for TLS_ST_BEFORE, because at that stage we have not negotiated
402 * TLSv1.3 yet, so that is handled by ossl_statem_server_write_transition()
405 switch (st->hand_state) {
407 /* Shouldn't happen */
408 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
409 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER13_WRITE_TRANSITION,
410 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
411 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
414 if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) {
415 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE;
416 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
418 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING) {
419 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
420 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
422 /* Try to read from the client instead */
423 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
425 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
426 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO;
427 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
429 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
430 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0
431 && s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_COMPLETE)
432 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
433 else if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING)
434 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
436 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
437 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
439 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
440 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING)
441 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
443 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
444 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
446 case TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
448 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
449 else if (send_certificate_request(s))
450 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
452 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
454 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
456 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
457 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING) {
458 s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_REQUESTED;
459 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
461 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
463 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
466 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY;
467 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
469 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY:
470 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
471 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
473 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
474 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
475 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
477 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
478 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
480 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
482 * Technically we have finished the handshake at this point, but we're
483 * going to remain "in_init" for now and write out the session ticket
485 * TODO(TLS1.3): Perhaps we need to be able to control this behaviour
486 * and give the application the opportunity to delay sending the
489 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED)
490 s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_EXT_RECEIVED;
491 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
492 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
494 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE:
495 if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) {
496 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE;
497 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
501 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE:
502 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
503 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
504 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
509 * ossl_statem_server_write_transition() works out what handshake state to move
510 * to next when the server is writing messages to be sent to the client.
512 WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server_write_transition(SSL *s)
514 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
517 * Note that before the ClientHello we don't know what version we are going
518 * to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later
522 return ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(s);
524 switch (st->hand_state) {
526 /* Shouldn't happen */
527 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
528 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_WRITE_TRANSITION,
529 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
530 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
533 if (st->request_state == TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ) {
534 /* We must be trying to renegotiate */
535 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ;
536 st->request_state = TLS_ST_BEFORE;
537 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
539 /* Must be an incoming ClientHello */
540 if (!tls_setup_handshake(s)) {
541 /* SSLfatal() already called */
542 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
547 /* Just go straight to trying to read from the client */
548 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
550 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
551 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
552 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
554 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
555 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->d1->cookie_verified
556 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE)) {
557 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
558 } else if (s->renegotiate == 0 && !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
559 /* We must have rejected the renegotiation */
560 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
561 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
563 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO;
565 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
567 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
568 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
570 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
572 if (s->ext.ticket_expected)
573 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
575 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
577 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
578 /* normal PSK or SRP */
579 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth &
580 (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
581 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
582 } else if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) {
583 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH;
584 } else if (send_certificate_request(s)) {
585 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
587 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE;
590 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
593 if (s->ext.status_expected) {
594 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS;
595 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
599 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS:
600 if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) {
601 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH;
602 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
606 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH:
607 if (send_certificate_request(s)) {
608 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
609 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
613 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
614 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE;
615 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
617 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
618 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
620 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
622 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
623 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
624 } else if (s->ext.ticket_expected) {
625 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
627 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
629 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
631 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
632 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
633 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
635 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
636 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
637 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
639 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
641 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
643 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
644 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
649 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
650 * the server to the client.
652 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
654 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
656 switch (st->hand_state) {
658 /* No pre work to be done */
661 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
664 dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s);
667 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
669 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
670 dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s);
671 /* We don't buffer this message so don't use the timer */
676 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
677 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
679 * Messages we write from now on should be buffered and
680 * retransmitted if necessary, so we need to use the timer now
686 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
687 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
688 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) {
689 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
690 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
693 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
695 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
696 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
698 * Actually this is the end of the handshake, but we're going
699 * straight into writing the session ticket out. So we finish off
700 * the handshake, but keep the various buffers active.
702 * Calls SSLfatal as required.
704 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 0, 0);
705 } if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
707 * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
708 * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer
714 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
717 s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
718 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
719 /* SSLfatal() already called */
722 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
724 * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
725 * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer. This might have
726 * already been set to 0 if we sent a NewSessionTicket message,
727 * but we'll set it again here in case we didn't.
731 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
733 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
734 if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTING
735 && (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_STATELESS) == 0)
736 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
740 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
741 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 1, 1);
744 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
748 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
749 * server to the client.
751 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
753 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
757 switch (st->hand_state) {
759 /* No post work to be done */
762 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
763 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
765 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
766 /* SSLfatal() already called */
771 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
772 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
774 /* HelloVerifyRequest resets Finished MAC */
775 if (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER && !ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
776 /* SSLfatal() already called */
780 * The next message should be another ClientHello which we need to
781 * treat like it was the first packet
786 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
787 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
788 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) == 0
789 && statem_flush(s) != 1)
793 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
794 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
795 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
796 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
799 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no
802 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
803 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
805 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
806 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
807 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0,
809 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
810 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_POST_WORK,
811 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
815 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
816 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
820 || ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0
821 && s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_COMPLETE))
825 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
826 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
827 if (!statem_flush(s))
832 * TODO(TLS1.3): This actually causes a problem. We don't yet know
833 * whether the next record we are going to receive is an unencrypted
834 * alert, or an encrypted handshake message. We're going to need
835 * something clever in the record layer for this.
837 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
838 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)
839 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
840 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)) {
841 /* SSLfatal() already called */
845 if (s->ext.early_data != SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED
846 && !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
847 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE |SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) {
848 /* SSLfatal() already called */
854 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
855 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->hit) {
857 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
860 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
864 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
865 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
867 /* SSLfatal() already called */
872 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
875 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
876 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
880 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
881 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
883 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
884 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
886 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
889 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
893 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
894 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
895 s->master_secret, s->handshake_secret, 0,
896 &s->session->master_key_length)
897 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
898 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
899 /* SSLfatal() already called */
904 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
905 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING) {
906 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
911 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE:
912 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
914 if (!tls13_update_key(s, 1)) {
915 /* SSLfatal() already called */
920 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
921 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && statem_flush(s) != 1)
926 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
930 * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the
933 * Valid return values are:
937 int ossl_statem_server_construct_message(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
938 confunc_f *confunc, int *mt)
940 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
942 switch (st->hand_state) {
944 /* Shouldn't happen */
945 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
946 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_CONSTRUCT_MESSAGE,
947 SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_STATE);
950 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
952 *confunc = dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
954 *confunc = tls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
955 *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
958 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
959 *confunc = dtls_construct_hello_verify_request;
960 *mt = DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
963 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
964 /* No construction function needed */
966 *mt = SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST;
969 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
970 *confunc = tls_construct_server_hello;
971 *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO;
975 *confunc = tls_construct_server_certificate;
976 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE;
979 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY:
980 *confunc = tls_construct_cert_verify;
981 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY;
985 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH:
986 *confunc = tls_construct_server_key_exchange;
987 *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE;
990 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
991 *confunc = tls_construct_certificate_request;
992 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST;
995 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
996 *confunc = tls_construct_server_done;
997 *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
1000 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
1001 *confunc = tls_construct_new_session_ticket;
1002 *mt = SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET;
1005 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS:
1006 *confunc = tls_construct_cert_status;
1007 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
1010 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
1011 *confunc = tls_construct_finished;
1012 *mt = SSL3_MT_FINISHED;
1015 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
1017 *mt = SSL3_MT_DUMMY;
1020 case TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
1021 *confunc = tls_construct_encrypted_extensions;
1022 *mt = SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
1025 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE:
1026 *confunc = tls_construct_key_update;
1027 *mt = SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE;
1035 * Maximum size (excluding the Handshake header) of a ClientHello message,
1036 * calculated as follows:
1038 * 2 + # client_version
1039 * 32 + # only valid length for random
1040 * 1 + # length of session_id
1041 * 32 + # maximum size for session_id
1042 * 2 + # length of cipher suites
1043 * 2^16-2 + # maximum length of cipher suites array
1044 * 1 + # length of compression_methods
1045 * 2^8-1 + # maximum length of compression methods
1046 * 2 + # length of extensions
1047 * 2^16-1 # maximum length of extensions
1049 #define CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH 131396
1051 #define CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH 2048
1052 #define NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH 514
1055 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
1056 * reading. Excludes the message header.
1058 size_t ossl_statem_server_max_message_size(SSL *s)
1060 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1062 switch (st->hand_state) {
1064 /* Shouldn't happen */
1067 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
1068 return CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH;
1070 case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
1071 return END_OF_EARLY_DATA_MAX_LENGTH;
1073 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT:
1074 return s->max_cert_list;
1076 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
1077 return CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH;
1079 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
1080 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
1082 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1083 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
1084 return NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH;
1087 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
1088 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH;
1090 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
1091 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH;
1093 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE:
1094 return KEY_UPDATE_MAX_LENGTH;
1099 * Process a message that the server has received from the client.
1101 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_server_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1103 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1105 switch (st->hand_state) {
1107 /* Shouldn't happen */
1108 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1109 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_PROCESS_MESSAGE,
1110 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1111 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1113 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
1114 return tls_process_client_hello(s, pkt);
1116 case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
1117 return tls_process_end_of_early_data(s, pkt);
1119 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT:
1120 return tls_process_client_certificate(s, pkt);
1122 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
1123 return tls_process_client_key_exchange(s, pkt);
1125 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
1126 return tls_process_cert_verify(s, pkt);
1128 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1129 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
1130 return tls_process_next_proto(s, pkt);
1133 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
1134 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt);
1136 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
1137 return tls_process_finished(s, pkt);
1139 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE:
1140 return tls_process_key_update(s, pkt);
1146 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
1149 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
1151 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1153 switch (st->hand_state) {
1155 /* Shouldn't happen */
1156 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1157 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_POST_PROCESS_MESSAGE,
1158 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1161 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
1162 return tls_post_process_client_hello(s, wst);
1164 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
1165 return tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(s, wst);
1169 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1170 /* Returns 1 on success, 0 for retryable error, -1 for fatal error */
1171 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s)
1174 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1176 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
1177 (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL)) {
1178 if (s->srp_ctx.login == NULL) {
1180 * RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, we do so if There is no srp
1183 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY,
1184 SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRP_EXT_CLIENTHELLO,
1185 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
1188 ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s, &al);
1191 if (ret == SSL3_AL_FATAL) {
1192 SSLfatal(s, al, SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRP_EXT_CLIENTHELLO,
1193 al == SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY
1194 ? SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND
1195 : SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1204 int dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(WPACKET *pkt, unsigned char *cookie,
1207 /* Always use DTLS 1.0 version: see RFC 6347 */
1208 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, DTLS1_VERSION)
1209 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, cookie, cookie_len))
1215 int dtls_construct_hello_verify_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
1217 unsigned int cookie_leni;
1218 if (s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb == NULL ||
1219 s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->cookie,
1220 &cookie_leni) == 0 ||
1221 cookie_leni > 255) {
1222 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST,
1223 SSL_R_COOKIE_GEN_CALLBACK_FAILURE);
1226 s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_leni;
1228 if (!dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(pkt, s->d1->cookie,
1229 s->d1->cookie_len)) {
1230 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST,
1231 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1238 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1240 * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1241 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |hello|.
1242 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1246 * signature_algorithms (for TLSv1.2 only)
1248 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1249 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1250 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1251 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1253 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello)
1255 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1256 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1257 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1258 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1259 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1260 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1261 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1263 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1264 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1265 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1266 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1267 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1268 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1269 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1270 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1271 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1272 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1273 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1274 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1275 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1277 /* Length of the common prefix (first two extensions). */
1278 static const size_t kSafariCommonExtensionsLength = 18;
1283 tmppkt = hello->extensions;
1285 if (!PACKET_forward(&tmppkt, 2)
1286 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt, &type)
1287 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&tmppkt, &sni)) {
1291 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1294 ext_len = TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION ?
1295 sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock) : kSafariCommonExtensionsLength;
1297 s->s3->is_probably_safari = PACKET_equal(&tmppkt, kSafariExtensionsBlock,
1300 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1302 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1304 /* |cookie| will only be initialized for DTLS. */
1305 PACKET session_id, compression, extensions, cookie;
1306 static const unsigned char null_compression = 0;
1307 CLIENTHELLO_MSG *clienthello = NULL;
1309 /* Check if this is actually an unexpected renegotiation ClientHello */
1310 if (s->renegotiate == 0 && !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
1311 if (!ossl_assert(!SSL_IS_TLS13(s))) {
1312 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1313 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1316 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION) != 0
1317 || (!s->s3->send_connection_binding
1319 & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION) == 0)) {
1320 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
1321 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1327 clienthello = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*clienthello));
1328 if (clienthello == NULL) {
1329 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1330 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1335 * First, parse the raw ClientHello data into the CLIENTHELLO_MSG structure.
1337 clienthello->isv2 = RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer);
1338 PACKET_null_init(&cookie);
1340 if (clienthello->isv2) {
1343 if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)
1344 || s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE) {
1345 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
1346 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
1351 * An SSLv3/TLSv1 backwards-compatible CLIENT-HELLO in an SSLv2
1352 * header is sent directly on the wire, not wrapped as a TLS
1353 * record. Our record layer just processes the message length and passes
1354 * the rest right through. Its format is:
1356 * 0-1 msg_length - decoded by the record layer
1357 * 2 msg_type - s->init_msg points here
1359 * 5-6 cipher_spec_length
1360 * 7-8 session_id_length
1361 * 9-10 challenge_length
1365 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &mt)
1366 || mt != SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
1368 * Should never happen. We should have tested this in the record
1369 * layer in order to have determined that this is a SSLv2 record
1370 * in the first place
1372 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1373 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1378 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &clienthello->legacy_version)) {
1379 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1380 SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1384 /* Parse the message and load client random. */
1385 if (clienthello->isv2) {
1387 * Handle an SSLv2 backwards compatible ClientHello
1388 * Note, this is only for SSLv3+ using the backward compatible format.
1389 * Real SSLv2 is not supported, and is rejected below.
1391 unsigned int ciphersuite_len, session_id_len, challenge_len;
1394 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ciphersuite_len)
1395 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &session_id_len)
1396 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &challenge_len)) {
1397 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1398 SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1402 if (session_id_len > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH) {
1403 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1404 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1408 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &clienthello->ciphersuites,
1410 || !PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, clienthello->session_id, session_id_len)
1411 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &challenge, challenge_len)
1412 /* No extensions. */
1413 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1414 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1415 SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1418 clienthello->session_id_len = session_id_len;
1420 /* Load the client random and compression list. We use SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1421 * here rather than sizeof(clienthello->random) because that is the limit
1422 * for SSLv3 and it is fixed. It won't change even if
1423 * sizeof(clienthello->random) does.
1425 challenge_len = challenge_len > SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1426 ? SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE : challenge_len;
1427 memset(clienthello->random, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1428 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&challenge,
1429 clienthello->random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE -
1430 challenge_len, challenge_len)
1431 /* Advertise only null compression. */
1432 || !PACKET_buf_init(&compression, &null_compression, 1)) {
1433 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1434 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1438 PACKET_null_init(&clienthello->extensions);
1440 /* Regular ClientHello. */
1441 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, clienthello->random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)
1442 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)
1443 || !PACKET_copy_all(&session_id, clienthello->session_id,
1444 SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH,
1445 &clienthello->session_id_len)) {
1446 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1447 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1451 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1452 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookie)) {
1453 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1454 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1457 if (!PACKET_copy_all(&cookie, clienthello->dtls_cookie,
1458 DTLS1_COOKIE_LENGTH,
1459 &clienthello->dtls_cookie_len)) {
1460 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1461 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1465 * If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one,
1466 * just return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet.
1467 * So check cookie length...
1469 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
1470 if (clienthello->dtls_cookie_len == 0)
1471 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1475 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &clienthello->ciphersuites)) {
1476 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1477 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1481 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &compression)) {
1482 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1483 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1487 /* Could be empty. */
1488 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) {
1489 PACKET_null_init(&clienthello->extensions);
1491 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &clienthello->extensions)
1492 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1493 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1494 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1500 if (!PACKET_copy_all(&compression, clienthello->compressions,
1501 MAX_COMPRESSIONS_SIZE,
1502 &clienthello->compressions_len)) {
1503 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1504 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1508 /* Preserve the raw extensions PACKET for later use */
1509 extensions = clienthello->extensions;
1510 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1511 &clienthello->pre_proc_exts,
1512 &clienthello->pre_proc_exts_len, 1)) {
1513 /* SSLfatal already been called */
1516 s->clienthello = clienthello;
1518 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
1521 if (clienthello != NULL)
1522 OPENSSL_free(clienthello->pre_proc_exts);
1523 OPENSSL_free(clienthello);
1525 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1528 static int tls_early_post_process_client_hello(SSL *s)
1531 int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1535 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1536 SSL_COMP *comp = NULL;
1538 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
1539 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL;
1540 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *scsvs = NULL;
1541 CLIENTHELLO_MSG *clienthello = s->clienthello;
1542 DOWNGRADE dgrd = DOWNGRADE_NONE;
1544 /* Finished parsing the ClientHello, now we can start processing it */
1545 /* Give the ClientHello callback a crack at things */
1546 if (s->ctx->client_hello_cb != NULL) {
1547 /* A failure in the ClientHello callback terminates the connection. */
1548 switch (s->ctx->client_hello_cb(s, &al, s->ctx->client_hello_cb_arg)) {
1549 case SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_SUCCESS:
1551 case SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_RETRY:
1552 s->rwstate = SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_CB;
1554 case SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_ERROR:
1557 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1558 SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED);
1563 /* Set up the client_random */
1564 memcpy(s->s3->client_random, clienthello->random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1566 /* Choose the version */
1568 if (clienthello->isv2) {
1569 if (clienthello->legacy_version == SSL2_VERSION
1570 || (clienthello->legacy_version & 0xff00)
1571 != (SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR << 8)) {
1573 * This is real SSLv2 or something completely unknown. We don't
1576 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
1577 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1578 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
1582 s->client_version = clienthello->legacy_version;
1585 * Do SSL/TLS version negotiation if applicable. For DTLS we just check
1586 * versions are potentially compatible. Version negotiation comes later.
1588 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1589 protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s, clienthello, &dgrd);
1590 } else if (s->method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION &&
1591 DTLS_VERSION_LT((int)clienthello->legacy_version, s->version)) {
1592 protverr = SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW;
1598 if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
1599 /* like ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
1600 s->version = s->client_version = clienthello->legacy_version;
1602 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
1603 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
1607 /* TLSv1.3 specifies that a ClientHello must end on a record boundary */
1608 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
1609 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
1610 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1611 SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
1615 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1616 /* Empty cookie was already handled above by returning early. */
1617 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
1618 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) {
1619 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, clienthello->dtls_cookie,
1620 clienthello->dtls_cookie_len) == 0) {
1621 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1622 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1623 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1625 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1627 /* default verification */
1628 } else if (s->d1->cookie_len != clienthello->dtls_cookie_len
1629 || memcmp(clienthello->dtls_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
1630 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) {
1631 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1632 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1633 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1636 s->d1->cookie_verified = 1;
1638 if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
1639 protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s, clienthello, &dgrd);
1640 if (protverr != 0) {
1641 s->version = s->client_version;
1642 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
1643 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
1651 if (!ssl_cache_cipherlist(s, &clienthello->ciphersuites,
1652 clienthello->isv2) ||
1653 !bytes_to_cipher_list(s, &clienthello->ciphersuites, &ciphers, &scsvs,
1654 clienthello->isv2, 1)) {
1655 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1659 s->s3->send_connection_binding = 0;
1660 /* Check what signalling cipher-suite values were received. */
1661 if (scsvs != NULL) {
1662 for(i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(scsvs); i++) {
1663 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(scsvs, i);
1664 if (SSL_CIPHER_get_id(c) == SSL3_CK_SCSV) {
1665 if (s->renegotiate) {
1666 /* SCSV is fatal if renegotiating */
1667 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1668 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1669 SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING);
1672 s->s3->send_connection_binding = 1;
1673 } else if (SSL_CIPHER_get_id(c) == SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV &&
1674 !ssl_check_version_downgrade(s)) {
1676 * This SCSV indicates that the client previously tried
1677 * a higher version. We should fail if the current version
1678 * is an unexpected downgrade, as that indicates that the first
1679 * connection may have been tampered with in order to trigger
1680 * an insecure downgrade.
1682 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK,
1683 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1684 SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
1690 /* For TLSv1.3 we must select the ciphersuite *before* session resumption */
1691 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1692 const SSL_CIPHER *cipher =
1693 ssl3_choose_cipher(s, ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1695 if (cipher == NULL) {
1696 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1697 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1698 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1701 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING
1702 && (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL
1703 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id != cipher->id)) {
1705 * A previous HRR picked a different ciphersuite to the one we
1706 * just selected. Something must have changed.
1708 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1709 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1713 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = cipher;
1716 /* We need to do this before getting the session */
1717 if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_extended_master_secret,
1718 SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1719 clienthello->pre_proc_exts, NULL, 0)) {
1720 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1725 * We don't allow resumption in a backwards compatible ClientHello.
1726 * TODO(openssl-team): in TLS1.1+, session_id MUST be empty.
1728 * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in
1729 * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally
1730 * ignore resumption requests with flag
1731 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
1732 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on
1733 * this for security won't even compile against older library versions).
1734 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to
1735 * request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains
1736 * unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the
1737 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be
1740 if (clienthello->isv2 ||
1742 (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) {
1743 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1)) {
1744 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1748 i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, clienthello);
1750 /* previous session */
1752 } else if (i == -1) {
1753 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1757 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1)) {
1758 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1764 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1765 memcpy(s->tmp_session_id, s->clienthello->session_id,
1766 s->clienthello->session_id_len);
1767 s->tmp_session_id_len = s->clienthello->session_id_len;
1771 * If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list. In TLSv1.3 we check
1772 * ciphersuite compatibility with the session as part of resumption.
1774 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->hit) {
1776 id = s->session->cipher->id;
1779 fprintf(stderr, "client sent %d ciphers\n", sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers));
1781 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) {
1782 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i);
1784 fprintf(stderr, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
1785 i, sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
1794 * we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked
1797 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1798 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1799 SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
1804 for (loop = 0; loop < clienthello->compressions_len; loop++) {
1805 if (clienthello->compressions[loop] == 0)
1809 if (loop >= clienthello->compressions_len) {
1811 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
1812 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1813 SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
1817 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1818 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1819 ssl_check_for_safari(s, clienthello);
1820 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1822 /* TLS extensions */
1823 if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1824 clienthello->pre_proc_exts, NULL, 0, 1)) {
1825 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1830 * Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this handshake
1831 * for not reused session only. We need to generate server_random before
1832 * calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow SessionTicket
1833 * processing to use it in key derivation.
1837 pos = s->s3->server_random;
1838 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, dgrd) <= 0) {
1839 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1840 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1841 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1847 && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
1850 && s->ext.session_secret_cb) {
1851 const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
1853 * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for
1854 * backwards compat reasons
1856 int master_key_length;
1858 master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1859 if (s->ext.session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
1860 &master_key_length, ciphers,
1862 s->ext.session_secret_cb_arg)
1863 && master_key_length > 0) {
1864 s->session->master_key_length = master_key_length;
1866 s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
1867 s->session->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
1871 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1872 if (pref_cipher == NULL)
1873 pref_cipher = ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers,
1874 SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1875 if (pref_cipher == NULL) {
1876 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1877 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1878 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1882 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher;
1883 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
1884 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1885 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
1886 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1891 * Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1892 * options, we will now look for them. We have complen-1 compression
1893 * algorithms from the client, starting at q.
1895 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = NULL;
1896 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1898 * We already checked above that the NULL compression method appears in
1899 * the list. Now we check there aren't any others (which is illegal in
1900 * a TLSv1.3 ClientHello.
1902 if (clienthello->compressions_len != 1) {
1903 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1904 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1905 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1909 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1910 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1911 else if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1912 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
1914 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1915 /* Can't disable compression */
1916 if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
1917 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1918 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1919 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1922 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1923 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++) {
1924 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
1925 if (comp_id == comp->id) {
1926 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1930 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) {
1931 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1932 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1933 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1936 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1937 for (k = 0; k < clienthello->compressions_len; k++) {
1938 if (clienthello->compressions[k] == comp_id)
1941 if (k >= clienthello->compressions_len) {
1942 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1943 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1944 SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
1947 } else if (s->hit) {
1949 } else if (ssl_allow_compression(s) && s->ctx->comp_methods) {
1950 /* See if we have a match */
1951 int m, nn, v, done = 0;
1954 nn = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1955 for (m = 0; m < nn; m++) {
1956 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
1958 for (o = 0; o < clienthello->compressions_len; o++) {
1959 if (v == clienthello->compressions[o]) {
1968 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1974 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1975 * using compression.
1977 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1978 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1979 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1980 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1986 * Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher
1989 if (!s->hit || SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1990 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
1991 s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
1992 if (ciphers == NULL) {
1993 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1994 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1995 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2002 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
2003 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
2005 s->session->compress_meth = (comp == NULL) ? 0 : comp->id;
2007 if (!tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s)) {
2008 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2013 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
2014 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(scsvs);
2015 OPENSSL_free(clienthello->pre_proc_exts);
2016 OPENSSL_free(s->clienthello);
2017 s->clienthello = NULL;
2020 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
2021 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(scsvs);
2022 OPENSSL_free(clienthello->pre_proc_exts);
2023 OPENSSL_free(s->clienthello);
2024 s->clienthello = NULL;
2030 * Call the status request callback if needed. Upon success, returns 1.
2031 * Upon failure, returns 0.
2033 static int tls_handle_status_request(SSL *s)
2035 s->ext.status_expected = 0;
2038 * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be
2039 * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed,
2040 * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may
2041 * influence which certificate is sent
2043 if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing && s->ctx != NULL
2044 && s->ctx->ext.status_cb != NULL) {
2047 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
2048 if (s->s3->tmp.cert != NULL) {
2050 * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
2051 * et al can pick it up.
2053 s->cert->key = s->s3->tmp.cert;
2054 ret = s->ctx->ext.status_cb(s, s->ctx->ext.status_arg);
2056 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
2057 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2058 s->ext.status_expected = 0;
2060 /* status request response should be sent */
2061 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
2062 if (s->ext.ocsp.resp)
2063 s->ext.status_expected = 1;
2065 /* something bad happened */
2066 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2068 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2069 SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_STATUS_REQUEST,
2070 SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2080 * Call the alpn_select callback if needed. Upon success, returns 1.
2081 * Upon failure, returns 0.
2083 int tls_handle_alpn(SSL *s)
2085 const unsigned char *selected = NULL;
2086 unsigned char selected_len = 0;
2088 if (s->ctx->ext.alpn_select_cb != NULL && s->s3->alpn_proposed != NULL) {
2089 int r = s->ctx->ext.alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len,
2090 s->s3->alpn_proposed,
2091 (unsigned int)s->s3->alpn_proposed_len,
2092 s->ctx->ext.alpn_select_cb_arg);
2094 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
2095 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2096 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_memdup(selected, selected_len);
2097 if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
2098 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_ALPN,
2099 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2102 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
2103 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2104 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
2105 s->s3->npn_seen = 0;
2108 /* Check ALPN is consistent with session */
2109 if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL
2110 || selected_len != s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len
2111 || memcmp(selected, s->session->ext.alpn_selected,
2112 selected_len) != 0) {
2113 /* Not consistent so can't be used for early_data */
2114 s->ext.early_data_ok = 0;
2118 * This is a new session and so alpn_selected should have
2119 * been initialised to NULL. We should update it with the
2122 if (!ossl_assert(s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL)) {
2123 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2124 SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_ALPN,
2125 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2128 s->session->ext.alpn_selected = OPENSSL_memdup(selected,
2130 if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL) {
2131 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2132 SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_ALPN,
2133 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2136 s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
2141 } else if (r != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK) {
2142 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL, SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_ALPN,
2143 SSL_R_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL);
2147 * If r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK then behave as if no callback was
2152 /* Check ALPN is consistent with session */
2153 if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected != NULL) {
2154 /* Not consistent so can't be used for early_data */
2155 s->ext.early_data_ok = 0;
2161 WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_hello(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
2163 const SSL_CIPHER *cipher;
2165 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
2166 int rv = tls_early_post_process_client_hello(s);
2168 /* SSLfatal() was already called */
2175 if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) {
2176 if (!s->hit || SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2177 /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
2178 if (!s->hit && s->cert->cert_cb != NULL) {
2179 int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
2181 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2182 SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
2183 SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR);
2187 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
2190 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
2193 /* In TLSv1.3 we selected the ciphersuite before resumption */
2194 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2196 ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
2198 if (cipher == NULL) {
2199 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2200 SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
2201 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
2204 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = cipher;
2207 if (!tls_choose_sigalg(s, 1)) {
2208 /* SSLfatal already called */
2211 /* check whether we should disable session resumption */
2212 if (s->not_resumable_session_cb != NULL)
2213 s->session->not_resumable =
2214 s->not_resumable_session_cb(s,
2215 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey
2216 & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)) != 0));
2217 if (s->session->not_resumable)
2218 /* do not send a session ticket */
2219 s->ext.ticket_expected = 0;
2222 /* Session-id reuse */
2223 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher;
2227 * we now have the following setup.
2229 * cipher_list - our preferred list of ciphers
2230 * ciphers - the clients preferred list of ciphers
2231 * compression - basically ignored right now
2232 * ssl version is set - sslv3
2233 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
2234 * s->hit - session reuse flag
2235 * s->s3->tmp.new_cipher- the new cipher to use.
2239 * Call status_request callback if needed. Has to be done after the
2240 * certificate callbacks etc above.
2242 if (!tls_handle_status_request(s)) {
2243 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2247 * Call alpn_select callback if needed. Has to be done after SNI and
2248 * cipher negotiation (HTTP/2 restricts permitted ciphers). In TLSv1.3
2249 * we already did this because cipher negotiation happens earlier, and
2250 * we must handle ALPN before we decide whether to accept early_data.
2252 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !tls_handle_alpn(s)) {
2253 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2259 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2260 if (wst == WORK_MORE_C) {
2262 if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s)) == 0) {
2264 * callback indicates further work to be done
2266 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
2270 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2276 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
2281 int tls_construct_server_hello(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2286 unsigned char *session_id;
2287 int usetls13 = SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING;
2289 version = usetls13 ? TLS1_2_VERSION : s->version;
2290 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, version)
2292 * Random stuff. Filling of the server_random takes place in
2293 * tls_process_client_hello()
2295 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt,
2296 s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING
2297 ? hrrrandom : s->s3->server_random,
2298 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
2299 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO,
2300 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2305 * There are several cases for the session ID to send
2306 * back in the server hello:
2307 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
2308 * we send back the old session ID.
2309 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
2310 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
2311 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
2312 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
2314 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
2315 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
2316 * - In TLSv1.3 we echo back the session id sent to us by the client
2318 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
2319 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
2322 if (s->session->not_resumable ||
2323 (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
2325 s->session->session_id_length = 0;
2328 sl = s->tmp_session_id_len;
2329 session_id = s->tmp_session_id;
2331 sl = s->session->session_id_length;
2332 session_id = s->session->session_id;
2335 if (sl > sizeof(s->session->session_id)) {
2336 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO,
2337 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2341 /* set up the compression method */
2342 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
2345 if (usetls13 || s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
2348 compm = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
2351 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, session_id, sl)
2352 || !s->method->put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, pkt, &len)
2353 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, compm)
2354 || !tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt,
2355 s->hello_retry_request
2357 ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
2359 ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
2360 : SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO),
2362 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2366 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
2367 /* Ditch the session. We'll create a new one next time around */
2368 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
2373 * Re-initialise the Transcript Hash. We're going to prepopulate it with
2374 * a synthetic message_hash in place of ClientHello1.
2376 if (!create_synthetic_message_hash(s, NULL, 0, NULL, 0)) {
2377 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2380 } else if (!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)
2381 && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
2382 /* SSLfatal() already called */;
2389 int tls_construct_server_done(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2391 if (!s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
2392 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
2393 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2400 int tls_construct_server_key_exchange(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2402 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2403 EVP_PKEY *pkdh = NULL;
2405 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2406 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
2407 size_t encodedlen = 0;
2410 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = s->s3->tmp.sigalg;
2414 EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2415 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2416 size_t paramlen, paramoffset;
2418 if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, ¶moffset)) {
2419 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2420 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2424 if (md_ctx == NULL) {
2425 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2426 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2430 type = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2432 r[0] = r[1] = r[2] = r[3] = NULL;
2433 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2434 /* Plain PSK or RSAPSK nothing to do */
2435 if (type & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
2437 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
2438 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2439 if (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
2440 CERT *cert = s->cert;
2442 EVP_PKEY *pkdhp = NULL;
2445 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto) {
2446 DH *dhp = ssl_get_auto_dh(s);
2447 pkdh = EVP_PKEY_new();
2448 if (pkdh == NULL || dhp == NULL) {
2450 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2451 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2452 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2455 EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(pkdh, dhp);
2458 pkdhp = cert->dh_tmp;
2460 if ((pkdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL)) {
2461 DH *dhp = s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s, 0, 1024);
2462 pkdh = ssl_dh_to_pkey(dhp);
2464 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2465 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2466 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2471 if (pkdhp == NULL) {
2472 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2473 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2474 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2477 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH,
2478 EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkdhp), 0, pkdhp)) {
2479 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2480 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2481 SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
2484 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) {
2485 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2486 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2487 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2491 s->s3->tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey(pkdhp);
2492 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey == NULL) {
2493 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2497 dh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
2499 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2500 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2501 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2505 EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh);
2508 DH_get0_pqg(dh, &r[0], NULL, &r[1]);
2509 DH_get0_key(dh, &r[2], NULL);
2512 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2513 if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2515 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) {
2516 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2517 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2518 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2522 /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */
2523 curve_id = tls1_shared_group(s, -2);
2524 if (curve_id == 0) {
2525 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2526 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2527 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
2530 s->s3->tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey_group(s, curve_id);
2531 /* Generate a new key for this curve */
2532 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey == NULL) {
2533 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2537 /* Encode the public key. */
2538 encodedlen = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->tmp.pkey,
2540 if (encodedlen == 0) {
2541 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2542 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2547 * We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we
2548 * can set these to NULLs
2555 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2556 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2557 if (type & SSL_kSRP) {
2558 if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
2559 (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
2560 (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) || (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL)) {
2561 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2562 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2563 SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
2566 r[0] = s->srp_ctx.N;
2567 r[1] = s->srp_ctx.g;
2568 r[2] = s->srp_ctx.s;
2569 r[3] = s->srp_ctx.B;
2573 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2574 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2575 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
2579 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP)) != 0)
2580 || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)) != 0) {
2582 } else if (lu == NULL) {
2583 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
2584 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2588 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2589 if (type & SSL_PSK) {
2590 size_t len = (s->cert->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
2591 ? 0 : strlen(s->cert->psk_identity_hint);
2594 * It should not happen that len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN - we already
2595 * checked this when we set the identity hint - but just in case
2597 if (len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
2598 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->cert->psk_identity_hint,
2600 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2601 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2602 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2608 for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
2609 unsigned char *binval;
2612 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2613 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) {
2614 res = WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt);
2617 res = WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt);
2620 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2621 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2622 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2626 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2628 * for interoperability with some versions of the Microsoft TLS
2629 * stack, we need to zero pad the DHE pub key to the same length
2632 if ((i == 2) && (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK))) {
2633 size_t len = BN_num_bytes(r[0]) - BN_num_bytes(r[2]);
2636 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, len, &binval)) {
2637 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2638 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2639 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2642 memset(binval, 0, len);
2646 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, BN_num_bytes(r[i]), &binval)
2647 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2648 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2649 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2650 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2654 BN_bn2bin(r[i], binval);
2657 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2658 if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2660 * We only support named (not generic) curves. In this situation, the
2661 * ServerKeyExchange message has: [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
2662 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by the actual encoded
2665 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
2666 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)
2667 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, curve_id)
2668 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, encodedPoint, encodedlen)) {
2669 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2670 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2671 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2674 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2675 encodedPoint = NULL;
2681 EVP_PKEY *pkey = s->s3->tmp.cert->privatekey;
2683 unsigned char *sigbytes1, *sigbytes2, *tbs;
2684 size_t siglen, tbslen;
2687 if (pkey == NULL || !tls1_lookup_md(lu, &md)) {
2688 /* Should never happen */
2689 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2690 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2691 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2694 /* Get length of the parameters we have written above */
2695 if (!WPACKET_get_length(pkt, ¶mlen)) {
2696 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2697 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2698 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2701 /* send signature algorithm */
2702 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, lu->sigalg)) {
2703 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2704 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2705 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2709 * Create the signature. We don't know the actual length of the sig
2710 * until after we've created it, so we reserve enough bytes for it
2711 * up front, and then properly allocate them in the WPACKET
2714 siglen = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
2715 if (!WPACKET_sub_reserve_bytes_u16(pkt, siglen, &sigbytes1)
2716 || EVP_DigestSignInit(md_ctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) {
2717 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2718 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2719 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2722 if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) {
2723 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0
2724 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) {
2725 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2726 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2731 tbslen = construct_key_exchange_tbs(s, &tbs,
2732 s->init_buf->data + paramoffset,
2735 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2738 rv = EVP_DigestSign(md_ctx, sigbytes1, &siglen, tbs, tbslen);
2740 if (rv <= 0 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, siglen, &sigbytes2)
2741 || sigbytes1 != sigbytes2) {
2742 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2743 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2744 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2749 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2752 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2753 EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh);
2755 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2756 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2758 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2762 int tls_construct_certificate_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2764 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2765 /* Send random context when doing post-handshake auth */
2766 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING) {
2767 OPENSSL_free(s->pha_context);
2768 s->pha_context_len = 32;
2769 if ((s->pha_context = OPENSSL_malloc(s->pha_context_len)) == NULL
2770 || RAND_bytes(s->pha_context, s->pha_context_len) <= 0
2771 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->pha_context, s->pha_context_len)) {
2772 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2773 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2774 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2777 /* reset the handshake hash back to just after the ClientFinished */
2778 if (!tls13_restore_handshake_digest_for_pha(s)) {
2779 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2783 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)) {
2784 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2785 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2786 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2791 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt,
2792 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, NULL,
2794 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2800 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
2801 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
2802 || !ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s, pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2803 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2804 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2808 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2809 const uint16_t *psigs;
2810 size_t nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &psigs);
2812 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
2813 || !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt, WPACKET_FLAGS_NON_ZERO_LENGTH)
2814 || !tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, pkt, psigs, nl)
2815 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2816 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2817 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2818 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2823 if (!construct_ca_names(s, pkt)) {
2824 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2830 s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 1;
2834 static int tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2836 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2837 unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
2839 PACKET psk_identity;
2841 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity)) {
2842 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2843 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2846 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2847 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2848 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2851 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL) {
2852 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2853 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
2857 if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity, &s->session->psk_identity)) {
2858 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2859 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2863 psklen = s->psk_server_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity,
2866 if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
2867 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2868 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2870 } else if (psklen == 0) {
2872 * PSK related to the given identity not found
2874 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY,
2875 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2876 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2880 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.psk);
2881 s->s3->tmp.psk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen);
2882 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
2884 if (s->s3->tmp.psk == NULL) {
2885 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2886 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2890 s->s3->tmp.psklen = psklen;
2894 /* Should never happen */
2895 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2896 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2901 static int tls_process_cke_rsa(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2903 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2904 unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
2906 unsigned char decrypt_good, version_good;
2907 size_t j, padding_len;
2908 PACKET enc_premaster;
2910 unsigned char *rsa_decrypt = NULL;
2913 rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA].privatekey);
2915 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
2916 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2920 /* SSLv3 and pre-standard DTLS omit the length bytes. */
2921 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
2922 enc_premaster = *pkt;
2924 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &enc_premaster)
2925 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2926 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
2927 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2933 * We want to be sure that the plaintext buffer size makes it safe to
2934 * iterate over the entire size of a premaster secret
2935 * (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). Reject overly short RSA keys because
2936 * their ciphertext cannot accommodate a premaster secret anyway.
2938 if (RSA_size(rsa) < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
2939 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
2940 RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
2944 rsa_decrypt = OPENSSL_malloc(RSA_size(rsa));
2945 if (rsa_decrypt == NULL) {
2946 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
2947 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2952 * We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of
2953 * Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246,
2954 * section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of the TLS RFC and
2955 * generates a random premaster secret for the case that the decrypt
2956 * fails. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1
2959 if (RAND_priv_bytes(rand_premaster_secret,
2960 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0) {
2961 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
2962 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2967 * Decrypt with no padding. PKCS#1 padding will be removed as part of
2968 * the timing-sensitive code below.
2970 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
2971 decrypt_len = (int)RSA_private_decrypt((int)PACKET_remaining(&enc_premaster),
2972 PACKET_data(&enc_premaster),
2973 rsa_decrypt, rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING);
2974 if (decrypt_len < 0) {
2975 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
2976 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2980 /* Check the padding. See RFC 3447, section 7.2.2. */
2983 * The smallest padded premaster is 11 bytes of overhead. Small keys
2984 * are publicly invalid, so this may return immediately. This ensures
2985 * PS is at least 8 bytes.
2987 if (decrypt_len < 11 + SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
2988 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
2989 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2993 padding_len = decrypt_len - SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
2994 decrypt_good = constant_time_eq_int_8(rsa_decrypt[0], 0) &
2995 constant_time_eq_int_8(rsa_decrypt[1], 2);
2996 for (j = 2; j < padding_len - 1; j++) {
2997 decrypt_good &= ~constant_time_is_zero_8(rsa_decrypt[j]);
2999 decrypt_good &= constant_time_is_zero_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len - 1]);
3002 * If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct then
3003 * version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero. The
3004 * Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
3005 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version number
3006 * check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks are done in
3007 * constant time and are treated like any other decryption error.
3010 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len],
3011 (unsigned)(s->client_version >> 8));
3013 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len + 1],
3014 (unsigned)(s->client_version & 0xff));
3017 * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
3018 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
3019 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
3020 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
3021 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
3022 * protocol version. If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such
3025 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) {
3026 unsigned char workaround_good;
3027 workaround_good = constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len],
3028 (unsigned)(s->version >> 8));
3030 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len + 1],
3031 (unsigned)(s->version & 0xff));
3032 version_good |= workaround_good;
3036 * Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good to
3037 * remain non-zero (0xff).
3039 decrypt_good &= version_good;
3042 * Now copy rand_premaster_secret over from p using
3043 * decrypt_good_mask. If decryption failed, then p does not
3044 * contain valid plaintext, however, a check above guarantees
3045 * it is still sufficiently large to read from.
3047 for (j = 0; j < sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); j++) {
3048 rsa_decrypt[padding_len + j] =
3049 constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good,
3050 rsa_decrypt[padding_len + j],
3051 rand_premaster_secret[j]);
3054 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, rsa_decrypt + padding_len,
3055 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret), 0)) {
3056 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3062 OPENSSL_free(rsa_decrypt);
3065 /* Should never happen */
3066 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
3067 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3072 static int tls_process_cke_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3074 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3075 EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL;
3079 const unsigned char *data;
3080 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL;
3083 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != i) {
3084 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
3085 SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
3088 skey = s->s3->tmp.pkey;
3090 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
3091 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
3095 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) {
3096 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
3097 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
3100 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) {
3101 /* We already checked we have enough data */
3102 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
3103 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3106 ckey = EVP_PKEY_new();
3107 if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) == 0) {
3108 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
3112 cdh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey);
3113 pub_key = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL);
3115 if (pub_key == NULL || !DH_set0_key(cdh, pub_key, NULL)) {
3116 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
3117 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3118 if (pub_key != NULL)
3123 if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) {
3124 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3129 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
3130 s->s3->tmp.pkey = NULL;
3132 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
3135 /* Should never happen */
3136 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
3137 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3142 static int tls_process_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3144 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3145 EVP_PKEY *skey = s->s3->tmp.pkey;
3146 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL;
3149 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) {
3150 /* We don't support ECDH client auth */
3151 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE,
3152 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
3156 const unsigned char *data;
3159 * Get client's public key from encoded point in the
3160 * ClientKeyExchange message.
3163 /* Get encoded point length */
3164 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &i) || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)
3165 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3166 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE,
3167 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3170 ckey = EVP_PKEY_new();
3171 if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) <= 0) {
3172 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE,
3176 if (EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey, data, i) == 0) {
3177 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE,
3183 if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) {
3184 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3189 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
3190 s->s3->tmp.pkey = NULL;
3192 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
3196 /* Should never happen */
3197 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE,
3198 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3203 static int tls_process_cke_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3205 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3207 const unsigned char *data;
3209 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i)
3210 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) {
3211 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP,
3212 SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
3215 if ((s->srp_ctx.A = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL)) == NULL) {
3216 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP,
3220 if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0 || BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A)) {
3221 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP,
3222 SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
3225 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
3226 s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
3227 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
3228 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP,
3229 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3233 if (!srp_generate_server_master_secret(s)) {
3234 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3240 /* Should never happen */
3241 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP,
3242 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3247 static int tls_process_cke_gost(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3249 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3250 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
3251 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
3252 unsigned char premaster_secret[32];
3253 const unsigned char *start;
3254 size_t outlen = 32, inlen;
3255 unsigned long alg_a;
3256 unsigned int asn1id, asn1len;
3260 /* Get our certificate private key */
3261 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3262 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST12) {
3264 * New GOST ciphersuites have SSL_aGOST01 bit too
3266 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512].privatekey;
3268 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256].privatekey;
3271 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
3273 } else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01) {
3274 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
3277 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL);
3278 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
3279 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
3280 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3283 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0) {
3284 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
3285 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3289 * If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
3290 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
3291 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use a
3292 * client certificate for authorization only.
3294 client_pub_pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
3295 if (client_pub_pkey) {
3296 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
3299 /* Decrypt session key */
3300 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &asn1id)
3301 || asn1id != (V_ASN1_SEQUENCE | V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED)
3302 || !PACKET_peek_1(pkt, &asn1len)) {
3303 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
3304 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3307 if (asn1len == 0x81) {
3309 * Long form length. Should only be one byte of length. Anything else
3311 * We did a successful peek before so this shouldn't fail
3313 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, 1)) {
3314 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
3315 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3318 } else if (asn1len >= 0x80) {
3320 * Indefinite length, or more than one long form length bytes. We don't
3323 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
3324 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3326 } /* else short form length */
3328 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &encdata)) {
3329 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
3330 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3333 inlen = PACKET_remaining(&encdata);
3334 start = PACKET_data(&encdata);
3336 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, start,
3338 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
3339 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3342 /* Generate master secret */
3343 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, premaster_secret,
3344 sizeof(premaster_secret), 0)) {
3345 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3348 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
3349 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2,
3351 s->statem.no_cert_verify = 1;
3355 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3358 /* Should never happen */
3359 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
3360 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3365 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3367 unsigned long alg_k;
3369 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3371 /* For PSK parse and retrieve identity, obtain PSK key */
3372 if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK) && !tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(s, pkt)) {
3373 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3377 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
3378 /* Identity extracted earlier: should be nothing left */
3379 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3380 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
3381 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
3382 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3385 /* PSK handled by ssl_generate_master_secret */
3386 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, NULL, 0, 0)) {
3387 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3390 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
3391 if (!tls_process_cke_rsa(s, pkt)) {
3392 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3395 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
3396 if (!tls_process_cke_dhe(s, pkt)) {
3397 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3400 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
3401 if (!tls_process_cke_ecdhe(s, pkt)) {
3402 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3405 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
3406 if (!tls_process_cke_srp(s, pkt)) {
3407 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3410 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
3411 if (!tls_process_cke_gost(s, pkt)) {
3412 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3416 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3417 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
3418 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
3422 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
3424 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
3425 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.psk, s->s3->tmp.psklen);
3426 s->s3->tmp.psk = NULL;
3428 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3431 WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
3433 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
3434 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
3435 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
3436 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
3437 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
3439 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
3442 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
3443 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
3445 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
3446 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
3447 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0,
3449 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3450 SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
3451 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3455 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
3456 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
3461 if (s->statem.no_cert_verify || !s->session->peer) {
3463 * No certificate verify or no peer certificate so we no longer need
3464 * the handshake_buffer
3466 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
3467 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3470 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3472 if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
3473 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3474 SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
3475 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3479 * For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer. If we support
3480 * extms we've done this already so this is a no-op
3482 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) {
3483 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3488 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3491 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3494 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3497 const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes;
3498 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
3499 PACKET spkt, context;
3501 SSL_SESSION *new_sess = NULL;
3503 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
3504 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3505 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3509 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &context)
3510 || (s->pha_context == NULL && PACKET_remaining(&context) != 0)
3511 || (s->pha_context != NULL &&
3512 !PACKET_equal(&context, s->pha_context, s->pha_context_len)))) {
3513 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3514 SSL_R_INVALID_CONTEXT);
3518 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_3(pkt, &spkt)
3519 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3520 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3521 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3525 for (chainidx = 0; PACKET_remaining(&spkt) > 0; chainidx++) {
3526 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(&spkt, &l)
3527 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&spkt, &certbytes, l)) {
3528 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
3529 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3530 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3534 certstart = certbytes;
3535 x = d2i_X509(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, l);
3537 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
3538 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
3541 if (certbytes != (certstart + l)) {
3542 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
3543 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3544 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3548 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
3549 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
3552 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&spkt, &extensions)) {
3553 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
3554 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3558 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
3559 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, &rawexts,
3560 NULL, chainidx == 0)
3561 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE,
3562 rawexts, x, chainidx,
3563 PACKET_remaining(&spkt) == 0)) {
3564 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3567 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3570 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
3571 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3572 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3573 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3579 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) {
3580 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
3581 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
3582 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3583 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3584 SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
3587 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
3588 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3589 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
3590 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED,
3591 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3592 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3595 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
3596 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
3597 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3602 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
3604 SSLfatal(s, ssl_x509err2alert(s->verify_result),
3605 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3606 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
3610 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3611 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, i);
3614 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(sk, 0));
3616 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3617 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3618 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
3624 * Sessions must be immutable once they go into the session cache. Otherwise
3625 * we can get multi-thread problems. Therefore we don't "update" sessions,
3626 * we replace them with a duplicate. Here, we need to do this every time
3627 * a new certificate is received via post-handshake authentication, as the
3628 * session may have already gone into the session cache.
3631 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
3632 int m = s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode;
3634 if ((new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0)) == 0) {
3635 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3636 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3637 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3641 if (m & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER) {
3643 * Remove the old session from the cache. We carry on if this fails
3645 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
3648 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
3649 s->session = new_sess;
3652 X509_free(s->session->peer);
3653 s->session->peer = sk_X509_shift(sk);
3654 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
3656 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->peer_chain, X509_free);
3657 s->session->peer_chain = sk;
3660 * Freeze the handshake buffer. For <TLS1.3 we do this after the CKE
3663 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) {
3664 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3669 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own
3670 * certificate, while we do include it in statem_clnt.c
3674 /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */
3676 && !ssl_handshake_hash(s, s->cert_verify_hash,
3677 sizeof(s->cert_verify_hash),
3678 &s->cert_verify_hash_len)) {
3679 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3683 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
3687 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
3691 int tls_construct_server_certificate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3693 CERT_PKEY *cpk = s->s3->tmp.cert;
3696 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3697 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3702 * In TLSv1.3 the certificate chain is always preceded by a 0 length context
3703 * for the server Certificate message
3705 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)) {
3706 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3707 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3710 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, pkt, cpk)) {
3711 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3718 int tls_construct_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3720 unsigned char *senc = NULL;
3721 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL;
3722 HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL;
3723 unsigned char *p, *encdata1, *encdata2, *macdata1, *macdata2;
3724 const unsigned char *const_p;
3725 int len, slen_full, slen, lenfinal;
3728 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->session_ctx;
3729 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
3730 unsigned char key_name[TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH];
3732 size_t macoffset, macendoffset;
3734 unsigned char age_add_c[sizeof(uint32_t)];
3738 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
3739 if (s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_EXT_RECEIVED) {
3740 void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
3743 * This is the first session ticket we've sent. In the state
3744 * machine we "cheated" and tacked this onto the end of the first
3745 * handshake. From an info callback perspective this should appear
3746 * like the start of a new handshake.
3748 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
3749 cb = s->info_callback;
3750 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
3751 cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
3753 cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START, 1);
3756 if (!ssl_generate_session_id(s, s->session)) {
3757 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3760 if (RAND_bytes(age_add_u.age_add_c, sizeof(age_add_u)) <= 0) {
3761 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3762 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
3763 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3766 s->session->ext.tick_age_add = age_add_u.age_add;
3768 * ticket_nonce is set to a single 0 byte because we only ever send a
3769 * single ticket per connection. IMPORTANT: If we ever support multiple
3770 * tickets per connection then this will need to be changed.
3772 OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.tick_nonce);
3773 s->session->ext.tick_nonce = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(char));
3774 if (s->session->ext.tick_nonce == NULL) {
3775 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3776 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
3777 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3780 s->session->ext.tick_nonce_len = 1;
3781 s->session->time = (long)time(NULL);
3782 if (s->s3->alpn_selected != NULL) {
3783 OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.alpn_selected);
3784 s->session->ext.alpn_selected =
3785 OPENSSL_memdup(s->s3->alpn_selected, s->s3->alpn_selected_len);
3786 if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL) {
3787 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3788 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
3789 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3792 s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
3794 s->session->ext.max_early_data = s->max_early_data;
3797 if (tctx->generate_ticket_cb != NULL &&
3798 tctx->generate_ticket_cb(s, tctx->ticket_cb_data) == 0)
3801 /* get session encoding length */
3802 slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
3804 * Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too
3807 if (slen_full == 0 || slen_full > 0xFF00) {
3808 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3809 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3812 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
3814 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3815 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3819 ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
3820 hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
3821 if (ctx == NULL || hctx == NULL) {
3822 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3823 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3828 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p)) {
3829 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3830 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3835 * create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up
3838 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
3840 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3841 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3845 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
3846 if (slen == 0 || slen > slen_full) {
3847 /* shouldn't ever happen */
3848 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3849 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3850 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3854 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p)) {
3855 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3856 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3857 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3860 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3863 * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does
3864 * all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx.
3866 if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb) {
3867 /* if 0 is returned, write an empty ticket */
3868 int ret = tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, ctx,
3873 /* Put timeout and length */
3874 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, 0)
3875 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
3876 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3877 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
3878 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3882 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3883 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3887 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3888 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
3889 SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED);
3892 iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
3894 const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = EVP_aes_256_cbc();
3896 iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher);
3897 if (RAND_bytes(iv, iv_len) <= 0
3898 || !EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, cipher, NULL,
3899 tctx->ext.secure->tick_aes_key, iv)
3900 || !HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key,
3901 sizeof(tctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key),
3902 EVP_sha256(), NULL)) {
3903 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3904 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
3905 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3908 memcpy(key_name, tctx->ext.tick_key_name,
3909 sizeof(tctx->ext.tick_key_name));
3913 * Ticket lifetime hint: For TLSv1.2 this is advisory only and we leave this
3914 * unspecified for resumed session (for simplicity).
3915 * In TLSv1.3 we reset the "time" field above, and always specify the
3918 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt,
3919 (s->hit && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
3920 ? 0 : s->session->timeout)
3922 && (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, age_add_u.age_add)
3923 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->session->ext.tick_nonce,
3924 s->session->ext.tick_nonce_len)))
3925 /* Now the actual ticket data */
3926 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
3927 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &macoffset)
3928 /* Output key name */
3929 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, key_name, sizeof(key_name))
3931 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, iv, iv_len)
3932 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, slen + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH,
3934 /* Encrypt session data */
3935 || !EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, encdata1, &len, senc, slen)
3936 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, len, &encdata2)
3937 || encdata1 != encdata2
3938 || !EVP_EncryptFinal(ctx, encdata1 + len, &lenfinal)
3939 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, lenfinal, &encdata2)
3940 || encdata1 + len != encdata2
3941 || len + lenfinal > slen + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH
3942 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &macendoffset)
3943 || !HMAC_Update(hctx,
3944 (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + macoffset,
3945 macendoffset - macoffset)
3946 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, &macdata1)
3947 || !HMAC_Final(hctx, macdata1, &hlen)
3948 || hlen > EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
3949 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, hlen, &macdata2)
3950 || macdata1 != macdata2
3951 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
3952 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3953 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3956 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
3957 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
3958 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt,
3959 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
3961 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3965 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3966 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3972 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3973 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3978 * In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to
3979 * create a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure.
3981 int tls_construct_cert_status_body(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3983 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->ext.status_type)
3984 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u24(pkt, s->ext.ocsp.resp,
3985 s->ext.ocsp.resp_len)) {
3986 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_STATUS_BODY,
3987 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3994 int tls_construct_cert_status(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3996 if (!tls_construct_cert_status_body(s, pkt)) {
3997 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4004 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
4006 * tls_process_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message.
4007 * It sets the next_proto member in s if found
4009 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_next_proto(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
4011 PACKET next_proto, padding;
4012 size_t next_proto_len;
4015 * The payload looks like:
4017 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
4018 * uint8 padding_len;
4019 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
4021 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &next_proto)
4022 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &padding)
4023 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
4024 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEXT_PROTO,
4025 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
4026 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
4029 if (!PACKET_memdup(&next_proto, &s->ext.npn, &next_proto_len)) {
4031 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEXT_PROTO,
4032 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4033 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
4036 s->ext.npn_len = (unsigned char)next_proto_len;
4038 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
4042 static int tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
4044 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
4046 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4053 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_end_of_early_data(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
4055 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
4056 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA,
4057 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
4058 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
4061 if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING
4062 && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_READ_RETRY) {
4063 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA,
4064 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4065 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
4069 * EndOfEarlyData signals a key change so the end of the message must be on
4070 * a record boundary.
4072 if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
4073 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
4074 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA,
4075 SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
4076 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
4079 s->early_data_state = SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_READING;
4080 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
4081 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) {
4082 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4083 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
4086 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;