2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
10 /* ====================================================================
11 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
12 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by
13 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project.
19 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
20 #include "statem_locl.h"
21 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
22 #include <openssl/objects.h>
23 #include <openssl/evp.h>
24 #include <openssl/x509.h>
27 * send s->init_buf in records of type 'type' (SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or
28 * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
30 int ssl3_do_write(SSL *s, int type)
35 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, type, &s->init_buf->data[s->init_off],
36 s->init_num, &written);
39 if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
41 * should not be done for 'Hello Request's, but in that case we'll
42 * ignore the result anyway
44 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s,
45 (unsigned char *)&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off],
49 if (written == s->init_num) {
51 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, type, s->init_buf->data,
52 (size_t)(s->init_off + s->init_num), s,
56 s->init_off += written;
57 s->init_num -= written;
61 int tls_close_construct_packet(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int htype)
65 if ((htype != SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC && !WPACKET_close(pkt))
66 || !WPACKET_get_length(pkt, &msglen)
69 s->init_num = (int)msglen;
76 * Size of the to-be-signed TLS13 data, without the hash size itself:
77 * 64 bytes of value 32, 33 context bytes, 1 byte separator
79 #define TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE 64
80 #define TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE (TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE + 33 + 1)
82 static int get_cert_verify_tbs_data(SSL *s, unsigned char *tls13tbs,
83 void **hdata, size_t *hdatalen)
85 static const char *servercontext = "TLS 1.3, server CertificateVerify";
86 static const char *clientcontext = "TLS 1.3, client CertificateVerify";
88 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
91 /* Set the first 64 bytes of to-be-signed data to octet 32 */
92 memset(tls13tbs, 32, TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE);
93 /* This copies the 33 bytes of context plus the 0 separator byte */
94 if (s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY
95 || s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY)
96 strcpy((char *)tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE, servercontext);
98 strcpy((char *)tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE, clientcontext);
101 * If we're currently reading then we need to use the saved handshake
102 * hash value. We can't use the current handshake hash state because
103 * that includes the CertVerify itself.
105 if (s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY
106 || s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY) {
107 memcpy(tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE, s->cert_verify_hash,
108 s->cert_verify_hash_len);
109 hashlen = s->cert_verify_hash_len;
110 } else if (!ssl_handshake_hash(s, tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE,
111 EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, &hashlen)) {
116 *hdatalen = TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE + hashlen;
120 retlen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, hdata);
129 int tls_construct_cert_verify(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
133 EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = NULL;
134 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
135 size_t hdatalen = 0, siglen = 0;
137 unsigned char *sig = NULL;
138 unsigned char tls13tbs[TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
139 int pktype, ispss = 0;
142 /* Only happens in TLSv1.3 */
144 * TODO(TLS1.3): This needs to change. We should not get this from the
145 * cipher. However, for now, we have not done the work to separate the
146 * certificate type from the ciphersuite
148 pkey = ssl_get_sign_pkey(s, s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, &md);
152 md = s->s3->tmp.md[s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys];
153 pkey = s->cert->key->privatekey;
155 pktype = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey);
157 mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
159 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
163 /* Get the data to be signed */
164 if (!get_cert_verify_tbs_data(s, tls13tbs, &hdata, &hdatalen)) {
165 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
169 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !tls12_get_sigandhash(s, pkt, pkey, md, &ispss)) {
170 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
174 fprintf(stderr, "Using client alg %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
176 siglen = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
177 sig = OPENSSL_malloc(siglen);
179 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
183 if (EVP_DigestSignInit(mctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0
184 || EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0) {
185 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
190 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0
191 /* -1 here means set saltlen to the digest len */
192 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, -1) <= 0) {
193 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
196 } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
197 if (!EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET,
198 (int)s->session->master_key_length,
199 s->session->master_key)) {
200 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
205 if (EVP_DigestSignFinal(mctx, sig, &siglen) <= 0) {
206 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
210 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
212 if (pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2001
213 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
214 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512)
215 BUF_reverse(sig, NULL, siglen);
219 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, sig, siglen)) {
220 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
224 /* Digest cached records and discard handshake buffer */
225 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0))
229 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
233 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
234 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
238 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
240 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
241 const unsigned char *data;
242 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
243 unsigned char *gost_data = NULL;
245 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
246 int type = 0, j, pktype, ispss = 0;
249 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
252 unsigned char tls13tbs[TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
253 EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
254 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
257 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
261 peer = s->session->peer;
262 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(peer);
263 pktype = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey);
264 type = X509_certificate_type(peer, pkey);
266 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
267 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
268 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
269 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
273 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
275 * If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare signature without
276 * length field (CryptoPro implementations at least till CSP 4.0)
278 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
279 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 64
280 && EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) {
285 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
289 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sigalg)) {
290 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
293 rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, s, sigalg, pkey);
296 } else if (rv == 0) {
297 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
300 ispss = SIGID_IS_PSS(sigalg);
302 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
305 /* Use default digest for this key type */
306 int idx = ssl_cert_type(NULL, pkey);
308 md = s->s3->tmp.md[idx];
310 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
315 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &len)) {
316 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
317 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
321 j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
322 if (((int)len > j) || ((int)PACKET_remaining(pkt) > j)
323 || (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)) {
324 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
325 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
328 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, len)) {
329 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
330 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
334 if (!get_cert_verify_tbs_data(s, tls13tbs, &hdata, &hdatalen)) {
335 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
340 fprintf(stderr, "Using client verify alg %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
342 if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit(mctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0
343 || EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0) {
344 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
347 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
349 if (pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2001
350 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
351 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512) {
352 if ((gost_data = OPENSSL_malloc(len)) == NULL) {
353 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
356 BUF_reverse(gost_data, data, len);
363 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0
364 /* -1 here means set saltlen to the digest len */
365 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, -1) <= 0) {
366 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
369 } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION
370 && !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET,
371 (int)s->session->master_key_length,
372 s->session->master_key)) {
373 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
377 if (EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(mctx, data, len) <= 0) {
378 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
379 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
384 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
386 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
389 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
390 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
392 BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
393 s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
394 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
395 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
396 OPENSSL_free(gost_data);
401 int tls_construct_finished(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
403 size_t finish_md_len;
408 sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label;
409 slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len;
411 sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label;
412 slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len;
415 finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
417 s->s3->tmp.finish_md);
418 if (finish_md_len == 0) {
419 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
423 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len = finish_md_len;
425 if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, finish_md_len)) {
426 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
430 /* Log the master secret, if logging is enabled. */
431 if (!ssl_log_master_secret(s, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
432 s->session->master_key,
433 s->session->master_key_length))
437 * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks
440 OPENSSL_assert(finish_md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
441 memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished, s->s3->tmp.finish_md,
443 s->s3->previous_client_finished_len = finish_md_len;
445 OPENSSL_assert(finish_md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
446 memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished, s->s3->tmp.finish_md,
448 s->s3->previous_server_finished_len = finish_md_len;
453 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
457 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
459 * ssl3_take_mac calculates the Finished MAC for the handshakes messages seen
462 static void ssl3_take_mac(SSL *s)
467 * If no new cipher setup return immediately: other functions will set
468 * the appropriate error.
470 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL)
473 sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label;
474 slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len;
476 sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label;
477 slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len;
480 s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
483 s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md);
487 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
492 remain = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
494 * 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, which should already have
495 * been consumed by ssl_get_message() so there should be no bytes left,
496 * unless we're using DTLS1_BAD_VER, which has an extra 2 bytes
498 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
499 if ((s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER
500 && remain != DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH + 1)
501 || (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER
502 && remain != DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH - 1)) {
503 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
504 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,
505 SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
510 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
511 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,
512 SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
517 /* Check we have a cipher to change to */
518 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL) {
519 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
520 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
524 s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 1;
525 if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s)) {
526 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
527 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
531 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
532 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_READ);
534 if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
535 s->d1->handshake_read_seq++;
537 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
539 * Remember that a CCS has been received, so that an old key of
540 * SCTP-Auth can be deleted when a CCS is sent. Will be ignored if no
543 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_AUTH_CCS_RCVD, 1, NULL);
547 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
549 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
550 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
551 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
554 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_finished(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
556 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
559 /* If this occurs, we have missed a message */
560 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !s->s3->change_cipher_spec) {
561 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
562 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_GOT_A_FIN_BEFORE_A_CCS);
565 s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0;
567 md_len = s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len;
569 if (md_len != PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
570 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
571 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH);
575 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(PACKET_data(pkt), s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md,
577 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
578 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED);
583 * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks
586 OPENSSL_assert(md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
587 memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md,
589 s->s3->previous_client_finished_len = md_len;
591 OPENSSL_assert(md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
592 memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md,
594 s->s3->previous_server_finished_len = md_len;
598 * In TLS1.3 we also have to change cipher state and do any final processing
599 * of the initial server flight (if we are a client)
601 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
603 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
604 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) {
605 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER);
609 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
610 s->session->master_key, s->handshake_secret, 0,
611 &s->session->master_key_length)) {
612 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER);
615 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
616 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ)) {
617 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER);
620 if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s, &al))
625 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
627 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
628 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
629 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
632 int tls_construct_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
634 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, SSL3_MT_CCS)) {
635 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
636 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
643 /* Add a certificate to the WPACKET */
644 static int ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, int chain,
648 unsigned char *outbytes;
650 len = i2d_X509(x, NULL);
652 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_TO_WPACKET, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
653 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
656 if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u24(pkt, len, &outbytes)
657 || i2d_X509(x, &outbytes) != len) {
658 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_TO_WPACKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
659 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
664 && !tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, x,
671 /* Add certificate chain to provided WPACKET */
672 static int ssl_add_cert_chain(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, CERT_PKEY *cpk, int *al)
676 STACK_OF(X509) *extra_certs;
677 STACK_OF(X509) *chain = NULL;
678 X509_STORE *chain_store;
679 int tmpal = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
681 if (cpk == NULL || cpk->x509 == NULL)
687 * If we have a certificate specific chain use it, else use parent ctx.
689 if (cpk->chain != NULL)
690 extra_certs = cpk->chain;
692 extra_certs = s->ctx->extra_certs;
694 if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN) || extra_certs)
696 else if (s->cert->chain_store)
697 chain_store = s->cert->chain_store;
699 chain_store = s->ctx->cert_store;
701 if (chain_store != NULL) {
702 X509_STORE_CTX *xs_ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new();
704 if (xs_ctx == NULL) {
705 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
708 if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(xs_ctx, chain_store, x, NULL)) {
709 X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx);
710 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_X509_LIB);
714 * It is valid for the chain not to be complete (because normally we
715 * don't include the root cert in the chain). Therefore we deliberately
716 * ignore the error return from this call. We're not actually verifying
717 * the cert - we're just building as much of the chain as we can
719 (void)X509_verify_cert(xs_ctx);
720 /* Don't leave errors in the queue */
722 chain = X509_STORE_CTX_get0_chain(xs_ctx);
723 i = ssl_security_cert_chain(s, chain, NULL, 0);
726 /* Dummy error calls so mkerr generates them */
727 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
728 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
729 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK);
731 X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx);
732 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, i);
735 chain_count = sk_X509_num(chain);
736 for (i = 0; i < chain_count; i++) {
737 x = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
739 if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, i, &tmpal)) {
740 X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx);
744 X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx);
746 i = ssl_security_cert_chain(s, extra_certs, x, 0);
748 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, i);
751 if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, 0, &tmpal))
753 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(extra_certs); i++) {
754 x = sk_X509_value(extra_certs, i);
755 if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, i + 1, &tmpal))
766 unsigned long ssl3_output_cert_chain(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, CERT_PKEY *cpk,
769 int tmpal = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
771 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u24(pkt)
772 || !ssl_add_cert_chain(s, pkt, cpk, &tmpal)
773 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
774 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
781 WORK_STATE tls_finish_handshake(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
783 void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
785 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
786 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) {
788 ret = dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
789 if (ret != WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE)
794 /* clean a few things up */
795 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
797 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
799 * We don't do this in DTLS because we may still need the init_buf
800 * in case there are any unexpected retransmits
802 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
806 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
810 if (!s->server || s->renegotiate == 2) {
811 /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
816 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
818 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
819 s->handshake_func = ossl_statem_accept;
821 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT);
823 s->ctx->stats.sess_hit++;
825 s->handshake_func = ossl_statem_connect;
826 s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_good++;
829 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
830 cb = s->info_callback;
831 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
832 cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
835 cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1);
837 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
838 /* done with handshaking */
839 s->d1->handshake_read_seq = 0;
840 s->d1->handshake_write_seq = 0;
841 s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq = 0;
842 dtls1_clear_received_buffer(s);
846 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
849 int tls_get_message_header(SSL *s, int *mt)
851 /* s->init_num < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */
852 int skip_message, i, recvd_type, al;
856 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
859 while (s->init_num < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) {
860 i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, &recvd_type,
862 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH - s->init_num,
865 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
868 if (recvd_type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
870 * A ChangeCipherSpec must be a single byte and may not occur
871 * in the middle of a handshake message.
873 if (s->init_num != 0 || readbytes != 1 || p[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS) {
874 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
875 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER,
876 SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
879 s->s3->tmp.message_type = *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
880 s->init_num = readbytes - 1;
881 s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data;
882 s->s3->tmp.message_size = readbytes;
884 } else if (recvd_type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
885 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
886 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
889 s->init_num += readbytes;
894 if (p[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST)
896 * The server may always send 'Hello Request' messages --
897 * we are doing a handshake anyway now, so ignore them if
898 * their format is correct. Does not count for 'Finished'
901 if (p[1] == 0 && p[2] == 0 && p[3] == 0) {
906 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
907 p, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, s,
908 s->msg_callback_arg);
910 } while (skip_message);
911 /* s->init_num == SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */
914 s->s3->tmp.message_type = *(p++);
916 if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer)) {
918 * Only happens with SSLv3+ in an SSLv2 backward compatible
921 * Total message size is the remaining record bytes to read
922 * plus the SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH bytes that we already read
924 l = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec_length(&s->rlayer)
925 + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
926 s->s3->tmp.message_size = l;
928 s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data;
929 s->init_num = SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
932 /* BUF_MEM_grow takes an 'int' parameter */
933 if (l > (INT_MAX - SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
934 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
935 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
938 s->s3->tmp.message_size = l;
940 s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
946 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
950 int tls_get_message_body(SSL *s, size_t *len)
956 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
957 /* We've already read everything in */
958 *len = (unsigned long)s->init_num;
963 n = s->s3->tmp.message_size - s->init_num;
965 i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, NULL,
966 &p[s->init_num], n, 0, &readbytes);
968 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
972 s->init_num += readbytes;
976 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
978 * If receiving Finished, record MAC of prior handshake messages for
979 * Finished verification.
981 if (*s->init_buf->data == SSL3_MT_FINISHED)
985 /* Feed this message into MAC computation. */
986 if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer)) {
987 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data,
989 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_BODY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
990 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
995 s->msg_callback(0, SSL2_VERSION, 0, s->init_buf->data,
996 (size_t)s->init_num, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
998 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data,
999 s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
1000 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_BODY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
1001 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1005 if (s->msg_callback)
1006 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->init_buf->data,
1007 (size_t)s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, s,
1008 s->msg_callback_arg);
1015 int ssl_cert_type(const X509 *x, const EVP_PKEY *pk)
1017 if (pk == NULL && (pk = X509_get0_pubkey(x)) == NULL)
1020 switch (EVP_PKEY_id(pk)) {
1024 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC;
1026 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
1027 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1029 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
1031 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
1032 case NID_id_GostR3410_2001:
1033 return SSL_PKEY_GOST01;
1034 case NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256:
1035 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256;
1036 case NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512:
1037 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512;
1042 int ssl_verify_alarm_type(long type)
1047 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT:
1048 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL:
1049 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER:
1050 al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA;
1052 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CERT_SIGNATURE:
1053 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CRL_SIGNATURE:
1054 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY:
1055 case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD:
1056 case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD:
1057 case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD:
1058 case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD:
1059 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID:
1060 case X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID:
1061 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED:
1062 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED:
1063 case X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH:
1064 case X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH:
1065 case X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH:
1066 case X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH:
1067 case X509_V_ERR_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL:
1068 case X509_V_ERR_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL:
1069 case X509_V_ERR_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK:
1070 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
1072 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE:
1073 case X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE:
1074 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
1076 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED:
1077 case X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED:
1078 al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED;
1080 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED:
1081 al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED;
1083 case X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED:
1084 case X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM:
1085 case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL:
1086 case X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP:
1087 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1089 case X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT:
1090 case X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN:
1091 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY:
1092 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE:
1093 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG:
1094 case X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED:
1095 case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA:
1096 al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA;
1098 case X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION:
1099 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1101 case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE:
1102 al = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
1105 al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN;
1111 int ssl_allow_compression(SSL *s)
1113 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION)
1115 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_COMPRESSION, 0, 0, NULL);
1118 static int version_cmp(const SSL *s, int a, int b)
1120 int dtls = SSL_IS_DTLS(s);
1125 return a < b ? -1 : 1;
1126 return DTLS_VERSION_LT(a, b) ? -1 : 1;
1131 const SSL_METHOD *(*cmeth) (void);
1132 const SSL_METHOD *(*smeth) (void);
1135 #if TLS_MAX_VERSION != TLS1_3_VERSION
1136 # error Code needs update for TLS_method() support beyond TLS1_3_VERSION.
1139 static const version_info tls_version_table[] = {
1140 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
1141 {TLS1_3_VERSION, tlsv1_3_client_method, tlsv1_3_server_method},
1143 {TLS1_3_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
1145 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2
1146 {TLS1_2_VERSION, tlsv1_2_client_method, tlsv1_2_server_method},
1148 {TLS1_2_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
1150 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_1
1151 {TLS1_1_VERSION, tlsv1_1_client_method, tlsv1_1_server_method},
1153 {TLS1_1_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
1155 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1
1156 {TLS1_VERSION, tlsv1_client_method, tlsv1_server_method},
1158 {TLS1_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
1160 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3
1161 {SSL3_VERSION, sslv3_client_method, sslv3_server_method},
1163 {SSL3_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
1168 #if DTLS_MAX_VERSION != DTLS1_2_VERSION
1169 # error Code needs update for DTLS_method() support beyond DTLS1_2_VERSION.
1172 static const version_info dtls_version_table[] = {
1173 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1_2
1174 {DTLS1_2_VERSION, dtlsv1_2_client_method, dtlsv1_2_server_method},
1176 {DTLS1_2_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
1178 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1
1179 {DTLS1_VERSION, dtlsv1_client_method, dtlsv1_server_method},
1180 {DTLS1_BAD_VER, dtls_bad_ver_client_method, NULL},
1182 {DTLS1_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
1183 {DTLS1_BAD_VER, NULL, NULL},
1189 * ssl_method_error - Check whether an SSL_METHOD is enabled.
1191 * @s: The SSL handle for the candidate method
1192 * @method: the intended method.
1194 * Returns 0 on success, or an SSL error reason on failure.
1196 static int ssl_method_error(const SSL *s, const SSL_METHOD *method)
1198 int version = method->version;
1200 if ((s->min_proto_version != 0 &&
1201 version_cmp(s, version, s->min_proto_version) < 0) ||
1202 ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_VERSION, 0, version, NULL) == 0)
1203 return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW;
1205 if (s->max_proto_version != 0 &&
1206 version_cmp(s, version, s->max_proto_version) > 0)
1207 return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_HIGH;
1209 if ((s->options & method->mask) != 0)
1210 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL;
1211 if ((method->flags & SSL_METHOD_NO_SUITEB) != 0 && tls1_suiteb(s))
1212 return SSL_R_AT_LEAST_TLS_1_2_NEEDED_IN_SUITEB_MODE;
1213 else if ((method->flags & SSL_METHOD_NO_FIPS) != 0 && FIPS_mode())
1214 return SSL_R_AT_LEAST_TLS_1_0_NEEDED_IN_FIPS_MODE;
1220 * ssl_version_supported - Check that the specified `version` is supported by
1223 * @s: The SSL handle for the candidate method
1224 * @version: Protocol version to test against
1226 * Returns 1 when supported, otherwise 0
1228 int ssl_version_supported(const SSL *s, int version)
1230 const version_info *vent;
1231 const version_info *table;
1233 switch (s->method->version) {
1235 /* Version should match method version for non-ANY method */
1236 return version_cmp(s, version, s->version) == 0;
1237 case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
1238 table = tls_version_table;
1240 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION:
1241 table = dtls_version_table;
1246 vent->version != 0 && version_cmp(s, version, vent->version) <= 0;
1248 if (vent->cmeth != NULL &&
1249 version_cmp(s, version, vent->version) == 0 &&
1250 ssl_method_error(s, vent->cmeth()) == 0) {
1258 * ssl_check_version_downgrade - In response to RFC7507 SCSV version
1259 * fallback indication from a client check whether we're using the highest
1260 * supported protocol version.
1262 * @s server SSL handle.
1264 * Returns 1 when using the highest enabled version, 0 otherwise.
1266 int ssl_check_version_downgrade(SSL *s)
1268 const version_info *vent;
1269 const version_info *table;
1272 * Check that the current protocol is the highest enabled version
1273 * (according to s->ctx->method, as version negotiation may have changed
1276 if (s->version == s->ctx->method->version)
1280 * Apparently we're using a version-flexible SSL_METHOD (not at its
1281 * highest protocol version).
1283 if (s->ctx->method->version == TLS_method()->version)
1284 table = tls_version_table;
1285 else if (s->ctx->method->version == DTLS_method()->version)
1286 table = dtls_version_table;
1288 /* Unexpected state; fail closed. */
1292 for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) {
1293 if (vent->smeth != NULL && ssl_method_error(s, vent->smeth()) == 0)
1294 return s->version == vent->version;
1300 * ssl_set_version_bound - set an upper or lower bound on the supported (D)TLS
1301 * protocols, provided the initial (D)TLS method is version-flexible. This
1302 * function sanity-checks the proposed value and makes sure the method is
1303 * version-flexible, then sets the limit if all is well.
1305 * @method_version: The version of the current SSL_METHOD.
1306 * @version: the intended limit.
1307 * @bound: pointer to limit to be updated.
1309 * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure.
1311 int ssl_set_version_bound(int method_version, int version, int *bound)
1319 * Restrict TLS methods to TLS protocol versions.
1320 * Restrict DTLS methods to DTLS protocol versions.
1321 * Note, DTLS version numbers are decreasing, use comparison macros.
1323 * Note that for both lower-bounds we use explicit versions, not
1324 * (D)TLS_MIN_VERSION. This is because we don't want to break user
1325 * configurations. If the MIN (supported) version ever rises, the user's
1326 * "floor" remains valid even if no longer available. We don't expect the
1327 * MAX ceiling to ever get lower, so making that variable makes sense.
1329 switch (method_version) {
1332 * XXX For fixed version methods, should we always fail and not set any
1333 * bounds, always succeed and not set any bounds, or set the bounds and
1334 * arrange to fail later if they are not met? At present fixed-version
1335 * methods are not subject to controls that disable individual protocol
1340 case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
1341 if (version < SSL3_VERSION || version > TLS_MAX_VERSION)
1345 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION:
1346 if (DTLS_VERSION_GT(version, DTLS_MAX_VERSION) ||
1347 DTLS_VERSION_LT(version, DTLS1_BAD_VER))
1357 * ssl_choose_server_version - Choose server (D)TLS version. Called when the
1358 * client HELLO is received to select the final server protocol version and
1359 * the version specific method.
1361 * @s: server SSL handle.
1363 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure.
1365 int ssl_choose_server_version(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello)
1368 * With version-flexible methods we have an initial state with:
1370 * s->method->version == (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION,
1371 * s->version == (D)TLS_MAX_VERSION.
1373 * So we detect version-flexible methods via the method version, not the
1376 int server_version = s->method->version;
1377 int client_version = hello->legacy_version;
1378 const version_info *vent;
1379 const version_info *table;
1381 RAW_EXTENSION *suppversions;
1383 s->client_version = client_version;
1385 switch (server_version) {
1388 * TODO(TLS1.3): This check will fail if someone attempts to do
1389 * renegotiation in TLS1.3 at the moment. We need to ensure we disable
1390 * renegotiation for TLS1.3
1392 if (version_cmp(s, client_version, s->version) < 0)
1393 return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION;
1395 * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
1396 * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
1397 * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
1398 * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return
1399 * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
1402 case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
1403 table = tls_version_table;
1405 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION:
1406 table = dtls_version_table;
1410 suppversions = &hello->pre_proc_exts[TLSEXT_IDX_supported_versions];
1412 if (suppversions->present && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1413 unsigned int candidate_vers = 0;
1414 unsigned int best_vers = 0;
1415 const SSL_METHOD *best_method = NULL;
1416 PACKET versionslist;
1418 suppversions->parsed = 1;
1420 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&suppversions->data, &versionslist)) {
1421 /* Trailing or invalid data? */
1422 return SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH;
1425 while (PACKET_get_net_2(&versionslist, &candidate_vers)) {
1426 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove this before release */
1427 if (candidate_vers == TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT)
1428 candidate_vers = TLS1_3_VERSION;
1430 * TODO(TLS1.3): There is some discussion on the TLS list about
1431 * wheter to ignore versions <TLS1.2 in supported_versions. At the
1432 * moment we honour them if present. To be reviewed later
1434 if (version_cmp(s, candidate_vers, best_vers) <= 0)
1437 vent->version != 0 && vent->version != (int)candidate_vers;
1440 if (vent->version != 0 && vent->smeth != NULL) {
1441 const SSL_METHOD *method;
1443 method = vent->smeth();
1444 if (ssl_method_error(s, method) == 0) {
1445 best_vers = candidate_vers;
1446 best_method = method;
1450 if (PACKET_remaining(&versionslist) != 0) {
1451 /* Trailing data? */
1452 return SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH;
1455 if (best_vers > 0) {
1456 s->version = best_vers;
1457 s->method = best_method;
1460 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL;
1464 * If the supported versions extension isn't present, then the highest
1465 * version we can negotiate is TLSv1.2
1467 if (version_cmp(s, client_version, TLS1_3_VERSION) >= 0)
1468 client_version = TLS1_2_VERSION;
1471 * No supported versions extension, so we just use the version supplied in
1474 for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) {
1475 const SSL_METHOD *method;
1477 if (vent->smeth == NULL ||
1478 version_cmp(s, client_version, vent->version) < 0)
1480 method = vent->smeth();
1481 if (ssl_method_error(s, method) == 0) {
1482 s->version = vent->version;
1488 return disabled ? SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL : SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW;
1492 * ssl_choose_client_version - Choose client (D)TLS version. Called when the
1493 * server HELLO is received to select the final client protocol version and
1494 * the version specific method.
1496 * @s: client SSL handle.
1497 * @version: The proposed version from the server's HELLO.
1499 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure.
1501 int ssl_choose_client_version(SSL *s, int version)
1503 const version_info *vent;
1504 const version_info *table;
1506 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove this before release */
1507 if (version == TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT)
1508 version = TLS1_3_VERSION;
1510 switch (s->method->version) {
1512 if (version != s->version)
1513 return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION;
1515 * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
1516 * (and never did) check min/max, FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
1517 * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
1518 * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return
1519 * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
1522 case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
1523 table = tls_version_table;
1525 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION:
1526 table = dtls_version_table;
1530 for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) {
1531 const SSL_METHOD *method;
1534 if (version != vent->version)
1536 if (vent->cmeth == NULL)
1538 method = vent->cmeth();
1539 err = ssl_method_error(s, method);
1543 s->version = version;
1547 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL;
1551 * ssl_get_client_min_max_version - get minimum and maximum client version
1552 * @s: The SSL connection
1553 * @min_version: The minimum supported version
1554 * @max_version: The maximum supported version
1556 * Work out what version we should be using for the initial ClientHello if the
1557 * version is initially (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION. We apply any explicit SSL_OP_NO_xxx
1558 * options, the MinProtocol and MaxProtocol configuration commands, any Suite B
1559 * or FIPS_mode() constraints and any floor imposed by the security level here,
1560 * so we don't advertise the wrong protocol version to only reject the outcome later.
1562 * Computing the right floor matters. If, e.g., TLS 1.0 and 1.2 are enabled,
1563 * TLS 1.1 is disabled, but the security level, Suite-B and/or MinProtocol
1564 * only allow TLS 1.2, we want to advertise TLS1.2, *not* TLS1.
1566 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. On failure
1567 * min_version and max_version will also be set to 0.
1569 int ssl_get_client_min_max_version(const SSL *s, int *min_version,
1574 const SSL_METHOD *single = NULL;
1575 const SSL_METHOD *method;
1576 const version_info *table;
1577 const version_info *vent;
1579 switch (s->method->version) {
1582 * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
1583 * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
1584 * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
1585 * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return
1586 * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
1588 *min_version = *max_version = s->version;
1590 case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
1591 table = tls_version_table;
1593 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION:
1594 table = dtls_version_table;
1599 * SSL_OP_NO_X disables all protocols above X *if* there are some protocols
1600 * below X enabled. This is required in order to maintain the "version
1601 * capability" vector contiguous. Any versions with a NULL client method
1602 * (protocol version client is disabled at compile-time) is also a "hole".
1604 * Our initial state is hole == 1, version == 0. That is, versions above
1605 * the first version in the method table are disabled (a "hole" above
1606 * the valid protocol entries) and we don't have a selected version yet.
1608 * Whenever "hole == 1", and we hit an enabled method, its version becomes
1609 * the selected version, and the method becomes a candidate "single"
1610 * method. We're no longer in a hole, so "hole" becomes 0.
1612 * If "hole == 0" and we hit an enabled method, then "single" is cleared,
1613 * as we support a contiguous range of at least two methods. If we hit
1614 * a disabled method, then hole becomes true again, but nothing else
1615 * changes yet, because all the remaining methods may be disabled too.
1616 * If we again hit an enabled method after the new hole, it becomes
1617 * selected, as we start from scratch.
1619 *min_version = version = 0;
1621 for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) {
1623 * A table entry with a NULL client method is still a hole in the
1624 * "version capability" vector.
1626 if (vent->cmeth == NULL) {
1630 method = vent->cmeth();
1631 if (ssl_method_error(s, method) != 0) {
1635 *min_version = method->version;
1637 version = (single = method)->version;
1638 *min_version = version;
1643 *max_version = version;
1645 /* Fail if everything is disabled */
1647 return SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE;
1653 * ssl_set_client_hello_version - Work out what version we should be using for
1654 * the initial ClientHello.legacy_version field.
1656 * @s: client SSL handle.
1658 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure.
1660 int ssl_set_client_hello_version(SSL *s)
1662 int ver_min, ver_max, ret;
1664 ret = ssl_get_client_min_max_version(s, &ver_min, &ver_max);
1669 s->version = ver_max;
1671 /* TLS1.3 always uses TLS1.2 in the legacy_version field */
1672 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && ver_max > TLS1_2_VERSION)
1673 ver_max = TLS1_2_VERSION;
1675 s->client_version = ver_max;