2 * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
5 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
6 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
7 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
8 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
14 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
15 #include "statem_locl.h"
16 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
17 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
18 #include <openssl/objects.h>
19 #include <openssl/evp.h>
20 #include <openssl/x509.h>
23 * Map error codes to TLS/SSL alart types.
25 typedef struct x509err2alert_st {
30 /* Fixed value used in the ServerHello random field to identify an HRR */
31 const unsigned char hrrrandom[] = {
32 0xcf, 0x21, 0xad, 0x74, 0xe5, 0x9a, 0x61, 0x11, 0xbe, 0x1d, 0x8c, 0x02,
33 0x1e, 0x65, 0xb8, 0x91, 0xc2, 0xa2, 0x11, 0x16, 0x7a, 0xbb, 0x8c, 0x5e,
34 0x07, 0x9e, 0x09, 0xe2, 0xc8, 0xa8, 0x33, 0x9c
38 * send s->init_buf in records of type 'type' (SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or
39 * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
41 int ssl3_do_write(SSL *s, int type)
46 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, type, &s->init_buf->data[s->init_off],
47 s->init_num, &written);
50 if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
52 * should not be done for 'Hello Request's, but in that case we'll
53 * ignore the result anyway
54 * TLS1.3 KeyUpdate and NewSessionTicket do not need to be added
56 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || (s->statem.hand_state != TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET
57 && s->statem.hand_state != TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE
58 && s->statem.hand_state != TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE))
59 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s,
60 (unsigned char *)&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off],
63 if (written == s->init_num) {
65 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, type, s->init_buf->data,
66 (size_t)(s->init_off + s->init_num), s,
70 s->init_off += written;
71 s->init_num -= written;
75 int tls_close_construct_packet(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int htype)
79 if ((htype != SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC && !WPACKET_close(pkt))
80 || !WPACKET_get_length(pkt, &msglen)
83 s->init_num = (int)msglen;
89 int tls_setup_handshake(SSL *s)
91 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
92 /* SSLfatal() already called */
96 /* Reset any extension flags */
97 memset(s->ext.extflags, 0, sizeof(s->ext.extflags));
100 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
101 int i, ver_min, ver_max, ok = 0;
104 * Sanity check that the maximum version we accept has ciphers
105 * enabled. For clients we do this check during construction of the
108 if (ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &ver_min, &ver_max, NULL) != 0) {
109 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_SETUP_HANDSHAKE,
110 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
113 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) {
114 const SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i);
116 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
117 if (DTLS_VERSION_GE(ver_max, c->min_dtls) &&
118 DTLS_VERSION_LE(ver_max, c->max_dtls))
120 } else if (ver_max >= c->min_tls && ver_max <= c->max_tls) {
127 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_SETUP_HANDSHAKE,
128 SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE);
129 ERR_add_error_data(1, "No ciphers enabled for max supported "
133 if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
134 /* N.B. s->session_ctx == s->ctx here */
135 tsan_counter(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_accept);
137 /* N.B. s->ctx may not equal s->session_ctx */
138 tsan_counter(&s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate);
140 s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 0;
143 if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s))
144 tsan_counter(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_connect);
146 tsan_counter(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_connect_renegotiate);
148 /* mark client_random uninitialized */
149 memset(s->s3->client_random, 0, sizeof(s->s3->client_random));
152 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 0;
155 s->statem.use_timer = 1;
162 * Size of the to-be-signed TLS13 data, without the hash size itself:
163 * 64 bytes of value 32, 33 context bytes, 1 byte separator
165 #define TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE 64
166 #define TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE (TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE + 33 + 1)
168 static int get_cert_verify_tbs_data(SSL *s, unsigned char *tls13tbs,
169 void **hdata, size_t *hdatalen)
171 static const char *servercontext = "TLS 1.3, server CertificateVerify";
172 static const char *clientcontext = "TLS 1.3, client CertificateVerify";
174 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
177 /* Set the first 64 bytes of to-be-signed data to octet 32 */
178 memset(tls13tbs, 32, TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE);
179 /* This copies the 33 bytes of context plus the 0 separator byte */
180 if (s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY
181 || s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY)
182 strcpy((char *)tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE, servercontext);
184 strcpy((char *)tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE, clientcontext);
187 * If we're currently reading then we need to use the saved handshake
188 * hash value. We can't use the current handshake hash state because
189 * that includes the CertVerify itself.
191 if (s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY
192 || s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY) {
193 memcpy(tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE, s->cert_verify_hash,
194 s->cert_verify_hash_len);
195 hashlen = s->cert_verify_hash_len;
196 } else if (!ssl_handshake_hash(s, tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE,
197 EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, &hashlen)) {
198 /* SSLfatal() already called */
203 *hdatalen = TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE + hashlen;
208 retlen = retlen_l = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, hdata);
210 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_GET_CERT_VERIFY_TBS_DATA,
211 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
220 int tls_construct_cert_verify(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
222 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
223 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
224 EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = NULL;
225 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
226 size_t hdatalen = 0, siglen = 0;
228 unsigned char *sig = NULL;
229 unsigned char tls13tbs[TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
230 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = s->s3->tmp.sigalg;
232 if (lu == NULL || s->s3->tmp.cert == NULL) {
233 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY,
234 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
237 pkey = s->s3->tmp.cert->privatekey;
239 if (pkey == NULL || !tls1_lookup_md(lu, &md)) {
240 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY,
241 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
245 mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
247 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY,
248 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
252 /* Get the data to be signed */
253 if (!get_cert_verify_tbs_data(s, tls13tbs, &hdata, &hdatalen)) {
254 /* SSLfatal() already called */
258 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, lu->sigalg)) {
259 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY,
260 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
263 siglen = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
264 sig = OPENSSL_malloc(siglen);
266 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY,
267 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
271 if (EVP_DigestSignInit(mctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) {
272 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY,
277 if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) {
278 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0
279 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx,
280 RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) {
281 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY,
286 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
287 if (EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0
288 || !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET,
289 (int)s->session->master_key_length,
290 s->session->master_key)
291 || EVP_DigestSignFinal(mctx, sig, &siglen) <= 0) {
293 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY,
297 } else if (EVP_DigestSign(mctx, sig, &siglen, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0) {
298 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY,
303 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
305 int pktype = lu->sig;
307 if (pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2001
308 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
309 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512)
310 BUF_reverse(sig, NULL, siglen);
314 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, sig, siglen)) {
315 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY,
316 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
320 /* Digest cached records and discard handshake buffer */
321 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
322 /* SSLfatal() already called */
327 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
331 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
335 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
337 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
338 const unsigned char *data;
339 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
340 unsigned char *gost_data = NULL;
342 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
346 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
349 unsigned char tls13tbs[TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
350 EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
351 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
354 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
355 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
359 peer = s->session->peer;
360 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(peer);
362 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
363 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
367 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, NULL) == NULL) {
368 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
369 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
373 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
376 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sigalg)) {
377 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
381 if (tls12_check_peer_sigalg(s, sigalg, pkey) <= 0) {
382 /* SSLfatal() already called */
385 } else if (!tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(s, pkey)) {
386 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
387 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
391 if (!tls1_lookup_md(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg, &md)) {
392 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
393 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
398 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
399 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n",
400 md == NULL ? "n/a" : EVP_MD_name(md));
403 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
405 * If key is GOST and len is exactly 64 or 128, it is signature without
406 * length field (CryptoPro implementations at least till TLS 1.2)
408 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
409 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)
410 && ((PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 64
411 && (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2001
412 || EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256))
413 || (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 128
414 && EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512))) {
415 len = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
418 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &len)) {
419 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
420 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
424 j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
425 if (((int)len > j) || ((int)PACKET_remaining(pkt) > j)
426 || (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)) {
427 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
428 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
431 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, len)) {
432 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
433 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
437 if (!get_cert_verify_tbs_data(s, tls13tbs, &hdata, &hdatalen)) {
438 /* SSLfatal() already called */
443 fprintf(stderr, "Using client verify alg %s\n",
444 md == NULL ? "n/a" : EVP_MD_name(md));
446 if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit(mctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) {
447 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
451 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
453 int pktype = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey);
454 if (pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2001
455 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
456 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512) {
457 if ((gost_data = OPENSSL_malloc(len)) == NULL) {
458 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
459 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
462 BUF_reverse(gost_data, data, len);
468 if (SSL_USE_PSS(s)) {
469 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0
470 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx,
471 RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) {
472 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
477 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
478 if (EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0
479 || !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET,
480 (int)s->session->master_key_length,
481 s->session->master_key)) {
482 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
486 if (EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(mctx, data, len) <= 0) {
487 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
488 SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
492 j = EVP_DigestVerify(mctx, data, len, hdata, hdatalen);
494 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
495 SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
501 * In TLSv1.3 on the client side we make sure we prepare the client
502 * certificate after the CertVerify instead of when we get the
503 * CertificateRequest. This is because in TLSv1.3 the CertificateRequest
504 * comes *before* the Certificate message. In TLSv1.2 it comes after. We
505 * want to make sure that SSL_get_peer_certificate() will return the actual
506 * server certificate from the client_cert_cb callback.
508 if (!s->server && SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1)
509 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
511 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
513 BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
514 s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
515 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
516 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
517 OPENSSL_free(gost_data);
522 int tls_construct_finished(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
524 size_t finish_md_len;
528 /* This is a real handshake so make sure we clean it up at the end */
529 if (!s->server && s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED)
530 s->statem.cleanuphand = 1;
533 * We only change the keys if we didn't already do this when we sent the
538 && s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 0
539 && (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
540 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))) {;
541 /* SSLfatal() already called */
546 sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label;
547 slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len;
549 sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label;
550 slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len;
553 finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
555 s->s3->tmp.finish_md);
556 if (finish_md_len == 0) {
557 /* SSLfatal() already called */
561 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len = finish_md_len;
563 if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, finish_md_len)) {
564 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED,
565 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
570 * Log the master secret, if logging is enabled. We don't log it for
571 * TLSv1.3: there's a different key schedule for that.
573 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !ssl_log_secret(s, MASTER_SECRET_LABEL,
574 s->session->master_key,
575 s->session->master_key_length)) {
576 /* SSLfatal() already called */
581 * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks
583 if (!ossl_assert(finish_md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)) {
584 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED,
585 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
589 memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished, s->s3->tmp.finish_md,
591 s->s3->previous_client_finished_len = finish_md_len;
593 memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished, s->s3->tmp.finish_md,
595 s->s3->previous_server_finished_len = finish_md_len;
601 int tls_construct_key_update(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
603 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->key_update)) {
604 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_KEY_UPDATE,
605 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
609 s->key_update = SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE;
613 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_update(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
615 unsigned int updatetype;
617 s->key_update_count++;
618 if (s->key_update_count > MAX_KEY_UPDATE_MESSAGES) {
619 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE,
620 SSL_R_TOO_MANY_KEY_UPDATES);
621 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
625 * A KeyUpdate message signals a key change so the end of the message must
626 * be on a record boundary.
628 if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
629 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE,
630 SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
631 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
634 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &updatetype)
635 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
636 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE,
637 SSL_R_BAD_KEY_UPDATE);
638 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
642 * There are only two defined key update types. Fail if we get a value we
645 if (updatetype != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NOT_REQUESTED
646 && updatetype != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_REQUESTED) {
647 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE,
648 SSL_R_BAD_KEY_UPDATE);
649 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
653 * If we get a request for us to update our sending keys too then, we need
654 * to additionally send a KeyUpdate message. However that message should
655 * not also request an update (otherwise we get into an infinite loop). We
656 * ignore a request for us to update our sending keys too if we already
659 if (updatetype == SSL_KEY_UPDATE_REQUESTED
660 && (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) == 0)
661 s->key_update = SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NOT_REQUESTED;
663 if (!tls13_update_key(s, 0)) {
664 /* SSLfatal() already called */
665 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
668 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
672 * ssl3_take_mac calculates the Finished MAC for the handshakes messages seen
675 int ssl3_take_mac(SSL *s)
681 sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label;
682 slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len;
684 sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label;
685 slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len;
688 s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len =
689 s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s, sender, slen,
690 s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md);
692 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len == 0) {
693 /* SSLfatal() already called */
700 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
704 remain = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
706 * 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, which should already have
707 * been consumed by ssl_get_message() so there should be no bytes left,
708 * unless we're using DTLS1_BAD_VER, which has an extra 2 bytes
710 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
711 if ((s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER
712 && remain != DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH + 1)
713 || (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER
714 && remain != DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH - 1)) {
715 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
716 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,
717 SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
718 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
722 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
723 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,
724 SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
725 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
729 /* Check we have a cipher to change to */
730 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL) {
731 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
732 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
733 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
736 s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 1;
737 if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s)) {
738 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,
739 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
740 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
743 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
744 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_READ);
746 if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
747 s->d1->handshake_read_seq++;
749 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
751 * Remember that a CCS has been received, so that an old key of
752 * SCTP-Auth can be deleted when a CCS is sent. Will be ignored if no
755 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_AUTH_CCS_RCVD, 1, NULL);
759 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
762 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_finished(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
767 /* This is a real handshake so make sure we clean it up at the end */
770 * To get this far we must have read encrypted data from the client. We
771 * no longer tolerate unencrypted alerts. This value is ignored if less
774 s->statem.enc_read_state = ENC_READ_STATE_VALID;
775 if (s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED)
776 s->statem.cleanuphand = 1;
777 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !tls13_save_handshake_digest_for_pha(s)) {
778 /* SSLfatal() already called */
779 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
784 * In TLSv1.3 a Finished message signals a key change so the end of the
785 * message must be on a record boundary.
787 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
788 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED,
789 SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
790 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
793 /* If this occurs, we have missed a message */
794 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !s->s3->change_cipher_spec) {
795 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED,
796 SSL_R_GOT_A_FIN_BEFORE_A_CCS);
797 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
799 s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0;
801 md_len = s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len;
803 if (md_len != PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
804 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED,
805 SSL_R_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH);
806 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
809 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(PACKET_data(pkt), s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md,
811 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED,
812 SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED);
813 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
817 * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks
819 if (!ossl_assert(md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)) {
820 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED,
821 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
822 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
825 memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md,
827 s->s3->previous_client_finished_len = md_len;
829 memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md,
831 s->s3->previous_server_finished_len = md_len;
835 * In TLS1.3 we also have to change cipher state and do any final processing
836 * of the initial server flight (if we are a client)
838 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
840 if (s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED &&
841 !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
842 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) {
843 /* SSLfatal() already called */
844 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
847 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
848 s->master_secret, s->handshake_secret, 0,
849 &s->session->master_key_length)) {
850 /* SSLfatal() already called */
851 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
853 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
854 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ)) {
855 /* SSLfatal() already called */
856 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
858 if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s)) {
859 /* SSLfatal() already called */
860 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
865 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
868 int tls_construct_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
870 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, SSL3_MT_CCS)) {
871 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
872 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
879 /* Add a certificate to the WPACKET */
880 static int ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, int chain)
883 unsigned char *outbytes;
885 len = i2d_X509(x, NULL);
887 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_TO_WPACKET,
891 if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u24(pkt, len, &outbytes)
892 || i2d_X509(x, &outbytes) != len) {
893 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_TO_WPACKET,
894 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
899 && !tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, x,
901 /* SSLfatal() already called */
908 /* Add certificate chain to provided WPACKET */
909 static int ssl_add_cert_chain(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, CERT_PKEY *cpk)
913 STACK_OF(X509) *extra_certs;
914 STACK_OF(X509) *chain = NULL;
915 X509_STORE *chain_store;
917 if (cpk == NULL || cpk->x509 == NULL)
923 * If we have a certificate specific chain use it, else use parent ctx.
925 if (cpk->chain != NULL)
926 extra_certs = cpk->chain;
928 extra_certs = s->ctx->extra_certs;
930 if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN) || extra_certs)
932 else if (s->cert->chain_store)
933 chain_store = s->cert->chain_store;
935 chain_store = s->ctx->cert_store;
937 if (chain_store != NULL) {
938 X509_STORE_CTX *xs_ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new();
940 if (xs_ctx == NULL) {
941 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN,
942 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
945 if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(xs_ctx, chain_store, x, NULL)) {
946 X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx);
947 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN,
952 * It is valid for the chain not to be complete (because normally we
953 * don't include the root cert in the chain). Therefore we deliberately
954 * ignore the error return from this call. We're not actually verifying
955 * the cert - we're just building as much of the chain as we can
957 (void)X509_verify_cert(xs_ctx);
958 /* Don't leave errors in the queue */
960 chain = X509_STORE_CTX_get0_chain(xs_ctx);
961 i = ssl_security_cert_chain(s, chain, NULL, 0);
964 /* Dummy error calls so mkerr generates them */
965 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
966 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
967 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK);
969 X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx);
970 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, i);
973 chain_count = sk_X509_num(chain);
974 for (i = 0; i < chain_count; i++) {
975 x = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
977 if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, i)) {
978 /* SSLfatal() already called */
979 X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx);
983 X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx);
985 i = ssl_security_cert_chain(s, extra_certs, x, 0);
987 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, i);
990 if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, 0)) {
991 /* SSLfatal() already called */
994 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(extra_certs); i++) {
995 x = sk_X509_value(extra_certs, i);
996 if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, i + 1)) {
997 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1005 unsigned long ssl3_output_cert_chain(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, CERT_PKEY *cpk)
1007 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u24(pkt)) {
1008 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN,
1009 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1013 if (!ssl_add_cert_chain(s, pkt, cpk))
1016 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1017 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN,
1018 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1026 * Tidy up after the end of a handshake. In the case of SCTP this may result
1027 * in NBIO events. If |clearbufs| is set then init_buf and the wbio buffer is
1030 WORK_STATE tls_finish_handshake(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst, int clearbufs, int stop)
1032 void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
1033 int cleanuphand = s->statem.cleanuphand;
1036 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1038 * We don't do this in DTLS because we may still need the init_buf
1039 * in case there are any unexpected retransmits
1041 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
1044 if (!ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s)) {
1045 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_FINISH_HANDSHAKE,
1046 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1052 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !s->server
1053 && s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED)
1054 s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_EXT_SENT;
1057 * Only set if there was a Finished message and this isn't after a TLSv1.3
1058 * post handshake exchange
1061 /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
1064 s->statem.cleanuphand = 0;
1065 s->ext.ticket_expected = 0;
1067 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
1071 * In TLSv1.3 we update the cache as part of constructing the
1074 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
1075 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
1077 /* N.B. s->ctx may not equal s->session_ctx */
1078 tsan_counter(&s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good);
1079 s->handshake_func = ossl_statem_accept;
1081 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1083 * We encourage applications to only use TLSv1.3 tickets once,
1084 * so we remove this one from the cache.
1086 if ((s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode
1087 & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT) != 0)
1088 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
1091 * In TLSv1.3 we update the cache as part of processing the
1094 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT);
1097 tsan_counter(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_hit);
1099 s->handshake_func = ossl_statem_connect;
1100 tsan_counter(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_connect_good);
1103 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1104 /* done with handshaking */
1105 s->d1->handshake_read_seq = 0;
1106 s->d1->handshake_write_seq = 0;
1107 s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq = 0;
1108 dtls1_clear_received_buffer(s);
1112 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1113 cb = s->info_callback;
1114 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1115 cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
1117 /* The callback may expect us to not be in init at handshake done */
1118 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
1123 || SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s))
1124 cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1);
1128 /* If we've got more work to do we go back into init */
1129 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 1);
1130 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
1133 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
1136 int tls_get_message_header(SSL *s, int *mt)
1138 /* s->init_num < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */
1139 int skip_message, i, recvd_type;
1141 size_t l, readbytes;
1143 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1146 while (s->init_num < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) {
1147 i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, &recvd_type,
1149 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH - s->init_num,
1152 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
1155 if (recvd_type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
1157 * A ChangeCipherSpec must be a single byte and may not occur
1158 * in the middle of a handshake message.
1160 if (s->init_num != 0 || readbytes != 1 || p[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS) {
1161 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
1162 SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER,
1163 SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
1166 if (s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_BEFORE
1167 && (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_STATELESS) != 0) {
1169 * We are stateless and we received a CCS. Probably this is
1170 * from a client between the first and second ClientHellos.
1171 * We should ignore this, but return an error because we do
1172 * not return success until we see the second ClientHello
1173 * with a valid cookie.
1177 s->s3->tmp.message_type = *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
1178 s->init_num = readbytes - 1;
1179 s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data;
1180 s->s3->tmp.message_size = readbytes;
1182 } else if (recvd_type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
1183 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
1184 SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER,
1185 SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1188 s->init_num += readbytes;
1193 if (s->statem.hand_state != TLS_ST_OK
1194 && p[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST)
1196 * The server may always send 'Hello Request' messages --
1197 * we are doing a handshake anyway now, so ignore them if
1198 * their format is correct. Does not count for 'Finished'
1201 if (p[1] == 0 && p[2] == 0 && p[3] == 0) {
1205 if (s->msg_callback)
1206 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
1207 p, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, s,
1208 s->msg_callback_arg);
1210 } while (skip_message);
1211 /* s->init_num == SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */
1214 s->s3->tmp.message_type = *(p++);
1216 if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer)) {
1218 * Only happens with SSLv3+ in an SSLv2 backward compatible
1221 * Total message size is the remaining record bytes to read
1222 * plus the SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH bytes that we already read
1224 l = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec_length(&s->rlayer)
1225 + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
1226 s->s3->tmp.message_size = l;
1228 s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data;
1229 s->init_num = SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
1232 /* BUF_MEM_grow takes an 'int' parameter */
1233 if (l > (INT_MAX - SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
1234 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER,
1235 SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
1238 s->s3->tmp.message_size = l;
1240 s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
1247 int tls_get_message_body(SSL *s, size_t *len)
1249 size_t n, readbytes;
1253 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
1254 /* We've already read everything in */
1255 *len = (unsigned long)s->init_num;
1260 n = s->s3->tmp.message_size - s->init_num;
1262 i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, NULL,
1263 &p[s->init_num], n, 0, &readbytes);
1265 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
1269 s->init_num += readbytes;
1274 * If receiving Finished, record MAC of prior handshake messages for
1275 * Finished verification.
1277 if (*(s->init_buf->data) == SSL3_MT_FINISHED && !ssl3_take_mac(s)) {
1278 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1283 /* Feed this message into MAC computation. */
1284 if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer)) {
1285 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data,
1287 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1291 if (s->msg_callback)
1292 s->msg_callback(0, SSL2_VERSION, 0, s->init_buf->data,
1293 (size_t)s->init_num, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1296 * We defer feeding in the HRR until later. We'll do it as part of
1297 * processing the message
1298 * The TLsv1.3 handshake transcript stops at the ClientFinished
1301 #define SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_OFFSET (SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + 2)
1302 /* KeyUpdate and NewSessionTicket do not need to be added */
1303 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET
1304 && s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE)) {
1305 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO
1306 || s->init_num < SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_OFFSET + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1307 || memcmp(hrrrandom,
1308 s->init_buf->data + SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_OFFSET,
1309 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) != 0) {
1310 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data,
1311 s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
1312 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1318 if (s->msg_callback)
1319 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->init_buf->data,
1320 (size_t)s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, s,
1321 s->msg_callback_arg);
1328 static const X509ERR2ALERT x509table[] = {
1329 {X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE},
1330 {X509_V_ERR_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1331 {X509_V_ERR_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1332 {X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA},
1333 {X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED},
1334 {X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1335 {X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1336 {X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED},
1337 {X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR},
1338 {X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1339 {X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED},
1340 {X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1341 {X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR},
1342 {X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1343 {X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA},
1344 {X509_V_ERR_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1345 {X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1346 {X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1347 {X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1348 {X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1349 {X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1350 {X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1351 {X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA},
1352 {X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR},
1353 {X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE},
1354 {X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1355 {X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR},
1356 {X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA},
1357 {X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA},
1358 {X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR},
1359 {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1360 {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CERT_SIGNATURE, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1361 {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CRL_SIGNATURE, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1362 {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA},
1363 {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA},
1364 {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA},
1365 {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA},
1366 {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA},
1367 {X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR},
1369 /* Last entry; return this if we don't find the value above. */
1370 {X509_V_OK, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN}
1373 int ssl_x509err2alert(int x509err)
1375 const X509ERR2ALERT *tp;
1377 for (tp = x509table; tp->x509err != X509_V_OK; ++tp)
1378 if (tp->x509err == x509err)
1383 int ssl_allow_compression(SSL *s)
1385 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION)
1387 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_COMPRESSION, 0, 0, NULL);
1390 static int version_cmp(const SSL *s, int a, int b)
1392 int dtls = SSL_IS_DTLS(s);
1397 return a < b ? -1 : 1;
1398 return DTLS_VERSION_LT(a, b) ? -1 : 1;
1403 const SSL_METHOD *(*cmeth) (void);
1404 const SSL_METHOD *(*smeth) (void);
1407 #if TLS_MAX_VERSION != TLS1_3_VERSION
1408 # error Code needs update for TLS_method() support beyond TLS1_3_VERSION.
1411 /* Must be in order high to low */
1412 static const version_info tls_version_table[] = {
1413 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
1414 {TLS1_3_VERSION, tlsv1_3_client_method, tlsv1_3_server_method},
1416 {TLS1_3_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
1418 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2
1419 {TLS1_2_VERSION, tlsv1_2_client_method, tlsv1_2_server_method},
1421 {TLS1_2_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
1423 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_1
1424 {TLS1_1_VERSION, tlsv1_1_client_method, tlsv1_1_server_method},
1426 {TLS1_1_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
1428 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1
1429 {TLS1_VERSION, tlsv1_client_method, tlsv1_server_method},
1431 {TLS1_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
1433 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3
1434 {SSL3_VERSION, sslv3_client_method, sslv3_server_method},
1436 {SSL3_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
1441 #if DTLS_MAX_VERSION != DTLS1_2_VERSION
1442 # error Code needs update for DTLS_method() support beyond DTLS1_2_VERSION.
1445 /* Must be in order high to low */
1446 static const version_info dtls_version_table[] = {
1447 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1_2
1448 {DTLS1_2_VERSION, dtlsv1_2_client_method, dtlsv1_2_server_method},
1450 {DTLS1_2_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
1452 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1
1453 {DTLS1_VERSION, dtlsv1_client_method, dtlsv1_server_method},
1454 {DTLS1_BAD_VER, dtls_bad_ver_client_method, NULL},
1456 {DTLS1_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
1457 {DTLS1_BAD_VER, NULL, NULL},
1463 * ssl_method_error - Check whether an SSL_METHOD is enabled.
1465 * @s: The SSL handle for the candidate method
1466 * @method: the intended method.
1468 * Returns 0 on success, or an SSL error reason on failure.
1470 static int ssl_method_error(const SSL *s, const SSL_METHOD *method)
1472 int version = method->version;
1474 if ((s->min_proto_version != 0 &&
1475 version_cmp(s, version, s->min_proto_version) < 0) ||
1476 ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_VERSION, 0, version, NULL) == 0)
1477 return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW;
1479 if (s->max_proto_version != 0 &&
1480 version_cmp(s, version, s->max_proto_version) > 0)
1481 return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_HIGH;
1483 if ((s->options & method->mask) != 0)
1484 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL;
1485 if ((method->flags & SSL_METHOD_NO_SUITEB) != 0 && tls1_suiteb(s))
1486 return SSL_R_AT_LEAST_TLS_1_2_NEEDED_IN_SUITEB_MODE;
1492 * Only called by servers. Returns 1 if the server has a TLSv1.3 capable
1493 * certificate type, or has PSK or a certificate callback configured. Otherwise
1496 static int is_tls13_capable(const SSL *s)
1499 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1504 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1505 if (s->psk_server_callback != NULL)
1509 if (s->psk_find_session_cb != NULL || s->cert->cert_cb != NULL)
1512 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
1513 /* Skip over certs disallowed for TLSv1.3 */
1515 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
1516 case SSL_PKEY_GOST01:
1517 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256:
1518 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512:
1523 if (!ssl_has_cert(s, i))
1525 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1526 if (i != SSL_PKEY_ECC)
1529 * Prior to TLSv1.3 sig algs allowed any curve to be used. TLSv1.3 is
1530 * more restrictive so check that our sig algs are consistent with this
1531 * EC cert. See section 4.2.3 of RFC8446.
1533 eckey = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey);
1536 curve = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(eckey));
1537 if (tls_check_sigalg_curve(s, curve))
1548 * ssl_version_supported - Check that the specified `version` is supported by
1551 * @s: The SSL handle for the candidate method
1552 * @version: Protocol version to test against
1554 * Returns 1 when supported, otherwise 0
1556 int ssl_version_supported(const SSL *s, int version, const SSL_METHOD **meth)
1558 const version_info *vent;
1559 const version_info *table;
1561 switch (s->method->version) {
1563 /* Version should match method version for non-ANY method */
1564 return version_cmp(s, version, s->version) == 0;
1565 case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
1566 table = tls_version_table;
1568 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION:
1569 table = dtls_version_table;
1574 vent->version != 0 && version_cmp(s, version, vent->version) <= 0;
1576 if (vent->cmeth != NULL
1577 && version_cmp(s, version, vent->version) == 0
1578 && ssl_method_error(s, vent->cmeth()) == 0
1580 || version != TLS1_3_VERSION
1581 || is_tls13_capable(s))) {
1583 *meth = vent->cmeth();
1591 * ssl_check_version_downgrade - In response to RFC7507 SCSV version
1592 * fallback indication from a client check whether we're using the highest
1593 * supported protocol version.
1595 * @s server SSL handle.
1597 * Returns 1 when using the highest enabled version, 0 otherwise.
1599 int ssl_check_version_downgrade(SSL *s)
1601 const version_info *vent;
1602 const version_info *table;
1605 * Check that the current protocol is the highest enabled version
1606 * (according to s->ctx->method, as version negotiation may have changed
1609 if (s->version == s->ctx->method->version)
1613 * Apparently we're using a version-flexible SSL_METHOD (not at its
1614 * highest protocol version).
1616 if (s->ctx->method->version == TLS_method()->version)
1617 table = tls_version_table;
1618 else if (s->ctx->method->version == DTLS_method()->version)
1619 table = dtls_version_table;
1621 /* Unexpected state; fail closed. */
1625 for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) {
1626 if (vent->smeth != NULL && ssl_method_error(s, vent->smeth()) == 0)
1627 return s->version == vent->version;
1633 * ssl_set_version_bound - set an upper or lower bound on the supported (D)TLS
1634 * protocols, provided the initial (D)TLS method is version-flexible. This
1635 * function sanity-checks the proposed value and makes sure the method is
1636 * version-flexible, then sets the limit if all is well.
1638 * @method_version: The version of the current SSL_METHOD.
1639 * @version: the intended limit.
1640 * @bound: pointer to limit to be updated.
1642 * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure.
1644 int ssl_set_version_bound(int method_version, int version, int *bound)
1652 * Restrict TLS methods to TLS protocol versions.
1653 * Restrict DTLS methods to DTLS protocol versions.
1654 * Note, DTLS version numbers are decreasing, use comparison macros.
1656 * Note that for both lower-bounds we use explicit versions, not
1657 * (D)TLS_MIN_VERSION. This is because we don't want to break user
1658 * configurations. If the MIN (supported) version ever rises, the user's
1659 * "floor" remains valid even if no longer available. We don't expect the
1660 * MAX ceiling to ever get lower, so making that variable makes sense.
1662 switch (method_version) {
1665 * XXX For fixed version methods, should we always fail and not set any
1666 * bounds, always succeed and not set any bounds, or set the bounds and
1667 * arrange to fail later if they are not met? At present fixed-version
1668 * methods are not subject to controls that disable individual protocol
1673 case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
1674 if (version < SSL3_VERSION || version > TLS_MAX_VERSION)
1678 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION:
1679 if (DTLS_VERSION_GT(version, DTLS_MAX_VERSION) ||
1680 DTLS_VERSION_LT(version, DTLS1_BAD_VER))
1689 static void check_for_downgrade(SSL *s, int vers, DOWNGRADE *dgrd)
1691 if (vers == TLS1_2_VERSION
1692 && ssl_version_supported(s, TLS1_3_VERSION, NULL)) {
1693 *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_TO_1_2;
1694 } else if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)
1695 && vers < TLS1_2_VERSION
1697 * We need to ensure that a server that disables TLSv1.2
1698 * (creating a hole between TLSv1.3 and TLSv1.1) can still
1699 * complete handshakes with clients that support TLSv1.2 and
1700 * below. Therefore we do not enable the sentinel if TLSv1.3 is
1701 * enabled and TLSv1.2 is not.
1703 && ssl_version_supported(s, TLS1_2_VERSION, NULL)) {
1704 *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_TO_1_1;
1706 *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_NONE;
1711 * ssl_choose_server_version - Choose server (D)TLS version. Called when the
1712 * client HELLO is received to select the final server protocol version and
1713 * the version specific method.
1715 * @s: server SSL handle.
1717 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure.
1719 int ssl_choose_server_version(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello, DOWNGRADE *dgrd)
1722 * With version-flexible methods we have an initial state with:
1724 * s->method->version == (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION,
1725 * s->version == (D)TLS_MAX_VERSION.
1727 * So we detect version-flexible methods via the method version, not the
1730 int server_version = s->method->version;
1731 int client_version = hello->legacy_version;
1732 const version_info *vent;
1733 const version_info *table;
1735 RAW_EXTENSION *suppversions;
1737 s->client_version = client_version;
1739 switch (server_version) {
1741 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1742 if (version_cmp(s, client_version, s->version) < 0)
1743 return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION;
1744 *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_NONE;
1746 * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
1747 * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
1748 * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
1749 * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return
1750 * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
1755 * Fall through if we are TLSv1.3 already (this means we must be after
1756 * a HelloRetryRequest
1759 case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
1760 table = tls_version_table;
1762 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION:
1763 table = dtls_version_table;
1767 suppversions = &hello->pre_proc_exts[TLSEXT_IDX_supported_versions];
1769 /* If we did an HRR then supported versions is mandatory */
1770 if (!suppversions->present && s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE)
1771 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL;
1773 if (suppversions->present && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1774 unsigned int candidate_vers = 0;
1775 unsigned int best_vers = 0;
1776 const SSL_METHOD *best_method = NULL;
1777 PACKET versionslist;
1779 suppversions->parsed = 1;
1781 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&suppversions->data, &versionslist)) {
1782 /* Trailing or invalid data? */
1783 return SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH;
1787 * The TLSv1.3 spec says the client MUST set this to TLS1_2_VERSION.
1788 * The spec only requires servers to check that it isn't SSLv3:
1789 * "Any endpoint receiving a Hello message with
1790 * ClientHello.legacy_version or ServerHello.legacy_version set to
1791 * 0x0300 MUST abort the handshake with a "protocol_version" alert."
1792 * We are slightly stricter and require that it isn't SSLv3 or lower.
1793 * We tolerate TLSv1 and TLSv1.1.
1795 if (client_version <= SSL3_VERSION)
1796 return SSL_R_BAD_LEGACY_VERSION;
1798 while (PACKET_get_net_2(&versionslist, &candidate_vers)) {
1799 if (version_cmp(s, candidate_vers, best_vers) <= 0)
1801 if (ssl_version_supported(s, candidate_vers, &best_method))
1802 best_vers = candidate_vers;
1804 if (PACKET_remaining(&versionslist) != 0) {
1805 /* Trailing data? */
1806 return SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH;
1809 if (best_vers > 0) {
1810 if (s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE) {
1812 * This is after a HelloRetryRequest so we better check that we
1813 * negotiated TLSv1.3
1815 if (best_vers != TLS1_3_VERSION)
1816 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL;
1819 check_for_downgrade(s, best_vers, dgrd);
1820 s->version = best_vers;
1821 s->method = best_method;
1824 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL;
1828 * If the supported versions extension isn't present, then the highest
1829 * version we can negotiate is TLSv1.2
1831 if (version_cmp(s, client_version, TLS1_3_VERSION) >= 0)
1832 client_version = TLS1_2_VERSION;
1835 * No supported versions extension, so we just use the version supplied in
1838 for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) {
1839 const SSL_METHOD *method;
1841 if (vent->smeth == NULL ||
1842 version_cmp(s, client_version, vent->version) < 0)
1844 method = vent->smeth();
1845 if (ssl_method_error(s, method) == 0) {
1846 check_for_downgrade(s, vent->version, dgrd);
1847 s->version = vent->version;
1853 return disabled ? SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL : SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW;
1857 * ssl_choose_client_version - Choose client (D)TLS version. Called when the
1858 * server HELLO is received to select the final client protocol version and
1859 * the version specific method.
1861 * @s: client SSL handle.
1862 * @version: The proposed version from the server's HELLO.
1863 * @extensions: The extensions received
1865 * Returns 1 on success or 0 on error.
1867 int ssl_choose_client_version(SSL *s, int version, RAW_EXTENSION *extensions)
1869 const version_info *vent;
1870 const version_info *table;
1871 int ret, ver_min, ver_max, real_max, origv;
1874 s->version = version;
1876 /* This will overwrite s->version if the extension is present */
1877 if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_supported_versions,
1878 SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
1879 | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO, extensions,
1885 if (s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE
1886 && s->version != TLS1_3_VERSION) {
1888 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION,
1889 SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION);
1893 switch (s->method->version) {
1895 if (s->version != s->method->version) {
1897 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
1898 SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION,
1899 SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION);
1903 * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
1904 * (and never did) check min/max, FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
1905 * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
1906 * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return
1907 * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
1910 case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
1911 table = tls_version_table;
1913 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION:
1914 table = dtls_version_table;
1918 ret = ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &ver_min, &ver_max, &real_max);
1921 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
1922 SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION, ret);
1925 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) ? DTLS_VERSION_LT(s->version, ver_min)
1926 : s->version < ver_min) {
1928 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
1929 SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL);
1931 } else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) ? DTLS_VERSION_GT(s->version, ver_max)
1932 : s->version > ver_max) {
1934 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
1935 SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL);
1939 if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) == 0)
1942 /* Check for downgrades */
1943 if (s->version == TLS1_2_VERSION && real_max > s->version) {
1944 if (memcmp(tls12downgrade,
1945 s->s3->server_random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1946 - sizeof(tls12downgrade),
1947 sizeof(tls12downgrade)) == 0) {
1949 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1950 SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION,
1951 SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
1954 } else if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)
1955 && s->version < TLS1_2_VERSION
1956 && real_max > s->version) {
1957 if (memcmp(tls11downgrade,
1958 s->s3->server_random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1959 - sizeof(tls11downgrade),
1960 sizeof(tls11downgrade)) == 0) {
1962 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1963 SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION,
1964 SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
1969 for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) {
1970 if (vent->cmeth == NULL || s->version != vent->version)
1973 s->method = vent->cmeth();
1978 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION,
1979 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL);
1984 * ssl_get_min_max_version - get minimum and maximum protocol version
1985 * @s: The SSL connection
1986 * @min_version: The minimum supported version
1987 * @max_version: The maximum supported version
1988 * @real_max: The highest version below the lowest compile time version hole
1989 * where that hole lies above at least one run-time enabled
1992 * Work out what version we should be using for the initial ClientHello if the
1993 * version is initially (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION. We apply any explicit SSL_OP_NO_xxx
1994 * options, the MinProtocol and MaxProtocol configuration commands, any Suite B
1995 * constraints and any floor imposed by the security level here,
1996 * so we don't advertise the wrong protocol version to only reject the outcome later.
1998 * Computing the right floor matters. If, e.g., TLS 1.0 and 1.2 are enabled,
1999 * TLS 1.1 is disabled, but the security level, Suite-B and/or MinProtocol
2000 * only allow TLS 1.2, we want to advertise TLS1.2, *not* TLS1.
2002 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. On failure
2003 * min_version and max_version will also be set to 0.
2005 int ssl_get_min_max_version(const SSL *s, int *min_version, int *max_version,
2008 int version, tmp_real_max;
2010 const SSL_METHOD *single = NULL;
2011 const SSL_METHOD *method;
2012 const version_info *table;
2013 const version_info *vent;
2015 switch (s->method->version) {
2018 * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
2019 * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
2020 * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
2021 * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return
2022 * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
2024 *min_version = *max_version = s->version;
2026 * Providing a real_max only makes sense where we're using a version
2029 if (!ossl_assert(real_max == NULL))
2030 return ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2032 case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
2033 table = tls_version_table;
2035 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION:
2036 table = dtls_version_table;
2041 * SSL_OP_NO_X disables all protocols above X *if* there are some protocols
2042 * below X enabled. This is required in order to maintain the "version
2043 * capability" vector contiguous. Any versions with a NULL client method
2044 * (protocol version client is disabled at compile-time) is also a "hole".
2046 * Our initial state is hole == 1, version == 0. That is, versions above
2047 * the first version in the method table are disabled (a "hole" above
2048 * the valid protocol entries) and we don't have a selected version yet.
2050 * Whenever "hole == 1", and we hit an enabled method, its version becomes
2051 * the selected version, and the method becomes a candidate "single"
2052 * method. We're no longer in a hole, so "hole" becomes 0.
2054 * If "hole == 0" and we hit an enabled method, then "single" is cleared,
2055 * as we support a contiguous range of at least two methods. If we hit
2056 * a disabled method, then hole becomes true again, but nothing else
2057 * changes yet, because all the remaining methods may be disabled too.
2058 * If we again hit an enabled method after the new hole, it becomes
2059 * selected, as we start from scratch.
2061 *min_version = version = 0;
2063 if (real_max != NULL)
2066 for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) {
2068 * A table entry with a NULL client method is still a hole in the
2069 * "version capability" vector.
2071 if (vent->cmeth == NULL) {
2076 method = vent->cmeth();
2078 if (hole == 1 && tmp_real_max == 0)
2079 tmp_real_max = vent->version;
2081 if (ssl_method_error(s, method) != 0) {
2085 *min_version = method->version;
2087 if (real_max != NULL && tmp_real_max != 0)
2088 *real_max = tmp_real_max;
2089 version = (single = method)->version;
2090 *min_version = version;
2095 *max_version = version;
2097 /* Fail if everything is disabled */
2099 return SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE;
2105 * ssl_set_client_hello_version - Work out what version we should be using for
2106 * the initial ClientHello.legacy_version field.
2108 * @s: client SSL handle.
2110 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure.
2112 int ssl_set_client_hello_version(SSL *s)
2114 int ver_min, ver_max, ret;
2117 * In a renegotiation we always send the same client_version that we sent
2118 * last time, regardless of which version we eventually negotiated.
2120 if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s))
2123 ret = ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &ver_min, &ver_max, NULL);
2128 s->version = ver_max;
2130 /* TLS1.3 always uses TLS1.2 in the legacy_version field */
2131 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && ver_max > TLS1_2_VERSION)
2132 ver_max = TLS1_2_VERSION;
2134 s->client_version = ver_max;
2139 * Checks a list of |groups| to determine if the |group_id| is in it. If it is
2140 * and |checkallow| is 1 then additionally check if the group is allowed to be
2141 * used. Returns 1 if the group is in the list (and allowed if |checkallow| is
2142 * 1) or 0 otherwise.
2144 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2145 int check_in_list(SSL *s, uint16_t group_id, const uint16_t *groups,
2146 size_t num_groups, int checkallow)
2150 if (groups == NULL || num_groups == 0)
2153 for (i = 0; i < num_groups; i++) {
2154 uint16_t group = groups[i];
2156 if (group_id == group
2158 || tls_curve_allowed(s, group, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK))) {
2167 /* Replace ClientHello1 in the transcript hash with a synthetic message */
2168 int create_synthetic_message_hash(SSL *s, const unsigned char *hashval,
2169 size_t hashlen, const unsigned char *hrr,
2172 unsigned char hashvaltmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
2173 unsigned char msghdr[SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH];
2175 memset(msghdr, 0, sizeof(msghdr));
2177 if (hashval == NULL) {
2178 hashval = hashvaltmp;
2180 /* Get the hash of the initial ClientHello */
2181 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)
2182 || !ssl_handshake_hash(s, hashvaltmp, sizeof(hashvaltmp),
2184 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2189 /* Reinitialise the transcript hash */
2190 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
2191 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2195 /* Inject the synthetic message_hash message */
2196 msghdr[0] = SSL3_MT_MESSAGE_HASH;
2197 msghdr[SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH - 1] = (unsigned char)hashlen;
2198 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, msghdr, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)
2199 || !ssl3_finish_mac(s, hashval, hashlen)) {
2200 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2205 * Now re-inject the HRR and current message if appropriate (we just deleted
2206 * it when we reinitialised the transcript hash above). Only necessary after
2207 * receiving a ClientHello2 with a cookie.
2210 && (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, hrr, hrrlen)
2211 || !ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data,
2212 s->s3->tmp.message_size
2213 + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH))) {
2214 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2221 static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b)
2223 return X509_NAME_cmp(*a, *b);
2226 int parse_ca_names(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2228 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp);
2229 X509_NAME *xn = NULL;
2232 if (ca_sk == NULL) {
2233 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES,
2234 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2237 /* get the CA RDNs */
2238 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &cadns)) {
2239 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES,
2240 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2244 while (PACKET_remaining(&cadns)) {
2245 const unsigned char *namestart, *namebytes;
2246 unsigned int name_len;
2248 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&cadns, &name_len)
2249 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&cadns, &namebytes, name_len)) {
2250 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES,
2251 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2255 namestart = namebytes;
2256 if ((xn = d2i_X509_NAME(NULL, &namebytes, name_len)) == NULL) {
2257 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES,
2261 if (namebytes != (namestart + name_len)) {
2262 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES,
2263 SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2267 if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk, xn)) {
2268 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES,
2269 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2275 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_ca_names, X509_NAME_free);
2276 s->s3->tmp.peer_ca_names = ca_sk;
2281 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk, X509_NAME_free);
2286 const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *get_ca_names(SSL *s)
2288 const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = NULL;;
2291 ca_sk = SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
2292 if (ca_sk != NULL && sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_sk) == 0)
2297 ca_sk = SSL_get0_CA_list(s);
2302 int construct_ca_names(SSL *s, const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk, WPACKET *pkt)
2304 /* Start sub-packet for client CA list */
2305 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
2306 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_CA_NAMES,
2307 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2311 if (ca_sk != NULL) {
2314 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_sk); i++) {
2315 unsigned char *namebytes;
2316 X509_NAME *name = sk_X509_NAME_value(ca_sk, i);
2320 || (namelen = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL)) < 0
2321 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, namelen,
2323 || i2d_X509_NAME(name, &namebytes) != namelen) {
2324 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_CA_NAMES,
2325 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2331 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2332 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_CA_NAMES,
2333 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2340 /* Create a buffer containing data to be signed for server key exchange */
2341 size_t construct_key_exchange_tbs(SSL *s, unsigned char **ptbs,
2342 const void *param, size_t paramlen)
2344 size_t tbslen = 2 * SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + paramlen;
2345 unsigned char *tbs = OPENSSL_malloc(tbslen);
2348 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_KEY_EXCHANGE_TBS,
2349 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2352 memcpy(tbs, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
2353 memcpy(tbs + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
2355 memcpy(tbs + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE * 2, param, paramlen);
2362 * Saves the current handshake digest for Post-Handshake Auth,
2363 * Done after ClientFinished is processed, done exactly once
2365 int tls13_save_handshake_digest_for_pha(SSL *s)
2367 if (s->pha_dgst == NULL) {
2368 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1))
2369 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2372 s->pha_dgst = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2373 if (s->pha_dgst == NULL) {
2374 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2375 SSL_F_TLS13_SAVE_HANDSHAKE_DIGEST_FOR_PHA,
2376 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2379 if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(s->pha_dgst,
2380 s->s3->handshake_dgst)) {
2381 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2382 SSL_F_TLS13_SAVE_HANDSHAKE_DIGEST_FOR_PHA,
2383 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2391 * Restores the Post-Handshake Auth handshake digest
2392 * Done just before sending/processing the Cert Request
2394 int tls13_restore_handshake_digest_for_pha(SSL *s)
2396 if (s->pha_dgst == NULL) {
2397 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2398 SSL_F_TLS13_RESTORE_HANDSHAKE_DIGEST_FOR_PHA,
2399 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2402 if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(s->s3->handshake_dgst,
2404 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2405 SSL_F_TLS13_RESTORE_HANDSHAKE_DIGEST_FOR_PHA,
2406 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);