2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
4 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
6 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
7 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
8 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
9 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
14 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
15 #include "statem_locl.h"
16 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
17 #include <openssl/rand.h>
18 #include <openssl/objects.h>
19 #include <openssl/evp.h>
20 #include <openssl/md5.h>
21 #include <openssl/dh.h>
22 #include <openssl/bn.h>
23 #include <openssl/engine.h>
25 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_hello_retry_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt);
26 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt);
28 static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s);
29 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s);
30 static int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk,
34 * Is a CertificateRequest message allowed at the moment or not?
40 static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s)
42 /* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */
43 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION
44 && (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL))
45 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK)))
52 * Should we expect the ServerKeyExchange message or not?
58 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s)
60 long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
63 * Can't skip server key exchange if this is an ephemeral
64 * ciphersuite or for SRP
66 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK
75 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
76 * handshake state transitions when a TLS1.3 client is reading messages from the
77 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
78 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
80 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
81 * (transition not allowed)
83 static int ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
85 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
88 * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO, because we haven't
89 * yet negotiated TLSv1.3 at that point so that is handled by
90 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition()
93 switch (st->hand_state) {
97 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
99 * This must a ClientHello following a HelloRetryRequest, so the only
100 * thing we can get now is a ServerHello.
102 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
103 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
108 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
109 if (mt == SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS) {
110 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
115 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
117 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
118 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
122 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
123 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
126 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
127 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
133 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
134 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
135 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
141 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
142 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY;
147 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
148 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
149 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
155 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
156 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
159 if (mt == SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE) {
160 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE;
166 /* No valid transition found */
171 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
172 * handshake state transitions when the client is reading messages from the
173 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
174 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
176 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
177 * (transition not allowed)
179 int ossl_statem_client_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
181 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
185 * Note that after writing the first ClientHello we don't know what version
186 * we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later.
188 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
189 if (!ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(s, mt))
194 switch (st->hand_state) {
198 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
199 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
200 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
204 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
205 if (mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
206 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
210 if (mt == SSL3_MT_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST) {
211 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST;
217 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
219 * We've not actually selected TLSv1.3 yet, but we have sent early
220 * data. The only thing allowed now is a ServerHello or a
223 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
224 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
227 if (mt == SSL3_MT_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST) {
228 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST;
233 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
235 if (s->ext.ticket_expected) {
236 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
237 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
240 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
241 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
245 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
246 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
248 } else if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
249 && s->ext.session_secret_cb != NULL
250 && s->session->ext.tick != NULL
251 && mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
253 * Normally, we can tell if the server is resuming the session
254 * from the session ID. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851), however, relies on
255 * the next server message after the ServerHello to determine if
256 * the server is resuming.
259 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
261 } else if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth
262 & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
263 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
264 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
268 ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s);
269 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
271 || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)
272 && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
273 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
274 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;
277 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
278 && cert_req_allowed(s)) {
279 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
281 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
282 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
291 * The CertificateStatus message is optional even if
292 * |ext.status_expected| is set
294 if (s->ext.status_expected && mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS) {
295 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS;
300 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
301 ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s);
302 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
303 if (ske_expected || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)
304 && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
305 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
306 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;
313 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
314 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
315 if (cert_req_allowed(s)) {
316 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
323 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
324 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
325 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
330 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
331 if (s->ext.ticket_expected) {
332 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
333 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
336 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
337 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
342 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
343 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
344 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
349 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
350 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
351 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
357 if (mt == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) {
358 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ;
365 /* No valid transition found */
366 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
367 SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_READ_TRANSITION, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
372 * ossl_statem_client13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
373 * move to next when the TLSv1.3 client is writing messages to be sent to the
376 static WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(SSL *s)
378 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
381 * Note: There are no cases for TLS_ST_BEFORE because we haven't negotiated
382 * TLSv1.3 yet at that point. They are handled by
383 * ossl_statem_client_write_transition().
385 switch (st->hand_state) {
387 /* Shouldn't happen */
388 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
390 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
391 /* We only hit this in the case of HelloRetryRequest */
392 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
394 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST:
395 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
396 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
398 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
399 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY
400 || s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING)
401 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END;
403 st->hand_state = (s->s3->tmp.cert_req != 0) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT
404 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
405 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
407 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END:
408 if (s->ext.early_data == SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED) {
409 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA;
410 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
414 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
415 st->hand_state = (s->s3->tmp.cert_req != 0) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT
416 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
417 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
420 /* If a non-empty Certificate we also send CertificateVerify */
421 st->hand_state = (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
422 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
423 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
425 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
426 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
427 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
429 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE:
430 if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) {
431 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE;
432 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
436 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE:
437 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
438 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
439 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
440 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
443 if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) {
444 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE;
445 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
448 /* Try to read from the server instead */
449 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
454 * ossl_statem_client_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
455 * move to next when the client is writing messages to be sent to the server.
457 WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client_write_transition(SSL *s)
459 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
462 * Note that immediately before/after a ClientHello we don't know what
463 * version we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until
467 return ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(s);
469 switch (st->hand_state) {
471 /* Shouldn't happen */
472 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
475 if (!s->renegotiate) {
477 * We haven't requested a renegotiation ourselves so we must have
478 * received a message from the server. Better read it.
480 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
485 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
486 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
488 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
489 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING) {
491 * We are assuming this is a TLSv1.3 connection, although we haven't
492 * actually selected a version yet.
494 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
495 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
498 * No transition at the end of writing because we don't know what
501 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
503 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
504 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
506 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
507 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
508 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
510 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
511 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req)
512 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT;
514 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;
515 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
518 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;
519 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
521 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
523 * For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain of nothing is
524 * sent, but no verify packet is sent
527 * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication in ECDH
528 * cipher suites with ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates. We
529 * need to skip the certificate verify message when client's
530 * ECDH public key is sent inside the client certificate.
532 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) {
533 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY;
535 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
537 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY) {
538 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
540 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
542 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
543 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
544 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
546 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
547 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
549 hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
551 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->s3->npn_seen)
552 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO;
554 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
556 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
558 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
559 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:
560 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
561 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
564 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
566 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
567 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
569 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
572 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
574 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
575 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
577 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
578 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
581 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ:
583 * If we can renegotiate now then do so, otherwise wait for a more
586 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s, 1)) {
587 if (!tls_setup_handshake(s)) {
588 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
589 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
591 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
592 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
594 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
595 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
600 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
601 * the client to the server.
603 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
605 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
607 switch (st->hand_state) {
609 /* No pre work to be done */
612 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
614 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
615 /* every DTLS ClientHello resets Finished MAC */
616 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
617 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
623 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
624 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
627 * We're into the last flight so we don't retransmit these
628 * messages unless we need to.
632 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
633 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)))
634 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
639 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END:
641 * If we've been called by SSL_do_handshake()/SSL_write(), or we did not
642 * attempt to write early data before calling SSL_read() then we press
643 * on with the handshake. Otherwise we pause here.
645 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING
646 || s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_NONE)
647 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
650 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
652 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 1);
655 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
659 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
660 * client to the server.
662 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
664 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
668 switch (st->hand_state) {
670 /* No post work to be done */
673 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
674 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A && statem_flush(s) != 1)
677 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
678 /* Treat the next message as the first packet */
682 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
683 && s->max_early_data > 0) {
685 * We haven't selected TLSv1.3 yet so we don't call the change
686 * cipher state function associated with the SSL_METHOD. Instead
687 * we call tls13_change_cipher_state() directly.
689 if (!tls13_change_cipher_state(s,
690 SSL3_CC_EARLY | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))
695 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
697 * We set the enc_write_ctx back to NULL because we may end up writing
698 * in cleartext again if we get a HelloRetryRequest from the server.
700 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(s->enc_write_ctx);
701 s->enc_write_ctx = NULL;
704 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
705 if (tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(s) == 0)
709 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
710 s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
711 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
712 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
714 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
715 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
717 s->session->compress_meth = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
719 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
722 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
723 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))
726 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
727 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
730 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
733 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
738 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
742 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
743 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
744 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A && SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit == 0) {
746 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
749 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
753 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
756 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
757 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
758 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))
763 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE:
764 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
766 if (!tls13_update_key(s, 1))
771 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
775 * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the
778 * Valid return values are:
782 int ossl_statem_client_construct_message(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
783 confunc_f *confunc, int *mt)
785 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
787 switch (st->hand_state) {
789 /* Shouldn't happen */
792 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
794 *confunc = dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
796 *confunc = tls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
797 *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
800 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
801 *confunc = tls_construct_client_hello;
802 *mt = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO;
805 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
806 *confunc = tls_construct_end_of_early_data;
807 *mt = SSL3_MT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA;
810 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END:
816 *confunc = tls_construct_client_certificate;
817 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE;
820 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
821 *confunc = tls_construct_client_key_exchange;
822 *mt = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE;
825 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
826 *confunc = tls_construct_cert_verify;
827 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY;
830 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
831 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:
832 *confunc = tls_construct_next_proto;
833 *mt = SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO;
836 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
837 *confunc = tls_construct_finished;
838 *mt = SSL3_MT_FINISHED;
841 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE:
842 *confunc = tls_construct_key_update;
843 *mt = SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE;
851 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
852 * reading. Excludes the message header.
854 size_t ossl_statem_client_max_message_size(SSL *s)
856 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
858 switch (st->hand_state) {
860 /* Shouldn't happen */
863 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
864 return SERVER_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH;
866 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
867 return HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH;
869 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST:
870 return HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH;
873 return s->max_cert_list;
875 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
876 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
878 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
879 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
881 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
882 return SERVER_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH;
884 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
886 * Set to s->max_cert_list for compatibility with previous releases. In
887 * practice these messages can get quite long if servers are configured
888 * to provide a long list of acceptable CAs
890 return s->max_cert_list;
892 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
893 return SERVER_HELLO_DONE_MAX_LENGTH;
895 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
896 if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
898 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH;
900 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
901 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
903 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
904 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH;
906 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
907 return ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS_MAX_LENGTH;
909 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE:
910 return KEY_UPDATE_MAX_LENGTH;
915 * Process a message that the client has been received from the server.
917 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_client_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
919 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
921 switch (st->hand_state) {
923 /* Shouldn't happen */
924 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
926 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
927 return tls_process_server_hello(s, pkt);
929 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
930 return dtls_process_hello_verify(s, pkt);
932 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST:
933 return tls_process_hello_retry_request(s, pkt);
936 return tls_process_server_certificate(s, pkt);
938 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
939 return tls_process_cert_verify(s, pkt);
941 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
942 return tls_process_cert_status(s, pkt);
944 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
945 return tls_process_key_exchange(s, pkt);
947 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
948 return tls_process_certificate_request(s, pkt);
950 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
951 return tls_process_server_done(s, pkt);
953 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
954 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt);
956 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
957 return tls_process_new_session_ticket(s, pkt);
959 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
960 return tls_process_finished(s, pkt);
962 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ:
963 return tls_process_hello_req(s, pkt);
965 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
966 return tls_process_encrypted_extensions(s, pkt);
968 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE:
969 return tls_process_key_update(s, pkt);
974 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
977 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
979 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
981 switch (st->hand_state) {
983 /* Shouldn't happen */
986 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
987 return tls_prepare_client_certificate(s, wst);
991 int tls_construct_client_hello(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
996 int al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
997 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1000 SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session;
1002 if (!WPACKET_set_max_size(pkt, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) {
1003 /* Should not happen */
1004 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1008 /* Work out what SSL/TLS/DTLS version to use */
1009 protverr = ssl_set_client_hello_version(s);
1010 if (protverr != 0) {
1011 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
1016 || !ssl_version_supported(s, sess->ssl_version)
1017 || !SSL_SESSION_is_resumable(sess)) {
1018 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0))
1021 /* else use the pre-loaded session */
1023 p = s->s3->client_random;
1026 * for DTLS if client_random is initialized, reuse it, we are
1027 * required to use same upon reply to HelloVerify
1029 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1032 for (idx = 0; idx < sizeof(s->s3->client_random); idx++) {
1041 if (i && ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p, sizeof(s->s3->client_random),
1042 DOWNGRADE_NONE) <= 0)
1046 * version indicates the negotiated version: for example from
1047 * an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version
1048 * field is the maximum version we permit and it is also
1049 * used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can
1050 * choke if we initially report a higher version then
1051 * renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This
1052 * didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it
1053 * but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports
1056 * Possible scenario with previous logic:
1057 * 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2
1058 * 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0
1059 * 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2.
1060 * 4. Handshake proceeds using TLS 1.0.
1061 * 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate.
1062 * 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now
1063 * know that is maximum server supports.
1064 * 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret
1065 * containing version 1.0.
1067 * For interoperability it should be OK to always use the
1068 * maximum version we support in client hello and then rely
1069 * on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't
1070 * being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with
1071 * TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using
1072 * client_version in client hello and not resetting it to
1073 * the negotiated version.
1075 * For TLS 1.3 we always set the ClientHello version to 1.2 and rely on the
1076 * supported_versions extension for the real supported versions.
1078 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->client_version)
1079 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1080 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1085 if (s->new_session || s->session->ssl_version == TLS1_3_VERSION)
1088 sess_id_len = s->session->session_id_length;
1089 if (sess_id_len > sizeof(s->session->session_id)
1090 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
1091 || (sess_id_len != 0 && !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->session->session_id,
1093 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1094 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1098 /* cookie stuff for DTLS */
1099 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1100 if (s->d1->cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)
1101 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->d1->cookie,
1102 s->d1->cookie_len)) {
1103 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1108 /* Ciphers supported */
1109 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1110 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1113 /* ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes() raises SSLerr if appropriate */
1114 if (!ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s, SSL_get_ciphers(s), pkt))
1116 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1117 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1122 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)) {
1123 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1126 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1127 if (ssl_allow_compression(s)
1128 && s->ctx->comp_methods
1129 && (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) || s->s3->tmp.max_ver < TLS1_3_VERSION)) {
1130 int compnum = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1131 for (i = 0; i < compnum; i++) {
1132 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, i);
1133 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, comp->id)) {
1134 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1140 /* Add the NULL method */
1141 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1142 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1146 /* TLS extensions */
1147 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO, NULL, 0, &al)) {
1148 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1155 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN dtls_process_hello_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1161 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, 2)
1162 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookiepkt)) {
1163 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1164 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1168 cookie_len = PACKET_remaining(&cookiepkt);
1169 if (cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)) {
1170 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1171 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1175 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&cookiepkt, s->d1->cookie, cookie_len)) {
1176 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1177 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1180 s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_len;
1182 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1184 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1185 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1186 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1189 static int set_client_ciphersuite(SSL *s, const unsigned char *cipherchars)
1191 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1192 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
1195 c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars, 0);
1197 /* unknown cipher */
1198 SSLerr(SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1202 * If it is a disabled cipher we either didn't send it in client hello,
1203 * or it's not allowed for the selected protocol. So we return an error.
1205 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_CHECK, 1)) {
1206 SSLerr(SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1210 sk = ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s);
1211 i = sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk, c);
1213 /* we did not say we would use this cipher */
1214 SSLerr(SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1218 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher != NULL
1219 && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id != c->id) {
1220 /* ServerHello selected a different ciphersuite to that in the HRR */
1221 SSLerr(SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1226 * Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher
1227 * and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that cipher_id is
1228 * set and use it for comparison.
1230 if (s->session->cipher != NULL)
1231 s->session->cipher_id = s->session->cipher->id;
1232 if (s->hit && (s->session->cipher_id != c->id)) {
1233 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1235 * In TLSv1.3 it is valid for the server to select a different
1236 * ciphersuite as long as the hash is the same.
1238 if (ssl_md(c->algorithm2)
1239 != ssl_md(s->session->cipher->algorithm2)) {
1240 SSLerr(SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE,
1241 SSL_R_CIPHERSUITE_DIGEST_HAS_CHANGED);
1246 * Prior to TLSv1.3 resuming a session always meant using the same
1249 SSLerr(SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE,
1250 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED);
1254 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c;
1259 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1261 PACKET session_id, extpkt;
1262 size_t session_id_len;
1263 const unsigned char *cipherchars;
1264 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1265 unsigned int compression;
1266 unsigned int sversion;
1267 unsigned int context;
1269 RAW_EXTENSION *extensions = NULL;
1270 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1274 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sversion)) {
1275 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1276 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1280 /* load the server random */
1281 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1282 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1283 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1288 * We do this immediately so we know what format the ServerHello is in.
1289 * Must be done after reading the random data so we can check for the
1290 * TLSv1.3 downgrade sentinels
1292 protverr = ssl_choose_client_version(s, sversion, 1, &al);
1293 if (protverr != 0) {
1294 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, protverr);
1299 * In TLSv1.3 a ServerHello message signals a key change so the end of the
1300 * message must be on a record boundary.
1302 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
1303 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1304 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
1308 /* Get the session-id. */
1309 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1310 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)) {
1311 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1312 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1315 session_id_len = PACKET_remaining(&session_id);
1316 if (session_id_len > sizeof s->session->session_id
1317 || session_id_len > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE) {
1318 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1319 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1320 SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG);
1324 PACKET_null_init(&session_id);
1328 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &cipherchars, TLS_CIPHER_LEN)) {
1329 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1330 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1334 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1335 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &compression)) {
1336 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1337 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1344 /* TLS extensions */
1345 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) {
1346 PACKET_null_init(&extpkt);
1347 } else if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt)
1348 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1349 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1350 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
1354 context = SSL_IS_TLS13(s) ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
1355 : SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO;
1356 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt, context, &extensions, &al, NULL, 1))
1361 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1362 /* This will set s->hit if we are resuming */
1363 if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_psk,
1364 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO,
1365 extensions, NULL, 0, &al))
1369 * Check if we can resume the session based on external pre-shared
1370 * secret. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851) supports two types of session resumption.
1371 * Resumption based on server-side state works with session IDs.
1372 * Resumption based on pre-shared Protected Access Credentials (PACs)
1373 * works by overriding the SessionTicket extension at the application
1374 * layer, and does not send a session ID. (We do not know whether
1375 * EAP-FAST servers would honour the session ID.) Therefore, the session
1376 * ID alone is not a reliable indicator of session resumption, so we
1377 * first check if we can resume, and later peek at the next handshake
1378 * message to see if the server wants to resume.
1380 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
1381 && s->ext.session_secret_cb != NULL && s->session->ext.tick) {
1382 const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
1384 * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for
1385 * backwards compat reasons
1387 int master_key_length;
1388 master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1389 if (s->ext.session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
1392 s->ext.session_secret_cb_arg)
1393 && master_key_length > 0) {
1394 s->session->master_key_length = master_key_length;
1395 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher ?
1396 pref_cipher : ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars, 0);
1398 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1399 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1404 if (session_id_len != 0
1405 && session_id_len == s->session->session_id_length
1406 && memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id), s->session->session_id,
1407 session_id_len) == 0)
1412 if (s->sid_ctx_length != s->session->sid_ctx_length
1413 || memcmp(s->session->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length)) {
1414 /* actually a client application bug */
1415 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1416 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1417 SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT);
1422 * If we were trying for session-id reuse but the server
1423 * didn't resume, make a new SSL_SESSION.
1424 * In the case of EAP-FAST and PAC, we do not send a session ID,
1425 * so the PAC-based session secret is always preserved. It'll be
1426 * overwritten if the server refuses resumption.
1428 if (s->session->session_id_length > 0
1430 && s->session->ext.tick_identity
1431 != TLSEXT_PSK_BAD_IDENTITY)) {
1432 s->ctx->stats.sess_miss++;
1433 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) {
1438 s->session->ssl_version = s->version;
1439 s->session->session_id_length = session_id_len;
1440 /* session_id_len could be 0 */
1441 if (session_id_len > 0)
1442 memcpy(s->session->session_id, PACKET_data(&session_id),
1446 /* Session version and negotiated protocol version should match */
1447 if (s->version != s->session->ssl_version) {
1448 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1450 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1451 SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_VERSION_MISMATCH);
1455 * Now that we know the version, update the check to see if it's an allowed
1458 s->s3->tmp.min_ver = s->version;
1459 s->s3->tmp.max_ver = s->version;
1461 if (!set_client_ciphersuite(s, cipherchars)) {
1462 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1466 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1467 if (compression != 0) {
1468 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1469 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1470 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1474 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1475 * using compression.
1477 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1478 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1482 if (s->hit && compression != s->session->compress_meth) {
1483 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1484 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1485 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED);
1488 if (compression == 0)
1490 else if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
1491 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1492 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED);
1495 comp = ssl3_comp_find(s->ctx->comp_methods, compression);
1498 if (compression != 0 && comp == NULL) {
1499 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1500 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1501 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1504 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1508 if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s, context, extensions, NULL, 0, &al, 1))
1511 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1512 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
1513 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
1514 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
1517 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
1520 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
1521 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
1523 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
1524 sizeof(sctpauthkey),
1526 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0)
1529 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s),
1530 BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
1531 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
1536 * In TLSv1.3 we have some post-processing to change cipher state, otherwise
1537 * we're done with this message
1540 && (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)
1541 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
1542 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ))) {
1543 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1544 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER);
1548 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1549 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
1551 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1552 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1553 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1554 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1557 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_hello_retry_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1559 unsigned int sversion;
1561 const unsigned char *cipherchars;
1562 RAW_EXTENSION *extensions = NULL;
1566 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sversion)) {
1567 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1568 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1572 s->hello_retry_request = 1;
1574 /* This will fail if it doesn't choose TLSv1.3+ */
1575 errorcode = ssl_choose_client_version(s, sversion, 0, &al);
1576 if (errorcode != 0) {
1577 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST, errorcode);
1581 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &cipherchars, TLS_CIPHER_LEN)) {
1582 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1583 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1587 if (!set_client_ciphersuite(s, cipherchars)) {
1588 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1592 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt)
1593 /* Must have a non-empty extensions block */
1594 || PACKET_remaining(&extpkt) == 0
1595 /* Must be no trailing data after extensions */
1596 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1597 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1598 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
1602 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
1603 &extensions, &al, NULL, 1)
1604 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
1605 extensions, NULL, 0, &al, 1))
1608 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1611 if (s->ext.tls13_cookie_len == 0 && s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) {
1613 * We didn't receive a cookie or a new key_share so the next
1614 * ClientHello will not change
1616 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1617 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
1618 SSL_R_NO_CHANGE_FOLLOWING_HRR);
1623 * Re-initialise the Transcript Hash. We're going to prepopulate it with
1624 * a synthetic message_hash in place of ClientHello1.
1626 if (!create_synthetic_message_hash(s)) {
1627 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1632 * Add this message to the Transcript Hash. Normally this is done
1633 * automatically prior to the message processing stage. However due to the
1634 * need to create the synthetic message hash, we defer that step until now
1637 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data,
1638 s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
1639 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1640 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1644 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1646 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1647 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1648 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1649 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1652 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1654 int al, i, ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR, exp_idx;
1655 unsigned long cert_list_len, cert_len;
1657 const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes;
1658 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
1659 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
1661 unsigned int context = 0;
1663 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
1664 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1668 if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !PACKET_get_1(pkt, &context))
1670 || !PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_list_len)
1671 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != cert_list_len
1672 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) {
1673 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1674 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1677 for (chainidx = 0; PACKET_remaining(pkt); chainidx++) {
1678 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_len)
1679 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &certbytes, cert_len)) {
1680 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1681 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1682 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1686 certstart = certbytes;
1687 x = d2i_X509(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, cert_len);
1689 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
1690 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
1693 if (certbytes != (certstart + cert_len)) {
1694 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1695 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1696 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1700 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1701 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
1704 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)) {
1705 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1706 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
1709 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
1710 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, &rawexts,
1711 &al, NULL, chainidx == 0)
1712 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE,
1713 rawexts, x, chainidx, &al,
1714 PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)) {
1715 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
1718 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
1721 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
1722 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1728 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
1730 * The documented interface is that SSL_VERIFY_PEER should be set in order
1731 * for client side verification of the server certificate to take place.
1732 * However, historically the code has only checked that *any* flag is set
1733 * to cause server verification to take place. Use of the other flags makes
1734 * no sense in client mode. An attempt to clean up the semantics was
1735 * reverted because at least one application *only* set
1736 * SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT. Prior to the clean up this still caused
1737 * server verification to take place, after the clean up it silently did
1738 * nothing. SSL_CTX_set_verify()/SSL_set_verify() cannot validate the flags
1739 * sent to them because they are void functions. Therefore, we now use the
1740 * (less clean) historic behaviour of performing validation if any flag is
1741 * set. The *documented* interface remains the same.
1743 if (s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE && i <= 0) {
1744 al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
1745 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1746 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
1749 ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */
1751 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, i);
1752 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1756 s->session->peer_chain = sk;
1758 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's certificate,
1759 * which we don't include in statem_srvr.c
1761 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
1764 * VRS 19990621: possible memory leak; sk=null ==> !sk_pop_free() @end
1767 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
1769 if (pkey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) {
1771 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1772 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1773 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS);
1777 i = ssl_cert_type(x, pkey);
1781 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1782 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
1786 * Check certificate type is consistent with ciphersuite. For TLS 1.3
1787 * skip check since TLS 1.3 ciphersuites can be used with any certificate
1790 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1791 exp_idx = ssl_cipher_get_cert_index(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher);
1792 if (exp_idx >= 0 && i != exp_idx
1793 && (exp_idx != SSL_PKEY_ECC || i != SSL_PKEY_ED25519)
1794 && (exp_idx != SSL_PKEY_GOST_EC ||
1795 (i != SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512 && i != SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
1796 && i != SSL_PKEY_GOST01))) {
1798 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1799 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1800 SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
1804 s->session->peer_type = i;
1806 X509_free(s->session->peer);
1808 s->session->peer = x;
1809 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
1812 /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */
1814 && !ssl_handshake_hash(s, s->cert_verify_hash,
1815 sizeof(s->cert_verify_hash),
1816 &s->cert_verify_hash_len)) {
1817 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1818 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1822 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
1826 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1828 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1831 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
1835 static int tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
1837 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1838 PACKET psk_identity_hint;
1840 /* PSK ciphersuites are preceded by an identity hint */
1842 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity_hint)) {
1843 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1844 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1849 * Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in
1850 * tls_construct_client_key_exchange. Assume that the maximum length of
1851 * a PSK identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK
1854 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
1855 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1856 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1860 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) == 0) {
1861 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
1862 s->session->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
1863 } else if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity_hint,
1864 &s->session->psk_identity_hint)) {
1865 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1871 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1872 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1877 static int tls_process_ske_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey, int *al)
1879 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1880 PACKET prime, generator, salt, server_pub;
1882 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime)
1883 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator)
1884 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &salt)
1885 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &server_pub)) {
1886 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1887 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1891 /* TODO(size_t): Convert BN_bin2bn() calls */
1893 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime),
1894 (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL)) == NULL
1896 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator),
1897 (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator), NULL)) == NULL
1899 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&salt),
1900 (int)PACKET_remaining(&salt), NULL)) == NULL
1902 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&server_pub),
1903 (int)PACKET_remaining(&server_pub), NULL)) == NULL) {
1904 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1905 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1909 if (!srp_verify_server_param(s, al)) {
1910 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
1914 /* We must check if there is a certificate */
1915 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS))
1916 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
1920 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1921 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1926 static int tls_process_ske_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey, int *al)
1928 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1929 PACKET prime, generator, pub_key;
1930 EVP_PKEY *peer_tmp = NULL;
1933 BIGNUM *p = NULL, *g = NULL, *bnpub_key = NULL;
1937 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime)
1938 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator)
1939 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &pub_key)) {
1940 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1941 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1945 peer_tmp = EVP_PKEY_new();
1948 if (peer_tmp == NULL || dh == NULL) {
1949 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1950 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1954 /* TODO(size_t): Convert these calls */
1955 p = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime), (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL);
1956 g = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator), (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator),
1958 bnpub_key = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&pub_key),
1959 (int)PACKET_remaining(&pub_key), NULL);
1960 if (p == NULL || g == NULL || bnpub_key == NULL) {
1961 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1962 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1966 /* test non-zero pubkey */
1967 if (BN_is_zero(bnpub_key)) {
1968 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1969 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE);
1973 if (!DH_set0_pqg(dh, p, NULL, g)) {
1974 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1975 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1980 if (DH_check_params(dh, &check_bits) == 0 || check_bits != 0) {
1981 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1982 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE);
1986 if (!DH_set0_key(dh, bnpub_key, NULL)) {
1987 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1988 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1993 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH, DH_security_bits(dh), 0, dh)) {
1994 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1995 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
1999 if (EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(peer_tmp, dh) == 0) {
2000 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2001 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2005 s->s3->peer_tmp = peer_tmp;
2008 * FIXME: This makes assumptions about which ciphersuites come with
2009 * public keys. We should have a less ad-hoc way of doing this
2011 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS))
2012 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2013 /* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */
2022 EVP_PKEY_free(peer_tmp);
2026 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2027 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2032 static int tls_process_ske_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey, int *al)
2034 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2036 const unsigned char *ecparams;
2038 unsigned int curve_flags;
2039 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2042 * Extract elliptic curve parameters and the server's ephemeral ECDH
2043 * public key. For now we only support named (not generic) curves and
2044 * ECParameters in this case is just three bytes.
2046 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &ecparams, 3)) {
2047 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2048 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
2052 * Check curve is one of our preferences, if not server has sent an
2053 * invalid curve. ECParameters is 3 bytes.
2055 if (!tls1_check_curve(s, ecparams, 3)) {
2056 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2057 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
2061 curve_nid = tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(*(ecparams + 2), &curve_flags);
2063 if (curve_nid == 0) {
2064 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2065 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
2066 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
2070 if ((curve_flags & TLS_CURVE_TYPE) == TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM) {
2071 EVP_PKEY *key = EVP_PKEY_new();
2073 if (key == NULL || !EVP_PKEY_set_type(key, curve_nid)) {
2074 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2075 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2079 s->s3->peer_tmp = key;
2081 /* Set up EVP_PKEY with named curve as parameters */
2082 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(EVP_PKEY_EC, NULL);
2084 || EVP_PKEY_paramgen_init(pctx) <= 0
2085 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ec_paramgen_curve_nid(pctx, curve_nid) <= 0
2086 || EVP_PKEY_paramgen(pctx, &s->s3->peer_tmp) <= 0) {
2087 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2088 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2089 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2092 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2096 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &encoded_pt)) {
2097 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2098 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2102 if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->peer_tmp,
2103 PACKET_data(&encoded_pt),
2104 PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt))) {
2105 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2106 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
2111 * The ECC/TLS specification does not mention the use of DSA to sign
2112 * ECParameters in the server key exchange message. We do support RSA
2115 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aECDSA)
2116 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2117 else if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aRSA)
2118 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2119 /* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
2123 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2124 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2129 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2133 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2134 EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = NULL;
2135 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2136 PACKET save_param_start, signature;
2138 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2140 save_param_start = *pkt;
2142 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
2143 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->peer_tmp);
2144 s->s3->peer_tmp = NULL;
2147 if (alg_k & SSL_PSK) {
2148 if (!tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(s, pkt, &al))
2152 /* Nothing else to do for plain PSK or RSAPSK */
2153 if (alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
2154 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
2155 if (!tls_process_ske_srp(s, pkt, &pkey, &al))
2157 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
2158 if (!tls_process_ske_dhe(s, pkt, &pkey, &al))
2160 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2161 if (!tls_process_ske_ecdhe(s, pkt, &pkey, &al))
2164 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2165 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
2169 /* if it was signed, check the signature */
2173 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
2179 * |pkt| now points to the beginning of the signature, so the difference
2180 * equals the length of the parameters.
2182 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(&save_param_start, ¶ms,
2183 PACKET_remaining(&save_param_start) -
2184 PACKET_remaining(pkt))) {
2185 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2186 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2190 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2191 unsigned int sigalg;
2193 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sigalg)) {
2194 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2195 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
2198 rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(s, sigalg, pkey);
2200 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2202 } else if (rv == 0) {
2203 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2207 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
2209 } else if (!tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(s, pkey)) {
2210 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2214 if (!tls1_lookup_md(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg, &md)) {
2215 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2219 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &signature)
2220 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2221 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2222 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2225 maxsig = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
2227 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2228 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2233 * Check signature length
2235 if (PACKET_remaining(&signature) > (size_t)maxsig) {
2236 /* wrong packet length */
2237 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2238 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2239 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH);
2243 md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2244 if (md_ctx == NULL) {
2245 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2246 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2250 if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit(md_ctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) {
2251 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2252 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2255 if (SSL_USE_PSS(s)) {
2256 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0
2257 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx,
2258 RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) {
2259 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2260 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2264 tbslen = construct_key_exchange_tbs(s, &tbs, PACKET_data(¶ms),
2265 PACKET_remaining(¶ms));
2267 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2268 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2272 rv = EVP_DigestVerify(md_ctx, PACKET_data(&signature),
2273 PACKET_remaining(&signature), tbs, tbslen);
2276 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2277 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
2280 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2283 /* aNULL, aSRP or PSK do not need public keys */
2284 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP))
2285 && !(alg_k & SSL_PSK)) {
2286 /* Might be wrong key type, check it */
2287 if (ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
2288 /* Otherwise this shouldn't happen */
2289 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2290 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2292 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2296 /* still data left over */
2297 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2298 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2299 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE);
2304 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2307 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2308 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2309 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2310 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2313 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_certificate_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2315 int ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2316 int al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2319 /* Clear certificate validity flags */
2320 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
2321 s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
2323 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2324 PACKET reqctx, extensions;
2325 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
2327 /* Free and zero certificate types: it is not present in TLS 1.3 */
2328 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.ctype);
2329 s->s3->tmp.ctype = NULL;
2330 s->s3->tmp.ctype_len = 0;
2332 /* TODO(TLS1.3) need to process request context, for now ignore */
2333 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &reqctx)) {
2334 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2335 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2339 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)) {
2340 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
2343 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
2344 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2345 &rawexts, &al, NULL, 1)
2346 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2347 rawexts, NULL, 0, &al, 1)) {
2348 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
2351 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
2352 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2353 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2354 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2360 /* get the certificate types */
2361 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &ctypes)) {
2362 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2363 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2367 if (!PACKET_memdup(&ctypes, &s->s3->tmp.ctype, &s->s3->tmp.ctype_len)) {
2368 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2369 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2373 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2376 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &sigalgs)) {
2377 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2378 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2382 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, &sigalgs)) {
2383 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2384 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR);
2387 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2388 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2389 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2390 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2395 /* get the CA RDNs */
2396 if (!parse_ca_names(s, pkt, &al))
2400 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2401 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2405 /* we should setup a certificate to return.... */
2406 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 1;
2408 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
2411 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2412 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2417 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2419 int al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2420 unsigned int ticklen;
2421 unsigned long ticket_lifetime_hint, age_add = 0;
2422 unsigned int sess_len;
2423 RAW_EXTENSION *exts = NULL;
2426 if (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &ticket_lifetime_hint)
2428 && (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &age_add)
2429 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &nonce)
2430 || PACKET_remaining(&nonce) == 0
2431 || !PACKET_memdup(&nonce, &s->session->ext.tick_nonce,
2432 &s->session->ext.tick_nonce_len)))
2433 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ticklen)
2434 || (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && PACKET_remaining(pkt) != ticklen)
2436 && (ticklen == 0 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) < ticklen))) {
2437 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2442 * Server is allowed to change its mind (in <=TLSv1.2) and send an empty
2443 * ticket. We already checked this TLSv1.3 case above, so it should never
2444 * be 0 here in that instance
2447 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2450 * Sessions must be immutable once they go into the session cache. Otherwise
2451 * we can get multi-thread problems. Therefore we don't "update" sessions,
2452 * we replace them with a duplicate. In TLSv1.3 we need to do this every
2453 * time a NewSessionTicket arrives because those messages arrive
2454 * post-handshake and the session may have already gone into the session
2457 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
2458 int i = s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode;
2459 SSL_SESSION *new_sess;
2461 * We reused an existing session, so we need to replace it with a new
2464 if (i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT) {
2466 * Remove the old session from the cache. We carry on if this fails
2468 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
2471 if ((new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0)) == 0) {
2472 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2473 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2477 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
2478 s->session = new_sess;
2482 * Technically the cast to long here is not guaranteed by the C standard -
2483 * but we use it elsewhere, so this should be ok.
2485 s->session->time = (long)time(NULL);
2487 OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.tick);
2488 s->session->ext.tick = NULL;
2489 s->session->ext.ticklen = 0;
2491 s->session->ext.tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
2492 if (s->session->ext.tick == NULL) {
2493 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2496 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->session->ext.tick, ticklen)) {
2497 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2498 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2502 s->session->ext.tick_lifetime_hint = ticket_lifetime_hint;
2503 s->session->ext.tick_age_add = age_add;
2504 s->session->ext.ticklen = ticklen;
2506 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2509 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt)
2510 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0
2511 || !tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt,
2512 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2513 &exts, &al, NULL, 1)
2514 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s,
2515 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2516 exts, NULL, 0, &al, 1)) {
2517 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
2523 * There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket session. One is to set
2524 * an appropriate session ID and then the server must return a match in
2525 * ServerHello. This allows the normal client session ID matching to work
2526 * and we know much earlier that the ticket has been accepted. The
2527 * other way is to set zero length session ID when the ticket is
2528 * presented and rely on the handshake to determine session resumption.
2529 * We choose the former approach because this fits in with assumptions
2530 * elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set to the SHA256 (or SHA1 is
2531 * SHA256 is disabled) hash of the ticket.
2534 * TODO(size_t): we use sess_len here because EVP_Digest expects an int
2535 * but s->session->session_id_length is a size_t
2537 if (!EVP_Digest(s->session->ext.tick, ticklen,
2538 s->session->session_id, &sess_len,
2539 EVP_sha256(), NULL)) {
2540 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2543 s->session->session_id_length = sess_len;
2545 /* This is a standalone message in TLSv1.3, so there is no more to read */
2546 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2548 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT);
2549 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
2552 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2554 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2556 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2558 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2562 * In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to
2563 * parse a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure. On failure
2564 * |*al| is populated with a suitable alert code.
2566 int tls_process_cert_status_body(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2571 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &type)
2572 || type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
2573 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2574 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY,
2575 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE);
2578 if (!PACKET_get_net_3_len(pkt, &resplen)
2579 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != resplen) {
2580 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2581 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2584 s->ext.ocsp.resp = OPENSSL_malloc(resplen);
2585 if (s->ext.ocsp.resp == NULL) {
2586 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2587 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2590 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->ext.ocsp.resp, resplen)) {
2591 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2592 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2595 s->ext.ocsp.resp_len = resplen;
2601 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_status(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2605 if (!tls_process_cert_status_body(s, pkt, &al)) {
2606 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2607 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2608 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2611 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2615 * Perform miscellaneous checks and processing after we have received the
2616 * server's initial flight. In TLS1.3 this is after the Server Finished message.
2617 * In <=TLS1.2 this is after the ServerDone message. Returns 1 on success or 0
2620 int tls_process_initial_server_flight(SSL *s, int *al)
2623 * at this point we check that we have the required stuff from
2626 if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
2627 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2632 * Call the ocsp status callback if needed. The |ext.ocsp.resp| and
2633 * |ext.ocsp.resp_len| values will be set if we actually received a status
2634 * message, or NULL and -1 otherwise
2636 if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing
2637 && s->ctx->ext.status_cb != NULL) {
2638 int ret = s->ctx->ext.status_cb(s, s->ctx->ext.status_arg);
2641 *al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
2642 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_INITIAL_SERVER_FLIGHT,
2643 SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE);
2647 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2648 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_INITIAL_SERVER_FLIGHT,
2649 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2653 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
2654 if (s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
2655 /* Note we validate the SCTs whether or not we abort on error */
2656 if (!ssl_validate_ct(s) && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) {
2657 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2666 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_done(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2668 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2670 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
2671 /* should contain no data */
2672 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2673 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2676 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2677 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
2678 if (SRP_Calc_A_param(s) <= 0) {
2679 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE, SSL_R_SRP_A_CALC);
2686 * Error queue messages are generated directly by this function
2688 if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s, &al))
2691 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
2694 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2695 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2696 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2699 static int tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
2701 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2704 * The callback needs PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 bytes to return a
2705 * \0-terminated identity. The last byte is for us for simulating
2708 char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1];
2709 size_t identitylen = 0;
2710 unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
2711 unsigned char *tmppsk = NULL;
2712 char *tmpidentity = NULL;
2715 if (s->psk_client_callback == NULL) {
2716 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB);
2717 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2721 memset(identity, 0, sizeof(identity));
2723 psklen = s->psk_client_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity_hint,
2724 identity, sizeof(identity) - 1,
2727 if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
2728 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2729 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2731 } else if (psklen == 0) {
2732 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2733 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2734 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2738 identitylen = strlen(identity);
2739 if (identitylen > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2740 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2741 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2745 tmppsk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen);
2746 tmpidentity = OPENSSL_strdup(identity);
2747 if (tmppsk == NULL || tmpidentity == NULL) {
2748 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2749 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2753 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.psk);
2754 s->s3->tmp.psk = tmppsk;
2755 s->s3->tmp.psklen = psklen;
2757 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
2758 s->session->psk_identity = tmpidentity;
2761 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, identity, identitylen)) {
2762 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2763 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2770 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
2771 OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, sizeof(identity));
2772 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmppsk, psklen);
2773 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmpidentity, identitylen);
2777 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2778 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2783 static int tls_construct_cke_rsa(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
2785 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2786 unsigned char *encdata = NULL;
2787 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2788 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2790 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
2793 if (s->session->peer == NULL) {
2795 * We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA.
2797 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2801 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2802 if (EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pkey) == NULL) {
2803 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2807 pmslen = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
2808 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
2810 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2811 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2815 pms[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
2816 pms[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
2817 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
2818 if (RAND_bytes(pms + 2, (int)(pmslen - 2)) <= 0) {
2822 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2823 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
2824 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2827 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
2828 if (pctx == NULL || EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pctx) <= 0
2829 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, NULL, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
2830 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2833 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, enclen, &encdata)
2834 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, encdata, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
2835 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT);
2838 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2841 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2842 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2843 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2847 /* Log the premaster secret, if logging is enabled. */
2848 if (!ssl_log_rsa_client_key_exchange(s, encdata, enclen, pms, pmslen))
2851 s->s3->tmp.pms = pms;
2852 s->s3->tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
2856 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
2857 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2861 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2862 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2867 static int tls_construct_cke_dhe(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
2869 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2871 const BIGNUM *pub_key;
2872 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL;
2873 unsigned char *keybytes = NULL;
2875 skey = s->s3->peer_tmp;
2879 ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(skey);
2883 dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey);
2885 if (dh_clnt == NULL || ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 0) == 0)
2888 /* send off the data */
2889 DH_get0_key(dh_clnt, &pub_key, NULL);
2890 if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, BN_num_bytes(pub_key), &keybytes))
2893 BN_bn2bin(pub_key, keybytes);
2894 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2898 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2900 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2901 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2905 static int tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
2907 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2908 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
2909 size_t encoded_pt_len = 0;
2910 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL;
2913 skey = s->s3->peer_tmp;
2915 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2919 ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(skey);
2921 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2925 if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 0) == 0) {
2926 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2930 /* Generate encoding of client key */
2931 encoded_pt_len = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey, &encodedPoint);
2933 if (encoded_pt_len == 0) {
2934 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2938 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len)) {
2939 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2945 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2946 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2949 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2950 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2955 static int tls_construct_cke_gost(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
2957 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2958 /* GOST key exchange message creation */
2959 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx = NULL;
2962 unsigned int md_len;
2963 unsigned char shared_ukm[32], tmp[256];
2964 EVP_MD_CTX *ukm_hash = NULL;
2965 int dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94;
2966 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
2969 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aGOST12) != 0)
2970 dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256;
2973 * Get server certificate PKEY and create ctx from it
2975 peer_cert = s->session->peer;
2977 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2978 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
2979 SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER);
2983 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(X509_get0_pubkey(peer_cert), NULL);
2984 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
2985 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2986 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2990 * If we have send a certificate, and certificate key
2991 * parameters match those of server certificate, use
2992 * certificate key for key exchange
2995 /* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */
2997 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
2999 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3000 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3004 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0
3005 /* Generate session key
3006 * TODO(size_t): Convert this function
3008 || RAND_bytes(pms, (int)pmslen) <= 0) {
3009 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3010 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3014 * Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific context
3017 ukm_hash = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
3018 if (ukm_hash == NULL
3019 || EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash, EVP_get_digestbynid(dgst_nid)) <= 0
3020 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->client_random,
3021 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
3022 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->server_random,
3023 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
3024 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash, shared_ukm, &md_len) <= 0) {
3025 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3026 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3029 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash);
3031 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT,
3032 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, 8, shared_ukm) < 0) {
3033 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3034 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
3037 /* Make GOST keytransport blob message */
3039 * Encapsulate it into sequence
3042 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx, tmp, &msglen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
3043 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3044 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
3048 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE | V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED)
3049 || (msglen >= 0x80 && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0x81))
3050 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, tmp, msglen)) {
3051 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3052 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3056 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3057 s->s3->tmp.pms = pms;
3058 s->s3->tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
3062 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3063 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
3064 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash);
3067 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3068 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3073 static int tls_construct_cke_srp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
3075 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3076 unsigned char *abytes = NULL;
3078 if (s->srp_ctx.A == NULL
3079 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, BN_num_bytes(s->srp_ctx.A),
3081 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3084 BN_bn2bin(s->srp_ctx.A, abytes);
3086 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
3087 s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
3088 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
3089 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3095 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3096 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3101 int tls_construct_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3103 unsigned long alg_k;
3106 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3108 if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK)
3109 && !tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(s, pkt, &al))
3112 if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
3113 if (!tls_construct_cke_rsa(s, pkt, &al))
3115 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
3116 if (!tls_construct_cke_dhe(s, pkt, &al))
3118 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
3119 if (!tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(s, pkt, &al))
3121 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
3122 if (!tls_construct_cke_gost(s, pkt, &al))
3124 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
3125 if (!tls_construct_cke_srp(s, pkt, &al))
3127 } else if (!(alg_k & SSL_kPSK)) {
3128 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3129 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3136 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3137 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.pms, s->s3->tmp.pmslen);
3138 s->s3->tmp.pms = NULL;
3139 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
3140 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.psk, s->s3->tmp.psklen);
3141 s->s3->tmp.psk = NULL;
3146 int tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(SSL *s)
3148 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
3151 pms = s->s3->tmp.pms;
3152 pmslen = s->s3->tmp.pmslen;
3154 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3156 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
3157 if (!srp_generate_client_master_secret(s)) {
3158 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK,
3159 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3166 if (pms == NULL && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
3167 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3168 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3171 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, pms, pmslen, 1)) {
3172 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3173 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3174 /* ssl_generate_master_secret frees the pms even on error */
3182 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
3183 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
3184 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
3185 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
3188 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
3191 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
3192 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
3194 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
3195 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
3196 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0)
3199 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
3200 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
3206 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
3207 s->s3->tmp.pms = NULL;
3212 * Check a certificate can be used for client authentication. Currently check
3213 * cert exists, if we have a suitable digest for TLS 1.2 if static DH client
3214 * certificates can be used and optionally checks suitability for Suite B.
3216 static int ssl3_check_client_certificate(SSL *s)
3218 /* If no suitable signature algorithm can't use certificate */
3219 if (!tls_choose_sigalg(s, NULL) || s->s3->tmp.sigalg == NULL)
3222 * If strict mode check suitability of chain before using it. This also
3223 * adjusts suite B digest if necessary.
3225 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT &&
3226 !tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, -2))
3231 WORK_STATE tls_prepare_client_certificate(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
3234 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
3237 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
3238 /* Let cert callback update client certificates if required */
3239 if (s->cert->cert_cb) {
3240 i = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
3242 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3246 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3247 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3250 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
3252 if (ssl3_check_client_certificate(s))
3253 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3255 /* Fall through to WORK_MORE_B */
3259 /* We need to get a client cert */
3260 if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) {
3262 * If we get an error, we need to ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3263 * return(-1); We then get retied later
3265 i = ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s, &x509, &pkey);
3267 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3270 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
3271 if ((i == 1) && (pkey != NULL) && (x509 != NULL)) {
3272 if (!SSL_use_certificate(s, x509) || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(s, pkey))
3274 } else if (i == 1) {
3276 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3277 SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK);
3281 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3282 if (i && !ssl3_check_client_certificate(s))
3285 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
3286 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 0;
3287 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE);
3288 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3290 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 2;
3291 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
3292 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3293 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3299 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3302 /* Shouldn't ever get here */
3306 int tls_construct_client_certificate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3308 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3311 * TODO(TLS1.3): For now we must put an empty context. Needs to be filled in
3314 if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0))
3315 || !ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, pkt,
3316 (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 2) ? NULL
3319 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3324 && SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)
3325 && (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
3326 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))) {
3327 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3328 SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER);
3330 * This is a fatal error, which leaves
3331 * enc_write_ctx in an inconsistent state
3332 * and thus ssl3_send_alert may crash.
3339 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3343 #define has_bits(i,m) (((i)&(m)) == (m))
3345 int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s)
3348 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3352 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
3353 int al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3355 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3356 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3358 /* we don't have a certificate */
3359 if ((alg_a & SSL_aNULL) || (alg_k & SSL_kPSK))
3362 /* This is the passed certificate */
3364 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3365 idx = s->session->peer_type;
3366 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_ECC || idx == SSL_PKEY_ED25519) {
3367 if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(s->session->peer, s) == 0) {
3369 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT);
3374 } else if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA) {
3375 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3376 SSL_R_MISSING_ECDSA_SIGNING_CERT);
3380 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
3381 i = X509_certificate_type(s->session->peer, pkey);
3383 /* Check that we have a certificate if we require one */
3384 if ((alg_a & SSL_aRSA) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
3385 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3386 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_SIGNING_CERT);
3389 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3390 else if ((alg_a & SSL_aDSS) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_DSA | EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
3391 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3392 SSL_R_MISSING_DSA_SIGNING_CERT);
3396 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3397 if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK) &&
3398 !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_ENC)) {
3399 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3400 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT);
3404 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3405 if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHE) && (s->s3->peer_tmp == NULL)) {
3406 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3407 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3414 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3418 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3419 int tls_construct_next_proto(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3421 size_t len, padding_len;
3422 unsigned char *padding = NULL;
3424 len = s->ext.npn_len;
3425 padding_len = 32 - ((len + 2) % 32);
3427 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->ext.npn, len)
3428 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u8(pkt, padding_len, &padding)) {
3429 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEXT_PROTO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3433 memset(padding, 0, padding_len);
3437 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3442 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_hello_req(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3444 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
3445 /* should contain no data */
3446 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_REQ, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3447 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
3448 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3449 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3452 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION)) {
3453 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
3454 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
3458 * This is a historical discrepancy (not in the RFC) maintained for
3459 * compatibility reasons. If a TLS client receives a HelloRequest it will
3460 * attempt an abbreviated handshake. However if a DTLS client receives a
3461 * HelloRequest it will do a full handshake. Either behaviour is reasonable
3462 * but doing one for TLS and another for DTLS is odd.
3467 SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated(s);
3469 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
3472 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3474 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3476 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
3478 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)
3479 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3480 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3481 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3485 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
3486 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, &rawexts,
3488 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
3489 rawexts, NULL, 0, &al, 1))
3492 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3493 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
3496 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3497 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3498 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3499 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3502 int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL *s, X509 **px509, EVP_PKEY **ppkey)
3505 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
3506 if (s->ctx->client_cert_engine) {
3507 i = ENGINE_load_ssl_client_cert(s->ctx->client_cert_engine, s,
3508 SSL_get_client_CA_list(s),
3509 px509, ppkey, NULL, NULL, NULL);
3514 if (s->ctx->client_cert_cb)
3515 i = s->ctx->client_cert_cb(s, px509, ppkey);
3519 int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk, WPACKET *pkt)
3522 size_t totlen = 0, len, maxlen, maxverok = 0;
3523 int empty_reneg_info_scsv = !s->renegotiate;
3524 /* Set disabled masks for this session */
3525 ssl_set_client_disabled(s);
3530 #ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
3531 # if OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH < 6
3532 # error Max cipher length too short
3535 * Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes as hack workaround
3536 * chop number of supported ciphers to keep it well below this if we
3539 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
3540 maxlen = OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH & ~1;
3543 /* Maximum length that can be stored in 2 bytes. Length must be even */
3546 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv)
3548 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV)
3551 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) && totlen < maxlen; i++) {
3552 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
3554 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);
3555 /* Skip disabled ciphers */
3556 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED, 0))
3559 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(c, pkt, &len)) {
3560 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3564 /* Sanity check that the maximum version we offer has ciphers enabled */
3566 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
3567 if (DTLS_VERSION_GE(c->max_dtls, s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
3568 && DTLS_VERSION_LE(c->min_dtls, s->s3->tmp.max_ver))
3571 if (c->max_tls >= s->s3->tmp.max_ver
3572 && c->min_tls <= s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
3580 if (totlen == 0 || !maxverok) {
3581 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE);
3584 ERR_add_error_data(1, "No ciphers enabled for max supported "
3591 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv) {
3592 static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
3593 0, NULL, SSL3_CK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3595 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, pkt, &len)) {
3596 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3600 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) {
3601 static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
3602 0, NULL, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3604 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, pkt, &len)) {
3605 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3614 int tls_construct_end_of_early_data(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3616 if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY
3617 && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING) {
3618 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA,
3619 ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
3623 s->early_data_state = SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING;