2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
10 /* ====================================================================
11 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
13 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
14 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
16 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
17 * license provided above.
19 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
20 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
23 /* ====================================================================
24 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
26 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
27 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
30 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
31 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
32 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
34 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
35 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
36 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
38 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
39 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
40 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
41 * to make use of the Contribution.
43 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
44 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
45 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
46 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
51 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
52 #include "statem_locl.h"
53 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
54 #include <openssl/rand.h>
55 #include <openssl/objects.h>
56 #include <openssl/evp.h>
57 #include <openssl/md5.h>
58 #include <openssl/dh.h>
59 #include <openssl/bn.h>
60 #include <openssl/engine.h>
62 static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s);
63 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s);
64 static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b);
65 static int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk,
70 * Is a CertificateRequest message allowed at the moment or not?
76 static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s)
78 /* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */
79 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION
80 && (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL))
81 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK)))
88 * Should we expect the ServerKeyExchange message or not?
95 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s)
97 long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
100 * Can't skip server key exchange if this is an ephemeral
101 * ciphersuite or for SRP
103 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK
112 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
113 * handshake state transitions when the client is reading messages from the
114 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
115 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
118 * 1: Success (transition allowed)
119 * 0: Error (transition not allowed)
121 int ossl_statem_client_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
123 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
126 switch(st->hand_state) {
127 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
128 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
129 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
133 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
134 if (mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
135 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
141 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
143 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) {
144 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
145 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
148 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
149 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
153 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
154 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
156 } else if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
157 && s->tls_session_secret_cb != NULL
158 && s->session->tlsext_tick != NULL
159 && mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
161 * Normally, we can tell if the server is resuming the session
162 * from the session ID. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851), however, relies on
163 * the next server message after the ServerHello to determine if
164 * the server is resuming.
167 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
169 } else if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth
170 & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
171 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
172 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
176 ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s);
177 if (ske_expected < 0)
179 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
181 || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)
182 && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
183 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
184 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;
187 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
188 && cert_req_allowed(s)) {
189 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
191 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
192 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
201 * The CertificateStatus message is optional even if
202 * |tlsext_status_expected| is set
204 if (s->tlsext_status_expected && mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS) {
205 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS;
210 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
211 ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s);
212 if (ske_expected < 0)
214 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
216 || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)
217 && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
218 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
219 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;
226 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
227 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
228 if (cert_req_allowed(s)) {
229 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
236 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
237 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
238 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
243 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
244 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) {
245 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
246 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
249 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
250 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
255 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
256 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
257 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
262 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
263 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
264 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
273 /* No valid transition found */
278 * client_write_transition() works out what handshake state to move to next
279 * when the client is writing messages to be sent to the server.
281 WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client_write_transition(SSL *s)
283 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
285 switch(st->hand_state) {
287 /* Renegotiation - fall through */
289 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
290 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
292 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
294 * No transition at the end of writing because we don't know what
297 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
299 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
300 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
301 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
303 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
304 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req)
305 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT;
307 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;
308 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
311 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;
312 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
314 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
316 * For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain of nothing is
317 * sent, but no verify packet is sent
320 * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication in ECDH
321 * cipher suites with ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates. We
322 * need to skip the certificate verify message when client's
323 * ECDH public key is sent inside the client certificate.
325 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) {
326 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY;
328 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
330 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY) {
331 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
333 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
335 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
336 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
337 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
339 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
340 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
341 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
343 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
344 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO;
346 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
348 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
350 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
351 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:
352 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
353 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
356 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
358 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
359 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
360 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
362 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
365 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
367 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
368 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
370 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
371 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
372 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
376 /* Shouldn't happen */
377 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
382 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
383 * the client to the server.
385 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
387 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
389 switch(st->hand_state) {
390 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
392 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
393 /* every DTLS ClientHello resets Finished MAC */
394 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
395 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
402 return tls_prepare_client_certificate(s, wst);
404 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
405 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
408 * We're into the last flight so we don't retransmit these
409 * messages unless we need to.
413 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
414 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)))
415 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
418 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
421 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst);
424 /* No pre work to be done */
428 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
432 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
433 * client to the server.
435 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
437 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
441 switch(st->hand_state) {
442 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
443 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A && statem_flush(s) != 1)
446 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
447 /* Treat the next message as the first packet */
452 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
453 if (tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(s) == 0)
457 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
458 s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
459 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
460 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
462 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
463 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
465 s->session->compress_meth = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
467 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
470 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
471 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))
474 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
475 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
478 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
481 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
486 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
490 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
491 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
492 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A && SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit == 0) {
494 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
497 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
501 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
506 /* No post work to be done */
510 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
514 * Construct a message to be sent from the client to the server.
516 * Valid return values are:
520 int ossl_statem_client_construct_message(SSL *s)
522 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
524 switch(st->hand_state) {
525 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
526 return tls_construct_client_hello(s);
529 return tls_construct_client_certificate(s);
531 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
532 return tls_construct_client_key_exchange(s);
534 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
535 return tls_construct_client_verify(s);
537 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
539 return dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec(s);
541 return tls_construct_change_cipher_spec(s);
543 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
544 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:
545 return tls_construct_next_proto(s);
547 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
548 return tls_construct_finished(s,
550 ssl3_enc->client_finished_label,
552 ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len);
555 /* Shouldn't happen */
563 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
564 * reading. Excludes the message header.
566 unsigned long ossl_statem_client_max_message_size(SSL *s)
568 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
570 switch(st->hand_state) {
571 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
572 return SERVER_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH;
574 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
575 return HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH;
578 return s->max_cert_list;
580 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
581 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
583 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
584 return SERVER_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH;
586 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
587 /* Set to s->max_cert_list for compatibility with previous releases.
588 * In practice these messages can get quite long if servers are
589 * configured to provide a long list of acceptable CAs
591 return s->max_cert_list;
593 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
594 return SERVER_HELLO_DONE_MAX_LENGTH;
596 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
597 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH;
599 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
600 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
602 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
603 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH;
606 /* Shouldn't happen */
614 * Process a message that the client has been received from the server.
616 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_client_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
618 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
620 switch(st->hand_state) {
621 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
622 return tls_process_server_hello(s, pkt);
624 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
625 return dtls_process_hello_verify(s, pkt);
628 return tls_process_server_certificate(s, pkt);
630 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
631 return tls_process_cert_status(s, pkt);
633 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
634 return tls_process_key_exchange(s, pkt);
636 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
637 return tls_process_certificate_request(s, pkt);
639 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
640 return tls_process_server_done(s, pkt);
642 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
643 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt);
645 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
646 return tls_process_new_session_ticket(s, pkt);
648 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
649 return tls_process_finished(s, pkt);
652 /* Shouldn't happen */
656 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
660 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
663 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
665 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
667 switch(st->hand_state) {
668 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
669 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
670 /* We only get here if we are using SCTP and we are renegotiating */
671 if (BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
672 s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
673 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
674 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
675 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
676 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 1);
679 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 0);
680 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
687 /* Shouldn't happen */
691 int tls_construct_client_hello(SSL *s)
694 unsigned char *p, *d;
699 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
703 SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session;
705 buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
707 /* Work out what SSL/TLS/DTLS version to use */
708 protverr = ssl_set_client_hello_version(s);
710 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
714 if ((sess == NULL) ||
715 !ssl_version_supported(s, sess->ssl_version) ||
717 * In the case of EAP-FAST, we can have a pre-shared
718 * "ticket" without a session ID.
720 (!sess->session_id_length && !sess->tlsext_tick) ||
721 (sess->not_resumable)) {
722 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0))
725 /* else use the pre-loaded session */
727 p = s->s3->client_random;
730 * for DTLS if client_random is initialized, reuse it, we are
731 * required to use same upon reply to HelloVerify
733 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
736 for (idx = 0; idx < sizeof(s->s3->client_random); idx++) {
745 if (i && ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p,
746 sizeof(s->s3->client_random)) <= 0)
749 /* Do the message type and length last */
750 d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
753 * version indicates the negotiated version: for example from
754 * an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version
755 * field is the maximum version we permit and it is also
756 * used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can
757 * choke if we initially report a higher version then
758 * renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This
759 * didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it
760 * but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports
763 * Possible scenario with previous logic:
764 * 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2
765 * 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0
766 * 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2.
767 * 4. Handshake proceeds using TLS 1.0.
768 * 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate.
769 * 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now
770 * know that is maximum server supports.
771 * 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret
772 * containing version 1.0.
774 * For interoperability it should be OK to always use the
775 * maximum version we support in client hello and then rely
776 * on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't
777 * being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with
778 * TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using
779 * client_version in client hello and not resetting it to
780 * the negotiated version.
782 *(p++) = s->client_version >> 8;
783 *(p++) = s->client_version & 0xff;
786 memcpy(p, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
787 p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
793 i = s->session->session_id_length;
796 if (i > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id)) {
797 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
800 memcpy(p, s->session->session_id, i);
804 /* cookie stuff for DTLS */
805 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
806 if (s->d1->cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)) {
807 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
810 *(p++) = s->d1->cookie_len;
811 memcpy(p, s->d1->cookie, s->d1->cookie_len);
812 p += s->d1->cookie_len;
815 /* Ciphers supported */
816 i = ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s, SSL_get_ciphers(s), &(p[2]));
818 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE);
821 #ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
823 * Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes as hack workaround
824 * chop number of supported ciphers to keep it well below this if we
827 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
828 && i > OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH)
829 i = OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH & ~1;
835 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
839 if (!ssl_allow_compression(s) || !s->ctx->comp_methods)
842 j = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
844 for (i = 0; i < j; i++) {
845 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, i);
849 *(p++) = 0; /* Add the NULL method */
852 if (ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
853 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
857 ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, buf + SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
859 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
860 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
865 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO, l)) {
866 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
867 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
873 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
877 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN dtls_process_hello_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
880 unsigned int cookie_len;
883 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, 2)
884 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookiepkt)) {
885 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
886 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
890 cookie_len = PACKET_remaining(&cookiepkt);
891 if (cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)) {
892 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
893 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
897 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&cookiepkt, s->d1->cookie, cookie_len)) {
898 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
899 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
902 s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_len;
904 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
906 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
907 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
908 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
911 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
913 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
916 size_t session_id_len;
917 const unsigned char *cipherchars;
918 int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
919 unsigned int compression;
920 unsigned int sversion;
922 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
926 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sversion)) {
927 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
928 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
932 protverr = ssl_choose_client_version(s, sversion);
934 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
935 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, protverr);
939 /* load the server hello data */
940 /* load the server random */
941 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
942 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
943 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
949 /* Get the session-id. */
950 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)) {
951 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
952 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
955 session_id_len = PACKET_remaining(&session_id);
956 if (session_id_len > sizeof s->session->session_id
957 || session_id_len > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE) {
958 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
959 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG);
963 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &cipherchars, TLS_CIPHER_LEN)) {
964 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
965 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
970 * Check if we can resume the session based on external pre-shared secret.
971 * EAP-FAST (RFC 4851) supports two types of session resumption.
972 * Resumption based on server-side state works with session IDs.
973 * Resumption based on pre-shared Protected Access Credentials (PACs)
974 * works by overriding the SessionTicket extension at the application
975 * layer, and does not send a session ID. (We do not know whether EAP-FAST
976 * servers would honour the session ID.) Therefore, the session ID alone
977 * is not a reliable indicator of session resumption, so we first check if
978 * we can resume, and later peek at the next handshake message to see if the
979 * server wants to resume.
981 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb &&
982 s->session->tlsext_tick) {
983 const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
984 s->session->master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
985 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
986 &s->session->master_key_length,
988 s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)) {
989 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher ?
990 pref_cipher : ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars);
992 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
993 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
998 if (session_id_len != 0 && session_id_len == s->session->session_id_length
999 && memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id), s->session->session_id,
1000 session_id_len) == 0) {
1001 if (s->sid_ctx_length != s->session->sid_ctx_length
1002 || memcmp(s->session->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length)) {
1003 /* actually a client application bug */
1004 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1005 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1006 SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT);
1012 * If we were trying for session-id reuse but the server
1013 * didn't echo the ID, make a new SSL_SESSION.
1014 * In the case of EAP-FAST and PAC, we do not send a session ID,
1015 * so the PAC-based session secret is always preserved. It'll be
1016 * overwritten if the server refuses resumption.
1018 if (s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
1019 s->ctx->stats.sess_miss++;
1020 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) {
1025 s->session->ssl_version = s->version;
1026 s->session->session_id_length = session_id_len;
1027 /* session_id_len could be 0 */
1028 memcpy(s->session->session_id, PACKET_data(&session_id),
1032 /* Session version and negotiated protocol version should match */
1033 if (s->version != s->session->ssl_version) {
1034 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1036 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1037 SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_VERSION_MISMATCH);
1041 c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars);
1043 /* unknown cipher */
1044 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1045 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1049 * Now that we know the version, update the check to see if it's an allowed
1052 s->s3->tmp.min_ver = s->version;
1053 s->s3->tmp.max_ver = s->version;
1055 * If it is a disabled cipher we either didn't send it in client hello,
1056 * or it's not allowed for the selected protocol. So we return an error.
1058 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_CHECK)) {
1059 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1060 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1064 sk = ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s);
1065 i = sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk, c);
1067 /* we did not say we would use this cipher */
1068 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1069 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1074 * Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher
1075 * and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that cipher_id is
1076 * set and use it for comparison.
1078 if (s->session->cipher)
1079 s->session->cipher_id = s->session->cipher->id;
1080 if (s->hit && (s->session->cipher_id != c->id)) {
1081 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1082 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1083 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED);
1086 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c;
1087 /* lets get the compression algorithm */
1089 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &compression)) {
1090 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1091 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1094 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1095 if (compression != 0) {
1096 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1097 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1098 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1102 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1103 * using compression.
1105 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1106 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1110 if (s->hit && compression != s->session->compress_meth) {
1111 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1112 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1113 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED);
1116 if (compression == 0)
1118 else if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
1119 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1120 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED);
1123 comp = ssl3_comp_find(s->ctx->comp_methods, compression);
1126 if (compression != 0 && comp == NULL) {
1127 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1128 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1129 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1132 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1136 /* TLS extensions */
1137 if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(s, pkt)) {
1138 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
1142 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1143 /* wrong packet length */
1144 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1145 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH);
1149 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1150 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
1151 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
1152 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
1155 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
1158 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
1159 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
1161 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
1162 sizeof(sctpauthkey),
1164 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0,
1168 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s),
1169 BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
1170 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
1174 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
1176 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1178 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1179 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1182 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1184 int al, i, ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR, exp_idx;
1185 unsigned long cert_list_len, cert_len;
1187 const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes;
1188 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
1189 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
1191 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
1192 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1196 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_list_len)
1197 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != cert_list_len) {
1198 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1199 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1202 while (PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
1203 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_len)
1204 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &certbytes, cert_len)) {
1205 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1206 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1207 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1211 certstart = certbytes;
1212 x = d2i_X509(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, cert_len);
1214 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
1215 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
1218 if (certbytes != (certstart + cert_len)) {
1219 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1220 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1221 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1224 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
1225 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1231 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
1232 if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) && i <= 0) {
1233 al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
1234 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1235 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
1238 ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */
1240 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, i);
1241 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1245 s->session->peer_chain = sk;
1247 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's certificate,
1248 * which we don't include in statem_srvr.c
1250 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
1253 * VRS 19990621: possible memory leak; sk=null ==> !sk_pop_free() @end
1256 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
1258 if (pkey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) {
1261 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1262 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS);
1266 i = ssl_cert_type(x, pkey);
1270 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1271 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
1275 exp_idx = ssl_cipher_get_cert_index(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher);
1276 if (exp_idx >= 0 && i != exp_idx
1277 && (exp_idx != SSL_PKEY_GOST_EC ||
1278 (i != SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512 && i != SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
1279 && i != SSL_PKEY_GOST01))) {
1281 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1282 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1283 SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
1286 s->session->peer_type = i;
1288 X509_free(s->session->peer);
1290 s->session->peer = x;
1291 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
1294 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
1298 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1300 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1303 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
1307 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1312 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
1313 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1314 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1317 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1318 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
1320 PACKET save_param_start, signature;
1322 md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
1323 if (md_ctx == NULL) {
1324 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1325 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1329 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1331 save_param_start = *pkt;
1333 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
1334 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->peer_tmp);
1335 s->s3->peer_tmp = NULL;
1338 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1340 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1342 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1343 /* PSK ciphersuites are preceded by an identity hint */
1344 if (alg_k & SSL_PSK) {
1345 PACKET psk_identity_hint;
1346 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity_hint)) {
1347 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1352 * Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in
1353 * ssl3_send_client_key_exchange. Assume that the maximum length of
1354 * a PSK identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK
1357 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
1358 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1359 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1363 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) == 0) {
1364 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
1365 s->session->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
1366 } else if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity_hint,
1367 &s->session->psk_identity_hint)) {
1368 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1373 /* Nothing else to do for plain PSK or RSAPSK */
1374 if (alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
1376 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1378 * Dummy "if" to ensure sane C code in the event of various OPENSSL_NO_*
1383 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1384 else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
1385 PACKET prime, generator, salt, server_pub;
1386 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime)
1387 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator)
1388 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &salt)
1389 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &server_pub)) {
1390 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1395 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime),
1396 PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL)) == NULL
1398 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator),
1399 PACKET_remaining(&generator), NULL)) == NULL
1401 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&salt),
1402 PACKET_remaining(&salt), NULL)) == NULL
1404 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&server_pub),
1405 PACKET_remaining(&server_pub), NULL)) == NULL) {
1406 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1410 if (!srp_verify_server_param(s, &al)) {
1411 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
1415 /* We must check if there is a certificate */
1416 if (alg_a & (SSL_aRSA|SSL_aDSS))
1417 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
1419 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
1420 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1421 else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
1422 PACKET prime, generator, pub_key;
1423 EVP_PKEY *peer_tmp = NULL;
1426 BIGNUM *p = NULL, *g = NULL, *bnpub_key = NULL;
1428 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime)
1429 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator)
1430 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &pub_key)) {
1431 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1435 peer_tmp = EVP_PKEY_new();
1438 if (peer_tmp == NULL || dh == NULL) {
1439 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1440 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1444 p = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime), PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL);
1445 g = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator), PACKET_remaining(&generator),
1447 bnpub_key = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&pub_key), PACKET_remaining(&pub_key),
1449 if (p == NULL || g == NULL || bnpub_key == NULL) {
1450 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1454 if (BN_is_zero(p) || BN_is_zero(g) || BN_is_zero(bnpub_key)) {
1455 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE);
1459 if (!DH_set0_pqg(dh, p, NULL, g)) {
1460 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1461 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1465 if (!DH_set0_key(dh, bnpub_key, NULL)) {
1466 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1467 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1471 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH, DH_security_bits(dh), 0, dh)) {
1472 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1473 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
1477 if (EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(peer_tmp, dh) == 0) {
1478 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1479 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
1483 s->s3->peer_tmp = peer_tmp;
1491 EVP_PKEY_free(peer_tmp);
1495 * FIXME: This makes assumptions about which ciphersuites come with
1496 * public keys. We should have a less ad-hoc way of doing this
1498 if (alg_a & (SSL_aRSA|SSL_aDSS))
1499 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
1500 /* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */
1502 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_DH */
1504 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1505 else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
1507 const unsigned char *ecparams;
1511 * Extract elliptic curve parameters and the server's ephemeral ECDH
1512 * public key. For now we only support named (not generic) curves and
1513 * ECParameters in this case is just three bytes.
1515 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &ecparams, 3)) {
1516 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1520 * Check curve is one of our preferences, if not server has sent an
1521 * invalid curve. ECParameters is 3 bytes.
1523 if (!tls1_check_curve(s, ecparams, 3)) {
1524 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
1528 curve_nid = tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(*(ecparams + 2));
1529 if (curve_nid == 0) {
1530 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1531 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1532 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
1536 /* Set up EVP_PKEY with named curve as parameters */
1537 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(EVP_PKEY_EC, NULL);
1539 || EVP_PKEY_paramgen_init(pctx) <= 0
1540 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ec_paramgen_curve_nid(pctx, curve_nid) <= 0
1541 || EVP_PKEY_paramgen(pctx, &s->s3->peer_tmp) <= 0) {
1542 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1543 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
1546 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
1549 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &encoded_pt)) {
1550 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1554 if (EC_KEY_oct2key(EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(s->s3->peer_tmp),
1555 PACKET_data(&encoded_pt),
1556 PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt), NULL) == 0) {
1557 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
1562 * The ECC/TLS specification does not mention the use of DSA to sign
1563 * ECParameters in the server key exchange message. We do support RSA
1567 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1568 else if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
1569 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
1571 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1572 else if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)
1573 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
1575 /* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
1577 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1578 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
1581 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1583 /* if it was signed, check the signature */
1587 * |pkt| now points to the beginning of the signature, so the difference
1588 * equals the length of the parameters.
1590 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(&save_param_start, ¶ms,
1591 PACKET_remaining(&save_param_start) -
1592 PACKET_remaining(pkt))) {
1593 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1594 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1598 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1599 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
1601 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &sigalgs, 2)) {
1602 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1605 rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, s, sigalgs, pkey);
1612 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
1614 } else if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
1615 md = EVP_md5_sha1();
1620 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &signature)
1621 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1622 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1625 j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
1627 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1632 * Check signature length
1634 if (PACKET_remaining(&signature) > (size_t)j) {
1635 /* wrong packet length */
1636 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH);
1639 if (EVP_VerifyInit_ex(md_ctx, md, NULL) <= 0
1640 || EVP_VerifyUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
1641 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
1642 || EVP_VerifyUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
1643 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
1644 || EVP_VerifyUpdate(md_ctx, PACKET_data(¶ms),
1645 PACKET_remaining(¶ms)) <= 0) {
1646 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1647 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
1650 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(md_ctx, PACKET_data(&signature),
1651 PACKET_remaining(&signature), pkey) <= 0) {
1653 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
1654 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
1658 /* aNULL, aSRP or PSK do not need public keys */
1659 if (!(alg_a & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP)) && !(alg_k & SSL_PSK)) {
1660 /* Might be wrong key type, check it */
1661 if (ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s))
1662 /* Otherwise this shouldn't happen */
1663 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1666 /* still data left over */
1667 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1668 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE);
1672 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
1673 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
1675 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1677 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1680 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1681 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
1683 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
1684 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1685 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1688 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_certificate_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1690 int ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1691 unsigned int list_len, ctype_num, i, name_len;
1692 X509_NAME *xn = NULL;
1693 const unsigned char *data;
1694 const unsigned char *namestart, *namebytes;
1695 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = NULL;
1697 if ((ca_sk = sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp)) == NULL) {
1698 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1702 /* get the certificate types */
1703 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &ctype_num)
1704 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, ctype_num)) {
1705 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
1706 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1709 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->ctypes);
1710 s->cert->ctypes = NULL;
1711 if (ctype_num > SSL3_CT_NUMBER) {
1712 /* If we exceed static buffer copy all to cert structure */
1713 s->cert->ctypes = OPENSSL_malloc(ctype_num);
1714 if (s->cert->ctypes == NULL) {
1715 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1718 memcpy(s->cert->ctypes, data, ctype_num);
1719 s->cert->ctype_num = (size_t)ctype_num;
1720 ctype_num = SSL3_CT_NUMBER;
1722 for (i = 0; i < ctype_num; i++)
1723 s->s3->tmp.ctype[i] = data[i];
1725 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1726 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &list_len)
1727 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, list_len)) {
1728 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
1729 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
1730 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1734 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
1735 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
1736 s->s3->tmp.md[i] = NULL;
1737 s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
1739 if ((list_len & 1) || !tls1_save_sigalgs(s, data, list_len)) {
1740 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
1741 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
1742 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR);
1745 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
1746 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1747 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1751 ssl_set_default_md(s);
1754 /* get the CA RDNs */
1755 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &list_len)
1756 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != list_len) {
1757 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
1758 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1762 while (PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
1763 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &name_len)
1764 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &namebytes, name_len)) {
1765 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
1766 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
1767 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1771 namestart = namebytes;
1773 if ((xn = d2i_X509_NAME(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&namebytes,
1774 name_len)) == NULL) {
1775 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
1776 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
1780 if (namebytes != (namestart + name_len)) {
1781 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
1782 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
1783 SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1786 if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk, xn)) {
1787 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1793 /* we should setup a certificate to return.... */
1794 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 1;
1795 s->s3->tmp.ctype_num = ctype_num;
1796 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->s3->tmp.ca_names, X509_NAME_free);
1797 s->s3->tmp.ca_names = ca_sk;
1800 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
1803 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1806 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk, X509_NAME_free);
1810 static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b)
1812 return (X509_NAME_cmp(*a, *b));
1815 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1818 unsigned int ticklen;
1819 unsigned long ticket_lifetime_hint;
1821 if (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &ticket_lifetime_hint)
1822 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ticklen)
1823 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != ticklen) {
1824 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1825 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1829 /* Server is allowed to change its mind and send an empty ticket. */
1831 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
1833 if (s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
1834 int i = s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode;
1835 SSL_SESSION *new_sess;
1837 * We reused an existing session, so we need to replace it with a new
1840 if (i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT) {
1842 * Remove the old session from the cache
1844 if (i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE) {
1845 if (s->session_ctx->remove_session_cb != NULL)
1846 s->session_ctx->remove_session_cb(s->session_ctx,
1849 /* We carry on if this fails */
1850 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
1854 if ((new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0)) == 0) {
1855 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1856 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1860 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
1861 s->session = new_sess;
1864 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_tick);
1865 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = 0;
1867 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1868 if (s->session->tlsext_tick == NULL) {
1869 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1872 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen)) {
1873 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1874 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1878 s->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint = ticket_lifetime_hint;
1879 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1881 * There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket session. One is to set
1882 * an appropriate session ID and then the server must return a match in
1883 * ServerHello. This allows the normal client session ID matching to work
1884 * and we know much earlier that the ticket has been accepted. The
1885 * other way is to set zero length session ID when the ticket is
1886 * presented and rely on the handshake to determine session resumption.
1887 * We choose the former approach because this fits in with assumptions
1888 * elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set to the SHA256 (or SHA1 is
1889 * SHA256 is disabled) hash of the ticket.
1891 EVP_Digest(s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen,
1892 s->session->session_id, &s->session->session_id_length,
1893 EVP_sha256(), NULL);
1894 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
1896 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1898 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1899 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1902 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_status(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1905 unsigned long resplen;
1908 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &type)
1909 || type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
1910 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1911 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE);
1914 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &resplen)
1915 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != resplen) {
1916 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1917 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1920 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = OPENSSL_malloc(resplen);
1921 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp == NULL) {
1922 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1923 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1926 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, resplen)) {
1927 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1928 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1931 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = resplen;
1932 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
1934 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1935 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1936 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1939 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_done(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1941 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
1942 /* should contain no data */
1943 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
1944 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1945 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1946 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1949 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1950 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
1951 if (SRP_Calc_A_param(s) <= 0) {
1952 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE, SSL_R_SRP_A_CALC);
1953 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1954 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1955 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1961 * at this point we check that we have the required stuff from
1964 if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
1965 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1966 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1967 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1971 * Call the ocsp status callback if needed. The |tlsext_ocsp_resp| and
1972 * |tlsext_ocsp_resplen| values will be set if we actually received a status
1973 * message, or NULL and -1 otherwise
1975 if (s->tlsext_status_type != -1 && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb != NULL) {
1977 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
1979 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL,
1980 SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE);
1981 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE,
1982 SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE);
1983 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1986 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1987 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1988 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1992 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
1993 if (s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
1994 /* Note we validate the SCTs whether or not we abort on error */
1995 if (!ssl_validate_ct(s) && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) {
1996 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1997 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2002 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
2003 /* Only applies to renegotiation */
2004 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))
2005 && s->renegotiate != 0)
2006 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
2009 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
2012 int tls_construct_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
2016 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2017 size_t pskhdrlen = 0;
2019 unsigned long alg_k;
2020 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2022 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2023 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2025 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
2026 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL;
2028 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2029 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
2030 int encoded_pt_len = 0;
2032 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
2034 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2036 p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
2039 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2040 if (alg_k & SSL_PSK) {
2043 * The callback needs PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 bytes to return a
2044 * \0-terminated identity. The last byte is for us for simulating
2047 char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1];
2049 unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
2052 if (s->psk_client_callback == NULL) {
2053 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2054 SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB);
2058 memset(identity, 0, sizeof(identity));
2060 psklen = s->psk_client_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity_hint,
2061 identity, sizeof(identity) - 1,
2064 if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
2065 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2066 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2068 } else if (psklen == 0) {
2069 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2070 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2073 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.psk);
2074 s->s3->tmp.psk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen);
2075 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
2077 if (s->s3->tmp.psk == NULL) {
2078 OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, sizeof(identity));
2082 s->s3->tmp.psklen = psklen;
2083 identitylen = strlen(identity);
2084 if (identitylen > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2085 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2086 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2089 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
2090 s->session->psk_identity = OPENSSL_strdup(identity);
2091 if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL) {
2092 OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, sizeof(identity));
2096 s2n(identitylen, p);
2097 memcpy(p, identity, identitylen);
2098 pskhdrlen = 2 + identitylen;
2102 OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, sizeof(identity));
2104 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
2108 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
2113 /* Fool emacs indentation */
2116 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2117 else if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
2119 pmslen = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
2120 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
2124 if (s->session->peer == NULL) {
2126 * We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA.
2128 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2129 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2133 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2134 if (EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pkey) == NULL) {
2135 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2136 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2140 pms[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
2141 pms[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
2142 if (RAND_bytes(pms + 2, pmslen - 2) <= 0)
2146 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2147 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION)
2149 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
2150 if (pctx == NULL || EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pctx) <= 0
2151 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, NULL, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
2152 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2156 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, p, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
2157 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2158 SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT);
2162 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2165 if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_1)
2167 if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_2)
2171 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2172 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) {
2178 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2179 else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
2181 const BIGNUM *pub_key;
2182 skey = s->s3->peer_tmp;
2184 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2185 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2188 ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(skey, NID_undef);
2189 dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey);
2191 if (dh_clnt == NULL || ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey) == 0) {
2192 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2193 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2198 /* send off the data */
2199 DH_get0_key(dh_clnt, &pub_key, NULL);
2200 n = BN_num_bytes(pub_key);
2202 BN_bn2bin(pub_key, p);
2204 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2209 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2210 else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2212 skey = s->s3->peer_tmp;
2213 if ((skey == NULL) || EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(skey) == NULL) {
2214 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2215 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2219 ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(skey, NID_undef);
2221 if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey) == 0) {
2222 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2226 /* Generate encoding of client key */
2227 encoded_pt_len = EC_KEY_key2buf(EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(ckey),
2228 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
2229 &encodedPoint, NULL);
2231 if (encoded_pt_len == 0) {
2232 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2236 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2241 *p = n; /* length of encoded point */
2242 /* Encoded point will be copied here */
2244 /* copy the point */
2245 memcpy(p, encodedPoint, n);
2246 /* increment n to account for length field */
2249 /* Free allocated memory */
2250 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2252 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2253 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2254 else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
2255 /* GOST key exchange message creation */
2256 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
2259 unsigned int md_len;
2260 unsigned char shared_ukm[32], tmp[256];
2261 EVP_MD_CTX *ukm_hash;
2262 int dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94;
2263 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aGOST12) != 0)
2264 dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256;
2268 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
2273 * Get server sertificate PKEY and create ctx from it
2275 peer_cert = s->session->peer;
2277 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2278 SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER);
2282 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(X509_get0_pubkey(peer_cert), NULL);
2283 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
2284 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2285 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2289 * If we have send a certificate, and certificate key
2290 * parameters match those of server certificate, use
2291 * certificate key for key exchange
2294 /* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */
2296 if (pkey_ctx == NULL
2297 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0
2298 /* Generate session key */
2299 || RAND_bytes(pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
2300 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2301 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2302 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2306 * If we have client certificate, use its secret as peer key
2308 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req && s->cert->key->privatekey) {
2309 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer
2310 (pkey_ctx, s->cert->key->privatekey) <= 0) {
2312 * If there was an error - just ignore it. Ephemeral key
2319 * Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific context
2322 ukm_hash = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2323 if (EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash,
2324 EVP_get_digestbynid(dgst_nid)) <= 0
2325 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->client_random,
2326 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
2327 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->server_random,
2328 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
2329 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash, shared_ukm, &md_len) <= 0) {
2330 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash);
2331 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2332 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2335 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash);
2336 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
2337 (pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, 8,
2339 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2343 /* Make GOST keytransport blob message */
2345 * Encapsulate it into sequence
2347 *(p++) = V_ASN1_SEQUENCE | V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED;
2349 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx, tmp, &msglen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
2350 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2354 if (msglen >= 0x80) {
2356 *(p++) = msglen & 0xff;
2359 *(p++) = msglen & 0xff;
2362 memcpy(p, tmp, msglen);
2363 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2364 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
2365 (pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0) {
2366 /* Set flag "skip certificate verify" */
2367 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY;
2369 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2373 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2374 else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
2375 if (s->srp_ctx.A != NULL) {
2376 /* send off the data */
2377 n = BN_num_bytes(s->srp_ctx.A);
2379 BN_bn2bin(s->srp_ctx.A, p);
2382 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2383 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2386 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
2387 s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
2388 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
2389 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2390 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2396 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
2397 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2401 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2405 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, n)) {
2406 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
2407 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2412 s->s3->tmp.pms = pms;
2413 s->s3->tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
2418 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2419 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2421 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
2422 s->s3->tmp.pms = NULL;
2423 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2424 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2426 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2427 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2429 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
2430 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2432 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2433 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.psk, s->s3->tmp.psklen);
2434 s->s3->tmp.psk = NULL;
2436 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2440 int tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(SSL *s)
2442 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
2445 pms = s->s3->tmp.pms;
2446 pmslen = s->s3->tmp.pmslen;
2448 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2450 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
2451 if (!srp_generate_client_master_secret(s)) {
2452 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK,
2453 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2460 if (pms == NULL && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
2461 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2462 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2465 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, pms, pmslen, 1)) {
2466 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2467 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2468 /* ssl_generate_master_secret frees the pms even on error */
2476 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
2477 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
2478 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
2479 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
2482 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
2485 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
2486 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
2488 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
2489 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
2490 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0)
2493 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
2494 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
2500 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
2501 s->s3->tmp.pms = NULL;
2505 int tls_construct_client_verify(SSL *s)
2509 const EVP_MD *md = s->s3->tmp.md[s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys];
2512 unsigned long n = 0;
2516 mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2518 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2522 p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
2523 pkey = s->cert->key->privatekey;
2525 hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
2526 if (hdatalen <= 0) {
2527 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2530 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2531 if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md)) {
2532 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2539 fprintf(stderr, "Using client alg %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
2541 if (!EVP_SignInit_ex(mctx, md, NULL)
2542 || !EVP_SignUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen)
2543 || (s->version == SSL3_VERSION
2544 && !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET,
2545 s->session->master_key_length,
2546 s->session->master_key))
2547 || !EVP_SignFinal(mctx, p + 2, &u, pkey)) {
2548 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2551 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2553 int pktype = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey);
2554 if (pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2001
2555 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
2556 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512)
2557 BUF_reverse(p + 2, NULL, u);
2563 /* Digest cached records and discard handshake buffer */
2564 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0))
2566 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY, n)) {
2567 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2571 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
2574 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
2579 * Check a certificate can be used for client authentication. Currently check
2580 * cert exists, if we have a suitable digest for TLS 1.2 if static DH client
2581 * certificates can be used and optionally checks suitability for Suite B.
2583 static int ssl3_check_client_certificate(SSL *s)
2585 if (!s->cert || !s->cert->key->x509 || !s->cert->key->privatekey)
2587 /* If no suitable signature algorithm can't use certificate */
2588 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !s->s3->tmp.md[s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys])
2591 * If strict mode check suitability of chain before using it. This also
2592 * adjusts suite B digest if necessary.
2594 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT &&
2595 !tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, -2))
2600 WORK_STATE tls_prepare_client_certificate(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
2603 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2606 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
2607 /* Let cert callback update client certificates if required */
2608 if (s->cert->cert_cb) {
2609 i = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
2611 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
2615 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2616 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2619 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
2621 if (ssl3_check_client_certificate(s))
2622 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
2624 /* Fall through to WORK_MORE_B */
2628 /* We need to get a client cert */
2629 if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) {
2631 * If we get an error, we need to ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
2632 * return(-1); We then get retied later
2634 i = ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s, &x509, &pkey);
2636 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
2639 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
2640 if ((i == 1) && (pkey != NULL) && (x509 != NULL)) {
2641 if (!SSL_use_certificate(s, x509) || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(s, pkey))
2643 } else if (i == 1) {
2645 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
2646 SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK);
2650 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
2651 if (i && !ssl3_check_client_certificate(s))
2654 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
2655 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 0;
2656 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE);
2657 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
2659 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 2;
2660 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
2661 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2662 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2668 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
2671 /* Shouldn't ever get here */
2675 int tls_construct_client_certificate(SSL *s)
2677 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,
2678 (s->s3->tmp.cert_req ==
2679 2) ? NULL : s->cert->key)) {
2680 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2681 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2682 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2689 #define has_bits(i,m) (((i)&(m)) == (m))
2691 int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s)
2694 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2698 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2699 int al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2701 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2702 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2704 /* we don't have a certificate */
2705 if ((alg_a & SSL_aNULL) || (alg_k & SSL_kPSK))
2708 /* This is the passed certificate */
2710 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2711 idx = s->session->peer_type;
2712 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_ECC) {
2713 if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(s->session->peer, s) == 0) {
2715 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT);
2720 } else if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA) {
2721 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
2722 SSL_R_MISSING_ECDSA_SIGNING_CERT);
2726 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2727 i = X509_certificate_type(s->session->peer, pkey);
2729 /* Check that we have a certificate if we require one */
2730 if ((alg_a & SSL_aRSA) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
2731 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
2732 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_SIGNING_CERT);
2735 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2736 else if ((alg_a & SSL_aDSS) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_DSA | EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
2737 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
2738 SSL_R_MISSING_DSA_SIGNING_CERT);
2742 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2743 if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK) &&
2744 !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_ENC)) {
2745 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
2746 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT);
2750 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2751 if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHE) && (s->s3->peer_tmp == NULL)) {
2752 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2753 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2760 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2764 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2765 int tls_construct_next_proto(SSL *s)
2767 unsigned int len, padding_len;
2770 len = s->next_proto_negotiated_len;
2771 padding_len = 32 - ((len + 2) % 32);
2772 d = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
2774 memcpy(d + 5, s->next_proto_negotiated, len);
2775 d[5 + len] = padding_len;
2776 memset(d + 6 + len, 0, padding_len);
2777 *(d++) = SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO;
2778 l2n3(2 + len + padding_len, d);
2779 s->init_num = 4 + 2 + len + padding_len;
2786 int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL *s, X509 **px509, EVP_PKEY **ppkey)
2789 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
2790 if (s->ctx->client_cert_engine) {
2791 i = ENGINE_load_ssl_client_cert(s->ctx->client_cert_engine, s,
2792 SSL_get_client_CA_list(s),
2793 px509, ppkey, NULL, NULL, NULL);
2798 if (s->ctx->client_cert_cb)
2799 i = s->ctx->client_cert_cb(s, px509, ppkey);
2803 int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk,
2807 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
2809 int empty_reneg_info_scsv = !s->renegotiate;
2810 /* Set disabled masks for this session */
2811 ssl_set_client_disabled(s);
2817 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++) {
2818 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);
2819 /* Skip disabled ciphers */
2820 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED))
2822 j = s->method->put_cipher_by_char(c, p);
2826 * If p == q, no ciphers; caller indicates an error. Otherwise, add
2830 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv) {
2831 static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
2832 0, NULL, SSL3_CK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
2834 j = s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, p);
2837 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) {
2838 static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
2839 0, NULL, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
2841 j = s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, p);