1 /* ssl/statem/statem_clnt.c */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
124 /* ====================================================================
125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
142 * to make use of the Contribution.
144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
152 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
153 #include "statem_locl.h"
154 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
155 #include <openssl/rand.h>
156 #include <openssl/objects.h>
157 #include <openssl/evp.h>
158 #include <openssl/md5.h>
159 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
160 # include <openssl/dh.h>
162 #include <openssl/bn.h>
163 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
164 # include <openssl/engine.h>
167 static inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s);
168 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s);
169 static int ssl_set_version(SSL *s);
170 static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b);
171 static int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk,
176 * Is a CertificateRequest message allowed at the moment or not?
182 static inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s)
184 /* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */
185 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION
186 && (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL))
187 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK)))
194 * Should we expect the ServerKeyExchange message or not?
201 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s)
203 long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
206 * Can't skip server key exchange if this is an ephemeral
207 * ciphersuite or for SRP
209 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK
215 * Export ciphersuites may have temporary RSA keys if the public key in the
216 * server certificate is longer than the maximum export strength
218 if ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA) && SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) {
221 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
226 * If the public key in the certificate is shorter than or equal to the
227 * maximum export strength then a temporary RSA key is not allowed
229 if (EVP_PKEY_bits(pkey)
230 <= SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher))
242 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
243 * handshake state transitions when the client is reading messages from the
244 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
245 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
248 * 1: Success (transition allowed)
249 * 0: Error (transition not allowed)
251 int ossl_statem_client_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
253 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
256 switch(st->hand_state) {
257 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
258 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
259 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
263 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
264 if (mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
265 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
271 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
273 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) {
274 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
275 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
278 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
279 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
283 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
284 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
286 } else if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth
287 & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
288 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
289 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
293 ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s);
294 if (ske_expected < 0)
296 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
298 || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)
299 && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
300 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
301 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;
304 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
305 && cert_req_allowed(s)) {
306 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
308 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
309 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
317 if (s->tlsext_status_expected) {
318 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS) {
319 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS;
326 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
327 ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s);
328 if (ske_expected < 0)
330 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
332 || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)
333 && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
334 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
335 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;
342 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
343 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
344 if (cert_req_allowed(s)) {
345 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
352 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
353 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
354 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
359 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
360 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET && s->tlsext_ticket_expected) {
361 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
363 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
364 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
369 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
370 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
371 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
376 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
377 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
378 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
387 /* No valid transition found */
392 * client_write_transition() works out what handshake state to move to next
393 * when the client is writing messages to be sent to the server.
395 WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client_write_transition(SSL *s)
397 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
399 switch(st->hand_state) {
401 /* Renegotiation - fall through */
403 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
404 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
406 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
408 * No transition at the end of writing because we don't know what
411 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
413 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
414 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
415 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
417 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
418 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req)
419 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT;
421 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;
422 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
425 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;
426 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
428 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
430 * For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain of nothing is
431 * sent, but no verify packet is sent
434 * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication in ECDH
435 * cipher suites with ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates. We
436 * need to skip the certificate verify message when client's
437 * ECDH public key is sent inside the client certificate.
439 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) {
440 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY;
442 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
444 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY) {
445 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
447 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
449 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
450 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
451 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
453 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
454 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
455 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
457 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
458 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO;
460 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
462 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
464 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
465 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:
466 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
467 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
470 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
472 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
473 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
474 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
476 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
479 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
481 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
482 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
484 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
485 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
486 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
490 /* Shouldn't happen */
491 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
496 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
497 * the client to the server.
499 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
501 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
503 switch(st->hand_state) {
504 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
506 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
507 /* every DTLS ClientHello resets Finished MAC */
508 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
513 return tls_prepare_client_certificate(s, wst);
515 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
516 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
519 * We're into the last flight so we don't retransmit these
520 * messages unless we need to.
524 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
525 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)))
526 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
529 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
532 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst);
535 /* No pre work to be done */
539 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
543 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
544 * client to the server.
546 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
548 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
552 switch(st->hand_state) {
553 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
554 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->d1->cookie_len > 0 && statem_flush(s) != 1)
556 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
557 /* Disable buffering for SCTP */
558 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) || !BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) {
561 * turn on buffering for the next lot of output
563 if (s->bbio != s->wbio)
564 s->wbio = BIO_push(s->bbio, s->wbio);
565 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
568 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
569 /* Treat the next message as the first packet */
574 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
575 if (tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(s) == 0)
579 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
580 s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
581 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
582 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
584 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
585 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
587 s->session->compress_meth = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
589 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
592 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
593 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))
596 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
597 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
600 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
603 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
608 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
612 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
613 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
614 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A && SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit == 0) {
616 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
619 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
623 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
628 /* No post work to be done */
632 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
636 * Construct a message to be sent from the client to the server.
638 * Valid return values are:
642 int ossl_statem_client_construct_message(SSL *s)
644 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
646 switch(st->hand_state) {
647 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
648 return tls_construct_client_hello(s);
651 return tls_construct_client_certificate(s);
653 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
654 return tls_construct_client_key_exchange(s);
656 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
657 return tls_construct_client_verify(s);
659 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
661 return dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec(s);
663 return tls_construct_change_cipher_spec(s);
665 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
666 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:
667 return tls_construct_next_proto(s);
669 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
670 return tls_construct_finished(s,
672 ssl3_enc->client_finished_label,
674 ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len);
677 /* Shouldn't happen */
685 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
686 * reading. Excludes the message header.
688 unsigned long ossl_statem_client_max_message_size(SSL *s)
690 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
692 switch(st->hand_state) {
693 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
694 return SERVER_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH;
696 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
697 return HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH;
700 return s->max_cert_list;
702 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
703 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
705 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
706 return SERVER_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH;
708 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
709 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
711 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
712 return SERVER_HELLO_DONE_MAX_LENGTH;
714 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
715 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH;
717 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
718 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
720 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
721 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH;
724 /* Shouldn't happen */
732 * Process a message that the client has been received from the server.
734 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_client_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
736 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
738 switch(st->hand_state) {
739 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
740 return tls_process_server_hello(s, pkt);
742 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
743 return dtls_process_hello_verify(s, pkt);
746 return tls_process_server_certificate(s, pkt);
748 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
749 return tls_process_cert_status(s, pkt);
751 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
752 return tls_process_key_exchange(s, pkt);
754 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
755 return tls_process_certificate_request(s, pkt);
757 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
758 return tls_process_server_done(s, pkt);
760 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
761 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt);
763 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
764 return tls_process_new_session_ticket(s, pkt);
766 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
767 return tls_process_finished(s, pkt);
770 /* Shouldn't happen */
774 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
778 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
781 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
783 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
785 switch(st->hand_state) {
786 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
787 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
788 /* We only get here if we are using SCTP and we are renegotiating */
789 if (BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
790 s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
791 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
792 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
793 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
794 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 1);
797 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 0);
798 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
805 /* Shouldn't happen */
810 * Work out what version we should be using for the initial ClientHello if
811 * the version is currently set to (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION.
812 * Returns 1 on success
815 static int ssl_set_version(SSL *s)
817 unsigned long mask, options = s->options;
819 if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION) {
821 * SSL_OP_NO_X disables all protocols above X *if* there are
822 * some protocols below X enabled. This is required in order
823 * to maintain "version capability" vector contiguous. So
824 * that if application wants to disable TLS1.0 in favour of
825 * TLS1>=1, it would be insufficient to pass SSL_NO_TLSv1, the
826 * answer is SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1|SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3.
828 mask = SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1 | SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1
829 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL3)
833 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2_CLIENT)
834 if (options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2) {
835 if ((options & mask) != mask) {
836 s->version = TLS1_1_VERSION;
838 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_VERSION, SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE);
842 s->version = TLS1_2_VERSION;
845 if ((options & mask) == mask) {
846 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_VERSION, SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE);
849 s->version = TLS1_1_VERSION;
852 mask &= ~SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1;
853 if ((options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1) && (options & mask) != mask)
854 s->version = TLS1_VERSION;
855 mask &= ~SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1;
856 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL3)
857 if ((options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1) && (options & mask) != mask)
858 s->version = SSL3_VERSION;
861 if (s->version != TLS1_2_VERSION && tls1_suiteb(s)) {
862 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_VERSION,
863 SSL_R_ONLY_TLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE);
867 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && FIPS_mode()) {
868 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_VERSION, SSL_R_ONLY_TLS_ALLOWED_IN_FIPS_MODE);
872 } else if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
873 /* Determine which DTLS version to use */
874 /* If DTLS 1.2 disabled correct the version number */
875 if (options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2) {
876 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
877 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_VERSION,
878 SSL_R_ONLY_DTLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE);
882 * Disabling all versions is silly: return an error.
884 if (options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1) {
885 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_VERSION, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION);
889 * Update method so we don't use any DTLS 1.2 features.
891 s->method = DTLSv1_client_method();
892 s->version = DTLS1_VERSION;
895 * We only support one version: update method
897 if (options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1)
898 s->method = DTLSv1_2_client_method();
899 s->version = DTLS1_2_VERSION;
903 s->client_version = s->version;
908 int tls_construct_client_hello(SSL *s)
911 unsigned char *p, *d;
915 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
919 SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session;
921 buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
923 /* Work out what SSL/TLS/DTLS version to use */
924 if (ssl_set_version(s) == 0)
927 if ((sess == NULL) || (sess->ssl_version != s->version) ||
929 * In the case of EAP-FAST, we can have a pre-shared
930 * "ticket" without a session ID.
932 (!sess->session_id_length && !sess->tlsext_tick) ||
933 (sess->not_resumable)) {
934 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0))
937 /* else use the pre-loaded session */
939 p = s->s3->client_random;
942 * for DTLS if client_random is initialized, reuse it, we are
943 * required to use same upon reply to HelloVerify
945 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
948 for (idx = 0; idx < sizeof(s->s3->client_random); idx++) {
957 if (i && ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p,
958 sizeof(s->s3->client_random)) <= 0)
961 /* Do the message type and length last */
962 d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
965 * version indicates the negotiated version: for example from
966 * an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version
967 * field is the maximum version we permit and it is also
968 * used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can
969 * choke if we initially report a higher version then
970 * renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This
971 * didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it
972 * but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports
975 * Possible scenario with previous logic:
976 * 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2
977 * 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0
978 * 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2.
979 * 4. Handhaked proceeds using TLS 1.0.
980 * 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate.
981 * 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now
982 * know that is maximum server supports.
983 * 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret
984 * containing version 1.0.
986 * For interoperability it should be OK to always use the
987 * maximum version we support in client hello and then rely
988 * on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't
989 * being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with
990 * TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using
991 * client_version in client hello and not resetting it to
992 * the negotiated version.
994 *(p++) = s->client_version >> 8;
995 *(p++) = s->client_version & 0xff;
998 memcpy(p, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
999 p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1005 i = s->session->session_id_length;
1008 if (i > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id)) {
1009 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1012 memcpy(p, s->session->session_id, i);
1016 /* cookie stuff for DTLS */
1017 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1018 if (s->d1->cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)) {
1019 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1022 *(p++) = s->d1->cookie_len;
1023 memcpy(p, s->d1->cookie, s->d1->cookie_len);
1024 p += s->d1->cookie_len;
1027 /* Ciphers supported */
1028 i = ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s, SSL_get_ciphers(s), &(p[2]));
1030 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE);
1033 #ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
1035 * Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes as hack workaround
1036 * chop number of supported ciphers to keep it well below this if we
1039 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
1040 && i > OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH)
1041 i = OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH & ~1;
1047 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1051 if (!ssl_allow_compression(s) || !s->ctx->comp_methods)
1054 j = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1056 for (i = 0; i < j; i++) {
1057 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, i);
1061 *(p++) = 0; /* Add the NULL method */
1063 /* TLS extensions */
1064 if (ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
1065 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1069 ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, buf + SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
1071 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1072 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1077 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO, l)) {
1078 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1079 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1085 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1089 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN dtls_process_hello_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1092 unsigned int cookie_len;
1095 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, 2)
1096 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookiepkt)) {
1097 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1098 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1102 cookie_len = PACKET_remaining(&cookiepkt);
1103 if (cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)) {
1104 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1105 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1109 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&cookiepkt, s->d1->cookie, cookie_len)) {
1110 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1111 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1114 s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_len;
1116 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1118 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1119 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1120 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1123 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1125 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1126 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
1128 size_t session_id_len;
1129 unsigned char *cipherchars;
1130 int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1131 unsigned int compression;
1132 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1136 if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION) {
1137 unsigned int sversion;
1139 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sversion)) {
1140 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1141 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1145 #if TLS_MAX_VERSION != TLS1_2_VERSION
1146 #error Code needs updating for new TLS version
1148 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3
1149 if ((sversion == SSL3_VERSION) && !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3)) {
1151 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1152 SSL_R_ONLY_TLS_ALLOWED_IN_FIPS_MODE);
1153 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1156 s->method = SSLv3_client_method();
1159 if ((sversion == TLS1_VERSION) && !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1)) {
1160 s->method = TLSv1_client_method();
1161 } else if ((sversion == TLS1_1_VERSION) &&
1162 !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1)) {
1163 s->method = TLSv1_1_client_method();
1164 } else if ((sversion == TLS1_2_VERSION) &&
1165 !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2)) {
1166 s->method = TLSv1_2_client_method();
1168 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL);
1169 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1172 s->session->ssl_version = s->version = s->method->version;
1174 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_VERSION, 0, s->version, NULL)) {
1175 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW);
1176 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1179 } else if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
1180 /* Work out correct protocol version to use */
1181 unsigned int hversion;
1184 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &hversion)) {
1185 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1186 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1190 options = s->options;
1191 if (hversion == DTLS1_2_VERSION && !(options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2))
1192 s->method = DTLSv1_2_client_method();
1193 else if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1194 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1195 SSL_R_ONLY_DTLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE);
1196 s->version = hversion;
1197 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1199 } else if (hversion == DTLS1_VERSION && !(options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1))
1200 s->method = DTLSv1_client_method();
1202 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION);
1203 s->version = hversion;
1204 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1207 s->session->ssl_version = s->version = s->method->version;
1209 unsigned char *vers;
1211 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &vers, 2)) {
1212 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1213 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1216 if ((vers[0] != (s->version >> 8))
1217 || (vers[1] != (s->version & 0xff))) {
1218 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION);
1219 s->version = (s->version & 0xff00) | vers[1];
1220 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1225 /* load the server hello data */
1226 /* load the server random */
1227 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1228 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1229 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1235 /* Get the session-id. */
1236 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)) {
1237 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1238 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1241 session_id_len = PACKET_remaining(&session_id);
1242 if (session_id_len > sizeof s->session->session_id
1243 || session_id_len > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE) {
1244 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1245 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG);
1249 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &cipherchars, TLS_CIPHER_LEN)) {
1250 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1251 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1256 * Check if we can resume the session based on external pre-shared secret.
1257 * EAP-FAST (RFC 4851) supports two types of session resumption.
1258 * Resumption based on server-side state works with session IDs.
1259 * Resumption based on pre-shared Protected Access Credentials (PACs)
1260 * works by overriding the SessionTicket extension at the application
1261 * layer, and does not send a session ID. (We do not know whether EAP-FAST
1262 * servers would honour the session ID.) Therefore, the session ID alone
1263 * is not a reliable indicator of session resumption, so we first check if
1264 * we can resume, and later peek at the next handshake message to see if the
1265 * server wants to resume.
1267 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb &&
1268 s->session->tlsext_tick) {
1269 SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
1270 s->session->master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1271 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
1272 &s->session->master_key_length,
1274 s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)) {
1275 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher ?
1276 pref_cipher : ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars);
1278 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1279 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1284 if (session_id_len != 0 && session_id_len == s->session->session_id_length
1285 && memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id), s->session->session_id,
1286 session_id_len) == 0) {
1287 if (s->sid_ctx_length != s->session->sid_ctx_length
1288 || memcmp(s->session->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length)) {
1289 /* actually a client application bug */
1290 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1291 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1292 SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT);
1298 * If we were trying for session-id reuse but the server
1299 * didn't echo the ID, make a new SSL_SESSION.
1300 * In the case of EAP-FAST and PAC, we do not send a session ID,
1301 * so the PAC-based session secret is always preserved. It'll be
1302 * overwritten if the server refuses resumption.
1304 if (s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
1305 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) {
1310 s->session->session_id_length = session_id_len;
1311 /* session_id_len could be 0 */
1312 memcpy(s->session->session_id, PACKET_data(&session_id),
1316 c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars);
1318 /* unknown cipher */
1319 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1320 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1323 /* Set version disabled mask now we know version */
1324 if (!SSL_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s))
1325 s->s3->tmp.mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
1327 s->s3->tmp.mask_ssl = 0;
1329 * If it is a disabled cipher we didn't send it in client hello, so
1332 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_CHECK)) {
1333 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1334 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1338 sk = ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s);
1339 i = sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk, c);
1341 /* we did not say we would use this cipher */
1342 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1343 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1348 * Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher
1349 * and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that cipher_id is
1350 * set and use it for comparison.
1352 if (s->session->cipher)
1353 s->session->cipher_id = s->session->cipher->id;
1354 if (s->hit && (s->session->cipher_id != c->id)) {
1355 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1356 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1357 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED);
1360 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c;
1362 * Don't digest cached records if no sigalgs: we may need them for client
1365 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0))
1367 /* lets get the compression algorithm */
1369 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &compression)) {
1370 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1371 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1374 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1375 if (compression != 0) {
1376 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1377 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1378 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1382 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1383 * using compression.
1385 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1386 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1390 if (s->hit && compression != s->session->compress_meth) {
1391 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1392 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1393 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED);
1396 if (compression == 0)
1398 else if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
1399 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1400 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED);
1403 comp = ssl3_comp_find(s->ctx->comp_methods, compression);
1406 if (compression != 0 && comp == NULL) {
1407 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1408 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1409 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1412 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1416 /* TLS extensions */
1417 if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(s, pkt)) {
1418 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
1422 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1423 /* wrong packet length */
1424 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1425 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH);
1429 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1430 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
1431 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
1432 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
1435 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
1438 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
1439 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
1441 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
1442 sizeof(sctpauthkey),
1444 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0,
1448 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s),
1449 BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
1450 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
1454 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
1456 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1458 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1459 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1462 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1464 int al, i, ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR, exp_idx;
1465 unsigned long cert_list_len, cert_len;
1467 unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes;
1468 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
1469 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
1471 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
1472 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1476 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_list_len)
1477 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != cert_list_len) {
1478 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1479 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1482 while (PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
1483 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_len)
1484 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &certbytes, cert_len)) {
1485 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1486 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1487 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1491 certstart = certbytes;
1492 x = d2i_X509(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, cert_len);
1494 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
1495 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
1498 if (certbytes != (certstart + cert_len)) {
1499 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1500 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1501 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1504 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
1505 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1511 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
1512 if (s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE && i <= 0) {
1513 al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
1514 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1515 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
1518 ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */
1520 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, i);
1521 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1525 s->session->peer_chain = sk;
1527 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's certificate,
1528 * which we don't include in s3_srvr.c
1530 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
1533 * VRS 19990621: possible memory leak; sk=null ==> !sk_pop_free() @end
1536 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
1538 if (pkey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) {
1541 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1542 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS);
1546 i = ssl_cert_type(x, pkey);
1550 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1551 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
1555 exp_idx = ssl_cipher_get_cert_index(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher);
1556 if (exp_idx >= 0 && i != exp_idx) {
1558 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1559 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1560 SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
1563 s->session->peer_type = i;
1565 X509_free(s->session->peer);
1567 s->session->peer = x;
1568 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
1571 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
1575 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1577 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1579 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
1581 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
1585 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1587 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1588 unsigned char *q, md_buf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE * 2];
1591 int al, j, verify_ret;
1593 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
1594 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1595 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1598 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1601 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1602 EC_KEY *ecdh = NULL;
1603 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1604 EC_POINT *srvr_ecpoint = NULL;
1607 PACKET save_param_start, signature;
1609 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
1611 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1613 save_param_start = *pkt;
1615 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1616 RSA_free(s->s3->peer_rsa_tmp);
1617 s->s3->peer_rsa_tmp = NULL;
1619 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1620 DH_free(s->s3->peer_dh_tmp);
1621 s->s3->peer_dh_tmp = NULL;
1623 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1624 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->peer_ecdh_tmp);
1625 s->s3->peer_ecdh_tmp = NULL;
1628 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1630 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1632 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1633 /* PSK ciphersuites are preceded by an identity hint */
1634 if (alg_k & SSL_PSK) {
1635 PACKET psk_identity_hint;
1636 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity_hint)) {
1637 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1642 * Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in
1643 * ssl3_send_client_key_exchange. Assume that the maximum length of
1644 * a PSK identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK
1647 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
1648 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1649 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1653 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) == 0) {
1654 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
1655 s->session->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
1656 } else if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity_hint,
1657 &s->session->psk_identity_hint)) {
1658 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1663 /* Nothing else to do for plain PSK or RSAPSK */
1664 if (alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
1666 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1667 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1668 if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
1669 PACKET prime, generator, salt, server_pub;
1670 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime)
1671 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator)
1672 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &salt)
1673 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &server_pub)) {
1674 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1679 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime),
1680 PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL)) == NULL
1682 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator),
1683 PACKET_remaining(&generator), NULL)) == NULL
1685 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&salt),
1686 PACKET_remaining(&salt), NULL)) == NULL
1688 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&server_pub),
1689 PACKET_remaining(&server_pub), NULL)) == NULL) {
1690 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1694 if (!srp_verify_server_param(s, &al)) {
1695 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
1699 /* We must check if there is a certificate */
1700 if (alg_a & (SSL_aRSA|SSL_aDSS))
1701 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
1703 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
1704 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1705 if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) {
1707 /* Temporary RSA keys only allowed in export ciphersuites */
1708 if (!SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) {
1709 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1710 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
1714 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &mod)
1715 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &exp)) {
1716 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1720 if ((rsa = RSA_new()) == NULL) {
1721 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1725 if ((rsa->n = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&mod), PACKET_remaining(&mod),
1727 || (rsa->e = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&exp), PACKET_remaining(&exp),
1729 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1733 /* this should be because we are using an export cipher */
1734 if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
1735 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
1737 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1741 s->s3->peer_rsa_tmp = rsa;
1744 #else /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
1747 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1748 else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
1749 PACKET prime, generator, pub_key;
1751 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime)
1752 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator)
1753 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &pub_key)) {
1754 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1758 if ((dh = DH_new()) == NULL) {
1759 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1763 if ((dh->p = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime),
1764 PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL)) == NULL
1765 || (dh->g = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator),
1766 PACKET_remaining(&generator), NULL)) == NULL
1768 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&pub_key),
1769 PACKET_remaining(&pub_key), NULL)) == NULL) {
1770 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1774 if (BN_is_zero(dh->p) || BN_is_zero(dh->g) || BN_is_zero(dh->pub_key)) {
1775 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE);
1779 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH, DH_security_bits(dh), 0, dh)) {
1780 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1781 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
1784 if (alg_a & (SSL_aRSA|SSL_aDSS))
1785 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
1786 /* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */
1788 s->s3->peer_dh_tmp = dh;
1791 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_DH */
1793 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1794 else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
1796 const EC_GROUP *group;
1798 unsigned char *ecparams;
1800 if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) {
1801 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1806 * Extract elliptic curve parameters and the server's ephemeral ECDH
1807 * public key. For now we only support named (not generic) curves and
1808 * ECParameters in this case is just three bytes.
1810 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &ecparams, 3)) {
1811 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1815 * Check curve is one of our preferences, if not server has sent an
1816 * invalid curve. ECParameters is 3 bytes.
1818 if (!tls1_check_curve(s, ecparams, 3)) {
1819 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
1823 if ((curve_nid = tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(*(ecparams + 2))) == 0) {
1824 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1825 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1826 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
1830 ngroup = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(curve_nid);
1831 if (ngroup == NULL) {
1832 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
1835 if (EC_KEY_set_group(ecdh, ngroup) == 0) {
1836 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
1839 EC_GROUP_free(ngroup);
1841 group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh);
1843 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
1844 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163)) {
1845 al = SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION;
1846 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1847 SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
1851 /* Next, get the encoded ECPoint */
1852 if (((srvr_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) ||
1853 ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)) {
1854 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1858 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &encoded_pt)) {
1859 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1863 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group, srvr_ecpoint, PACKET_data(&encoded_pt),
1864 PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt), bn_ctx) == 0) {
1865 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
1870 * The ECC/TLS specification does not mention the use of DSA to sign
1871 * ECParameters in the server key exchange message. We do support RSA
1875 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1876 else if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
1877 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
1879 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1880 else if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)
1881 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
1883 /* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
1884 EC_KEY_set_public_key(ecdh, srvr_ecpoint);
1885 s->s3->peer_ecdh_tmp = ecdh;
1887 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
1889 EC_POINT_free(srvr_ecpoint);
1890 srvr_ecpoint = NULL;
1892 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1893 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
1896 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1898 /* if it was signed, check the signature */
1902 * |pkt| now points to the beginning of the signature, so the difference
1903 * equals the length of the parameters.
1905 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(&save_param_start, ¶ms,
1906 PACKET_remaining(&save_param_start) -
1907 PACKET_remaining(pkt))) {
1908 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1909 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1913 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1914 unsigned char *sigalgs;
1916 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &sigalgs, 2)) {
1917 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1920 rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, s, sigalgs, pkey);
1927 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
1933 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &signature)
1934 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1935 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1938 j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
1940 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1945 * Check signature length
1947 if (PACKET_remaining(&signature) > (size_t)j) {
1948 /* wrong packet length */
1949 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH);
1952 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1953 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1959 for (num = 2; num > 0; num--) {
1960 EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
1961 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, (num == 2)
1962 ? s->ctx->md5 : s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
1963 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
1965 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
1967 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, PACKET_data(¶ms),
1968 PACKET_remaining(¶ms));
1969 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, q, &size);
1974 RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j, PACKET_data(&signature),
1975 PACKET_remaining(&signature), pkey->pkey.rsa);
1976 if (verify_ret < 0) {
1977 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
1978 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
1981 if (verify_ret == 0) {
1983 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
1984 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
1990 EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL);
1991 EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
1993 EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
1995 EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx, PACKET_data(¶ms),
1996 PACKET_remaining(¶ms));
1997 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&md_ctx, PACKET_data(&signature),
1998 PACKET_remaining(&signature), pkey) <= 0) {
2000 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2001 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
2006 /* aNULL, aSRP or PSK do not need public keys */
2007 if (!(alg_a & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP)) && !(alg_k & SSL_PSK)) {
2008 /* Might be wrong key type, check it */
2009 if (ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s))
2010 /* Otherwise this shouldn't happen */
2011 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2014 /* still data left over */
2015 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2016 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE);
2020 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
2021 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
2022 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2024 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2026 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
2027 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2030 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2033 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2034 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2035 EC_POINT_free(srvr_ecpoint);
2038 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
2039 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2040 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2043 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_certificate_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2045 int ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2046 unsigned int list_len, ctype_num, i, name_len;
2047 X509_NAME *xn = NULL;
2048 unsigned char *data;
2049 unsigned char *namestart, *namebytes;
2050 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = NULL;
2052 if ((ca_sk = sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp)) == NULL) {
2053 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2057 /* get the certificate types */
2058 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &ctype_num)
2059 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, ctype_num)) {
2060 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2061 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2064 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->ctypes);
2065 s->cert->ctypes = NULL;
2066 if (ctype_num > SSL3_CT_NUMBER) {
2067 /* If we exceed static buffer copy all to cert structure */
2068 s->cert->ctypes = OPENSSL_malloc(ctype_num);
2069 if (s->cert->ctypes == NULL) {
2070 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2073 memcpy(s->cert->ctypes, data, ctype_num);
2074 s->cert->ctype_num = (size_t)ctype_num;
2075 ctype_num = SSL3_CT_NUMBER;
2077 for (i = 0; i < ctype_num; i++)
2078 s->s3->tmp.ctype[i] = data[i];
2080 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2081 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &list_len)
2082 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, list_len)) {
2083 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2084 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2085 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2089 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
2090 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
2091 s->s3->tmp.md[i] = NULL;
2092 s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
2094 if ((list_len & 1) || !tls1_save_sigalgs(s, data, list_len)) {
2095 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2096 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2097 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR);
2100 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2101 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2102 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2107 /* get the CA RDNs */
2108 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &list_len)
2109 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != list_len) {
2110 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2111 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2115 while (PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
2116 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &name_len)
2117 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &namebytes, name_len)) {
2118 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2119 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2120 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2124 namestart = namebytes;
2126 if ((xn = d2i_X509_NAME(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&namebytes,
2127 name_len)) == NULL) {
2128 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2129 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
2133 if (namebytes != (namestart + name_len)) {
2134 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2135 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2136 SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2139 if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk, xn)) {
2140 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2145 /* we should setup a certificate to return.... */
2146 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 1;
2147 s->s3->tmp.ctype_num = ctype_num;
2148 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->s3->tmp.ca_names, X509_NAME_free);
2149 s->s3->tmp.ca_names = ca_sk;
2152 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2155 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2157 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk, X509_NAME_free);
2161 static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b)
2163 return (X509_NAME_cmp(*a, *b));
2166 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2169 unsigned int ticklen;
2170 unsigned long ticket_lifetime_hint;
2172 if (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &ticket_lifetime_hint)
2173 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ticklen)
2174 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != ticklen) {
2175 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2176 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2180 /* Server is allowed to change its mind and send an empty ticket. */
2182 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2184 if (s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
2185 int i = s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode;
2186 SSL_SESSION *new_sess;
2188 * We reused an existing session, so we need to replace it with a new
2191 if (i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT) {
2193 * Remove the old session from the cache
2195 if (i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE) {
2196 if (s->session_ctx->remove_session_cb != NULL)
2197 s->session_ctx->remove_session_cb(s->session_ctx,
2200 /* We carry on if this fails */
2201 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
2205 if ((new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0)) == 0) {
2206 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2207 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2211 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
2212 s->session = new_sess;
2215 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_tick);
2216 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = 0;
2218 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
2219 if (s->session->tlsext_tick == NULL) {
2220 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2223 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen)) {
2224 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2225 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2229 s->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint = ticket_lifetime_hint;
2230 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
2232 * There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket session. One is to set
2233 * an appropriate session ID and then the server must return a match in
2234 * ServerHello. This allows the normal client session ID matching to work
2235 * and we know much earlier that the ticket has been accepted. The
2236 * other way is to set zero length session ID when the ticket is
2237 * presented and rely on the handshake to determine session resumption.
2238 * We choose the former approach because this fits in with assumptions
2239 * elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set to the SHA256 (or SHA1 is
2240 * SHA256 is disabled) hash of the ticket.
2242 EVP_Digest(s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen,
2243 s->session->session_id, &s->session->session_id_length,
2244 EVP_sha256(), NULL);
2245 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2247 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2249 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2250 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2253 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_status(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2256 unsigned long resplen;
2259 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &type)
2260 || type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
2261 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2262 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE);
2265 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &resplen)
2266 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != resplen) {
2267 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2268 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2271 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
2272 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = OPENSSL_malloc(resplen);
2273 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp == NULL) {
2274 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2275 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2278 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, resplen)) {
2279 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2280 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2283 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = resplen;
2284 if (s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
2286 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2288 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
2289 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE);
2293 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2294 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2298 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2300 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2301 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2302 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2305 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_done(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2307 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
2308 /* should contain no data */
2309 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2310 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2311 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2312 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2315 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2316 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
2317 if (SRP_Calc_A_param(s) <= 0) {
2318 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE, SSL_R_SRP_A_CALC);
2319 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2320 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2321 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2327 * at this point we check that we have the required stuff from
2330 if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
2331 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
2332 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2333 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2336 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
2337 /* Only applies to renegotiation */
2338 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))
2339 && s->renegotiate != 0)
2340 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
2343 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
2346 int tls_construct_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
2350 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2351 size_t pskhdrlen = 0;
2353 unsigned long alg_k;
2354 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2356 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2358 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2359 EC_KEY *clnt_ecdh = NULL;
2360 const EC_POINT *srvr_ecpoint = NULL;
2361 EVP_PKEY *srvr_pub_pkey = NULL;
2362 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
2363 int encoded_pt_len = 0;
2364 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
2366 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
2368 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2370 p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
2373 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2374 if (alg_k & SSL_PSK) {
2377 * The callback needs PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 bytes to return a
2378 * \0-terminated identity. The last byte is for us for simulating
2381 char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1];
2383 unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
2386 if (s->psk_client_callback == NULL) {
2387 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2388 SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB);
2392 memset(identity, 0, sizeof(identity));
2394 psklen = s->psk_client_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity_hint,
2395 identity, sizeof(identity) - 1,
2398 if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
2399 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2400 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2402 } else if (psklen == 0) {
2403 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2404 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2408 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.psk);
2409 s->s3->tmp.psk = BUF_memdup(psk, psklen);
2410 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
2412 if (s->s3->tmp.psk == NULL) {
2413 OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, sizeof(identity));
2417 s->s3->tmp.psklen = psklen;
2419 identitylen = strlen(identity);
2420 if (identitylen > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2421 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2422 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2425 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
2426 s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup(identity);
2427 if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL) {
2428 OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, sizeof(identity));
2432 s2n(identitylen, p);
2433 memcpy(p, identity, identitylen);
2434 pskhdrlen = 2 + identitylen;
2438 OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, sizeof(identity));
2440 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
2444 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
2449 /* Fool emacs indentation */
2452 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2453 else if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
2455 pmslen = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
2456 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
2460 if (s->session->peer == NULL) {
2462 * We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA.
2464 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2465 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2469 if (s->s3->peer_rsa_tmp != NULL)
2470 rsa = s->s3->peer_rsa_tmp;
2472 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2473 if ((pkey == NULL) || (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA)
2474 || (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL)) {
2475 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2476 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2477 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
2480 rsa = pkey->pkey.rsa;
2481 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
2484 pms[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
2485 pms[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
2486 if (RAND_bytes(pms + 2, pmslen - 2) <= 0)
2490 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2491 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION)
2493 n = RSA_public_encrypt(pmslen, pms, p, rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
2495 if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_1)
2497 if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_2)
2501 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2502 SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT);
2506 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2507 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) {
2513 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2514 else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
2515 DH *dh_srvr, *dh_clnt;
2516 if (s->s3->peer_dh_tmp != NULL)
2517 dh_srvr = s->s3->peer_dh_tmp;
2519 /* we get them from the cert */
2520 EVP_PKEY *spkey = NULL;
2522 spkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2524 dh_srvr = EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(spkey);
2525 EVP_PKEY_free(spkey);
2527 if (dh_srvr == NULL) {
2528 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2529 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2533 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY) {
2534 /* Use client certificate key */
2535 EVP_PKEY *clkey = s->cert->key->privatekey;
2538 dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(clkey);
2539 if (dh_clnt == NULL) {
2540 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2541 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2545 /* generate a new random key */
2546 if ((dh_clnt = DHparams_dup(dh_srvr)) == NULL) {
2547 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
2550 if (!DH_generate_key(dh_clnt)) {
2551 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
2557 pmslen = DH_size(dh_clnt);
2558 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
2563 * use the 'p' output buffer for the DH key, but make sure to
2564 * clear it out afterwards
2567 n = DH_compute_key(pms, dh_srvr->pub_key, dh_clnt);
2568 if (s->s3->peer_dh_tmp == NULL)
2572 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
2578 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY)
2581 /* send off the data */
2582 n = BN_num_bytes(dh_clnt->pub_key);
2584 BN_bn2bin(dh_clnt->pub_key, p);
2592 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2593 else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2594 const EC_GROUP *srvr_group = NULL;
2596 int ecdh_clnt_cert = 0;
2599 * Did we send out the client's ECDH share for use in premaster
2600 * computation as part of client certificate? If so, set
2601 * ecdh_clnt_cert to 1.
2603 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) && (s->cert != NULL)) {
2605 * XXX: For now, we do not support client
2606 * authentication using ECDH certificates.
2607 * To add such support, one needs to add
2608 * code that checks for appropriate
2609 * conditions and sets ecdh_clnt_cert to 1.
2610 * For example, the cert have an ECC
2611 * key on the same curve as the server's
2612 * and the key should be authorized for
2615 * One also needs to add code in ssl3_connect
2616 * to skip sending the certificate verify
2619 * if ((s->cert->key->privatekey != NULL) &&
2620 * (s->cert->key->privatekey->type ==
2621 * EVP_PKEY_EC) && ...)
2622 * ecdh_clnt_cert = 1;
2626 if (s->s3->peer_ecdh_tmp != NULL) {
2627 tkey = s->s3->peer_ecdh_tmp;
2629 /* Get the Server Public Key from Cert */
2630 srvr_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2631 if ((srvr_pub_pkey == NULL)
2632 || (srvr_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)
2633 || (srvr_pub_pkey->pkey.ec == NULL)) {
2634 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2635 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2639 tkey = srvr_pub_pkey->pkey.ec;
2642 srvr_group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
2643 srvr_ecpoint = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(tkey);
2645 if ((srvr_group == NULL) || (srvr_ecpoint == NULL)) {
2646 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2647 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2651 if ((clnt_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) {
2652 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2653 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2657 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(clnt_ecdh, srvr_group)) {
2658 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2661 if (ecdh_clnt_cert) {
2663 * Reuse key info from our certificate We only need our
2664 * private key to perform the ECDH computation.
2666 const BIGNUM *priv_key;
2667 tkey = s->cert->key->privatekey->pkey.ec;
2668 priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
2669 if (priv_key == NULL) {
2670 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2671 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2674 if (!EC_KEY_set_private_key(clnt_ecdh, priv_key)) {
2675 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2679 /* Generate a new ECDH key pair */
2680 if (!(EC_KEY_generate_key(clnt_ecdh))) {
2681 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2688 * use the 'p' output buffer for the ECDH key, but make sure to
2689 * clear it out afterwards
2692 field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(srvr_group);
2693 if (field_size <= 0) {
2694 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
2697 pmslen = (field_size + 7) / 8;
2698 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
2701 n = ECDH_compute_key(pms, pmslen, srvr_ecpoint, clnt_ecdh, NULL);
2702 if (n <= 0 || pmslen != (size_t)n) {
2703 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
2707 if (ecdh_clnt_cert) {
2708 /* Send empty client key exch message */
2712 * First check the size of encoding and allocate memory
2716 EC_POINT_point2oct(srvr_group,
2717 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_ecdh),
2718 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
2721 encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
2722 OPENSSL_malloc(encoded_pt_len * sizeof(unsigned char));
2723 bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
2724 if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL)) {
2725 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2726 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2730 /* Encode the public key */
2731 n = EC_POINT_point2oct(srvr_group,
2732 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_ecdh),
2733 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
2734 encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len, bn_ctx);
2736 *p = n; /* length of encoded point */
2737 /* Encoded point will be copied here */
2739 /* copy the point */
2740 memcpy(p, encodedPoint, n);
2741 /* increment n to account for length field */
2745 /* Free allocated memory */
2746 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2747 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2748 EC_KEY_free(clnt_ecdh);
2749 EVP_PKEY_free(srvr_pub_pkey);
2751 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2752 else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
2753 /* GOST key exchange message creation */
2754 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
2757 unsigned int md_len;
2758 unsigned char shared_ukm[32], tmp[256];
2759 EVP_MD_CTX *ukm_hash;
2763 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
2768 * Get server sertificate PKEY and create ctx from it
2770 peer_cert = s->session->peer;
2772 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2773 SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER);
2777 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pub_key =
2778 X509_get_pubkey(peer_cert), NULL);
2779 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
2780 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2781 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2785 * If we have send a certificate, and certificate key
2787 * * parameters match those of server certificate, use
2788 * certificate key for key exchange
2791 /* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */
2793 EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx);
2794 /* Generate session key */
2795 if (RAND_bytes(pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
2796 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2797 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2798 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2802 * If we have client certificate, use its secret as peer key
2804 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req && s->cert->key->privatekey) {
2805 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer
2806 (pkey_ctx, s->cert->key->privatekey) <= 0) {
2808 * If there was an error - just ignore it. Ephemeral key
2815 * Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific context
2818 ukm_hash = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
2819 EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash,
2820 EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_94));
2821 EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->client_random,
2823 EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->server_random,
2825 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash, shared_ukm, &md_len);
2826 EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(ukm_hash);
2827 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
2828 (pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, 8,
2830 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2834 /* Make GOST keytransport blob message */
2836 * Encapsulate it into sequence
2838 *(p++) = V_ASN1_SEQUENCE | V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED;
2840 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx, tmp, &msglen, pms, pmslen) < 0) {
2841 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2845 if (msglen >= 0x80) {
2847 *(p++) = msglen & 0xff;
2850 *(p++) = msglen & 0xff;
2853 memcpy(p, tmp, msglen);
2854 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2855 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
2856 (pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0) {
2857 /* Set flag "skip certificate verify" */
2858 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY;
2860 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2861 EVP_PKEY_free(pub_key);
2864 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2865 else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
2866 if (s->srp_ctx.A != NULL) {
2867 /* send off the data */
2868 n = BN_num_bytes(s->srp_ctx.A);
2870 BN_bn2bin(s->srp_ctx.A, p);
2873 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2874 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2877 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
2878 s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
2879 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
2880 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2881 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2887 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
2888 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2892 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2896 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, n)) {
2897 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
2898 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2902 s->s3->tmp.pms = pms;
2903 s->s3->tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
2907 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2908 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2910 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
2911 s->s3->tmp.pms = NULL;
2912 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2913 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2914 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2915 EC_KEY_free(clnt_ecdh);
2916 EVP_PKEY_free(srvr_pub_pkey);
2918 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2919 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.psk, s->s3->tmp.psklen);
2920 s->s3->tmp.psk = NULL;
2922 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2926 int tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(SSL *s)
2928 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
2931 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2933 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
2934 if (!srp_generate_client_master_secret(s)) {
2935 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK,
2936 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2942 pms = s->s3->tmp.pms;
2943 pmslen = s->s3->tmp.pmslen;
2945 if (pms == NULL && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
2946 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2947 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2950 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, pms, pmslen, 1)) {
2951 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2952 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2956 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
2957 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
2958 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
2959 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
2962 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
2965 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
2966 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
2968 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
2969 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
2970 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0)
2973 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
2974 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
2980 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
2981 s->s3->tmp.pms = NULL;
2985 int tls_construct_client_verify(SSL *s)
2988 unsigned char data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
2990 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2996 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx);
2998 p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
2999 pkey = s->cert->key->privatekey;
3000 /* Create context from key and test if sha1 is allowed as digest */
3001 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
3003 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3006 EVP_PKEY_sign_init(pctx);
3007 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md(pctx, EVP_sha1()) > 0) {
3008 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3009 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
3012 [MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]));
3017 * For TLS v1.2 send signature algorithm and signature using agreed
3018 * digest and cached handshake records.
3020 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
3023 const EVP_MD *md = s->s3->tmp.md[s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys];
3024 hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
3025 if (hdatalen <= 0 || !tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md)) {
3026 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3031 fprintf(stderr, "Using TLS 1.2 with client alg %s\n",
3034 if (!EVP_SignInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL)
3035 || !EVP_SignUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen)
3036 || !EVP_SignFinal(&mctx, p + 2, &u, pkey)) {
3037 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
3042 /* Digest cached records and discard handshake buffer */
3043 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0))
3046 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3047 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
3048 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s, NID_md5, &(data[0]));
3049 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, data,
3050 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,
3051 &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0) {
3052 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_RSA_LIB);
3059 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3060 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA) {
3061 if (!DSA_sign(pkey->save_type,
3062 &(data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3063 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, &(p[2]),
3064 (unsigned int *)&j, pkey->pkey.dsa)) {
3065 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_DSA_LIB);
3072 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3073 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
3074 if (!ECDSA_sign(pkey->save_type,
3075 &(data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3076 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, &(p[2]),
3077 (unsigned int *)&j, pkey->pkey.ec)) {
3078 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_ECDSA_LIB);
3085 if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) {
3086 unsigned char signbuf[64];
3088 size_t sigsize = 64;
3089 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
3090 NID_id_GostR3411_94, data);
3091 if (EVP_PKEY_sign(pctx, signbuf, &sigsize, data, 32) <= 0) {
3092 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3095 for (i = 63, j = 0; i >= 0; j++, i--) {
3096 p[2 + j] = signbuf[i];
3101 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3104 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY, n)) {
3105 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3109 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
3110 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
3113 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
3114 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
3119 * Check a certificate can be used for client authentication. Currently check
3120 * cert exists, if we have a suitable digest for TLS 1.2 if static DH client
3121 * certificates can be used and optionally checks suitability for Suite B.
3123 static int ssl3_check_client_certificate(SSL *s)
3125 unsigned long alg_k;
3126 if (!s->cert || !s->cert->key->x509 || !s->cert->key->privatekey)
3128 /* If no suitable signature algorithm can't use certificate */
3129 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !s->s3->tmp.md[s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys])
3132 * If strict mode check suitability of chain before using it. This also
3133 * adjusts suite B digest if necessary.
3135 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT &&
3136 !tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, -2))
3138 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3139 /* See if we can use client certificate for fixed DH */
3140 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd)) {
3141 int i = s->session->peer_type;
3142 EVP_PKEY *clkey = NULL, *spkey = NULL;
3143 clkey = s->cert->key->privatekey;
3144 /* If client key not DH assume it can be used */
3145 if (EVP_PKEY_id(clkey) != EVP_PKEY_DH)
3148 spkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
3150 /* Compare server and client parameters */
3151 i = EVP_PKEY_cmp_parameters(clkey, spkey);
3152 EVP_PKEY_free(spkey);
3156 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY;
3161 WORK_STATE tls_prepare_client_certificate(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
3164 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
3167 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
3168 /* Let cert callback update client certificates if required */
3169 if (s->cert->cert_cb) {
3170 i = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
3172 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3176 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3177 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3180 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
3182 if (ssl3_check_client_certificate(s))
3183 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3185 /* Fall through to WORK_MORE_B */
3189 /* We need to get a client cert */
3190 if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) {
3192 * If we get an error, we need to ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3193 * return(-1); We then get retied later
3195 i = ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s, &x509, &pkey);
3197 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3200 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
3201 if ((i == 1) && (pkey != NULL) && (x509 != NULL)) {
3202 if (!SSL_use_certificate(s, x509) || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(s, pkey))
3204 } else if (i == 1) {
3206 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3207 SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK);
3211 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3212 if (i && !ssl3_check_client_certificate(s))
3215 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
3216 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 0;
3217 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE);
3218 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3220 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 2;
3221 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
3222 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3223 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3229 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3232 /* Shouldn't ever get here */
3236 int tls_construct_client_certificate(SSL *s)
3238 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,
3239 (s->s3->tmp.cert_req ==
3240 2) ? NULL : s->cert->key)) {
3241 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3242 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3243 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3250 #define has_bits(i,m) (((i)&(m)) == (m))
3252 int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s)
3256 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
3258 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3261 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3264 int al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3266 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3267 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3269 /* we don't have a certificate */
3270 if ((alg_a & SSL_aNULL) || (alg_k & SSL_kPSK))
3272 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3273 rsa = s->s3->peer_rsa_tmp;
3275 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3276 dh = s->s3->peer_dh_tmp;
3279 /* This is the passed certificate */
3281 idx = s->session->peer_type;
3282 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3283 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_ECC) {
3284 if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(s->session->peer, s) == 0) {
3286 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT);
3291 } else if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA) {
3292 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3293 SSL_R_MISSING_ECDSA_SIGNING_CERT);
3295 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) {
3296 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_MISSING_ECDH_CERT);
3300 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
3301 pkey_bits = EVP_PKEY_bits(pkey);
3302 i = X509_certificate_type(s->session->peer, pkey);
3303 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3305 /* Check that we have a certificate if we require one */
3306 if ((alg_a & SSL_aRSA) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
3307 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3308 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_SIGNING_CERT);
3311 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3312 else if ((alg_a & SSL_aDSS) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_DSA | EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
3313 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3314 SSL_R_MISSING_DSA_SIGNING_CERT);
3318 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3319 if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
3320 if (!SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
3321 !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_ENC)) {
3322 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3323 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT);
3325 } else if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) {
3326 if (pkey_bits <= SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) {
3327 if (!has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_ENC)) {
3328 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3329 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT);
3333 /* server key exchange is not allowed. */
3334 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3335 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3342 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3343 if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHE) && (dh == NULL)) {
3344 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3345 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3347 } else if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHr) && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) &&
3348 !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_DH | EVP_PKS_RSA)) {
3349 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3350 SSL_R_MISSING_DH_RSA_CERT);
3353 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3354 else if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHd) && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) &&
3355 !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_DH | EVP_PKS_DSA)) {
3356 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3357 SSL_R_MISSING_DH_DSA_CERT);
3363 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
3364 pkey_bits > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) {
3365 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3366 if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) {
3368 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3369 SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_RSA_KEY);
3371 } else if (RSA_bits(rsa) >
3372 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) {
3373 /* We have a temporary RSA key but it's too large. */
3374 al = SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION;
3375 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3376 SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_RSA_KEY);
3381 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3382 if (alg_k & SSL_kDHE) {
3384 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) {
3385 /* We have a temporary DH key but it's too large. */
3386 al = SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION;
3387 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3388 SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_DH_KEY);
3391 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd)) {
3392 /* The cert should have had an export DH key. */
3393 al = SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION;
3394 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3395 SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_DH_KEY);
3400 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3401 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
3407 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3411 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3412 int tls_construct_next_proto(SSL *s)
3414 unsigned int len, padding_len;
3417 len = s->next_proto_negotiated_len;
3418 padding_len = 32 - ((len + 2) % 32);
3419 d = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3421 memcpy(d + 5, s->next_proto_negotiated, len);
3422 d[5 + len] = padding_len;
3423 memset(d + 6 + len, 0, padding_len);
3424 *(d++) = SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO;
3425 l2n3(2 + len + padding_len, d);
3426 s->init_num = 4 + 2 + len + padding_len;
3433 int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL *s, X509 **px509, EVP_PKEY **ppkey)
3436 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
3437 if (s->ctx->client_cert_engine) {
3438 i = ENGINE_load_ssl_client_cert(s->ctx->client_cert_engine, s,
3439 SSL_get_client_CA_list(s),
3440 px509, ppkey, NULL, NULL, NULL);
3445 if (s->ctx->client_cert_cb)
3446 i = s->ctx->client_cert_cb(s, px509, ppkey);
3450 int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk,
3456 int empty_reneg_info_scsv = !s->renegotiate;
3457 /* Set disabled masks for this session */
3458 ssl_set_client_disabled(s);
3464 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++) {
3465 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);
3466 /* Skip disabled ciphers */
3467 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED))
3469 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3470 if (c->id == SSL3_CK_SCSV) {
3471 if (!empty_reneg_info_scsv)
3474 empty_reneg_info_scsv = 0;
3477 j = s->method->put_cipher_by_char(c, p);
3481 * If p == q, no ciphers; caller indicates an error. Otherwise, add
3485 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv) {
3486 static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
3487 0, NULL, SSL3_CK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3489 j = s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, p);
3491 #ifdef OPENSSL_RI_DEBUG
3493 "TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV sent by client\n");
3496 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) {
3497 static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
3498 0, NULL, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3500 j = s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, p);