2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
4 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
6 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
7 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
8 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
9 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
14 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
15 #include "statem_locl.h"
16 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
17 #include <openssl/rand.h>
18 #include <openssl/objects.h>
19 #include <openssl/evp.h>
20 #include <openssl/md5.h>
21 #include <openssl/dh.h>
22 #include <openssl/bn.h>
23 #include <openssl/engine.h>
25 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_hello_retry_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt);
26 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt);
28 static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s);
29 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s);
30 static int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk,
34 * Is a CertificateRequest message allowed at the moment or not?
40 static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s)
42 /* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */
43 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION
44 && (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL))
45 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK)))
52 * Should we expect the ServerKeyExchange message or not?
58 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s)
60 long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
63 * Can't skip server key exchange if this is an ephemeral
64 * ciphersuite or for SRP
66 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK
75 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
76 * handshake state transitions when a TLS1.3 client is reading messages from the
77 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
78 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
80 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
81 * (transition not allowed)
83 static int ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
85 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
88 * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO, because we haven't
89 * yet negotiated TLSv1.3 at that point so that is handled by
90 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition()
93 switch (st->hand_state) {
97 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
99 * This must a ClientHello following a HelloRetryRequest, so the only
100 * thing we can get now is a ServerHello.
102 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
103 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
108 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
109 if (mt == SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS) {
110 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
115 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
117 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
118 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
122 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
123 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
126 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
127 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
133 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
134 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
135 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
141 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
142 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY;
147 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
148 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
149 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
155 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
156 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
159 if (mt == SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE) {
160 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE;
166 /* No valid transition found */
171 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
172 * handshake state transitions when the client is reading messages from the
173 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
174 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
176 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
177 * (transition not allowed)
179 int ossl_statem_client_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
181 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
185 * Note that after writing the first ClientHello we don't know what version
186 * we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later.
188 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
189 if (!ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(s, mt))
194 switch (st->hand_state) {
198 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
199 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
200 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
204 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
205 if (mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
206 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
210 if (mt == SSL3_MT_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST) {
211 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST;
217 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
219 * We've not actually selected TLSv1.3 yet, but we have sent early
220 * data. The only thing allowed now is a ServerHello or a
223 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
224 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
227 if (mt == SSL3_MT_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST) {
228 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST;
233 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
235 if (s->ext.ticket_expected) {
236 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
237 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
240 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
241 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
245 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
246 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
248 } else if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
249 && s->ext.session_secret_cb != NULL
250 && s->session->ext.tick != NULL
251 && mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
253 * Normally, we can tell if the server is resuming the session
254 * from the session ID. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851), however, relies on
255 * the next server message after the ServerHello to determine if
256 * the server is resuming.
259 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
261 } else if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth
262 & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
263 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
264 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
268 ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s);
269 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
271 || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)
272 && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
273 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
274 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;
277 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
278 && cert_req_allowed(s)) {
279 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
281 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
282 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
291 * The CertificateStatus message is optional even if
292 * |ext.status_expected| is set
294 if (s->ext.status_expected && mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS) {
295 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS;
300 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
301 ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s);
302 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
303 if (ske_expected || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)
304 && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
305 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
306 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;
313 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
314 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
315 if (cert_req_allowed(s)) {
316 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
323 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
324 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
325 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
330 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
331 if (s->ext.ticket_expected) {
332 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
333 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
336 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
337 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
342 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
343 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
344 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
349 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
350 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
351 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
357 if (mt == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) {
358 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ;
365 /* No valid transition found */
366 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
367 SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_READ_TRANSITION, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
372 * ossl_statem_client13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
373 * move to next when the TLSv1.3 client is writing messages to be sent to the
376 static WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(SSL *s)
378 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
381 * Note: There are no cases for TLS_ST_BEFORE because we haven't negotiated
382 * TLSv1.3 yet at that point. They are handled by
383 * ossl_statem_client_write_transition().
385 switch (st->hand_state) {
387 /* Shouldn't happen */
388 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
390 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
391 /* We only hit this in the case of HelloRetryRequest */
392 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
394 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST:
395 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
396 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
398 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
399 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY
400 || s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING)
401 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END;
403 st->hand_state = (s->s3->tmp.cert_req != 0) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT
404 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
405 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
407 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END:
408 if (s->ext.early_data == SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED) {
409 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA;
410 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
414 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
415 st->hand_state = (s->s3->tmp.cert_req != 0) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT
416 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
417 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
420 /* If a non-empty Certificate we also send CertificateVerify */
421 st->hand_state = (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
422 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
423 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
425 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
426 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
427 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
429 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE:
430 if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) {
431 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE;
432 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
436 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE:
437 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
438 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
439 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
440 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
443 if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) {
444 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE;
445 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
448 /* Try to read from the server instead */
449 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
454 * ossl_statem_client_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
455 * move to next when the client is writing messages to be sent to the server.
457 WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client_write_transition(SSL *s)
459 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
462 * Note that immediately before/after a ClientHello we don't know what
463 * version we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until
467 return ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(s);
469 switch (st->hand_state) {
471 /* Shouldn't happen */
472 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
475 if (!s->renegotiate) {
477 * We haven't requested a renegotiation ourselves so we must have
478 * received a message from the server. Better read it.
480 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
485 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
486 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
488 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
489 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING) {
491 * We are assuming this is a TLSv1.3 connection, although we haven't
492 * actually selected a version yet.
494 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
495 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
498 * No transition at the end of writing because we don't know what
501 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
503 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
504 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
506 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
507 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
508 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
510 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
511 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req)
512 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT;
514 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;
515 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
518 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;
519 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
521 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
523 * For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain of nothing is
524 * sent, but no verify packet is sent
527 * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication in ECDH
528 * cipher suites with ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates. We
529 * need to skip the certificate verify message when client's
530 * ECDH public key is sent inside the client certificate.
532 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) {
533 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY;
535 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
537 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY) {
538 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
540 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
542 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
543 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
544 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
546 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
547 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
549 hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
551 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->s3->npn_seen)
552 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO;
554 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
556 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
558 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
559 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:
560 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
561 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
564 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
566 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
567 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
569 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
572 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
574 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
575 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
577 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
578 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
581 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ:
583 * If we can renegotiate now then do so, otherwise wait for a more
586 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s, 1)) {
587 if (!tls_setup_handshake(s)) {
588 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
589 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
591 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
592 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
594 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
595 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
600 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
601 * the client to the server.
603 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
605 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
607 switch (st->hand_state) {
609 /* No pre work to be done */
612 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
614 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
615 /* every DTLS ClientHello resets Finished MAC */
616 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
617 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
623 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
624 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
627 * We're into the last flight so we don't retransmit these
628 * messages unless we need to.
632 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
633 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)))
634 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
639 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END:
641 * If we've been called by SSL_do_handshake()/SSL_write(), or we did not
642 * attempt to write early data before calling SSL_read() then we press
643 * on with the handshake. Otherwise we pause here.
645 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING
646 || s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_NONE)
647 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
650 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
652 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 1);
655 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
659 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
660 * client to the server.
662 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
664 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
668 switch (st->hand_state) {
670 /* No post work to be done */
673 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
674 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A && statem_flush(s) != 1)
677 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
678 /* Treat the next message as the first packet */
682 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
683 && s->max_early_data > 0) {
685 * We haven't selected TLSv1.3 yet so we don't call the change
686 * cipher state function associated with the SSL_METHOD. Instead
687 * we call tls13_change_cipher_state() directly.
689 if (!tls13_change_cipher_state(s,
690 SSL3_CC_EARLY | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))
695 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
697 * We set the enc_write_ctx back to NULL because we may end up writing
698 * in cleartext again if we get a HelloRetryRequest from the server.
700 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(s->enc_write_ctx);
701 s->enc_write_ctx = NULL;
704 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
705 if (tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(s) == 0)
709 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
710 s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
711 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
712 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
714 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
715 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
717 s->session->compress_meth = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
719 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
722 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
723 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))
726 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
727 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
730 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
733 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
738 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
742 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
743 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
744 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A && SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit == 0) {
746 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
749 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
753 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
756 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
757 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
758 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))
763 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE:
764 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
766 if (!tls13_update_key(s, 1))
771 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
775 * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the
778 * Valid return values are:
782 int ossl_statem_client_construct_message(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
783 confunc_f *confunc, int *mt)
785 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
787 switch (st->hand_state) {
789 /* Shouldn't happen */
792 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
794 *confunc = dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
796 *confunc = tls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
797 *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
800 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
801 *confunc = tls_construct_client_hello;
802 *mt = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO;
805 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
806 *confunc = tls_construct_end_of_early_data;
807 *mt = SSL3_MT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA;
810 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END:
816 *confunc = tls_construct_client_certificate;
817 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE;
820 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
821 *confunc = tls_construct_client_key_exchange;
822 *mt = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE;
825 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
826 *confunc = tls_construct_cert_verify;
827 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY;
830 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
831 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:
832 *confunc = tls_construct_next_proto;
833 *mt = SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO;
836 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
837 *confunc = tls_construct_finished;
838 *mt = SSL3_MT_FINISHED;
841 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE:
842 *confunc = tls_construct_key_update;
843 *mt = SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE;
851 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
852 * reading. Excludes the message header.
854 size_t ossl_statem_client_max_message_size(SSL *s)
856 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
858 switch (st->hand_state) {
860 /* Shouldn't happen */
863 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
864 return SERVER_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH;
866 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
867 return HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH;
869 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST:
870 return HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH;
873 return s->max_cert_list;
875 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
876 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
878 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
879 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
881 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
882 return SERVER_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH;
884 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
886 * Set to s->max_cert_list for compatibility with previous releases. In
887 * practice these messages can get quite long if servers are configured
888 * to provide a long list of acceptable CAs
890 return s->max_cert_list;
892 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
893 return SERVER_HELLO_DONE_MAX_LENGTH;
895 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
896 if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
898 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH;
900 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
901 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
903 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
904 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH;
906 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
907 return ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS_MAX_LENGTH;
909 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE:
910 return KEY_UPDATE_MAX_LENGTH;
915 * Process a message that the client has been received from the server.
917 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_client_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
919 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
921 switch (st->hand_state) {
923 /* Shouldn't happen */
924 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
926 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
927 return tls_process_server_hello(s, pkt);
929 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
930 return dtls_process_hello_verify(s, pkt);
932 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST:
933 return tls_process_hello_retry_request(s, pkt);
936 return tls_process_server_certificate(s, pkt);
938 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
939 return tls_process_cert_verify(s, pkt);
941 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
942 return tls_process_cert_status(s, pkt);
944 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
945 return tls_process_key_exchange(s, pkt);
947 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
948 return tls_process_certificate_request(s, pkt);
950 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
951 return tls_process_server_done(s, pkt);
953 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
954 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt);
956 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
957 return tls_process_new_session_ticket(s, pkt);
959 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
960 return tls_process_finished(s, pkt);
962 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ:
963 return tls_process_hello_req(s, pkt);
965 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
966 return tls_process_encrypted_extensions(s, pkt);
968 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE:
969 return tls_process_key_update(s, pkt);
974 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
977 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
979 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
981 switch (st->hand_state) {
983 /* Shouldn't happen */
986 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
987 return tls_prepare_client_certificate(s, wst);
991 int tls_construct_client_hello(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
996 int al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
997 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1000 SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session;
1002 if (!WPACKET_set_max_size(pkt, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) {
1003 /* Should not happen */
1004 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1008 /* Work out what SSL/TLS/DTLS version to use */
1009 protverr = ssl_set_client_hello_version(s);
1010 if (protverr != 0) {
1011 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
1016 || !ssl_version_supported(s, sess->ssl_version)
1017 || !SSL_SESSION_is_resumable(sess)) {
1018 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0))
1021 /* else use the pre-loaded session */
1023 p = s->s3->client_random;
1026 * for DTLS if client_random is initialized, reuse it, we are
1027 * required to use same upon reply to HelloVerify
1029 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1032 for (idx = 0; idx < sizeof(s->s3->client_random); idx++) {
1041 if (i && ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p, sizeof(s->s3->client_random),
1042 DOWNGRADE_NONE) <= 0)
1046 * version indicates the negotiated version: for example from
1047 * an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version
1048 * field is the maximum version we permit and it is also
1049 * used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can
1050 * choke if we initially report a higher version then
1051 * renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This
1052 * didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it
1053 * but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports
1056 * Possible scenario with previous logic:
1057 * 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2
1058 * 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0
1059 * 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2.
1060 * 4. Handshake proceeds using TLS 1.0.
1061 * 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate.
1062 * 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now
1063 * know that is maximum server supports.
1064 * 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret
1065 * containing version 1.0.
1067 * For interoperability it should be OK to always use the
1068 * maximum version we support in client hello and then rely
1069 * on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't
1070 * being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with
1071 * TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using
1072 * client_version in client hello and not resetting it to
1073 * the negotiated version.
1075 * For TLS 1.3 we always set the ClientHello version to 1.2 and rely on the
1076 * supported_versions extension for the real supported versions.
1078 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->client_version)
1079 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1080 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1085 if (s->new_session || s->session->ssl_version == TLS1_3_VERSION)
1088 sess_id_len = s->session->session_id_length;
1089 if (sess_id_len > sizeof(s->session->session_id)
1090 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
1091 || (sess_id_len != 0 && !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->session->session_id,
1093 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1094 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1098 /* cookie stuff for DTLS */
1099 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1100 if (s->d1->cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)
1101 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->d1->cookie,
1102 s->d1->cookie_len)) {
1103 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1108 /* Ciphers supported */
1109 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1110 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1113 /* ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes() raises SSLerr if appropriate */
1114 if (!ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s, SSL_get_ciphers(s), pkt))
1116 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1117 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1122 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)) {
1123 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1126 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1127 if (ssl_allow_compression(s)
1128 && s->ctx->comp_methods
1129 && (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) || s->s3->tmp.max_ver < TLS1_3_VERSION)) {
1130 int compnum = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1131 for (i = 0; i < compnum; i++) {
1132 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, i);
1133 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, comp->id)) {
1134 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1140 /* Add the NULL method */
1141 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1142 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1146 /* TLS extensions */
1147 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO, NULL, 0, &al)) {
1148 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1155 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN dtls_process_hello_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1161 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, 2)
1162 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookiepkt)) {
1163 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1164 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1168 cookie_len = PACKET_remaining(&cookiepkt);
1169 if (cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)) {
1170 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1171 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1175 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&cookiepkt, s->d1->cookie, cookie_len)) {
1176 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1177 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1180 s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_len;
1182 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1184 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1185 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1186 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1189 static int set_client_ciphersuite(SSL *s, const unsigned char *cipherchars)
1191 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1192 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
1195 c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars, 0);
1197 /* unknown cipher */
1198 SSLerr(SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1202 * If it is a disabled cipher we either didn't send it in client hello,
1203 * or it's not allowed for the selected protocol. So we return an error.
1205 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_CHECK, 1)) {
1206 SSLerr(SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1210 sk = ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s);
1211 i = sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk, c);
1213 /* we did not say we would use this cipher */
1214 SSLerr(SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1218 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher != NULL
1219 && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id != c->id) {
1220 /* ServerHello selected a different ciphersuite to that in the HRR */
1221 SSLerr(SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1226 * Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher
1227 * and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that cipher_id is
1228 * set and use it for comparison.
1230 if (s->session->cipher != NULL)
1231 s->session->cipher_id = s->session->cipher->id;
1232 if (s->hit && (s->session->cipher_id != c->id)) {
1233 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1235 * In TLSv1.3 it is valid for the server to select a different
1236 * ciphersuite as long as the hash is the same.
1238 if (ssl_md(c->algorithm2)
1239 != ssl_md(s->session->cipher->algorithm2)) {
1240 SSLerr(SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE,
1241 SSL_R_CIPHERSUITE_DIGEST_HAS_CHANGED);
1246 * Prior to TLSv1.3 resuming a session always meant using the same
1249 SSLerr(SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE,
1250 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED);
1254 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c;
1259 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1261 PACKET session_id, extpkt;
1262 size_t session_id_len;
1263 const unsigned char *cipherchars;
1264 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1265 unsigned int compression;
1266 unsigned int sversion;
1267 unsigned int context;
1269 RAW_EXTENSION *extensions = NULL;
1270 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1274 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sversion)) {
1275 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1276 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1280 /* load the server random */
1281 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1282 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1283 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1288 * We do this immediately so we know what format the ServerHello is in.
1289 * Must be done after reading the random data so we can check for the
1290 * TLSv1.3 downgrade sentinels
1292 protverr = ssl_choose_client_version(s, sversion, 1, &al);
1293 if (protverr != 0) {
1294 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, protverr);
1299 * In TLSv1.3 a ServerHello message signals a key change so the end of the
1300 * message must be on a record boundary.
1302 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
1303 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1304 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
1308 /* Get the session-id. */
1309 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1310 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)) {
1311 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1312 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1315 session_id_len = PACKET_remaining(&session_id);
1316 if (session_id_len > sizeof s->session->session_id
1317 || session_id_len > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE) {
1318 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1319 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1320 SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG);
1324 PACKET_null_init(&session_id);
1328 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &cipherchars, TLS_CIPHER_LEN)) {
1329 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1330 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1334 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1335 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &compression)) {
1336 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1337 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1344 /* TLS extensions */
1345 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) {
1346 PACKET_null_init(&extpkt);
1347 } else if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt)
1348 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1349 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1350 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
1354 context = SSL_IS_TLS13(s) ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
1355 : SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO;
1356 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt, context, &extensions, &al, NULL, 1))
1361 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1362 /* This will set s->hit if we are resuming */
1363 if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_psk,
1364 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO,
1365 extensions, NULL, 0, &al))
1369 * Check if we can resume the session based on external pre-shared
1370 * secret. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851) supports two types of session resumption.
1371 * Resumption based on server-side state works with session IDs.
1372 * Resumption based on pre-shared Protected Access Credentials (PACs)
1373 * works by overriding the SessionTicket extension at the application
1374 * layer, and does not send a session ID. (We do not know whether
1375 * EAP-FAST servers would honour the session ID.) Therefore, the session
1376 * ID alone is not a reliable indicator of session resumption, so we
1377 * first check if we can resume, and later peek at the next handshake
1378 * message to see if the server wants to resume.
1380 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
1381 && s->ext.session_secret_cb != NULL && s->session->ext.tick) {
1382 const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
1384 * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for
1385 * backwards compat reasons
1387 int master_key_length;
1388 master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1389 if (s->ext.session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
1392 s->ext.session_secret_cb_arg)
1393 && master_key_length > 0) {
1394 s->session->master_key_length = master_key_length;
1395 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher ?
1396 pref_cipher : ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars, 0);
1398 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1399 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1404 if (session_id_len != 0
1405 && session_id_len == s->session->session_id_length
1406 && memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id), s->session->session_id,
1407 session_id_len) == 0)
1412 if (s->sid_ctx_length != s->session->sid_ctx_length
1413 || memcmp(s->session->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length)) {
1414 /* actually a client application bug */
1415 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1416 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1417 SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT);
1422 * If we were trying for session-id reuse but the server
1423 * didn't resume, make a new SSL_SESSION.
1424 * In the case of EAP-FAST and PAC, we do not send a session ID,
1425 * so the PAC-based session secret is always preserved. It'll be
1426 * overwritten if the server refuses resumption.
1428 if (s->session->session_id_length > 0
1430 && s->session->ext.tick_identity
1431 != TLSEXT_PSK_BAD_IDENTITY)) {
1432 s->ctx->stats.sess_miss++;
1433 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) {
1438 s->session->ssl_version = s->version;
1439 s->session->session_id_length = session_id_len;
1440 /* session_id_len could be 0 */
1441 if (session_id_len > 0)
1442 memcpy(s->session->session_id, PACKET_data(&session_id),
1446 /* Session version and negotiated protocol version should match */
1447 if (s->version != s->session->ssl_version) {
1448 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1450 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1451 SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_VERSION_MISMATCH);
1455 * Now that we know the version, update the check to see if it's an allowed
1458 s->s3->tmp.min_ver = s->version;
1459 s->s3->tmp.max_ver = s->version;
1461 if (!set_client_ciphersuite(s, cipherchars)) {
1462 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1466 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1467 if (compression != 0) {
1468 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1469 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1470 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1474 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1475 * using compression.
1477 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1478 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1482 if (s->hit && compression != s->session->compress_meth) {
1483 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1484 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1485 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED);
1488 if (compression == 0)
1490 else if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
1491 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1492 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED);
1495 comp = ssl3_comp_find(s->ctx->comp_methods, compression);
1498 if (compression != 0 && comp == NULL) {
1499 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1500 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1501 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1504 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1508 if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s, context, extensions, NULL, 0, &al, 1))
1511 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1512 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
1513 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
1514 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
1517 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
1520 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
1521 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
1523 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
1524 sizeof(sctpauthkey),
1526 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0)
1529 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s),
1530 BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
1531 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
1536 * In TLSv1.3 we have some post-processing to change cipher state, otherwise
1537 * we're done with this message
1540 && (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)
1541 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
1542 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ))) {
1543 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1544 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER);
1548 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1549 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
1551 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1552 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1553 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1554 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1557 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_hello_retry_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1559 unsigned int sversion;
1561 const unsigned char *cipherchars;
1562 RAW_EXTENSION *extensions = NULL;
1566 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sversion)) {
1567 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1568 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1572 s->hello_retry_request = 1;
1575 * If we were sending early_data then the enc_write_ctx is now invalid and
1576 * should not be used.
1578 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(s->enc_write_ctx);
1579 s->enc_write_ctx = NULL;
1581 /* This will fail if it doesn't choose TLSv1.3+ */
1582 errorcode = ssl_choose_client_version(s, sversion, 0, &al);
1583 if (errorcode != 0) {
1584 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST, errorcode);
1588 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &cipherchars, TLS_CIPHER_LEN)) {
1589 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1590 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1594 if (!set_client_ciphersuite(s, cipherchars)) {
1595 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1599 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt)
1600 /* Must have a non-empty extensions block */
1601 || PACKET_remaining(&extpkt) == 0
1602 /* Must be no trailing data after extensions */
1603 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1604 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1605 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
1609 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
1610 &extensions, &al, NULL, 1)
1611 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
1612 extensions, NULL, 0, &al, 1))
1615 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1618 if (s->ext.tls13_cookie_len == 0
1619 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
1620 && s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL
1624 * We didn't receive a cookie or a new key_share so the next
1625 * ClientHello will not change
1627 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1628 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
1629 SSL_R_NO_CHANGE_FOLLOWING_HRR);
1634 * Re-initialise the Transcript Hash. We're going to prepopulate it with
1635 * a synthetic message_hash in place of ClientHello1.
1637 if (!create_synthetic_message_hash(s)) {
1638 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1643 * Add this message to the Transcript Hash. Normally this is done
1644 * automatically prior to the message processing stage. However due to the
1645 * need to create the synthetic message hash, we defer that step until now
1648 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data,
1649 s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
1650 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1651 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1655 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1657 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1658 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1659 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1660 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1663 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1666 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1667 unsigned long cert_list_len, cert_len;
1669 const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes;
1670 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
1671 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
1672 size_t chainidx, certidx;
1673 unsigned int context = 0;
1674 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu;
1676 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
1677 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1681 if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !PACKET_get_1(pkt, &context))
1683 || !PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_list_len)
1684 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != cert_list_len
1685 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) {
1686 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1687 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1690 for (chainidx = 0; PACKET_remaining(pkt); chainidx++) {
1691 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_len)
1692 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &certbytes, cert_len)) {
1693 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1694 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1695 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1699 certstart = certbytes;
1700 x = d2i_X509(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, cert_len);
1702 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
1703 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
1706 if (certbytes != (certstart + cert_len)) {
1707 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1708 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1709 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1713 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1714 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
1717 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)) {
1718 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1719 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
1722 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
1723 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, &rawexts,
1724 &al, NULL, chainidx == 0)
1725 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE,
1726 rawexts, x, chainidx, &al,
1727 PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)) {
1728 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
1731 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
1734 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
1735 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1741 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
1743 * The documented interface is that SSL_VERIFY_PEER should be set in order
1744 * for client side verification of the server certificate to take place.
1745 * However, historically the code has only checked that *any* flag is set
1746 * to cause server verification to take place. Use of the other flags makes
1747 * no sense in client mode. An attempt to clean up the semantics was
1748 * reverted because at least one application *only* set
1749 * SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT. Prior to the clean up this still caused
1750 * server verification to take place, after the clean up it silently did
1751 * nothing. SSL_CTX_set_verify()/SSL_set_verify() cannot validate the flags
1752 * sent to them because they are void functions. Therefore, we now use the
1753 * (less clean) historic behaviour of performing validation if any flag is
1754 * set. The *documented* interface remains the same.
1756 if (s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE && i <= 0) {
1757 al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
1758 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1759 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
1762 ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */
1764 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, i);
1765 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1769 s->session->peer_chain = sk;
1771 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's certificate,
1772 * which we don't include in statem_srvr.c
1774 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
1777 * VRS 19990621: possible memory leak; sk=null ==> !sk_pop_free() @end
1780 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
1782 if (pkey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) {
1784 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1785 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1786 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS);
1790 if ((clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, &certidx)) == NULL) {
1793 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1794 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
1798 * Check certificate type is consistent with ciphersuite. For TLS 1.3
1799 * skip check since TLS 1.3 ciphersuites can be used with any certificate
1802 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1803 if ((clu->amask & s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth) == 0) {
1805 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1806 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1807 SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
1811 s->session->peer_type = certidx;
1813 X509_free(s->session->peer);
1815 s->session->peer = x;
1816 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
1819 /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */
1821 && !ssl_handshake_hash(s, s->cert_verify_hash,
1822 sizeof(s->cert_verify_hash),
1823 &s->cert_verify_hash_len)) {
1824 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1825 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1829 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
1833 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1835 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1838 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
1842 static int tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
1844 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1845 PACKET psk_identity_hint;
1847 /* PSK ciphersuites are preceded by an identity hint */
1849 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity_hint)) {
1850 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1851 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1856 * Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in
1857 * tls_construct_client_key_exchange. Assume that the maximum length of
1858 * a PSK identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK
1861 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
1862 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1863 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1867 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) == 0) {
1868 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
1869 s->session->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
1870 } else if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity_hint,
1871 &s->session->psk_identity_hint)) {
1872 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1878 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1879 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1884 static int tls_process_ske_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey, int *al)
1886 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1887 PACKET prime, generator, salt, server_pub;
1889 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime)
1890 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator)
1891 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &salt)
1892 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &server_pub)) {
1893 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1894 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1898 /* TODO(size_t): Convert BN_bin2bn() calls */
1900 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime),
1901 (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL)) == NULL
1903 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator),
1904 (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator), NULL)) == NULL
1906 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&salt),
1907 (int)PACKET_remaining(&salt), NULL)) == NULL
1909 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&server_pub),
1910 (int)PACKET_remaining(&server_pub), NULL)) == NULL) {
1911 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1912 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1916 if (!srp_verify_server_param(s, al)) {
1917 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
1921 /* We must check if there is a certificate */
1922 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS))
1923 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
1927 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1928 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1933 static int tls_process_ske_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey, int *al)
1935 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1936 PACKET prime, generator, pub_key;
1937 EVP_PKEY *peer_tmp = NULL;
1940 BIGNUM *p = NULL, *g = NULL, *bnpub_key = NULL;
1944 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime)
1945 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator)
1946 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &pub_key)) {
1947 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1948 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1952 peer_tmp = EVP_PKEY_new();
1955 if (peer_tmp == NULL || dh == NULL) {
1956 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1957 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1961 /* TODO(size_t): Convert these calls */
1962 p = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime), (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL);
1963 g = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator), (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator),
1965 bnpub_key = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&pub_key),
1966 (int)PACKET_remaining(&pub_key), NULL);
1967 if (p == NULL || g == NULL || bnpub_key == NULL) {
1968 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1969 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1973 /* test non-zero pubkey */
1974 if (BN_is_zero(bnpub_key)) {
1975 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1976 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE);
1980 if (!DH_set0_pqg(dh, p, NULL, g)) {
1981 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1982 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1987 if (DH_check_params(dh, &check_bits) == 0 || check_bits != 0) {
1988 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1989 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE);
1993 if (!DH_set0_key(dh, bnpub_key, NULL)) {
1994 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1995 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2000 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH, DH_security_bits(dh), 0, dh)) {
2001 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2002 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
2006 if (EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(peer_tmp, dh) == 0) {
2007 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2008 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2012 s->s3->peer_tmp = peer_tmp;
2015 * FIXME: This makes assumptions about which ciphersuites come with
2016 * public keys. We should have a less ad-hoc way of doing this
2018 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS))
2019 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2020 /* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */
2029 EVP_PKEY_free(peer_tmp);
2033 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2034 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2039 static int tls_process_ske_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey, int *al)
2041 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2043 const unsigned char *ecparams;
2045 unsigned int curve_flags;
2046 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2049 * Extract elliptic curve parameters and the server's ephemeral ECDH
2050 * public key. For now we only support named (not generic) curves and
2051 * ECParameters in this case is just three bytes.
2053 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &ecparams, 3)) {
2054 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2055 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
2059 * Check curve is one of our preferences, if not server has sent an
2060 * invalid curve. ECParameters is 3 bytes.
2062 if (!tls1_check_curve(s, ecparams, 3)) {
2063 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2064 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
2068 curve_nid = tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(*(ecparams + 2), &curve_flags);
2070 if (curve_nid == 0) {
2071 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2072 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
2073 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
2077 if ((curve_flags & TLS_CURVE_TYPE) == TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM) {
2078 EVP_PKEY *key = EVP_PKEY_new();
2080 if (key == NULL || !EVP_PKEY_set_type(key, curve_nid)) {
2081 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2082 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2086 s->s3->peer_tmp = key;
2088 /* Set up EVP_PKEY with named curve as parameters */
2089 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(EVP_PKEY_EC, NULL);
2091 || EVP_PKEY_paramgen_init(pctx) <= 0
2092 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ec_paramgen_curve_nid(pctx, curve_nid) <= 0
2093 || EVP_PKEY_paramgen(pctx, &s->s3->peer_tmp) <= 0) {
2094 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2095 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2096 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2099 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2103 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &encoded_pt)) {
2104 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2105 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2109 if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->peer_tmp,
2110 PACKET_data(&encoded_pt),
2111 PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt))) {
2112 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2113 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
2118 * The ECC/TLS specification does not mention the use of DSA to sign
2119 * ECParameters in the server key exchange message. We do support RSA
2122 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aECDSA)
2123 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2124 else if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aRSA)
2125 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2126 /* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
2130 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2131 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2136 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2140 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2141 EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = NULL;
2142 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2143 PACKET save_param_start, signature;
2145 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2147 save_param_start = *pkt;
2149 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
2150 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->peer_tmp);
2151 s->s3->peer_tmp = NULL;
2154 if (alg_k & SSL_PSK) {
2155 if (!tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(s, pkt, &al))
2159 /* Nothing else to do for plain PSK or RSAPSK */
2160 if (alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
2161 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
2162 if (!tls_process_ske_srp(s, pkt, &pkey, &al))
2164 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
2165 if (!tls_process_ske_dhe(s, pkt, &pkey, &al))
2167 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2168 if (!tls_process_ske_ecdhe(s, pkt, &pkey, &al))
2171 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2172 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
2176 /* if it was signed, check the signature */
2180 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
2186 * |pkt| now points to the beginning of the signature, so the difference
2187 * equals the length of the parameters.
2189 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(&save_param_start, ¶ms,
2190 PACKET_remaining(&save_param_start) -
2191 PACKET_remaining(pkt))) {
2192 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2193 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2197 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2198 unsigned int sigalg;
2200 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sigalg)) {
2201 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2202 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
2205 rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(s, sigalg, pkey);
2207 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2209 } else if (rv == 0) {
2210 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2214 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
2216 } else if (!tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(s, pkey)) {
2217 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2221 if (!tls1_lookup_md(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg, &md)) {
2222 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2226 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &signature)
2227 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2228 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2229 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2232 maxsig = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
2234 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2235 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2240 * Check signature length
2242 if (PACKET_remaining(&signature) > (size_t)maxsig) {
2243 /* wrong packet length */
2244 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2245 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2246 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH);
2250 md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2251 if (md_ctx == NULL) {
2252 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2253 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2257 if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit(md_ctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) {
2258 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2259 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2262 if (SSL_USE_PSS(s)) {
2263 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0
2264 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx,
2265 RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) {
2266 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2267 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2271 tbslen = construct_key_exchange_tbs(s, &tbs, PACKET_data(¶ms),
2272 PACKET_remaining(¶ms));
2274 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2275 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2279 rv = EVP_DigestVerify(md_ctx, PACKET_data(&signature),
2280 PACKET_remaining(&signature), tbs, tbslen);
2283 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2284 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
2287 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2290 /* aNULL, aSRP or PSK do not need public keys */
2291 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP))
2292 && !(alg_k & SSL_PSK)) {
2293 /* Might be wrong key type, check it */
2294 if (ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
2295 /* Otherwise this shouldn't happen */
2296 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2297 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2299 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2303 /* still data left over */
2304 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2305 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2306 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE);
2311 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2314 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2315 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2316 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2317 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2320 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_certificate_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2322 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2323 int al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2326 /* Clear certificate validity flags */
2327 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
2328 s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
2330 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2331 PACKET reqctx, extensions;
2332 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
2334 /* Free and zero certificate types: it is not present in TLS 1.3 */
2335 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.ctype);
2336 s->s3->tmp.ctype = NULL;
2337 s->s3->tmp.ctype_len = 0;
2339 /* TODO(TLS1.3) need to process request context, for now ignore */
2340 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &reqctx)) {
2341 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2342 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2346 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)) {
2347 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
2350 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
2351 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2352 &rawexts, &al, NULL, 1)
2353 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2354 rawexts, NULL, 0, &al, 1)) {
2355 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
2358 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
2359 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2360 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2361 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2367 /* get the certificate types */
2368 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &ctypes)) {
2369 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2370 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2374 if (!PACKET_memdup(&ctypes, &s->s3->tmp.ctype, &s->s3->tmp.ctype_len)) {
2375 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2376 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2380 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2383 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &sigalgs)) {
2384 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2385 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2389 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, &sigalgs)) {
2390 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2391 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR);
2394 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2395 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2396 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2397 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2402 /* get the CA RDNs */
2403 if (!parse_ca_names(s, pkt, &al))
2407 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2408 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2412 /* we should setup a certificate to return.... */
2413 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 1;
2415 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
2418 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2419 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2424 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2426 int al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2427 unsigned int ticklen;
2428 unsigned long ticket_lifetime_hint, age_add = 0;
2429 unsigned int sess_len;
2430 RAW_EXTENSION *exts = NULL;
2433 if (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &ticket_lifetime_hint)
2435 && (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &age_add)
2436 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &nonce)
2437 || !PACKET_memdup(&nonce, &s->session->ext.tick_nonce,
2438 &s->session->ext.tick_nonce_len)))
2439 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ticklen)
2440 || (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && PACKET_remaining(pkt) != ticklen)
2442 && (ticklen == 0 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) < ticklen))) {
2443 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2448 * Server is allowed to change its mind (in <=TLSv1.2) and send an empty
2449 * ticket. We already checked this TLSv1.3 case above, so it should never
2450 * be 0 here in that instance
2453 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2456 * Sessions must be immutable once they go into the session cache. Otherwise
2457 * we can get multi-thread problems. Therefore we don't "update" sessions,
2458 * we replace them with a duplicate. In TLSv1.3 we need to do this every
2459 * time a NewSessionTicket arrives because those messages arrive
2460 * post-handshake and the session may have already gone into the session
2463 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
2464 int i = s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode;
2465 SSL_SESSION *new_sess;
2467 * We reused an existing session, so we need to replace it with a new
2470 if ((new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0)) == 0) {
2471 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2472 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2476 if (i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT) {
2478 * Remove the old session from the cache. We carry on if this fails
2480 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
2483 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
2484 s->session = new_sess;
2488 * Technically the cast to long here is not guaranteed by the C standard -
2489 * but we use it elsewhere, so this should be ok.
2491 s->session->time = (long)time(NULL);
2493 OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.tick);
2494 s->session->ext.tick = NULL;
2495 s->session->ext.ticklen = 0;
2497 s->session->ext.tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
2498 if (s->session->ext.tick == NULL) {
2499 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2502 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->session->ext.tick, ticklen)) {
2503 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2504 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2508 s->session->ext.tick_lifetime_hint = ticket_lifetime_hint;
2509 s->session->ext.tick_age_add = age_add;
2510 s->session->ext.ticklen = ticklen;
2512 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2515 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt)
2516 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0
2517 || !tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt,
2518 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2519 &exts, &al, NULL, 1)
2520 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s,
2521 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2522 exts, NULL, 0, &al, 1)) {
2523 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
2529 * There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket session. One is to set
2530 * an appropriate session ID and then the server must return a match in
2531 * ServerHello. This allows the normal client session ID matching to work
2532 * and we know much earlier that the ticket has been accepted. The
2533 * other way is to set zero length session ID when the ticket is
2534 * presented and rely on the handshake to determine session resumption.
2535 * We choose the former approach because this fits in with assumptions
2536 * elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set to the SHA256 (or SHA1 is
2537 * SHA256 is disabled) hash of the ticket.
2540 * TODO(size_t): we use sess_len here because EVP_Digest expects an int
2541 * but s->session->session_id_length is a size_t
2543 if (!EVP_Digest(s->session->ext.tick, ticklen,
2544 s->session->session_id, &sess_len,
2545 EVP_sha256(), NULL)) {
2546 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2549 s->session->session_id_length = sess_len;
2551 /* This is a standalone message in TLSv1.3, so there is no more to read */
2552 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2554 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT);
2555 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
2558 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2560 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2562 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2564 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2568 * In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to
2569 * parse a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure. On failure
2570 * |*al| is populated with a suitable alert code.
2572 int tls_process_cert_status_body(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2577 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &type)
2578 || type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
2579 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2580 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY,
2581 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE);
2584 if (!PACKET_get_net_3_len(pkt, &resplen)
2585 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != resplen) {
2586 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2587 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2590 s->ext.ocsp.resp = OPENSSL_malloc(resplen);
2591 if (s->ext.ocsp.resp == NULL) {
2592 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2593 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2596 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->ext.ocsp.resp, resplen)) {
2597 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2598 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2601 s->ext.ocsp.resp_len = resplen;
2607 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_status(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2611 if (!tls_process_cert_status_body(s, pkt, &al)) {
2612 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2613 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2614 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2617 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2621 * Perform miscellaneous checks and processing after we have received the
2622 * server's initial flight. In TLS1.3 this is after the Server Finished message.
2623 * In <=TLS1.2 this is after the ServerDone message. Returns 1 on success or 0
2626 int tls_process_initial_server_flight(SSL *s, int *al)
2629 * at this point we check that we have the required stuff from
2632 if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
2633 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2638 * Call the ocsp status callback if needed. The |ext.ocsp.resp| and
2639 * |ext.ocsp.resp_len| values will be set if we actually received a status
2640 * message, or NULL and -1 otherwise
2642 if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing
2643 && s->ctx->ext.status_cb != NULL) {
2644 int ret = s->ctx->ext.status_cb(s, s->ctx->ext.status_arg);
2647 *al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
2648 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_INITIAL_SERVER_FLIGHT,
2649 SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE);
2653 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2654 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_INITIAL_SERVER_FLIGHT,
2655 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2659 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
2660 if (s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
2661 /* Note we validate the SCTs whether or not we abort on error */
2662 if (!ssl_validate_ct(s) && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) {
2663 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2672 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_done(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2674 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2676 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
2677 /* should contain no data */
2678 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2679 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2682 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2683 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
2684 if (SRP_Calc_A_param(s) <= 0) {
2685 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE, SSL_R_SRP_A_CALC);
2692 * Error queue messages are generated directly by this function
2694 if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s, &al))
2697 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
2700 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2701 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2702 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2705 static int tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
2707 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2710 * The callback needs PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 bytes to return a
2711 * \0-terminated identity. The last byte is for us for simulating
2714 char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1];
2715 size_t identitylen = 0;
2716 unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
2717 unsigned char *tmppsk = NULL;
2718 char *tmpidentity = NULL;
2721 if (s->psk_client_callback == NULL) {
2722 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB);
2723 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2727 memset(identity, 0, sizeof(identity));
2729 psklen = s->psk_client_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity_hint,
2730 identity, sizeof(identity) - 1,
2733 if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
2734 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2735 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2737 } else if (psklen == 0) {
2738 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2739 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2740 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2744 identitylen = strlen(identity);
2745 if (identitylen > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2746 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2747 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2751 tmppsk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen);
2752 tmpidentity = OPENSSL_strdup(identity);
2753 if (tmppsk == NULL || tmpidentity == NULL) {
2754 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2755 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2759 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.psk);
2760 s->s3->tmp.psk = tmppsk;
2761 s->s3->tmp.psklen = psklen;
2763 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
2764 s->session->psk_identity = tmpidentity;
2767 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, identity, identitylen)) {
2768 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2769 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2776 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
2777 OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, sizeof(identity));
2778 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmppsk, psklen);
2779 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmpidentity, identitylen);
2783 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2784 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2789 static int tls_construct_cke_rsa(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
2791 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2792 unsigned char *encdata = NULL;
2793 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2794 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2796 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
2799 if (s->session->peer == NULL) {
2801 * We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA.
2803 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2807 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2808 if (EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pkey) == NULL) {
2809 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2813 pmslen = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
2814 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
2816 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2817 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2821 pms[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
2822 pms[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
2823 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
2824 if (ssl_randbytes(s, pms + 2, (int)(pmslen - 2)) <= 0) {
2828 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2829 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
2830 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2833 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
2834 if (pctx == NULL || EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pctx) <= 0
2835 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, NULL, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
2836 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2839 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, enclen, &encdata)
2840 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, encdata, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
2841 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT);
2844 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2847 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2848 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2849 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2853 /* Log the premaster secret, if logging is enabled. */
2854 if (!ssl_log_rsa_client_key_exchange(s, encdata, enclen, pms, pmslen))
2857 s->s3->tmp.pms = pms;
2858 s->s3->tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
2862 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
2863 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2867 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2868 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2873 static int tls_construct_cke_dhe(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
2875 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2877 const BIGNUM *pub_key;
2878 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL;
2879 unsigned char *keybytes = NULL;
2881 skey = s->s3->peer_tmp;
2885 ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(skey);
2889 dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey);
2891 if (dh_clnt == NULL || ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 0) == 0)
2894 /* send off the data */
2895 DH_get0_key(dh_clnt, &pub_key, NULL);
2896 if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, BN_num_bytes(pub_key), &keybytes))
2899 BN_bn2bin(pub_key, keybytes);
2900 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2904 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2906 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2907 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2911 static int tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
2913 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2914 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
2915 size_t encoded_pt_len = 0;
2916 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL;
2919 skey = s->s3->peer_tmp;
2921 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2925 ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(skey);
2927 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2931 if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 0) == 0) {
2932 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2936 /* Generate encoding of client key */
2937 encoded_pt_len = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey, &encodedPoint);
2939 if (encoded_pt_len == 0) {
2940 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2944 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len)) {
2945 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2951 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2952 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2955 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2956 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2961 static int tls_construct_cke_gost(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
2963 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2964 /* GOST key exchange message creation */
2965 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx = NULL;
2968 unsigned int md_len;
2969 unsigned char shared_ukm[32], tmp[256];
2970 EVP_MD_CTX *ukm_hash = NULL;
2971 int dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94;
2972 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
2975 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aGOST12) != 0)
2976 dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256;
2979 * Get server certificate PKEY and create ctx from it
2981 peer_cert = s->session->peer;
2983 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2984 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
2985 SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER);
2989 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(X509_get0_pubkey(peer_cert), NULL);
2990 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
2991 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2992 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2996 * If we have send a certificate, and certificate key
2997 * parameters match those of server certificate, use
2998 * certificate key for key exchange
3001 /* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */
3003 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
3005 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3006 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3010 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0
3011 /* Generate session key
3012 * TODO(size_t): Convert this function
3014 || ssl_randbytes(s, pms, (int)pmslen) <= 0) {
3015 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3016 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3020 * Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific context
3023 ukm_hash = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
3024 if (ukm_hash == NULL
3025 || EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash, EVP_get_digestbynid(dgst_nid)) <= 0
3026 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->client_random,
3027 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
3028 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->server_random,
3029 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
3030 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash, shared_ukm, &md_len) <= 0) {
3031 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3032 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3035 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash);
3037 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT,
3038 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, 8, shared_ukm) < 0) {
3039 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3040 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
3043 /* Make GOST keytransport blob message */
3045 * Encapsulate it into sequence
3048 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx, tmp, &msglen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
3049 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3050 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
3054 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE | V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED)
3055 || (msglen >= 0x80 && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0x81))
3056 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, tmp, msglen)) {
3057 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3058 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3062 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3063 s->s3->tmp.pms = pms;
3064 s->s3->tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
3068 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3069 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
3070 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash);
3073 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3074 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3079 static int tls_construct_cke_srp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
3081 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3082 unsigned char *abytes = NULL;
3084 if (s->srp_ctx.A == NULL
3085 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, BN_num_bytes(s->srp_ctx.A),
3087 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3090 BN_bn2bin(s->srp_ctx.A, abytes);
3092 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
3093 s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
3094 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
3095 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3101 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3102 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3107 int tls_construct_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3109 unsigned long alg_k;
3112 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3114 if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK)
3115 && !tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(s, pkt, &al))
3118 if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
3119 if (!tls_construct_cke_rsa(s, pkt, &al))
3121 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
3122 if (!tls_construct_cke_dhe(s, pkt, &al))
3124 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
3125 if (!tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(s, pkt, &al))
3127 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
3128 if (!tls_construct_cke_gost(s, pkt, &al))
3130 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
3131 if (!tls_construct_cke_srp(s, pkt, &al))
3133 } else if (!(alg_k & SSL_kPSK)) {
3134 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3135 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3142 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3143 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.pms, s->s3->tmp.pmslen);
3144 s->s3->tmp.pms = NULL;
3145 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
3146 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.psk, s->s3->tmp.psklen);
3147 s->s3->tmp.psk = NULL;
3152 int tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(SSL *s)
3154 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
3157 pms = s->s3->tmp.pms;
3158 pmslen = s->s3->tmp.pmslen;
3160 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3162 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
3163 if (!srp_generate_client_master_secret(s)) {
3164 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK,
3165 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3172 if (pms == NULL && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
3173 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3174 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3177 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, pms, pmslen, 1)) {
3178 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3179 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3180 /* ssl_generate_master_secret frees the pms even on error */
3188 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
3189 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
3190 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
3191 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
3194 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
3197 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
3198 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
3200 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
3201 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
3202 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0)
3205 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
3206 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
3212 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
3213 s->s3->tmp.pms = NULL;
3218 * Check a certificate can be used for client authentication. Currently check
3219 * cert exists, if we have a suitable digest for TLS 1.2 if static DH client
3220 * certificates can be used and optionally checks suitability for Suite B.
3222 static int ssl3_check_client_certificate(SSL *s)
3224 /* If no suitable signature algorithm can't use certificate */
3225 if (!tls_choose_sigalg(s, NULL) || s->s3->tmp.sigalg == NULL)
3228 * If strict mode check suitability of chain before using it. This also
3229 * adjusts suite B digest if necessary.
3231 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT &&
3232 !tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, -2))
3237 WORK_STATE tls_prepare_client_certificate(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
3240 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
3243 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
3244 /* Let cert callback update client certificates if required */
3245 if (s->cert->cert_cb) {
3246 i = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
3248 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3252 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3253 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3256 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
3258 if (ssl3_check_client_certificate(s))
3259 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3261 /* Fall through to WORK_MORE_B */
3265 /* We need to get a client cert */
3266 if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) {
3268 * If we get an error, we need to ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3269 * return(-1); We then get retied later
3271 i = ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s, &x509, &pkey);
3273 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3276 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
3277 if ((i == 1) && (pkey != NULL) && (x509 != NULL)) {
3278 if (!SSL_use_certificate(s, x509) || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(s, pkey))
3280 } else if (i == 1) {
3282 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3283 SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK);
3287 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3288 if (i && !ssl3_check_client_certificate(s))
3291 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
3292 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 0;
3293 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE);
3294 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3296 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 2;
3297 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
3298 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3299 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3305 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3308 /* Shouldn't ever get here */
3312 int tls_construct_client_certificate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3314 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3317 * TODO(TLS1.3): For now we must put an empty context. Needs to be filled in
3320 if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0))
3321 || !ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, pkt,
3322 (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 2) ? NULL
3325 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3330 && SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)
3331 && (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
3332 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))) {
3333 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3334 SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER);
3336 * This is a fatal error, which leaves
3337 * enc_write_ctx in an inconsistent state
3338 * and thus ssl3_send_alert may crash.
3345 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3349 int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s)
3351 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu;
3354 int al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3356 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3357 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3359 /* we don't have a certificate */
3360 if (!(alg_a & SSL_aCERT))
3363 /* This is the passed certificate */
3364 clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer), &idx);
3366 /* Check certificate is recognised and suitable for cipher */
3367 if (clu == NULL || (alg_a & clu->amask) == 0) {
3368 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_MISSING_SIGNING_CERT);
3372 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3373 if (clu->amask & SSL_aECDSA) {
3374 if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(s->session->peer, s))
3376 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT);
3380 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3381 if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK) && idx != SSL_PKEY_RSA) {
3382 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3383 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT);
3387 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3388 if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHE) && (s->s3->peer_tmp == NULL)) {
3389 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3390 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3397 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3401 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3402 int tls_construct_next_proto(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3404 size_t len, padding_len;
3405 unsigned char *padding = NULL;
3407 len = s->ext.npn_len;
3408 padding_len = 32 - ((len + 2) % 32);
3410 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->ext.npn, len)
3411 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u8(pkt, padding_len, &padding)) {
3412 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEXT_PROTO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3416 memset(padding, 0, padding_len);
3420 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3425 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_hello_req(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3427 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
3428 /* should contain no data */
3429 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_REQ, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3430 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
3431 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3432 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3435 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION)) {
3436 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
3437 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
3441 * This is a historical discrepancy (not in the RFC) maintained for
3442 * compatibility reasons. If a TLS client receives a HelloRequest it will
3443 * attempt an abbreviated handshake. However if a DTLS client receives a
3444 * HelloRequest it will do a full handshake. Either behaviour is reasonable
3445 * but doing one for TLS and another for DTLS is odd.
3450 SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated(s);
3452 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
3455 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3457 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3459 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
3461 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)
3462 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3463 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3464 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3468 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
3469 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, &rawexts,
3471 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
3472 rawexts, NULL, 0, &al, 1))
3475 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3476 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
3479 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3480 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3481 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3482 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3485 int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL *s, X509 **px509, EVP_PKEY **ppkey)
3488 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
3489 if (s->ctx->client_cert_engine) {
3490 i = ENGINE_load_ssl_client_cert(s->ctx->client_cert_engine, s,
3491 SSL_get_client_CA_list(s),
3492 px509, ppkey, NULL, NULL, NULL);
3497 if (s->ctx->client_cert_cb)
3498 i = s->ctx->client_cert_cb(s, px509, ppkey);
3502 int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk, WPACKET *pkt)
3505 size_t totlen = 0, len, maxlen, maxverok = 0;
3506 int empty_reneg_info_scsv = !s->renegotiate;
3507 /* Set disabled masks for this session */
3508 ssl_set_client_disabled(s);
3513 #ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
3514 # if OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH < 6
3515 # error Max cipher length too short
3518 * Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes as hack workaround
3519 * chop number of supported ciphers to keep it well below this if we
3522 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
3523 maxlen = OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH & ~1;
3526 /* Maximum length that can be stored in 2 bytes. Length must be even */
3529 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv)
3531 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV)
3534 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) && totlen < maxlen; i++) {
3535 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
3537 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);
3538 /* Skip disabled ciphers */
3539 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED, 0))
3542 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(c, pkt, &len)) {
3543 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3547 /* Sanity check that the maximum version we offer has ciphers enabled */
3549 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
3550 if (DTLS_VERSION_GE(c->max_dtls, s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
3551 && DTLS_VERSION_LE(c->min_dtls, s->s3->tmp.max_ver))
3554 if (c->max_tls >= s->s3->tmp.max_ver
3555 && c->min_tls <= s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
3563 if (totlen == 0 || !maxverok) {
3564 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE);
3567 ERR_add_error_data(1, "No ciphers enabled for max supported "
3574 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv) {
3575 static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
3576 0, NULL, NULL, SSL3_CK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3578 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, pkt, &len)) {
3579 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3583 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) {
3584 static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
3585 0, NULL, NULL, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3587 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, pkt, &len)) {
3588 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3597 int tls_construct_end_of_early_data(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3599 if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY
3600 && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING) {
3601 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA,
3602 ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
3606 s->early_data_state = SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING;