2 * Copyright 2016-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
10 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
11 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
12 #include "statem_locl.h"
13 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
15 #define COOKIE_STATE_FORMAT_VERSION 0
18 * 2 bytes for packet length, 2 bytes for format version, 2 bytes for
19 * protocol version, 2 bytes for group id, 2 bytes for cipher id, 1 byte for
20 * key_share present flag, 4 bytes for timestamp, 2 bytes for the hashlen,
21 * EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE for transcript hash, 1 byte for app cookie length, app cookie
22 * length bytes, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH bytes for the HMAC of the whole thing.
24 #define MAX_COOKIE_SIZE (2 + 2 + 2 + 2 + 2 + 1 + 4 + 2 + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + 1 \
25 + SSL_COOKIE_LENGTH + SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH)
28 * Message header + 2 bytes for protocol version + number of random bytes +
29 * + 1 byte for legacy session id length + number of bytes in legacy session id
30 * + 2 bytes for ciphersuite + 1 byte for legacy compression
31 * + 2 bytes for extension block length + 6 bytes for key_share extension
32 * + 4 bytes for cookie extension header + the number of bytes in the cookie
34 #define MAX_HRR_SIZE (SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + 2 + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + 1 \
35 + SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH + 2 + 1 + 2 + 6 + 4 \
39 * Parse the client's renegotiation binding and abort if it's not right
41 int tls_parse_ctos_renegotiate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
42 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
45 const unsigned char *data;
47 /* Parse the length byte */
48 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &ilen)
49 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, ilen)) {
50 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_RENEGOTIATE,
51 SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_ENCODING_ERR);
55 /* Check that the extension matches */
56 if (ilen != s->s3->previous_client_finished_len) {
57 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_RENEGOTIATE,
58 SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH);
62 if (memcmp(data, s->s3->previous_client_finished,
63 s->s3->previous_client_finished_len)) {
64 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_RENEGOTIATE,
65 SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH);
69 s->s3->send_connection_binding = 1;
75 * The servername extension is treated as follows:
77 * - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
78 * - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
79 * in which case an fatal alert is generated.
80 * - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
81 * - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
82 * to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
83 * - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
84 * it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
85 * Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
86 * set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
87 * case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
88 * a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
89 * presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
90 * the value of the Host: field.
91 * - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
92 * if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the
93 * session, i.e. when the session has been established with a servername
95 * - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
97 int tls_parse_ctos_server_name(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
98 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
100 unsigned int servname_type;
101 PACKET sni, hostname;
103 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &sni)
104 /* ServerNameList must be at least 1 byte long. */
105 || PACKET_remaining(&sni) == 0) {
106 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SERVER_NAME,
107 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
112 * Although the intent was for server_name to be extensible, RFC 4366
113 * was not clear about it; and so OpenSSL among other implementations,
114 * always and only allows a 'host_name' name types.
115 * RFC 6066 corrected the mistake but adding new name types
116 * is nevertheless no longer feasible, so act as if no other
117 * SNI types can exist, to simplify parsing.
119 * Also note that the RFC permits only one SNI value per type,
120 * i.e., we can only have a single hostname.
122 if (!PACKET_get_1(&sni, &servname_type)
123 || servname_type != TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name
124 || !PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&sni, &hostname)) {
125 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SERVER_NAME,
126 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
131 if (PACKET_remaining(&hostname) > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) {
132 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME,
133 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SERVER_NAME,
134 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
138 if (PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&hostname)) {
139 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME,
140 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SERVER_NAME,
141 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
145 OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.hostname);
146 s->session->ext.hostname = NULL;
147 if (!PACKET_strndup(&hostname, &s->session->ext.hostname)) {
148 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SERVER_NAME,
149 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
153 s->servername_done = 1;
156 * TODO(openssl-team): if the SNI doesn't match, we MUST
157 * fall back to a full handshake.
159 s->servername_done = s->session->ext.hostname
160 && PACKET_equal(&hostname, s->session->ext.hostname,
161 strlen(s->session->ext.hostname));
163 if (!s->servername_done && s->session->ext.hostname != NULL)
164 s->ext.early_data_ok = 0;
170 int tls_parse_ctos_maxfragmentlen(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
171 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
175 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 1 || !PACKET_get_1(pkt, &value)) {
176 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_MAXFRAGMENTLEN,
177 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
181 /* Received |value| should be a valid max-fragment-length code. */
182 if (!IS_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT_VALID(value)) {
183 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
184 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_MAXFRAGMENTLEN,
185 SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH);
190 * RFC 6066: The negotiated length applies for the duration of the session
191 * including session resumptions.
192 * We should receive the same code as in resumed session !
194 if (s->hit && s->session->ext.max_fragment_len_mode != value) {
195 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
196 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_MAXFRAGMENTLEN,
197 SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH);
202 * Store it in session, so it'll become binding for us
203 * and we'll include it in a next Server Hello.
205 s->session->ext.max_fragment_len_mode = value;
209 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
210 int tls_parse_ctos_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
215 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &srp_I)
216 || PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&srp_I)) {
217 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
218 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SRP,
219 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
224 * TODO(openssl-team): currently, we re-authenticate the user
225 * upon resumption. Instead, we MUST ignore the login.
227 if (!PACKET_strndup(&srp_I, &s->srp_ctx.login)) {
228 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SRP,
229 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
237 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
238 int tls_parse_ctos_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
239 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
241 PACKET ec_point_format_list;
243 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &ec_point_format_list)
244 || PACKET_remaining(&ec_point_format_list) == 0) {
245 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_EC_PT_FORMATS,
246 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
251 if (!PACKET_memdup(&ec_point_format_list,
252 &s->session->ext.ecpointformats,
253 &s->session->ext.ecpointformats_len)) {
254 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
255 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_EC_PT_FORMATS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
262 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
264 int tls_parse_ctos_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
265 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
267 if (s->ext.session_ticket_cb &&
268 !s->ext.session_ticket_cb(s, PACKET_data(pkt),
269 PACKET_remaining(pkt),
270 s->ext.session_ticket_cb_arg)) {
271 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
272 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
279 int tls_parse_ctos_sig_algs_cert(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
280 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
282 PACKET supported_sig_algs;
284 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &supported_sig_algs)
285 || PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) == 0) {
286 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
287 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SIG_ALGS_CERT, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
291 if (!s->hit && !tls1_save_sigalgs(s, &supported_sig_algs, 1)) {
292 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
293 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SIG_ALGS_CERT, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
300 int tls_parse_ctos_sig_algs(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
303 PACKET supported_sig_algs;
305 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &supported_sig_algs)
306 || PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) == 0) {
307 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
308 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SIG_ALGS, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
312 if (!s->hit && !tls1_save_sigalgs(s, &supported_sig_algs, 0)) {
313 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
314 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SIG_ALGS, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
321 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
322 int tls_parse_ctos_status_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
323 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
325 PACKET responder_id_list, exts;
327 /* We ignore this in a resumption handshake */
331 /* Not defined if we get one of these in a client Certificate */
335 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, (unsigned int *)&s->ext.status_type)) {
336 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
337 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
341 if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
343 * We don't know what to do with any other type so ignore it.
345 s->ext.status_type = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing;
349 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2 (pkt, &responder_id_list)) {
350 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
351 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
356 * We remove any OCSP_RESPIDs from a previous handshake
357 * to prevent unbounded memory growth - CVE-2016-6304
359 sk_OCSP_RESPID_pop_free(s->ext.ocsp.ids, OCSP_RESPID_free);
360 if (PACKET_remaining(&responder_id_list) > 0) {
361 s->ext.ocsp.ids = sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null();
362 if (s->ext.ocsp.ids == NULL) {
363 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
364 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
368 s->ext.ocsp.ids = NULL;
371 while (PACKET_remaining(&responder_id_list) > 0) {
374 const unsigned char *id_data;
376 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&responder_id_list, &responder_id)
377 || PACKET_remaining(&responder_id) == 0) {
378 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
379 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
383 id_data = PACKET_data(&responder_id);
384 /* TODO(size_t): Convert d2i_* to size_t */
385 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, &id_data,
386 (int)PACKET_remaining(&responder_id));
388 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
389 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
393 if (id_data != PACKET_end(&responder_id)) {
394 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
395 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
396 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
401 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->ext.ocsp.ids, id)) {
402 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
403 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
404 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
410 /* Read in request_extensions */
411 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &exts)) {
412 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
413 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
417 if (PACKET_remaining(&exts) > 0) {
418 const unsigned char *ext_data = PACKET_data(&exts);
420 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->ext.ocsp.exts,
421 X509_EXTENSION_free);
423 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &ext_data, (int)PACKET_remaining(&exts));
424 if (s->ext.ocsp.exts == NULL || ext_data != PACKET_end(&exts)) {
425 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
426 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
435 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
436 int tls_parse_ctos_npn(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
440 * We shouldn't accept this extension on a
443 if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s))
451 * Save the ALPN extension in a ClientHello.|pkt| holds the contents of the ALPN
452 * extension, not including type and length. Returns: 1 on success, 0 on error.
454 int tls_parse_ctos_alpn(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
457 PACKET protocol_list, save_protocol_list, protocol;
459 if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s))
462 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &protocol_list)
463 || PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) < 2) {
464 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_ALPN,
465 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
469 save_protocol_list = protocol_list;
471 /* Protocol names can't be empty. */
472 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&protocol_list, &protocol)
473 || PACKET_remaining(&protocol) == 0) {
474 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_ALPN,
475 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
478 } while (PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) != 0);
480 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_proposed);
481 s->s3->alpn_proposed = NULL;
482 s->s3->alpn_proposed_len = 0;
483 if (!PACKET_memdup(&save_protocol_list,
484 &s->s3->alpn_proposed, &s->s3->alpn_proposed_len)) {
485 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_ALPN,
486 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
493 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
494 int tls_parse_ctos_use_srtp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
497 STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *srvr;
498 unsigned int ct, mki_len, id;
502 /* Ignore this if we have no SRTP profiles */
503 if (SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s) == NULL)
506 /* Pull off the length of the cipher suite list and check it is even */
507 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ct) || (ct & 1) != 0
508 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &subpkt, ct)) {
509 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_USE_SRTP,
510 SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST);
514 srvr = SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s);
515 s->srtp_profile = NULL;
516 /* Search all profiles for a match initially */
517 srtp_pref = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(srvr);
519 while (PACKET_remaining(&subpkt)) {
520 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&subpkt, &id)) {
521 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_USE_SRTP,
522 SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST);
527 * Only look for match in profiles of higher preference than
529 * If no profiles have been have been configured then this
532 for (i = 0; i < srtp_pref; i++) {
533 SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *sprof =
534 sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(srvr, i);
536 if (sprof->id == id) {
537 s->srtp_profile = sprof;
544 /* Now extract the MKI value as a sanity check, but discard it for now */
545 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &mki_len)) {
546 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_USE_SRTP,
547 SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST);
551 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, mki_len)
552 || PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
553 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_USE_SRTP,
554 SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_MKI_VALUE);
562 int tls_parse_ctos_etm(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
565 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC))
572 * Process a psk_kex_modes extension received in the ClientHello. |pkt| contains
573 * the raw PACKET data for the extension. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure.
575 int tls_parse_ctos_psk_kex_modes(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
576 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
578 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
579 PACKET psk_kex_modes;
582 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &psk_kex_modes)
583 || PACKET_remaining(&psk_kex_modes) == 0) {
584 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK_KEX_MODES,
585 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
589 while (PACKET_get_1(&psk_kex_modes, &mode)) {
590 if (mode == TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_KE_DHE)
591 s->ext.psk_kex_mode |= TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE_DHE;
592 else if (mode == TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_KE
593 && (s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_NO_DHE_KEX) != 0)
594 s->ext.psk_kex_mode |= TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE;
602 * Process a key_share extension received in the ClientHello. |pkt| contains
603 * the raw PACKET data for the extension. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure.
605 int tls_parse_ctos_key_share(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
608 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
609 unsigned int group_id;
610 PACKET key_share_list, encoded_pt;
611 const uint16_t *clntgroups, *srvrgroups;
612 size_t clnt_num_groups, srvr_num_groups;
615 if (s->hit && (s->ext.psk_kex_mode & TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE_DHE) == 0)
619 if (s->s3->peer_tmp != NULL) {
620 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE,
621 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
625 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &key_share_list)) {
626 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE,
627 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
631 /* Get our list of supported groups */
632 tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &srvrgroups, &srvr_num_groups);
633 /* Get the clients list of supported groups. */
634 tls1_get_peer_groups(s, &clntgroups, &clnt_num_groups);
635 if (clnt_num_groups == 0) {
637 * This can only happen if the supported_groups extension was not sent,
638 * because we verify that the length is non-zero when we process that
641 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_MISSING_EXTENSION, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE,
642 SSL_R_MISSING_SUPPORTED_GROUPS_EXTENSION);
646 if (s->s3->group_id != 0 && PACKET_remaining(&key_share_list) == 0) {
648 * If we set a group_id already, then we must have sent an HRR
649 * requesting a new key_share. If we haven't got one then that is an
652 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE,
653 SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE);
657 while (PACKET_remaining(&key_share_list) > 0) {
658 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&key_share_list, &group_id)
659 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&key_share_list, &encoded_pt)
660 || PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt) == 0) {
661 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE,
662 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
667 * If we already found a suitable key_share we loop through the
668 * rest to verify the structure, but don't process them.
674 * If we sent an HRR then the key_share sent back MUST be for the group
675 * we requested, and must be the only key_share sent.
677 if (s->s3->group_id != 0
678 && (group_id != s->s3->group_id
679 || PACKET_remaining(&key_share_list) != 0)) {
680 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
681 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE);
685 /* Check if this share is in supported_groups sent from client */
686 if (!check_in_list(s, group_id, clntgroups, clnt_num_groups, 0)) {
687 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
688 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE);
692 /* Check if this share is for a group we can use */
693 if (!check_in_list(s, group_id, srvrgroups, srvr_num_groups, 1)) {
694 /* Share not suitable */
698 if ((s->s3->peer_tmp = ssl_generate_param_group(group_id)) == NULL) {
699 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE,
700 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
704 s->s3->group_id = group_id;
706 if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->peer_tmp,
707 PACKET_data(&encoded_pt),
708 PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt))) {
709 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
710 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
721 int tls_parse_ctos_cookie(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
724 unsigned int format, version, key_share, group_id;
727 PACKET cookie, raw, chhash, appcookie;
729 const unsigned char *data, *mdin, *ciphdata;
730 unsigned char hmac[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH];
731 unsigned char hrr[MAX_HRR_SIZE];
732 size_t rawlen, hmaclen, hrrlen, ciphlen;
733 unsigned long tm, now;
735 /* Ignore any cookie if we're not set up to verify it */
736 if (s->ctx->verify_stateless_cookie_cb == NULL
737 || (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_STATELESS) == 0)
740 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &cookie)) {
741 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
742 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
747 data = PACKET_data(&raw);
748 rawlen = PACKET_remaining(&raw);
749 if (rawlen < SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH
750 || !PACKET_forward(&raw, rawlen - SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH)) {
751 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
752 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
755 mdin = PACKET_data(&raw);
757 /* Verify the HMAC of the cookie */
758 hctx = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
759 pkey = EVP_PKEY_new_raw_private_key(EVP_PKEY_HMAC, NULL,
760 s->session_ctx->ext.cookie_hmac_key,
761 sizeof(s->session_ctx->ext
763 if (hctx == NULL || pkey == NULL) {
764 EVP_MD_CTX_free(hctx);
766 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
767 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
771 hmaclen = SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH;
772 if (EVP_DigestSignInit(hctx, NULL, EVP_sha256(), NULL, pkey) <= 0
773 || EVP_DigestSign(hctx, hmac, &hmaclen, data,
774 rawlen - SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH) <= 0
775 || hmaclen != SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH) {
776 EVP_MD_CTX_free(hctx);
778 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
779 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
783 EVP_MD_CTX_free(hctx);
786 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(hmac, mdin, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH) != 0) {
787 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
788 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
792 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&cookie, &format)) {
793 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
794 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
797 /* Check the cookie format is something we recognise. Ignore it if not */
798 if (format != COOKIE_STATE_FORMAT_VERSION)
802 * The rest of these checks really shouldn't fail since we have verified the
806 /* Check the version number is sane */
807 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&cookie, &version)) {
808 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
809 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
812 if (version != TLS1_3_VERSION) {
813 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
814 SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER);
818 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&cookie, &group_id)) {
819 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
820 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
824 ciphdata = PACKET_data(&cookie);
825 if (!PACKET_forward(&cookie, 2)) {
826 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
827 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
830 if (group_id != s->s3->group_id
831 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher
832 != ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, ciphdata, 0)) {
834 * We chose a different cipher or group id this time around to what is
835 * in the cookie. Something must have changed.
837 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
842 if (!PACKET_get_1(&cookie, &key_share)
843 || !PACKET_get_net_4(&cookie, &tm)
844 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&cookie, &chhash)
845 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&cookie, &appcookie)
846 || PACKET_remaining(&cookie) != SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH) {
847 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
848 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
852 /* We tolerate a cookie age of up to 10 minutes (= 60 * 10 seconds) */
853 now = (unsigned long)time(NULL);
854 if (tm > now || (now - tm) > 600) {
855 /* Cookie is stale. Ignore it */
859 /* Verify the app cookie */
860 if (s->ctx->verify_stateless_cookie_cb(s, PACKET_data(&appcookie),
861 PACKET_remaining(&appcookie)) == 0) {
862 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
863 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
868 * Reconstruct the HRR that we would have sent in response to the original
869 * ClientHello so we can add it to the transcript hash.
870 * Note: This won't work with custom HRR extensions
872 if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(&hrrpkt, hrr, sizeof(hrr), 0)) {
873 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
874 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
877 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(&hrrpkt, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO)
878 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u24(&hrrpkt)
879 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(&hrrpkt, TLS1_2_VERSION)
880 || !WPACKET_memcpy(&hrrpkt, hrrrandom, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)
881 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(&hrrpkt, s->tmp_session_id,
882 s->tmp_session_id_len)
883 || !s->method->put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, &hrrpkt,
885 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(&hrrpkt, 0)
886 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(&hrrpkt)) {
887 WPACKET_cleanup(&hrrpkt);
888 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
889 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
892 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(&hrrpkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_versions)
893 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(&hrrpkt)
894 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Fix this before release */
895 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(&hrrpkt, TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT)
896 || !WPACKET_close(&hrrpkt)) {
897 WPACKET_cleanup(&hrrpkt);
898 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
899 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
903 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(&hrrpkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share)
904 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(&hrrpkt)
905 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(&hrrpkt, s->s3->group_id)
906 || !WPACKET_close(&hrrpkt)) {
907 WPACKET_cleanup(&hrrpkt);
908 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
909 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
913 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(&hrrpkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_cookie)
914 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(&hrrpkt)
915 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(&hrrpkt, data, rawlen)
916 || !WPACKET_close(&hrrpkt) /* cookie extension */
917 || !WPACKET_close(&hrrpkt) /* extension block */
918 || !WPACKET_close(&hrrpkt) /* message */
919 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(&hrrpkt, &hrrlen)
920 || !WPACKET_finish(&hrrpkt)) {
921 WPACKET_cleanup(&hrrpkt);
922 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
923 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
927 /* Reconstruct the transcript hash */
928 if (!create_synthetic_message_hash(s, PACKET_data(&chhash),
929 PACKET_remaining(&chhash), hrr,
931 /* SSLfatal() already called */
935 /* Act as if this ClientHello came after a HelloRetryRequest */
936 s->hello_retry_request = 1;
943 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
944 int tls_parse_ctos_supported_groups(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
945 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
947 PACKET supported_groups_list;
949 /* Each group is 2 bytes and we must have at least 1. */
950 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &supported_groups_list)
951 || PACKET_remaining(&supported_groups_list) == 0
952 || (PACKET_remaining(&supported_groups_list) % 2) != 0) {
953 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
954 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SUPPORTED_GROUPS, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
958 if (!s->hit || SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
959 OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.supportedgroups);
960 s->session->ext.supportedgroups = NULL;
961 s->session->ext.supportedgroups_len = 0;
962 if (!tls1_save_u16(&supported_groups_list,
963 &s->session->ext.supportedgroups,
964 &s->session->ext.supportedgroups_len)) {
965 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
966 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SUPPORTED_GROUPS,
967 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
976 int tls_parse_ctos_ems(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
979 /* The extension must always be empty */
980 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
981 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
982 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_EMS, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
986 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
992 int tls_parse_ctos_early_data(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
993 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
995 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
996 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
997 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_EARLY_DATA, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1001 if (s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE) {
1002 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1003 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_EARLY_DATA, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1010 int tls_parse_ctos_psk(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1013 PACKET identities, binders, binder;
1014 size_t binderoffset, hashsize;
1015 SSL_SESSION *sess = NULL;
1016 unsigned int id, i, ext = 0;
1017 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1020 * If we have no PSK kex mode that we recognise then we can't resume so
1021 * ignore this extension
1023 if ((s->ext.psk_kex_mode
1024 & (TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE | TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE_DHE)) == 0)
1027 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &identities)) {
1028 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
1029 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1033 for (id = 0; PACKET_remaining(&identities) != 0; id++) {
1035 unsigned long ticket_agel;
1038 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&identities, &identity)
1039 || !PACKET_get_net_4(&identities, &ticket_agel)) {
1040 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
1041 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1045 idlen = PACKET_remaining(&identity);
1046 if (s->psk_find_session_cb != NULL
1047 && !s->psk_find_session_cb(s, PACKET_data(&identity), idlen,
1049 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1050 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1054 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1056 && s->psk_server_callback != NULL
1057 && idlen <= PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
1059 unsigned char pskdata[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
1060 unsigned int pskdatalen;
1062 if (!PACKET_strndup(&identity, &pskid)) {
1063 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK,
1064 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1067 pskdatalen = s->psk_server_callback(s, pskid, pskdata,
1069 OPENSSL_free(pskid);
1070 if (pskdatalen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
1071 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK,
1072 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1074 } else if (pskdatalen > 0) {
1075 const SSL_CIPHER *cipher;
1076 const unsigned char tls13_aes128gcmsha256_id[] = { 0x13, 0x01 };
1079 * We found a PSK using an old style callback. We don't know
1080 * the digest so we default to SHA256 as per the TLSv1.3 spec
1082 cipher = SSL_CIPHER_find(s, tls13_aes128gcmsha256_id);
1083 if (cipher == NULL) {
1084 OPENSSL_cleanse(pskdata, pskdatalen);
1085 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK,
1086 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1090 sess = SSL_SESSION_new();
1092 || !SSL_SESSION_set1_master_key(sess, pskdata,
1094 || !SSL_SESSION_set_cipher(sess, cipher)
1095 || !SSL_SESSION_set_protocol_version(sess,
1097 OPENSSL_cleanse(pskdata, pskdatalen);
1098 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK,
1099 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1102 OPENSSL_cleanse(pskdata, pskdatalen);
1105 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1108 /* We found a PSK */
1109 SSL_SESSION *sesstmp = ssl_session_dup(sess, 0);
1111 if (sesstmp == NULL) {
1112 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1113 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1116 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
1120 * We've just been told to use this session for this context so
1121 * make sure the sid_ctx matches up.
1123 memcpy(sess->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length);
1124 sess->sid_ctx_length = s->sid_ctx_length;
1127 s->ext.early_data_ok = 1;
1129 uint32_t ticket_age = 0, now, agesec, agems;
1130 int ret = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, PACKET_data(&identity),
1131 PACKET_remaining(&identity), NULL, 0,
1134 if (ret == SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC
1135 || ret == SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER) {
1136 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1137 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1140 if (ret == SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT)
1143 /* Check for replay */
1144 if (s->max_early_data > 0
1145 && !SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, sess)) {
1146 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
1151 ticket_age = (uint32_t)ticket_agel;
1152 now = (uint32_t)time(NULL);
1153 agesec = now - (uint32_t)sess->time;
1154 agems = agesec * (uint32_t)1000;
1155 ticket_age -= sess->ext.tick_age_add;
1158 * For simplicity we do our age calculations in seconds. If the
1159 * client does it in ms then it could appear that their ticket age
1160 * is longer than ours (our ticket age calculation should always be
1161 * slightly longer than the client's due to the network latency).
1162 * Therefore we add 1000ms to our age calculation to adjust for
1166 && sess->timeout >= (long)agesec
1167 && agems / (uint32_t)1000 == agesec
1168 && ticket_age <= agems + 1000
1169 && ticket_age + TICKET_AGE_ALLOWANCE >= agems + 1000) {
1171 * Ticket age is within tolerance and not expired. We allow it
1174 s->ext.early_data_ok = 1;
1178 md = ssl_md(sess->cipher->algorithm2);
1179 if (md != ssl_md(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2)) {
1180 /* The ciphersuite is not compatible with this session. */
1181 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
1183 s->ext.early_data_ok = 0;
1192 binderoffset = PACKET_data(pkt) - (const unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1193 hashsize = EVP_MD_size(md);
1195 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &binders)) {
1196 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK,
1197 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1201 for (i = 0; i <= id; i++) {
1202 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&binders, &binder)) {
1203 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK,
1204 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1209 if (PACKET_remaining(&binder) != hashsize) {
1210 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK,
1211 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1214 if (tls_psk_do_binder(s, md, (const unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data,
1215 binderoffset, PACKET_data(&binder), NULL, sess, 0,
1217 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1221 sess->ext.tick_identity = id;
1223 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
1227 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
1231 int tls_parse_ctos_post_handshake_auth(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
1232 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1234 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1235 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_POST_HANDSHAKE_AUTH,
1236 SSL_R_POST_HANDSHAKE_AUTH_ENCODING_ERR);
1240 s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_EXT_RECEIVED;
1246 * Add the server's renegotiation binding
1248 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_renegotiate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1249 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1252 if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1253 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1255 /* Still add this even if SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION is set */
1256 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
1257 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1258 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
1259 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->previous_client_finished,
1260 s->s3->previous_client_finished_len)
1261 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->previous_server_finished,
1262 s->s3->previous_server_finished_len)
1263 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1264 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1265 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_RENEGOTIATE,
1266 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1267 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1270 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1273 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_server_name(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1274 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1277 if (s->hit || s->servername_done != 1
1278 || s->session->ext.hostname == NULL)
1279 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1281 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1282 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1283 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SERVER_NAME,
1284 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1285 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1288 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1291 /* Add/include the server's max fragment len extension into ServerHello */
1292 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_maxfragmentlen(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1293 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1296 if (!USE_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT(s->session))
1297 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1300 * 4 bytes for this extension type and extension length
1301 * 1 byte for the Max Fragment Length code value.
1303 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_max_fragment_length)
1304 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1305 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->session->ext.max_fragment_len_mode)
1306 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1307 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1308 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_MAXFRAGMENTLEN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1309 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1312 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1315 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1316 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1317 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1320 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1321 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1322 int using_ecc = ((alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))
1323 && (s->session->ext.ecpointformats != NULL);
1324 const unsigned char *plist;
1328 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1330 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1331 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
1332 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1333 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, plist, plistlen)
1334 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1335 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1336 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_EC_PT_FORMATS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1337 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1340 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1344 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1345 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_supported_groups(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1346 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1349 const uint16_t *groups;
1350 size_t numgroups, i, first = 1;
1352 /* s->s3->group_id is non zero if we accepted a key_share */
1353 if (s->s3->group_id == 0)
1354 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1356 /* Get our list of supported groups */
1357 tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &groups, &numgroups);
1358 if (numgroups == 0) {
1359 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1360 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SUPPORTED_GROUPS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1361 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1364 /* Copy group ID if supported */
1365 for (i = 0; i < numgroups; i++) {
1366 uint16_t group = groups[i];
1368 if (tls_curve_allowed(s, group, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) {
1371 * Check if the client is already using our preferred group. If
1372 * so we don't need to add this extension
1374 if (s->s3->group_id == group)
1375 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1377 /* Add extension header */
1378 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_groups)
1379 /* Sub-packet for supported_groups extension */
1380 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1381 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1382 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1383 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SUPPORTED_GROUPS,
1384 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1385 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1390 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, group)) {
1391 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1392 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SUPPORTED_GROUPS,
1393 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1394 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1399 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1400 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1401 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SUPPORTED_GROUPS,
1402 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1403 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1406 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1410 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_session_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1411 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1414 if (!s->ext.ticket_expected || !tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1415 s->ext.ticket_expected = 0;
1416 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1419 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
1420 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1421 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1422 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1423 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1426 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1429 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
1430 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_status_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1431 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1434 if (!s->ext.status_expected)
1435 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1437 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && chainidx != 0)
1438 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1440 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
1441 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1442 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1443 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_STATUS_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1444 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1448 * In TLSv1.3 we include the certificate status itself. In <= TLSv1.2 we
1449 * send back an empty extension, with the certificate status appearing as a
1452 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !tls_construct_cert_status_body(s, pkt)) {
1453 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1454 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1456 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1457 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1458 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_STATUS_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1459 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1462 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1466 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1467 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_next_proto_neg(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1468 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1471 const unsigned char *npa;
1472 unsigned int npalen;
1474 int npn_seen = s->s3->npn_seen;
1476 s->s3->npn_seen = 0;
1477 if (!npn_seen || s->ctx->ext.npn_advertised_cb == NULL)
1478 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1480 ret = s->ctx->ext.npn_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen,
1481 s->ctx->ext.npn_advertised_cb_arg);
1482 if (ret == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1483 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg)
1484 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, npa, npalen)) {
1485 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1486 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_NEXT_PROTO_NEG,
1487 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1488 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1490 s->s3->npn_seen = 1;
1493 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1497 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_alpn(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
1498 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1500 if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL)
1501 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1503 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt,
1504 TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation)
1505 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1506 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1507 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->s3->alpn_selected,
1508 s->s3->alpn_selected_len)
1509 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1510 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1511 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1512 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_ALPN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1513 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1516 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1519 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1520 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_use_srtp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1521 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1524 if (s->srtp_profile == NULL)
1525 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1527 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
1528 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1529 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 2)
1530 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->srtp_profile->id)
1531 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)
1532 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1533 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_USE_SRTP,
1534 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1535 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1538 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1542 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_etm(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
1543 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1545 if (!s->ext.use_etm)
1546 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1549 * Don't use encrypt_then_mac if AEAD or RC4 might want to disable
1550 * for other cases too.
1552 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD
1553 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4
1554 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT
1555 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT12) {
1557 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1560 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
1561 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1562 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_ETM,
1563 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1564 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1567 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1570 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_ems(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
1571 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1573 if ((s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) == 0)
1574 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1576 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret)
1577 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1578 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_EMS,
1579 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1580 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1583 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1586 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_supported_versions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1587 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1590 if (!ossl_assert(SSL_IS_TLS13(s))) {
1591 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1592 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS,
1593 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1594 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1597 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_versions)
1598 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1599 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Update to remove the TLSv1.3 draft indicator */
1600 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT)
1601 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1602 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1603 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS,
1604 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1605 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1608 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1611 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_key_share(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1612 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1615 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
1616 unsigned char *encodedPoint;
1617 size_t encoded_pt_len = 0;
1618 EVP_PKEY *ckey = s->s3->peer_tmp, *skey = NULL;
1620 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
1622 /* Original key_share was acceptable so don't ask for another one */
1623 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1625 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share)
1626 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1627 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->s3->group_id)
1628 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1629 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1630 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE,
1631 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1632 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1635 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1639 /* No key_share received from client - must be resuming */
1640 if (!s->hit || !tls13_generate_handshake_secret(s, NULL, 0)) {
1641 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1642 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1643 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1645 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1648 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share)
1649 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1650 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->s3->group_id)) {
1651 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1652 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1653 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1656 skey = ssl_generate_pkey(ckey);
1658 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE,
1659 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1660 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1663 /* Generate encoding of server key */
1664 encoded_pt_len = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(skey, &encodedPoint);
1665 if (encoded_pt_len == 0) {
1666 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE,
1668 EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
1669 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1672 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len)
1673 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1674 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE,
1675 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1676 EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
1677 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1678 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1680 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1682 /* This causes the crypto state to be updated based on the derived keys */
1683 s->s3->tmp.pkey = skey;
1684 if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) {
1685 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1686 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1690 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1693 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_cookie(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
1694 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1696 unsigned char *hashval1, *hashval2, *appcookie1, *appcookie2, *cookie;
1697 unsigned char *hmac, *hmac2;
1698 size_t startlen, ciphlen, totcookielen, hashlen, hmaclen, appcookielen;
1701 int ret = EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1703 if ((s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_STATELESS) == 0)
1704 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1706 if (s->ctx->gen_stateless_cookie_cb == NULL) {
1707 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_COOKIE,
1708 SSL_R_NO_COOKIE_CALLBACK_SET);
1709 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1712 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_cookie)
1713 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1714 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1715 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &startlen)
1716 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, MAX_COOKIE_SIZE, &cookie)
1717 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, COOKIE_STATE_FORMAT_VERSION)
1718 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLS1_3_VERSION)
1719 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->s3->group_id)
1720 || !s->method->put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, pkt,
1722 /* Is there a key_share extension present in this HRR? */
1723 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->s3->peer_tmp == NULL)
1724 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, (unsigned int)time(NULL))
1725 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1726 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, &hashval1)) {
1727 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_COOKIE,
1728 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1729 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1733 * Get the hash of the initial ClientHello. ssl_handshake_hash() operates
1734 * on raw buffers, so we first reserve sufficient bytes (above) and then
1735 * subsequently allocate them (below)
1737 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)
1738 || !ssl_handshake_hash(s, hashval1, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, &hashlen)) {
1739 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1740 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1743 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, hashlen, &hashval2)
1744 || !ossl_assert(hashval1 == hashval2)
1745 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1746 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
1747 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, SSL_COOKIE_LENGTH, &appcookie1)) {
1748 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_COOKIE,
1749 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1750 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1753 /* Generate the application cookie */
1754 if (s->ctx->gen_stateless_cookie_cb(s, appcookie1, &appcookielen) == 0) {
1755 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_COOKIE,
1756 SSL_R_COOKIE_GEN_CALLBACK_FAILURE);
1757 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1760 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, appcookielen, &appcookie2)
1761 || !ossl_assert(appcookie1 == appcookie2)
1762 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1763 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &totcookielen)
1764 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH, &hmac)) {
1765 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_COOKIE,
1766 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1767 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1769 hmaclen = SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH;
1771 totcookielen -= startlen;
1772 if (!ossl_assert(totcookielen <= MAX_COOKIE_SIZE - SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH)) {
1773 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_COOKIE,
1774 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1775 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1778 /* HMAC the cookie */
1779 hctx = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
1780 pkey = EVP_PKEY_new_raw_private_key(EVP_PKEY_HMAC, NULL,
1781 s->session_ctx->ext.cookie_hmac_key,
1782 sizeof(s->session_ctx->ext
1784 if (hctx == NULL || pkey == NULL) {
1785 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_COOKIE,
1786 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1790 if (EVP_DigestSignInit(hctx, NULL, EVP_sha256(), NULL, pkey) <= 0
1791 || EVP_DigestSign(hctx, hmac, &hmaclen, cookie,
1792 totcookielen) <= 0) {
1793 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_COOKIE,
1794 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1798 if (!ossl_assert(totcookielen + hmaclen <= MAX_COOKIE_SIZE)) {
1799 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_COOKIE,
1800 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1804 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, hmaclen, &hmac2)
1805 || !ossl_assert(hmac == hmac2)
1806 || !ossl_assert(cookie == hmac - totcookielen)
1807 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1808 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1809 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_COOKIE,
1810 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1814 ret = EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1817 EVP_MD_CTX_free(hctx);
1818 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
1822 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_cryptopro_bug(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1823 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1826 const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1827 0xfd, 0xe8, /* 65000 */
1828 0x00, 0x20, /* 32 bytes length */
1829 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1830 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1831 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1832 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17
1835 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) != 0x80
1836 && (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) != 0x81)
1837 || (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG) == 0)
1838 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1840 if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, cryptopro_ext, sizeof(cryptopro_ext))) {
1841 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1842 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_CRYPTOPRO_BUG, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1843 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1846 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1849 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_early_data(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1850 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1853 if (context == SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET) {
1854 if (s->max_early_data == 0)
1855 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1857 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_early_data)
1858 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1859 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, s->max_early_data)
1860 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1861 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1862 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_EARLY_DATA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1863 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1866 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1869 if (s->ext.early_data != SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED)
1870 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1872 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_early_data)
1873 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1874 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1875 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_EARLY_DATA,
1876 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1877 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1880 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1883 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_psk(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
1884 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1887 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1889 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_psk)
1890 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1891 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->session->ext.tick_identity)
1892 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1893 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1894 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_PSK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1895 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1898 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;