2 * Copyright 2016-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
10 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
11 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
12 #include "statem_locl.h"
13 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
15 #define COOKIE_STATE_FORMAT_VERSION 0
18 * 2 bytes for packet length, 2 bytes for format version, 2 bytes for
19 * protocol version, 2 bytes for group id, 2 bytes for cipher id, 1 byte for
20 * key_share present flag, 4 bytes for timestamp, 2 bytes for the hashlen,
21 * EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE for transcript hash, 1 byte for app cookie length, app cookie
22 * length bytes, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH bytes for the HMAC of the whole thing.
24 #define MAX_COOKIE_SIZE (2 + 2 + 2 + 2 + 2 + 1 + 4 + 2 + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + 1 \
25 + SSL_COOKIE_LENGTH + SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH)
28 * Message header + 2 bytes for protocol version + number of random bytes +
29 * + 1 byte for legacy session id length + number of bytes in legacy session id
30 * + 2 bytes for ciphersuite + 1 byte for legacy compression
31 * + 2 bytes for extension block length + 6 bytes for key_share extension
32 * + 4 bytes for cookie extension header + the number of bytes in the cookie
34 #define MAX_HRR_SIZE (SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + 2 + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + 1 \
35 + SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH + 2 + 1 + 2 + 6 + 4 \
39 * Parse the client's renegotiation binding and abort if it's not right
41 int tls_parse_ctos_renegotiate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
42 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
45 const unsigned char *data;
47 /* Parse the length byte */
48 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &ilen)
49 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, ilen)) {
50 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_RENEGOTIATE,
51 SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_ENCODING_ERR);
55 /* Check that the extension matches */
56 if (ilen != s->s3->previous_client_finished_len) {
57 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_RENEGOTIATE,
58 SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH);
62 if (memcmp(data, s->s3->previous_client_finished,
63 s->s3->previous_client_finished_len)) {
64 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_RENEGOTIATE,
65 SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH);
69 s->s3->send_connection_binding = 1;
75 * The servername extension is treated as follows:
77 * - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
78 * - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
79 * in which case an fatal alert is generated.
80 * - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
81 * - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
82 * to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
83 * - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
84 * it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
85 * Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
86 * set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
87 * case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
88 * a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
89 * presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
90 * the value of the Host: field.
91 * - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
92 * if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the
93 * session, i.e. when the session has been established with a servername
95 * - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
97 int tls_parse_ctos_server_name(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
98 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
100 unsigned int servname_type;
101 PACKET sni, hostname;
103 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &sni)
104 /* ServerNameList must be at least 1 byte long. */
105 || PACKET_remaining(&sni) == 0) {
106 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SERVER_NAME,
107 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
112 * Although the intent was for server_name to be extensible, RFC 4366
113 * was not clear about it; and so OpenSSL among other implementations,
114 * always and only allows a 'host_name' name types.
115 * RFC 6066 corrected the mistake but adding new name types
116 * is nevertheless no longer feasible, so act as if no other
117 * SNI types can exist, to simplify parsing.
119 * Also note that the RFC permits only one SNI value per type,
120 * i.e., we can only have a single hostname.
122 if (!PACKET_get_1(&sni, &servname_type)
123 || servname_type != TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name
124 || !PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&sni, &hostname)) {
125 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SERVER_NAME,
126 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
131 if (PACKET_remaining(&hostname) > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) {
132 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME,
133 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SERVER_NAME,
134 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
138 if (PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&hostname)) {
139 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME,
140 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SERVER_NAME,
141 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
145 OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.hostname);
146 s->session->ext.hostname = NULL;
147 if (!PACKET_strndup(&hostname, &s->session->ext.hostname)) {
148 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SERVER_NAME,
149 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
153 s->servername_done = 1;
156 * TODO(openssl-team): if the SNI doesn't match, we MUST
157 * fall back to a full handshake.
159 s->servername_done = s->session->ext.hostname
160 && PACKET_equal(&hostname, s->session->ext.hostname,
161 strlen(s->session->ext.hostname));
163 if (!s->servername_done && s->session->ext.hostname != NULL)
164 s->ext.early_data_ok = 0;
170 int tls_parse_ctos_maxfragmentlen(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
171 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
175 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 1 || !PACKET_get_1(pkt, &value)) {
176 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_MAXFRAGMENTLEN,
177 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
181 /* Received |value| should be a valid max-fragment-length code. */
182 if (!IS_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT_VALID(value)) {
183 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
184 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_MAXFRAGMENTLEN,
185 SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH);
190 * RFC 6066: The negotiated length applies for the duration of the session
191 * including session resumptions.
192 * We should receive the same code as in resumed session !
194 if (s->hit && s->session->ext.max_fragment_len_mode != value) {
195 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
196 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_MAXFRAGMENTLEN,
197 SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH);
202 * Store it in session, so it'll become binding for us
203 * and we'll include it in a next Server Hello.
205 s->session->ext.max_fragment_len_mode = value;
209 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
210 int tls_parse_ctos_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
215 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &srp_I)
216 || PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&srp_I)) {
217 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
218 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SRP,
219 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
224 * TODO(openssl-team): currently, we re-authenticate the user
225 * upon resumption. Instead, we MUST ignore the login.
227 if (!PACKET_strndup(&srp_I, &s->srp_ctx.login)) {
228 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SRP,
229 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
237 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
238 int tls_parse_ctos_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
239 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
241 PACKET ec_point_format_list;
243 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &ec_point_format_list)
244 || PACKET_remaining(&ec_point_format_list) == 0) {
245 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_EC_PT_FORMATS,
246 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
251 if (!PACKET_memdup(&ec_point_format_list,
252 &s->session->ext.ecpointformats,
253 &s->session->ext.ecpointformats_len)) {
254 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
255 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_EC_PT_FORMATS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
262 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
264 int tls_parse_ctos_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
265 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
267 if (s->ext.session_ticket_cb &&
268 !s->ext.session_ticket_cb(s, PACKET_data(pkt),
269 PACKET_remaining(pkt),
270 s->ext.session_ticket_cb_arg)) {
271 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
272 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
279 int tls_parse_ctos_sig_algs_cert(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
280 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
282 PACKET supported_sig_algs;
284 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &supported_sig_algs)
285 || PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) == 0) {
286 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
287 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SIG_ALGS_CERT, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
291 if (!s->hit && !tls1_save_sigalgs(s, &supported_sig_algs, 1)) {
292 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
293 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SIG_ALGS_CERT, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
300 int tls_parse_ctos_sig_algs(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
303 PACKET supported_sig_algs;
305 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &supported_sig_algs)
306 || PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) == 0) {
307 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
308 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SIG_ALGS, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
312 if (!s->hit && !tls1_save_sigalgs(s, &supported_sig_algs, 0)) {
313 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
314 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SIG_ALGS, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
321 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
322 int tls_parse_ctos_status_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
323 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
325 PACKET responder_id_list, exts;
327 /* We ignore this in a resumption handshake */
331 /* Not defined if we get one of these in a client Certificate */
335 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, (unsigned int *)&s->ext.status_type)) {
336 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
337 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
341 if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
343 * We don't know what to do with any other type so ignore it.
345 s->ext.status_type = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing;
349 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2 (pkt, &responder_id_list)) {
350 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
351 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
356 * We remove any OCSP_RESPIDs from a previous handshake
357 * to prevent unbounded memory growth - CVE-2016-6304
359 sk_OCSP_RESPID_pop_free(s->ext.ocsp.ids, OCSP_RESPID_free);
360 if (PACKET_remaining(&responder_id_list) > 0) {
361 s->ext.ocsp.ids = sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null();
362 if (s->ext.ocsp.ids == NULL) {
363 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
364 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
368 s->ext.ocsp.ids = NULL;
371 while (PACKET_remaining(&responder_id_list) > 0) {
374 const unsigned char *id_data;
376 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&responder_id_list, &responder_id)
377 || PACKET_remaining(&responder_id) == 0) {
378 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
379 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
383 id_data = PACKET_data(&responder_id);
384 /* TODO(size_t): Convert d2i_* to size_t */
385 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, &id_data,
386 (int)PACKET_remaining(&responder_id));
388 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
389 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
393 if (id_data != PACKET_end(&responder_id)) {
394 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
395 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
396 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
401 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->ext.ocsp.ids, id)) {
402 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
403 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
404 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
410 /* Read in request_extensions */
411 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &exts)) {
412 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
413 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
417 if (PACKET_remaining(&exts) > 0) {
418 const unsigned char *ext_data = PACKET_data(&exts);
420 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->ext.ocsp.exts,
421 X509_EXTENSION_free);
423 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &ext_data, (int)PACKET_remaining(&exts));
424 if (s->ext.ocsp.exts == NULL || ext_data != PACKET_end(&exts)) {
425 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
426 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
435 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
436 int tls_parse_ctos_npn(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
440 * We shouldn't accept this extension on a
443 if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s))
451 * Save the ALPN extension in a ClientHello.|pkt| holds the contents of the ALPN
452 * extension, not including type and length. Returns: 1 on success, 0 on error.
454 int tls_parse_ctos_alpn(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
457 PACKET protocol_list, save_protocol_list, protocol;
459 if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s))
462 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &protocol_list)
463 || PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) < 2) {
464 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_ALPN,
465 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
469 save_protocol_list = protocol_list;
471 /* Protocol names can't be empty. */
472 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&protocol_list, &protocol)
473 || PACKET_remaining(&protocol) == 0) {
474 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_ALPN,
475 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
478 } while (PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) != 0);
480 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_proposed);
481 s->s3->alpn_proposed = NULL;
482 s->s3->alpn_proposed_len = 0;
483 if (!PACKET_memdup(&save_protocol_list,
484 &s->s3->alpn_proposed, &s->s3->alpn_proposed_len)) {
485 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_ALPN,
486 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
493 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
494 int tls_parse_ctos_use_srtp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
497 STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *srvr;
498 unsigned int ct, mki_len, id;
502 /* Ignore this if we have no SRTP profiles */
503 if (SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s) == NULL)
506 /* Pull off the length of the cipher suite list and check it is even */
507 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ct) || (ct & 1) != 0
508 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &subpkt, ct)) {
509 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_USE_SRTP,
510 SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST);
514 srvr = SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s);
515 s->srtp_profile = NULL;
516 /* Search all profiles for a match initially */
517 srtp_pref = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(srvr);
519 while (PACKET_remaining(&subpkt)) {
520 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&subpkt, &id)) {
521 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_USE_SRTP,
522 SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST);
527 * Only look for match in profiles of higher preference than
529 * If no profiles have been have been configured then this
532 for (i = 0; i < srtp_pref; i++) {
533 SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *sprof =
534 sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(srvr, i);
536 if (sprof->id == id) {
537 s->srtp_profile = sprof;
544 /* Now extract the MKI value as a sanity check, but discard it for now */
545 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &mki_len)) {
546 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_USE_SRTP,
547 SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST);
551 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, mki_len)
552 || PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
553 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_USE_SRTP,
554 SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_MKI_VALUE);
562 int tls_parse_ctos_etm(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
565 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC))
572 * Process a psk_kex_modes extension received in the ClientHello. |pkt| contains
573 * the raw PACKET data for the extension. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure.
575 int tls_parse_ctos_psk_kex_modes(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
576 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
578 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
579 PACKET psk_kex_modes;
582 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &psk_kex_modes)
583 || PACKET_remaining(&psk_kex_modes) == 0) {
584 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK_KEX_MODES,
585 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
589 while (PACKET_get_1(&psk_kex_modes, &mode)) {
590 if (mode == TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_KE_DHE)
591 s->ext.psk_kex_mode |= TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE_DHE;
592 else if (mode == TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_KE
593 && (s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_NO_DHE_KEX) != 0)
594 s->ext.psk_kex_mode |= TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE;
602 * Process a key_share extension received in the ClientHello. |pkt| contains
603 * the raw PACKET data for the extension. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure.
605 int tls_parse_ctos_key_share(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
608 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
609 unsigned int group_id;
610 PACKET key_share_list, encoded_pt;
611 const uint16_t *clntgroups, *srvrgroups;
612 size_t clnt_num_groups, srvr_num_groups;
615 if (s->hit && (s->ext.psk_kex_mode & TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE_DHE) == 0)
619 if (s->s3->peer_tmp != NULL) {
620 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE,
621 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
625 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &key_share_list)) {
626 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE,
627 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
631 /* Get our list of supported groups */
632 tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &srvrgroups, &srvr_num_groups);
633 /* Get the clients list of supported groups. */
634 tls1_get_peer_groups(s, &clntgroups, &clnt_num_groups);
635 if (clnt_num_groups == 0) {
637 * This can only happen if the supported_groups extension was not sent,
638 * because we verify that the length is non-zero when we process that
641 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_MISSING_EXTENSION, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE,
642 SSL_R_MISSING_SUPPORTED_GROUPS_EXTENSION);
646 if (s->s3->group_id != 0 && PACKET_remaining(&key_share_list) == 0) {
648 * If we set a group_id already, then we must have sent an HRR
649 * requesting a new key_share. If we haven't got one then that is an
652 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE,
653 SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE);
657 while (PACKET_remaining(&key_share_list) > 0) {
658 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&key_share_list, &group_id)
659 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&key_share_list, &encoded_pt)
660 || PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt) == 0) {
661 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE,
662 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
667 * If we already found a suitable key_share we loop through the
668 * rest to verify the structure, but don't process them.
674 * If we sent an HRR then the key_share sent back MUST be for the group
675 * we requested, and must be the only key_share sent.
677 if (s->s3->group_id != 0
678 && (group_id != s->s3->group_id
679 || PACKET_remaining(&key_share_list) != 0)) {
680 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
681 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE);
685 /* Check if this share is in supported_groups sent from client */
686 if (!check_in_list(s, group_id, clntgroups, clnt_num_groups, 0)) {
687 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
688 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE);
692 /* Check if this share is for a group we can use */
693 if (!check_in_list(s, group_id, srvrgroups, srvr_num_groups, 1)) {
694 /* Share not suitable */
698 if ((s->s3->peer_tmp = ssl_generate_param_group(group_id)) == NULL) {
699 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE,
700 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
704 s->s3->group_id = group_id;
706 if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->peer_tmp,
707 PACKET_data(&encoded_pt),
708 PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt))) {
709 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
710 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
721 int tls_parse_ctos_cookie(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
724 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
725 unsigned int format, version, key_share, group_id;
728 PACKET cookie, raw, chhash, appcookie;
730 const unsigned char *data, *mdin, *ciphdata;
731 unsigned char hmac[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH];
732 unsigned char hrr[MAX_HRR_SIZE];
733 size_t rawlen, hmaclen, hrrlen, ciphlen;
734 unsigned long tm, now;
736 /* Ignore any cookie if we're not set up to verify it */
737 if (s->ctx->verify_stateless_cookie_cb == NULL
738 || (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_STATELESS) == 0)
741 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &cookie)) {
742 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
743 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
748 data = PACKET_data(&raw);
749 rawlen = PACKET_remaining(&raw);
750 if (rawlen < SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH
751 || !PACKET_forward(&raw, rawlen - SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH)) {
752 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
753 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
756 mdin = PACKET_data(&raw);
758 /* Verify the HMAC of the cookie */
759 hctx = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
760 pkey = EVP_PKEY_new_raw_private_key(EVP_PKEY_HMAC, NULL,
761 s->session_ctx->ext.cookie_hmac_key,
762 sizeof(s->session_ctx->ext
764 if (hctx == NULL || pkey == NULL) {
765 EVP_MD_CTX_free(hctx);
767 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
768 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
772 hmaclen = SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH;
773 if (EVP_DigestSignInit(hctx, NULL, EVP_sha256(), NULL, pkey) <= 0
774 || EVP_DigestSign(hctx, hmac, &hmaclen, data,
775 rawlen - SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH) <= 0
776 || hmaclen != SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH) {
777 EVP_MD_CTX_free(hctx);
779 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
780 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
784 EVP_MD_CTX_free(hctx);
787 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(hmac, mdin, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH) != 0) {
788 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
789 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
793 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&cookie, &format)) {
794 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
795 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
798 /* Check the cookie format is something we recognise. Ignore it if not */
799 if (format != COOKIE_STATE_FORMAT_VERSION)
803 * The rest of these checks really shouldn't fail since we have verified the
807 /* Check the version number is sane */
808 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&cookie, &version)) {
809 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
810 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
813 if (version != TLS1_3_VERSION) {
814 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
815 SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER);
819 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&cookie, &group_id)) {
820 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
821 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
825 ciphdata = PACKET_data(&cookie);
826 if (!PACKET_forward(&cookie, 2)) {
827 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
828 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
831 if (group_id != s->s3->group_id
832 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher
833 != ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, ciphdata, 0)) {
835 * We chose a different cipher or group id this time around to what is
836 * in the cookie. Something must have changed.
838 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
843 if (!PACKET_get_1(&cookie, &key_share)
844 || !PACKET_get_net_4(&cookie, &tm)
845 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&cookie, &chhash)
846 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&cookie, &appcookie)
847 || PACKET_remaining(&cookie) != SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH) {
848 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
849 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
853 /* We tolerate a cookie age of up to 10 minutes (= 60 * 10 seconds) */
854 now = (unsigned long)time(NULL);
855 if (tm > now || (now - tm) > 600) {
856 /* Cookie is stale. Ignore it */
860 /* Verify the app cookie */
861 if (s->ctx->verify_stateless_cookie_cb(s, PACKET_data(&appcookie),
862 PACKET_remaining(&appcookie)) == 0) {
863 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
864 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
869 * Reconstruct the HRR that we would have sent in response to the original
870 * ClientHello so we can add it to the transcript hash.
871 * Note: This won't work with custom HRR extensions
873 if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(&hrrpkt, hrr, sizeof(hrr), 0)) {
874 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
875 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
878 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(&hrrpkt, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO)
879 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u24(&hrrpkt)
880 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(&hrrpkt, TLS1_2_VERSION)
881 || !WPACKET_memcpy(&hrrpkt, hrrrandom, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)
882 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(&hrrpkt, s->tmp_session_id,
883 s->tmp_session_id_len)
884 || !s->method->put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, &hrrpkt,
886 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(&hrrpkt, 0)
887 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(&hrrpkt)) {
888 WPACKET_cleanup(&hrrpkt);
889 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
890 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
893 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(&hrrpkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_versions)
894 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(&hrrpkt)
895 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Fix this before release */
896 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(&hrrpkt, s->version_draft)
897 || !WPACKET_close(&hrrpkt)) {
898 WPACKET_cleanup(&hrrpkt);
899 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
900 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
904 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(&hrrpkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share)
905 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(&hrrpkt)
906 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(&hrrpkt, s->s3->group_id)
907 || !WPACKET_close(&hrrpkt)) {
908 WPACKET_cleanup(&hrrpkt);
909 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
910 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
914 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(&hrrpkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_cookie)
915 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(&hrrpkt)
916 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(&hrrpkt, data, rawlen)
917 || !WPACKET_close(&hrrpkt) /* cookie extension */
918 || !WPACKET_close(&hrrpkt) /* extension block */
919 || !WPACKET_close(&hrrpkt) /* message */
920 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(&hrrpkt, &hrrlen)
921 || !WPACKET_finish(&hrrpkt)) {
922 WPACKET_cleanup(&hrrpkt);
923 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
924 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
928 /* Reconstruct the transcript hash */
929 if (!create_synthetic_message_hash(s, PACKET_data(&chhash),
930 PACKET_remaining(&chhash), hrr,
932 /* SSLfatal() already called */
936 /* Act as if this ClientHello came after a HelloRetryRequest */
937 s->hello_retry_request = 1;
945 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
946 int tls_parse_ctos_supported_groups(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
947 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
949 PACKET supported_groups_list;
951 /* Each group is 2 bytes and we must have at least 1. */
952 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &supported_groups_list)
953 || PACKET_remaining(&supported_groups_list) == 0
954 || (PACKET_remaining(&supported_groups_list) % 2) != 0) {
955 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
956 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SUPPORTED_GROUPS, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
960 if (!s->hit || SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
961 OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.supportedgroups);
962 s->session->ext.supportedgroups = NULL;
963 s->session->ext.supportedgroups_len = 0;
964 if (!tls1_save_u16(&supported_groups_list,
965 &s->session->ext.supportedgroups,
966 &s->session->ext.supportedgroups_len)) {
967 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
968 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SUPPORTED_GROUPS,
969 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
978 int tls_parse_ctos_ems(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
981 /* The extension must always be empty */
982 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
983 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
984 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_EMS, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
988 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
994 int tls_parse_ctos_early_data(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
995 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
997 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
998 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
999 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_EARLY_DATA, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1003 if (s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE) {
1004 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1005 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_EARLY_DATA, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1012 static SSL_TICKET_STATUS tls_get_stateful_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *tick,
1015 SSL_SESSION *tmpsess = NULL;
1017 s->ext.ticket_expected = 1;
1019 switch (PACKET_remaining(tick)) {
1021 return SSL_TICKET_EMPTY;
1023 case SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH:
1027 return SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1030 tmpsess = lookup_sess_in_cache(s, PACKET_data(tick),
1031 SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH);
1033 if (tmpsess == NULL)
1034 return SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1037 return SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS;
1040 int tls_parse_ctos_psk(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1043 PACKET identities, binders, binder;
1044 size_t binderoffset, hashsize;
1045 SSL_SESSION *sess = NULL;
1046 unsigned int id, i, ext = 0;
1047 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1050 * If we have no PSK kex mode that we recognise then we can't resume so
1051 * ignore this extension
1053 if ((s->ext.psk_kex_mode
1054 & (TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE | TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE_DHE)) == 0)
1057 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &identities)) {
1058 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
1059 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1063 s->ext.ticket_expected = 0;
1064 for (id = 0; PACKET_remaining(&identities) != 0; id++) {
1066 unsigned long ticket_agel;
1069 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&identities, &identity)
1070 || !PACKET_get_net_4(&identities, &ticket_agel)) {
1071 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
1072 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1076 idlen = PACKET_remaining(&identity);
1077 if (s->psk_find_session_cb != NULL
1078 && !s->psk_find_session_cb(s, PACKET_data(&identity), idlen,
1080 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1081 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1085 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1087 && s->psk_server_callback != NULL
1088 && idlen <= PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
1090 unsigned char pskdata[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
1091 unsigned int pskdatalen;
1093 if (!PACKET_strndup(&identity, &pskid)) {
1094 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK,
1095 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1098 pskdatalen = s->psk_server_callback(s, pskid, pskdata,
1100 OPENSSL_free(pskid);
1101 if (pskdatalen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
1102 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK,
1103 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1105 } else if (pskdatalen > 0) {
1106 const SSL_CIPHER *cipher;
1107 const unsigned char tls13_aes128gcmsha256_id[] = { 0x13, 0x01 };
1110 * We found a PSK using an old style callback. We don't know
1111 * the digest so we default to SHA256 as per the TLSv1.3 spec
1113 cipher = SSL_CIPHER_find(s, tls13_aes128gcmsha256_id);
1114 if (cipher == NULL) {
1115 OPENSSL_cleanse(pskdata, pskdatalen);
1116 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK,
1117 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1121 sess = SSL_SESSION_new();
1123 || !SSL_SESSION_set1_master_key(sess, pskdata,
1125 || !SSL_SESSION_set_cipher(sess, cipher)
1126 || !SSL_SESSION_set_protocol_version(sess,
1128 OPENSSL_cleanse(pskdata, pskdatalen);
1129 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK,
1130 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1133 OPENSSL_cleanse(pskdata, pskdatalen);
1136 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1139 /* We found a PSK */
1140 SSL_SESSION *sesstmp = ssl_session_dup(sess, 0);
1142 if (sesstmp == NULL) {
1143 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1144 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1147 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
1151 * We've just been told to use this session for this context so
1152 * make sure the sid_ctx matches up.
1154 memcpy(sess->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length);
1155 sess->sid_ctx_length = s->sid_ctx_length;
1158 s->ext.early_data_ok = 1;
1160 uint32_t ticket_age = 0, now, agesec, agems;
1164 * If we are using anti-replay protection then we behave as if
1165 * SSL_OP_NO_TICKET is set - we are caching tickets anyway so there
1166 * is no point in using full stateless tickets.
1168 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) != 0
1169 || (s->max_early_data > 0
1170 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ANTI_REPLAY) == 0))
1171 ret = tls_get_stateful_ticket(s, &identity, &sess);
1173 ret = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, PACKET_data(&identity),
1174 PACKET_remaining(&identity), NULL, 0,
1177 if (ret == SSL_TICKET_EMPTY) {
1178 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK,
1179 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1183 if (ret == SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC
1184 || ret == SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER) {
1185 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1186 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1189 if (ret == SSL_TICKET_NONE || ret == SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT)
1192 /* Check for replay */
1193 if (s->max_early_data > 0
1194 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ANTI_REPLAY) == 0
1195 && !SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, sess)) {
1196 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
1201 ticket_age = (uint32_t)ticket_agel;
1202 now = (uint32_t)time(NULL);
1203 agesec = now - (uint32_t)sess->time;
1204 agems = agesec * (uint32_t)1000;
1205 ticket_age -= sess->ext.tick_age_add;
1208 * For simplicity we do our age calculations in seconds. If the
1209 * client does it in ms then it could appear that their ticket age
1210 * is longer than ours (our ticket age calculation should always be
1211 * slightly longer than the client's due to the network latency).
1212 * Therefore we add 1000ms to our age calculation to adjust for
1216 && sess->timeout >= (long)agesec
1217 && agems / (uint32_t)1000 == agesec
1218 && ticket_age <= agems + 1000
1219 && ticket_age + TICKET_AGE_ALLOWANCE >= agems + 1000) {
1221 * Ticket age is within tolerance and not expired. We allow it
1224 s->ext.early_data_ok = 1;
1228 md = ssl_md(sess->cipher->algorithm2);
1229 if (md != ssl_md(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2)) {
1230 /* The ciphersuite is not compatible with this session. */
1231 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
1233 s->ext.early_data_ok = 0;
1242 binderoffset = PACKET_data(pkt) - (const unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1243 hashsize = EVP_MD_size(md);
1245 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &binders)) {
1246 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK,
1247 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1251 for (i = 0; i <= id; i++) {
1252 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&binders, &binder)) {
1253 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK,
1254 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1259 if (PACKET_remaining(&binder) != hashsize) {
1260 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK,
1261 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1264 if (tls_psk_do_binder(s, md, (const unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data,
1265 binderoffset, PACKET_data(&binder), NULL, sess, 0,
1267 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1271 sess->ext.tick_identity = id;
1273 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
1277 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
1281 int tls_parse_ctos_post_handshake_auth(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
1282 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1284 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1285 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_POST_HANDSHAKE_AUTH,
1286 SSL_R_POST_HANDSHAKE_AUTH_ENCODING_ERR);
1290 s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_EXT_RECEIVED;
1296 * Add the server's renegotiation binding
1298 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_renegotiate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1299 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1302 if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1303 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1305 /* Still add this even if SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION is set */
1306 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
1307 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1308 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
1309 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->previous_client_finished,
1310 s->s3->previous_client_finished_len)
1311 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->previous_server_finished,
1312 s->s3->previous_server_finished_len)
1313 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1314 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1315 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_RENEGOTIATE,
1316 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1317 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1320 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1323 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_server_name(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1324 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1327 if (s->hit || s->servername_done != 1
1328 || s->session->ext.hostname == NULL)
1329 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1331 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1332 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1333 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SERVER_NAME,
1334 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1335 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1338 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1341 /* Add/include the server's max fragment len extension into ServerHello */
1342 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_maxfragmentlen(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1343 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1346 if (!USE_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT(s->session))
1347 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1350 * 4 bytes for this extension type and extension length
1351 * 1 byte for the Max Fragment Length code value.
1353 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_max_fragment_length)
1354 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1355 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->session->ext.max_fragment_len_mode)
1356 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1357 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1358 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_MAXFRAGMENTLEN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1359 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1362 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1365 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1366 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1367 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1370 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1371 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1372 int using_ecc = ((alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))
1373 && (s->session->ext.ecpointformats != NULL);
1374 const unsigned char *plist;
1378 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1380 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1381 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
1382 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1383 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, plist, plistlen)
1384 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1385 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1386 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_EC_PT_FORMATS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1387 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1390 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1394 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1395 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_supported_groups(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1396 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1399 const uint16_t *groups;
1400 size_t numgroups, i, first = 1;
1402 /* s->s3->group_id is non zero if we accepted a key_share */
1403 if (s->s3->group_id == 0)
1404 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1406 /* Get our list of supported groups */
1407 tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &groups, &numgroups);
1408 if (numgroups == 0) {
1409 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1410 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SUPPORTED_GROUPS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1411 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1414 /* Copy group ID if supported */
1415 for (i = 0; i < numgroups; i++) {
1416 uint16_t group = groups[i];
1418 if (tls_curve_allowed(s, group, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) {
1421 * Check if the client is already using our preferred group. If
1422 * so we don't need to add this extension
1424 if (s->s3->group_id == group)
1425 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1427 /* Add extension header */
1428 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_groups)
1429 /* Sub-packet for supported_groups extension */
1430 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1431 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1432 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1433 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SUPPORTED_GROUPS,
1434 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1435 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1440 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, group)) {
1441 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1442 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SUPPORTED_GROUPS,
1443 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1444 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1449 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1450 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1451 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SUPPORTED_GROUPS,
1452 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1453 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1456 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1460 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_session_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1461 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1464 if (!s->ext.ticket_expected || !tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1465 s->ext.ticket_expected = 0;
1466 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1469 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
1470 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1471 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1472 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1473 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1476 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1479 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
1480 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_status_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1481 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1484 if (!s->ext.status_expected)
1485 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1487 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && chainidx != 0)
1488 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1490 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
1491 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1492 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1493 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_STATUS_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1494 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1498 * In TLSv1.3 we include the certificate status itself. In <= TLSv1.2 we
1499 * send back an empty extension, with the certificate status appearing as a
1502 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !tls_construct_cert_status_body(s, pkt)) {
1503 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1504 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1506 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1507 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1508 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_STATUS_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1509 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1512 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1516 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1517 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_next_proto_neg(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1518 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1521 const unsigned char *npa;
1522 unsigned int npalen;
1524 int npn_seen = s->s3->npn_seen;
1526 s->s3->npn_seen = 0;
1527 if (!npn_seen || s->ctx->ext.npn_advertised_cb == NULL)
1528 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1530 ret = s->ctx->ext.npn_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen,
1531 s->ctx->ext.npn_advertised_cb_arg);
1532 if (ret == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1533 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg)
1534 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, npa, npalen)) {
1535 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1536 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_NEXT_PROTO_NEG,
1537 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1538 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1540 s->s3->npn_seen = 1;
1543 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1547 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_alpn(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
1548 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1550 if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL)
1551 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1553 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt,
1554 TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation)
1555 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1556 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1557 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->s3->alpn_selected,
1558 s->s3->alpn_selected_len)
1559 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1560 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1561 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1562 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_ALPN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1563 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1566 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1569 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1570 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_use_srtp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1571 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1574 if (s->srtp_profile == NULL)
1575 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1577 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
1578 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1579 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 2)
1580 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->srtp_profile->id)
1581 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)
1582 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1583 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_USE_SRTP,
1584 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1585 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1588 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1592 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_etm(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
1593 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1595 if (!s->ext.use_etm)
1596 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1599 * Don't use encrypt_then_mac if AEAD or RC4 might want to disable
1600 * for other cases too.
1602 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD
1603 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4
1604 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT
1605 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT12) {
1607 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1610 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
1611 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1612 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_ETM,
1613 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1614 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1617 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1620 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_ems(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
1621 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1623 if ((s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) == 0)
1624 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1626 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret)
1627 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1628 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_EMS,
1629 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1630 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1633 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1636 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_supported_versions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1637 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1640 if (!ossl_assert(SSL_IS_TLS13(s))) {
1641 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1642 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS,
1643 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1644 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1647 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_versions)
1648 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1649 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Update to remove the TLSv1.3 draft indicator */
1650 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->version_draft)
1651 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1652 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1653 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS,
1654 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1655 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1658 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1661 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_key_share(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1662 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1665 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
1666 unsigned char *encodedPoint;
1667 size_t encoded_pt_len = 0;
1668 EVP_PKEY *ckey = s->s3->peer_tmp, *skey = NULL;
1670 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
1672 /* Original key_share was acceptable so don't ask for another one */
1673 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1675 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share)
1676 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1677 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->s3->group_id)
1678 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1679 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1680 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE,
1681 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1682 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1685 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1689 /* No key_share received from client - must be resuming */
1690 if (!s->hit || !tls13_generate_handshake_secret(s, NULL, 0)) {
1691 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1692 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1693 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1695 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1698 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share)
1699 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1700 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->s3->group_id)) {
1701 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1702 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1703 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1706 skey = ssl_generate_pkey(ckey);
1708 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE,
1709 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1710 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1713 /* Generate encoding of server key */
1714 encoded_pt_len = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(skey, &encodedPoint);
1715 if (encoded_pt_len == 0) {
1716 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE,
1718 EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
1719 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1722 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len)
1723 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1724 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE,
1725 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1726 EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
1727 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1728 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1730 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1732 /* This causes the crypto state to be updated based on the derived keys */
1733 s->s3->tmp.pkey = skey;
1734 if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) {
1735 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1736 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1738 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1740 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1744 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_cookie(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
1745 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1747 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
1748 unsigned char *hashval1, *hashval2, *appcookie1, *appcookie2, *cookie;
1749 unsigned char *hmac, *hmac2;
1750 size_t startlen, ciphlen, totcookielen, hashlen, hmaclen, appcookielen;
1753 int ret = EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1755 if ((s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_STATELESS) == 0)
1756 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1758 if (s->ctx->gen_stateless_cookie_cb == NULL) {
1759 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_COOKIE,
1760 SSL_R_NO_COOKIE_CALLBACK_SET);
1761 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1764 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_cookie)
1765 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1766 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1767 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &startlen)
1768 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, MAX_COOKIE_SIZE, &cookie)
1769 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, COOKIE_STATE_FORMAT_VERSION)
1770 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLS1_3_VERSION)
1771 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->s3->group_id)
1772 || !s->method->put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, pkt,
1774 /* Is there a key_share extension present in this HRR? */
1775 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->s3->peer_tmp == NULL)
1776 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, (unsigned int)time(NULL))
1777 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1778 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, &hashval1)) {
1779 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_COOKIE,
1780 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1781 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1785 * Get the hash of the initial ClientHello. ssl_handshake_hash() operates
1786 * on raw buffers, so we first reserve sufficient bytes (above) and then
1787 * subsequently allocate them (below)
1789 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)
1790 || !ssl_handshake_hash(s, hashval1, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, &hashlen)) {
1791 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1792 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1795 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, hashlen, &hashval2)
1796 || !ossl_assert(hashval1 == hashval2)
1797 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1798 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
1799 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, SSL_COOKIE_LENGTH, &appcookie1)) {
1800 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_COOKIE,
1801 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1802 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1805 /* Generate the application cookie */
1806 if (s->ctx->gen_stateless_cookie_cb(s, appcookie1, &appcookielen) == 0) {
1807 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_COOKIE,
1808 SSL_R_COOKIE_GEN_CALLBACK_FAILURE);
1809 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1812 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, appcookielen, &appcookie2)
1813 || !ossl_assert(appcookie1 == appcookie2)
1814 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1815 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &totcookielen)
1816 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH, &hmac)) {
1817 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_COOKIE,
1818 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1819 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1821 hmaclen = SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH;
1823 totcookielen -= startlen;
1824 if (!ossl_assert(totcookielen <= MAX_COOKIE_SIZE - SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH)) {
1825 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_COOKIE,
1826 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1827 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1830 /* HMAC the cookie */
1831 hctx = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
1832 pkey = EVP_PKEY_new_raw_private_key(EVP_PKEY_HMAC, NULL,
1833 s->session_ctx->ext.cookie_hmac_key,
1834 sizeof(s->session_ctx->ext
1836 if (hctx == NULL || pkey == NULL) {
1837 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_COOKIE,
1838 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1842 if (EVP_DigestSignInit(hctx, NULL, EVP_sha256(), NULL, pkey) <= 0
1843 || EVP_DigestSign(hctx, hmac, &hmaclen, cookie,
1844 totcookielen) <= 0) {
1845 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_COOKIE,
1846 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1850 if (!ossl_assert(totcookielen + hmaclen <= MAX_COOKIE_SIZE)) {
1851 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_COOKIE,
1852 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1856 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, hmaclen, &hmac2)
1857 || !ossl_assert(hmac == hmac2)
1858 || !ossl_assert(cookie == hmac - totcookielen)
1859 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1860 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1861 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_COOKIE,
1862 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1866 ret = EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1869 EVP_MD_CTX_free(hctx);
1870 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
1873 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1877 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_cryptopro_bug(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1878 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1881 const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1882 0xfd, 0xe8, /* 65000 */
1883 0x00, 0x20, /* 32 bytes length */
1884 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1885 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1886 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1887 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17
1890 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) != 0x80
1891 && (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) != 0x81)
1892 || (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG) == 0)
1893 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1895 if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, cryptopro_ext, sizeof(cryptopro_ext))) {
1896 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1897 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_CRYPTOPRO_BUG, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1898 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1901 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1904 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_early_data(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1905 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1908 if (context == SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET) {
1909 if (s->max_early_data == 0)
1910 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1912 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_early_data)
1913 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1914 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, s->max_early_data)
1915 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1916 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1917 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_EARLY_DATA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1918 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1921 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1924 if (s->ext.early_data != SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED)
1925 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1927 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_early_data)
1928 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1929 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1930 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_EARLY_DATA,
1931 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1932 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1935 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1938 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_psk(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
1939 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1942 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1944 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_psk)
1945 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1946 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->session->ext.tick_identity)
1947 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1948 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1949 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_PSK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1950 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1953 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;