2 * Copyright 2016-2023 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
10 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
11 #include "../ssl_local.h"
12 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
13 #include "statem_local.h"
15 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_renegotiate(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt,
16 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
19 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
21 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
23 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
24 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
25 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->s3.previous_client_finished,
26 s->s3.previous_client_finished_len)
27 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
28 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
29 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
32 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
35 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_server_name(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt,
36 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
39 if (s->ext.hostname == NULL)
40 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
42 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
43 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
44 /* Sub-packet for server_name extension */
45 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
46 /* Sub-packet for servername list (always 1 hostname)*/
47 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
48 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name)
49 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->ext.hostname,
50 strlen(s->ext.hostname))
51 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
52 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
53 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
54 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
57 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
60 /* Push a Max Fragment Len extension into ClientHello */
61 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_maxfragmentlen(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt,
62 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
65 if (s->ext.max_fragment_len_mode == TLSEXT_max_fragment_length_DISABLED)
66 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
68 /* Add Max Fragment Length extension if client enabled it. */
70 * 4 bytes for this extension type and extension length
71 * 1 byte for the Max Fragment Length code value.
73 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_max_fragment_length)
74 /* Sub-packet for Max Fragment Length extension (1 byte) */
75 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
76 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->ext.max_fragment_len_mode)
77 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
78 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
79 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
82 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
85 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
86 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_srp(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt,
88 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
90 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
91 if (s->srp_ctx.login == NULL)
92 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
94 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_srp)
95 /* Sub-packet for SRP extension */
96 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
97 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
98 /* login must not be zero...internal error if so */
99 || !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt, WPACKET_FLAGS_NON_ZERO_LENGTH)
100 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->srp_ctx.login,
101 strlen(s->srp_ctx.login))
102 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
103 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
104 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
105 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
108 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
112 static int use_ecc(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int min_version, int max_version)
115 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
116 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = NULL;
117 const uint16_t *pgroups = NULL;
118 size_t num_groups, j;
119 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
121 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
122 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
125 cipher_stack = SSL_get1_supported_ciphers(ssl);
126 end = sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack);
127 for (i = 0; i < end; i++) {
128 const SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
130 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
131 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
132 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK))
133 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)
134 || c->min_tls >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
139 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(cipher_stack);
143 /* Check we have at least one EC supported group */
144 tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &pgroups, &num_groups);
145 for (j = 0; j < num_groups; j++) {
146 uint16_t ctmp = pgroups[j];
148 if (tls_valid_group(s, ctmp, min_version, max_version, 1, NULL)
149 && tls_group_allowed(s, ctmp, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED))
156 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_ec_pt_formats(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt,
157 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
160 const unsigned char *pformats;
162 int reason, min_version, max_version;
164 reason = ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &min_version, &max_version, NULL);
166 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, reason);
167 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
169 if (!use_ecc(s, min_version, max_version))
170 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
172 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */
173 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &pformats, &num_formats);
175 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
176 /* Sub-packet for formats extension */
177 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
178 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, pformats, num_formats)
179 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
180 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
181 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
184 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
187 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_supported_groups(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt,
188 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
191 const uint16_t *pgroups = NULL;
192 size_t num_groups = 0, i, tls13added = 0, added = 0;
193 int min_version, max_version, reason;
195 reason = ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &min_version, &max_version, NULL);
197 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, reason);
198 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
202 * We only support EC groups in TLSv1.2 or below, and in DTLS. Therefore
203 * if we don't have EC support then we don't send this extension.
205 if (!use_ecc(s, min_version, max_version)
206 && (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) || max_version < TLS1_3_VERSION))
207 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
210 * Add TLS extension supported_groups to the ClientHello message
212 tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &pgroups, &num_groups);
214 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_groups)
215 /* Sub-packet for supported_groups extension */
216 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
217 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
218 || !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt, WPACKET_FLAGS_NON_ZERO_LENGTH)) {
219 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
220 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
222 /* Copy group ID if supported */
223 for (i = 0; i < num_groups; i++) {
224 uint16_t ctmp = pgroups[i];
227 if (tls_valid_group(s, ctmp, min_version, max_version, 0, &okfortls13)
228 && tls_group_allowed(s, ctmp, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) {
229 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, ctmp)) {
230 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
231 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
233 if (okfortls13 && max_version == TLS1_3_VERSION)
238 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
240 SSLfatal_data(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_GROUPS,
241 "No groups enabled for max supported SSL/TLS version");
243 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
244 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
247 if (tls13added == 0 && max_version == TLS1_3_VERSION) {
248 SSLfatal_data(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_GROUPS,
249 "No groups enabled for max supported SSL/TLS version");
250 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
253 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
256 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_session_ticket(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt,
257 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
262 if (!tls_use_ticket(s))
263 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
265 if (!s->new_session && s->session != NULL
266 && s->session->ext.tick != NULL
267 && s->session->ssl_version != TLS1_3_VERSION) {
268 ticklen = s->session->ext.ticklen;
269 } else if (s->session && s->ext.session_ticket != NULL
270 && s->ext.session_ticket->data != NULL) {
271 ticklen = s->ext.session_ticket->length;
272 s->session->ext.tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
273 if (s->session->ext.tick == NULL) {
274 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
275 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
277 memcpy(s->session->ext.tick,
278 s->ext.session_ticket->data, ticklen);
279 s->session->ext.ticklen = ticklen;
284 if (ticklen == 0 && s->ext.session_ticket != NULL &&
285 s->ext.session_ticket->data == NULL)
286 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
288 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
289 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->session->ext.tick, ticklen)) {
290 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
291 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
294 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
297 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_sig_algs(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt,
298 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
302 const uint16_t *salg;
304 if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_SIGALGS(s))
305 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
307 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &salg);
308 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms)
309 /* Sub-packet for sig-algs extension */
310 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
311 /* Sub-packet for the actual list */
312 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
313 || !tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, pkt, salg, salglen)
314 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
315 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
316 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
317 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
320 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
323 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
324 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_status_request(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt,
325 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
330 /* This extension isn't defined for client Certificates */
332 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
334 if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
335 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
337 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
338 /* Sub-packet for status request extension */
339 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
340 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
341 /* Sub-packet for the ids */
342 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
343 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
344 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
346 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->ext.ocsp.ids); i++) {
347 unsigned char *idbytes;
348 OCSP_RESPID *id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->ext.ocsp.ids, i);
349 int idlen = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
352 /* Sub-packet for an individual id */
353 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, idlen, &idbytes)
354 || i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &idbytes) != idlen) {
355 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
356 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
359 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)
360 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
361 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
362 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
364 if (s->ext.ocsp.exts) {
365 unsigned char *extbytes;
366 int extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->ext.ocsp.exts, NULL);
369 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
370 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
372 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, extlen, &extbytes)
373 || i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->ext.ocsp.exts, &extbytes)
375 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
376 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
379 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
380 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
381 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
384 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
388 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
389 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_npn(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt,
390 unsigned int context,
391 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
393 if (SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s)->ext.npn_select_cb == NULL
394 || !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s))
395 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
398 * The client advertises an empty extension to indicate its support
399 * for Next Protocol Negotiation
401 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg)
402 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
403 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
404 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
407 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
411 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_alpn(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt,
412 unsigned int context,
413 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
417 if (s->ext.alpn == NULL || !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s))
418 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
420 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt,
421 TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation)
422 /* Sub-packet ALPN extension */
423 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
424 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->ext.alpn, s->ext.alpn_len)
425 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
426 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
427 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
431 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
435 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
436 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_use_srtp(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt,
437 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
440 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
441 STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *clnt = SSL_get_srtp_profiles(ssl);
445 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
447 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
448 /* Sub-packet for SRTP extension */
449 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
450 /* Sub-packet for the protection profile list */
451 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
452 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
453 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
456 end = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(clnt);
457 for (i = 0; i < end; i++) {
458 const SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *prof =
459 sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(clnt, i);
461 if (prof == NULL || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, prof->id)) {
462 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
463 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
466 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)
467 /* Add an empty use_mki value */
468 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)
469 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
470 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
471 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
474 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
478 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_etm(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt,
479 unsigned int context,
480 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
482 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
483 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
485 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
486 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
487 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
488 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
491 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
494 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
495 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_sct(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt,
496 unsigned int context,
497 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
499 if (s->ct_validation_callback == NULL)
500 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
502 /* Not defined for client Certificates */
504 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
506 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp)
507 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
508 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
509 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
512 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
516 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_ems(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt,
517 unsigned int context,
518 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
520 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET)
521 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
523 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret)
524 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
525 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
526 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
529 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
532 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_supported_versions(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt,
533 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
536 int currv, min_version, max_version, reason;
538 reason = ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &min_version, &max_version, NULL);
540 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, reason);
541 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
545 * Don't include this if we can't negotiate TLSv1.3. We can do a straight
546 * comparison here because we will never be called in DTLS.
548 if (max_version < TLS1_3_VERSION)
549 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
551 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_versions)
552 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
553 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)) {
554 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
555 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
558 for (currv = max_version; currv >= min_version; currv--) {
559 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, currv)) {
560 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
561 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
564 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
565 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
566 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
569 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
573 * Construct a psk_kex_modes extension.
575 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_psk_kex_modes(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt,
576 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
579 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
580 int nodhe = s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_NO_DHE_KEX;
582 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_psk_kex_modes)
583 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
584 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
585 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_KE_DHE)
586 || (nodhe && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_KE))
587 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
588 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
589 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
590 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
593 s->ext.psk_kex_mode = TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE_DHE;
595 s->ext.psk_kex_mode |= TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE;
598 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
601 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
602 static int add_key_share(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int curve_id)
604 unsigned char *encoded_point = NULL;
605 EVP_PKEY *key_share_key = NULL;
608 if (s->s3.tmp.pkey != NULL) {
609 if (!ossl_assert(s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING)) {
610 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
614 * Could happen if we got an HRR that wasn't requesting a new key_share
616 key_share_key = s->s3.tmp.pkey;
618 key_share_key = ssl_generate_pkey_group(s, curve_id);
619 if (key_share_key == NULL) {
620 /* SSLfatal() already called */
625 /* Encode the public key. */
626 encodedlen = EVP_PKEY_get1_encoded_public_key(key_share_key,
628 if (encodedlen == 0) {
629 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
633 /* Create KeyShareEntry */
634 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, curve_id)
635 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, encoded_point, encodedlen)) {
636 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
641 * When changing to send more than one key_share we're
642 * going to need to be able to save more than one EVP_PKEY. For now
643 * we reuse the existing tmp.pkey
645 s->s3.tmp.pkey = key_share_key;
646 s->s3.group_id = curve_id;
647 OPENSSL_free(encoded_point);
651 if (s->s3.tmp.pkey == NULL)
652 EVP_PKEY_free(key_share_key);
653 OPENSSL_free(encoded_point);
658 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_key_share(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt,
659 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
662 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
663 size_t i, num_groups = 0;
664 const uint16_t *pgroups = NULL;
665 uint16_t curve_id = 0;
667 /* key_share extension */
668 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share)
669 /* Extension data sub-packet */
670 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
671 /* KeyShare list sub-packet */
672 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
673 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
674 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
677 tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &pgroups, &num_groups);
680 * Make the number of key_shares sent configurable. For
681 * now, we just send one
683 if (s->s3.group_id != 0) {
684 curve_id = s->s3.group_id;
686 for (i = 0; i < num_groups; i++) {
687 if (!tls_group_allowed(s, pgroups[i], SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED))
690 if (!tls_valid_group(s, pgroups[i], TLS1_3_VERSION, TLS1_3_VERSION,
694 curve_id = pgroups[i];
700 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_KEY_SHARE);
701 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
704 if (!add_key_share(s, pkt, curve_id)) {
705 /* SSLfatal() already called */
706 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
709 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
710 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
711 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
713 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
715 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
719 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_cookie(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt,
720 unsigned int context,
721 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
723 EXT_RETURN ret = EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
725 /* Should only be set if we've had an HRR */
726 if (s->ext.tls13_cookie_len == 0)
727 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
729 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_cookie)
730 /* Extension data sub-packet */
731 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
732 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->ext.tls13_cookie,
733 s->ext.tls13_cookie_len)
734 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
735 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
739 ret = EXT_RETURN_SENT;
741 OPENSSL_free(s->ext.tls13_cookie);
742 s->ext.tls13_cookie = NULL;
743 s->ext.tls13_cookie_len = 0;
748 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_early_data(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt,
749 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
752 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
753 char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1];
754 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
755 const unsigned char *id = NULL;
757 SSL_SESSION *psksess = NULL;
758 SSL_SESSION *edsess = NULL;
759 const EVP_MD *handmd = NULL;
760 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
762 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING)
763 handmd = ssl_handshake_md(s);
765 if (s->psk_use_session_cb != NULL
766 && (!s->psk_use_session_cb(ssl, handmd, &id, &idlen, &psksess)
768 && psksess->ssl_version != TLS1_3_VERSION))) {
769 SSL_SESSION_free(psksess);
770 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_PSK);
771 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
774 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
775 if (psksess == NULL && s->psk_client_callback != NULL) {
776 unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
779 memset(identity, 0, sizeof(identity));
780 psklen = s->psk_client_callback(ssl, NULL,
781 identity, sizeof(identity) - 1,
784 if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
785 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
786 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
787 } else if (psklen > 0) {
788 const unsigned char tls13_aes128gcmsha256_id[] = { 0x13, 0x01 };
789 const SSL_CIPHER *cipher;
791 idlen = strlen(identity);
792 if (idlen > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
793 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
794 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
796 id = (unsigned char *)identity;
799 * We found a PSK using an old style callback. We don't know
800 * the digest so we default to SHA256 as per the TLSv1.3 spec
802 cipher = SSL_CIPHER_find(ssl, tls13_aes128gcmsha256_id);
803 if (cipher == NULL) {
804 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
805 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
808 psksess = SSL_SESSION_new();
810 || !SSL_SESSION_set1_master_key(psksess, psk, psklen)
811 || !SSL_SESSION_set_cipher(psksess, cipher)
812 || !SSL_SESSION_set_protocol_version(psksess, TLS1_3_VERSION)) {
813 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
814 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
815 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
817 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
820 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
822 SSL_SESSION_free(s->psksession);
823 s->psksession = psksess;
824 if (psksess != NULL) {
825 OPENSSL_free(s->psksession_id);
826 s->psksession_id = OPENSSL_memdup(id, idlen);
827 if (s->psksession_id == NULL) {
828 s->psksession_id_len = 0;
829 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
830 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
832 s->psksession_id_len = idlen;
835 if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
836 || (s->session->ext.max_early_data == 0
837 && (psksess == NULL || psksess->ext.max_early_data == 0))) {
838 s->max_early_data = 0;
839 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
841 edsess = s->session->ext.max_early_data != 0 ? s->session : psksess;
842 s->max_early_data = edsess->ext.max_early_data;
844 if (edsess->ext.hostname != NULL) {
845 if (s->ext.hostname == NULL
846 || (s->ext.hostname != NULL
847 && strcmp(s->ext.hostname, edsess->ext.hostname) != 0)) {
848 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
849 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EARLY_DATA_SNI);
850 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
854 if ((s->ext.alpn == NULL && edsess->ext.alpn_selected != NULL)) {
855 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EARLY_DATA_ALPN);
856 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
860 * Verify that we are offering an ALPN protocol consistent with the early
863 if (edsess->ext.alpn_selected != NULL) {
864 PACKET prots, alpnpkt;
867 if (!PACKET_buf_init(&prots, s->ext.alpn, s->ext.alpn_len)) {
868 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
869 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
871 while (PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&prots, &alpnpkt)) {
872 if (PACKET_equal(&alpnpkt, edsess->ext.alpn_selected,
873 edsess->ext.alpn_selected_len)) {
879 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
880 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EARLY_DATA_ALPN);
881 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
885 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_early_data)
886 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
887 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
888 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
889 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
893 * We set this to rejected here. Later, if the server acknowledges the
894 * extension, we set it to accepted.
896 s->ext.early_data = SSL_EARLY_DATA_REJECTED;
897 s->ext.early_data_ok = 1;
899 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
902 #define F5_WORKAROUND_MIN_MSG_LEN 0xff
903 #define F5_WORKAROUND_MAX_MSG_LEN 0x200
906 * PSK pre binder overhead =
907 * 2 bytes for TLSEXT_TYPE_psk
908 * 2 bytes for extension length
909 * 2 bytes for identities list length
910 * 2 bytes for identity length
911 * 4 bytes for obfuscated_ticket_age
912 * 2 bytes for binder list length
913 * 1 byte for binder length
914 * The above excludes the number of bytes for the identity itself and the
915 * subsequent binder bytes
917 #define PSK_PRE_BINDER_OVERHEAD (2 + 2 + 2 + 2 + 4 + 2 + 1)
919 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_padding(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt,
920 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
923 unsigned char *padbytes;
926 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING) == 0)
927 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
930 * Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See RFC7685.
931 * This code calculates the length of all extensions added so far but
932 * excludes the PSK extension (because that MUST be written last). Therefore
933 * this extension MUST always appear second to last.
935 if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &hlen)) {
936 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
937 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
941 * If we're going to send a PSK then that will be written out after this
942 * extension, so we need to calculate how long it is going to be.
944 if (s->session->ssl_version == TLS1_3_VERSION
945 && s->session->ext.ticklen != 0
946 && s->session->cipher != NULL) {
947 const EVP_MD *md = ssl_md(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s),
948 s->session->cipher->algorithm2);
952 * Add the fixed PSK overhead, the identity length and the binder
955 hlen += PSK_PRE_BINDER_OVERHEAD + s->session->ext.ticklen
956 + EVP_MD_get_size(md);
960 if (hlen > F5_WORKAROUND_MIN_MSG_LEN && hlen < F5_WORKAROUND_MAX_MSG_LEN) {
961 /* Calculate the amount of padding we need to add */
962 hlen = F5_WORKAROUND_MAX_MSG_LEN - hlen;
965 * Take off the size of extension header itself (2 bytes for type and
966 * 2 bytes for length bytes), but ensure that the extension is at least
967 * 1 byte long so as not to have an empty extension last (WebSphere 7.x,
968 * 8.x are intolerant of that condition)
975 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_padding)
976 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, hlen, &padbytes)) {
977 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
978 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
980 memset(padbytes, 0, hlen);
983 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
987 * Construct the pre_shared_key extension
989 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_psk(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt,
990 unsigned int context,
991 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
993 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
994 uint32_t agesec, agems = 0;
995 size_t reshashsize = 0, pskhashsize = 0, binderoffset, msglen;
996 unsigned char *resbinder = NULL, *pskbinder = NULL, *msgstart = NULL;
997 const EVP_MD *handmd = NULL, *mdres = NULL, *mdpsk = NULL;
999 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
1002 s->ext.tick_identity = 0;
1005 * Note: At this stage of the code we only support adding a single
1006 * resumption PSK. If we add support for multiple PSKs then the length
1007 * calculations in the padding extension will need to be adjusted.
1011 * If this is an incompatible or new session then we have nothing to resume
1012 * so don't add this extension.
1014 if (s->session->ssl_version != TLS1_3_VERSION
1015 || (s->session->ext.ticklen == 0 && s->psksession == NULL))
1016 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1018 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING)
1019 handmd = ssl_handshake_md(s);
1021 if (s->session->ext.ticklen != 0) {
1022 /* Get the digest associated with the ciphersuite in the session */
1023 if (s->session->cipher == NULL) {
1024 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1025 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1027 mdres = ssl_md(sctx, s->session->cipher->algorithm2);
1028 if (mdres == NULL) {
1030 * Don't recognize this cipher so we can't use the session.
1036 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING && mdres != handmd) {
1038 * Selected ciphersuite hash does not match the hash for the session
1039 * so we can't use it.
1045 * Technically the C standard just says time() returns a time_t and says
1046 * nothing about the encoding of that type. In practice most
1047 * implementations follow POSIX which holds it as an integral type in
1048 * seconds since epoch. We've already made the assumption that we can do
1049 * this in multiple places in the code, so portability shouldn't be an
1052 t = ossl_time_subtract(ossl_time_now(), s->session->time);
1053 agesec = (uint32_t)ossl_time2seconds(t);
1055 * We calculate the age in seconds but the server may work in ms. Due to
1056 * rounding errors we could overestimate the age by up to 1s. It is
1057 * better to underestimate it. Otherwise, if the RTT is very short, when
1058 * the server calculates the age reported by the client it could be
1059 * bigger than the age calculated on the server - which should never
1065 if (s->session->ext.tick_lifetime_hint < agesec) {
1066 /* Ticket is too old. Ignore it. */
1071 * Calculate age in ms. We're just doing it to nearest second. Should be
1074 agems = agesec * (uint32_t)1000;
1076 if (agesec != 0 && agems / (uint32_t)1000 != agesec) {
1078 * Overflow. Shouldn't happen unless this is a *really* old session.
1079 * If so we just ignore it.
1085 * Obfuscate the age. Overflow here is fine, this addition is supposed
1088 agems += s->session->ext.tick_age_add;
1090 reshashsize = EVP_MD_get_size(mdres);
1091 s->ext.tick_identity++;
1096 if (!dores && s->psksession == NULL)
1097 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1099 if (s->psksession != NULL) {
1100 mdpsk = ssl_md(sctx, s->psksession->cipher->algorithm2);
1101 if (mdpsk == NULL) {
1103 * Don't recognize this cipher so we can't use the session.
1104 * If this happens it's an application bug.
1106 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_PSK);
1107 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1110 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING && mdpsk != handmd) {
1112 * Selected ciphersuite hash does not match the hash for the PSK
1113 * session. This is an application bug.
1115 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_PSK);
1116 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1119 pskhashsize = EVP_MD_get_size(mdpsk);
1122 /* Create the extension, but skip over the binder for now */
1123 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_psk)
1124 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1125 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1126 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1127 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1131 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->session->ext.tick,
1132 s->session->ext.ticklen)
1133 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, agems)) {
1134 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1135 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1139 if (s->psksession != NULL) {
1140 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->psksession_id,
1141 s->psksession_id_len)
1142 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, 0)) {
1143 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1144 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1146 s->ext.tick_identity++;
1149 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)
1150 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &binderoffset)
1151 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1153 && !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u8(pkt, reshashsize, &resbinder))
1154 || (s->psksession != NULL
1155 && !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u8(pkt, pskhashsize, &pskbinder))
1156 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1157 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1158 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &msglen)
1160 * We need to fill in all the sub-packet lengths now so we can
1161 * calculate the HMAC of the message up to the binders
1163 || !WPACKET_fill_lengths(pkt)) {
1164 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1165 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1168 msgstart = WPACKET_get_curr(pkt) - msglen;
1171 && tls_psk_do_binder(s, mdres, msgstart, binderoffset, NULL,
1172 resbinder, s->session, 1, 0) != 1) {
1173 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1174 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1177 if (s->psksession != NULL
1178 && tls_psk_do_binder(s, mdpsk, msgstart, binderoffset, NULL,
1179 pskbinder, s->psksession, 1, 1) != 1) {
1180 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1181 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1184 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1186 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1190 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_post_handshake_auth(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1191 ossl_unused unsigned int context,
1192 ossl_unused X509 *x,
1193 ossl_unused size_t chainidx)
1195 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
1196 if (!s->pha_enabled)
1197 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1199 /* construct extension - 0 length, no contents */
1200 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_post_handshake_auth)
1201 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1202 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1203 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1204 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1207 s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_EXT_SENT;
1209 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1211 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1217 * Parse the server's renegotiation binding and abort if it's not right
1219 int tls_parse_stoc_renegotiate(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt,
1220 unsigned int context,
1221 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1223 size_t expected_len = s->s3.previous_client_finished_len
1224 + s->s3.previous_server_finished_len;
1226 const unsigned char *data;
1228 /* Check for logic errors */
1229 if (!ossl_assert(expected_len == 0
1230 || s->s3.previous_client_finished_len != 0)
1231 || !ossl_assert(expected_len == 0
1232 || s->s3.previous_server_finished_len != 0)) {
1233 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1237 /* Parse the length byte */
1238 if (!PACKET_get_1_len(pkt, &ilen)) {
1239 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_ENCODING_ERR);
1243 /* Consistency check */
1244 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != ilen) {
1245 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_ENCODING_ERR);
1249 /* Check that the extension matches */
1250 if (ilen != expected_len) {
1251 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH);
1255 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, s->s3.previous_client_finished_len)
1256 || memcmp(data, s->s3.previous_client_finished,
1257 s->s3.previous_client_finished_len) != 0) {
1258 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH);
1262 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, s->s3.previous_server_finished_len)
1263 || memcmp(data, s->s3.previous_server_finished,
1264 s->s3.previous_server_finished_len) != 0) {
1265 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH);
1268 s->s3.send_connection_binding = 1;
1273 /* Parse the server's max fragment len extension packet */
1274 int tls_parse_stoc_maxfragmentlen(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt,
1275 unsigned int context,
1276 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1280 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 1 || !PACKET_get_1(pkt, &value)) {
1281 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1285 /* |value| should contains a valid max-fragment-length code. */
1286 if (!IS_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT_VALID(value)) {
1287 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1288 SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH);
1292 /* Must be the same value as client-configured one who was sent to server */
1294 * RFC 6066: if a client receives a maximum fragment length negotiation
1295 * response that differs from the length it requested, ...
1296 * It must abort with SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER alert
1298 if (value != s->ext.max_fragment_len_mode) {
1299 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1300 SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH);
1305 * Maximum Fragment Length Negotiation succeeded.
1306 * The negotiated Maximum Fragment Length is binding now.
1308 s->session->ext.max_fragment_len_mode = value;
1313 int tls_parse_stoc_server_name(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt,
1314 unsigned int context,
1315 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1317 if (s->ext.hostname == NULL) {
1318 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1322 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
1323 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1328 if (s->session->ext.hostname != NULL) {
1329 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1332 s->session->ext.hostname = OPENSSL_strdup(s->ext.hostname);
1333 if (s->session->ext.hostname == NULL) {
1334 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1342 int tls_parse_stoc_ec_pt_formats(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt,
1343 unsigned int context,
1344 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1346 size_t ecpointformats_len;
1347 PACKET ecptformatlist;
1349 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &ecptformatlist)) {
1350 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1354 ecpointformats_len = PACKET_remaining(&ecptformatlist);
1355 if (ecpointformats_len == 0) {
1356 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
1360 s->ext.peer_ecpointformats_len = 0;
1361 OPENSSL_free(s->ext.peer_ecpointformats);
1362 s->ext.peer_ecpointformats = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformats_len);
1363 if (s->ext.peer_ecpointformats == NULL) {
1364 s->ext.peer_ecpointformats_len = 0;
1365 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1369 s->ext.peer_ecpointformats_len = ecpointformats_len;
1371 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&ecptformatlist,
1372 s->ext.peer_ecpointformats,
1373 ecpointformats_len)) {
1374 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1382 int tls_parse_stoc_session_ticket(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt,
1383 unsigned int context,
1384 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1386 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
1388 if (s->ext.session_ticket_cb != NULL &&
1389 !s->ext.session_ticket_cb(ssl, PACKET_data(pkt),
1390 PACKET_remaining(pkt),
1391 s->ext.session_ticket_cb_arg)) {
1392 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1396 if (!tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1397 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1400 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
1401 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1405 s->ext.ticket_expected = 1;
1410 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
1411 int tls_parse_stoc_status_request(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt,
1412 unsigned int context,
1413 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1415 if (context == SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
1416 /* We ignore this if the server sends a CertificateRequest */
1421 * MUST only be sent if we've requested a status
1422 * request message. In TLS <= 1.2 it must also be empty.
1424 if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
1425 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1428 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) && PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
1429 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1433 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1434 /* We only know how to handle this if it's for the first Certificate in
1435 * the chain. We ignore any other responses.
1440 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1441 return tls_process_cert_status_body(s, pkt);
1444 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
1445 s->ext.status_expected = 1;
1452 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
1453 int tls_parse_stoc_sct(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
1454 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1456 if (context == SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
1457 /* We ignore this if the server sends it in a CertificateRequest */
1462 * Only take it if we asked for it - i.e if there is no CT validation
1463 * callback set, then a custom extension MAY be processing it, so we
1464 * need to let control continue to flow to that.
1466 if (s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
1467 size_t size = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
1469 /* Simply copy it off for later processing */
1470 OPENSSL_free(s->ext.scts);
1473 s->ext.scts_len = (uint16_t)size;
1475 s->ext.scts = OPENSSL_malloc(size);
1476 if (s->ext.scts == NULL) {
1477 s->ext.scts_len = 0;
1478 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
1481 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->ext.scts, size)) {
1482 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1487 ENDPOINT role = (context & SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO) != 0
1488 ? ENDPOINT_CLIENT : ENDPOINT_BOTH;
1491 * If we didn't ask for it then there must be a custom extension,
1492 * otherwise this is unsolicited.
1494 if (custom_ext_find(&s->cert->custext, role,
1495 TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp,
1497 SSLfatal(s, TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1501 if (!custom_ext_parse(s, context,
1502 TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp,
1503 PACKET_data(pkt), PACKET_remaining(pkt),
1505 /* SSLfatal already called */
1515 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1517 * ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
1518 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly
1519 * fill the length of the block. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure.
1521 static int ssl_next_proto_validate(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
1523 PACKET tmp_protocol;
1525 while (PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
1526 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &tmp_protocol)
1527 || PACKET_remaining(&tmp_protocol) == 0) {
1528 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1536 int tls_parse_stoc_npn(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
1537 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1539 unsigned char *selected;
1540 unsigned char selected_len;
1542 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
1544 /* Check if we are in a renegotiation. If so ignore this extension */
1545 if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s))
1548 /* We must have requested it. */
1549 if (sctx->ext.npn_select_cb == NULL) {
1550 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1554 /* The data must be valid */
1556 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(s, &tmppkt)) {
1557 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1560 if (sctx->ext.npn_select_cb(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s),
1561 &selected, &selected_len,
1562 PACKET_data(pkt), PACKET_remaining(pkt),
1563 sctx->ext.npn_select_cb_arg) !=
1564 SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1565 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1570 * Could be non-NULL if server has sent multiple NPN extensions in
1571 * a single Serverhello
1573 OPENSSL_free(s->ext.npn);
1574 s->ext.npn = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
1575 if (s->ext.npn == NULL) {
1577 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1581 memcpy(s->ext.npn, selected, selected_len);
1582 s->ext.npn_len = selected_len;
1589 int tls_parse_stoc_alpn(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
1590 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1594 /* We must have requested it. */
1595 if (!s->s3.alpn_sent) {
1596 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1600 * The extension data consists of:
1601 * uint16 list_length
1602 * uint8 proto_length;
1603 * uint8 proto[proto_length];
1605 if (!PACKET_get_net_2_len(pkt, &len)
1606 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != len || !PACKET_get_1_len(pkt, &len)
1607 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != len) {
1608 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1611 OPENSSL_free(s->s3.alpn_selected);
1612 s->s3.alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
1613 if (s->s3.alpn_selected == NULL) {
1614 s->s3.alpn_selected_len = 0;
1615 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1618 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->s3.alpn_selected, len)) {
1619 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1622 s->s3.alpn_selected_len = len;
1624 if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL
1625 || s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len != len
1626 || memcmp(s->session->ext.alpn_selected, s->s3.alpn_selected, len)
1628 /* ALPN not consistent with the old session so cannot use early_data */
1629 s->ext.early_data_ok = 0;
1633 * This is a new session and so alpn_selected should have been
1634 * initialised to NULL. We should update it with the selected ALPN.
1636 if (!ossl_assert(s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL)) {
1637 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1640 s->session->ext.alpn_selected =
1641 OPENSSL_memdup(s->s3.alpn_selected, s->s3.alpn_selected_len);
1642 if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL) {
1643 s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len = 0;
1644 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1647 s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len = s->s3.alpn_selected_len;
1653 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1654 int tls_parse_stoc_use_srtp(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt,
1655 unsigned int context, X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1657 unsigned int id, ct, mki;
1659 STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *clnt;
1660 SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *prof;
1662 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ct) || ct != 2
1663 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &id)
1664 || !PACKET_get_1(pkt, &mki)
1665 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1666 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
1667 SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST);
1672 /* Must be no MKI, since we never offer one */
1673 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_MKI_VALUE);
1677 /* Throw an error if the server gave us an unsolicited extension */
1678 clnt = SSL_get_srtp_profiles(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s));
1680 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_NO_SRTP_PROFILES);
1685 * Check to see if the server gave us something we support (and
1686 * presumably offered)
1688 for (i = 0; i < sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(clnt); i++) {
1689 prof = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(clnt, i);
1691 if (prof->id == id) {
1692 s->srtp_profile = prof;
1697 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
1698 SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST);
1703 int tls_parse_stoc_etm(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
1704 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1706 /* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite */
1707 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
1708 && s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD
1709 && s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc != SSL_RC4
1710 && s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc != SSL_eGOST2814789CNT
1711 && s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc != SSL_eGOST2814789CNT12
1712 && s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc != SSL_MAGMA
1713 && s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc != SSL_KUZNYECHIK)
1719 int tls_parse_stoc_ems(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
1720 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1722 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET)
1724 s->s3.flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
1726 s->session->flags |= SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS;
1731 int tls_parse_stoc_supported_versions(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt,
1732 unsigned int context,
1733 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1735 unsigned int version;
1737 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &version)
1738 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1739 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1744 * The only protocol version we support which is valid in this extension in
1745 * a ServerHello is TLSv1.3 therefore we shouldn't be getting anything else.
1747 if (version != TLS1_3_VERSION) {
1748 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1749 SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER);
1753 /* We ignore this extension for HRRs except to sanity check it */
1754 if (context == SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST)
1757 /* We just set it here. We validate it in ssl_choose_client_version */
1758 s->version = version;
1759 if (!ssl_set_record_protocol_version(s, version)) {
1760 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1767 int tls_parse_stoc_key_share(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt,
1768 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1771 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
1772 unsigned int group_id;
1774 EVP_PKEY *ckey = s->s3.tmp.pkey, *skey = NULL;
1775 const TLS_GROUP_INFO *ginf = NULL;
1778 if (ckey == NULL || s->s3.peer_tmp != NULL) {
1779 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1783 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &group_id)) {
1784 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1788 if ((context & SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST) != 0) {
1789 const uint16_t *pgroups = NULL;
1790 size_t i, num_groups;
1792 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1793 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1798 * It is an error if the HelloRetryRequest wants a key_share that we
1799 * already sent in the first ClientHello
1801 if (group_id == s->s3.group_id) {
1802 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE);
1806 /* Validate the selected group is one we support */
1807 tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &pgroups, &num_groups);
1808 for (i = 0; i < num_groups; i++) {
1809 if (group_id == pgroups[i])
1813 || !tls_group_allowed(s, group_id, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)
1814 || !tls_valid_group(s, group_id, TLS1_3_VERSION, TLS1_3_VERSION,
1816 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE);
1820 s->s3.group_id = group_id;
1821 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3.tmp.pkey);
1822 s->s3.tmp.pkey = NULL;
1826 if (group_id != s->s3.group_id) {
1828 * This isn't for the group that we sent in the original
1831 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE);
1834 /* Retain this group in the SSL_SESSION */
1836 s->session->kex_group = group_id;
1837 } else if (group_id != s->session->kex_group) {
1839 * If this is a resumption but changed what group was used, we need
1840 * to record the new group in the session, but the session is not
1841 * a new session and could be in use by other threads. So, make
1842 * a copy of the session to record the new information so that it's
1843 * useful for any sessions resumed from tickets issued on this
1846 SSL_SESSION *new_sess;
1848 if ((new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0)) == NULL) {
1849 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_SSL_LIB);
1852 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
1853 s->session = new_sess;
1854 s->session->kex_group = group_id;
1857 if ((ginf = tls1_group_id_lookup(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s),
1858 group_id)) == NULL) {
1859 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE);
1863 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &encoded_pt)
1864 || PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt) == 0) {
1865 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1869 if (!ginf->is_kem) {
1871 skey = EVP_PKEY_new();
1872 if (skey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(skey, ckey) <= 0) {
1873 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_COPY_PARAMETERS_FAILED);
1874 EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
1878 if (tls13_set_encoded_pub_key(skey, PACKET_data(&encoded_pt),
1879 PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt)) <= 0) {
1880 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
1881 EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
1885 if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 1) == 0) {
1886 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1887 EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
1890 s->s3.peer_tmp = skey;
1893 const unsigned char *ct = PACKET_data(&encoded_pt);
1894 size_t ctlen = PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt);
1896 if (ssl_decapsulate(s, ckey, ct, ctlen, 1) == 0) {
1897 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1907 int tls_parse_stoc_cookie(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
1908 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1912 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &cookie)
1913 || !PACKET_memdup(&cookie, &s->ext.tls13_cookie,
1914 &s->ext.tls13_cookie_len)) {
1915 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1922 int tls_parse_stoc_early_data(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt,
1923 unsigned int context,
1924 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1926 if (context == SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET) {
1927 unsigned long max_early_data;
1929 if (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &max_early_data)
1930 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1931 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_INVALID_MAX_EARLY_DATA);
1935 s->session->ext.max_early_data = max_early_data;
1937 if (SSL_IS_QUIC_HANDSHAKE(s) && max_early_data != 0xffffffff) {
1939 * QUIC allows missing max_early_data, or a max_early_data value
1940 * of 0xffffffff. Missing max_early_data is stored in the session
1941 * as 0. This is indistinguishable in OpenSSL from a present
1942 * max_early_data value that was 0. In order that later checks for
1943 * invalid max_early_data correctly treat as an error the case where
1944 * max_early_data is present and it is 0, we store any invalid
1945 * value in the same (non-zero) way. Otherwise we would have to
1946 * introduce a new flag just for this.
1948 s->session->ext.max_early_data = 1;
1949 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_INVALID_MAX_EARLY_DATA);
1956 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1957 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1961 if (!s->ext.early_data_ok
1964 * If we get here then we didn't send early data, or we didn't resume
1965 * using the first identity, or the SNI/ALPN is not consistent so the
1966 * server should not be accepting it.
1968 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1972 s->ext.early_data = SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED;
1977 int tls_parse_stoc_psk(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt,
1978 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1981 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
1982 unsigned int identity;
1984 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &identity) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1985 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1989 if (identity >= (unsigned int)s->ext.tick_identity) {
1990 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_BAD_PSK_IDENTITY);
1995 * Session resumption tickets are always sent before PSK tickets. If the
1996 * ticket index is 0 then it must be for a session resumption ticket if we
1997 * sent two tickets, or if we didn't send a PSK ticket.
1999 if (identity == 0 && (s->psksession == NULL || s->ext.tick_identity == 2)) {
2001 SSL_SESSION_free(s->psksession);
2002 s->psksession = NULL;
2006 if (s->psksession == NULL) {
2007 /* Should never happen */
2008 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2013 * If we used the external PSK for sending early_data then s->early_secret
2014 * is already set up, so don't overwrite it. Otherwise we copy the
2015 * early_secret across that we generated earlier.
2017 if ((s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY
2018 && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING)
2019 || s->session->ext.max_early_data > 0
2020 || s->psksession->ext.max_early_data == 0)
2021 memcpy(s->early_secret, s->psksession->early_secret, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
2023 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
2024 s->session = s->psksession;
2025 s->psksession = NULL;
2027 /* Early data is only allowed if we used the first ticket */
2029 s->ext.early_data_ok = 0;
2035 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_client_cert_type(SSL_CONNECTION *sc, WPACKET *pkt,
2036 unsigned int context,
2037 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
2039 sc->ext.client_cert_type_ctos = OSSL_CERT_TYPE_CTOS_NONE;
2040 if (sc->client_cert_type == NULL)
2041 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
2043 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_client_cert_type)
2044 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
2045 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, sc->client_cert_type, sc->client_cert_type_len)
2046 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2047 SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2048 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
2050 sc->ext.client_cert_type_ctos = OSSL_CERT_TYPE_CTOS_GOOD;
2051 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
2054 int tls_parse_stoc_client_cert_type(SSL_CONNECTION *sc, PACKET *pkt,
2055 unsigned int context,
2056 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
2060 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 1) {
2061 SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
2064 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &type)) {
2065 SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
2068 /* We did not send/ask for this */
2069 if (!ossl_assert(sc->ext.client_cert_type_ctos == OSSL_CERT_TYPE_CTOS_GOOD)) {
2070 SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
2073 /* We don't have this enabled */
2074 if (sc->client_cert_type == NULL) {
2075 SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
2078 /* Given back a value we didn't configure */
2079 if (memchr(sc->client_cert_type, type, sc->client_cert_type_len) == NULL) {
2080 SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_VALUE);
2083 sc->ext.client_cert_type = type;
2087 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_server_cert_type(SSL_CONNECTION *sc, WPACKET *pkt,
2088 unsigned int context,
2089 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
2091 sc->ext.server_cert_type_ctos = OSSL_CERT_TYPE_CTOS_NONE;
2092 if (sc->server_cert_type == NULL)
2093 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
2095 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_server_cert_type)
2096 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
2097 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, sc->server_cert_type, sc->server_cert_type_len)
2098 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2099 SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2100 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
2102 sc->ext.server_cert_type_ctos = OSSL_CERT_TYPE_CTOS_GOOD;
2103 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
2106 int tls_parse_stoc_server_cert_type(SSL_CONNECTION *sc, PACKET *pkt,
2107 unsigned int context,
2108 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
2112 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 1) {
2113 SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
2116 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &type)) {
2117 SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
2120 /* We did not send/ask for this */
2121 if (!ossl_assert(sc->ext.server_cert_type_ctos == OSSL_CERT_TYPE_CTOS_GOOD)) {
2122 SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
2125 /* We don't have this enabled */
2126 if (sc->server_cert_type == NULL) {
2127 SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
2130 /* Given back a value we didn't configure */
2131 if (memchr(sc->server_cert_type, type, sc->server_cert_type_len) == NULL) {
2132 SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_VALUE);
2135 sc->ext.server_cert_type = type;