1 /* ssl/s3_srvr.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
124 /* ====================================================================
125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
142 * to make use of the Contribution.
144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
151 #define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
152 #define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
155 #include "ssl_locl.h"
156 #include "kssl_lcl.h"
157 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
158 #include <openssl/rand.h>
159 #include <openssl/objects.h>
160 #include <openssl/evp.h>
161 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
162 #include <openssl/x509.h>
163 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
164 #include <openssl/dh.h>
166 #include <openssl/bn.h>
167 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
168 #include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
170 #include <openssl/md5.h>
172 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver);
174 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver)
176 if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
177 return(SSLv3_server_method());
182 IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method,
184 ssl_undefined_function,
185 ssl3_get_server_method)
187 int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
190 unsigned long alg_k,Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);
191 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
194 int new_state,state,skip=0;
196 RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0);
200 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
202 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
203 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
205 /* init things to blank */
207 if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s);
211 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
221 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
223 /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
227 case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
228 case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
231 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1);
233 if ((s->version>>8) != 3)
235 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
238 s->type=SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
240 if (s->init_buf == NULL)
242 if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL)
247 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH))
255 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
263 if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE)
265 /* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that
266 * the output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
268 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) { ret= -1; goto end; }
270 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
271 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
272 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
276 /* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE,
277 * we will just send a HelloRequest */
278 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
279 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
283 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
284 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
287 ret=ssl3_send_hello_request(s);
288 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
289 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;
290 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
293 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
296 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
300 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
301 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
302 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
305 ret=ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
306 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
309 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
313 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
314 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
315 ret=ssl3_send_server_hello(s);
316 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
317 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
320 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
321 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
323 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
327 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
330 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
334 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
335 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
336 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
337 /* normal PSK or KRB5 */
338 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
339 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)
340 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5))
342 ret=ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
343 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
344 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
345 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
346 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A;
348 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
353 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
360 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
365 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
366 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
367 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
369 /* clear this, it may get reset by
370 * send_server_key_exchange */
371 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA)
372 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
373 && !(alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
374 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
376 /* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary RSA key
377 * even when forbidden by protocol specs
378 * (handshake may fail as clients are not required to
379 * be able to handle this) */
380 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
382 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0;
385 /* only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or
386 * RSA but we have a sign only certificate
388 * PSK: may send PSK identity hints
390 * For ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange
391 * message only if the cipher suite is either
392 * ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, the
393 * server certificate contains the server's
394 * public key for key exchange.
396 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp
397 /* PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity
398 * hint if provided */
399 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
400 || ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
402 || (alg_k & (SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd|SSL_kEDH))
403 || (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
404 || ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
405 && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
406 || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
407 && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
413 ret=ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s);
414 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
419 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
423 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
424 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
425 if (/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
426 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
427 /* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set,
428 * don't request cert during re-negotiation: */
429 ((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
430 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
431 /* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites
432 * (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts
433 * and in RFC 2246): */
434 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) &&
435 /* ... except when the application insists on verification
436 * (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */
437 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
438 /* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */
439 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5)
440 /* With normal PSK Certificates and
441 * Certificate Requests are omitted */
442 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
444 /* no cert request */
446 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=0;
447 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
451 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=1;
452 ret=ssl3_send_certificate_request(s);
453 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
454 #ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
455 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
457 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
458 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
464 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
465 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
466 ret=ssl3_send_server_done(s);
467 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
468 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
469 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
473 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
474 /* number of bytes to be flushed */
475 num1=BIO_ctrl(s->wbio,BIO_CTRL_INFO,0,NULL);
478 s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
479 num1=BIO_flush(s->wbio);
480 if (num1 <= 0) { ret= -1; goto end; }
481 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
484 s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state;
487 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
488 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
489 /* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */
490 ret = ssl3_check_client_hello(s);
494 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C;
496 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
498 ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
499 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
502 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
506 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
507 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
508 ret=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
513 /* For the ECDH ciphersuites when
514 * the client sends its ECDH pub key in
515 * a certificate, the CertificateVerify
516 * message is not sent.
518 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
525 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
528 /* We need to get hashes here so if there is
529 * a client cert, it can be verified
530 * FIXME - digest processing for CertificateVerify
531 * should be generalized. But it is next step
533 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
534 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
536 for (dgst_num=0; dgst_num<SSL_MAX_DIGEST;dgst_num++)
537 if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num])
539 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,EVP_MD_CTX_type(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]),&(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[offset]));
540 offset+=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]);
545 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
546 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
548 /* we should decide if we expected this one */
549 ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
550 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
552 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
556 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
557 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
558 ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
559 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
560 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
561 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
562 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
563 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
571 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
575 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
576 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A:
577 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B:
578 ret=ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s);
579 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
580 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
584 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A:
585 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B:
586 ret=ssl3_send_cert_status(s);
587 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
588 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
594 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
595 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
597 s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
598 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
599 { ret= -1; goto end; }
601 ret=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
602 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
604 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
605 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
608 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
609 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
617 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
618 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
619 ret=ssl3_send_finished(s,
620 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
621 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
622 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
623 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
624 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
626 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
628 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK;
633 /* clean a few things up */
634 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
636 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
639 /* remove buffering on output */
640 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
644 if (s->new_session == 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
646 /* actually not necessarily a 'new' session unless
647 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is set */
651 ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
653 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
655 s->handshake_func=ssl3_accept;
657 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1);
665 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
671 if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip)
675 if ((ret=BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
680 if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state))
684 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP,1);
691 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
695 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT,ret);
699 int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
703 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A)
705 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
706 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST;
711 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B;
712 /* number of bytes to write */
717 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
718 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
721 int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s)
726 /* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message,
727 * so permit appropriate message length */
728 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
734 if (!ok) return((int)n);
735 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
736 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO)
738 /* Throw away what we have done so far in the current handshake,
739 * which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.)
740 * I hope that tmp.dh is the only thing that may need to be cleared
741 * when a handshake is not completed ... */
742 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
743 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
745 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
746 s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL;
754 int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
756 int i,j,ok,al,ret= -1;
757 unsigned int cookie_len;
760 unsigned char *p,*d,*q;
762 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
765 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers=NULL;
767 /* We do this so that we will respond with our native type.
768 * If we are TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1,
769 * This down switching should be handled by a different method.
770 * If we are SSLv3, we will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with
773 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)
775 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
778 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
779 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B,
780 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C,
781 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO,
782 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
785 if (!ok) return((int)n);
787 d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
789 /* use version from inside client hello, not from record header
790 * (may differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) */
791 s->client_version=(((int)p[0])<<8)|(int)p[1];
794 if ((s->version == DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version > s->version) ||
795 (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version < s->version))
797 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
798 if ((s->client_version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
800 /* similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
801 s->version = s->client_version;
803 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
807 /* load the client random */
808 memcpy(s->s3->client_random,p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
811 /* get the session-id */
815 /* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow session reuse during renegotiation
816 * (i.e. when s->new_session is true), option
817 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is new with 0.9.7.
818 * Maybe this optional behaviour should always have been the default,
819 * but we cannot safely change the default behaviour (or new applications
820 * might be written that become totally unsecure when compiled with
821 * an earlier library version)
823 if ((s->new_session && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION)))
825 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
830 i=ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n);
832 { /* previous session */
839 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
846 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION)
851 if ( (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) &&
852 s->d1->send_cookie == 0)
854 /* HelloVerifyMessage has already been sent */
855 if ( cookie_len != s->d1->cookie_len)
857 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
858 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
864 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
865 * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
866 * does not cause an overflow.
868 if ( cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie))
871 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
872 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
876 /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
877 if ( (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) &&
880 memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len);
882 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL)
884 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie,
887 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
888 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
889 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
892 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
894 else if ( memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
895 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) /* default verification */
897 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
898 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
899 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
908 if ((i == 0) && (j != 0))
910 /* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */
911 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
912 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
917 /* not enough data */
918 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
919 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
922 if ((i > 0) && (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s,p,i,&(ciphers))
929 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
930 if ((s->hit) && (i > 0))
933 id=s->session->cipher->id;
936 printf("client sent %d ciphers\n",sk_num(ciphers));
938 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++)
940 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers,i);
942 printf("client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
943 i,sk_num(ciphers),SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
951 if (j == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1))
953 /* Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used cipher may
954 * not be in the current list, the client instead might be trying to
955 * continue using a cipher that before wasn't chosen due to server
956 * preferences. We'll have to reject the connection if the cipher is not
957 * enabled, though. */
958 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0);
959 if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s), c) >= 0)
961 s->session->cipher = c;
967 /* we need to have the cipher in the cipher
968 * list if we are asked to reuse it */
969 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
970 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
979 /* not enough data */
980 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
981 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
987 if (p[j] == 0) break;
994 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
995 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
999 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1001 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION)
1003 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s,&p,d,n, &al))
1005 /* 'al' set by ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext */
1006 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
1010 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
1011 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1015 /* Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this
1016 * handshake for not reused session only. We need to generate
1017 * server_random before calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow
1018 * SessionTicket processing to use it in key derivation. */
1022 Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); /* Time */
1023 pos=s->s3->server_random;
1025 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(pos,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4) <= 0)
1027 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1032 if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb)
1034 SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher=NULL;
1036 s->session->master_key_length=sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1037 if(s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key, &s->session->master_key_length,
1038 ciphers, &pref_cipher, s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg))
1041 s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
1042 s->session->verify_result=X509_V_OK;
1046 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1047 pref_cipher=pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1048 if (pref_cipher == NULL)
1050 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1051 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1055 s->session->cipher=pref_cipher;
1058 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
1060 if (s->cipher_list_by_id)
1061 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
1063 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1064 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1069 /* Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1070 * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression
1071 * algorithms from the client, starting at q. */
1072 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=NULL;
1073 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1074 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) && s->ctx->comp_methods)
1075 { /* See if we have a match */
1076 int m,nn,o,v,done=0;
1078 nn=sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1079 for (m=0; m<nn; m++)
1081 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
1094 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
1100 /* Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must
1105 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1106 s->session->compress_meth=0;
1108 s->session->compress_meth=(comp == NULL)?0:comp->id;
1110 if (s->session->ciphers != NULL)
1111 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
1112 s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
1113 if (ciphers == NULL)
1115 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1116 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED);
1120 c=ssl3_choose_cipher(s,s->session->ciphers,
1121 SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1125 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1126 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1129 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=c;
1133 /* Session-id reuse */
1134 #ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
1135 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1136 SSL_CIPHER *nc=NULL;
1137 SSL_CIPHER *ec=NULL;
1139 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG)
1141 sk=s->session->ciphers;
1142 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++)
1144 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk,i);
1145 if (c->algorithm_enc & SSL_eNULL)
1147 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c))
1151 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=nc;
1152 else if (ec != NULL)
1153 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=ec;
1155 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1159 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1162 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
1165 /* we now have the following setup.
1167 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
1168 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
1169 * compression - basically ignored right now
1170 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1171 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1172 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1173 * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
1180 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1183 if (ciphers != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1187 int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
1190 unsigned char *p,*d;
1193 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1197 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A)
1199 buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1200 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1201 p=s->s3->server_random;
1202 /* Generate server_random if it was not needed previously */
1203 Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); /* Time */
1205 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4) <= 0)
1208 /* Do the message type and length last */
1211 *(p++)=s->version>>8;
1212 *(p++)=s->version&0xff;
1215 memcpy(p,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1216 p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1218 /* now in theory we have 3 options to sending back the
1219 * session id. If it is a re-use, we send back the
1220 * old session-id, if it is a new session, we send
1221 * back the new session-id or we send back a 0 length
1222 * session-id if we want it to be single use.
1223 * Currently I will not implement the '0' length session-id
1224 * 12-Jan-98 - I'll now support the '0' length stuff.
1226 * We also have an additional case where stateless session
1227 * resumption is successful: we always send back the old
1228 * session id. In this case s->hit is non zero: this can
1229 * only happen if stateless session resumption is succesful
1230 * if session caching is disabled so existing functionality
1233 if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
1235 s->session->session_id_length=0;
1237 sl=s->session->session_id_length;
1238 if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id))
1240 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1244 memcpy(p,s->session->session_id,sl);
1247 /* put the cipher */
1248 i=ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,p);
1251 /* put the compression method */
1252 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1255 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1258 *(p++)=s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
1260 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1261 if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
1263 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
1266 if ((p = ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) == NULL)
1268 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1275 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO;
1278 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B;
1279 /* number of bytes to write */
1284 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */
1285 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1288 int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s)
1292 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A)
1294 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1297 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
1302 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;
1303 /* number of bytes to write */
1308 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
1309 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1312 int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1314 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1318 unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
1321 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1324 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1325 EC_KEY *ecdh=NULL, *ecdhp;
1326 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
1329 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1332 unsigned char *p,*d;
1342 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
1343 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A)
1345 type=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1350 r[0]=r[1]=r[2]=r[3]=NULL;
1352 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1353 if (type & SSL_kRSA)
1356 if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL))
1358 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s,
1359 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1360 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1363 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1364 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1372 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1373 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1378 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
1382 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1383 if (type & SSL_kEDH)
1386 if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1387 dhp=s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s,
1388 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1389 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1392 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1393 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1397 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
1400 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1404 if ((dh=DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL)
1406 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1411 if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL ||
1412 dhp->priv_key == NULL ||
1413 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE)))
1415 if(!DH_generate_key(dh))
1417 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1424 dh->pub_key=BN_dup(dhp->pub_key);
1425 dh->priv_key=BN_dup(dhp->priv_key);
1426 if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) ||
1427 (dh->priv_key == NULL))
1429 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1439 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1440 if (type & SSL_kEECDH)
1442 const EC_GROUP *group;
1444 ecdhp=cert->ecdh_tmp;
1445 if ((ecdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1447 ecdhp=s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s,
1448 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1449 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1453 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1454 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
1458 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
1460 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
1461 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1465 /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
1468 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1471 if (!EC_KEY_up_ref(ecdhp))
1473 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1478 s->s3->tmp.ecdh=ecdh;
1479 if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1480 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1481 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE))
1483 if(!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh))
1485 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1490 if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) ||
1491 (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1492 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL))
1494 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1498 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
1499 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163))
1501 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
1505 /* XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH
1506 * keys over named (not generic) curves. For
1507 * supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero.
1510 tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group)))
1513 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
1517 /* Encode the public key.
1518 * First check the size of encoding and
1519 * allocate memory accordingly.
1521 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1522 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1523 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1526 encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
1527 OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen*sizeof(unsigned char));
1528 bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
1529 if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL))
1531 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1536 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1537 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1538 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1539 encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);
1541 if (encodedlen == 0)
1543 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1547 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); bn_ctx=NULL;
1549 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not
1550 * generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges.
1551 * In this situation, we need four additional bytes
1552 * to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
1557 /* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message
1558 * explicitly so we can set these to NULLs
1566 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
1567 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1568 if (type & SSL_kPSK)
1570 /* reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint*/
1571 n+=2+strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1574 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1576 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1577 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
1580 for (i=0; r[i] != NULL; i++)
1582 nr[i]=BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
1586 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
1587 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
1589 if ((pkey=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s,s->s3->tmp.new_cipher))
1592 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1595 kn=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
1603 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,n+4+kn))
1605 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_BUF);
1608 d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1611 for (i=0; r[i] != NULL; i++)
1618 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1619 if (type & SSL_kEECDH)
1621 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves.
1622 * In this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has:
1623 * [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
1624 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by
1625 * the actual encoded point itself
1627 *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
1635 memcpy((unsigned char*)p,
1636 (unsigned char *)encodedPoint,
1638 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1643 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1644 if (type & SSL_kPSK)
1646 /* copy PSK identity hint */
1647 s2n(strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint), p);
1648 strncpy((char *)p, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint, strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint));
1649 p+=strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1656 /* n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4])
1657 * and p points to the space at the end. */
1658 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1659 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
1663 for (num=2; num > 0; num--)
1665 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2)
1666 ?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
1667 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1668 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1669 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
1670 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q,
1671 (unsigned int *)&i);
1675 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j,
1676 &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0)
1678 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_RSA);
1686 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSA)
1687 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
1690 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_dss1(), NULL);
1691 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1692 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1693 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
1694 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
1695 (unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
1697 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_DSA);
1705 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA)
1706 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
1708 /* let's do ECDSA */
1709 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_ecdsa(), NULL);
1710 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1711 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1712 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
1713 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
1714 (unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
1716 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_ECDSA);
1725 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
1726 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1727 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
1732 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE;
1735 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
1741 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
1742 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
1743 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1745 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1747 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1748 if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1749 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
1751 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
1755 int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
1757 unsigned char *p,*d;
1759 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk=NULL;
1763 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A)
1767 d=p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4]);
1769 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
1771 n=ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s,p);
1780 sk=SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
1784 for (i=0; i<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++)
1786 name=sk_X509_NAME_value(sk,i);
1787 j=i2d_X509_NAME(name,NULL);
1788 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,4+n+j+2))
1790 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
1793 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+n]);
1794 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG))
1797 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
1804 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
1805 j-=2; s2n(j,d); j+=2;
1811 /* else no CA names */
1812 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+off]);
1815 d=(unsigned char *)buf->data;
1816 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST;
1819 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
1824 #ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
1825 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num;
1828 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
1835 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;
1838 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
1839 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1844 int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1848 unsigned long alg_k;
1850 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1852 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
1854 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1858 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1860 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
1862 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1863 EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL;
1864 EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL;
1865 EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL;
1866 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1869 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
1870 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A,
1871 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B,
1872 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1876 if (!ok) return((int)n);
1877 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
1879 alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1881 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1882 if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
1884 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
1885 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp)
1887 if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL))
1888 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp;
1889 /* Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should
1890 * be sent already */
1893 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1894 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY);
1901 pkey=s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey;
1902 if ( (pkey == NULL) ||
1903 (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) ||
1904 (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL))
1906 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1907 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
1913 /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS{0xFEFF} */
1914 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION)
1919 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG))
1921 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
1931 i=RSA_private_decrypt((int)n,p,p,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
1935 if (i != SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
1937 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1938 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); */
1941 if ((al == -1) && !((p[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
1943 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
1944 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
1945 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
1946 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
1947 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
1949 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. */
1950 if (!((s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) &&
1951 (p[0] == (s->version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->version & 0xff))))
1953 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1954 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER); */
1956 /* The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
1957 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version
1958 * number check as a "bad version oracle" -- an alert would
1959 * reveal that the plaintext corresponding to some ciphertext
1960 * made up by the adversary is properly formatted except
1961 * that the version number is wrong. To avoid such attacks,
1962 * we should treat this just like any other decryption error. */
1968 /* Some decryption failure -- use random value instead as countermeasure
1969 * against Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding
1970 * (see RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). */
1972 i = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
1973 p[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
1974 p[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
1975 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p+2, i-2) <= 0) /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure */
1979 s->session->master_key_length=
1980 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
1981 s->session->master_key,
1983 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
1987 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1988 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))
1993 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG))
1995 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2005 if (n == 0L) /* the parameters are in the cert */
2007 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2008 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_DH_CERTS);
2013 if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL)
2015 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2016 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2020 dh_srvr=s->s3->tmp.dh;
2023 pub=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL);
2026 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BN_LIB);
2030 i=DH_compute_key(p,pub,dh_srvr);
2034 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
2038 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
2043 s->session->master_key_length=
2044 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2045 s->session->master_key,p,i);
2046 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
2050 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2051 if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
2053 krb5_error_code krb5rc;
2054 krb5_data enc_ticket;
2055 krb5_data authenticator;
2057 KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
2058 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
2059 EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
2060 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
2061 unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
2062 + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
2064 krb5_timestamp authtime = 0;
2065 krb5_ticket_times ttimes;
2067 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
2069 if (!kssl_ctx) kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();
2072 enc_ticket.length = i;
2074 if (n < enc_ticket.length + 6)
2076 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2077 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2081 enc_ticket.data = (char *)p;
2082 p+=enc_ticket.length;
2085 authenticator.length = i;
2087 if (n < enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + 6)
2089 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2090 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2094 authenticator.data = (char *)p;
2095 p+=authenticator.length;
2099 enc_pms.data = (char *)p;
2102 /* Note that the length is checked again below,
2105 if(enc_pms.length > sizeof pms)
2107 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2108 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2112 if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length +
2113 enc_pms.length + 6))
2115 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2116 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2120 if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes,
2124 printf("kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
2125 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2127 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2128 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2129 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2134 /* Note: no authenticator is not considered an error,
2135 ** but will return authtime == 0.
2137 if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator,
2138 &authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0)
2141 printf("kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
2142 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2144 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2145 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2146 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2151 if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0)
2153 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc);
2158 kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
2159 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2161 enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
2165 memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
2167 if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc,NULL,kssl_ctx->key,iv))
2169 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2170 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2173 if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms,&outl,
2174 (unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length))
2176 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2177 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2180 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2182 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2183 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2186 if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx,&(pms[outl]),&padl))
2188 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2189 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2193 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2195 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2196 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2199 if (!((p[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
2201 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2202 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2203 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2204 * However, buggy clients exist that send random bytes instead of
2205 * the protocol version.
2206 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients.
2207 * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos cipher)
2209 if (!((s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) &&
2210 (p[0] == (s->version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->version & 0xff))))
2212 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2213 SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2218 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
2220 s->session->master_key_length=
2221 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2222 s->session->master_key, pms, outl);
2224 if (kssl_ctx->client_princ)
2226 size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ);
2227 if ( len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH )
2229 s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len;
2230 memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ,kssl_ctx->client_princ,len);
2235 /* Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
2236 ** but it caused problems for apache.
2237 ** kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
2238 ** if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
2242 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2244 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2245 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
2250 const EC_GROUP *group;
2251 const BIGNUM *priv_key;
2253 /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
2254 if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL)
2256 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2257 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2261 /* Let's get server private key and group information */
2262 if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
2264 /* use the certificate */
2265 tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec;
2269 /* use the ephermeral values we saved when
2270 * generating the ServerKeyExchange msg.
2272 tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh;
2275 group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
2276 priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
2278 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) ||
2279 !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key))
2281 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2286 /* Let's get client's public key */
2287 if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL)
2289 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2290 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2296 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
2298 if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
2300 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2301 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
2304 if (((clnt_pub_pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer))
2306 (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC))
2308 /* XXX: For now, we do not support client
2309 * authentication using ECDH certificates
2310 * so this branch (n == 0L) of the code is
2311 * never executed. When that support is
2312 * added, we ought to ensure the key
2313 * received in the certificate is
2314 * authorized for key agreement.
2315 * ECDH_compute_key implicitly checks that
2316 * the two ECDH shares are for the same
2319 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2320 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2321 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS);
2325 if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint,
2326 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->pkey.ec)) == 0)
2328 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2332 ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
2336 /* Get client's public key from encoded point
2337 * in the ClientKeyExchange message.
2339 if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
2341 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2342 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2346 /* Get encoded point length */
2349 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group,
2350 clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0)
2352 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2356 /* p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer
2357 * currently, so set it to the start
2359 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
2362 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
2363 field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);
2364 if (field_size <= 0)
2366 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2370 i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size+7)/8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh, NULL);
2373 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2378 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2379 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2380 if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
2381 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2382 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2384 /* Compute the master secret */
2385 s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc-> \
2386 generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key, p, i);
2388 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
2393 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2394 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK)
2396 unsigned char *t = NULL;
2397 unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN*2+4];
2398 unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0;
2400 char tmp_id[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1];
2402 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2407 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2408 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2411 if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN)
2413 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2414 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2417 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL)
2419 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2420 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
2424 /* Create guaranteed NULL-terminated identity
2425 * string for the callback */
2426 memcpy(tmp_id, p, i);
2427 memset(tmp_id+i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1-i);
2428 psk_len = s->psk_server_callback(s, tmp_id,
2429 psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2430 OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_id, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1);
2432 if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN)
2434 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2435 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2438 else if (psk_len == 0)
2440 /* PSK related to the given identity not found */
2441 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2442 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2443 al=SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
2447 /* create PSK pre_master_secret */
2448 pre_ms_len=2+psk_len+2+psk_len;
2450 memmove(psk_or_pre_ms+psk_len+4, psk_or_pre_ms, psk_len);
2452 memset(t, 0, psk_len);
2456 if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL)
2457 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
2458 s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup((char *)p);
2459 if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL)
2461 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2462 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2466 if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
2467 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
2468 s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
2469 if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL &&
2470 s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
2472 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2473 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2477 s->session->master_key_length=
2478 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2479 s->session->master_key, psk_or_pre_ms, pre_ms_len);
2482 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2488 if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST)
2490 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
2491 unsigned char premaster_secret[32];
2494 /* Get our certificate privatec key*/
2495 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(s->cert->key->privatekey,NULL);
2496 EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx);
2497 /* Decrypt session key */
2498 if ((*p!=( V_ASN1_SEQUENCE| V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED)) || p[1]!=0x81 )
2500 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2503 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx,premaster_secret,&outlen,p+3,p[2]) <0)
2506 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2509 /* Generate master secret */
2510 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2511 s->session->master_key_length=
2512 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2513 s->session->master_key,premaster_secret,32);
2518 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2519 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2520 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
2526 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2527 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH)
2530 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2531 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2532 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2533 if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
2534 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2535 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2540 int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
2542 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
2549 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2550 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A,
2551 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B,
2556 if (!ok) return((int)n);
2558 if (s->session->peer != NULL)
2560 peer=s->session->peer;
2561 pkey=X509_get_pubkey(peer);
2562 type=X509_certificate_type(peer,pkey);
2570 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY)
2572 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
2573 if ((peer != NULL) && (type | EVP_PKT_SIGN))
2575 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2576 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE);
2585 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED);
2586 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2590 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN))
2592 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
2593 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2597 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
2599 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
2600 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2604 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
2605 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2606 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
2607 /* If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare
2608 * signature without length field */
2609 if (n==64 && (pkey->type==NID_id_GostR3410_94 ||
2610 pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) )
2620 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2621 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2625 j=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
2626 if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0))
2628 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
2629 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2633 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2634 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
2636 i=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
2637 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i,
2641 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2642 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
2647 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2648 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE);
2654 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2655 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
2657 j=DSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
2658 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
2659 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.dsa);
2663 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2664 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE);
2670 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
2671 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
2673 j=ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
2674 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
2675 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.ec);
2679 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2680 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
2681 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
2687 if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001)
2688 { unsigned char signature[64];
2690 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey,NULL);
2691 EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx);
2693 fprintf(stderr,"GOST signature length is %d",i);
2695 for (idx=0;idx<64;idx++) {
2696 signature[63-idx]=p[idx];
2698 j=EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx,signature,64,s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,32);
2699 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2702 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2703 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
2704 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
2710 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2711 al=SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
2720 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2723 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
2727 int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s)
2729 int i,ok,al,ret= -1;
2731 unsigned long l,nc,llen,n;
2732 const unsigned char *p,*q;
2734 STACK_OF(X509) *sk=NULL;
2736 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2743 if (!ok) return((int)n);
2745 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE)
2747 if ( (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
2748 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
2750 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
2751 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2754 /* If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list */
2755 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
2757 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST);
2758 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2761 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
2765 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE)
2767 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2768 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
2771 p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2773 if ((sk=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL)
2775 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2782 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2783 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2786 for (nc=0; nc<llen; )
2789 if ((l+nc+3) > llen)
2791 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2792 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2797 x=d2i_X509(NULL,&p,l);
2800 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
2805 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2806 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2809 if (!sk_X509_push(sk,x))
2811 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2818 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0)
2820 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
2821 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
2823 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2824 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
2827 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
2828 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
2829 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
2831 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
2832 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2838 i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk);
2841 al=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
2842 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_RETURNED);
2847 if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */
2848 X509_free(s->session->peer);
2849 s->session->peer=sk_X509_shift(sk);
2850 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
2852 /* With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL
2853 * when we arrive here. */
2854 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
2856 s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
2857 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
2859 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2863 if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL)
2864 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free);
2865 s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain=sk;
2866 /* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the
2867 * peer's own certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c */
2875 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2878 if (x != NULL) X509_free(x);
2879 if (sk != NULL) sk_X509_pop_free(sk,X509_free);
2883 int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
2888 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A)
2890 x=ssl_get_server_send_cert(s);
2893 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
2894 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aKRB5) ||
2895 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5))
2897 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2902 l=ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,x);
2903 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
2908 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
2909 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
2911 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
2912 int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
2914 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A)
2916 unsigned char *p, *senc, *macstart;
2921 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
2922 unsigned char key_name[16];
2924 /* get session encoding length */
2925 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
2926 /* Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is
2931 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
2932 * follows 1 (size of message name) + 3 (message length
2933 * bytes) + 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
2934 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
2935 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
2936 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
2938 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
2939 26 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH +
2940 EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
2942 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen);
2946 i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p);
2948 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
2950 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET;
2951 /* Skip message length for now */
2953 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
2954 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
2955 /* Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present
2956 * it does all the work otherwise use generated values
2959 if (s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
2961 if (s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx,
2970 RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, 16);
2971 EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
2972 s->ctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv);
2973 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, s->ctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
2974 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
2975 memcpy(key_name, s->ctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
2977 l2n(s->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint, p);
2978 /* Skip ticket length for now */
2980 /* Output key name */
2982 memcpy(p, key_name, 16);
2985 memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx));
2986 p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
2987 /* Encrypt session data */
2988 EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen);
2990 EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len);
2992 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
2994 HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart);
2995 HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen);
2996 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
2999 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
3001 len = p - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3002 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + 1;
3003 l2n3(len - 4, p); /* Message length */
3005 s2n(len - 10, p); /* Ticket length */
3007 /* number of bytes to write */
3009 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
3014 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
3015 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3018 int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s)
3020 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A)
3023 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3024 * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
3025 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
3028 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen))
3031 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3034 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
3035 /* message length */
3036 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p);
3038 *(p++)= s->tlsext_status_type;
3039 /* length of OCSP response */
3040 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p);
3041 /* actual response */
3042 memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen);
3043 /* number of bytes to write */
3044 s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen;
3045 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B;
3049 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */
3050 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));