1 /* ssl/s3_srvr.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
124 /* ====================================================================
125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
142 * to make use of the Contribution.
144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
153 #include "ssl_locl.h"
154 #include "internal/constant_time_locl.h"
155 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
156 #include <openssl/rand.h>
157 #include <openssl/objects.h>
158 #include <openssl/evp.h>
159 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
160 #include <openssl/x509.h>
161 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
162 # include <openssl/dh.h>
164 #include <openssl/bn.h>
165 #include <openssl/md5.h>
167 static STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s,
168 PACKET *cipher_suites,
169 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **skp,
170 int sslv2format, int *al);
172 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
173 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al)
175 int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE;
177 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
179 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
180 (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL)) {
181 if (s->srp_ctx.login == NULL) {
183 * RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, we do so if There is no srp
187 *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
189 ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s, al);
197 int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
200 unsigned long alg_k, Time = (unsigned long)time(NULL);
201 void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
203 int new_state, state, skip = 0;
205 RAND_add(&Time, sizeof(Time), 0);
209 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
210 cb = s->info_callback;
211 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
212 cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
214 /* init things to blank */
216 if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) {
221 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
223 * If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we already got and
224 * don't await it anymore, because Heartbeats don't make sense during
227 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) {
228 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
237 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
239 /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
243 case SSL_ST_BEFORE | SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
244 case SSL_ST_OK | SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
248 cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START, 1);
250 if ((s->version >> 8 != 3) && s->version != TLS_ANY_VERSION) {
251 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
252 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
256 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_VERSION, 0, s->version, NULL)) {
257 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW);
261 s->type = SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
263 if (s->init_buf == NULL) {
264 if ((buf = BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL) {
266 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
269 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) {
272 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
278 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) {
280 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
285 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY;
287 * Should have been reset by ssl3_get_finished, too.
289 s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0;
291 if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE) {
293 * Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that the
294 * output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
296 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s, 1)) {
298 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
302 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
303 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
304 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
305 } else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
307 SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
309 * Server attempting to renegotiate with client that doesn't
310 * support secure renegotiation.
312 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,
313 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
314 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
316 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
320 * s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE, we will just send a
323 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
324 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
328 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
329 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
332 ret = ssl3_send_hello_request(s);
335 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;
336 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
339 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
342 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
343 s->state = SSL_ST_OK;
346 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
347 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
348 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
350 ret = ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
354 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
358 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
359 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D:
361 enum WORK_STATE wst_ret;
363 wst_ret = tls_post_process_client_hello(s, WORK_MORE_B);
364 if (wst_ret == WORK_MORE_B)
366 if (wst_ret == WORK_ERROR) {
372 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
377 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
378 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
379 ret = ssl3_send_server_hello(s);
384 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
385 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
387 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
389 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
394 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
395 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
396 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
397 /* normal PSK or SRP */
398 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth &
399 (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
400 ret = ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
404 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
405 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A;
407 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
410 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
415 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
416 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
417 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
420 * clear this, it may get reset by
421 * send_server_key_exchange
423 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp = 0;
426 * only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or RSA but we have a
427 * sign only certificate PSK: may send PSK identity hints For
428 * ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange message only if
429 * the cipher suite is either ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases,
430 * the server certificate contains the server's public key for
435 * PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if
438 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
439 /* Only send SKE if we have identity hint for plain PSK */
440 || ((alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) && s->cert->psk_identity_hint)
441 /* For other PSK always send SKE */
442 || (alg_k & (SSL_PSK & (SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK)))
444 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
445 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
446 || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
448 || (alg_k & SSL_kDHE)
449 || (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE)
450 || ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
451 && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
452 || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
453 && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys
454 [SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey) *
455 8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
460 ret = ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s);
466 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
470 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
471 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
472 if ( /* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
473 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
475 * if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert
476 * during re-negotiation:
478 ((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
479 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
481 * never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see
482 * section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in
485 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) &&
487 * ... except when the application insists on
488 * verification (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts
491 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
492 /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
493 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)
495 * With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests
498 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)) {
499 /* no cert request */
501 s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 0;
502 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
503 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
504 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
508 s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 1;
509 ret = ssl3_send_certificate_request(s);
512 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
517 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
518 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
519 ret = ssl3_send_server_done(s);
522 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
523 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
527 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
530 * This code originally checked to see if any data was pending
531 * using BIO_CTRL_INFO and then flushed. This caused problems as
532 * documented in PR#1939. The proposed fix doesn't completely
533 * resolve this issue as buggy implementations of
534 * BIO_CTRL_PENDING still exist. So instead we just flush
538 s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
539 if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0) {
543 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
545 s->state = s->s3->tmp.next_state;
548 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
549 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
550 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
551 ret = ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
556 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
559 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
560 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
561 ret = ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
564 if (s->no_cert_verify) {
566 * For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH
567 * pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is
568 * not sent. Also for GOST ciphersuites when the client uses
569 * its key from the certificate for key exchange.
571 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CHANGE_A;
573 } else if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
574 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
576 if (!s->session->peer)
578 if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
579 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
580 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
584 * For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer. If we support
585 * extms we've done this already so this is a no-op
587 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) {
588 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
595 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
599 * We need to get hashes here so if there is a client cert,
600 * it can be verified FIXME - digest processing for
601 * CertificateVerify should be generalized. But it is next
604 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
605 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
608 for (dgst_num = 0; dgst_num < SSL_MAX_DIGEST; dgst_num++)
609 if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]) {
612 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
621 EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]);
623 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
632 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
633 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
634 ret = ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
638 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CHANGE_A;
642 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
643 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A:
644 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B:
645 ret = ssl3_get_next_proto(s);
649 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
654 case SSL3_ST_SR_CHANGE_A:
655 case SSL3_ST_SR_CHANGE_B:
656 ret = ssl3_get_change_cipher_spec(s, SSL3_ST_SR_CHANGE_A,
657 SSL3_ST_SR_CHANGE_B);
661 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
662 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
664 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
665 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
667 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
672 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
673 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
674 ret = ssl3_get_finished(s, SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
675 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
679 s->state = SSL_ST_OK;
680 else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
681 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
683 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
687 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A:
688 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B:
689 ret = ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s);
692 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
696 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A:
697 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B:
698 ret = ssl3_send_cert_status(s);
701 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
705 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
706 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
708 s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
709 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
711 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
715 ret = ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
717 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
721 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
724 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
725 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
728 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
734 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
735 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
736 ret = ssl3_send_finished(s,
737 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,
738 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
740 ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
742 ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
745 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
747 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CHANGE_A;
749 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL_ST_OK;
754 /* clean a few things up */
755 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
757 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
760 /* remove buffering on output */
761 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
765 if (s->renegotiate == 2) { /* skipped if we just sent a
770 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
772 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
774 s->handshake_func = ssl3_accept;
777 cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1);
786 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
792 if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip) {
794 if ((ret = BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
798 if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state)) {
799 new_state = s->state;
801 cb(s, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP, 1);
802 s->state = new_state;
808 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
812 cb(s, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT, ret);
817 int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
820 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) {
821 if (tls_construct_hello_request(s) == 0) {
824 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B;
827 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
828 return ssl_do_write(s);
831 int tls_construct_hello_request(SSL *s)
833 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST, 0)) {
834 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
842 int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
846 enum WORK_STATE wst_ret;
848 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C && !s->first_packet)
852 * We do this so that we will respond with our native type. If we are
853 * TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1, This down
854 * switching should be handled by a different method. If we are SSLv3, we
855 * will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with TLSv1.
857 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A) {
858 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
861 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
862 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B,
863 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C,
864 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO,
865 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, &ok);
871 if (tls_process_client_hello(s, n) == 0)
875 wst_ret = tls_post_process_client_hello(s, WORK_MORE_A);
876 if (wst_ret == WORK_MORE_A || wst_ret == WORK_ERROR)
878 if (wst_ret == WORK_MORE_B) {
879 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D;
885 enum MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_hello(SSL *s, long n)
887 int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
888 unsigned int j, complen = 0;
891 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
892 SSL_COMP *comp = NULL;
894 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL;
896 /* |cookie| will only be initialized for DTLS. */
897 PACKET pkt, session_id, cipher_suites, compression, extensions, cookie;
900 if (!PACKET_buf_init(&pkt, s->init_msg, n)) {
901 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
902 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
906 is_v2_record = RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer);
908 PACKET_null_init(&cookie);
909 /* First lets get s->client_version set correctly */
911 unsigned int version;
914 * An SSLv3/TLSv1 backwards-compatible CLIENT-HELLO in an SSLv2
915 * header is sent directly on the wire, not wrapped as a TLS
916 * record. Our record layer just processes the message length and passes
917 * the rest right through. Its format is:
919 * 0-1 msg_length - decoded by the record layer
920 * 2 msg_type - s->init_msg points here
922 * 5-6 cipher_spec_length
923 * 7-8 session_id_length
924 * 9-10 challenge_length
928 if (!PACKET_get_1(&pkt, &mt)
929 || mt != SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
931 * Should never happen. We should have tested this in the record
932 * layer in order to have determined that this is a SSLv2 record
935 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
939 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&pkt, &version)) {
940 /* No protocol version supplied! */
941 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
944 if (version == 0x0002) {
945 /* This is real SSLv2. We don't support it. */
946 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
948 } else if ((version & 0xff00) == (SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR << 8)) {
950 s->client_version = version;
952 /* No idea what protocol this is */
953 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
958 * use version from inside client hello, not from record header (may
959 * differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph)
961 if(!PACKET_get_net_2(&pkt, (unsigned int *)&s->client_version)) {
962 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
963 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
968 /* Do SSL/TLS version negotiation if applicable */
969 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
970 if (s->version != TLS_ANY_VERSION) {
971 if (s->client_version >= s->version) {
974 } else if (s->client_version >= SSL3_VERSION) {
975 switch(s->client_version) {
978 if(!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2)) {
979 s->version = TLS1_2_VERSION;
980 s->method = TLSv1_2_server_method();
984 /* Deliberately fall through */
986 if(!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1)) {
987 s->version = TLS1_1_VERSION;
988 s->method = TLSv1_1_server_method();
992 /* Deliberately fall through */
994 if(!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1)) {
995 s->version = TLS1_VERSION;
996 s->method = TLSv1_server_method();
1000 /* Deliberately fall through */
1002 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3
1003 if(!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3)) {
1004 s->version = SSL3_VERSION;
1005 s->method = SSLv3_server_method();
1014 } else if (s->client_version <= s->version
1015 || s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
1017 * For DTLS we just check versions are potentially compatible. Version
1018 * negotiation comes later.
1024 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
1025 if ((!s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash)) {
1027 * similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version
1030 s->version = s->client_version;
1032 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1036 /* Parse the message and load client random. */
1039 * Handle an SSLv2 backwards compatible ClientHello
1040 * Note, this is only for SSLv3+ using the backward compatible format.
1041 * Real SSLv2 is not supported, and is rejected above.
1043 unsigned int cipher_len, session_id_len, challenge_len;
1046 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&pkt, &cipher_len)
1047 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&pkt, &session_id_len)
1048 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&pkt, &challenge_len)) {
1049 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1050 SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1051 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1055 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(&pkt, &cipher_suites, cipher_len)
1056 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(&pkt, &session_id, session_id_len)
1057 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(&pkt, &challenge, challenge_len)
1058 /* No extensions. */
1059 || PACKET_remaining(&pkt) != 0) {
1060 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1061 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1065 /* Load the client random */
1066 challenge_len = challenge_len > SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE ? SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE :
1068 memset(s->s3->client_random, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1069 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&challenge,
1070 s->s3->client_random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE -
1071 challenge_len, challenge_len)) {
1072 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1073 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1077 PACKET_null_init(&compression);
1078 PACKET_null_init(&extensions);
1080 /* Regular ClientHello. */
1081 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&pkt, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)
1082 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&pkt, &session_id)) {
1083 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1084 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1088 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1089 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&pkt, &cookie)) {
1090 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1091 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1095 * If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one,
1096 * just return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet.
1097 * So check cookie length...
1099 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
1100 if (PACKET_remaining(&cookie) == 0)
1105 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&pkt, &cipher_suites)
1106 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&pkt, &compression)) {
1107 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1108 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1111 /* Could be empty. */
1118 * We don't allow resumption in a backwards compatible ClientHello.
1119 * TODO(openssl-team): in TLS1.1+, session_id MUST be empty.
1121 * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in
1122 * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally
1123 * ignore resumption requests with flag
1124 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
1125 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on
1126 * this for security won't even compile against older library versions).
1127 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to
1128 * request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains
1129 * unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the
1130 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be
1135 (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) {
1136 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
1139 i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, &extensions, &session_id);
1141 * Only resume if the session's version matches the negotiated
1143 * RFC 5246 does not provide much useful advice on resumption
1144 * with a different protocol version. It doesn't forbid it but
1145 * the sanity of such behaviour would be questionable.
1146 * In practice, clients do not accept a version mismatch and
1147 * will abort the handshake with an error.
1149 if (i == 1 && s->version == s->session->ssl_version) {
1150 /* previous session */
1152 } else if (i == -1) {
1156 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
1161 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1162 /* Empty cookie was already handled above by returning early. */
1163 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
1164 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) {
1165 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, PACKET_data(&cookie),
1166 PACKET_remaining(&cookie)) == 0) {
1167 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1168 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1169 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1171 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1173 /* default verification */
1174 } else if (!PACKET_equal(&cookie, s->d1->cookie,
1175 s->d1->cookie_len)) {
1176 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1177 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1180 s->d1->cookie_verified = 1;
1182 if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
1183 /* Select version to use */
1184 if (s->client_version <= DTLS1_2_VERSION &&
1185 !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2)) {
1186 s->version = DTLS1_2_VERSION;
1187 s->method = DTLSv1_2_server_method();
1188 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1189 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1190 SSL_R_ONLY_DTLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE);
1191 s->version = s->client_version;
1192 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1194 } else if (s->client_version <= DTLS1_VERSION &&
1195 !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1)) {
1196 s->version = DTLS1_VERSION;
1197 s->method = DTLSv1_server_method();
1199 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1200 SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
1201 s->version = s->client_version;
1202 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1205 s->session->ssl_version = s->version;
1209 if (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s, &cipher_suites, &(ciphers),
1210 is_v2_record, &al) == NULL) {
1214 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
1217 id = s->session->cipher->id;
1220 fprintf(stderr, "client sent %d ciphers\n",
1221 sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers));
1223 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) {
1224 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i);
1226 fprintf(stderr, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
1227 i, sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
1236 * we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked
1239 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1240 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1241 SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
1246 complen = PACKET_remaining(&compression);
1247 for (j = 0; j < complen; j++) {
1248 if (PACKET_data(&compression)[j] == 0)
1254 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1255 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
1259 /* TLS extensions */
1260 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) {
1261 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s, &extensions)) {
1262 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
1268 * Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this handshake
1269 * for not reused session only. We need to generate server_random before
1270 * calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow SessionTicket
1271 * processing to use it in key derivation.
1275 pos = s->s3->server_random;
1276 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0) {
1281 if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
1282 SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
1284 s->session->master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1285 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
1286 &s->session->master_key_length, ciphers,
1288 s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)) {
1290 s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
1291 s->session->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
1295 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1297 pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s,
1302 if (pref_cipher == NULL) {
1303 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1304 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1308 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher;
1309 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
1310 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1311 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
1312 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1317 * Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1318 * options, we will now look for them. We have complen-1 compression
1319 * algorithms from the client, starting at q.
1321 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = NULL;
1322 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1323 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1324 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1325 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
1327 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1328 /* Can't disable compression */
1329 if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
1330 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1331 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1334 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1335 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++) {
1336 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
1337 if (comp_id == comp->id) {
1338 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1342 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) {
1343 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1344 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1347 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1348 for (k = 0; k < complen; k++) {
1349 if (PACKET_data(&compression)[k] == comp_id)
1353 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1354 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1355 SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
1360 else if (ssl_allow_compression(s) && s->ctx->comp_methods) {
1361 /* See if we have a match */
1362 int m, nn, v, done = 0;
1365 nn = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1366 for (m = 0; m < nn; m++) {
1367 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
1369 for (o = 0; o < complen; o++) {
1370 if (v == PACKET_data(&compression)[o]) {
1379 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1385 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1386 * using compression.
1388 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1389 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1395 * Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher
1399 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1400 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
1402 s->session->compress_meth = (comp == NULL) ? 0 : comp->id;
1404 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
1405 s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
1406 if (ciphers == NULL) {
1407 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1408 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1412 if (!tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s)) {
1413 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1418 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1419 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
1421 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1423 statem_set_error(s);
1425 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1426 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1430 enum WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_hello(SSL *s, enum WORK_STATE wst)
1435 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
1437 /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
1438 if (s->cert->cert_cb) {
1439 int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
1441 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1442 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR);
1446 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
1449 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1451 cipher = ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1453 if (cipher == NULL) {
1454 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1455 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1458 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = cipher;
1459 /* check whether we should disable session resumption */
1460 if (s->not_resumable_session_cb != NULL)
1461 s->session->not_resumable = s->not_resumable_session_cb(s,
1462 ((cipher->algorithm_mkey & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)) != 0));
1463 if (s->session->not_resumable)
1464 /* do not send a session ticket */
1465 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
1467 /* Session-id reuse */
1468 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher;
1471 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) {
1472 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0))
1477 * we now have the following setup.
1479 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
1480 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
1481 * compression - basically ignored right now
1482 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1483 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1484 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1485 * s->s3->tmp.new_cipher- the new cipher to use.
1488 /* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */
1489 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) {
1490 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s) <= 0) {
1491 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1498 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1499 if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) {
1501 if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s, &al)) < 0) {
1503 * callback indicates further work to be done
1505 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
1508 if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE) {
1510 * This is not really an error but the only means to for
1511 * a client to detect whether srp is supported.
1513 if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY)
1514 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1515 SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1522 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
1524 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1525 statem_set_error(s);
1529 int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
1531 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A) {
1532 if (tls_construct_server_hello(s) != 1)
1534 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B;
1537 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */
1538 return ssl_do_write(s);
1541 int tls_construct_server_hello(SSL *s)
1544 unsigned char *p, *d;
1549 buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1551 /* Do the message type and length last */
1552 d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
1554 *(p++) = s->version >> 8;
1555 *(p++) = s->version & 0xff;
1558 * Random stuff. Filling of the server_random takes place in
1559 * tls_process_client_hello()
1561 memcpy(p, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1562 p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1565 * There are several cases for the session ID to send
1566 * back in the server hello:
1567 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
1568 * we send back the old session ID.
1569 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
1570 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
1571 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
1572 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
1574 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
1575 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
1576 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
1577 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
1580 if (s->session->not_resumable ||
1581 (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
1583 s->session->session_id_length = 0;
1585 sl = s->session->session_id_length;
1586 if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id)) {
1587 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1588 statem_set_error(s);
1592 memcpy(p, s->session->session_id, sl);
1595 /* put the cipher */
1596 i = ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, p);
1599 /* put the compression method */
1600 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1603 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1606 *(p++) = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
1609 if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
1610 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
1611 statem_set_error(s);
1615 ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf + SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
1617 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1618 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1619 statem_set_error(s);
1625 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO, l)) {
1626 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1627 statem_set_error(s);
1634 int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s)
1637 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A) {
1638 if (tls_construct_server_done(s) == 0)
1640 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;
1643 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
1644 return ssl_do_write(s);
1647 int tls_construct_server_done(SSL *s)
1649 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE, 0)) {
1650 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_DONE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1651 statem_set_error(s);
1655 if (!s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
1656 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
1657 statem_set_error(s);
1664 int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1666 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A) {
1667 if (tls_construct_server_key_exchange(s) == 0)
1671 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
1672 return ssl_do_write(s);
1675 int tls_construct_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1677 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1681 unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
1684 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1685 DH *dh = NULL, *dhp;
1687 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1688 EC_KEY *ecdh = NULL, *ecdhp;
1689 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
1692 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1695 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1696 unsigned char *p, *d;
1706 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
1708 type = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1713 r[0] = r[1] = r[2] = r[3] = NULL;
1715 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1716 if (type & SSL_PSK) {
1718 * reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint
1721 if (s->cert->psk_identity_hint)
1722 n += strlen(s->cert->psk_identity_hint);
1724 /* Plain PSK or RSAPSK nothing to do */
1725 if (type & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
1727 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1728 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1729 if (type & SSL_kRSA) {
1730 rsa = cert->rsa_tmp;
1731 if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL)) {
1732 rsa = s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s,
1733 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->
1735 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->
1738 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1739 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1740 SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1744 cert->rsa_tmp = rsa;
1747 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1748 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1749 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1754 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp = 1;
1757 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1758 if (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
1759 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto) {
1760 dhp = ssl_get_auto_dh(s);
1762 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1763 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1764 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1769 if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1770 dhp = s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s,
1771 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->
1773 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->
1776 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1777 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1778 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1781 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH,
1782 DH_security_bits(dhp), 0, dhp)) {
1783 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1784 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1785 SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
1788 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL) {
1789 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1790 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1794 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto)
1796 else if ((dh = DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL) {
1797 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1802 if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL ||
1803 dhp->priv_key == NULL ||
1804 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE))) {
1805 if (!DH_generate_key(dh)) {
1806 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1810 dh->pub_key = BN_dup(dhp->pub_key);
1811 dh->priv_key = BN_dup(dhp->priv_key);
1812 if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) || (dh->priv_key == NULL)) {
1813 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1822 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1823 if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
1824 const EC_GROUP *group;
1826 ecdhp = cert->ecdh_tmp;
1827 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto) {
1828 /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */
1829 int nid = tls1_shared_curve(s, -2);
1830 if (nid != NID_undef)
1831 ecdhp = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid);
1832 } else if ((ecdhp == NULL) && s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb) {
1833 ecdhp = s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s,
1834 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->
1836 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->
1837 s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1839 if (ecdhp == NULL) {
1840 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1841 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1842 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
1846 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL) {
1847 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1848 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1852 /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
1853 if (ecdhp == NULL) {
1854 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1857 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
1859 else if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_dup(ecdhp)) == NULL) {
1860 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1864 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = ecdh;
1865 if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1866 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1867 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE)) {
1868 if (!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh)) {
1869 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1875 if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) ||
1876 (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1877 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL)) {
1878 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1882 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
1883 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163)) {
1884 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1885 SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
1890 * XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH keys over named
1891 * (not generic) curves. For supported named curves, curve_id is
1895 tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group)))
1897 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1898 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
1903 * Encode the public key. First check the size of encoding and
1904 * allocate memory accordingly.
1906 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1907 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1908 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1911 encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
1912 OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen * sizeof(unsigned char));
1913 bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
1914 if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL)) {
1915 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1916 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1920 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1921 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1922 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1923 encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);
1925 if (encodedlen == 0) {
1926 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1930 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
1934 * XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves in
1935 * ECDH ephemeral key exchanges. In this situation, we need four
1936 * additional bytes to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
1939 n += 4 + encodedlen;
1942 * We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we
1943 * can set these to NULLs
1950 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1951 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1952 if (type & SSL_kSRP) {
1953 if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
1954 (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
1955 (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) || (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL)) {
1956 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1957 SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
1960 r[0] = s->srp_ctx.N;
1961 r[1] = s->srp_ctx.g;
1962 r[2] = s->srp_ctx.s;
1963 r[3] = s->srp_ctx.B;
1967 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1968 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1969 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
1972 for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
1973 nr[i] = BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
1974 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1975 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
1982 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL|SSL_aSRP))
1983 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)) {
1984 if ((pkey = ssl_get_sign_pkey(s, s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, &md))
1986 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1989 kn = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
1995 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, n + SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + kn)) {
1996 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_BUF);
1999 d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
2001 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2002 if (type & SSL_PSK) {
2003 /* copy PSK identity hint */
2004 if (s->cert->psk_identity_hint) {
2005 s2n(strlen(s->cert->psk_identity_hint), p);
2006 strncpy((char *)p, s->cert->psk_identity_hint,
2007 strlen(s->cert->psk_identity_hint));
2008 p += strlen(s->cert->psk_identity_hint);
2015 for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
2016 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2017 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) {
2027 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2028 if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2030 * XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves. In
2031 * this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has: [1 byte
2032 * CurveType], [2 byte CurveName] [1 byte length of encoded
2033 * point], followed by the actual encoded point itself
2035 *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
2043 memcpy(p, encodedPoint, encodedlen);
2044 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2045 encodedPoint = NULL;
2053 * n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4]) and p
2054 * points to the space at the end.
2056 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2057 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2060 for (num = 2; num > 0; num--) {
2061 EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx,
2062 EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
2063 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, (num == 2)
2064 ? s->ctx->md5 : s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
2065 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
2067 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
2069 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, d, n);
2070 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, q, (unsigned int *)&i);
2074 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j,
2075 &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0) {
2076 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_RSA);
2084 /* send signature algorithm */
2085 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2086 if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md)) {
2087 /* Should never happen */
2088 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2089 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2090 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2096 fprintf(stderr, "Using hash %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
2098 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL);
2099 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
2101 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
2103 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, d, n);
2104 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx, &(p[2]),
2105 (unsigned int *)&i, pkey)) {
2106 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_EVP);
2111 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2114 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
2115 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2116 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2117 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
2122 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, n)) {
2123 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2124 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2128 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
2131 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2133 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2134 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2135 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2137 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
2138 statem_set_error(s);
2142 int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
2144 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A) {
2145 if (tls_construct_certificate_request(s) == 0)
2147 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;
2150 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
2151 return ssl_do_write(s);
2154 int tls_construct_certificate_request(SSL *s)
2156 unsigned char *p, *d;
2157 int i, j, nl, off, n;
2158 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk = NULL;
2164 d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
2166 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
2168 n = ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s, p);
2173 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2174 const unsigned char *psigs;
2175 unsigned char *etmp = p;
2176 nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &psigs);
2177 /* Skip over length for now */
2179 nl = tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, p, psigs, nl);
2180 /* Now fill in length */
2190 sk = SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
2193 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) {
2194 name = sk_X509_NAME_value(sk, i);
2195 j = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL);
2196 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean
2197 (buf, SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + n + j + 2)) {
2198 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2202 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + n;
2204 i2d_X509_NAME(name, &p);
2209 /* else no CA names */
2210 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + off;
2213 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, n)) {
2214 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2218 s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 1;
2222 statem_set_error(s);
2226 int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
2231 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2232 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A,
2233 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B,
2234 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2048, &ok);
2239 if (tls_process_client_key_exchange(s, n) == 0)
2245 enum MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, long n)
2249 unsigned long alg_k;
2250 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2252 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2254 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2256 DH *dh_srvr, *dh_clnt = NULL;
2258 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2259 EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL;
2260 EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL;
2261 EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL;
2262 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
2264 PACKET pkt, enc_premaster;
2265 unsigned char *data, *rsa_decrypt = NULL;
2267 if (!PACKET_buf_init(&pkt, s->init_msg, n)) {
2268 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2269 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2273 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2275 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2276 /* For PSK parse and retrieve identity, obtain PSK key */
2277 if (alg_k & SSL_PSK) {
2278 unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
2280 PACKET psk_identity;
2282 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&pkt, &psk_identity)) {
2283 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2284 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2287 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2288 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2289 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2290 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2293 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL) {
2294 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2295 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2296 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
2300 if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity, &s->session->psk_identity)) {
2301 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2302 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2306 psklen = s->psk_server_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity,
2309 if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
2310 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2311 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2313 } else if (psklen == 0) {
2315 * PSK related to the given identity not found
2317 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2318 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2319 al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
2323 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.psk);
2324 s->s3->tmp.psk = BUF_memdup(psk, psklen);
2325 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
2327 if (s->s3->tmp.psk == NULL) {
2328 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2329 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2333 s->s3->tmp.psklen = psklen;
2335 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
2336 /* Identity extracted earlier: should be nothing left */
2337 if (PACKET_remaining(&pkt) != 0) {
2338 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2339 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2342 /* PSK handled by ssl_generate_master_secret */
2343 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, NULL, 0, 0)) {
2344 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2345 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2350 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2351 if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
2352 unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
2354 unsigned char decrypt_good, version_good;
2357 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
2358 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp) {
2359 if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL))
2360 rsa = s->cert->rsa_tmp;
2362 * Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should be sent already
2365 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2366 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2367 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY);
2372 pkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey;
2373 if ((pkey == NULL) ||
2374 (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) || (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL)) {
2375 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2376 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2377 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2380 rsa = pkey->pkey.rsa;
2383 /* SSLv3 and pre-standard DTLS omit the length bytes. */
2384 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
2385 enc_premaster = pkt;
2388 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&pkt, &enc_premaster)
2389 || PACKET_remaining(&pkt) != 0) {
2390 /* Try SSLv3 behaviour for TLS. */
2391 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG) {
2392 enc_premaster = orig;
2394 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2395 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2402 * We want to be sure that the plaintext buffer size makes it safe to
2403 * iterate over the entire size of a premaster secret
2404 * (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). Reject overly short RSA keys because
2405 * their ciphertext cannot accommodate a premaster secret anyway.
2407 if (RSA_size(rsa) < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
2408 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2409 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2410 RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
2414 rsa_decrypt = OPENSSL_malloc(RSA_size(rsa));
2415 if (rsa_decrypt == NULL) {
2416 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2417 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2422 * We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of
2423 * Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246,
2424 * section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of the TLS RFC and
2425 * generates a random premaster secret for the case that the decrypt
2426 * fails. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1
2429 if (RAND_bytes(rand_premaster_secret,
2430 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0) {
2434 decrypt_len = RSA_private_decrypt(PACKET_remaining(&enc_premaster),
2435 PACKET_data(&enc_premaster),
2436 rsa_decrypt, rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
2440 * decrypt_len should be SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH. decrypt_good will
2441 * be 0xff if so and zero otherwise.
2444 constant_time_eq_int_8(decrypt_len, SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH);
2447 * If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct then
2448 * version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero. The
2449 * Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
2450 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version number
2451 * check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks are done in
2452 * constant time and are treated like any other decryption error.
2455 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[0],
2456 (unsigned)(s->client_version >> 8));
2458 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[1],
2459 (unsigned)(s->client_version & 0xff));
2462 * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2463 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2464 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2465 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
2466 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
2467 * protocol version. If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such
2470 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) {
2471 unsigned char workaround_good;
2473 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[0], (unsigned)(s->version >> 8));
2475 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[1],
2476 (unsigned)(s->version & 0xff));
2477 version_good |= workaround_good;
2481 * Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good to
2482 * remain non-zero (0xff).
2484 decrypt_good &= version_good;
2487 * Now copy rand_premaster_secret over from p using
2488 * decrypt_good_mask. If decryption failed, then p does not
2489 * contain valid plaintext, however, a check above guarantees
2490 * it is still sufficiently large to read from.
2492 for (j = 0; j < sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); j++) {
2494 constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good, rsa_decrypt[j],
2495 rand_premaster_secret[j]);
2498 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, rsa_decrypt,
2499 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret), 0)) {
2500 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2501 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2504 OPENSSL_free(rsa_decrypt);
2508 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2509 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
2511 EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL;
2512 PACKET bookmark = pkt;
2513 unsigned char shared[(OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS + 7) / 8];
2515 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&pkt, &i)) {
2516 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
2517 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2518 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2519 SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2524 if (PACKET_remaining(&pkt) != i) {
2525 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG)) {
2526 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2527 SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2531 i = PACKET_remaining(&pkt);
2534 if (alg_k & SSL_kDHr)
2535 idx = SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA;
2536 else if (alg_k & SSL_kDHd)
2537 idx = SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA;
2539 skey = s->cert->pkeys[idx].privatekey;
2540 if ((skey == NULL) ||
2541 (skey->type != EVP_PKEY_DH) || (skey->pkey.dh == NULL)) {
2542 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2543 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2544 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2547 dh_srvr = skey->pkey.dh;
2548 } else if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL) {
2549 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2550 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2551 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2554 dh_srvr = s->s3->tmp.dh;
2557 /* Get pubkey from cert */
2558 EVP_PKEY *clkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2560 if (EVP_PKEY_cmp_parameters(clkey, skey) == 1)
2561 dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(clkey);
2563 if (dh_clnt == NULL) {
2564 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2565 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2566 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2569 EVP_PKEY_free(clkey);
2570 pub = dh_clnt->pub_key;
2572 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&pkt, &data, i)) {
2573 /* We already checked we have enough data */
2574 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2575 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2576 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2579 pub = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL);
2582 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BN_LIB);
2586 i = DH_compute_key(shared, pub, dh_srvr);
2589 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
2594 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
2595 s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL;
2601 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, shared, i, 0)) {
2602 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2603 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2607 s->no_cert_verify = 1;
2608 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
2613 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2614 if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2617 const EC_GROUP *group;
2618 const BIGNUM *priv_key;
2619 unsigned char *shared;
2621 /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
2622 if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) {
2623 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2627 /* Let's get server private key and group information */
2628 if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) {
2629 /* use the certificate */
2630 tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec;
2633 * use the ephermeral values we saved when generating the
2634 * ServerKeyExchange msg.
2636 tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh;
2639 group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
2640 priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
2642 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) ||
2643 !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key)) {
2644 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2648 /* Let's get client's public key */
2649 if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) {
2650 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2655 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
2657 if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2658 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2659 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2660 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
2663 if (((clnt_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer))
2664 == NULL) || (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)) {
2666 * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication
2667 * using ECDH certificates so this branch (n == 0L) of the
2668 * code is never executed. When that support is added, we
2669 * ought to ensure the key received in the certificate is
2670 * authorized for key agreement. ECDH_compute_key implicitly
2671 * checks that the two ECDH shares are for the same group.
2673 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2674 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2675 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS);
2679 if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint,
2680 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->
2682 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2685 s->no_cert_verify = 1;
2688 * Get client's public key from encoded point in the
2689 * ClientKeyExchange message.
2691 if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
2692 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2693 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2697 /* Get encoded point length */
2698 if (!PACKET_get_1(&pkt, &i)) {
2699 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2700 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2701 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2704 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&pkt, &data, i)
2705 || PACKET_remaining(&pkt) != 0) {
2706 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2709 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group, clnt_ecpoint, data, i, bn_ctx) == 0) {
2710 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2715 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
2716 field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);
2717 if (field_size <= 0) {
2718 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
2721 shared = OPENSSL_malloc((field_size + 7) / 8);
2722 if (shared == NULL) {
2723 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2726 i = ECDH_compute_key(shared, (field_size + 7) / 8, clnt_ecpoint,
2729 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
2730 OPENSSL_free(shared);
2734 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2735 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2736 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2737 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2738 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
2739 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
2741 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, shared, i, 1)) {
2742 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2743 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2746 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
2749 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2750 if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
2751 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&pkt, &i)
2752 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&pkt, &data, i)) {
2753 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2754 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
2757 if ((s->srp_ctx.A = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL)) == NULL) {
2758 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2761 if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0
2762 || BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A)) {
2763 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2764 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2765 SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
2768 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
2769 s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
2770 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
2771 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2775 if (!srp_generate_server_master_secret(s)) {
2776 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2780 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
2781 if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
2782 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
2783 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
2784 unsigned char premaster_secret[32], *start;
2785 size_t outlen = 32, inlen;
2786 unsigned long alg_a;
2790 /* Get our certificate private key */
2791 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2792 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01)
2793 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
2795 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL);
2796 EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx);
2798 * If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
2799 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
2800 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use a
2801 * client certificate for authorization only.
2803 client_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2804 if (client_pub_pkey) {
2805 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
2808 /* Decrypt session key */
2809 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&pkt, &data, n)) {
2810 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2811 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2815 ((const unsigned char **)&data, &Tlen, &Ttag, &Tclass,
2816 n) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED || Ttag != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE
2817 || Tclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL) {
2818 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2819 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2824 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt
2825 (pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, start, inlen) <= 0) {
2826 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2827 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2830 /* Generate master secret */
2831 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, premaster_secret,
2832 sizeof(premaster_secret), 0)) {
2833 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2834 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2837 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2838 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
2839 (pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
2840 s->no_cert_verify = 1;
2842 EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey);
2843 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2844 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
2846 EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey);
2847 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2850 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2851 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
2855 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
2857 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2858 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_SRP)
2861 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2862 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2863 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2864 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2865 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2866 OPENSSL_free(rsa_decrypt);
2868 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2869 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.psk, s->s3->tmp.psklen);
2870 s->s3->tmp.psk = NULL;
2872 statem_set_error(s);
2873 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2876 enum WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s,
2877 enum WORK_STATE wst)
2879 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
2880 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
2881 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
2882 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
2883 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
2885 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
2888 snprintf((char *)labelbuffer, sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL),
2889 DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL);
2891 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
2892 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
2893 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0) {
2894 statem_set_error(s);
2898 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
2899 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
2904 if ((wst == WORK_MORE_B)
2906 && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))
2907 /* Are we renegotiating? */
2909 /* Are we going to skip the CertificateVerify? */
2910 && (s->session->peer == NULL || s->no_cert_verify)
2911 && BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
2912 s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
2913 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
2914 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
2915 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
2916 statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 1);
2919 statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 0);
2923 if (s->no_cert_verify) {
2924 /* No certificate verify so we no longer need the handshake_buffer */
2925 BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
2926 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
2927 } else if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2928 if (!s->session->peer) {
2929 /* No peer certificate so we no longer need the handshake_buffer */
2930 BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
2931 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
2933 if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
2934 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2935 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2936 statem_set_error(s);
2940 * For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer. If we support
2941 * extms we've done this already so this is a no-op
2943 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) {
2944 statem_set_error(s);
2952 * We need to get hashes here so if there is a client cert,
2953 * it can be verified FIXME - digest processing for
2954 * CertificateVerify should be generalized. But it is next
2957 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
2958 statem_set_error(s);
2961 for (dgst_num = 0; dgst_num < SSL_MAX_DIGEST; dgst_num++) {
2962 if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]) {
2965 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
2974 EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]);
2975 if (dgst_size < 0) {
2976 statem_set_error(s);
2979 offset += dgst_size;
2984 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
2987 int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
2993 * We should only process a CertificateVerify message if we have received
2994 * a Certificate from the client. If so then |s->session->peer| will be non
2995 * NULL. In some instances a CertificateVerify message is not required even
2996 * if the peer has sent a Certificate (e.g. such as in the case of static
2997 * DH). In that case the ClientKeyExchange processing will skip the
2998 * CertificateVerify state so we should not arrive here.
3000 if (s->session->peer == NULL) {
3004 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3005 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A,
3006 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B,
3007 SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY,
3008 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, &ok);
3013 if (tls_process_cert_verify(s, n) == 0)
3017 BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
3018 s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
3023 enum MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_verify(SSL *s, long n)
3025 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
3026 unsigned char *sig, *data;
3027 int al, ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3031 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
3034 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx);
3036 peer = s->session->peer;
3037 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(peer);
3038 type = X509_certificate_type(peer, pkey);
3040 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
3041 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
3042 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
3043 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3047 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
3048 if (!PACKET_buf_init(&pkt, s->init_msg, n)) {
3049 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3050 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3053 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
3055 * If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare signature without
3058 if (n == 64 && pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) {
3061 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
3064 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&pkt, &sig, 2)) {
3065 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3068 rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, s, sig, pkey);
3070 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3072 } else if (rv == 0) {
3073 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3077 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
3080 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&pkt, &len)) {
3081 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3082 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3086 j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
3087 if (((int)len > j) || ((int)PACKET_remaining(&pkt) > j) || (n <= 0)) {
3088 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
3089 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3092 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&pkt, &data, len)) {
3093 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3094 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3098 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
3101 hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
3102 if (hdatalen <= 0) {
3103 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3104 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3108 fprintf(stderr, "Using TLS 1.2 with client verify alg %s\n",
3111 if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL)
3112 || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen)) {
3113 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
3114 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3118 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&mctx, data, len, pkey) <= 0) {
3119 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3120 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
3124 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3125 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
3126 i = RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
3127 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, data, len,
3130 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3131 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
3135 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3136 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE);
3141 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3142 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA) {
3143 j = DSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
3144 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3145 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, data, len, pkey->pkey.dsa);
3148 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3149 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE);
3154 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3155 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
3156 j = ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
3157 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3158 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, data, len, pkey->pkey.ec);
3161 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3162 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
3167 if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) {
3168 unsigned char signature[64];
3170 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
3171 EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx);
3173 fprintf(stderr, "GOST signature length is %d", len);
3175 for (idx = 0; idx < 64; idx++) {
3176 signature[63 - idx] = data[idx];
3178 j = EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx, signature, 64, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
3180 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
3182 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3183 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
3187 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3188 al = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
3192 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
3195 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3196 statem_set_error(s);
3198 BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
3199 s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
3200 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
3201 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3205 int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s)
3210 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3213 -1, s->max_cert_list, &ok);
3218 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
3219 if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3220 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
3221 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3222 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3223 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3227 * If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list
3229 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
3230 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3231 SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST);
3232 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3235 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
3239 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
3240 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3241 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
3245 if (tls_process_client_certificate(s, n) == 0)
3250 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3251 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3255 enum MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_certificate(SSL *s, long n)
3257 int i, al, ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3259 unsigned long l, llen;
3260 const unsigned char *certstart;
3261 unsigned char *certbytes;
3262 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
3265 if (!PACKET_buf_init(&pkt, s->init_msg, n)) {
3266 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3267 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3271 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
3272 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3276 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(&pkt, &llen)
3277 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(&pkt, &spkt, llen)
3278 || PACKET_remaining(&pkt) != 0) {
3279 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3280 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3284 while (PACKET_remaining(&spkt) > 0) {
3285 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(&spkt, &l)
3286 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&spkt, &certbytes, l)) {
3287 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3288 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3289 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3293 certstart = certbytes;
3294 x = d2i_X509(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, l);
3296 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
3299 if (certbytes != (certstart + l)) {
3300 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3301 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3302 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3305 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
3306 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3312 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) {
3313 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
3314 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
3315 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3316 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3317 SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
3320 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
3321 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3322 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
3323 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3324 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3325 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3328 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
3329 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
3330 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3335 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
3337 al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
3338 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3339 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
3343 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, i);
3344 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3347 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(sk, 0));
3349 al = SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3350 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3351 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
3354 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3357 X509_free(s->session->peer);
3358 s->session->peer = sk_X509_shift(sk);
3359 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
3361 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->peer_chain, X509_free);
3362 s->session->peer_chain = sk;
3364 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own
3365 * certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c
3368 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
3372 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3373 statem_set_error(s);
3376 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
3380 int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
3382 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A) {
3383 if (tls_construct_server_certificate(s) == 0)
3385 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
3388 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
3389 return ssl_do_write(s);
3392 int tls_construct_server_certificate(SSL *s)
3396 cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
3398 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3399 statem_set_error(s);
3403 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, cpk)) {
3404 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3405 statem_set_error(s);
3412 /* send a new session ticket (not necessarily for a new session) */
3413 int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
3415 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A) {
3416 if (tls_construct_new_session_ticket(s) == 0)
3419 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
3422 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
3423 return ssl_do_write(s);
3426 int tls_construct_new_session_ticket(SSL *s)
3428 unsigned char *senc = NULL;
3431 unsigned char *p, *macstart;
3432 const unsigned char *const_p;
3433 int len, slen_full, slen;
3436 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3437 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
3438 unsigned char key_name[16];
3440 /* get session encoding length */
3441 slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
3443 * Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too
3446 if (slen_full == 0 || slen_full > 0xFF00) {
3447 statem_set_error(s);
3450 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
3452 statem_set_error(s);
3456 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3457 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3460 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p))
3464 * create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up
3467 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
3470 sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
3472 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
3473 if (slen == 0 || slen > slen_full) { /* shouldn't ever happen */
3474 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3478 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p)) {
3479 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3482 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3485 * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3486 * follows handshake_header_length +
3487 * 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
3488 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
3489 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
3490 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
3492 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
3493 SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + 22 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH +
3494 EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
3497 p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
3499 * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does
3500 * all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx.
3502 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
3503 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx,
3507 if (RAND_bytes(iv, 16) <= 0)
3509 if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3510 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv))
3512 if (!HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3513 EVP_sha256(), NULL))
3515 memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
3519 * Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only): We leave this unspecified
3520 * for resumed session (for simplicity), and guess that tickets for
3521 * new sessions will live as long as their sessions.
3523 l2n(s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout, p);
3525 /* Skip ticket length for now */
3527 /* Output key name */
3529 memcpy(p, key_name, 16);
3532 memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx));
3533 p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3534 /* Encrypt session data */
3535 if (!EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen))
3538 if (!EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len))
3542 if (!HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart))
3544 if (!HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen))
3547 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3548 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3551 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
3553 len = p - ssl_handshake_start(s);
3554 /* Skip ticket lifetime hint */
3555 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + 4;
3557 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, len))
3564 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3565 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3566 statem_set_error(s);
3570 int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s)
3572 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A) {
3573 if (tls_construct_cert_status(s) == 0)
3576 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B;
3579 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */
3580 return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3583 int tls_construct_cert_status(SSL *s)
3587 * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3588 * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
3589 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
3592 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen)) {
3593 statem_set_error(s);
3597 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3600 *(p++) = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
3601 /* message length */
3602 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p);
3604 *(p++) = s->tlsext_status_type;
3605 /* length of OCSP response */
3606 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p);
3607 /* actual response */
3608 memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen);
3609 /* number of bytes to write */
3610 s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen;
3616 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3618 * ssl3_get_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message.
3619 * It sets the next_proto member in s if found
3621 int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *s)
3627 * Clients cannot send a NextProtocol message if we didn't see the
3628 * extension in their ClientHello
3630 if (!s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) {
3631 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,
3632 SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION);
3633 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3637 /* See the payload format below */
3638 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3639 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A,
3640 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B,
3641 SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO, 514, &ok);
3647 * s->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received in
3648 * this handshake, but s->s3->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset by
3649 * ssl3_get_finished).
3651 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec) {
3652 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO, SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS);
3653 statem_set_error(s);
3657 if (tls_process_next_proto(s, n) == 0)
3664 * tls_process_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message.
3665 * It sets the next_proto member in s if found
3667 enum MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_next_proto(SSL *s, long n)
3669 PACKET pkt, next_proto, padding;
3670 size_t next_proto_len;
3673 goto err; /* The body must be > 1 bytes long */
3676 if (!PACKET_buf_init(&pkt, s->init_msg, n)) {
3677 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEXT_PROTO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3682 * The payload looks like:
3684 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
3685 * uint8 padding_len;
3686 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
3688 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&pkt, &next_proto)
3689 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&pkt, &padding)
3690 || PACKET_remaining(&pkt) > 0) {
3691 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEXT_PROTO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3695 if (!PACKET_memdup(&next_proto, &s->next_proto_negotiated,
3697 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = 0;
3701 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = (unsigned char)next_proto_len;
3703 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
3705 statem_set_error(s);
3706 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3710 #define SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN 3
3712 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s,
3713 PACKET *cipher_suites,
3714 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **skp,
3715 int sslv2format, int *al
3718 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
3719 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
3721 /* 3 = SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN > TLS_CIPHER_LEN = 2. */
3722 unsigned char cipher[SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN];
3724 s->s3->send_connection_binding = 0;
3726 n = sslv2format ? SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN : TLS_CIPHER_LEN;
3728 if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites) == 0) {
3729 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
3730 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3734 if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites) % n != 0) {
3735 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,
3736 SSL_R_ERROR_IN_RECEIVED_CIPHER_LIST);
3737 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3741 if ((skp == NULL) || (*skp == NULL)) {
3742 sk = sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null(); /* change perhaps later */
3744 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3745 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3750 sk_SSL_CIPHER_zero(sk);
3753 if (!PACKET_memdup(cipher_suites, &s->s3->tmp.ciphers_raw,
3754 &s->s3->tmp.ciphers_rawlen)) {
3755 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3759 while (PACKET_copy_bytes(cipher_suites, cipher, n)) {
3761 * SSLv3 ciphers wrapped in an SSLv2-compatible ClientHello have the
3762 * first byte set to zero, while true SSLv2 ciphers have a non-zero
3763 * first byte. We don't support any true SSLv2 ciphers, so skip them.
3765 if (sslv2format && cipher[0] != '\0')
3768 /* Check for TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV */
3769 if ((cipher[n - 2] == ((SSL3_CK_SCSV >> 8) & 0xff)) &&
3770 (cipher[n - 1] == (SSL3_CK_SCSV & 0xff))) {
3771 /* SCSV fatal if renegotiating */
3772 if (s->renegotiate) {
3773 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,
3774 SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING);
3775 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3778 s->s3->send_connection_binding = 1;
3779 #ifdef OPENSSL_RI_DEBUG
3780 fprintf(stderr, "SCSV received by server\n");
3785 /* Check for TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV */
3786 if ((cipher[n - 2] == ((SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV >> 8) & 0xff)) &&
3787 (cipher[n - 1] == (SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV & 0xff))) {
3789 * The SCSV indicates that the client previously tried a higher
3790 * version. Fail if the current version is an unexpected
3793 if (!SSL_ctrl(s, SSL_CTRL_CHECK_PROTO_VERSION, 0, NULL)) {
3794 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,
3795 SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
3796 *al = SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK;
3802 /* For SSLv2-compat, ignore leading 0-byte. */
3803 c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, sslv2format ? &cipher[1] : cipher);
3805 if (!sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(sk, c)) {
3806 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3807 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3812 if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites) > 0) {
3813 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3814 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3822 if ((skp == NULL) || (*skp == NULL))
3823 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(sk);