1 /* ssl/s3_srvr.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
124 /* ====================================================================
125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
142 * to make use of the Contribution.
144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
153 #include "ssl_locl.h"
154 #include "internal/constant_time_locl.h"
155 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
156 #include <openssl/rand.h>
157 #include <openssl/objects.h>
158 #include <openssl/evp.h>
159 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
160 #include <openssl/x509.h>
161 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
162 # include <openssl/dh.h>
164 #include <openssl/bn.h>
165 #include <openssl/md5.h>
167 static STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s,
168 PACKET *cipher_suites,
169 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **skp,
170 int sslv2format, int *al);
172 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
173 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al)
175 int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE;
177 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
179 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
180 (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL)) {
181 if (s->srp_ctx.login == NULL) {
183 * RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, we do so if There is no srp
187 *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
189 ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s, al);
196 int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
199 unsigned long alg_k, Time = (unsigned long)time(NULL);
200 void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
202 int new_state, state, skip = 0;
204 RAND_add(&Time, sizeof(Time), 0);
208 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
209 cb = s->info_callback;
210 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
211 cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
213 /* init things to blank */
215 if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) {
220 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
222 * If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we already got and
223 * don't await it anymore, because Heartbeats don't make sense during
226 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) {
227 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
236 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
238 /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
242 case SSL_ST_BEFORE | SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
243 case SSL_ST_OK | SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
247 cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START, 1);
249 if ((s->version >> 8 != 3) && s->version != TLS_ANY_VERSION) {
250 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
251 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
255 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_VERSION, 0, s->version, NULL)) {
256 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW);
260 s->type = SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
262 if (s->init_buf == NULL) {
263 if ((buf = BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL) {
265 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
268 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) {
271 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
277 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) {
279 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
284 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY;
286 * Should have been reset by ssl3_get_finished, too.
288 s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0;
290 if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE) {
292 * Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that the
293 * output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
295 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s, 1)) {
297 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
301 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
302 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
303 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
304 } else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
306 SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
308 * Server attempting to renegotiate with client that doesn't
309 * support secure renegotiation.
311 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,
312 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
313 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
315 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
319 * s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE, we will just send a
322 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
323 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
327 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
328 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
331 ret = ssl3_send_hello_request(s);
334 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;
335 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
338 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
341 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
342 s->state = SSL_ST_OK;
345 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
346 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
347 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
349 ret = ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
353 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
357 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
358 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D:
360 enum WORK_STATE wst_ret;
362 wst_ret = tls_post_process_client_hello(s, WORK_MORE_B);
363 if (wst_ret == WORK_MORE_B)
365 if (wst_ret == WORK_ERROR) {
371 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
376 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
377 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
378 ret = ssl3_send_server_hello(s);
383 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
384 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
386 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
388 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
393 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
394 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
395 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
396 /* normal PSK or SRP */
397 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth &
398 (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
399 ret = ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
403 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
404 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A;
406 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
409 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
414 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
415 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
416 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
419 * clear this, it may get reset by
420 * send_server_key_exchange
422 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp = 0;
425 * only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or RSA but we have a
426 * sign only certificate PSK: may send PSK identity hints For
427 * ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange message only if
428 * the cipher suite is either ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases,
429 * the server certificate contains the server's public key for
434 * PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if
437 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
438 /* Only send SKE if we have identity hint for plain PSK */
439 || ((alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) && s->cert->psk_identity_hint)
440 /* For other PSK always send SKE */
441 || (alg_k & (SSL_PSK & (SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK)))
443 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
444 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
445 || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
447 || (alg_k & SSL_kDHE)
448 || (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE)
449 || ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
450 && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
451 || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
452 && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys
453 [SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey) *
454 8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
459 ret = ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s);
465 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
469 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
470 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
471 if ( /* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
472 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
474 * if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert
475 * during re-negotiation:
477 ((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
478 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
480 * never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see
481 * section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in
484 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) &&
486 * ... except when the application insists on
487 * verification (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts
490 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
491 /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
492 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)
494 * With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests
497 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)) {
498 /* no cert request */
500 s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 0;
501 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
502 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
503 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
507 s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 1;
508 ret = ssl3_send_certificate_request(s);
511 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
516 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
517 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
518 ret = ssl3_send_server_done(s);
521 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
522 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
526 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
529 * This code originally checked to see if any data was pending
530 * using BIO_CTRL_INFO and then flushed. This caused problems as
531 * documented in PR#1939. The proposed fix doesn't completely
532 * resolve this issue as buggy implementations of
533 * BIO_CTRL_PENDING still exist. So instead we just flush
537 s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
538 if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0) {
542 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
544 s->state = s->s3->tmp.next_state;
547 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
548 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
549 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
550 ret = ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
555 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
558 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
559 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
560 ret = ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
563 if (s->no_cert_verify) {
565 * For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH
566 * pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is
567 * not sent. Also for GOST ciphersuites when the client uses
568 * its key from the certificate for key exchange.
570 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CHANGE_A;
572 } else if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
573 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
575 if (!s->session->peer)
577 if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
578 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
579 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
583 * For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer. If we support
584 * extms we've done this already so this is a no-op
586 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) {
587 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
594 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
598 * We need to get hashes here so if there is a client cert,
599 * it can be verified FIXME - digest processing for
600 * CertificateVerify should be generalized. But it is next
603 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
604 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
607 for (dgst_num = 0; dgst_num < SSL_MAX_DIGEST; dgst_num++)
608 if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]) {
611 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
620 EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]);
622 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
631 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
632 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
633 ret = ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
637 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CHANGE_A;
641 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
642 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A:
643 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B:
644 ret = ssl3_get_next_proto(s);
648 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
653 case SSL3_ST_SR_CHANGE_A:
654 case SSL3_ST_SR_CHANGE_B:
655 ret = ssl3_get_change_cipher_spec(s, SSL3_ST_SR_CHANGE_A,
656 SSL3_ST_SR_CHANGE_B);
660 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
661 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
663 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
664 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
666 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
671 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
672 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
673 ret = ssl3_get_finished(s, SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
674 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
678 s->state = SSL_ST_OK;
679 else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
680 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
682 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
686 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A:
687 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B:
688 ret = ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s);
691 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
695 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A:
696 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B:
697 ret = ssl3_send_cert_status(s);
700 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
704 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
705 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
707 s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
708 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
710 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
714 ret = ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
716 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
720 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
723 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
724 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
727 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
733 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
734 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
735 ret = ssl3_send_finished(s,
736 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,
737 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
739 ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
741 ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
744 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
746 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CHANGE_A;
748 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL_ST_OK;
753 /* clean a few things up */
754 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
756 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
759 /* remove buffering on output */
760 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
764 if (s->renegotiate == 2) { /* skipped if we just sent a
769 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
771 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
773 s->handshake_func = ssl3_accept;
776 cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1);
785 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
791 if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip) {
793 if ((ret = BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
797 if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state)) {
798 new_state = s->state;
800 cb(s, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP, 1);
801 s->state = new_state;
807 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
811 cb(s, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT, ret);
815 int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
818 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) {
819 if (tls_construct_hello_request(s) == 0) {
822 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B;
825 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
826 return ssl_do_write(s);
829 int tls_construct_hello_request(SSL *s)
831 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST, 0)) {
832 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
840 int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
844 enum WORK_STATE wst_ret;
846 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C && !s->first_packet)
850 * We do this so that we will respond with our native type. If we are
851 * TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1, This down
852 * switching should be handled by a different method. If we are SSLv3, we
853 * will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with TLSv1.
855 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A) {
856 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
859 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
860 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B,
861 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C,
862 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO,
863 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, &ok);
869 if (tls_process_client_hello(s, n) == 0)
873 wst_ret = tls_post_process_client_hello(s, WORK_MORE_A);
874 if (wst_ret == WORK_MORE_A || wst_ret == WORK_ERROR)
876 if (wst_ret == WORK_MORE_B) {
877 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D;
883 enum MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_hello(SSL *s, long n)
885 int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
886 unsigned int j, complen = 0;
889 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
890 SSL_COMP *comp = NULL;
892 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL;
894 /* |cookie| will only be initialized for DTLS. */
895 PACKET pkt, session_id, cipher_suites, compression, extensions, cookie;
898 if (!PACKET_buf_init(&pkt, s->init_msg, n)) {
899 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
900 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
904 is_v2_record = RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer);
906 PACKET_null_init(&cookie);
907 /* First lets get s->client_version set correctly */
909 unsigned int version;
912 * An SSLv3/TLSv1 backwards-compatible CLIENT-HELLO in an SSLv2
913 * header is sent directly on the wire, not wrapped as a TLS
914 * record. Our record layer just processes the message length and passes
915 * the rest right through. Its format is:
917 * 0-1 msg_length - decoded by the record layer
918 * 2 msg_type - s->init_msg points here
920 * 5-6 cipher_spec_length
921 * 7-8 session_id_length
922 * 9-10 challenge_length
926 if (!PACKET_get_1(&pkt, &mt)
927 || mt != SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
929 * Should never happen. We should have tested this in the record
930 * layer in order to have determined that this is a SSLv2 record
933 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
937 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&pkt, &version)) {
938 /* No protocol version supplied! */
939 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
942 if (version == 0x0002) {
943 /* This is real SSLv2. We don't support it. */
944 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
946 } else if ((version & 0xff00) == (SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR << 8)) {
948 s->client_version = version;
950 /* No idea what protocol this is */
951 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
956 * use version from inside client hello, not from record header (may
957 * differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph)
959 if(!PACKET_get_net_2(&pkt, (unsigned int *)&s->client_version)) {
960 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
961 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
966 /* Do SSL/TLS version negotiation if applicable */
967 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
968 if (s->version != TLS_ANY_VERSION) {
969 if (s->client_version >= s->version) {
972 } else if (s->client_version >= SSL3_VERSION) {
973 switch(s->client_version) {
976 if(!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2)) {
977 s->version = TLS1_2_VERSION;
978 s->method = TLSv1_2_server_method();
982 /* Deliberately fall through */
984 if(!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1)) {
985 s->version = TLS1_1_VERSION;
986 s->method = TLSv1_1_server_method();
990 /* Deliberately fall through */
992 if(!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1)) {
993 s->version = TLS1_VERSION;
994 s->method = TLSv1_server_method();
998 /* Deliberately fall through */
1000 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3
1001 if(!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3)) {
1002 s->version = SSL3_VERSION;
1003 s->method = SSLv3_server_method();
1012 } else if (s->client_version <= s->version
1013 || s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
1015 * For DTLS we just check versions are potentially compatible. Version
1016 * negotiation comes later.
1022 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
1023 if ((!s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash)) {
1025 * similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version
1028 s->version = s->client_version;
1030 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1034 /* Parse the message and load client random. */
1037 * Handle an SSLv2 backwards compatible ClientHello
1038 * Note, this is only for SSLv3+ using the backward compatible format.
1039 * Real SSLv2 is not supported, and is rejected above.
1041 unsigned int cipher_len, session_id_len, challenge_len;
1044 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&pkt, &cipher_len)
1045 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&pkt, &session_id_len)
1046 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&pkt, &challenge_len)) {
1047 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1048 SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1049 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1053 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(&pkt, &cipher_suites, cipher_len)
1054 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(&pkt, &session_id, session_id_len)
1055 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(&pkt, &challenge, challenge_len)
1056 /* No extensions. */
1057 || PACKET_remaining(&pkt) != 0) {
1058 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1059 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1063 /* Load the client random */
1064 challenge_len = challenge_len > SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE ? SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE :
1066 memset(s->s3->client_random, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1067 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&challenge,
1068 s->s3->client_random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE -
1069 challenge_len, challenge_len)) {
1070 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1071 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1075 PACKET_null_init(&compression);
1076 PACKET_null_init(&extensions);
1078 /* Regular ClientHello. */
1079 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&pkt, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)
1080 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&pkt, &session_id)) {
1081 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1082 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1086 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1087 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&pkt, &cookie)) {
1088 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1089 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1093 * If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one,
1094 * just return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet.
1095 * So check cookie length...
1097 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
1098 if (PACKET_remaining(&cookie) == 0)
1103 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&pkt, &cipher_suites)
1104 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&pkt, &compression)) {
1105 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1106 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1109 /* Could be empty. */
1116 * We don't allow resumption in a backwards compatible ClientHello.
1117 * TODO(openssl-team): in TLS1.1+, session_id MUST be empty.
1119 * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in
1120 * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally
1121 * ignore resumption requests with flag
1122 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
1123 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on
1124 * this for security won't even compile against older library versions).
1125 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to
1126 * request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains
1127 * unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the
1128 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be
1133 (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) {
1134 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
1137 i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, &extensions, &session_id);
1139 * Only resume if the session's version matches the negotiated
1141 * RFC 5246 does not provide much useful advice on resumption
1142 * with a different protocol version. It doesn't forbid it but
1143 * the sanity of such behaviour would be questionable.
1144 * In practice, clients do not accept a version mismatch and
1145 * will abort the handshake with an error.
1147 if (i == 1 && s->version == s->session->ssl_version) {
1148 /* previous session */
1150 } else if (i == -1) {
1154 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
1159 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1160 /* Empty cookie was already handled above by returning early. */
1161 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
1162 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) {
1163 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, PACKET_data(&cookie),
1164 PACKET_remaining(&cookie)) == 0) {
1165 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1166 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1167 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1169 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1171 /* default verification */
1172 } else if (!PACKET_equal(&cookie, s->d1->cookie,
1173 s->d1->cookie_len)) {
1174 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1175 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1178 s->d1->cookie_verified = 1;
1180 if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
1181 /* Select version to use */
1182 if (s->client_version <= DTLS1_2_VERSION &&
1183 !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2)) {
1184 s->version = DTLS1_2_VERSION;
1185 s->method = DTLSv1_2_server_method();
1186 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1187 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1188 SSL_R_ONLY_DTLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE);
1189 s->version = s->client_version;
1190 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1192 } else if (s->client_version <= DTLS1_VERSION &&
1193 !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1)) {
1194 s->version = DTLS1_VERSION;
1195 s->method = DTLSv1_server_method();
1197 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1198 SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
1199 s->version = s->client_version;
1200 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1203 s->session->ssl_version = s->version;
1207 if (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s, &cipher_suites, &(ciphers),
1208 is_v2_record, &al) == NULL) {
1212 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
1215 id = s->session->cipher->id;
1218 fprintf(stderr, "client sent %d ciphers\n",
1219 sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers));
1221 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) {
1222 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i);
1224 fprintf(stderr, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
1225 i, sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
1234 * we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked
1237 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1238 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1239 SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
1244 complen = PACKET_remaining(&compression);
1245 for (j = 0; j < complen; j++) {
1246 if (PACKET_data(&compression)[j] == 0)
1252 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1253 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
1257 /* TLS extensions */
1258 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) {
1259 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s, &extensions)) {
1260 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
1266 * Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this handshake
1267 * for not reused session only. We need to generate server_random before
1268 * calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow SessionTicket
1269 * processing to use it in key derivation.
1273 pos = s->s3->server_random;
1274 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0) {
1279 if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
1280 SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
1282 s->session->master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1283 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
1284 &s->session->master_key_length, ciphers,
1286 s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)) {
1288 s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
1289 s->session->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
1293 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1295 pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s,
1300 if (pref_cipher == NULL) {
1301 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1302 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1306 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher;
1307 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
1308 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1309 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
1310 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1315 * Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1316 * options, we will now look for them. We have complen-1 compression
1317 * algorithms from the client, starting at q.
1319 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = NULL;
1320 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1321 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1322 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1323 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
1325 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1326 /* Can't disable compression */
1327 if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
1328 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1329 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1332 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1333 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++) {
1334 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
1335 if (comp_id == comp->id) {
1336 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1340 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) {
1341 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1342 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1345 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1346 for (k = 0; k < complen; k++) {
1347 if (PACKET_data(&compression)[k] == comp_id)
1351 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1352 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1353 SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
1358 else if (ssl_allow_compression(s) && s->ctx->comp_methods) {
1359 /* See if we have a match */
1360 int m, nn, v, done = 0;
1363 nn = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1364 for (m = 0; m < nn; m++) {
1365 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
1367 for (o = 0; o < complen; o++) {
1368 if (v == PACKET_data(&compression)[o]) {
1377 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1383 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1384 * using compression.
1386 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1387 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1393 * Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher
1397 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1398 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
1400 s->session->compress_meth = (comp == NULL) ? 0 : comp->id;
1402 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
1403 s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
1404 if (ciphers == NULL) {
1405 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1406 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1410 if (!tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s)) {
1411 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1416 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1417 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
1419 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1421 statem_set_error(s);
1423 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1424 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1428 enum WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_hello(SSL *s, enum WORK_STATE wst)
1433 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
1435 /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
1436 if (s->cert->cert_cb) {
1437 int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
1439 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1440 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR);
1444 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
1447 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1449 cipher = ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1451 if (cipher == NULL) {
1452 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1453 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1456 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = cipher;
1457 /* check whether we should disable session resumption */
1458 if (s->not_resumable_session_cb != NULL)
1459 s->session->not_resumable = s->not_resumable_session_cb(s,
1460 ((cipher->algorithm_mkey & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)) != 0));
1461 if (s->session->not_resumable)
1462 /* do not send a session ticket */
1463 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
1465 /* Session-id reuse */
1466 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher;
1469 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) {
1470 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0))
1475 * we now have the following setup.
1477 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
1478 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
1479 * compression - basically ignored right now
1480 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1481 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1482 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1483 * s->s3->tmp.new_cipher- the new cipher to use.
1486 /* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */
1487 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) {
1488 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s) <= 0) {
1489 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1496 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1497 if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) {
1499 if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s, &al)) < 0) {
1501 * callback indicates further work to be done
1503 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
1506 if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE) {
1508 * This is not really an error but the only means to for
1509 * a client to detect whether srp is supported.
1511 if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY)
1512 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1513 SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1520 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
1522 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1523 statem_set_error(s);
1527 int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
1529 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A) {
1530 if (tls_construct_server_hello(s) != 1)
1532 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B;
1535 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */
1536 return ssl_do_write(s);
1539 int tls_construct_server_hello(SSL *s)
1542 unsigned char *p, *d;
1547 buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1549 /* Do the message type and length last */
1550 d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
1552 *(p++) = s->version >> 8;
1553 *(p++) = s->version & 0xff;
1556 * Random stuff. Filling of the server_random takes place in
1557 * tls_process_client_hello()
1559 memcpy(p, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1560 p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1563 * There are several cases for the session ID to send
1564 * back in the server hello:
1565 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
1566 * we send back the old session ID.
1567 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
1568 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
1569 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
1570 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
1572 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
1573 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
1574 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
1575 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
1578 if (s->session->not_resumable ||
1579 (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
1581 s->session->session_id_length = 0;
1583 sl = s->session->session_id_length;
1584 if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id)) {
1585 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1586 statem_set_error(s);
1590 memcpy(p, s->session->session_id, sl);
1593 /* put the cipher */
1594 i = ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, p);
1597 /* put the compression method */
1598 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1601 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1604 *(p++) = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
1607 if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
1608 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
1609 statem_set_error(s);
1613 ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf + SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
1615 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1616 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1617 statem_set_error(s);
1623 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO, l)) {
1624 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1625 statem_set_error(s);
1632 int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s)
1635 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A) {
1636 if (tls_construct_server_done(s) == 0)
1638 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;
1641 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
1642 return ssl_do_write(s);
1645 int tls_construct_server_done(SSL *s)
1647 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE, 0)) {
1648 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_DONE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1649 statem_set_error(s);
1653 if (!s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
1654 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
1655 statem_set_error(s);
1662 int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1664 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A) {
1665 if (tls_construct_server_key_exchange(s) == 0)
1669 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
1670 return ssl_do_write(s);
1673 int tls_construct_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1675 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1679 unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
1682 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1683 DH *dh = NULL, *dhp;
1685 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1686 EC_KEY *ecdh = NULL, *ecdhp;
1687 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
1690 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1693 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1694 unsigned char *p, *d;
1704 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
1706 type = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1711 r[0] = r[1] = r[2] = r[3] = NULL;
1713 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1714 if (type & SSL_PSK) {
1716 * reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint
1719 if (s->cert->psk_identity_hint)
1720 n += strlen(s->cert->psk_identity_hint);
1722 /* Plain PSK or RSAPSK nothing to do */
1723 if (type & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
1725 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1726 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1727 if (type & SSL_kRSA) {
1728 rsa = cert->rsa_tmp;
1729 if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL)) {
1730 rsa = s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s,
1731 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->
1733 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->
1736 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1737 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1738 SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1742 cert->rsa_tmp = rsa;
1745 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1746 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1747 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1752 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp = 1;
1755 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1756 if (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
1757 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto) {
1758 dhp = ssl_get_auto_dh(s);
1760 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1761 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1762 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1767 if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1768 dhp = s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s,
1769 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->
1771 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->
1774 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1775 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1776 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1779 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH,
1780 DH_security_bits(dhp), 0, dhp)) {
1781 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1782 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1783 SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
1786 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL) {
1787 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1788 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1792 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto)
1794 else if ((dh = DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL) {
1795 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1800 if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL ||
1801 dhp->priv_key == NULL ||
1802 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE))) {
1803 if (!DH_generate_key(dh)) {
1804 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1808 dh->pub_key = BN_dup(dhp->pub_key);
1809 dh->priv_key = BN_dup(dhp->priv_key);
1810 if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) || (dh->priv_key == NULL)) {
1811 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1820 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1821 if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
1822 const EC_GROUP *group;
1824 ecdhp = cert->ecdh_tmp;
1825 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto) {
1826 /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */
1827 int nid = tls1_shared_curve(s, -2);
1828 if (nid != NID_undef)
1829 ecdhp = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid);
1830 } else if ((ecdhp == NULL) && s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb) {
1831 ecdhp = s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s,
1832 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->
1834 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->
1835 s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1837 if (ecdhp == NULL) {
1838 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1839 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1840 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
1844 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL) {
1845 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1846 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1850 /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
1851 if (ecdhp == NULL) {
1852 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1855 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
1857 else if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_dup(ecdhp)) == NULL) {
1858 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1862 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = ecdh;
1863 if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1864 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1865 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE)) {
1866 if (!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh)) {
1867 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1873 if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) ||
1874 (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1875 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL)) {
1876 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1880 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
1881 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163)) {
1882 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1883 SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
1888 * XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH keys over named
1889 * (not generic) curves. For supported named curves, curve_id is
1893 tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group)))
1895 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1896 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
1901 * Encode the public key. First check the size of encoding and
1902 * allocate memory accordingly.
1904 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1905 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1906 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1909 encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
1910 OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen * sizeof(unsigned char));
1911 bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
1912 if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL)) {
1913 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1914 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1918 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1919 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1920 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1921 encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);
1923 if (encodedlen == 0) {
1924 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1928 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
1932 * XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves in
1933 * ECDH ephemeral key exchanges. In this situation, we need four
1934 * additional bytes to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
1937 n += 4 + encodedlen;
1940 * We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we
1941 * can set these to NULLs
1948 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1949 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1950 if (type & SSL_kSRP) {
1951 if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
1952 (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
1953 (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) || (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL)) {
1954 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1955 SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
1958 r[0] = s->srp_ctx.N;
1959 r[1] = s->srp_ctx.g;
1960 r[2] = s->srp_ctx.s;
1961 r[3] = s->srp_ctx.B;
1965 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1966 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1967 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
1970 for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
1971 nr[i] = BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
1972 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1973 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
1980 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL|SSL_aSRP))
1981 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)) {
1982 if ((pkey = ssl_get_sign_pkey(s, s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, &md))
1984 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1987 kn = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
1993 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, n + SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + kn)) {
1994 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_BUF);
1997 d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
1999 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2000 if (type & SSL_PSK) {
2001 /* copy PSK identity hint */
2002 if (s->cert->psk_identity_hint) {
2003 s2n(strlen(s->cert->psk_identity_hint), p);
2004 strncpy((char *)p, s->cert->psk_identity_hint,
2005 strlen(s->cert->psk_identity_hint));
2006 p += strlen(s->cert->psk_identity_hint);
2013 for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
2014 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2015 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) {
2025 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2026 if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2028 * XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves. In
2029 * this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has: [1 byte
2030 * CurveType], [2 byte CurveName] [1 byte length of encoded
2031 * point], followed by the actual encoded point itself
2033 *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
2041 memcpy(p, encodedPoint, encodedlen);
2042 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2043 encodedPoint = NULL;
2051 * n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4]) and p
2052 * points to the space at the end.
2054 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2055 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2058 for (num = 2; num > 0; num--) {
2059 EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx,
2060 EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
2061 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, (num == 2)
2062 ? s->ctx->md5 : s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
2063 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
2065 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
2067 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, d, n);
2068 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, q, (unsigned int *)&i);
2072 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j,
2073 &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0) {
2074 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_RSA);
2082 /* send signature algorithm */
2083 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2084 if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md)) {
2085 /* Should never happen */
2086 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2087 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2088 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2094 fprintf(stderr, "Using hash %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
2096 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL);
2097 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
2099 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
2101 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, d, n);
2102 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx, &(p[2]),
2103 (unsigned int *)&i, pkey)) {
2104 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_EVP);
2109 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2112 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
2113 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2114 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2115 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
2120 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, n)) {
2121 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2122 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2126 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
2129 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2131 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2132 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2133 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2135 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
2136 statem_set_error(s);
2140 int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
2142 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A) {
2143 if (tls_construct_certificate_request(s) == 0)
2145 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;
2148 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
2149 return ssl_do_write(s);
2152 int tls_construct_certificate_request(SSL *s)
2154 unsigned char *p, *d;
2155 int i, j, nl, off, n;
2156 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk = NULL;
2162 d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
2164 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
2166 n = ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s, p);
2171 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2172 const unsigned char *psigs;
2173 unsigned char *etmp = p;
2174 nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &psigs);
2175 /* Skip over length for now */
2177 nl = tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, p, psigs, nl);
2178 /* Now fill in length */
2188 sk = SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
2191 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) {
2192 name = sk_X509_NAME_value(sk, i);
2193 j = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL);
2194 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean
2195 (buf, SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + n + j + 2)) {
2196 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2200 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + n;
2202 i2d_X509_NAME(name, &p);
2207 /* else no CA names */
2208 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + off;
2211 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, n)) {
2212 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2216 s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 1;
2220 statem_set_error(s);
2224 int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
2229 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2230 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A,
2231 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B,
2232 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2048, &ok);
2237 if (tls_process_client_key_exchange(s, n) == 0)
2243 enum MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, long n)
2247 unsigned long alg_k;
2248 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2250 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2252 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2254 DH *dh_srvr, *dh_clnt = NULL;
2256 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2257 EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL;
2258 EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL;
2259 EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL;
2260 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
2262 PACKET pkt, enc_premaster;
2263 unsigned char *data, *rsa_decrypt = NULL;
2265 if (!PACKET_buf_init(&pkt, s->init_msg, n)) {
2266 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2267 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2271 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2273 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2274 /* For PSK parse and retrieve identity, obtain PSK key */
2275 if (alg_k & SSL_PSK) {
2276 unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
2278 PACKET psk_identity;
2280 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&pkt, &psk_identity)) {
2281 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2282 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2285 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2286 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2287 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2288 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2291 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL) {
2292 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2293 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2294 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
2298 if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity, &s->session->psk_identity)) {
2299 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2300 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2304 psklen = s->psk_server_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity,
2307 if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
2308 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2309 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2311 } else if (psklen == 0) {
2313 * PSK related to the given identity not found
2315 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2316 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2317 al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
2321 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.psk);
2322 s->s3->tmp.psk = BUF_memdup(psk, psklen);
2323 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
2325 if (s->s3->tmp.psk == NULL) {
2326 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2327 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2331 s->s3->tmp.psklen = psklen;
2333 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
2334 /* Identity extracted earlier: should be nothing left */
2335 if (PACKET_remaining(&pkt) != 0) {
2336 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2337 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2340 /* PSK handled by ssl_generate_master_secret */
2341 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, NULL, 0, 0)) {
2342 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2343 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2348 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2349 if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
2350 unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
2352 unsigned char decrypt_good, version_good;
2355 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
2356 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp) {
2357 if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL))
2358 rsa = s->cert->rsa_tmp;
2360 * Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should be sent already
2363 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2364 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2365 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY);
2370 pkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey;
2371 if ((pkey == NULL) ||
2372 (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) || (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL)) {
2373 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2374 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2375 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2378 rsa = pkey->pkey.rsa;
2381 /* SSLv3 and pre-standard DTLS omit the length bytes. */
2382 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
2383 enc_premaster = pkt;
2386 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&pkt, &enc_premaster)
2387 || PACKET_remaining(&pkt) != 0) {
2388 /* Try SSLv3 behaviour for TLS. */
2389 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG) {
2390 enc_premaster = orig;
2392 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2393 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2400 * We want to be sure that the plaintext buffer size makes it safe to
2401 * iterate over the entire size of a premaster secret
2402 * (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). Reject overly short RSA keys because
2403 * their ciphertext cannot accommodate a premaster secret anyway.
2405 if (RSA_size(rsa) < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
2406 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2407 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2408 RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
2412 rsa_decrypt = OPENSSL_malloc(RSA_size(rsa));
2413 if (rsa_decrypt == NULL) {
2414 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2415 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2420 * We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of
2421 * Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246,
2422 * section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of the TLS RFC and
2423 * generates a random premaster secret for the case that the decrypt
2424 * fails. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1
2427 if (RAND_bytes(rand_premaster_secret,
2428 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0) {
2432 decrypt_len = RSA_private_decrypt(PACKET_remaining(&enc_premaster),
2433 PACKET_data(&enc_premaster),
2434 rsa_decrypt, rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
2438 * decrypt_len should be SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH. decrypt_good will
2439 * be 0xff if so and zero otherwise.
2442 constant_time_eq_int_8(decrypt_len, SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH);
2445 * If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct then
2446 * version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero. The
2447 * Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
2448 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version number
2449 * check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks are done in
2450 * constant time and are treated like any other decryption error.
2453 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[0],
2454 (unsigned)(s->client_version >> 8));
2456 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[1],
2457 (unsigned)(s->client_version & 0xff));
2460 * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2461 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2462 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2463 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
2464 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
2465 * protocol version. If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such
2468 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) {
2469 unsigned char workaround_good;
2471 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[0], (unsigned)(s->version >> 8));
2473 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[1],
2474 (unsigned)(s->version & 0xff));
2475 version_good |= workaround_good;
2479 * Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good to
2480 * remain non-zero (0xff).
2482 decrypt_good &= version_good;
2485 * Now copy rand_premaster_secret over from p using
2486 * decrypt_good_mask. If decryption failed, then p does not
2487 * contain valid plaintext, however, a check above guarantees
2488 * it is still sufficiently large to read from.
2490 for (j = 0; j < sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); j++) {
2492 constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good, rsa_decrypt[j],
2493 rand_premaster_secret[j]);
2496 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, rsa_decrypt,
2497 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret), 0)) {
2498 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2499 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2502 OPENSSL_free(rsa_decrypt);
2506 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2507 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
2509 EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL;
2510 PACKET bookmark = pkt;
2511 unsigned char shared[(OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS + 7) / 8];
2513 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&pkt, &i)) {
2514 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
2515 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2516 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2517 SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2522 if (PACKET_remaining(&pkt) != i) {
2523 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG)) {
2524 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2525 SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2529 i = PACKET_remaining(&pkt);
2532 if (alg_k & SSL_kDHr)
2533 idx = SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA;
2534 else if (alg_k & SSL_kDHd)
2535 idx = SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA;
2537 skey = s->cert->pkeys[idx].privatekey;
2538 if ((skey == NULL) ||
2539 (skey->type != EVP_PKEY_DH) || (skey->pkey.dh == NULL)) {
2540 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2541 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2542 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2545 dh_srvr = skey->pkey.dh;
2546 } else if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL) {
2547 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2548 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2549 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2552 dh_srvr = s->s3->tmp.dh;
2555 /* Get pubkey from cert */
2556 EVP_PKEY *clkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2558 if (EVP_PKEY_cmp_parameters(clkey, skey) == 1)
2559 dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(clkey);
2561 if (dh_clnt == NULL) {
2562 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2563 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2564 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2567 EVP_PKEY_free(clkey);
2568 pub = dh_clnt->pub_key;
2570 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&pkt, &data, i)) {
2571 /* We already checked we have enough data */
2572 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2573 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2574 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2577 pub = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL);
2580 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BN_LIB);
2584 i = DH_compute_key(shared, pub, dh_srvr);
2587 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
2592 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
2593 s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL;
2599 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, shared, i, 0)) {
2600 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2601 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2605 s->no_cert_verify = 1;
2606 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
2611 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2612 if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2615 const EC_GROUP *group;
2616 const BIGNUM *priv_key;
2617 unsigned char *shared;
2619 /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
2620 if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) {
2621 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2625 /* Let's get server private key and group information */
2626 if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) {
2627 /* use the certificate */
2628 tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec;
2631 * use the ephermeral values we saved when generating the
2632 * ServerKeyExchange msg.
2634 tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh;
2637 group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
2638 priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
2640 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) ||
2641 !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key)) {
2642 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2646 /* Let's get client's public key */
2647 if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) {
2648 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2653 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
2655 if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2656 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2657 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2658 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
2661 if (((clnt_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer))
2662 == NULL) || (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)) {
2664 * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication
2665 * using ECDH certificates so this branch (n == 0L) of the
2666 * code is never executed. When that support is added, we
2667 * ought to ensure the key received in the certificate is
2668 * authorized for key agreement. ECDH_compute_key implicitly
2669 * checks that the two ECDH shares are for the same group.
2671 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2672 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2673 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS);
2677 if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint,
2678 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->
2680 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2683 s->no_cert_verify = 1;
2686 * Get client's public key from encoded point in the
2687 * ClientKeyExchange message.
2689 if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
2690 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2691 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2695 /* Get encoded point length */
2696 if (!PACKET_get_1(&pkt, &i)) {
2697 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2698 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2699 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2702 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&pkt, &data, i)
2703 || PACKET_remaining(&pkt) != 0) {
2704 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2707 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group, clnt_ecpoint, data, i, bn_ctx) == 0) {
2708 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2713 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
2714 field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);
2715 if (field_size <= 0) {
2716 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
2719 shared = OPENSSL_malloc((field_size + 7) / 8);
2720 if (shared == NULL) {
2721 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2724 i = ECDH_compute_key(shared, (field_size + 7) / 8, clnt_ecpoint,
2727 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
2728 OPENSSL_free(shared);
2732 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2733 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2734 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2735 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2736 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
2737 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
2739 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, shared, i, 1)) {
2740 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2741 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2744 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
2747 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2748 if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
2749 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&pkt, &i)
2750 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&pkt, &data, i)) {
2751 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2752 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
2755 if ((s->srp_ctx.A = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL)) == NULL) {
2756 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2759 if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0
2760 || BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A)) {
2761 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2762 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2763 SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
2766 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
2767 s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
2768 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
2769 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2773 if (!srp_generate_server_master_secret(s)) {
2774 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2778 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
2779 if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
2780 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
2781 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
2782 unsigned char premaster_secret[32], *start;
2783 size_t outlen = 32, inlen;
2784 unsigned long alg_a;
2788 /* Get our certificate private key */
2789 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2790 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01)
2791 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
2793 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL);
2794 EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx);
2796 * If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
2797 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
2798 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use a
2799 * client certificate for authorization only.
2801 client_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2802 if (client_pub_pkey) {
2803 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
2806 /* Decrypt session key */
2807 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&pkt, &data, n)) {
2808 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2809 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2813 ((const unsigned char **)&data, &Tlen, &Ttag, &Tclass,
2814 n) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED || Ttag != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE
2815 || Tclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL) {
2816 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2817 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2822 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt
2823 (pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, start, inlen) <= 0) {
2824 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2825 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2828 /* Generate master secret */
2829 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, premaster_secret,
2830 sizeof(premaster_secret), 0)) {
2831 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2832 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2835 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2836 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
2837 (pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
2838 s->no_cert_verify = 1;
2840 EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey);
2841 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2842 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
2844 EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey);
2845 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2848 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2849 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
2853 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
2855 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2856 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_SRP)
2859 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2860 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2861 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2862 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2863 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2864 OPENSSL_free(rsa_decrypt);
2866 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2867 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.psk, s->s3->tmp.psklen);
2868 s->s3->tmp.psk = NULL;
2870 statem_set_error(s);
2871 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2874 int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
2880 * We should only process a CertificateVerify message if we have received
2881 * a Certificate from the client. If so then |s->session->peer| will be non
2882 * NULL. In some instances a CertificateVerify message is not required even
2883 * if the peer has sent a Certificate (e.g. such as in the case of static
2884 * DH). In that case the ClientKeyExchange processing will skip the
2885 * CertificateVerify state so we should not arrive here.
2887 if (s->session->peer == NULL) {
2891 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2892 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A,
2893 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B,
2894 SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY,
2895 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, &ok);
2900 if (tls_process_cert_verify(s, n) == 0)
2904 BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
2905 s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
2910 enum MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_verify(SSL *s, long n)
2912 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2913 unsigned char *sig, *data;
2914 int al, ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2918 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
2921 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx);
2923 peer = s->session->peer;
2924 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(peer);
2925 type = X509_certificate_type(peer, pkey);
2927 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
2928 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
2929 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
2930 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2934 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
2935 if (!PACKET_buf_init(&pkt, s->init_msg, n)) {
2936 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2937 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2940 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
2942 * If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare signature without
2945 if (n == 64 && pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) {
2948 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2951 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&pkt, &sig, 2)) {
2952 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2955 rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, s, sig, pkey);
2957 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2959 } else if (rv == 0) {
2960 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2964 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
2967 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&pkt, &len)) {
2968 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2969 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2973 j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
2974 if (((int)len > j) || ((int)PACKET_remaining(&pkt) > j) || (n <= 0)) {
2975 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
2976 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2979 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&pkt, &data, len)) {
2980 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2981 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2985 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2988 hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
2989 if (hdatalen <= 0) {
2990 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2991 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2995 fprintf(stderr, "Using TLS 1.2 with client verify alg %s\n",
2998 if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL)
2999 || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen)) {
3000 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
3001 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3005 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&mctx, data, len, pkey) <= 0) {
3006 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3007 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
3011 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3012 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
3013 i = RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
3014 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, data, len,
3017 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3018 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
3022 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3023 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE);
3028 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3029 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA) {
3030 j = DSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
3031 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3032 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, data, len, pkey->pkey.dsa);
3035 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3036 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE);
3041 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3042 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
3043 j = ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
3044 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3045 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, data, len, pkey->pkey.ec);
3048 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3049 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
3054 if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) {
3055 unsigned char signature[64];
3057 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
3058 EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx);
3060 fprintf(stderr, "GOST signature length is %d", len);
3062 for (idx = 0; idx < 64; idx++) {
3063 signature[63 - idx] = data[idx];
3065 j = EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx, signature, 64, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
3067 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
3069 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3070 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
3074 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3075 al = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
3079 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
3082 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3083 statem_set_error(s);
3085 BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
3086 s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
3087 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
3088 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3092 int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s)
3097 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3100 -1, s->max_cert_list, &ok);
3105 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
3106 if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3107 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
3108 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3109 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3110 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3114 * If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list
3116 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
3117 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3118 SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST);
3119 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3122 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
3126 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
3127 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3128 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
3132 if (tls_process_client_certificate(s, n) == 0)
3137 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3138 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3142 enum MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_certificate(SSL *s, long n)
3144 int i, al, ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3146 unsigned long l, llen;
3147 const unsigned char *certstart;
3148 unsigned char *certbytes;
3149 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
3152 if (!PACKET_buf_init(&pkt, s->init_msg, n)) {
3153 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3154 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3158 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
3159 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3163 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(&pkt, &llen)
3164 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(&pkt, &spkt, llen)
3165 || PACKET_remaining(&pkt) != 0) {
3166 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3167 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3171 while (PACKET_remaining(&spkt) > 0) {
3172 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(&spkt, &l)
3173 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&spkt, &certbytes, l)) {
3174 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3175 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3176 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3180 certstart = certbytes;
3181 x = d2i_X509(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, l);
3183 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
3186 if (certbytes != (certstart + l)) {
3187 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3188 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3189 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3192 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
3193 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3199 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) {
3200 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
3201 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
3202 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3203 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3204 SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
3207 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
3208 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3209 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
3210 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3211 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3212 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3215 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
3216 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
3217 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3222 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
3224 al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
3225 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3226 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
3230 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, i);
3231 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3234 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(sk, 0));
3236 al = SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3237 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3238 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
3241 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3244 X509_free(s->session->peer);
3245 s->session->peer = sk_X509_shift(sk);
3246 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
3248 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->peer_chain, X509_free);
3249 s->session->peer_chain = sk;
3251 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own
3252 * certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c
3255 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
3259 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3260 statem_set_error(s);
3263 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
3267 int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
3269 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A) {
3270 if (tls_construct_server_certificate(s) == 0)
3272 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
3275 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
3276 return ssl_do_write(s);
3279 int tls_construct_server_certificate(SSL *s)
3283 cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
3285 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3286 statem_set_error(s);
3290 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, cpk)) {
3291 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3292 statem_set_error(s);
3299 /* send a new session ticket (not necessarily for a new session) */
3300 int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
3302 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A) {
3303 if (tls_construct_new_session_ticket(s) == 0)
3306 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
3309 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
3310 return ssl_do_write(s);
3313 int tls_construct_new_session_ticket(SSL *s)
3315 unsigned char *senc = NULL;
3318 unsigned char *p, *macstart;
3319 const unsigned char *const_p;
3320 int len, slen_full, slen;
3323 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3324 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
3325 unsigned char key_name[16];
3327 /* get session encoding length */
3328 slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
3330 * Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too
3333 if (slen_full == 0 || slen_full > 0xFF00) {
3334 statem_set_error(s);
3337 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
3339 statem_set_error(s);
3343 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3344 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3347 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p))
3351 * create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up
3354 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
3357 sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
3359 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
3360 if (slen == 0 || slen > slen_full) { /* shouldn't ever happen */
3361 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3365 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p)) {
3366 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3369 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3372 * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3373 * follows handshake_header_length +
3374 * 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
3375 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
3376 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
3377 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
3379 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
3380 SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + 22 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH +
3381 EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
3384 p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
3386 * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does
3387 * all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx.
3389 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
3390 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx,
3394 if (RAND_bytes(iv, 16) <= 0)
3396 if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3397 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv))
3399 if (!HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3400 EVP_sha256(), NULL))
3402 memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
3406 * Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only): We leave this unspecified
3407 * for resumed session (for simplicity), and guess that tickets for
3408 * new sessions will live as long as their sessions.
3410 l2n(s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout, p);
3412 /* Skip ticket length for now */
3414 /* Output key name */
3416 memcpy(p, key_name, 16);
3419 memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx));
3420 p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3421 /* Encrypt session data */
3422 if (!EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen))
3425 if (!EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len))
3429 if (!HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart))
3431 if (!HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen))
3434 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3435 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3438 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
3440 len = p - ssl_handshake_start(s);
3441 /* Skip ticket lifetime hint */
3442 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + 4;
3444 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, len))
3451 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3452 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3453 statem_set_error(s);
3457 int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s)
3459 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A) {
3460 if (tls_construct_cert_status(s) == 0)
3463 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B;
3466 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */
3467 return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3470 int tls_construct_cert_status(SSL *s)
3474 * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3475 * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
3476 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
3479 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen)) {
3480 statem_set_error(s);
3484 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3487 *(p++) = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
3488 /* message length */
3489 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p);
3491 *(p++) = s->tlsext_status_type;
3492 /* length of OCSP response */
3493 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p);
3494 /* actual response */
3495 memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen);
3496 /* number of bytes to write */
3497 s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen;
3503 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG